From 1936 to 1938, more than 300 incidents were noted on the Soviet-Japanese border, the most famous of which occurred at the junction of the borders of the USSR, Manchuria and Korea at Lake Khasan in July-August 1938.
At the origins of the conflict
The conflict in the Lake Khasan area was caused by a number of both foreign policy factors and very difficult relations within the ruling elite of Japan. An important detail was the rivalry within the Japanese military-political machine itself, when funds were distributed to strengthen the army, and the presence of even an imaginary military threat could give the command of the Japanese Korean Army a good opportunity to remind itself, given that the priority at that time was the operations of Japanese troops in China, which never brought the desired result.
Another headache for Tokyo was the military aid flowing from the USSR to China. In this case, it was possible to exert military and political pressure by organizing a large-scale military provocation with a visible external effect. All that remained was to find a weak spot on the Soviet border, where an invasion could be successfully carried out and the combat effectiveness of the Soviet troops could be tested. And such an area was found 35 km from Vladivostok.
And while on the Japanese side the border was approached by a railroad and several highways, on the Soviet side there was only one dirt road. . It is noteworthy that until 1938, this area, where there really was no clear boundary marking, was of no interest to anyone, and suddenly in July 1938, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively took up this problem.
After the refusal of the Soviet side to withdraw troops and the incident with the death of a Japanese gendarme, shot by a Soviet border guard in the disputed area, tension began to increase day by day.
On July 29, the Japanese launched an attack on the Soviet border post, but after a hot battle they were driven back. On the evening of July 31, the attack was repeated, and here the Japanese troops already managed to wedge 4 kilometers deep into Soviet territory. The first attempts to drive out the Japanese with the 40th Infantry Division were unsuccessful. However, everything was not going well for the Japanese either - every day the conflict grew, threatening to escalate into a big war, for which Japan, stuck in China, was not ready.
Richard Sorge reported to Moscow: “The Japanese General Staff is interested in a war with the USSR not now, but later. Active actions on the border were taken by the Japanese to show the Soviet Union that Japan was still capable of demonstrating its power."
Meanwhile, in difficult off-road conditions and poor readiness of individual units, the concentration of forces of the 39th Rifle Corps continued. With great difficulty, they managed to gather 15 thousand people, 1014 machine guns, 237 guns, and 285 tanks in the combat area. In total, the 39th Rifle Corps consisted of up to 32 thousand people, 609 guns and 345 tanks. 250 aircraft were sent to provide air support.
Hostages of provocation
If in the first days of the conflict, due to poor visibility and, apparently, the hope that the conflict could still be resolved diplomatically, Soviet aviation was not used, then starting from August 5, Japanese positions were subjected to massive air strikes.
Aviation, including TB-3 heavy bombers, was brought in to destroy Japanese fortifications. The fighters carried out a series of assault strikes on Japanese troops. Moreover, the targets of Soviet aviation were located not only on the captured hills, but also deep in Korean territory.
It was later noted: “To defeat the Japanese infantry in the enemy’s trenches and artillery, high-explosive bombs were mainly used - 50, 82 and 100 kg, a total of 3,651 bombs were dropped. 6 pieces of high-explosive bombs 1000 kg on the battlefield 08/06/38. were used solely for the purpose of moral influence on the enemy infantry, and these bombs were dropped into the enemy infantry areas after these areas had been thoroughly hit by groups of SB-bombs FAB-50 and 100. The enemy infantry rushed about in the defensive zone, not finding cover, since almost the entire main line of their defense was covered with heavy fire from the explosions of bombs from our aircraft. 6 bombs of 1000 kg, dropped during this period in the area of the Zaozernaya height, shook the air with strong explosions, the roar of these bombs exploding across the valleys and mountains of Korea was heard tens of kilometers away. After the explosion of 1000 kg of bombs, the Zaozernaya height was covered with smoke and dust for several minutes. It must be assumed that in those areas where these bombs were dropped, the Japanese infantry were 100% incapacitated from shell shock and stones thrown out of the craters by the explosion of the bombs.”
Having completed 1003 sorties, Soviet aviation lost two aircraft - one SB and one I-15. The Japanese, having no more than 18-20 anti-aircraft guns in the conflict area, could not provide serious resistance. And throwing your own aviation into battle meant starting a large-scale war, for which neither the command of the Korean Army nor Tokyo were ready. From this moment on, the Japanese side began to frantically search for a way out of the current situation, which required both saving face and stopping hostilities, which no longer promised anything good for the Japanese infantry.
Denouement
The denouement came when Soviet troops launched a new offensive on August 8, having overwhelming military-technical superiority. The attack by tanks and infantry was carried out based on military expediency and without taking into account compliance with the border. As a result, Soviet troops managed to capture Bezymyannaya and a number of other heights, and also gain a foothold near the top of Zaozernaya, where the Soviet flag was hoisted.
On August 10, the chief of staff of the 19th telegraphed the chief of staff of the Korean Army: “Every day the combat effectiveness of the division is declining. The enemy suffered great damage. He is using new methods of combat and increasing artillery fire. If this continues, there is a danger that the fighting will escalate into even more fierce battles. Within one to three days it is necessary to decide on the division’s further actions... Until now, Japanese troops have already demonstrated their power to the enemy, and therefore, while it is still possible, it is necessary to take measures to resolve the conflict diplomatically.”
On the same day, armistice negotiations began in Moscow and at noon on August 11, hostilities were stopped. Strategically and politically, the Japanese test of strength, and by and large, the military adventure ended in failure. Not being prepared for a major war with the USSR, the Japanese units in the Khasan area found themselves hostage to the created situation, when further expansion of the conflict was impossible, and it was also impossible to retreat while preserving the prestige of the army.
The Hassan conflict did not lead to a reduction in USSR military assistance to China. At the same time, the battles on Khasan revealed a number of weaknesses of both the troops of both the Far Eastern Military District and the Red Army as a whole. The Soviet troops apparently suffered even greater losses than the enemy; at the initial stage of the fighting, the interaction between the infantry, tank units and artillery turned out to be weak. The reconnaissance was not at a high level, unable to reveal the enemy's positions.
The losses of the Red Army amounted to 759 people killed, 100 people died in hospitals, 95 people missing and 6 people killed in accidents. 2752 people was injured or sick (dysentery and colds). The Japanese admitted the loss to 650 killed and 2,500 wounded. At the same time, the battles on Khasan were far from the last military clash between the USSR and Japan in the Far East. Less than a year later, an undeclared war began in Mongolia on Khalkhin Gol, where, however, the forces of the Japanese Kwantung Army, rather than the Korean ones, would be involved.
This armed conflict between the USSR and Japan matured gradually. Japan's policy in the Far East did not imply any improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. The aggressive policy of this country in China posed a potential threat to the security of the USSR. Having captured all of Manchuria in March 1932, the Japanese created a puppet state there - Manchukuo. The Japanese Minister of War, General Sadao Araki, said on this occasion: “The State of Manjugo (so Manchukuo in Japanese - M.P.) is nothing more than the brainchild of the Japanese army, and Mr. Pu Yi is his dummy.” In Manchukuo, the Japanese began to create a military infrastructure and increase the size of their army. The USSR sought to maintain normal relations with Japan. At the end of December 1931, he proposed concluding a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact, but a year later received a negative response. The capture of Manchuria fundamentally changed the situation on the Chinese Eastern Railway. The road was in the zone of direct control of the Japanese armed forces.
There were provocations on the road: damage to tracks, raids to rob trains, the use of trains to transport Japanese troops, military cargo, etc. The Japanese and Manchu authorities began to openly encroach on the CER. Under these conditions, in May 1933, the Soviet government expressed its readiness to sell the CER. Negotiations on this issue took place in Tokyo for 2.5 years. The problem came down to price. The Japanese side believed that given the current situation, the USSR was ready to give way under any conditions. After lengthy negotiations that lasted more than 20 months, on March 23, 1935, an agreement was signed on the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway on the following terms: Manchukuo pays 140 million yen for the Chinese Eastern Railway; 1/3 of the total amount must be paid in money, and the rest - in the supply of goods from Japanese and Manchurian companies under Soviet orders for 3 years. In addition, the Manchu side had to pay 30 million yen to the dismissed Soviet road employees. On July 7, 1937, Japan began a new invasion of China, the capture of which was seen as the threshold of war against the Soviet Union. Tensions have increased on the Far Eastern border.
If previously the main violators on the border were armed detachments of White emigrants and the so-called White Chinese, now more and more Japanese military personnel are becoming violators. In 1936-1938, 231 violations of the state border of the USSR were registered, of which 35 were major military clashes. This was accompanied by losses of border guards, both from the Soviet and Japanese sides. Japan's aggressive policy in China and the Far East forced the Soviet Union to strengthen its defenses. On July 1, 1938, the special Red Banner Far Eastern Army (OKDVA) was transformed into the Red Banner Far Eastern Front. Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. was appointed its commander. Blucher. The front consisted of two combined arms armies - the 1st Primorskaya and the 2nd Separate Red Banner armies, commanded by brigade commander K.P. Podlas and corps commander I.S. Konev. The 2nd Air Army was created from the Far Eastern aviation. The construction of 120 defensive areas was underway in the most threatened directions. By the end of 1938, the number of rank and file and command personnel was supposed to be 105,800 people. The military conflict between the two states arose at the southernmost tip of the state border - at the previously unknown Lake Khasan, surrounded by a ridge of hills, just 10 kilometers from the shore of the Sea of Japan, and in a straight line - 130 kilometers from Vladivostok. Here the borders of the USSR, the puppet state of Manchukuo and Korea, occupied by the Japanese, converged.
On this section of the border, two hills played a special role - Zaozernaya and its neighbor to the north - Bezymyannaya Hill, along the tops of which the border with China ran. From these hills it was possible to view in detail the coast, railways, tunnels, and other structures adjacent to the border without any optical instruments. From them, direct artillery fire could fire at the entire section of Soviet territory south and west of Posyet Bay, threatening the entire coast in the direction of Vladivostok. This is what caused the Japanese to take special interest in them. The immediate reason for the start of the armed conflict was the border incident on July 3, 1938, when Japanese infantrymen (about a company) advanced to the border guard of two Red Army soldiers on the Zaozernaya hill. Without firing any shots, the Japanese detachment left this place a day later and returned to the Korean settlement, located 500 meters from the hill, and began to build fortifications. On July 8, the Soviet reserve border outpost occupied the Zaozernaya hill and established a permanent border guard, thereby declaring it Soviet territory. Here they began to build trenches and wire fences. The measures of the Soviet border guards, in turn, caused the conflict to escalate in the following days, since both sides considered the hills to be their territory.
On July 15, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs B.S. Stomonyakov, in a conversation with the Charge d'Affaires of the Japanese Embassy in the USSR, Nishi, tried to document the issue of the legality of the presence of Soviet border guards on the shores of Lake Khasan and at the height of Zaozernaya. Stomonyakov, relying on the Hunchun Protocol, signed between Russia and China on June 22, 1886, as well as the map attached to it, proved that Lake Khasan and some areas west of these shores belong to the Soviet Union. In response, the Japanese diplomat demanded that the Soviet border guards be removed from the Zaozernaya heights. The situation seriously escalated on July 15, when in the evening Lieutenant V.M. shot from a rifle. Vinevitin killed Japanese intelligence officer Sakuni Matsushima, who was on the Zaozernaya hill. This provoked a massive violation of the section of the border guarded by the Posyetsky border detachment. The violators were Japanese “postmen”, each of whom carried a letter to the Soviet authorities demanding to “clean up” the Manchurian territory. On July 20, 1938, the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow Mamoru Segemitsu at a reception with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinova, on behalf of his government, demanded the withdrawal of Soviet border guards from the Zaozernaya hill because it belonged to Manchukuo.
At the same time, the ambassador stated in an ultimatum that if this territory is not liberated voluntarily, then it will be liberated by force. In response, on July 22, the Soviet government sent a note to the Japanese government, which rejected the Japanese demands for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Zaozernaya heights. Commander of the Far Eastern Front V.K. Blucher tried to avoid military conflict. He proposed to “exhaust” the border conflict by admitting that the actions of the Soviet border guards, who dug trenches and carried out simple sapping work not on their territory, were a mistake. The “illegal” commission he created on July 24 established that part of the Soviet trenches and wire fences on the Zaozernaya hill was installed on the Manchurian side.
However, neither Moscow nor Tokyo no longer wanted to hear about a peaceful, diplomatic settlement of the border conflict. By his actions, Blucher caused Stalin and the People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov has doubts about whether he is capable of fighting decisively and following the instructions of the country's leadership. On July 29, Japanese troops, numbering up to an infantry company, launched an offensive with the aim of capturing the top of the Bezymyannaya hill, where the Soviet garrison of 11 people was located. The Japanese managed to capture the heights for a short time. Of the 11 border guards, six remained alive. The head of the outpost, Alexei Makhalin, who became posthumously a Hero of the Soviet Union, also died. Having received reinforcements, the height was again in the hands of the Soviet border guards. The Japanese command brought up large artillery forces and the 19th Infantry Division in order to capture both hills - Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya. On the night of July 31, the Japanese regiment, with artillery support, attacked Zaozernaya, and then Bezymyannaya. By the end of the day, these heights were captured, and within three days trenches, dugouts, firing positions, and wire barriers were built there. The commander of the 40th Infantry Division of the Far Eastern Front made a decision - on August 1, attack the enemy at the heights on the move and restore the status quo on the border. However, the commanders fought using maps that were compiled by the cartographic division of the NKVD and marked “top secret.”
These maps were deliberately made with variations, meaning they did not reflect the actual geography of the area. These were “cards for foreign tourists.” They did not indicate swampy places, and the roads were indicated completely differently. When hostilities began, the Soviet artillery got stuck in the swamps and was shot at by the Japanese with direct fire from the commanding heights. The artillerymen suffered particularly heavy losses. The same thing happened with tanks (T-26). On August 1, in a telephone conversation with the commander of the Far Eastern Front, Blucher, Stalin sharply criticized him for commanding the operation. He was forced to ask the commander a question: “Tell me, Comrade Blucher, honestly, do you have a desire to really fight the Japanese? If you don’t have such a desire, tell me directly, as befits a communist, and if you have a desire, I would think that you should go to the place immediately.” On August 3, People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov decided to entrust the leadership of combat operations in the area of Lake Khasan to the chief of staff of the Far Eastern Front, corps commander G.M. Stern, appointing him simultaneously as commander of the 39th Rifle Corps. By this decision V.K. Blucher actually removed himself from the direct leadership of military operations on the state border. The 39th Rifle Corps included the 32nd, 40th and 39th Rifle Divisions and the 2nd Mechanized Brigade. 32 thousand people were concentrated directly in the combat area; on the Japanese side there was the 19th Infantry Division, numbering about 20 thousand people. It should be noted that there was still an opportunity to end the military conflict at Lake Khasan through peaceful negotiations. Tokyo understood that there would be no quick victory. And the main forces of the Japanese army at that time were not in Manchukuo, but were conducting military operations against Chiang Kai-shek in China. Therefore, the Japanese side sought to end the military conflict with the USSR on favorable terms. On August 4 in Moscow, Japanese Ambassador Segemitsu informed M.M. Litvinov about the desire to resolve the conflict diplomatically.
Litvinov stated that this is possible provided that the situation that existed before July 29 is restored, that is, before the date when Japanese troops crossed the border and began to occupy the Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya heights. The Japanese side proposed returning to the border before July 11 - that is, before the appearance of Soviet trenches on the top of Zaozernaya. But this no longer suited the Soviet side, since protest rallies took place throughout the country, demanding to curb the aggressor. In addition, the leadership of the USSR, led by Stalin, had the same sentiments. The offensive of the Soviet troops on the Japanese positions, in whose hands the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills were located, began on August 6 at 16:00. The first blow was struck by Soviet aviation - 180 bombers covered by 70 fighters. 1,592 aerial bombs were dropped on enemy positions. On the same day, the 32nd Infantry Division and a tank battalion advanced on the Bezymyannaya hill, and the 40th Infantry Division, reinforced by a reconnaissance battalion and tanks, advanced on the Zaozernaya hill, which was captured after two days of fierce fighting on August 8, and on August 9 they captured the Bezymyannaya height . Under these conditions, Japanese Ambassador Segemitsu sued for peace.
On the same day, a truce agreement was signed. Hostilities ceased on August 11 at 12 noon. Two hills - Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya, over which a military conflict broke out between the two states, were assigned to the USSR. There is still no accurate data on the number of losses of the Red Army. According to declassified official data, during the battles on Lake Khasan, irretrievable losses amounted to 717 people, 75 were missing or captured; 3,279 were wounded, shell-shocked, burned or sick. On the Japanese side, there were 650 dead and 2,500 injured. Commander of the Red Banner Far Eastern Front V.K. Blucher was removed from his post and soon repressed. 26 combat participants became Heroes of the Soviet Union; 95 - awarded the Order of Lenin; 1985 - Order of the Red Banner; 4 thousand – Order of the Red Star, medals “For Courage” and “For Military Merit”. The government established a special badge for “Participant in the Khasan battles.” It was also awarded to home front workers who helped and supported the soldiers. Along with the courage and heroism of the soldiers, the Khasan events also showed something else: the poor training of the command staff. Voroshilov’s secret order No. 0040 stated: “The events of these few days revealed huge shortcomings in the state of the front’s CDV. The combat training of the troops, headquarters and command and control personnel of the front turned out to be at an unacceptably low level. The military units were torn apart and incapable of combat; The supply of military units is not organized. It has been discovered that the Far Eastern theater is poorly prepared for this war (roads, bridges, communications) ... "
Polynov M.F. USSR/Russia in local wars and
armed conflicts of the XX-XXI centuries. Tutorial. – St. Petersburg,
2017. – Info-Da Publishing House. – 162 s.
Military-historical reconstruction of the Battle of Khasan in 1938.
On a black night, on a dark night -
An order was given to the front,
A stubborn battle ensued
Near Lake Khasan!
The stars didn't shine in the sky
But the blood burned with fire
We beat the Japanese more than once
And we'll beat you again!
S. Alimov.
From the memoirs of the former head of the Podgornaya border post, Hero of the Soviet Union P. Tereshkin:
“On July 29, the head of the political department of the district, divisional commissar Bogdanov, and Colonel Grebnik arrived at the height of Zaozernaya. ...At the beginning of the conversation, Lieutenant Makhalin urgently called me by phone. I reported to Bogdanov. In response: “Let them act independently, do not allow the Japanese into our territory...”. Makhalin calls again and in an excited voice says: “A large detachment of Japanese violated the border and began to attack the border detachment’s locations, we will fight to the death, avenge us! The connection was interrupted. I asked permission from divisional commissar Bogdanov to hold Makhalin’s group with heavy machine gun fire. I was refused this with the reasoning that this would cause retaliatory actions by the Japanese in the area of Zaozernaya Heights. Then I sent 2 squads under the command of Chernopyatko and Bataroshin to help Lieutenant Makhalin. Soon, divisional commissar Bogdanov and department head Grebnik left for Posyet.” July 29, 7 p.m. 20 minutes. Report from the Far Eastern District Directorate of Airborne Internal Affairs via direct wire: “Colonel Fedotov, who was at the height of Zaozernaya at 18:00. 20 minutes. reported that Nameless Height had been liberated from the Japanese. And that Lieutenant Makhalin was found killed at the height and four wounded Red Army soldiers were found. The rest have not yet been found at all. The Japanese retreated in the fog and positioned themselves approximately 400 meters from the border line.”
Lieutenant of Border Troops A.Makhalin
With this battle, in which 11 Soviet border guards fought with the infantry of the Japanese regular army, the Khasan Incident began. It has been maturing for a long time. Even during their unsuccessful intervention of 1918-22, the Japanese began to seriously think about breaking away from Russia and annexing the entire Far East up to Lake Baikal to the Mikado Empire. Tokyo did not hide its expansionist fantasies; in 1927, Prime Minister Tanaka voiced them in his memorandum. In response, the USSR proposed concluding a non-aggression pact in 1928, but the proposal was not accepted. On the contrary, the imperial general staff began to develop plans for war against the USSR. These plans differed significantly from ordinary operational plans, the preparation of which is the function of any general staff of any country. The war plans against the USSR, which were codenamed “Otsu,” were never theoretical in nature and were always distinguished by their specificity and thorough development.
In 1931, the Sino-Japanese War and the occupation of Manchuria began; according to Japanese plans, this was only a prelude to the invasion of Siberia. It was calculated that by 1934 the Kwantung Army should be technically and organizationally ready for an attack on the USSR. The Soviet Union again proposed a non-aggression pact, but to no avail.
In order to create more favorable conditions for an attack on the USSR in the early 30s, the Japanese organized numerous provocations on the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), connecting Transbaikalia with Port Arthur (Lüshun). The road was built under the Russian Empire, was the property of the USSR, had a right-of-way and extraterritorial status. In 1929, the Red Army already fought for it with the White Chinese, but this time the enemy was much more serious.
In response to the extreme aggravation of the situation on the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1933, the Soviet Union offered Japan to buy the road; after very difficult bargaining, on March 23, 1935, an agreement was signed on the acquisition of the road by the authorities of Japanese-controlled Manchukuo for 140 million yen. This was significantly less than the funds that were once invested by the Russian government in the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway.
In February 1936, a coup d'etat was attempted in Tokyo and, although it failed, more radical politicians came to power. On November 25 of the same year, Japan signed the so-called “Anti-Comintern Pact” with Germany, the main goal of which was the liquidation of the USSR. In response, the Soviet Union increased assistance to China, which with its resistance kept Japan from invading. The Nanking authorities (the capital at that time was the city of Nanjing) and the communists received Soviet money, weapons, military advisers and volunteers, among whom there were especially many pilots. The USSR did the same in the West, helping, as a counterbalance to Germany and Italy, to the Reds in the civil war that had just broken out in Spain.
Meanwhile, preparations for war against the USSR intensified in Japanese government and military circles. The main elements in it were the acceleration of the creation of a military and military-industrial bridgehead in Manchuria and Korea, the expansion of aggression in China and the seizure of the most developed regions of Northern, Central and Southern China. The program was approved by the government of General S. Hayashi, who came to power in February 1937. At the very first meeting of the government, General Hayashi declared that “the policy of liberalism towards the communists will be ended.” Openly anti-Soviet articles began to appear in the Japanese press calling for a “march to the Urals.”
Hayashi's cabinet was soon forced to resign, giving way to a new government led by Prince F. Konoe, whose political platform was openly anti-Russian. Both countries found themselves on the verge of a major war.
What this war could be was shown by the monstrous massacre carried out by the Japanese during the capture of the Chinese capital of Nanjing in December 1937, as a result of which more than 300 thousand civilians were killed and at least 20 thousand Chinese women were raped.
Anticipating the possibility of a sharp aggravation of relations, the USSR Government on April 4, 1938 invited Japan to peacefully resolve all controversial issues. The response to this was a propaganda campaign around the so-called “disputed territories” on the border of Manchukuo and Primorye, launched by Japan in May-June 1938.
The Japanese were ready. Already at the end of 1937, thirteen fortified areas were created in Manchuria on the border with the Soviet Union and the Mongolia. Each of them could accommodate from one to three infantry divisions. Half of the 13 Levels were built near the borders of Primorye. Japan actively built roads, military facilities, and enterprises in Manchuria located in close proximity to the borders of the USSR. The main group of the Kwantung Army was concentrated in Northern and Northeastern Manchuria (about 400 thousand people, which amounted to 2/3 of the entire Japanese army). In addition, the Japanese maintained reserve armies in Korea.
But the Soviet Union was also preparing for a clash. In January 1938, the Japanese tried to capture the heights in the Zolotaya section of the Grodekovsky border detachment, in February the same thing happened in the Utinaya outpost section of the Posyet border detachment, both provocations were stopped.
On April 14, the head of the Posyet border detachment, Colonel K.E. Grebnik, issued an order to prepare outposts and units for defensive battles in connection with the Japanese intentions to commit armed provocations on the border. And on April 22, 1938, the commander of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern District, Marshal V.K. Blucher, gave the order to bring aviation, anti-aircraft defense units, air surveillance services, lighting, communications and fortified areas to a state of increased combat readiness.
On June 13, 1938, an unusual incident occurred on the Soviet-Japanese border. The head of the NKVD department for the Far Eastern Territory, G. Lyushkov, crossed it and surrendered to the Japanese. The information received from him completely shocked the Japanese command. It learned that the Red Army in the Far East was much stronger than the Japanese had imagined. Nevertheless, preparations for reconnaissance in force on the Japanese side continued.
The Soviet side did the same. On June 28, 1938, the Special Red Banner Far Eastern District was transformed into the Far Eastern Red Banner Front, which was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher. Throughout May and June, more and more blatant Japanese provocations continued on the border.
In response to this, on July 12, Soviet border guards occupied the Zaozernaya (Changgufen) hill, one of the two dominant heights in the area of Lake Khasan, on the disputed territory with Manchukuo. And they began building fortifications there.
Sopka Zaozernaya
On July 14, the Government of Manchukuo protested to the USSR regarding the violation of the Manchurian border by Soviet troops, and on the 15th, during another provocation in the Zaozernaya area, a Japanese gendarme was killed. An immediate reaction followed - on July 19, with the connivance of the official Japanese authorities in Tokyo, local fascists raided the embassy of the Soviet Union.
On July 20, the Japanese demanded that the Lake Hassan area be transferred to Manchukuo. A collision became inevitable. On July 22, a directive was issued by the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal K. Voroshilov, to the commander of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front, Marshal V. Blyukher, on bringing the front's troops to combat readiness, and on the 24th, a directive was issued from the Military Council of the front on bringing the 118, 119 rifle regiments and 121 cavalry regiments to combat readiness. Demoralized by the wave of repressions in the army, the front commander played it safe and sent a commission to the Zaozernaya heights to investigate the actions of the Soviet border guards. After the commission discovered a violation of the Manchurian border by 3 meters by the border guards, V. Blucher sent a telegram to the People's Commissar of Defense demanding the immediate arrest of the head of the border section and other “those responsible for provoking the conflict” with the Japanese, for which he was sharply pulled back from Moscow.
After the start of the incident on July 29 and the attack on a detachment of border guards on the Zaozernaya hill, the Japanese continued their attacks the next day, expanding the offensive zone and including the Bezymyannaya height. Units of the 53rd separate anti-tank artillery division were urgently deployed to help the border guards. The 1st Primorsky Army and the Pacific Fleet were put on combat readiness.
At 3 o'clock in the morning on July 31, Japanese troops attacked the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills with significant forces, and by 8 o'clock they occupied them. All further struggle during the conflict was for these commanding heights. On the same day of the front, Marshal V. Blucher sent the 32nd Infantry Division and 2nd Mechanized Brigade to the incident area. The chief of staff of the front, corps commander G. Stern, and army commissar 1st rank L. Mekhlis, who arrived in the Far East on July 29, arrived at the headquarters of the 39th Rifle Corps.
Red Army soldiers in a trench near Lake Khasan
However, on August 1 and 2, Soviet troops, despite their overall superiority in strength, were unable to achieve success. The Japanese chose the invasion site very well. From their bank of the Tumannaya River (Tumen-Ula, Tumenjiang), several dirt roads and a railway line approached the incident site, thanks to which they could easily maneuver. On the Soviet side there were swamps and Lake Khasan itself, which excluded frontal attacks on the heights captured by the Japanese. Troops were forbidden to go beyond the border of the USSR, so they attacked under the constant threat of a flank attack from the Japanese, who could not be suppressed by artillery.
The crew of a 1902/1930 model 76.2 mm cannon reads a report from the combat area. 32nd Rifle Division of the Red Army, early August 1938 (AVL).
Marshal V. Blucher received a personal scolding from I. Stalin for his delay in using aviation (the Japanese did not use the available aviation throughout the conflict). But the marshal had an excuse; the weather during the battles was not just cloudy, the fighters fought under a real tropical downpour. However, even without this, for a number of reasons, the troops were not sufficiently prepared to fight a strong enemy. The main one was the low level of training of commanders, many of whom took their positions only recently, having made dizzying careers as a result of repression.
To strengthen the command, on August 3, the People's Commissar of Defense sent a directive to V. Blucher demanding the immediate elimination of multiple commands in command and control of troops. All units operating in the conflict area were consolidated into the 39th Rifle Corps, consisting of 40, 32, 39 rifle divisions, 2 mechanized brigades and other smaller units. Front Chief of Staff G. Stern was appointed commander of the corps.
Komkor G.Stern
On August 4, Japan proposed to resolve the incident peacefully; in response, the USSR stated that it could only be resolved by withdrawing troops to the line they occupied as of the beginning of July 29.
Meanwhile, the fighting continued. G. Stern advanced parts of the corps to positions south of Lake Khasan. In total, over 15 thousand people, 1014 machine guns, 237 guns, and 285 tanks had already been deployed to the combat area.
T-26 from the tank battalion of the 32nd Rifle Division of the Red Army. The tanks are camouflaged with engineering means. Lake Khasan area, August 1938 (RGAKFD)
On August 5, Moscow allowed troops to use Manchurian territory to attack commanding heights. V. Blucher gave the order to begin the offensive on August 6.
The offensive began with a massive artillery shelling and subsequent bombing of Japanese positions by 216 Soviet aircraft. As a result of the assault, the Zaozernaya heights were captured. The banner was placed on it by Lieutenant of the 118th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division I. Moshlyak.
Lieutenant of the 118th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division I. Moshlyak
During August 7 and 8, the Japanese continuously attacked Zaozernaya up to 20 times a day, but to no avail; on August 9, Red Army units took the Soviet part of the Bezymyannaya heights.
Infantrymen of the 120th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division practice combat coordination while being in the reserve of the advancing group. Zaozernaya height area, August 1938 (RGAKFD)
On August 10, Japan approached the USSR with a proposal for a truce. On August 11, the fire ceased, and from 20:00 on August 12, the main forces of the Japanese army and the main forces of the Red Army in the northern part of the Zaozernaya height were withdrawn back to a distance of no closer than 80 meters from the ridge.
Commanders and soldiers of one of the battalions of the 78th Kazan Red Banner Rifle Regiment of the 26th Zlatoust Red Banner Rifle Division under the command of Captain M.L. Svirina in the operational reserve near the village of Kraskino. Far Eastern Front, August 9, 1938 (RGAKFD)
Red banner over the height of Zaozernaya
During the conflict, up to 20 thousand people participated on each side. Soviet casualties amounted to 960 dead and 2,752 wounded. Among the dead:
- died on the battlefield - 759,
- died in hospitals from wounds and illnesses - 100,
- missing - 95,
- died in non-combat incidents - 6.
Japanese losses, according to Soviet data, amounted to about 650 killed and 2,500 wounded.
The actions of Marshal V. Blucher during the conflict caused irritation in Moscow and soon after the end of the fighting he was summoned to the capital. From there, after analyzing the results of the conflict, he was sent to rest in the south, where he was arrested. On November 9, 1938, he died in prison, unable to withstand torture.
Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K.Blyukher
Two and a half months after the end of the conflict at Lake Khasan. For the exemplary performance of combat missions and the courage and heroism displayed, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of October 25, 1938, the 40th Infantry Division was awarded the Order of Lenin, the 32nd Infantry Division and the Posyet Border Detachment were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
26 participants in the battles were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union; 95 fighters and commanders were awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner - 1985 combat participants; 4 thousand people were awarded the Order of the Red Star, medals “For Courage” and “For Military Merit” (this award was established specifically). A total of 6,500 participants in the Khasan events received military state awards.
On the Krestovaya hill, near the village of Kraskino, there is an 11-meter tall figure of a Red Army soldier cast in bronze. This is a monument to those who died for their homeland in the battles near Lake Khasan. Many railway stations and villages in Primorye are named after the heroes - Makhalino, Provalovo, Pozharskoye, Bamburovo and others.
In 1938, the USSR Government established a special badge “Participant in the Khasan battles.” It was also awarded to home front workers who helped and supported the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army. A year after the conflict at Lake Khasan, the Japanese once again tested the combat capability of the Red Army. A crushing defeat on the shores of Khalkhin Gol forced them to finally sign a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, which protected the USSR from fighting on two fronts in the upcoming world war.
participants of the Khasan battles were awarded
119th Infantry Regiment
120th Infantry Regiment
40th Light Artillery Regiment
40th Howitzer Artillery Regiment
40th separate tank battalion (Senior Lieutenant Sitnik)
39th Infantry Division
115th Infantry Regiment
tank company
32 Saratov Rifle Division (Colonel N.E. Berzarin)
94th Infantry Regiment
95th Infantry Regiment
96th Infantry Regiment
32 light artillery regiment
32 Howitzer Artillery Regiment
32nd separate tank battalion (Major M.V. Alimov)
26 Zlatoust Red Banner Rifle Division
78 Kazan Red Banner Rifle Regiment
176th Infantry Regiment
2nd Mechanized Brigade (Colonel A.P. Panfilov)
121st Cavalry Regiment
2nd assault aviation regiment 40th fighter aviation regiment
48th Fighter Aviation Regiment
36th mixed bomber aviation regiment
55th Mixed Bomber Aviation Regiment
10th mixed aviation regiment of the Pacific Fleet Air Force
separate aviation squadron named after. IN AND. Lenin
21 separate reconnaissance squadrons
59th separate reconnaissance squadron
Japanese units
19th Ranama Imperial Division (Lieutenant General Kamezo Suetaka)
64th Guards Regiment
75th regiment
Photo album of military actions
Having been defeated during the intervention against Soviet Russia, in 1922 the Japanese were forced to evacuate from Vladivostok, but in the future they did not lose hope of subjugating the vast Asian territories of the USSR, right up to the Urals. By the early 1930s. The militarists took over in Japanese ruling circles. Japanese troops repeatedly staged military provocations against the Soviet Union from the territory of Manchuria they occupied in 1931-1932. In the summer of 1938, Japan with large military forces violated the Soviet border in the south of Primorye near Lake. Hassan. The 19th Infantry Division took part directly in the invasion. In addition, the 15th and 20th infantry divisions and other units were moving towards the combat area. On July 29, 1938, Japanese troops, after a series of attacks, throwing back the border units, captured the tactically advantageous Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills, relying on which they threatened the entire Posyet region. Troops of the future 39th Rifle Corps (formed on August 2, 1938, commander - corps commander G.N. Stern) took part in repelling the Japanese invasion. As soon as the provocation became known, the 40th Infantry Division of Colonel V.K. was concentrated in the conflict area. Bazarova. On July 31, the Primorsky Army and the Pacific Fleet were put on alert. The 32nd Infantry Division (Colonel N.E. Berzarin) and the 2nd Mechanized Brigade were additionally sent to the Lake Khasan area. The 2nd Mechanized Brigade was formed in April 1932 in Kyiv, and in 1934 it was transferred to the Far East. In October 1938, it was reorganized into the 42nd Light Tank Brigade. Just before the start of the conflict, Colonel A.P. took command of the brigade. Panfilov. The brigade was armed with, among other things, 94 BT-5 and BT-7 tanks. The brigade also includes a company of fire-reinforced HT-26s (5 serviceable units). In addition, the 32nd Rifle Division had a 32nd separate tank battalion (Major M.V. Alimov) with T-26s. The same battalion (Senior Lieutenant Sitnikov) was in the 40th Rifle Division. With considerable difficulty, the attack was repulsed and the border was restored, however, this incident revealed shortcomings in the management and training of troops. Miscalculations were used to justify repression. Many commanders, including one of the five first Marshals of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher were arrested and then shot.
ENTRY IN I.M.MAISKY’S DIARY OF APRIL 12, 1938 ABOUT THE CONVERSATION WITH SUN FO
Sun Fo spent 6 weeks in Moscow. Negotiated with the Soviet government about assistance to China. He left satisfied and expressed gratitude to me for the careful implementation of the agreements we concluded in Moscow. However, Sun Fo apparently did not immediately become satisfied with the Moscow negotiations. As far as I could understand from his somewhat vague explanations in this part (in general, he speaks very clearly, precisely and frankly), on his way to Moscow, he hoped to convince the Soviet government of the need for a military action by the USSR against Japan in alliance with China. The Soviet government rejected such a proposal, but promised energetic assistance by sending weapons, airplanes, etc. The results are visible in the course of military operations in China. There is no doubt that the Chinese successes of three weeks are largely due to the arrival of our aircraft, our tanks, our artillery, etc. It is not surprising that Sun Fo now feels almost triumphant. The details of his decisive conversation with Comrade are curious. “I was told,” Sun Fo said, “that I would see your leader on a certain day, but they did not indicate the exact date. I got ready. I’m sitting at the embassy and waiting. Evening comes - 8 o'clock, 9 o'clock, 10 o'clock, 11 o'clock... Nothing!.. Somewhat disappointed, I decided to go to bed. He undressed and climbed into bed. Suddenly, at a quarter to twelve they came for me: “Please, they are waiting for you!” I jumped up, got dressed and drove off. Along with Stalin were Molotov and Voroshilov. At the end, Mikoyan and Yezhov also came. Our conversation lasted from 12 at night to 5 1/2 in the morning. And then everything was decided.” It was during this conversation, according to Sun Fo, that the Soviet government rejected direct military participation of the USSR in the fight against Japan. The motives put forward by Comrade Stalin in defense of such a line of behavior, as transmitted by Sun Fo, boil down to the following: 1) a military action by the USSR would immediately unite the entire Japanese nation, which is now far from united in supporting Japanese aggression in China; 2) a military offensive by the USSR, on the contrary, could frighten the right-wing elements in China and, thus, split the united national front that has now been created there; 3) a military offensive by the USSR with the prospect of our victory would frighten England and the USA and could turn the current sympathy of both countries for China into its opposite; 4) the military action of the USSR - and this is especially important - would be used by Germany to attack our country in Europe, and this would unleash a world war. For all the above reasons, Comrade Stalin considers an open military action by the USSR against Japan inappropriate. But he is ready to help China in every possible way by supplying weapons, etc. (Sun Fo is the head of the Chinese special mission sent to the USSR, England and France; Chiang Kai-shek’s confidant, millionaire). Published: Sokolov V.V. two meetings between Sun Fo and I.V. Stalin in 1938-1939. // New and recent history. 1999. N6.
HEAD OF THE PODGORNAYA BORDER POST P. TERESHKIN
On July 29, the head of the political department of the district, divisional commissar Bogdanov, and Colonel Grebnik arrived at the height of Zaozernaya. ...At the beginning of the conversation, Lieutenant Makhalin urgently called me by phone. I reported to Bogdanov. In response: “Let them act independently, do not allow the Japanese into our territory...”. Makhalin calls again and in an excited voice says: “A large detachment of Japanese violated the border and began to attack the border detachment’s locations, we will fight to the death, avenge us!” The connection was interrupted. I asked permission from divisional commissar Bogdanov to hold Makhalin’s group with heavy machine gun fire. I was refused this with the reasoning that this would cause retaliatory actions by the Japanese in the area of Zaozernaya Heights. Then I sent 2 squads under the command of Chernopyatko and Bataroshin to help Lieutenant Makhalin. Soon, divisional commissar Bogdanov and department head Grebnik left for Posiet. From the memoirs of Hero of the Soviet Union P.F. Tereshkina
ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR DEFENSE OF THE USSR No. 0071, August 4, 1938
In recent days, the Japanese in the Posyet region suddenly attacked our border units and captured part of Soviet territory near Lake Khasan. This new military provocation met with due resistance on our part. However, the Japanese stubbornly cling to Soviet territory, despite heavy losses of their troops. The provocative actions of the Japanese military are obviously calculated on our peacefulness and restraint. The Japanese believe that the Soviet Union and the Red Army will endlessly tolerate the brazen provocations of their military, which, under the guise of local border incidents, began to seize entire chunks of Soviet territory. We don’t want a single inch of foreign land, including Manchurian and Korean, but we will never give up even an inch of our own, Soviet land, to anyone, including the Japanese invaders! In order to be ready to repel provocative attacks of the Japanese-Manchus and in order to be ready at any moment to deliver a powerful blow to the burrowing, insolent Japanese aggressors along the entire front, immediately bring the troops of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front and the Trans-Baikal Military District to full combat readiness, for which I order: 1 Immediately return to their units all command, political, commanding and Red Army personnel from all types of work, secondments and vacations. 2. The Military Council of the DKFront take measures to cover the borders of the front. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account that if a new provocation arises from the Japanese-Manchus, then the covering troops with aircraft and tanks must be ready, upon special orders from Moscow, for an immediate powerful, crushing blow. 3. Bring the air forces of the DKFront and the Western Military District to full combat readiness: a) relocate air units to field airfields, providing them with air defense systems and reliable communications, having strong fists for powerful strikes; b) establish constant duty of fighter flights in full readiness for immediate departure; c) provide units at field airfields with bombs, ammunition for at least 2 sorties, at remote airfields for 5 sorties and fuel for 5 sorties; d) provide all flight personnel with oxygen devices for high-altitude flights and the required amount of oxygen; check and seal devices; e) The military councils of the DKFront, ZabVO, 1st and 2nd armies and the Khabarovsk group immediately, through special flight technical groups, together with the command, verify the readiness of the aircraft’s equipment, weapons and instruments. This check should be carried out at least four times a month. Commanders and commissars of air units should check daily; f) commanders and commissars of air units ensure the speed of refueling aircraft, hanging bombs and filling with cartridges; g) all commanders of the air forces of the specified front, armies, district and Khabarovsk group immediately have the stock of bombs, aircraft cartridges, fuel and technical personnel in charge of storing weapons and fuel checked, immediately eliminating all discovered shortcomings. 4. A. The Military Councils of the Democratic Front and the Western Military District should put all fortified areas on full combat readiness, reinforcing them, if necessary, with field troops. B. In fortified areas, their commandants: a) immediately install fully weapons and equipment in all structures; b) fill military installations with the required standard amount of ammunition and property; c) install wire barriers in important directions and build anti-tank obstacles; d) fully provide combat installations, command posts and field troops occupying fortified areas with communications means; e) establish a permanent military guard, patrol and observation service. 5. Rifle, cavalry and tank units must be placed in camps or bivouacs with combat support measures (security, duty units, air surveillance and air defense), having reliable communications within the formation. 6. In tank units, put ammunition in combat vehicles, have tanks constantly refueled and fully ready for immediate action. 7. In rifle and cavalry units: a) restore the full regular number of units in the units; b) check the readiness of mobilized plans for formations and units; c) issue the weapons and ammunition assigned to the soldiers to the units, where they are stored in a sealed form under the responsibility of the duty officer; d) transported supplies of ammunition should be placed in charging boxes and carts; e) commission repair horses no younger than 3 years old, check forging. Reforge horse train with old forging; f) have weapons and other property ready for quick delivery. 8. At air defense points, install artillery and machine gun units in position, relocate fighter aircraft to operational airfields and raise the VNOS system, checking the connection of VNOS posts with command posts and airfields of the fighter unit. 9. Fully provide transport parts with rubber, spare parts and fuel. 10. The military councils of the DKFront, the 1st and 2nd armies, the Khabarovsk group and the Western Military District: a) fully provide the units with all required property and ammunition according to wartime standards at the expense of the front-line (district, army) warehouses; b) put warehouses in order, and first of all, ammunition warehouses: dismantle the property stored in them, check the readiness of warehouses for the rapid release of property, review the security of warehouses and strengthen the main ones at the expense of secondary objects; c) conduct combat alerts of units and subunits. When raising units on combat alert, check their equipment and material security to the smallest detail in accordance with established standards and report cards. At the same time, conduct tactical exercises as part of formations, in which units raised on combat alert will act, obtaining from each commander, soldier and staff excellent knowledge of the terrain and combat conditions in their sector. Monitor the organization of communications at all levels of the headquarters service; d) pay special attention to training in night operations and repelling surprise enemy attacks at night and in fog, training your units to operate at night and in fog. I would like to draw the special attention of the entire command staff to this; e) in support units of border troops: 1) commanders of support units to develop on the ground, together with commanders of border units, a plan for border defense in their sectors. Provide technical communication between support units and the command of border units and with their direct superiors; 2) strengthen continuous military surveillance abroad, especially be vigilant at night; 3) study in detail the topography of their plots on the territory of the USSR; 4) store weapons and ammunition of support units in units, ensuring their uninterrupted food supply. 11. All measures to bring units into full combat readiness must be carried out while maintaining military secrets. 12. Commanders and commissars of all military formations should check all units and eliminate all detected deficiencies on the spot. The results of verifications and the measures taken must be reported in code to the command of units and formations, the Military Councils of the DKFront, the 1st and 2nd Armies, the Khabarovsk Army Group of Forces and the ZabVO once every five days, and the command of the DKFront and the ZabVO must be reported to the General Staff of the Red Army within the same period. Report receipt of this order and its communication to the executors no later than 24 hours on 08/06/38.37. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Army Commander 1st Rank B. Shaposhnikov
Present: Voroshilov, Stalin, Shchadenko... Blucher. Listened: About the events on the lake. Hassan. The Main Military Council, having heard a report from the NGO on the situation in the DKF [Far Eastern Red Banner Front] in connection with the events at Lake. Khasan, as well as the explanations of the front commander Comrade Blucher and the deputy front commander, member of the military council Mazepov, and having discussed this issue, we came to the following conclusions: 1. Combat operations near the lake. Khasan were a comprehensive test of the mobilization and combat readiness of not only those units that directly took part in them, but also of all DCF troops without exception. 2. The events of these few days revealed huge shortcomings in the composition of the DCF. The combat training of the troops, headquarters and command and control personnel of the front turned out to be at an unacceptably low level. The military units were torn apart and incapable of combat; The supply of military units is not organized. It was discovered that the Far Eastern theater was poorly prepared for war (roads, bridges, communications). Storage, conservation and accounting of mobilization and emergency reserves, both in front-line warehouses and military units, found themselves in a chaotic state. In addition to all this, it was discovered that the most important directives of the Main Military Council and NGOs were criminally not implemented by the front command for a long time. As a result of this unacceptable state of the front troops, we suffered significant losses in this relatively small clash - 408 people. killed and 2807 wounded. These losses cannot be justified either by the extremely difficult terrain in which our troops had to operate, or by the three times greater losses of the Japanese. The number of our troops, the participation of our aviation and tanks in operations gave us such advantages that our losses in battles could be much smaller... Moreover, the percentage of losses of command and political personnel is unnaturally high - about 40%, which once again proves that The Japanese were defeated and thrown beyond our borders only thanks to the fighting enthusiasm of the fighters, junior commanders, middle and senior command and political personnel, who were ready to sacrifice themselves, defending the honor and inviolability of the territory of their great socialist Motherland, as well as thanks to the skillful management of operations against the Japanese, i.e. Stern and the correct leadership of Comrade Rychagov in the actions of our aviation (...) During the period of hostilities, we had to resort to cobbling together units from different units and individual fighters, allowing harmful organizational improvisation, creating all kinds of confusion, which could not but affect the actions of our troops. The troops advanced to the border on a combat alert completely unprepared... In many cases, entire artillery batteries found themselves at the front without shells, spare barrels for machine guns were not fitted in advance, rifles were issued unsighted, and many soldiers, and even one of the rifle units of the 32nd division , arrived at the front without rifles or gas masks at all. Despite the huge reserves of clothing, many soldiers were sent into battle in completely worn-out shoes, half-footed, and a large number of Red Army soldiers were without overcoats. Commanders and staffs lacked maps of the combat area. All types of troops, especially the infantry, showed an inability to act on the battlefield, to maneuver, to combine movement and fire, to apply themselves to the terrain... tank units were used ineptly, as a result of which they suffered heavy losses in materiel. The culprit for these major shortcomings and for the excessive losses we suffered in a relatively small clash are the commanders, commissars and chiefs of all levels of the DKF and, first of all, the commander of the DKF, Marshal Blucher... The Main Military Council decides: 1. The administration of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front is to be disbanded. 2. Marshal Blucher should be removed from the post of commander of the DKF troops and left at the disposal of the Main Military Council of the Red Army. 3. Create two separate armies from the DKF troops, directly subordinate to the NPO... RGVA. F. 4. Op. 18. D. 46. L. 183-189 Blucher V. (1890-1938). Since 1929, commander of the Separate Far Eastern Red Banner Army. In the summer of 1938 - commander of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front. Arrested and shot in 1938. Rehabilitated after 1953. Stern G. (1900-1941). In 1938 - chief of staff of the Far Eastern Front. In 1941 - Colonel General, Head of the Main Directorate of Air Defense of the NPO of the USSR. Arrested on June 7, 1941 on charges of participation in an anti-Soviet military conspiratorial organization. Shot without trial on October 28, 1941. Rehabilitated in 1954. Rychagov P. (1911-1941) - Lieutenant General of Aviation (1940). In 1938 - commander of the Air Force of the Primorsky Group of the Far Eastern Front, 1st Separate Red Banner Army. In 1940 - Head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force. Arrested on June 24, 1941 on charges of participation in an anti-Soviet military conspiratorial organization. Shot without trial on October 28, 1941. Rehabilitated in 1954.
ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR DEFENSE OF THE USSR No. 0169, September 8, 1938
On the imposition of penalties on the command of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front for violating the orders of the NKO On August 7, 1938, during the period of hot battles with the Japanese in the area of Lake Khasan, the deputy commander of the DKFront, corps commander Comrade Filatov, signed an order on the disbandment of medical battalions and field hospitals in the rifle divisions located in battles. The Military Council of the 1st Army delayed the execution of this order. On August 17, the corps commander, Comrade Filatov, made another gross mistake - he ordered the deputy commander of the front air force to provide a DB-3 aircraft for the transfer of a representative of the NKVD from Khabarovsk to the city of Chita, thereby violating the orders of NKO No. 022 of 1934 and [No. 022] of 1936, categorically prohibiting the use of combat aircraft as transport vehicles. Asked on my orders why the plane was provided, and even the DB-3, Comrade Filatov reported that he had given the order to provide the plane, but did not indicate the type of plane; Meanwhile, Comrade Senatorov reported to me that Comrade Filatov’s written order specifically indicated DB-3. Thus, Comrade Filatov did not find the courage to admit his mistake, did not tell the truth, trying to shift the blame to Comrade Senatorov. In turn, the deputy commander of the DKFront Air Force, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel Comrade Senatorov, having received and executed the order of the Corps Commander Comrade Filatov to send an aircraft for the specified purpose, did not report to him about the illegality of this order. Wine vol. Filatov and Senatorov is aggravated all the more so because they, having violated my orders, also did not take the necessary measures to organize this flight, and the plane crashed on the way back from Chita to Khabarovsk and 3 crew members were killed. For a frivolous attitude towards service and violation of NKO orders No. 022 of 1934 and No. 022 of 1936, I severely reprimand Comrade Commander Filatov. I put Colonel Comrade Senatorov on notice for violating NKO orders No. 022 of 1934 and 1936. I warn you that for the use of combat aircraft for purposes not related to combat and training missions, I will severely punish those responsible. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov
We can safely say that the generation that had to withstand severe trials in the crucible of the Great Patriotic War was brought up on the glorious military traditions and exploits of the Far Easterners...R.Ya. Malinovsky,
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Tanker March Music: Dm. and Dan. Pokrass Words: B. Laskin 1939.
More than seventy years have passed since the Khasan events. They belong to history, which is always ready to teach useful lessons and enrich us with the necessary experience.
In the 1930s, the Soviet Union constantly strived for peaceful relations with neighboring countries in the Far East, including Japan, which was in common interests. However, this policy did not find a response from the then ruling circles of Japan.
Japanese leaders and the press conducted anti-Soviet propaganda and openly declared the need to prepare for war against the Soviet Union. General S. Hayashi, who came to power in February 1937, at the very first meeting of the government he led, declared that “the policy of liberalism towards the communists will be ended.”
Openly anti-Soviet articles began to appear in Japanese newspapers calling for a “march to the Urals.”
In May-June 1938, a propaganda campaign was launched in Japan around supposedly “disputed territories” on the border of Manchukuo with Russian Primorye. At the beginning of July 1938, the Japanese border troops located west of Lake Khasan were reinforced with field units that concentrated on the eastern bank of the Tumen-Ula River. And immediately before the start of the conflict, the Japanese army command sent a division stationed in Korea (numbering about 10 thousand people), a heavy artillery division and about 2 thousand soldiers of the Kwantung Army to the Zaozernaya Heights area. This group was led by Colonel Isamu Nagai, a member of the nationalist “Sakura Society”, an active participant in Japan’s capture of Northeast China in 1931.
The Japanese side explained the preparation for hostilities and the concentration of their troops to the area of Lake Khasan by the fact that the USSR border zone near this lake is supposedly Manchurian territory.
On July 15, 1938, the Charge d'Affaires of Japan in the USSR appeared at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and demanded the withdrawal of Soviet border guards from the heights in the area of Lake Khasan. After the Japanese representative was presented with the Hunchun Agreement between Russia and China of 1886 and the map attached to it, irrefutably indicating that Lake Khasan and the heights adjacent to it from the west are on Soviet territory and that, therefore, there are no violations in this no area, he retreated. However, on July 20, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, Shigemitsu, repeated his claims to the Khasan area. When it was pointed out to him that such claims were unfounded, the ambassador said: if Japan's demands are not met, it will use force.
Naturally, there was no question of fulfilling the unfounded territorial claims of the Japanese.
And then, in the early morning of July 29, 1938, a Japanese company, under the cover of fog, violated the state border of the USSR, shouting “banzai” and attacked Bezymyannaya Height. The night before, a detachment of 11 border guards, led by the assistant head of the outpost, Lieutenant Alexei Makhalin, arrived at this height.
...The Japanese chains surrounded the trench more and more tightly, and the border guards were running out of ammunition. Eleven soldiers heroically repelled the onslaught of superior enemy forces for several hours, and several border guards died. Then Alexey Makhalin decides to break through the encirclement with hand-to-hand combat. He rises to his full height and says “Forward! For the Motherland!” rushes with the fighters into a counterattack.
They managed to break through the encirclement. But out of the eleven, six defenders of Nameless remained alive. Alexey Makhalin also died. At the cost of heavy losses, the Japanese managed to take control of the heights. But soon a group of border guards and a rifle company under the command of Lieutenant D. Levchenko arrived at the battlefield. With a bold bayonet attack and grenades, our soldiers knocked out the invaders from the heights.
At dawn on July 30, enemy artillery brought down dense, concentrated fire onto the heights. And then the Japanese attacked several times, but Lieutenant Levchenko’s company fought to the death. The company commander himself was wounded three times, but did not leave the battle. A battery of anti-tank guns under Lieutenant I. Lazarev came to the aid of Levchenko’s unit and shot the Japanese with direct fire. One of our gunners died. Lazarev, wounded in the shoulder, took his place. The artillerymen managed to suppress several enemy machine guns and destroy almost a company of the enemy. It was with difficulty that the battery commander was forced to leave for dressing. A day later he was back in action and fought until final success. . . And Lieutenant Alexei Makhalin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously).
The Japanese invaders decided to strike a new and main blow in the area of the Zaozernaya hill. Anticipating this, the command of the Posyet border detachment - Colonel K.E. Grebennik - organized the defense of Zaozernaya. The northern slope of the height was guarded by a detachment of border guards under the command of Lieutenant Tereshkin. In the center and on the southern slope of Zaozernaya there was a reserve outpost of Lieutenant Khristolubov and a squad of fighters of a maneuver group with two crews of heavy machine guns. On the southern bank of Khasan there was a branch of Gilfan Batarshin. Their task was to cover the command post of the squad leader and prevent the Japanese from reaching the rear of the border guards. Senior Lieutenant Bykhovtsev’s group strengthened on Bezymyannaya. Near the height was the 2nd company of the 119th regiment of the 40th Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant Levchenko. Each height was a small, independently operating stronghold. Approximately halfway between the heights there was a group of Lieutenant Ratnikov, covering the flanks with reinforced units. Ratnikov had 16 soldiers with a machine gun. In addition, he was given a platoon of small-caliber guns and four light T-26 tanks.
However, when the battle began, it turned out that the forces of the border defenders were meager. The lesson at Bezymyannaya was useful for the Japanese, and they brought into action two reinforced divisions with a total number of up to 20 thousand people, about 200 guns and mortars, three armored trains, and a battalion of tanks. The Japanese pinned great hopes on their “suicide bombers” who also took part in the battle.
On the night of July 31, a Japanese regiment, with artillery support, attacked Zaozernaya. The defenders of the hill returned fire, and then counterattacked the enemy and drove him back. Four times the Japanese rushed to Zaozernaya and each time they were forced to retreat with losses. A powerful avalanche of Japanese troops, although at the cost of heavy losses, managed to push back our fighters and reach the lake.
Then, by decision of the government, units of the First Primorsky Army entered the battle. Its soldiers and commanders, heroically fighting together with the border guards, cleared our territory of Japanese invaders after fierce military clashes on August 9, 1938.
Aviators, tank crews, and artillerymen also made a significant contribution to the overall success of repelling the enemy. Accurate bomb strikes fell on the heads of the invaders, the enemy was thrown to the ground by dashing tank attacks, and destroyed by irresistible and powerful artillery salvoes.
The campaign of Japanese troops to Lake Khasan ended ingloriously. After August 9, the Japanese government had no choice but to enter into negotiations to end hostilities. On August 10, the USSR government proposed a truce to the Japanese side. The Japanese government accepted our terms, also agreeing to create a commission to resolve the controversial border issue.
For the massive heroism shown in the battles near Lake Khasan, thousands of Soviet soldiers were awarded high state awards, many became Heroes of the Soviet Union.
Settlements, streets, schools, and ships were named after the heroes. The memory of the valiant warriors is still preserved in the hearts of Russians, in the hearts of the Far Easterners.
60 years separate us from the time of the conflict at Lake Khasan. But even today this event continues to attract the attention of political and military leaders, historians in our country and abroad.
In the conflict at Lake Khasan, domestic troops not only entered into battle with an experienced enemy army for the first time since the Civil War. The provocative actions of the Japanese had a long-range aim: a local conflict for the Japanese General Staff could only become a prelude to larger-scale actions. Maybe - to war.
Hence the enduring significance of the victorious successes at Hasan, which is rightly celebrated today, sixty years later. And then, in the thirties, this victory also contributed to the intensification of the national liberation war of the Chinese people against the Japanese invaders: during the battles on Khasan, the Japanese army practically stopped the offensive on the Chinese front.
No less important was the military-political side of this conflict. The defeat of the imperial army was the first of a number of reasons that kept Japan from moving against the USSR during the Second World War. As noted in documents of that time: “Our firm position in these events forced the presumptuous adventurers both in Tokyo and Berlin to come to their senses. . . There is no doubt that by doing this the Soviet Union rendered the greatest service to the cause of peace.”
However, just as the sea is reflected in a drop of water, the Khasan events highlighted not only positives, but also a number of negative aspects characteristic of the state of the country and the army in those years.
Yes, the Far Eastern fighters and commanders fought heroically and did not retreat, but their lack of preparation for battles and confusion during them should have made them think about it in anticipation of future formidable trials. “We now not only know the price of our enemy, but also saw those shortcomings in the combat training of the Red Army units and border troops, which were not noticed by many before the Khasan operation. We will make a huge mistake if, based on the experience of the Khasan operation, we fail to move to the highest class of ability to defeat the enemy,” this is how experts in hot pursuit assessed what happened. However, not all of Hassan’s lessons were learned: June 1941 turned out to be so tragically similar to the first days of the fighting at Hassan, so much of what preceded them coincided! In the light of Hassan, the catastrophic situation that had developed by 1939 in the command echelons of the Red Army is assessed in a new way; it is enough to analyze the actions of the command staff in the operation. And perhaps today, 60 years later, we understand this more clearly, more comprehensively.
And yet, the events on Khasan, with all their complexity and ambiguity, clearly demonstrated the military power of the USSR. The experience of fighting with the regular Japanese army greatly helped the training of our soldiers and commanders during the battles at Khalkin Gol in 1939 and in the Manchurian strategic operation in August 1945.
To understand everything, you need to know everything. The time has come to rediscover Khasan - for serious research by scientists, historians, local historians, writers, all Russian people. And not for the duration of the holiday campaign, but for many years.