The combat path of the 5th Tank Army. Fifth Guards Tank Army

By order of the NKO USSR No. 57 of February 7, 1943, the 4th tank corps transformed into the 5th Guards Tank Corps. In September 1945, based on the order of the USSR NKO No. 0013 dated June 10, 1945, the corps was reorganized into the 5th Guards Tank Division. Converted by order of the NKO dated 02/07/1943 from the 4th Tank Corps for exemplary performance combat missions, perseverance, courage, high discipline and heroism of personnel shown in Battle of Stalingrad. The corps included the 20th, 21st, 22nd Guards Tank and 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigades. Until February 16, 1943, the corps took part in the Kharkov offensive operation, liberates Kharkov. Since February 25, the 43rd corps units, in cooperation with the 309th Infantry Division, entered the Oposhnya area, which created favorable conditions for the capture of Poltava. On March 5, 1943, the corps, having suffered a sudden attack from the enemy, retreated in an orderly manner, leaving us. Gayvoron and Bolshaya Pisarevka. By April 22, 1943, the corps, being in the reserve of the commander of the Voronezh Front, was concentrated in the area south of Oboyan. Since 07/06/1943 it has been holding back the enemy’s onslaught at the line east of town. Yakovlevo, Pokrovka (Battle of Kursk). But the enemy breaks through the defenses. On July 7-8, corps units lead heavy fighting in the Oboyan direction. Since July 10th - in the reserve of the commander of the Voronezh Front. On November 6, 1943, units of the corps, in cooperation with the corps of the 3rd Tank Army, captured the city of Kyiv. By order of the Supreme High Command dated November 7, 1943, for distinctions in battles during the liberation of Kyiv, the honorary name “Kyiv” was awarded. In January 1944, the corps was included in the 6th (from September 12 - 6th Guards) Tank Army, in which it led fighting until the end of the war. At the end of January - February 1944, the corps took part in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. From March 6, 1944, participating in the Uman-Botosha operation, corps units attacked the enemy stronghold of Khrestinovka and subsequently advanced on Vapnyarka. The corps operated especially successfully in the summer of 1944 as part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Iasi-Kishinev offensive operation and in the subsequent offensive in the central and western regions Romania. Advancing at a high tempo, formations and corps units captured the cities of Birlad (August 24), Tekuch (August 25), Focsani and Ramnikul-Sarat (August 27), Buzeu (August 28) and others. September 15, 1944 for successful actions in the battles for the cities of Rymnikul-Sarat and Focsani Corps awarded the order Suvorov 2nd degree. In October 1944 - April 1945. As part of the army that was part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, from March 17 to the 3rd Ukrainian Front, the corps participates in the Debrecen, Budapest and Vienna offensive operations. By March 1, 1945, the corps from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters was transferred to strengthen the 4th Ukrainian Front. When taking part in the Moravian-Ostravian operation, parts of the corps are intended to be used as the main forces of the front's mobile group. In mid-April, the corps as part of the army was returned to the 2nd Ukrainian Front and took part in the final stage of the Bratislava-Brnov offensive operation. April 26, 1945 for exemplary performance of command assignments during the capture of the Hungarian city of Veszprem on March 23 and displays of personnel The corps was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for valor and courage. The corps completed combat operations in Europe in Prague operation in the Prague area. On May 17, 1945, for distinction in the battles during the liberation of Vienna (April 13), the corps was awarded the Order of Kutuzov, 2nd degree. In July 1945, the corps, along with other army formations, was regrouped in the Far East and in August, as part of the Trans-Baikal Front, participated in the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army. September 20, 1945 for distinction in battles on Far East during the breakthrough of the Manchu-Zhailainur and Halun-Arshan fortified areas, overcoming mountain range Greater Khingan, the corps was awarded the Order of Lenin /////////////// By Order of the USSR NKO No. 57 of February 7, 1943, the 4th Tank Corps was transformed into the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Formations and units included in the 5th Guards. tk, combined arms numbers were assigned by directive of the General Staff of the KA No. 36594 dated February 14, 1943. On February 6, 1943, the corps was included in the troops of the Voronezh Front (on October 20, 1943, renamed the 1st Ukrainian Front). During fierce battles from July 6 to July 12, 1943, the corps was transferred from the OZEROVSKY, KALININO area to the ZORINSKIE DVORY, ORLOVSKA area, and the next day to the MELOVOYE area. On January 21, 1944, the corps became part of the 6th TA of the 1st Ukrainian Front. On March 4, 1944, the corps became part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. From May 8 to August 20, 1944 and from November 1 to December 3, 1944, he was recruited in the front reserve. On March 19, 1945, the corps was reassigned to the 3rd Ukrainian Front. On April 18, 1945, it again became part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. In September 1945, based on the order of the USSR NKO No. 0013 dated June 10, 1945, the corps was reorganized into the 5th Guards Tank Division.

5th GUARDS TANK ARMY formed on February 25, 1943 on the basis of a directive of the General Staff of February 10, 1943 in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters. It included the 3rd Guards and 29th Tank Corps, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, the 994th Light Bomber Corps aviation regiment, artillery and other formations and units.
In connection with the enemy breakthrough in the Kharkov region, the 3rd Guards Tank Corps was withdrawn from the army even before its formation was completed and sent to the Voronezh Front.
On April 6, the army became part of the Reserve Front (from April 15 - the Steppe Military District). Located in the concentration area southwest of the city of Stary Oskol, on July 9 it was transferred to the Voronezh Front.
During the defensive period Battle of Kursk(July 5-23) its troops, reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps, stopped the advance of the enemy strike force in an oncoming tank battle in the Prokhorovka area and inflicted significant damage on it.
During the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic operation (August 3-23), operating as part of the Voronezh (from August 9 - Steppe) Front, the army, in cooperation with the troops of other armies, defeated a strong enemy group and advanced to a depth of 120 km.
On September 10, 1943, the army was withdrawn to the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, on October 7 it was included in the Stepnoy (from October 20 - 2nd Ukrainian) Front, as part of which in October - December it fought to expand the bridgehead on the Dnieper River southeast of the city of Kremenchug.
In the first half of January 1944, the army took part in the Kirovograd (January 5-16), then in the Korsun-Shevchenko (January 24 - February 17) and Uman-Botoshan (March 5 - April 17) offensive operations.During their implementation, the army troops fought about 500 km; participated in the defeat of large enemy groups in the areas of Kirovograd and Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, in the crossing of the Southern Bug, Dniester and Prut rivers, and the liberation of the cities of Kirovograd (January 8), Zvenigorodka (January 28) and Uman (March 10).
On June 23, 1944, after a short stay in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the army was included in the 3rd Belorussian Front, as part of which it participated in the Belarusian strategic operation (June 23 - August 29). The formations and units of the army brought into the battle on June 25 in the offensive zone of the 5th Army defeated the reinforced 5th Tank Division of the enemy advancing towards the reinforced 5th Tank Division in the area of Krupki and reached the Berezina River north and south of Borisov.
After the liberation of Borisov (July 1), the army developed an offensive in the direction of Minsk and Vilnius.
Since July 26, formations and units of the army conducted offensive battles in order to complete the liberation of the territory of the Lithuanian SSR and reach the borders East Prussia.
On August 17, 1944, the army was transferred to the 1st Baltic Front, in October participated in the Memel offensive operation (October 5-22), on October 20 - transferred to the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters.
In 1945, as part of the 2nd (from January 8), then the 3rd (from February 11) Belarusian fronts, the army took part in the East Prussian strategic operation (January 13 - April 25). The army troops, introduced into the breakthrough on January 17 in the zone of the 48th Army, reached the Mlavsky fortified area by the end of the day, by the morning of January 19 they defeated the garrison defending it and, developing an offensive in the direction of Elbing, on January 25 reached the Frisches Huff (Vistula) Bay, cutting off the main communications of Army Group Center.
At the end of January - February 1945, the army took part in repelling counterattacks of the enemy, who was trying to push back Soviet troops from the coast and restore their land communications.
In early April, the army, together with the attached 98th Rifle Corps and the 1st Polish Tank Brigade, fought to eliminate the remnants of German troops in the area of the mouth of the Vistula River, where they celebrated Victory Day.
Behind feats of arms During the war, over 38 thousand army soldiers were awarded orders and medals, more than 50 of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Army Commanders: General Lieutenant tank troops, from October 1943 - Colonel General of Tank Forces, from February 1944 - Marshal of Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov (February 1943 - August 1944); Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Solomatin M.D. (August 1944); Lieutenant General of Tank Forces, from October 1944 - Colonel General of Tank Forces Volsky V.T. (August 1944 - March 1945);Major General of Tank Forces Sinenko M.D. (March 1945 - until the end of the war).
Member of the Military Council of the Army - Major General of Tank Forces P. G. Grishin (April 1943 - until the end of the war).
Chiefs of Army Staff: Colonel, from June 1943 - Major General of Tank Forces V.N. Baskakov (April 1943 - May 1944); Major General of Tank Forces Kalinichenko P.I. (May - November 1944); Major General of Tank Forces Sidorovich G.S. (November 1944 - until the end of the war).

Tank forces of the USSR ["Cavalry" of World War II] Daines Vladimir Ottovich

Fifth Guards tank army

According to the GKO decree of January 28, 1943, the Fifth Tank Army was to be formed by March 30 of the same year. On February 22, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin signed Directive No. 1124821 on the formation of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the Millerovo area five days earlier. Directive No. 36736 of the General Staff of the Red Army, sent on February 27 to the commander of the Southern Front, noted that the army included the 3rd Guards Kotelnikovsky and 29th Tank, 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps, as well as army reinforcement units. By March 5, it was required by order of the Front Military Council to concentrate the 3rd Guards Kotelnikovsky Tank and 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps in the Millerovo area, and the remaining units, formations and institutions were to arrive from March 5 to 12. The use of the army was permitted only by special instructions VGK rates. Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces P.A. was appointed commander of the army. Rotmistrov (see Appendix No. 3).

P.A. Rotmistrov, recalling his appointment to the position of army commander, in the book “ Steel Guard» talks in detail about the meeting with I.V. Stalin in mid-February 1943 in the Kremlin. “I.V. Stalin was also interested in the views I expressed on the use of tank armies in offensive operations, writes Rotmistrov. “They boiled down to the fact that tank armies should be used as a means of the front commander or even the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to deliver massive attacks, first of all, on enemy tank groups in the main directions without indicating to them offensive zones, which only hinder the maneuver of tanks. It was felt that Stalin well understood the importance of the massive use of tank troops and he was not the only one who heard me on this issue.” At the end of the meeting, Stalin invited Rotmistrov to lead one of the tank armies. Major General I.A. was appointed first deputy commander of the army. Pliev, second deputy – Major General K.G. Trufanov, member of the Military Council - Major General of Tank Forces P.G. Grishin and the chief of staff of the army - Colonel V.N. Baskakov.

During its formation, the composition of the army was subject to changes more than once, and its location and subordination also changed. Thus, on March 4, Directive No. 211/org of the General Staff was issued on the urgent replenishment of the 3rd Guards Kotelnikovsky Tank Corps with personnel, weapons, vehicles and other property. The corps was ordered to be loaded at Glubokaya station and sent to Starobelsk by March 7. It included the 266th Mortar Regiment, the 1436th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment and the 73rd Motorcycle Battalion. On March 8, a directive was issued from the Supreme Command Headquarters on the transfer of the corps to the disposal of the Marshal Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky for use in the defense of Kharkov. Subsequently, after the arrival of new forces in the Kharkov region from the Headquarters reserve, it was ordered that the 5th Guards Tank Army be transferred to the command of the commander of the Southwestern Front. Thus, only two corps remained in the army (29th Tank, 5th Zimovnikovsky Guards Mechanized). In this composition, according to Directive No. 46076 of the Supreme Command Headquarters of March 19, it was supposed to concentrate by rail in the area of Puhovo station, Rybalchino, Evdakovo station, Khrestiki, Kolomeytsevo by the end of March 24. The army’s “ordeals” did not end there. According to Directive No. 4610 ° of the Supreme Command Headquarters of April 6, it became part of the newly formed Reserve Front. According to Directive No. 12941 of the General Staff of July 6, she was given another corps - the 18th Tank.

While the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff of the Red Army were resolving issues related to the formation and regrouping of troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army, they were engaged in combat training. On May 21, General Rotmistrov issued an order to put into effect " Brief instructions on some issues of the combat use of units and formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army in connection with the partial redistribution of tanks and artillery in army units.” Its appearance was due to the fact that the composition and equipment of the compounds were not the same. Yes, 32nd tank brigade The 29th Tank Corps and the 24th Tank Brigade of the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps had T-34 tanks (a total of 65 tanks in the brigade). In the 25th and 31st tank brigades, the first tank battalions were equipped with T-34 tanks (31 tanks in the battalion), and the second battalions were equipped with T-70 tanks (31 tanks in the battalion).

The Instructions noted that “the experience of combat operations of tank and mechanized corps has shown that in all types of combat the corps commander must have a strong reserve in his hands,” and it is advisable to include not randomly assigned units or units, but one strong tank brigade. For this purpose, it was considered necessary to carry out a partial redistribution of tanks in the tank and mechanized brigades of the 29th Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps in order to create one strong tank brigade in each corps at the expense of reserve tanks. The 32nd Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps, equipped only with T-34 tanks, was required to be kept in reserve by the corps commander and used to parry enemy attacks and carry out counterattacks. She had to lead independent actions on the most important areas, on the flanks of the corps or in the junction between brigades. It was planned to use the 24th Tank Brigade of the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps in the same way. The 25th and 31st tank brigades, equipped with T-34 and T-70 tanks, were to be used in the first echelon of the corps together with the 53rd motorized rifle brigade, including for conducting defense together with this brigade or independently. To support the tank attack, it was necessary to attract corps-based anti-tank artillery and self-propelled guns artillery regiment And.

The troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army, engaged in combat training, were preparing for the Kursk strategic defensive operation.

In the chapter “The First Guards Tank Army” we became acquainted with the situation that had developed at the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the forces of the parties and their plans. Therefore, let's immediately move on to the description of the hostilities.

On July 5, 1943, the enemy launched an attack on Kursk Bulge. In the Voronezh Front, he struck with the forces of the 4th Panzer Army (2nd SS Panzer Corps, 48th Panzer and 52nd Army Corps; about 1 thousand tanks and assault guns) of General G. Hoth and army group"Kempf" (over 400 tanks and assault guns). After fierce five-day battles, the enemy managed to penetrate the defenses in the Oboyan direction to a depth of about 35 km and in the Korochan direction - up to 10 km. On the morning of July 10, General Hoth planned to strike a new a strong beat to the northeast. To this end, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps was supposed to defeat the troops of the Voronezh Front southwest of Prokhorovka and push them east. The 48th Tank Corps was to destroy the Soviet 6th Guards Tank Corps in front of Oboyan. west bank R. Pena and continue the offensive from the Novoselovka area in a southwestern direction. The 52nd Army Corps was required to hold its previous positions in readiness to advance through Pena in the Alekseevka-Zavidovka sector.

Due to the tense situation created in the Belgorod-Kursk direction, the commander of the Voronezh Front, Army General N.F. On July 7, Vatutin turned to I.V. Stalin with a request to strengthen the front with two armies from the strategic reserve. They were intended to “strongly cover the Oboyan direction and, most importantly, to ensure the timely transition of troops to a counteroffensive at the most advantageous moment.” Both armies were planned to advance to the areas of Oboyan, Prokhorovka, Maryino and Prizrachnoye. By Stalin's decision, the Voronezh Front was reinforced from the Steppe Front by the 5th Guards Army of General A.S. Zhadov and the 5th Guards Tank Army. At the same time, by the end of July 9, the tank army was supposed to concentrate in the area of Bobryshevo, Bolshaya Psinka, Prelestnoye, Prokhorovka with the task of being ready to repel the enemy’s offensive, which occupied Kochetovka on July 8. The army of General Zhadov had to reach the river. Psel, take up defensive positions and prevent the enemy from further advancing to the north and northeast.

By the end of July 9, the 5th Guards Tank Army reached the area indicated to it. At eleven o'clock in the evening, General Rotmistrov assigned the following tasks to the troops. 29th Tank Corps, Major General of Tank Forces I.F. By dawn on July 10, Kirichenko was supposed to take up defensive positions along the southern edge of the forest (5 km south of Maryino), southern outskirts Pork, Pogorelovka, Zhuravka. It was necessary to allocate at least two tank brigades to the reserve. The task of the corps is to be ready to repel enemy attacks and proceed to active offensive actions. 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps, Major General of Tank Forces B.M. Skvortsov had two brigades to take up defense along north shore R. Psel on the river section Zapselets, (lawsuit) Merry, having in reserve one tank and one motorized rifle brigade. 18th Tank Corps, Major General of Tank Forces B.S. Bakharov was ordered to go to defense along the northern bank of the river. Psel on the site Vesely, Polezhaev, southern outskirts of Prelestnoye, southern outskirts of Aleksandrovsky. The order did not indicate how the change of positions should be carried out, who is responsible for the stability of the defense, and there is also no mention of the fact that the 5th Guards Army, which had the task of organizing a strong defense at this same line, was entering this line.

On the morning of July 10, formations of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps went on the offensive. However, as a result of the stubborn defense of the troops of the 6th Guards and 69th Armies, the enemy's advance was stopped by the end of the day. The enemy's offensive on July 11 in the Prokhorovsk direction was also unsuccessful. However, General Hoth did not give up hope of defeating the troops of the Voronezh Front. He decided to use the 48th Tank Corps to push back the 10th Tank Corps, attached to the 1st Tank Army of General M.E. Katukova, beyond Psel southeast of Oboyan. Subsequently, turning to the northeast, create conditions for a systematic offensive through Psel of the remaining forces of the 4th Tank Army. 52nd army corps had to continue to cover the left flank of the 48th Panzer Corps in readiness to use its success on its right flank. On the left flank of the army, the 167th Infantry Division was supposed to support the attack of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps on Provorot, defeating Soviet units at Leskov, and subsequently advance to the heights east of Teterevin. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps received the task of defeating the Soviet troops south of Prokhorovka and create the preconditions for a further offensive through Prokhorovka.

In turn, the commander of the Voronezh Front, on the night of July 11, decided to launch part of his forces on a counteroffensive in order to encircle and defeat the main enemy group rushing towards Oboyan and Prokhorovka. To this end, it was planned on the morning of July 12 to launch a powerful counterattack from the Prokhorovka area with the forces of the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies, and by the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies from the Melovoe, Orlovka line in general direction on Yakovlevo. Units of the 40th, 69th and 7th Guards Armies were also involved in the counterattack. From the air ground troops covered by the 2nd and 17th air armies.

The decisive role in the counterattack was assigned to the 5th Guards Tank Army. By order of the front commander, the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, numbering only 187 tanks and a small amount of artillery, were transferred to the operational subordination of General Rotmistrov. The army was reinforced by the 10th anti-tank artillery brigade, the 1529th SAU-152 regiment, the 1148th and 1529th howitzers, the 93rd and 148th cannon artillery regiments, 16th and 80th Guards mortar regiments BM-13. All these units had a large shortage of standard weapons and personnel due to losses in previous battles. According to army headquarters, by July 12, it consisted of 793 tanks and 45 self-propelled guns, 79 guns, 330 anti-tank guns, 495 mortars and 39 BM-13 rocket launchers. P.A. Rotmistrov provides other information: together with the attached tank formations, the army had about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns.

General Rotmistrov decided main blow attack with the forces of the 18th, 29th and 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps along the railway and highway and further to Pokrovka and Yakovlevo. The 18th Tank Corps was to strike along the river. Psel destroy the enemy in Krasnaya Dubrava, Bolshiye Mayachki, Krasnaya Polyana, and then, turning the front to the north, ensure the advance of the remaining forces of the army in a southern direction. The 29th Tank Corps was ordered to strike along railway destroy the enemy in the area of Luchka, Bolshie Mayachki, Pokrovka and be ready for future actions in a southern direction. The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps received the task of striking at Kalinin, Luchki to destroy the enemy in the Yakovlevo area, the forest to the east, and then be ready to act in a southern direction. The 2nd Tank Corps was instructed, while remaining in its positions, to cover the army's entry to the battle line, and with the start of the attack to support the tank corps with all its firepower. The commander's reserve included: 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps; detachment of Major General K.G. Trufanov (1st Guards Motorcycle, 53rd Guards Heavy Tank, 57th Howitzer Artillery, 689th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment).

By three o'clock in the morning on July 12, troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army and divisions of the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps occupied starting positions to go on the attack. “It has already been signed and sent combat report that the army occupied initial position for a counterattack and is ready to complete the task. But at four o’clock in the morning,” recalled P.A. Rotmistrov,” followed the order of the front commander, Army General N.F. Vatutina to urgently send my reserve to the 69th Army zone. It turned out that the enemy, by bringing into battle the main forces of the 3rd Tank Corps of the Kempf Operational Group, drove back parts of the 81st and 92nd Guards Rifle Divisions and captured the settlements of Rzhavets, Ryndinka, and Vypolzovka. In the event of further advance of the enemy’s mobile units to the north, not only a threat was created to the left flank and rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army, but also the stability of all the troops of the left wing of the Voronezh Front was disrupted.” In this regard, General Rotmistrov ordered the commander combined detachment General Trufanov to force a march into the 69th Army's zone in the breakthrough area and "together with its troops, stop the enemy's tanks, preventing their advance in the northern direction."

By six o'clock in the morning it became known that the enemy's 3rd Tank Corps was continuing its advance and was located 28 km southeast of Prokhorovka. By order of the Headquarters representative, Marshal Vasilevsky, the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army ordered the commander of the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps to send the 11th and 12th mechanized brigades from the Krasnoe region to reinforce the combined detachment of General Trufanov. The commander of the 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps was ordered to deploy the 26th Tank Brigade in the Plot area with a front to the south and cover the left flank of the army. Soon, the commander of the Voronezh Front ordered to unite all these units under the command of General Trufanov into an operational group with the task: together with the 81st and 92nd Guards Rifle Divisions and the 96th Tank Brigade of the 69th Army of General V.D. Kryuchenkin “to encircle and destroy the enemy in the Ryndinka, Rzhavets area and by the end of the day reach the Shakhovo-Shchelkanovo line.”

As a result, the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army were dispersed, and General Rotmistrov lost his powerful reserve. Two of the four brigades remained in the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps: the 24th Tank and the 10th Mechanized.

At 8:30 a.m. on July 12, after air and artillery preparation, the troops of the 6th and 5th Guards Armies and the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies went on the offensive. In the direction of the main attack on the Oktyabrsky state farm site, Yamki, the most powerful in its composition, the 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army, acted. To the right, between the river. Psel and the Oktyabrsky state farm, its 18th Tank Corps was advancing, and to the left - the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps. The 42nd Guards Rifle and 9th Guards Rifles were also involved in the direction of the main attack. airborne division. In this regard, the statement of P.A. is not entirely correct. Rotmistrov that in this tank battle, unprecedented in scope, “in the battle formations of tanks in the direction of the main attack there was almost no infantry from either side.”

At the same time, the enemy strike force also went on the offensive. A major oncoming has begun tank battle, in which 1,160 tanks and self-propelled (assault) guns (with Soviet side– 670, from the enemy – 490). In the “Report on the hostilities of the 5th Guards. TA in the period from 7 to 27.7.43.” it was noted that “a tank battle, unusual in its scale, unfolded, in which more than 1,500 tanks took part on a narrow section of the front on both sides.”

The oncoming tank battle was characterized by frequent and abrupt change situation, activity, determination and a wide variety of forms and methods of combat operations. In some directions there were oncoming battles, in others - defensive actions combined with counterattacks, in others - an offensive with repelling counterattacks.

Units of the 18th Tank Corps of General B.S. Bakharov, having broken the fierce resistance of the enemy, by the evening of July 12, they advanced only 3–4 km, losing 55 tanks. The corps commander decided to abandon further fruitless attacks and go on the defensive. Perhaps that is why General Bakharov, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense Stalin dated July 25, was relieved of his post and appointed deputy commander of the 9th Tank Corps.

29th Tank Corps under the command of General I.F. Kirichenko also overcame enemy resistance and by the end of the day advanced 1.5 km. The enemy was forced to retreat to the Greznoye area. At the same time, the corps, which had 212 tanks and self-propelled guns, lost 150 vehicles. The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps went on the attack at 10 a.m., knocked out enemy cover and began to slowly advance in the direction of Yasnaya Polyana. However, the enemy, having created superiority in forces and means, stopped parts of the corps, and in some areas pushed them back. Of the 94 tanks that took part in the offensive, the enemy destroyed 54. Units of General Trufanov’s combined detachment managed to stop the advance of the enemy’s 3rd Tank Corps. At the same time, the interaction between units and formations was not properly organized. As a result, the 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment attacked battle formations 92nd Guards Rifle Division and 96th Separate Tank Brigade. After this, the regiment entered into a fire battle with enemy tanks, and then received an order to withdraw. By order of the commander of the 69th Army, General Trufanov was reprimanded, and the commander of the 92nd Guards Rifle Division, Colonel V.F. Trunin was later removed from his position.

Troops of the 5th Guards Army with their right flank, having overcome the resistance of enemy troops, they reached the northern outskirts of Kochetovka, and on the left flank they fought defensive battles on the river Psel. Although the troops of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank armies took part in the counterattack, they advanced to an insignificant depth. This is mainly due to the lack of time they had to prepare for the counterattack, and poor artillery and engineering support.

Thus, the troops of the Voronezh Front were unable to defeat the enemy group, which had penetrated the defense at 30–35 km. Army General Vatutin reported to Stalin at midnight on July 12: “Rotmistrov’s tank army with the 2nd and 2nd Guards attached to it. TC immediately southwest of Prokhorovka, on a narrow section of the front, immediately entered into a counter battle with the enemy SS tank corps and 17 TD, which moved towards Rotmistrov. As a result, a fierce massive tank battle took place on a small field. The enemy was defeated here, but Rotmistrov also suffered losses and made almost no progress. True, Rotmistrov did not bring in the troops of his mechanized corps and Trufanov’s detachment, which were partially used to fend off enemy attacks on Kryuchenkin’s army and on the left flank of Zhadov’s army.” According to updated data, on July 12 the enemy lost 200 tanks and assault guns out of 420, and the 5th Guards Tank Army lost 500 tanks and self-propelled guns out of 951.

At half past three in the morning on July 13, General Rotmistrov ordered the commander of the 18th Tank Corps to gain a foothold on the occupied line, turning Special attention to secure the right flank at the line Petrovka, Mikhailovka. Other corps received the same orders.

However, all attempts by the divisions of the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps and the corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army to push back the enemy on July 13 were unsuccessful. At about three o'clock in the morning on July 14, Marshal Vasilevsky reported to Stalin: “...Yesterday I personally observed southwest of Prokhorovka tank battle our 18th and 29th corps with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack. At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the PCs we had took part in the battle. As a result, the entire field was dotted with burning German and our tanks within an hour. Over the course of two days of fighting, Rotmistrov's 29th Tank Corps lost 60% of its tanks, irrecoverable and temporarily out of action, and the 18th Corps - up to 30% of its tanks. The next day, the threat of a breakthrough by enemy tanks from the south in the area of Shakhovo, Avdeevka, Aleksandrovka continues to remain real. During the night I take all measures to remove the IPTAP shelves. Taking into account the large tank forces of the enemy in the Prokhorovsky direction, here on 14.VII the main forces of Rotmistrov, together with the rifle corps of Zhadov, were given the task of defeating the enemy in the Storozhevoye area, north of Storozhevoye, the Komsomolets state farm, reaching the Greznoye - Yasnaya Polyana and even more firmly ensure the Prokhorov direction.”

The offensive of the troops of the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies on July 14–15 was also unsuccessful. This forced the commander of the Voronezh Front to order a transition to a tough defense on July 16. By this time, as noted earlier, the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht also decided to stop further offensive on the Kursk Bulge. On July 16, the enemy began the systematic withdrawal of his main forces to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh, and on the night of July 19 and the Steppe fronts began to pursue him and by July 23 reached the line of Cherkassk, (claim) Zadelnoye, Melekhovo and further along the left bank of the river. Seversky Donets. Basically, this was the line occupied by Soviet troops before the start of the operation. This ended the Kursk strategic defensive operation. The idea of Operation Citadel was finally buried. The Soviet command not only guessed the enemy’s plans, but also quite accurately determined the place and time of his attacks. The transition to deliberate defense played a role.

Subsequently, P.A. Rotmistrov, summing up the results of the battle near Prokhorovka, noted: “At the same time, it should be noted that the 5th Guards Tank Army, which was given the task of moving out to the Yakovlevo, Pokrovka area on July 12, did not complete this task. There were many reasons for this.” He included among them: the superiority of the enemy in forces over the first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the main direction; the withdrawal of the active troops ahead and the loss of army deployment lines on July 11, which disrupted the results of two days of intense organizational work; the army commander’s lack of a reserve in the midst of battle to develop success in the direction of the main attack; insufficient artillery and aviation support for the counterattack of the tank army. All these reasons were the result of miscalculations made by both the command of the Voronezh Front and the 5th Guards Tank Army. In addition, the entry of the army into the battle was planned and carried out in the front of a powerful enemy tank group.

On the night of July 24, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army, without the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky and 2nd Tank Corps transferred to the 5th Guards Army, was withdrawn to the reserve of the Voronezh Front. Commanders and staffs immediately began to put their units and formations in order. The army, together with the 1st Tank Army, was to take part in the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation.

Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation “Commander Rumyantsev” (August 3-23, 1943)

In accordance with the plan of the operation “Commander Rumyantsev”, set out in the chapter “First Guards Tank Army”, the troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army were to build on their success in the direction of Zolochev, Olshany, by the end of the third day to capture the area of Olshany, Lyubotin and cut off the Kharkov retreat routes groups to the west. The depth of the task is about 100 km.

10 days were allotted to prepare for the offensive. During this time command staff The 5th Guards Tank Army studied the terrain in the zone of upcoming actions, the nature of the enemy’s defense and organized cooperation. At the same time it was being repaired Combat vehicles and supplies of material resources were replenished. Telephone and radio communications, as well as communications using mobile devices, were organized with all interacting parts and connections. The army created operational groups that were supposed to move behind the first echelon of advancing troops. In preparation for the offensive, training and exercises were conducted on sandboxes with headquarters officers to practice command and control. Much attention focused on carrying out measures to disinform the enemy, which made it possible to attract his attention to the Sumy direction and ensure surprise attacks in the Belgorod area. The army headquarters worked out a plan of interaction and a scheme for introducing the army into battle. Support issues were reflected in the plans of the chiefs engineering troops, reconnaissance and army logistics. The political department drew up a work plan for the period from August 2 to August 5.

The army included one mechanized and two tank corps, a separate tank, motorcycle, two self-propelled artillery, howitzer artillery, anti-tank artillery, guards mortar and light bomber regiments, anti-aircraft artillery division and a separate engineer battalion. The army had 550 tanks.

General Rotmistrov decided to lead the army into the breakthrough in a two-echelon formation: in the first - the 18th and 29th Tank Corps, in the second - the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps. The detachment of General K.G. was allocated to the reserve. Trufanova. To coordinate issues of interaction between the 5th Guards Army, the 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Armies at the command post of the commander of the 5th Guards Army, General A.S. Zhadov held a meeting. On it are generals A.S. Zhadov, P.A. Rotmistrov and M.E. Katukov discussed all issues of interaction at the stages of the operation, outlined the routes of movement of the tank corps introduced into the breakthrough in the offensive zone of the 5th Guards Army.

On the evening of August 2, units of the first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army (18th and 29th Tank Corps) began moving to their original areas. At two o'clock in the morning on August 3, they concentrated on the line Bykovka, Krapivenskie Dvory, where army artillery, deployed the day before the tanks arrived, took up firing positions.

On the morning of August 3, after powerful artillery and air preparation, the strike forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts went on the offensive. At the same time, the partisans began carrying out the operation behind enemy lines. Rail War" On the Voronezh Front, the 5th and 6th Guards armies had advanced only 4–5 km by mid-day. Therefore, to build up the strike in the zone of the 5th Guards Army, formations of the first echelon of tank armies and the 5th Guards Tank Corps were introduced into the battle. The input was carried out in narrow strip: 1st Tank Army - 4–6 km, and 5th Guards Tank Army - about 5 km. From the air, General Rotmistrov's formations were supported by the 291st Assault aviation division General A.N. Vitruk and the 10th Fighter Aviation Corps of Colonel M.M. Golovni.

Developing the success of the rifle divisions, the tank armies completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone, advanced units reached the Tomarovka, Orlovka line, advancing 12–26 km. As a result, the Tomarov and Belgorod centers of enemy resistance were separated. In the offensive zone of the 53rd and 69th armies of the Steppe Front, the 1st Mechanized Corps was introduced into the battle, which completed the breakthrough of the main enemy defense line and entered the area north of Rakov.

On the morning of August 4, the strike force of the Voronezh Front began pursuing the enemy. By nine o'clock the forward detachments of the first echelon corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army reached Orlovka and Kozichev. But here they were stopped by the German 6th tank division, reinforced with parts of other compounds. The enemy, relying on pre-prepared defenses along the impassable Gostenka River, offered stubborn resistance. As a result, part of the 18th Tank Corps of General A.V. Egorova were forced to pause the offensive. The 29th Tank Corps of General I.F. also did not advance. Kirichenko. The army commander was forced to bring up artillery and bring the second echelon of the army into the battle - the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps of General B.M. Skvortsova. He was ordered to strike at Kazachev, Udy, bypassing the left flank of the enemy’s 6th Panzer Division and by the end of the day to reach the Zolochev area. But this plan remained unrealized, since the commander of the Voronezh Front demanded that the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps be turned to Belgorod in order to assist the troops of the Steppe Front in capturing the city.

General Rotmistrov, left without a second echelon, urgently brought his reserve into the battle (the detachment of General K.G. Trufanov), giving it the same task as the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps. At the same time, the 18th Tank Corps was ordered to bypass Orlovka from the northwest to Gomzino, and the 29th Tank Corps, in cooperation with the troops of the 5th Guards Army, destroyed the enemy in the Orlovka area.

Carrying out the assigned tasks, the 18th Tank Corps, having bypassed Orlovka from the west, by five o'clock in the evening on August 5, with the forces of the 110th Tank and 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigades, reached the Gomzino line and launched an attack on Shchetinovka. Units of the 29th Tank Corps, having captured Orlovka, developed their success to the southwest. The 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps in the Grezny area came into contact with units of the 1st Mechanized Corps. On the same day, troops of the Steppe Front liberated Belgorod.

To increase the pace of the offensive, General Rotmistrov ordered the first echelon formations to conduct combat operations at night. At the same time, tank brigades, advancing in the second echelon of corps and, therefore, having a lower daily consumption of ammunition and fuel, advanced to the first echelon by nightfall. At this time, the rear was pulled up, ammunition, fuel, and tanks restored by repairmen were brought in for the withdrawn units of the first echelon. This refreshment made it possible to maintain high tempo offensive On the night of August 8, the 181st Tank Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel V.A. Puzyreva, acting as an advance detachment of the 18th Tank Corps, went behind enemy lines along an overgrown country road and suddenly burst into the city of Zolochev. The main forces of the corps, having knocked out the enemy from Shchetinovka and Uda, came to the aid of the 181st Tank Brigade. By evening, the enemy was completely defeated and thrown back from Zolochev to the southwest.

On August 7, the 6th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army liberated Bogodukhov with a sudden attack, and the 5th Guards Tank Corps liberated Grayvoron, cutting off the enemy’s escape routes to the west and south.

As a result successful actions troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, the enemy’s defenses were broken through in a strip 120 km wide. Formations of the 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Armies advanced up to 100 km, and the combined arms armies advanced 60–65 km. This forced the enemy to begin advancing to the Belgorod-Kharkov direction the divisions “Reich”, “Totenkopf”, “Viking”, the 3rd tank division from Donbass and the motorized division “ Greater Germany"from the Orel region.

On August 6, the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal G.K. Zhukov and the commander of the Steppe Front, General I.S. Konev was introduced to I.V. Stalin's plan to defeat the enemy in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction in two stages.

At the first stage, the troops of the 53rd Army with the 1st Mechanized Corps were to advance along the Belgorod-Kharkov highway, delivering the main blow in the direction of Dergachi with access to the Olshany-Dergachi line, where they would replace units of the 5th Guards Army. The 69th Army was entrusted with the task of advancing in the direction of Cheremoshny and taking possession of this locality and then go to the reserve of the Steppe Front. The formations of the 7th Guards Army were ordered to advance from the Pushkarny area to Brodok and Bochkovka, to capture the line of Cherkasskoye, Lozovoye, Tsirkuny, Klyuchkin. Part of the army's forces were to advance on Murom and Ternovaya in order to help the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front cross the river. Seversky Donets in the Rubezhnoye area, Stary Saltov. This army was ordered to strike in the direction of Nepokrytaya, state farm named after. Frunze. At the same time, it was proposed to transfer the army to the Steppe Front.

To carry out the second stage ( Kharkov operation) it was planned to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army to the Steppe Front, which was supposed to reach the Olshany, Stary Merchik, Ogultsy area. The operation was planned to be carried out in the following way. The troops of the 53rd Army, in cooperation with the 5th Guards Tank Army, were supposed to cover Kharkov from the west and southwest. The 7th Guards Army was to advance from north to south from the Tsirkuna and Dergachi lines, from the east from the State Farm line. Frunze, Rogan, covering Kharkov from the south - the 57th Army. The troops of the 69th Army were planned to be deployed at the junction between the 5th Guards and 53rd armies in the Olshany area with the task of advancing south to support the Kharkov operation from the south. The left flank of the Voronezh Front was to be brought to the line of Otrada, Kolomak, Snezhkov Kut. This task was to be completed by the 5th Guards Army and the left flank of the 27th Army. The 1st Tank Army was planned to be concentrated in the area of Kovyagi, Alekseevka, Merefa.

At the same time, it was proposed that the forces of the Southwestern Front strike from the Zamosc region on both banks of the river. Mzha na Merefu. Part of the forces of the front was to advance through Chuguev to Osnova, as well as clear the forest south of Zamosc from the enemy and reach the line of Novoselovka, Okhochaya, Verkhniy Bishkin, Geevka.

To carry out the second stage of the operation, Marshal Zhukov and General Konev asked to allocate 35 thousand reinforcements, 200 T-34 tanks, 100 T-70 tanks and 35 KB tanks, four regiments of self-propelled artillery, two engineering brigades and 190 aircraft to strengthen the troops.

Stalin approved the presented plan. According to his decision, from 24 hours on August 8, the 57th Army was transferred to the Steppe Front from the Southwestern Front with the task of assisting the main group of the Steppe Front in capturing the city by attacking Kharkov from the south. The main task of the Southwestern Front is to deliver the main blow to the south in the general direction of Golaya Dolina, Krasnoarmeyskoye, defeat the Donbass enemy group in cooperation with the Southern Front and capture the Gorlovka, Stalino (Donetsk) region. The Southern Front was to deliver the main blow in the general direction of Kuibyshevo and Stalino with the aim of connecting with the strike group of the Southwestern Front. Preparedness for the offensive of the South-Western and Southern Fronts– August 13–14. Marshal Zhukov was entrusted with coordinating the actions of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, and Marshal Vasilevsky was entrusted with coordinating the actions of the Southwestern and Southern fronts.

The troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army, transferred to the Steppe Front on August 9, began regrouping in the Bogodukhov area the next day. The main forces of the 1st Tank Army by this time had reached the river. Merchik. Troops of the 6th Guards Army reached the Krasnokutsk region, and formations of the 5th Guards Army captured Kharkov from the west. The troops of the Steppe Front approached the outer defensive perimeter of the city and hung over it from the north. Units of the 57th Army, transferred to the Steppe Front on August 8, approached Kharkov from the southeast.

On August 10, Stalin sent directive No. 30163 to the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal Zhukov, on the use of tank armies to isolate the Kharkov enemy group:

“The headquarters of the Supreme High Command considers it necessary to isolate Kharkov by quickly intercepting the main railway and highway routes in the directions to Poltava, Krasnograd, Lozovaya and thereby speed up the liberation of Kharkov.

For this purpose, Katukov’s 1st Tank Army cut the main routes in the area of Kovyaga, Valka, and the 5th Guards. Rotmistrov’s tank army, having bypassed Kharkov from the southwest, cut the tracks in the Merefa area.”

Field Marshal E. von Manstein, trying to eliminate the breakthrough Soviet troops, pulled the 3rd Tank Corps (about 360 tanks) to Kharkov, which it intended to use together with the Kempf task force to strike the eastern flank of the wedged Soviet troops. “At the same time,” writes Manstein, “the 4th Tank Army was supposed to strike the western flank with the forces of two tank divisions returned by the Center group and one motorized division. But it was clear that these forces and the group’s forces in general could no longer hold the front line.”

On August 11, a counter battle took place between the enemy’s 1st Tank Army and the 3rd Tank Corps, during which he managed to stop the army’s troops. On the same day, the Supreme High Command Headquarters, by its directive No. 30164, ordered the commander of the Steppe Front troops to take all measures to ensure that the 5th Guards Tank Army, without expecting complete concentration, marches along the route Kovyagi, Valki, Novaya Vodolaga and closes the enemy’s escape routes from the area Merefa. Part of the forces needed to take crossings on the river. Mzha on the Sokolovo, Merefa site.

On the morning of August 12, a counter battle broke out again between the 1st Tank Army (134 tanks) and the 3rd Tank Corps (about 400 tanks), during which the enemy forced the army to go on the defensive and then pushed it back 3–4 km. In the middle of the day, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps came to the aid of the 1st Tank Army. Together they stopped the enemy. The next day, formations of the 6th and 5th Guards armies entered the battle. With the support of front-line aviation, ground troops inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, and then threw them back to their original position.

After this, the troops of the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies went on the defensive. It was carried out in those combat formations in which they conducted offensive operations, trying to concentrate the main efforts on consolidating the occupied line. Therefore, the second echelons and reserves of the corps were located at a distance of 2–3 km from the front edge, and then the depth of defense gradually increased. The defense was focal in nature with the creation of a system of tank ambushes, anti-tank areas and mine-explosive barriers. The ambushes were located in a checkerboard pattern at a depth of 2–3 km, together with submachine gunners and anti-tank artillery units. Anti-tank areas (an anti-tank artillery division or regiment in each) were created in the corps and army units in the most important directions.

The tank armies had a single-echelon formation and were quite low densities strength and means. They carried out defensive actions together with approaching rifle formations combined arms armies: 1st Tank Army with the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 6th Guards Army; 5th Guards Tank Army with the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army.

A quick transition to the defensive and its skillful conduct allowed the 5th Guards Tank Army to repel enemy counterattacks. At the same time, she suffered minor losses over the course of three days - only 38 tanks and self-propelled guns.

On August 12, the Supreme High Command Headquarters, by directive No. 10165, supplied the troops of Voronezh, Steppe and Southwestern Fronts new tasks. They are described in detail in the chapter “The First Guards Tank Army”. Let us only recall that the Voronezh Front was ordered to strike the 1st Tank Army in the general direction of Valki, Novaya Vodolaga, together with the 5th Guards Tank Army, to cut off the retreat routes of the Kharkov group to the south and southwest. After its defeat and capture of the city of Kharkov, it was prescribed to continue the offensive in the general direction of Poltava, Kremenchug and by August 23-24 to reach the line Yareski station, Poltava, (leg.) Karlovka with the main forces. In the future it was planned to go to the river. Dnieper in the Kremenchug, Orlik section, providing for the capture of river crossings by moving parts. To ensure the offensive strike force it was necessary for the right wing of the front to reach the river by August 23–24. Psel, where to firmly gain a foothold.

Meanwhile, the enemy did not abandon his plan. After unsuccessful attempts To break through the defense of the first echelon formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army, he decided to bypass it from the left flank. On August 15, units of the SS tank division "Reich" broke through the defenses of the 13th Guards Rifle Division, defending on the left flank of the 5th Guards Tank Army, and rushed in the direction of Lozovaya, Bogodukhov. General Rotmistrov at 10 o'clock on August 16 ordered the 53rd tank regiment(general reserve) and the artillery and anti-tank reserve of the army to move from Bogodukhov to the area south of Lozovaya. By three o'clock in the afternoon they arrived at the designated area, took up defensive positions and, meeting the enemy with fire of all means, stopped his advance. Timely maneuver by reserves largely contributed to the enemy’s refusal to further offensive actions in this direction.

The enemy launched a new attack on the morning of August 18 from the Akhtyrka area with the forces of two tank and two motorized divisions and a separate tank battalion, equipped with Tiger and Panther tanks. They managed to break through the defenses of the 27th Army. At the same time, from the area south of Krasnokutsk, the Totenkopf tank division attacked Kaplunovka. The attempt by the commander of the Voronezh Front to defeat the enemy’s Akhtyrka group with a counterattack was unsuccessful. He managed to stop the advance of the troops of the Voronezh Front and even push them back in some places. After Stalin’s intervention, the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal Zhukov, and the commander of the Voronezh Front took measures to localize the breakthrough of the enemy’s Akhtyrka group. The 4th Guards Army with the 3rd Guards Tank Corps and the 47th Army with the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps were brought into the battle. By August 27, they, in cooperation with the troops of the 27th and 6th Guards Armies, the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, defeated the enemy’s Akhtyr group and began to advance towards the Dnieper.

During these days, the 53rd Army of the Steppe Front continued to push back the enemy in the Kharkov direction. The 1st Mechanized Corps began fighting for Peresechnaya, and rifle units cleared the forest northwest of Kharkov. The troops of the 69th Army began to flow around Kharkov from the northwest and west. To speed up the liberation of the city, the 5th Guards Tank Army (without the 29th Tank Corps) was transferred from near Bogodukhov to the area northwest of Kharkov. Breaking enemy resistance, units of the 18th Tank and 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps liberated Korotich by the end of the day on August 22, and the tank brigades of the 57th Army reached the Bezlyudovka line and further south, enveloping the Kharkov enemy group from the southeast. On the night of August 23, the assault on the city began. In the morning, Kharkov was completely cleared of the enemy.

With the liberation of Kharkov, the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation ended, and with it the entire Battle of Kursk. Their results are summarized in the chapter devoted to the 1st Guards Tank Army.

After the completion of the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the commander of the Steppe Front, General I.S. Konev, trying to prevent an organized retreat of the enemy to the Dnieper, on August 27, 1943, assigned the 5th Guards Tank Army the task, together with the 5th Guards Army, to push the enemy back from Kharkov to the southwest. By this time, the formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army had only 66 serviceable tanks, which was 12% of their original strength. The corps headquarters had a staffing level of officers that did not exceed 30–35%, and almost 85% of the company and battalion commanders were out of action.

Under these conditions, General P.A. Rotmistrov decided to equip the remaining tanks and personnel with one brigade in each corps, strengthen them with artillery and combine them into a consolidated army squad under the command of General B.M. Skvortsov - commander of the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps. The rest of the personnel were withdrawn to the concentration area to staff and restore the combat effectiveness of the units.

From the book Battle of Berlin. Collection of memories author Rokossovsky Konstantin Konstantinovich

From the author's book

Third Guards Tank Army May 14, 1943 I.V. Stalin gave instructions to the Deputy Chief of the Main Armored Directorate for Political Affairs, General N.I. Biryukov on the restoration of the 3rd Guards Tank Army by June 5. At the same time, I.V. Stalin and Marshal

From the author's book

Fifth Guards Tank Army The Fifth Tank Army, according to the GKO decree of January 28, 1943, was to be formed by March 30 of the same year. On February 22, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin signed directive No. 1124821 on the formation five days earlier in the region

From the author's book

Third Tank Army The Third Tank Army was formed second after the 5th Tank Army. The formation of the 3rd Tank Army began with Directive No. 994022 of May 25, 1942, signed by I.V. Stalin and General A.M. Vasilevsky. The directive stated: “Rate

From the author's book

Fourth Tank Army The birth of the 4th Tank Army, like the 1st, was due to the difficult situation that developed in July 1942 in the Stalingrad direction. According to A. Hitler’s decision on July 23, the troops of the 6th Army of Colonel General F. Paulus were to capture Stalingrad

From the author's book

Fifth Tank Army The Fifth Tank Army was formed in the Moscow Military District, the second in a row after the 3rd Tank Army. In the directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 994021, signed on May 25, 1942 by I.V. Stalin and General A.M. Vasilevsky, it was said: See: Babajanyan A., Kravchenko I. 1st

From the author's book

First Guards Tank Army In accordance with Resolution No. GOKO-2791ss dated January 28, 1943, I.V. Stalin and Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. On January 30, Zhukov signed directive No. 46021 of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the formation of the 1st Tank Army by February 8, appointment as army commander

From the author's book

Second Guards Tank Army In the chapter devoted to the 1st Guards Tank Army, it was noted that its formation was carried out on the basis of the GKO decree of January 28, 1943. The process associated with the creation of the 2nd Tank Army proceeded somewhat differently. By

From the author's book

The Fourth Guards Tank Army The 4th Guards Tank Army was scheduled to be formed at the end of February 1943. In accordance with this, the formation of the field command of this army began. However, on March 1, I.V. Stalin gave instructions to General N.I. Detain Biryukova

From the author's book

Sixth Guards Tank Army In this chapter we'll talk about the last one, I mean serial number, and not the importance, of a tank army. On January 20, 1944, the Supreme High Command Headquarters issued order No. 302001 on the formation of the 6th Tank Army under the command of a lieutenant general of tank forces

From the author's book

D.D. Lelyushenko 4th Guards Tank storms Berlin. Before the historic battle By mid-April 1945, the troops of the Red Army, having marched hundreds of kilometers in victorious battles, defeating large enemy groups in East Prussia, Poland and Pomerania, liberated

Formed on February 25, 1943 on the basis of a directive General Staff dated February 10, 1943 in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters. It included the 3rd Guards and 29th Tank Corps, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, the 994th Light Bomber Aviation Regiment, artillery and other formations and units. The main units of the army changed throughout its existence. As a rule, it consisted of two or more guards tank corps and one or more guards mechanized corps.

According to the military doctrine of the Red Army at that time, the main role of tank armies was to develop the success of large offensive operations. When breaking through the enemy line of defense (usually by a shock or combined army), the tank army rushed into this breakthrough, attacking rear units and central communications centers, thereby disrupting the interaction of enemy troops. The distances covered by the tank army were supposed to be several hundred kilometers.

In 1943, the army played a significant role in the Battle of Kursk, taking part in the counter battle at Prokhorovka. During this period, the army was subordinate to the Steppe Front and included
18th Tank Corps (commander - Major General of Tank Forces Boris Sergeevich Bakharov);
29th Tank Corps;
2nd Tank Corps;
5th Guards Mechanized Corps;
32nd motorized rifle brigade(commander - Colonel Mikhail Emelyanovich Khvatov, until June 28, 1943, his acting brigade commander was his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Ilya Aleksandrovich Stukov);
110th Tank Brigade (commander - Colonel Ivan Mikhailovich Kolesnikov);
170th Tank Brigade (commander - Lieutenant Colonel Vasily Dmitrievich Tarasov);
181st Tank Brigade (commander - Lieutenant Colonel Vyacheslav Alekseevich Puzyrev);
36th Tank Breakthrough Regiment
29th separate reconnaissance battalion (29orb)
78th separate motorcycle battalion (78omtsb)
115th separate engineer battalion (115osapb)
292nd Mortar Regiment (292minp)
419th separate battalion communications (419obs)
1000th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment (1000iptap)
1694th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment (1694zenap)
repair and other rear services housing

With a total approximate number of tanks of 850 units.

At the beginning of 1944, the army took part in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. In the spring of 1944, she took part, as part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, in the Uman-Botosha operation.

In June 1944, the 5th Guards Tank Army was used as the main unit to build on the success during summer offensive Soviet troops during Operation Bagration. The formation was put on the offensive after the rifle divisions of the 11th Guards Army broke through the enemy defenses, during which they completed the encirclement of Minsk and liberated the city. Further, the army took part in the operation to liberate Vilnius. Heavy losses in this operation, however, led to the fact that the army commander, Marshal armored forces Pavel Rotmistrov was relieved of his post and replaced by Vasily Volsky.

At the end of 1944, during the Soviet offensive in the Baltic states, the 5th Guards Tank Army was used against the German 3rd Tank Army, resulting in the encirclement of German troops in the Memel area.

At the beginning of 1945, the army consisting of the 2nd Belorussian Front(hereinafter referred to as the 3rd Belorussian Front) took part in East Prussian operation. During its advance towards Elblag, the army cut off German troops, defending in East Prussia, from the main forces of the Wehrmacht, forming the so-called. "Heiligenbeil cauldron".

From the end of the war until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 5th Guards Tank Army was stationed in the Belarusian Military District.

Wars Participation in Marks of Excellence

5th Guards Tank Army (Battle of Kursk)- composition and commanders of units of the 5th Guards Tank Army (abbreviated 5 Guards TA ) during the Battle of Kursk. As part of the Steppe Front, the army was transferred to the Voronezh Front along with the 5th Guards All-Army Army for a counterattack in the Prokhorovka area in July 1943.

In the list of formation commanders, the first to be indicated are the persons who commanded the given formation on July 5, 1943 and in the rank they held at that time. For subsequent commanders, the rank they had at the time of taking command of the formation is indicated.

Available photographs taken in different years World War II, therefore visible insignia and awards may not correspond to the rank and list of awards for July-August 1943. Cases where it is known for sure that the photograph was taken during the Battle of Kursk are indicated separately.

18th Tank Corps (18 tk)

Major General of Tank Forces

On July 26, the colonel took command of the corps. Bakharov was appointed deputy commander of 9 tk(from November 1943 - commander of 9 tk).

Major General Bakharov died on July 16, 1944 during the Bobruisk offensive operation. He was buried in Bobruisk; a street in the city was named after him.
Egorov rose to the rank of major general. Author of the war memoir “With Faith in Victory.”

On December 10, 1943, “in commemoration of the victory, the formations and units that distinguished themselves in the battles for the liberation of the city of Znamenka” were given the name “Znamenskie”. These include the 18th Znamensky Tank Corps and the 32nd, 110th, 181st brigades of this corps. (Order Supreme Commander-in-Chief December 10, 1943 No. 48).

32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (32 MSBR)

Colonel

At the beginning of 1943, Khvatov was seriously wounded, and until June 28, 1943, acting. The brigade commander was his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Stukov (Oleinikov: Strukov L.A.). Due to a typo in the documents (June 28 became July 28), Colonel Khvatov is sometimes mistakenly not listed as a brigade commander during the battles near Prokhorovka.

110th Tank Brigade (110 TBR)

Colonel

Oleinikov: Lieutenant Colonel?

170th Tank Brigade (170 TBR)

lieutenant colonel

Oleynikov: Lieutenant Colonel Kazakov A.I.?

181st Tank Brigade (181 TBR)

lieutenant colonel

Units of corps subordination

36th Breakthrough Tank Regiment (36 TPP)

21 Mk IV Churchill infantry tanks and 3 BA-64 armored vehicles

Other connections

29th separate reconnaissance battalion (29 orb)
78th separate motorcycle battalion (78 omcb)
115th separate engineer battalion (115 osapb)
292nd Mortar Regiment (292 minp)
419th separate communications battalion (419 obs)
1000th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment (1000 iptap)
1694th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment (1694 zenap)

29th Tank Corps (29 tk)

Major General of Tank Forces

25th Tank Brigade (25 TBR)

Colonel

31st Tank Brigade (31 TBR)

Colonel

32nd Tank Brigade (32 TBR)

Colonel

53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (53 MSBR)

lieutenant colonel Lipichev N.P.

Units of corps subordination

1446th self-propelled artillery regiment (1446 glanders)

data

Other connections

38th separate armored battalion (38 obrb)
75th Motorcycle Battalion (75 mtsb)
108th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment (108 iptap)
271st Mortar Regiment (271 minp)
363rd separate communications battalion (363 obs)
366th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment (366 zenap)
747th separate anti-tank fighter division (747 oiptdn)
repair and other rear services of the corps

5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps (5 gv.mk)

Major General of Tank Forces

Oleinikov: Major General t/v Sleptsov B.M. ?

10th Guards Mechanized Brigade (10 Guards Mkhbr)

Colonel Mikhailov I. B.

11th Guards Mechanized Brigade (11 Guards Mkhbr)

Colonel Grishchenko N.V.

12th Guards Mechanized Brigade (12 Guards Mkhbr)

Colonel Borisenko G. Ya.

24th Guards Tank Brigade (24 Guards TBR)

Colonel Karpov V. P.

The 53rd Tank Regiment (Major I. A. Kurnosov) was withdrawn from the brigade and corps and transferred directly to the commander 5 Guards TA. When moving to the Prokhorovka area 53 tp entered