Unknown pages of the Great Patriotic War

In July 1943, the world's attention was focused on Russia. The greatest battle unfolded on the Kursk Bulge, on the outcome of which the further course of the Second World War depended. It is a well-known fact that German military leaders in their memoirs regarded this battle as decisive, and their defeat in it as the complete collapse of the Third Reich. It would seem that everything in the history of the Battle of Kursk is completely clear. However, real historical facts indicate the possibility of a completely different development of events.

The Fuhrer's fatal decision

When planning the summer campaign of 1943, the German High Command was of the view that there was a real opportunity to seize the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front. The Stalingrad disaster seriously shook the position of German troops on the southern flank of the front, but did not lead to the complete defeat of Army Group South. In the battle for Kharkov that followed approximately six weeks after the surrender of Paulus’s army, the Germans managed to inflict a heavy defeat on the Soviet troops of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts and thereby stabilize the front line. These were the operational-strategic prerequisites for the plan for a grandiose offensive operation, which was developed at the Wehrmacht General Staff under the code name “Citadel”.

On May 3, 1943, in Munich, at a meeting chaired by Hitler, the first discussion of the plan for Operation Citadel took place.

The famous German military leader Heinz Guderian, who took a direct part in this meeting, recalled: “Among those present were all the heads of the OKW departments, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces with his main advisers, the commanders of Army Groups South von Manstein and Center von Kluge, commander 9th Army Model, Minister Speer and others. An extremely important issue was discussed - whether Army Groups South and Center would be able to launch a large-scale offensive in the summer of 1943. This issue was raised as a result of the proposal of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General Zeitzler, which implied a double enveloping attack on a large Russian-held arc west of Kursk. If the operation had been successful, many Russian divisions would have been destroyed, which would have decisively weakened the offensive power of the Russian army and changed the situation on the Eastern Front in a direction favorable to Germany. This issue was already discussed in April, but in view of the blow recently received at Stalingrad, at that time the forces for large-scale offensive operations were clearly insufficient.”

It should be noted that, thanks to the effective work of intelligence, the Soviet command was aware in advance of the plans for the German offensive on the Kursk Bulge. Accordingly, a system of powerful, deeply echeloned defense was being prepared to meet this attack by German troops. The axiomatic rule of strategy is well known: revealing the enemy’s plans means half winning. This is exactly what one of the most talented front-line Wehrmacht generals, Walter Model, warned Hitler about.

Returning to the above-mentioned meeting at Führer Headquarters, let us pay attention to Guderian’s testimony: “Model cited information, based mainly on aerial photography, that the Russians had prepared strong, deeply echeloned defensive positions precisely where our two army groups were supposed to attack. The Russians have already withdrawn most of their mobile units from the front edge of the Kursk Bulge. Anticipating the possibility of an enveloping attack from our side, they strengthened the defense in the directions of our upcoming breakthrough with a large concentration of artillery and anti-tank weapons there. The model made the absolutely correct conclusion from this that the enemy expects just such an offensive from us and we should abandon this idea altogether.” Let us add that Model outlined his warnings in a memo to Hitler, who was greatly impressed by this document. First of all, for the reason that Model was one of the few military leaders who earned the Fuhrer’s complete trust. But he was far from the only general who clearly understood all the fatal consequences of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge.

Heinz Guderian spoke out against Operation Citadel in an even harsher and more decisive tone. He directly stated that the offensive was pointless.

The German army had just completed the reorganization and recruitment of units on the Eastern Front after the Stalingrad disaster. An offensive according to Zeiztler's plan will inevitably lead to heavy losses, which will not be able to be replenished throughout 1943. But mobile reserves are urgently needed on the Western Front so that they can be thrown against the Allied landings expected in 1944.

In this case, Guderian’s opinion completely coincided with the point of view of another experienced general - the head of the Operations Department of the Fuhrer Headquarters, Walter Warlimont, who noted in his memoirs: “Army formations maintained in combat readiness for operations in the Mediterranean theater were at the same time the core of the offensive forces for the only the major 1943 offensive in the East known as Operation Citadel. It became increasingly likely that this operation would coincide with the expected start of the Western Allied offensive in the Mediterranean. On June 18, the OKW operational headquarters presented Hitler with an assessment of the situation, which contained a proposal to cancel Operation Citadel.” What was the Fuhrer's reaction? “On that day,” Warlimont recalled, “Hitler decided that although he appreciated this point of view, Operation Citadel must be carried out.”

At the end of June 1943, about two weeks before the start of the fateful offensive on Kursk, another general who was unconditionally trusted by Hitler, OKW Chief of Staff Alfred Jodl, returned from vacation. According to Warlimont, Jodl “strongly objected to the premature entry into battle of the main reserves in the east; he argued both verbally and in writing that local success was all that could be expected from Operation Citadel for the situation as a whole.”

The Fuhrer could not ignore Jodl's opinion. “Hitler clearly wavered,” Warlimont recalled.

To complete this paradoxical picture, we note that on July 5, the day the Battle of Kursk began, Jodl gave instructions to the Wehrmacht propaganda department regarding Operation Citadel. The entry in the OKW combat log reads: “Present the operation as a counterattack, preventing the Russian advance and preparing the ground for the withdrawal of troops.” In addition to Jodl, the commander of Army Group South, Erich von Manstein, and the Minister of Armaments, Albert Speer, spoke out against the fatal offensive. In addition, on May 10, Guderian made another desperate attempt to convince Hitler to abandon Operation Citadel, and the Fuhrer seemed to listen to him...

But nevertheless, the German army launched a doomed offensive, suffering defeat and completely losing its chances for a successful outcome of the war. “It is still unclear how Hitler was persuaded to launch this offensive,” Guderian stated. What happened?

Intrigues at Hitler's Headquarters

It should be especially emphasized that the entire process of development and preparation of Operation Citadel was carried out by the main command of the ground forces (OKH) in its General Staff. In addition to the OKH, there was also the Luftwaffe High Command (OKL) and the Kriegsmarine High Command (OKM) with their own General Staffs. The nominally superior structure in relation to the OKH, OKL and OKM was the OKW - the Supreme High Command or Fuhrer Headquarters. At the same time, Hitler, after the resignation of Field Marshal Brauchitsch in December 1941, assumed the duties of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. Thus, the leadership of all these structures obviously found themselves in a situation of mutual struggle for powers and influence over the Fuhrer, which he himself contributed to, following his favorite principle of “Divide and conquer.”

Even before the start of the war, relations between the OKW and OKH were extremely strained. The war only worsened this situation.

Let us give one typical example illustrating the general rule: in December 1943, the OKH, without the knowledge of the OKW, took to the Eastern Front all the assault guns from the airfield divisions concentrated in France and under the jurisdiction of the OKW. In the scandal that followed, Hitler took the side of the OKW, issuing a special directive on this matter.

The story of Operation Citadel was a classic case. General Zeitzler perceived the OKW generals' objections to the attack on Kursk... as intrigues against the OKH. Warlimont testifies: “Hitler considered it necessary to deal with Zeitzer’s complaint against Jodl - supposedly Jodl’s objections were nothing more than interference in the sphere of competence of the ground forces.” “Perhaps the decisive factor was the pressure from the Chief of the General Staff,” Guderian echoed Warlimont in his memoirs. Paradoxical but true: Zeitzler insisted on carrying out a doomed offensive operation in order to put his OKW competitors in their place and prevail over them in the struggle for the strategic reserves that both sides needed to carry out their plans!

Zeitzler's attitude towards Guderian's opinion has a similar explanation. The fact is that on February 28, 1943, Guderian was appointed to the post of Inspector General of Armored Forces, reporting directly to Hitler. It is not difficult to imagine Zeitzler's reaction, since previously all other inspector generals, including the inspector general of armored forces, were subordinate to the chief of the General Staff. In his memoirs, Albert Speer stated: “The relationship between these military leaders was extremely tense due to unresolved problems in the sphere of division of powers.” One more important point should be taken into account: the commander of Army Group Center von Kluge disliked Guderian much more strongly than Zeitzler. The old field marshal could not stand the young talented tank general since the campaign in France. In the summer of 1941, they both ended up in Army Group Center, and Kluge constantly put a spoke in Guderian’s wheels, even insisting that he be put on trial.

Moreover, it was in June 1943 that this hatred went so far that he decided to challenge Guderian to a duel and asked Hitler in writing to act as his second.

It is not surprising that at the meeting in Munich, where the fate of Operation Citadel was being decided, Kluge decided to annoy Guderian and began, as the latter recalled, to “ardently defend Zeitzler’s plan.”

As a result, ordinary soldiers at the front became the victims of all these intrigues.

Disagreements in the Soviet Headquarters

Our command knew absolutely everything about the enemy’s plans: the composition and number of strike groups, the directions of their upcoming attacks, the timing of the start of the offensive. At first glance, nothing stood in the way of making the only right decision. But even at Soviet Headquarters, events developed no less dramatically and could have followed a completely different scenario.

As soon as full information about Operation Citadel reached Stalin and the General Staff, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was faced with the dilemma of choosing between two mutually exclusive options. The fact is that the two military leaders, whose troops were to decide the outcome of the Battle of Kursk, had sharp disagreements, and each of them appealed to Stalin. Commander of the Central Front K.K. Rokossovsky (on the picture) proposed a transition to a deliberate defense in order to exhaust and bleed the advancing enemy, followed by a counteroffensive for his final defeat. But the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin insisted that our troops go on the offensive without any defensive actions. Both commanders also differed in the choice of directions for the main attack: Rokossovsky proposed the northern, Oryol direction as the main goal, while Vatutin considered the southern one - towards Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk. Since, due to intrigues at the Fuhrer Headquarters, the timing of Operation Citadel was postponed several times by Hitler, the struggle between two mutually exclusive opinions at the Supreme Command Headquarters became increasingly intense.

Being one of the most talented commanders of our army and possessing a genuine gift of strategic foresight, Rokossovsky was the first to absolutely correctly assess the situation.

Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov noted in his memoirs: “In April, when member of the State Defense Committee G.M. arrived to familiarize himself with the situation and needs of the Central Front. Malenkov and Deputy Chief of the General Staff A.I. Antonov, Rokossovsky directly expressed their thoughts to them - now they need to think not about the offensive, but to prepare and prepare as thoroughly as possible for defense, because the enemy will definitely use the front configuration that is favorable to him and will try to encircle the troops of both, Central and Voronezh, with attacks from the north and south, fronts in order to achieve decisive results in the conduct of the war. Malenkov suggested that Rokossovsky write a memo on this issue to Stalin, which was done... Rokossovsky’s note had an effect. Both fronts were given instructions to intensify work on organizing defense, and in May-June 1943, a Reserve Front was created in the rear of both fronts, which was later called Steppe when it was put into operation.”

However, Vatutin, despite the evidence, stood his ground, and Stalin began to hesitate. The bold offensive plans of the commander of the Voronezh Front clearly appealed to him. And the passive behavior of the Germans seemed to confirm Vatutin was right. Since his increasingly persistent proposals began to arrive at Headquarters on the eve of the German offensive, the question arose of revising the entire carefully developed plan for the operation to defeat the German troops on the Kursk Bulge, known as “Kutuzov”. Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky recalled: “The commander of the Voronezh Front, N.F., began to show particular impatience. Vatutin. My arguments that the enemy going on the offensive against us was a matter of the next few days and that our offensive would certainly be beneficial to the enemy did not convince him. One day, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief told me that Vatutin called him and insisted that we begin our offensive no later than the first days of July. Stalin further said that he considered this proposal worthy of the most serious attention.” Thus, the fate of the upcoming battle and our army hung in the balance.

What consequences would the adoption of Vatutin’s plan by the Supreme Command Headquarters entail? Without exaggeration, this would mean disaster for our army.

When advancing in a southern direction, Soviet troops would have to face the main forces of the enemy, since it was Army Group South, according to the plan for Operation Citadel, that delivered the main blow and had the maximum reserves. Manstein, being a generally recognized specialist in defensive operations in the Wehrmacht, would not have missed the chance to arrange another defeat for Vatutin, similar to the Kharkov one. According to A.E. Golovanov, Rokossovsky clearly understood this danger: “The organized defense gave Rokossovsky firm confidence that he would defeat the enemy, and our possible attack gave rise to speculation. Given the balance of forces and means that has developed now, it was difficult to hope for confident success in the event of our offensive actions.” Moreover, the advancing Soviet troops were threatened with a flank attack from Army Group Center. The then Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, S.M., wrote in his memoirs about the reality of such a threat. Shtemenko: “Vatutin’s plan did not affect the center of the Soviet-German front and the main, western strategic direction, did not neutralize Army Group Center, which in this case would threaten the flanks of our most important fronts.”

While Stalin was hesitating on which side to take, the Germans resolved his doubts by launching their offensive. A.E. Golovanov was present at the Supreme Command Headquarters on the night of July 4–5, 1943, and described in his memoirs the astonishing scene:

“Is Rokossovsky really mistaken?..” said the Supreme Commander.

It was already morning when a phone call stopped me. Without haste, Stalin picked up the HF receiver. Rokossovsky called. In a joyful voice he reported:

- Comrade Stalin! The Germans have launched an offensive!

-What are you happy about? – the Supreme Commander asked somewhat surprised.

– Now victory will be ours, Comrade Stalin! – answered Konstantin Konstantinovich.

The conversation was over."

“Still, Rokossovsky turned out to be right,” Stalin admitted.

But it could happen that he would eventually agree to a premature offensive according to Vatutin’s plan. As food for thought, we can recall how just two months later, in September 1943, new disagreements arose between the same commanders - Rokossovsky and Vatutin - on the question of which direction was best to take Kyiv. This time Stalin took Vatutin's side. The result was the infamous tragedy at the Bukrinsky bridgehead. But that's a completely different story.

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The Doomed Citadel

Afterwards, Hitler still hoped to achieve victory in the war against the USSR. To solve this problem, the German command decided to conduct a major offensive operation in the summer of 1943. On April 15, 1943, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 6, a plan for the summer offensive of German troops on the eastern front. The plan for this operation was developed by the Wehrmacht High Command in the second half of March - early April 1943 and provided for the defeat of the main forces of the Red Army near Kursk, seizing the strategic initiative and changing the course of the war in favor of Germany. The operation was codenamed "Citadel".

A decisive improvement in the activities of intelligence agencies was required

Preparation for the summer-autumn campaign of 1943 required a decisive improvement in the activities of the entire system of intelligence agencies of the USSR, including the intelligence of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO), which included all types of military intelligence: foreign (strategic), operational, tactical, radio intelligence. and aerial reconnaissance.

In February 1943, a number of front commanders asked for the operational intelligence agencies to be returned to their subordination. This request was considered and approved at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, to which the Marshals of the Soviet Union and the Army General were invited. In April 1943, by decree of the State Defense Committee (GKO), two intelligence departments were created in the military intelligence system: the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army (GRU KA) and the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army (RU GSH KA).

The GRU KA was subordinate to the People's Commissar of Defense and was the Main Intelligence Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. The GRU KA was entrusted with the tasks of conducting foreign (strategic) human intelligence. Lieutenant General I.I. was appointed head of the GRU of the spacecraft. Ilyichev.

The Military Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the KA was transformed into the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, which was responsible for organizing and conducting operational intelligence. Lieutenant General F.F. was appointed head of the RU General Staff of the spacecraft. Kuznetsov.

The conditions of war that changed at the beginning of 1943 (the defeat of a group of German troops in the Stalingrad area, preparations for a new summer campaign) brought to the fore the tasks of providing the activities of the State Defense Committee, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) and the General Staff with military-political information of a strategic nature. At the same time, while improving the activities of foreign intelligence NPOs, the Supreme Command Headquarters paid significant attention to strengthening operational and front-line intelligence. In April 1943, an order was prepared by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin “On the state of military intelligence agencies and measures to improve its activities.” It indicated that the experience of the troops' combat activities showed that the commanders of units and formations did not pay due attention to military intelligence. The commanders of the fronts and armies asked little of the commanders of divisions and regiments about the state of military intelligence and did not strive to improve the intelligence literacy of combined arms commanders. Intelligence units were very often used for other purposes than their intended purpose.

The order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief noted that reconnaissance units, as a rule, were not provided with material resources; no moral or material incentives were created to ensure that the best combat commanders and fighters who wanted to prove themselves in the field of reconnaissance joined the reconnaissance units and intelligence agencies. .

Serious shortcomings were also mentioned in the training of intelligence personnel; it was pointed out that because of this, military intelligence units were not staffed, which did not allow them to efficiently solve the problems of obtaining information about the enemy.

Shortcomings were also pointed out in the activities of military intelligence units, which in a number of cases carried out their work separately and did not consider it necessary to report all the data they received to the intelligence departments of the fronts and armies.

A serious drawback that had a significant impact on obtaining operational information about the enemy was the lack of aviation reconnaissance equipment at the disposal of the reconnaissance departments of the fronts and armies. The reconnaissance regiments available in the air armies, as a rule, conducted limited reconnaissance in the interests of the Air Force and were staffed with operationally and tactically inexperienced observer pilots.

In general, the order emphasized that the combat activities of reconnaissance units and intelligence agencies were at a low level and did not sufficiently provide the troops with the necessary data about the enemy. The intelligence officers showed little initiative or ingenuity during operations to obtain information about the enemy. There were shortcomings in the processing of all intelligence data, the organization of the interrogation of prisoners of war and the processing of captured documents were assessed unsatisfactorily.

In order to improve the work of military intelligence, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered:

1. “Oblige commanders of regiments, divisions, corps, commanders of armies and fronts to pay serious attention to the matter of intelligence.

   Chiefs of staff everywhere supervise the work of intelligence chiefs and check their implementation.

2. Reconnaissance units and reconnaissance commanders should be used only for their intended purpose to carry out combat reconnaissance missions, in no case should they be assigned tasks like ordinary rifle companies in battle, and should not be assigned to guard headquarters.
3. In the combat activities of intelligence agencies, they should more widely practice various forms and methods of reconnaissance, showing ingenuity and military cunning in all areas of intelligence, including the use of spies, organizing ambushes and sabotage raids on communication lines and centers, on individual officers and enemy headquarters in order to their defeat, capture of prisoners and operational documents.
4. By May 10, 1943, fully staff all intelligence agencies and units of the Karelian, Leningrad, Volkhov, North-Western, Kalinin, Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, South-Western, Southern, North Caucasus fronts and the 7th department. Army, not allowing intelligence agencies and intelligence units to continue to be short-staffed. Intelligence agencies and units should be staffed with proactive commanders and Red Army soldiers capable of being real intelligence officers, including military volunteers.”

Further, the order ordered that all documents captured from the enemy be immediately delivered to the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the fronts and armies, and that a faculty be formed at the Higher Special School of the Red Army to train employees of the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the fronts and armies; at the Higher Intelligence Retraining Courses, train reconnaissance commanders for regiments of divisions and armies; from among the cadets - graduates of infantry schools, select the most capable to staff military intelligence agencies. It was recommended that before being assigned to the troops, young commanders of the Red Army were required to be trained in intelligence work for a month according to a special program.

Considerable attention was paid to strengthening military intelligence and increasing the efficiency of its activities. For these purposes, it was recommended that courses for junior lieutenants of fronts and armies create training units to train commanders of reconnaissance companies and platoons, and organize permanent training units in reserve units of fronts, armies and division training battalions to train junior reconnaissance commanders.

Taking into account the particular complexity and danger of intelligence work, the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief provided for the development of measures for the moral and material encouragement of distinguished military intelligence officers. The head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army was instructed to develop and submit for approval a system of incentives and pay for commanders and reconnaissance fighters. By order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief it was established that the heads of intelligence departments of fronts, armies, corps and division intelligence departments are deputy chiefs of the corresponding intelligence headquarters.

The heads of the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the North-Western, Kalinin, Western, Bryansk, Central, South-Western, Southern and North Caucasian fronts received instructions to create and fully equip motorized reconnaissance companies consisting of 6 to 10 armored vehicles by May 15, 1943, from 30 to 40 motorcycles with sidecars and from 15 to 20 Willys vehicles (depending on the size of the front) for use in the main directions of offensive operations.

The order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief required the restoration of reconnaissance units in all cavalry units and formations (reconnaissance divisions in cavalry corps, reconnaissance squadrons in cavalry divisions and reconnaissance platoons in cavalry regiments), gave the right to the heads of intelligence departments of fronts and armies to assign tasks to the heads of intelligence agencies of special branches of the military and control their implementation, operationally subordinate the reconnaissance aviation regiments of the air armies to the heads of the reconnaissance departments of the front headquarters, have the Yak-7 and Pe-2 aircraft as part of the reconnaissance aviation regiments, and create aviation reconnaissance departments as part of the reconnaissance departments of the front headquarters , staffing them with tactically competent combined arms commanders.

The order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief also stated:

“... By May 1, 1943, the Commander of the Red Army Air Force is to place at the disposal of the heads of the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the Leningrad, Volkhov, Kalinin, Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, Southwestern, Southern and North Caucasian fronts one Douglas aircraft and one two U-2 aircraft to carry out special reconnaissance missions, staffing them with the best night crews.

The head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army is to allocate 150 political workers at the disposal of the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army to work in intelligence agencies.”

The Main Political Directorate of the Red Army was instructed to organize the preparation of materials about military intelligence officers for newspapers and magazines, prepare the publication of books about the activities of intelligence officers in Russian and foreign languages, all commanders were recommended to “study the enemy, improve intelligence - the eyes and ears of the Red Army, remember that without you can’t beat the enemy for sure.”

The order “On the state of military intelligence bodies and measures to improve its activities” played a significant role in increasing the efficiency of military intelligence intelligence activities.

At the same time, in connection with the creation of the GRU KA, an urgent need arose for a clear delineation of functions between the Main Intelligence Directorate of the NKO and the foreign intelligence agencies of the NKVD. For these purposes, the State Defense Committee adopted Resolution No. 3522ss “Measures to improve the foreign work of intelligence agencies of the USSR”, according to which it was determined that the function of the GRU NPO is to conduct intelligence in the interests of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. The function of the First Main Directorate of the NKVD is to conduct political intelligence.

The GKO Resolution stated that the intelligence agencies of the USSR should direct their main attention to work against Germany, Japan and Italy, strengthen intelligence work in England, the USA and Turkey, intensify the activities of residencies under the guise of official missions, practice sending abroad personnel of intelligence agencies consisting of various delegations, commissions.

The decision of the State Defense Committee required expanding the creation of illegal residencies in the territories of foreign states; the forms of their cover were indicated, such as the organization of trading firms, cinemas, photo studios, restaurants, as well as the entry of partners into various firms, enterprises, etc.

Based on the decision of the State Defense Committee, the command of the GRU KA on April 27, 1943 developed the Regulations “On measures to improve intelligence work abroad.”

In order to increase the reliability of intelligence information used by the top political leadership of the USSR and the command of the Red Army, by decision of the State Defense Committee in the spring of 1943, under the Chief of the General Staff, a Group was formed for the generalization and analysis of intelligence information about the enemy (Intelligence Group). The group included the heads of the intelligence agencies of the USSR: the heads of the GRU KA, RU GSh KA, RU NK Navy, PGU NKVD and the special operations department of the NKVD. Colonel General F.I. was appointed head of the group. Golikov, who in April 1943 became Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR for Personnel.

The group was engaged in preparing analytical reports for the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Command Headquarters on the state of the German armed forces, its economy and the capabilities of waging war against the USSR.

Thus, in April 1943, a system of intelligence agencies was created in the USSR, which included: GRU KA, RU GSh KA, PGU NKVD and RU NK VMF, and the directions of their activities were clearly defined and intelligence tasks were specified.

At the beginning of 1943, the Supreme Command Headquarters began assessing the situation on the Soviet-German front and planning combat operations in the spring-summer period. A comprehensive assessment of the situation required reliable intelligence information about the enemy and his plans for the further conduct of the war. The following tasks were assigned to military intelligence officers:

Military intelligence:

Through interviewing prisoners and studying captured documents, reveal the enemy’s intentions;
clarify the numbering of enemy units in front of the front and the deployment of its reserves to a depth of 30 km; the degree of staffing of enemy troops with personnel and equipment, from what reserves and to what strength the first line units are replenished; areas of concentration of troops, especially tanks and artillery, at the front line and in the immediate depths; new types of weapons (tanks, artillery, mortars, machine guns, aircraft) received by the troops and their tactical and technical properties.

Human intelligence:

Identify the enemy’s operational plans for the spring and summer periods;
establish areas for replenishment of troops being withdrawn from the first line, at the expense of which resources the replenishment of personnel and weapons is carried out;
determine which units are being replenished and restored; when and how many connections will be ready for upcoming operations;
obtain information about how many and what formations from the enemy’s allied forces will be restored; establish the flow of railway troop transfers and unloading areas where troops are transferred from Crimea.

Human intelligence was supposed to obtain information about areas of concentration of German troops for upcoming operations and identify the composition of the groupings.

The reconnaissance officers were supposed to establish the airfield base of the enemy air force; the location of enemy army and front-line bases for ammunition, fuel, lubricants and food, the presence of strategic reserves, the number and numbering of formations that can be transferred to the eastern front, as well as solve other problems. It was important to establish the presence and construction of defensive lines up to the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. Intelligence was supposed to obtain information about the location of chemical units and warehouses of toxic substances, the organization and armament of chemical units.

Important tasks were assigned to radio-technical and aerial reconnaissance, which were supposed to identify the grouping and airfield base of the enemy air force; the intensity of railway transportation, areas of unloading and concentration of enemy troops, especially tank and engine units; ongoing regroupings of German troops.

The actions of the military intelligence forces were clearly coordinated

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the Bryansk and Central Fronts were able to create 20 intelligence and intelligence-intelligence groups behind enemy lines. The command of the Voronezh Front had three intelligence groups behind enemy lines, which not only obtained valuable information, but also actively engaged in sabotage activities, inflicting sensitive blows on the enemy, mainly on railway communications.

Foreign military intelligence residencies obtained information about Germany’s preparations for the spring-summer campaign of 1943. The hesitations of Hitler and the high command of the German armed forces regarding the choice of the direction of the main attack were revealed, the transfer of German troops to the eastern front from France, Belgium, Holland, as well as through the territory of Sweden, it was established that the Anglo-Americans deliberately delayed the opening of a second front in Europe in 1943.

At the beginning of March 1943, the Center received reports from military intelligence officers about the preparation of the next summer German offensive on the Soviet front in the Kursk region.

Report from Sandor Rado from Geneva, March 18, 1943.

On March 22, the resident of the GRU KA in Switzerland, Sandor Rado, reported that for “... an attack on Kursk, the SS tank corps, which is currently receiving reinforcements, may be used. Manstein's army group includes, in addition to two others (not yet established), the following formations: in the Donbass and north-west - 15 ak and a newly formed ak; in the Kharkov area - 41 ak and SS tank corps N 1 ... ".

In March 1943, the leadership of the GRU KA prepared a report for the Supreme Command Headquarters “On the probable plans of the German command for the spring and summer of 1943.” This report made the following conclusions:

1. “By eliminating the southern fronts “A” and “B”, the German command abandons attempts to attack the Caucasus and in the direction of the bend of the river. Don.
2. The operational formation of armies indicates the strengthening of the right flank of the Central Front and the left flank of the enemy’s Southern Front.
3. All tank divisions of the enemy's Eastern Front, with the exception of two or three, are concentrated in the southern sector of the front, i.e. south of the Orel-Bryansk line. This confirms the position that the main active fronts will be the right flank of the Central Front and the entire Southern Front of the enemy.”

The report outlined the enemy's hypothetical options for action in the summer of 1943. According to the head of the GRU of the spacecraft, there were two possible options for action, which resulted from the operational formation of the German armies.

The first is an offensive with the aim of reaching the river. Don from Voronezh to Boguchar, on the river. Kalitva and into the bend of the lower reaches of the river. Seversky Donets with the capture of Rostov.

The second is an attack on Voronezh with a further advance to the northeast, bypassing Moscow from the east.

GRU analysts concluded that the enemy would seek consistent encirclement and destruction of the Soviet troops that were part of the Kursk group.

In the 1943 operation, the possibility of repeating the offensive operation of 1942 cannot be ruled out in terms of choosing the direction of the main attack with a sharp change in direction to reach the operational rear of the defending side. As further developments showed, the assessment was correct.

Illegal GRU intelligence officers also continued to actively obtain information about the enemy. Important information about the enemy continued to arrive from resident Sandor Rado, who was operating in Switzerland. On April 3, S. Rado reported to the Center that, according to his trusted source, “... the German high command will continue its consistent movement in the direction of Kursk.”

From London on April 8, the Center received a report from Dolly’s source, who reported that British Prime Minister W. Churchill demanded that his military intelligence provide him with an assessment of the losses of the Red Army during the Battle of Stalingrad and Germany’s possible plans for the summer campaign of 1943. In The report stated that “... there is an indication where an attack may be launched. It is known that in mid-March there was a small concentration of German armored divisions northeast of Kursk. Perhaps the Germans will concentrate their troops to eliminate the Kursk ledge...”

A few days later, “Dolly” also reported that British intelligence “... intercepted an order to the German Eastern Command Air Force (an air force group operating approximately from Smolensk to Kursk), indicating that the forward units for Operation Citadella could begin preparations for operations."

“On the basis of these data, British analysts from the Air Ministry have come to the conclusion,” Dolly reported, “that the German 8th Air Corps is included in this operation, and believe that these advanced units will be moved out of Germany. This operation could be the core of a future offensive against Kursk."

A day after Hitler signed order No. 6, that is, April 16, 1943, the GRU resident in England, Major General I.A. Sklyarov reported that the concentration of German troops in the Belgorod and Orel area proves that the Germans want to use this sector for a major offensive, the general direction of which should lead approximately to the Voronezh region. Sklyarov reported to the Center data on the number of reserves available in Germany, and also announced plans for the production of basic weapons in Germany for the first six months of 1943.

Resident GRU KA in London major general I.A. Sklyarov

British military intelligence, at the request of W. Churchill, on April 16, 1943, prepared a detailed analytical report “Assessment of possible German intentions and actions in the Russian campaign of 1943.” On April 29, 1943, GRU KA intelligence officers in London obtained this document and reported its contents to the Center. The fifth paragraph of this report read: “...There is a small indication where an offensive can be carried out. In mid-March, the beginning concentration of armored divisions northeast of Kursk was revealed, possibly for offensive actions. It is likely that the Germans will concentrate forces to eliminate the Kursk salient.” Thus, the information obtained by the scouts in early April received another important confirmation, revealing the plan of the enemy’s summer campaign. Information about the enemy, which in the early spring of 1943 was received by the Center from residents of the GRU KA, indicated that the German command was planning to carry out a major offensive on the Soviet front during the summer campaign, during which it intended to seize the strategic initiative and attack the Red Army troops a decisive defeat and achieve a turning point in the course of hostilities.

Taking into account numerous reports from military intelligence officers about the plans of the German command for the summer of 1943, the Supreme High Command Headquarters in April decided to temporarily switch to a deliberate defense in the Kursk Bulge area, during a defensive battle to bleed the enemy and, having created favorable conditions, to defeat the German troops. Simply put, the decision was made to draw the enemy into a trap and inflict defeat on him, which would finally secure the strategic initiative with the Soviet command. Theoretically, thanks to the information obtained by military intelligence officers and the capabilities that the Supreme Command Headquarters already had, the Citadel was doomed. But there was still a long way to go from plans and plans to their implementation.

The upcoming battles in the summer campaign of 1943 required further strengthening of military intelligence and increasing the effectiveness of its activities, both behind the front line and abroad. Therefore, on April 27, 1943, the head of the GRU KA sent the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR a memorandum “On measures to improve intelligence work abroad,” in which he outlined proposals aimed at increasing the efficiency of the work of foreign military intelligence agencies. These proposals were approved, which made it possible to increase the efficiency of the GRU in both the second and third periods of the Great Patriotic War.

From the foreign residencies of the GRU, operating in England, Bulgaria and a number of other countries, information continued to be received about the transfer of German troops in the direction of Orel, Bryansk, Belgorod, Kharkov. The intelligence officers reported information about the enemy's transfer of tank units, the development of the airfield network, and the increase in the pace of work of the German military industry.

The results of the analysis of information that came to the Center from intelligence officers made it possible to understand in general terms the plan of the German command for the 1943 summer campaign on the Soviet-German front. It boiled down to two simultaneous counter strikes in the direction of Kursk - from the areas of Orel to the south and Kharkov to the north - to encircle and destroy Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge. In the future, expand the offensive front to the southeast and strike at the Red Army troops in the Donbass.

Resident Sandor Rado reported to the Center on April 22 that at a meeting in Berlin “... a decision was made on measures to ensure German offensive operations in May and June in the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. These operations have limited goals - the capture of Kursk and Voroshilovgrad...”

At the end of April - May 1943, Sh. Rado clarified the composition of Weichs' Army Group, and at the beginning of June, information was received from him about the composition of Manstein's Army Group.

Important information that revealed the plans of the German command for the summer of 1943 came to Moscow from the GRU resident in Washington, L.A. Sergeeva. In the first half of May, Sergeev reported to the Center: “...Additional data indicate the concentration of German troops in the northern part of the southern front in Russia. No major operations are expected in the central sector of the front until the end of May or the beginning of June. No major operations are expected on the northern front, at least for a month... The main blow of the Germans in the summer campaign will be delivered from the Kursk-Orel region in the direction of Voronezh.”

On May 24, 1943, the Center received a new important message from S. Rado. It said that “... the plan of the German command of the ground forces may fail if the Russians, who have already improved their communications, move quickly and in significant forces to the west and southwest of Tula and from the Kursk region.”

In the spring and summer of 1943, the GRU KA residency, operating in London, often sent to the Center copies of reports that were prepared in the English military department for W. Churchill. This secret information was obtained by Lieutenant Colonel I.M. Kozlov. These generalized materials outlined an assessment of the situation developing on the Soviet-German front.

Important information came to the Center from the GRU resident in Sweden, Colonel N.I. Nikitusheva. In 1943, Nikitushev sent to the Center 74 reports on Germany, 21 reports on Finland, 31 reports on Norway, 6 reports on Italy and 3 reports on Romania. Intelligence obtained by N.I. Nikitushev, revealed the use by the German command of the capabilities of the countries of Northern Europe to strengthen the group of German troops in Finland and transfer reserves to the central section of the Soviet-German front. This information made it possible to evaluate the efforts of the German command in various sectors of the Soviet-German front and, first of all, in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge.

The concentration of German troops in the Orel and Belgorod areas was revealed by radio and aerial reconnaissance. Radio reconnaissance units of the fronts revealed the creation of enemy groups in this area with a large number of tank divisions. The arrival of the 2nd and 4th tank, as well as the 2nd and 9th armies of the enemy was established. Despite the camouflage measures taken by the enemy, the 1st Radio Regiment OSNAZ at the end of March 1943 revealed the movement of the radio station of the 9th Field Army, which worked in the radio network of the German General Staff from Smolensk in a southerly direction, to Bryansk, where it stopped broadcasting. At the same time, in the Bryansk region, the Germans deployed a new large army-type radio network and began to operate continuously. Thus, the German command tried to create a false impression that the headquarters of the 9th Field Army was stationed in the Bryansk region, that is, in a secondary direction in the depths of the Kursk Bulge. This radio camouflage was detected by Soviet radio intelligence officers.

Valuable information about the enemy was obtained by radio reconnaissance officers of the 347th radio division of the Bryansk and 394th radio division of the Central Front. They were able to identify a group of German troops in the Orel area and revealed the creation of a second strike group of German troops on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. The 313th Radio Division of the Voronezh Front in March 1943 received information about the transfer to the Kharkov area of ​​the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, previously located in France, as part of the Reich, Viking and Death's Head tank divisions.

In April-May 1943, the transfer from the south, from Donbass, to this direction of four more tank divisions (6.7, 11 and 17 tank divisions) was revealed, the German Air Force grouping in the Kursk Bulge was completely revealed, and the numbering of aviation units and subunits was established , as well as their airfields. In cooperation with aerial reconnaissance, the number of enemy aircraft based at airfields was regularly monitored. Information was also received about the movement of tank and infantry formations to their starting positions for the offensive. In the first half of 1943, information about the enemy’s plans for the summer of 1943 was obtained in large quantities by the forces of the RU GSH KA. Reconnaissance and sabotage groups, trained and provided with radio communications with the Center, were sent behind enemy lines. Using the experience gained and, these groups obtained valuable information about the enemy. The reconnaissance departments of the headquarters of the Bryansk, Central and Voronezh fronts, in particular, during this period sent about 50 reconnaissance groups behind enemy lines.

Radio intelligence officer staff Sergeant A. Zinichev

Simultaneously with preparations for the offensive Operation Citadel, the German command began to create a system of defensive lines, the main one of which was the Eastern Wall. Information about the beginning of its construction was received by the Center on March 25, 1943 from Sandor Rado. In April-May 1943, the intelligence officer repeatedly reported on the parameters of the Eastern Wall system of defensive structures, the timing of their creation, as well as the Wehrmacht units that took part in their equipment.

Residents of the GRU KA, as well as the forces of the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, by July 1, 1943, established that in the zone of the Central Front, in the Pokrovskoye, Trosna, Orel area, the enemy concentrated up to six to seven infantry divisions and up to six tank divisions, reinforced separate tank battalions, separate assault gun battalions and other units from the reserve of the main command. The total number of tanks and assault guns was determined to be 1000-1200 units. A grouping of enemy troops was also established in the Voronezh Front zone, in the area of ​​Grayvoron, Kharkov, and Belgorod.

The enemy command took measures to conceal the actions of its troops. The entry of tank formations into concentration areas located at a considerable distance from the front line was carried out sequentially and mainly at night. These areas were covered by air defense units. When moving forward, units and formations observed the strictest camouflage measures and radio silence. The tank divisions of the 4th Tank Army were located in the initial areas that were beyond the reach of the actual fire of the bulk of the artillery of the Soviet fronts.

Aerial reconnaissance obtained valuable information about the movement of enemy troops. In particular, the crew of the aircraft of the 4th separate reconnaissance aviation regiment, which included air reconnaissance officer I.I. Lezzhov, on July 6-7, conducted several sorties to reconnaissance the enemy. On July 7, the crew conducted aerial reconnaissance in the area of ​​Belgorod and Kharkov, discovered and photographed the transfer of tanks along the road that led from Kharkov to Belgorod. This information was transmitted to regimental headquarters.

German fighters damaged the plane of the brave reconnaissance aircraft, but they were still able to reach the territory where the Soviet troops were located.

Participant in the Battle of Kursk, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General I.I. Lezzhov during the opening of the monument to fallen crew commanders and pilots. Kursk, 1998

The activities of the foreign residencies of the GRU KA in Turkey, Switzerland and Sweden took place under conditions of active pressure from representatives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the governments of these states. German representatives demanded that the governments of Switzerland and Sweden take measures aimed at identifying and stopping the activities of Soviet intelligence officers and radio operators in the territories of these states, who continued to regularly go on the air.

As a result of measures taken by the counterintelligence services of these countries, an illegal GRU reconnaissance group of the Admiral spacecraft (resident V.A. Stashevsky) was identified in Sweden. In Switzerland, local police identified some members of the GRU Dora station, whose activities were led by Sandor Rado. The resident was able to avoid arrest, but the group ceased its operational activities at the end of 1943.

Despite the losses suffered, the GRU KA and RU GSh KA, as well as the reconnaissance departments of the headquarters of the Central and Voronezh fronts in April - July 1943 were able to organize reconnaissance of enemy troops to great depth. In general, military intelligence managed to reveal areas of concentration of enemy strike groups, their combat and numerical strength, weapons, the presence of new types of tanks, assault guns, aircraft and other military equipment.

The sectors of the fronts on which the enemy planned to go on the offensive were also correctly identified. In the fourth volume of the multi-volume publication, which was published in 2012, it is noted that “Soviet intelligence still managed to carefully study the enemy’s strike force.”

Military intelligence officers also established possible dates for the start of the offensive of German troops - from July 3 to July 7, 1943.

Hitler only made the final decision on July 1 - Operation Citadel would begin on July 5. The German command hoped to deliver a surprise attack on the Red Army troops in the Kursk direction. But there was no surprise. GRU residents, long before the start of Operation Citadel, obtained information about the enemy’s preparations for an offensive in the Kursk Bulge area.

Foreign residents of the GRU were unable to obtain accurate information about the day and hour of the start of Operation Citadel. This is explained by the fact that Hitler gave the order to launch the offensive almost on the eve of the operation. The Soviet command learned the exact time of the enemy's transition to the offensive on July 5 from soldiers of the enemy's 6th Infantry Division, captured by scouts from the headquarters of the Central Front, and from a defector - a soldier of the 168th German Infantry Division, who crossed the front in the 7th Cavalry sector army of the Voronezh Front. He announced that the attack was scheduled for dawn on July 5th.

In general, intelligence was able to provide commanders, commanders and staffs with a significant amount of information about the enemy necessary for making decisions and setting tasks for the troops. Military reconnaissance provided information about the enemy to a depth of up to 5 km of enemy defense. Data on longer-range targets was obtained through operational intelligence and aerial reconnaissance. The work carried out made it possible to expose enemy fire weapons and a system of engineering structures to a depth of 2-3 km, and in some places up to 5 km, which provided the necessary initial data for preparing an artillery fire system. However, it was not possible to completely expose the grouping of infantry and, most importantly, tank formations, especially in areas remote 10-25 km or more, where the main forces of the strike group were located. The enemy command took enhanced measures to camouflage the transfer of troops, which was carried out mainly at night.

Despite significant difficulties, military intelligence officers acted actively, purposefully, showing high professional skill. Purposeful and clearly coordinated actions of military (strategic, operational, tactical, radio and air) intelligence forces made it possible to timely reveal the operational plans of the German command in the summer campaign of 1943.

The initial stage of the Battle of Kursk was the most crucial period of this battle. Thanks to the information obtained by military intelligence officers, the initiative was in the hands of the Soviet command. At dawn on July 5, 1943, the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts unleashed a powerful fire attack on the battle formations of the German troops preparing for the offensive, during which the enemy suffered serious damage. The implementation of the Citadel plan, developed in conditions of increased secrecy, was disrupted at the very beginning of the battle.

With the beginning of the offensive of the fascist German troops, their radio communications intensified, especially in the “division-regiment” link, which made it possible for radio reconnaissance officers of the Central and Voronezh fronts to track their combat personnel and find the location of enemy headquarters.

During the defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk, the radio divisions of the Central and Voronezh Fronts promptly detected the movements of the enemy's divisional and corps headquarters and constantly monitored their offensive zones. Valuable information about the enemy was obtained by the forces of individual OSNAZ radio divisions of the Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, Western and Steppe fronts, commanded by I.N. Maksimov, I.A. Lobyshev, V.A. Groth, P.T. Solovyanov, B.Ya. Shadrin. For example, with the transition of the Soviet troops to the counteroffensive, radio intelligence timely established the transfer of three German tank divisions (18, 20 and 2nd) to other directions. This indicated that the enemy was concerned about the successes of the Soviet troops in the northern and eastern sections of the Oryol salient and was taking retaliatory actions.

With the transition of our troops to the offensive, the tasks of radio reconnaissance during the offensive operations “Kutuzov” and Rumyantsev” expanded significantly, and it provided continuous monitoring of the actions of the Nazi troops retreating under the attacks of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and Southwestern fronts.

During this period of time, the 1st Radio Regiment of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, by radio interception and direction finding of the radio networks of the German General Staff, regularly collected intelligence information about the deployment and movements of the headquarters of the 2nd Tank, 9th Field, 2nd Field and 4th Tank armies of the enemy, as well as flank groupings of German troops in the Smolensk and Kharkov directions. Front-line radio divisions conducted constant surveillance of army, corps and division radio networks and directions of relocation of their headquarters. The maneuver groups of the radio divisions regularly intercepted open radio communications in the German radio networks of the tactical command level and obtained valuable information about the location of the headquarters and command posts of enemy regiments and battalions.

During the Battle of Kursk, the Center also received information from residents of the GRU KA that reflected the German high command's assessment of the situation developing in the Kursk salient.

The defeat of German troops in the Battle of Kursk was also facilitated by accurate information obtained by residents of the GRU KA about changes in relations between Germany and its allies (that is, about the strength of the military-political bloc opposing the Soviet Union). This information was obtained by residents of foreign intelligence, Major L.A. Sergeev in Washington and Colonel P.P. Melkishev, who operated in New York.

L.A. On February 18, Sergeev reported to the Center about the plans of the Finnish leadership to exit the war. In June 1943, L.A. Sergeev also reported to the Center that the Japanese leadership was unlikely to allow itself to start a war against the USSR in 1943.

In the first half of 1943, GRU intelligence officers began to note a transformation in the relations of the US and British leadership towards the Soviet Union. High-level negotiations between Washington and London have intensified. GRU resident in New York, Colonel P.P. Melkishev reported to the Center: “...America and England intend to enter the Balkans before the Red Army reaches Romania, and before the partisan movement becomes the dominant sector of resistance to Germany in the Balkans.” And further: “Anti-Soviet sentiment in the US State Department and Military Department is becoming stronger. There they openly talk about the need to prevent the Red Army from occupying the Baltic states, defeating Finland and entering the Balkans..."

P.P. On April 24, Melkishev reported to the Center that “...The Americans are trying to secure hegemony in Europe, absorb French interests and isolate the British from the heavy and chemical industries in Europe.”

Colonel P.P. Melkishev managed to obtain information about the results of negotiations between Roosevelt and Churchill, which took place at the end of May 1943. The leaders of the United States and England continued to take a wait-and-see approach, reduced the provision of logistical assistance to the USSR and did not plan to open a second front in 1943.

Information about the state of relations between the states of the German bloc was obtained by the residencies “Akasto” in Sweden, “Brion” in London and “Nak” in Ankara. The attitude of the Japanese government to the German war against the USSR was covered by Colonels L.A. Sergeev from Washington and M.A. Sergeechev from Tokyo, as well as other residents.

GRU residents in London, Major General I.A. Sklyarov and Colonel A.F. Sizov also reported to the Center that the political leaders of the USA and England, despite their declared promises, did not intend to open a second front in Europe in 1943. In particular, Major General I.A. Sklyarov reported from London on October 9, 1943: “... A second front in Western Europe is not opening for purely political reasons. It is believed that the Russians are not yet sufficiently weakened and represent a great force that is feared both in England and in America.”

In general, military intelligence on the eve and during the Battle of Kursk acted as a single well-oiled mechanism, promptly providing the Supreme Command Headquarters, the General Staff, front commanders and other commanders of the Red Army with reliable information about the enemy, which contributed to achieving victory in the Battle of Kursk.

For the courage and heroism shown in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, 180 soldiers and officers of the Red Army were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Among them are five military intelligence officers: senior sergeant N.A. Belozertsev, sergeant V.M. Timoshchuk, junior sergeants S.T. Vasyuta and N.S. Muravyov, air reconnaissance captain N.E. Samokhin and Colonel V.S. Svirchevsky.

The actions of the intelligence departments of the front headquarters that took part in the Battle of Kursk were led by Major General P.N. Chekmazov, I.V. Vinogradov, A.S. Rogov and Colonel Ya.T. Ilnitsky.

Assessing the activities of all types of military intelligence on the eve and during the Battle of Kursk, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov wrote: “...Thanks to the brilliant work of military intelligence in the spring of 1943, we had a number of important information about the grouping of German troops before the summer offensive. Well-functioning intelligence was also one of the factors that ensured the success of this greatest battle.”

Vladimir Lota,
Doctor of Historical Sciences,
Laureate of the State Prize of the Russian Federation
named after Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukova

Losses Defensive phase:

Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all)
Irrevocable - 70 330
Sanitary - 107 517
Operation Kutuzov: Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front
Irrevocable - 112 529
Sanitary - 317 361
Operation "Rumyantsev": Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front
Irrevocable - 71 611
Sanitary - 183 955
General in the battle for the Kursk ledge:
Irrevocable - 189 652
Sanitary - 406 743
In the Battle of Kursk in general
~ 254 470 killed, captured, missing
608 833 wounded, sick
153 thousand small arms units
6064 tanks and self-propelled guns
5245 guns and mortars
1626 combat aircraft

According to German sources 103 600 killed and missing on the entire Eastern Front. 433 933 wounded. According to Soviet sources 500 thousand total losses on the Kursk ledge.

1000 tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet data
less 1696 airplanes

The Great Patriotic War

Invasion of the USSR Karelia Arctic Leningrad Rostov Moscow Sevastopol Barvenkovo-Lozovaya Kharkiv Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad Rzhev Stalingrad Caucasus Velikie Luki Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Voronezh-Kastornoye Kursk Smolensk Donbass Dnieper Right Bank Ukraine Leningrad-Novgorod Crimea (1944) Belarus Lviv-Sandomir Iasi-Chisinau Eastern Carpathians Baltics Courland Romania Bulgaria Debrecen Belgrade Budapest Poland (1944) Western Carpathians East Prussia Lower Silesia Eastern Pomerania Upper Silesia Vein Berlin Prague

The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, exhaust the enemy troops and defeat them, launching counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. For this purpose, a deeply layered defense was created on both sides of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average mining density in the direction of expected enemy attacks was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines for every kilometer of the front.

In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as differences in the methods of recording and classifying military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is related to the inclusion or exclusion of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1,500 tanks) from the calculations. The following table contains some estimates:

Estimates of the forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk according to various sources

Source	Personnel (thousands)		Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns		Guns and (sometimes) mortars		Aircraft
	USSR	Germany	USSR	Germany	USSR	Germany	USSR	Germany
RF Ministry of Defense	1336	over 900	3444	2733	19100	about 10000	2172 2900 (including Po-2 and long range)	2050
Krivosheev 2001	1272
Glanz, House	1910	780	5040	2696 or 2928
Müller-Gill.				2540 or 2758
Zett., Frankson	1910	777	5128 +2688 “reserve rates” total more than 8000	2451	31415	7417	3549	1830
KOSAVE	1337	900	3306	2700	20220	10000	2650	2500

The role of intelligence

However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on data from intelligence agencies of the Kursk fronts, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk Bulge:

...I believe that the enemy will launch the main offensive operations against these three fronts, so that, having defeated our troops in this direction, he will gain freedom of maneuver to bypass Moscow in the shortest direction.
2. Apparently, at the first stage, the enemy, having gathered the maximum of his forces, including up to 13-15 tank divisions, with the support of a large number of aircraft, will strike with his Oryol-Krom grouping bypassing Kursk from the northeast and by the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping bypassing Kursk from the southeast.

Thus, although the exact text of the “Citadel” fell on Stalin’s desk three days before Hitler signed it, four days before that the German plan became obvious to the highest Soviet military command.

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation, at 3 a.m. (the German army fought on Berlin time - translated to Moscow 5 a.m.), 30-40 minutes before the start of the operation, artillery and aviation counter-preparation was carried out.

Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 a.m. our time, the Germans also launched a bomb and artillery strike on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern front was delivered in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having failed to achieve success, the Germans moved their attack in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they were unable to break through the Soviet defense. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of its tanks, the 9th German Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main German attacks were directed towards the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.

July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkasy.

To complete the assigned task, units of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive (Day “X”) needed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards SD (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and 67th Guards SD (Colonel A.I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoe and make a breakthrough with armored units in direction to the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th Tank Corps determined that the village of Cherkasskoe was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, units of the 48th Tank Army. were supposed to reach the city of Oboyan.

However, as a result of the actions of Soviet units and formations, their courage and fortitude, as well as their advance preparation of defensive lines, the Wehrmacht’s plans in this direction were “significantly adjusted” - 48 Tank Tank did not reach Oboyan at all.

The factors that determined the unacceptably slow pace of advance of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the area by Soviet units (from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the entire defense to radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of attack aircraft against those accumulated in front of engineering barriers to enemy tanks, competent placement of anti-tank strong points (No. 6 south of Korovin in the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the battle formations of the 196th Guards Battalions .sp (Colonel V.I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassy, ​​timely maneuver by the divisional (245 detachment, 1440 gap) and army (493 iptap, as well as the 27th brigade of Colonel N.D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units of the 3rd TD and 11th TD with the involvement of forces of 245 detachment (Lieutenant Colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 tanks) and 1440 sap (Lieutenant Colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), as well as not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the military outpost in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 baht. 199th Guards Regiment, Captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of ​​workers’ barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of the 11th Tank Division and 332nd Infantry Division by the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day of “X-1”, but the resistance of the combat outpost was never completely suppressed by dawn on July 5th). All of the above factors influenced both the speed of concentration of units in their initial positions before the main attack, and their progress during the offensive itself.

A machine gun crew fires at advancing German units

Also, the pace of the corps' advance was affected by the German command's shortcomings in planning the operation and poorly developed interaction between tank and infantry units. In particular, the “Greater Germany” division (W. Heyerlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and the 10 armored brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 Pz.V command tanks) in the current conditions The battle turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (it was especially difficult to overcome the swampy anti-tank ditch south of Cherkasy), and came under a combined attack from Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments of the 33 detachment (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially among officers), and was unable to deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the line Korovino - Cherkasskoe for a further attack in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that had overcome anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own firepower. So, for example, the combat group of the 3rd battalion of the Fusilier Regiment, which was at the forefront of the attack of the VG division, at the time of the first attack found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division was actually unable to bring them into battle for a long time.

The resulting congestion on the advance routes also resulted in the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th Tank Corps in firing positions, which affected the results of artillery preparation before the start of the attack.

It should be noted that the commander of the 48th Tank Tank became hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of his superiors. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative impact - all divisions of the corps were brought into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.

The development of the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps on the day of July 5 was greatly facilitated by: active actions of engineer-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the proactive actions of units of the 11th TD (I. Mikl) and 911th department. division of assault guns (overcoming a strip of engineering obstacles and reaching the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy with a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).

An important factor in the success of German tank units was the qualitative leap in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles that occurred by the summer. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units was revealed when fighting both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet anti-tank tanks were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times less than the effective firing range of the latter; heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in the combined arms 6th Guards A, but also in the 1st Tank Army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).

Only after the bulk of the tanks had overcome the anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassy in the afternoon, repelling a number of counterattacks by Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11th Panzer Division were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00, Divisional Commander A.I. Baksov gave the order to withdraw units of the 196th Guards Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassy, ​​as well as to the center of the village. When units of the 196th Guards Regiment retreated, minefields were laid. At about 21:20, a combat group of grenadiers from the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th brigade, broke into the village of Yarki (north of Cherkassy). A little later, the 3rd Wehrmacht TD managed to capture the village of Krasny Pochinok (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th Tank Tank of the Wehrmacht was a wedge into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the backdrop of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating to the east parallel to the 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. A.

Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was suppressed around midnight on July 5. However, German units were able to establish complete control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.

Thus, the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD, not possessing large tank formations (at their disposal were only 39 American tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245th detachment and 1440 glanders) held in the area of ​​​​the villages of Korovino and Cherkasskoe five for about a day enemy divisions (three of them are tank divisions). In the battle of July 5 in the Cherkassy region, the soldiers and commanders of the 196th and 199th Guards particularly distinguished themselves. rifle regiments of the 67th Guards. divisions. Competent and truly heroic actions of the soldiers and commanders of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner, pull up army reserves to the place where units of the 48th Tank Corps are wedged at the junction of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this area in the subsequent days of the defensive operation.

As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoe virtually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts: “it was a lunar landscape”).

The heroic defense of the village of Cherkassk on July 5 - one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.

July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.

By the end of the first day of the offensive, the 4th TA had penetrated the defenses of the 6th Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the offensive sector of 48 TK (in the area of ​​​​the village of Cherkasskoe) and at 12-13 km in the section of 2 TK SS (in the Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka area). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the entire depth of the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards SD (Colonel I.M. Nekrasov), and approached the front 5-6 km directly to the second line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), entering into battle with its advanced units.

However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - did not complete the task of the day on July 5, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the 4th Tank Army that had advanced forward. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to July 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely the Death's Head infantry division, to cover his right flank against the 375th Infantry Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units performed brilliantly in the battles of July 5 .

Nevertheless, the success achieved by the Leibstandarte divisions and especially Das Reich forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of not complete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough that had formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakova about the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin with his order transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad Tank (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34 and 21 are Mk.IV “Churchill”) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34 and 17 are Mk.IV Churchill) subordinate to the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves of his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards SD with the forces of the 5th Guards. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 tk SS forces of 2 guards. Ttk (directly through the battle formations of the 375th Infantry Division). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I.M. Chistyakov assigned the commander of the 5th Guards. CT to Major General A. G. Kravchenko the task of withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strong points) the main part of the corps (two of three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and a counterattack by these forces on the flank of the Leibstandarte MD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture of the village. Lucky tanks from the Das Reich division, and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the execution of this order. However, under the threat of arrest and execution, they were forced to begin implementing it. The attack by the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.

Sufficient own artillery assets of the 5th Guards. The Stk did not have it, and the order did not leave time for coordinating the actions of the corps with its neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on flat terrain and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of the Das Reich MD, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted a significant fire defeat on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After this, having brought up anti-tank artillery and organized flank maneuvers, units of the Das Reich MD between 17 and 19 hours managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of ​​the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenaps (Major Savchenko) and 464 Guards Artillery, which had withdrawn from the village of Luchki. .division and 460 Guards. mortar battalion 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade. By 19:00, units of the Das Reich MD actually managed to encircle most of the 5th Guards. Stk between the village. Luchki and the Kalinin farm, after which, building on the success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of the station. Prokhorovka, tried to capture the Belenikhino crossing. However, thanks to the proactive actions of the commander and battalion commanders, the 20th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) remaining outside the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikhino from various corps units that were at hand, managed to stop the offensive of the Das Reich MD, and even forced the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without contact with corps headquarters, on the night of July 7, surrounded units of the 5th Guards. The Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and linked up with units of the 20th Tank Brigade. During July 6, parts of the 5th Guards. Stk 119 tanks were irretrievably lost for combat reasons, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unknown reasons, and 19 were sent for repairs. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (the losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 even exceeded the losses of 29 tanks during the attack on July 12 at the Oktyabrsky storage farm).

After being surrounded by 5th Guards. Stk, continuing the development of success in the northern direction, another detachment of the tank regiment MD "Das Reich", taking advantage of the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of the army defense, occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin) , near the village of Teterevino, and for a short time wedged itself into the defense of the 285th infantry regiment of the 183rd infantry division, but due to the obvious insufficient strength, having lost several tanks, it was forced to retreat. The entry of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.

Battle of Prokhorovka

Belfry in memory of those killed on the Prokhorovsky field

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The central front, involved in the battle in the north of the arc, suffered losses of 33,897 people from July 5-11, 1943, of which 15,336 were irrevocable, its enemy - Model’s 9th Army - lost 20,720 people during the same period. which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which took part in the battle on the southern front of the arc, lost from July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including the Voronezh Front alone - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed that the losses of their front were 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irrevocable. If, contrary to Soviet documents from the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account the German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides here is 4.95: 1.

During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front consumed 1,079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh Front used 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was due to the smaller massing of forces and assets in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

On the southern front, the counter-offensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at approximately 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway on August 11, and captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were unsuccessful.

After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives such as "

The year 1943 is a “turning point” Beshanov Vladimir Vasilievich

CITADEL PLAN

CITADEL PLAN

By the spring of 1943, the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front was thrown back 600, in some places 700 kilometers, having lost 26 divisions, almost completely destroyed, and most of the territorial gains of 1942 in the “battle with Bolshevism”. However, the subsequent defeat of the Red Army near Kharkov reminded the Kremlin that the German armed forces, having lost the Battle of Stalingrad, had not yet lost the war. At the end of the winter campaign, the Germans managed to stabilize the front on the southern wing, regaining the initiative and a sense of moral superiority.

However, when embarking on long-term planning of military operations, the German high command was aware that, due to the current strategic situation, lack of forces and means, conducting large offensive operations with far-reaching goals in the summer of 1943 was no longer possible. The inflexible Fuhrer, having publicly acknowledged in a narrow circle his personal responsibility for Stalingrad, became silent for a while: “For the first time in twenty years, Hitler was silent. He had no ideas... Even in his close circle, Hitler spoke little about grand strategy, but spent a long time talking about new weapons that would restore the military superiority of the Reich. He did not imagine any grandiose tasks for the army, other than preserving what had been conquered..."

The total losses of the German armed forces from January to the end of April amounted to 860 thousand people, including almost 300 thousand killed and missing, 2900 tanks and 967 self-propelled guns (the total number of the tank fleet decreased to 2504 units), more than 9000 aircraft. The loss of personnel on the Eastern Front in the first quarter reached 689 thousand people, of which only 371 thousand were replaced. There was nothing and no one to restore the regular strength of the formations, and the problem of a shortage of experienced commanders and technical specialists became acute. The Allied troops, who had previously not been distinguished by outstanding combat capability, now completely lost it. The situation in the West was steadily deteriorating, where the submarine war was lost (American industry riveted transports and aircraft carriers in an assembly line manner, restoring gross tonnage four times faster than Admiral Doenitz’s “wolf packs” managed to sink it, while the losses of the German submarine fleet increased sharply) and the war in the air (“Large massive air raids by American and British aircraft reached Berlin and from that moment spread to the most remote areas of Germany and became an everyday occurrence” - the US 8th Air Force joined in destroying the economic potential). On the African continent, they had to part with most of Libya; in the second half of March, the Anglo-American offensive began in Tunisia, which required a build-up of German forces in the Mediterranean - there was no hope for the demoralized Italians, who had fallen “in a state of ferment” and cried out for help. D-Day, the Allied landing in Europe, was approaching inexorably.

Therefore, the OKW headquarters recommended a transition to strategic defense and a war of attrition in the East. Reduce the front line if necessary. In certain areas, carry out limited offensive operations with the sole purpose of grinding down the enemy’s forces, bleeding him dry and thereby thwarting the predicted general offensive of the Red Army. In other words: “If the Soviets intend to expel us from their country, then let them themselves bear the burden and losses in the offensive, in which they may bleed... The offensive forces of the Russians must eventually dry up!” After which it was necessary to transfer the “saved” divisions to repel the invasion from the West.

German strategists no longer expected to defeat the Soviet Union, but, intending to inflict casualties on it that were incompatible with the continuation of active hostilities, they cherished the hope of achieving a “draw” in the war and, if it was the will of the Fuhrer, concluding an honorable separate peace with Stalin. As a last resort, you can do without the Fuhrer.

The OKH headquarters did not miss too much in its calculations when it claimed that since the beginning of the war the USSR had lost 11 million people killed, captured and “unable to carry out combat service.” According to current official data, the Red Army's losses in killed and missing by March 31, 1943 reached 6.8 million people. Wounded, shell-shocked, frostbitten - 6.9 million. Of the latter, 387 thousand died in hospitals, and God knows how many lost their “ability to perform combat service.” (In the German army, 12-15% did not return to duty from hospitals. Even this percentage, when applied to our figures, if we take it on faith that Soviet military medicine was in no way inferior to German, gives more than a million disabled people.) Millions of potential conscripts were under German occupation.

In total, Soviet irretrievable losses from June 22, 1941 to March 31, 1943 amounted to at least 7.1 million soldiers and commanders. During the same period, the Germans estimated their losses on the Eastern Front in killed and wounded at approximately one million people - seven times less.

In general, irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht on all fronts (without Allied troops, but taking into account citizens of other states, including Soviet citizens who wore German uniforms), in all battles of the Second World War - from September 1, 1939 until the moment of surrender in May 1945 - amounted to 7.8 million people (of which 3.3 million were prisoners).

As part of the adopted concept, the headquarters of Army Group South was one of the first to present to the OKH a plan for a “retaliatory strike.” Manstein, having turned the “chessboard” and moving the pieces for the “Reds”, saw that they had several opportunities at once, despite their clear quantitative advantage: to make a breakthrough on the southern flank of Army Group North and press it to the Baltic Sea, to take the Oryol ledge in pincers and destroy significant forces of the Center group, delivering a powerful blow in the Kharkov area. But the most likely from the point of view of achieving operational and military-economic goals seemed to the field marshal to be a repeated attempt by the Red Army to recapture the Donbass with attacks from the north and east. Based on this and being confident in the qualitative superiority of the “browns” in terms of mobility and tactical skill, Manstein proposed concentrating large forces in the rear of the northern flank of Army Group South, waiting for the enemy to attack on the southern wing, wearing him down with stubborn defense, then the planned “panic “to cede the Donetsk basin by retreat, to let the “Reds” through to the coast of the Sea of ​​Azov and destroy them with a sudden attack from the north-west: “The goal of the operation should not be territorial goals (as in 1942, Stalingrad or the Caucasus), but the destruction of enemy troops on an important flank by encircling it off the coast of the Sea of ​​Azov.”

As one would expect, Hitler categorically did not like the risky plan that included leaving Donbass.

“In this respect,” Manstein lamented, “he lacked courage or faith in his skill in leading troops, as well as in the skill of his generals.” That's for sure! The Fuhrer was simply sick of his generals, who dared to talk out loud about the “amateurish military leadership” and ruined the magnificent plans of the “generator of the German nation” with their idiocy. (For such talk, in January 1942, the commander of the 4th Panzer Army and the most active conspirator, Colonel General Erich Hepner, was sent straight from his post into indefinite retirement. The dictator in a rage deprived him... No, not his head, - orders, pensions, the right to wear a uniform and a service apartment. But: “Hepner refused to recognize this illegal order (!), and the lawyers from the main command of the ground forces had the courage to report to Hitler that he had no right (!!) to make such decisions.” The post-war case immediately comes to mind Generals Kulik, Gordov, Rybalchenko: either in the kitchen or in the toilet they whispered about the Generalissimo’s mistakes in personnel matters, and hello - “treason to the Motherland,” to the wall.)

“His opinion of the generals as such is derogatory. Sometimes it is so caustic that it seems unfair... - the Imperial Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary. - He says that all generals lie. He simply can’t stand them, because they have disappointed him so often.”

For some time now, even the “best operational mind”, who wanted to carry out “only brilliant operations”, who never missed an opportunity to remind of his merits, who expressed a special opinion on all issues and, moreover, who loved to express himself in a pompous manner, began to irritate Hitler.

However, the Fuhrer’s attention was attracted by Manstein’s idea, which was not implemented before the start of the spring thaw, to eliminate the Kursk bulge, occupied by Soviet troops and protruding far to the west: “This arc cutting into our front was not just an inconvenient circumstance for us. It extended our front by almost 500 km and required significant forces to hold it in the north, west and south. It cut through the railways that led from the area of ​​the Center group to Kharkov and were important communications for us behind the front line. Finally, this arc could serve as the enemy’s starting point for an offensive both on the northern flank of the “South” GA and on the southern flank of the “Center” GA. It posed a particular danger in case it was decided to launch a counterattack from the Kharkov area against the Soviet forces advancing in the GA “South” sector... With a simultaneous offensive from the south and north, it was possible to cut off relatively large enemy forces in it and then release significant German strength."

Thus was born the plan for a pre-emptive strike, which later received the code name “Citadel”. On March 13, the Fuhrer signed operational order No. 5, which contained general instructions for the conduct of military operations in the East:

“It should be expected that the Russians, after the end of winter and the spring thaw, having created reserves of material resources and partially replenished their formations with people, will resume the offensive. Therefore, our task is to, if possible, preempt their offensive in individual places in order to impose our will on them, at least on one of the sectors of the front, as is currently already the case on the front of Army Group South. In other sectors of the front, the task comes down to bleeding the advancing enemy.”

Army Group North was supposed to prepare an operation against Leningrad, Group Center and South - destroyed Soviet troops in the Kursk salient. Army Group A was to hold the Kuban bridgehead and “free up forces for other fronts.”

Previously, Hitler wanted to carry out a number of private operations in front of the front of Army Group South. On March 22, her command received orders to begin developing the Hawk plan. It was supposed to be carried out by the forces of the 1st Tank Army and the Kempf operational group, which were supposed to cross the Seversky Donets and, with converging attacks on Kupyansk from Chuguev and along the western bank of the Oskol River, encircle and destroy the troops of the Southwestern Front. The deadline is April 13. Two days later, the Fuhrer instructed Manstein to think over a larger-scale option, code-named “Panther,” which envisaged the defeat of Soviet troops southeast of Kharkov by the 1st and 4th Tank Armies and the crushing of the Soviet front along the Seversky Donets River line.

Meanwhile, debates continued among the top leadership about the advisability of an offensive in the East in principle. OKH Chief of Staff General Zeiztler, who developed the plan for the Kursk operation, was entirely in favor and argued that success was guaranteed - only 10-12 tank divisions were needed for this. The command of Army Group South also supported the plan for active operations in the Kursk area. The OKW headquarters, represented by the head of the operations department, Colonel General Alfred Jodl, feared that a large offensive would, without much benefit, consume the hard-to-create reserves, and as a result, the Wehrmacht would have no strength left to strengthen the coast of France and positions in the Mediterranean basin.

However, Hitler, who viewed the problem from a political point of view, desperately needed a resounding victory of German weapons in order to strengthen the shaken authority of the Reich, encourage allies, warn enemies, strengthen the faith of the army and people in the immortality of the ideas of National Socialism and the genius of the Fuhrer.

On April 15, headquarters made the “final decision” by issuing Operational Order No. 6. It stated that by April 28, the troops of Army Groups Center and South should be put on six-day readiness for Operation Citadel. Thus, the initial date for the start of the offensive was set at May 3, 1943. For the Germans, given the fact that the time factor was playing against them, it was fundamentally important to launch a preemptive strike as early as possible, before the battered Soviet troops pulled up their rear, fully restored their combat capability, and strengthened their defensive positions. The trick was to “catch the enemy in a stage of weakness,” drive him into time trouble, and force him to throw tank corps that had not completed replenishment into battle.

The order noted: “This offensive is given decisive importance. It must end with rapid and decisive success... In this regard, all preparatory measures must be carried out with the greatest care and energy. The best formations, the best weapons, the best commanders and a large amount of ammunition must be used in the directions of the main attacks. Every commander, every ordinary soldier must become aware of the decisive significance of this offensive. The victory at Kursk should be a torch for the whole world.”

The essence of the operation was to encircle and destroy the main forces of the Central and Voronezh fronts in the Kursk ledge with counter strikes from two powerful tank groupings from the Orel and Belgorod regions. To carry out the Citadel, it was planned to involve three armies and one task force. In order to quickly break through the Soviet defense - “with one blow” - it was prescribed to “ensure maximum massing of strike forces in a narrow area” and “create overwhelming superiority in all offensive means.” By the end of the fourth day, the Wehrmacht strike forces were supposed to meet east of Kursk. If successful, it was planned to immediately launch Operation Panther - a strike from Kursk to the southeast with the goal of defeating the Southwestern Front, followed by an attack on Leningrad - “Bear Hunt”.

On paper everything looked smooth, paper, it will endure anything. But one important question had to be resolved: where to get all this from - the best weapons, a large amount of ammunition, soldiers - and in a short time? It was especially difficult to make up for human losses.

On January 13, 1943, Hitler - with nowhere to go - was forced to sign an order for total mobilization. All men between 16 and 60 years of age and women between 17 and 45 years of age were required to register for military work. This event was intended to replace citizens working in military factories and suitable for use in the armed forces with citizens engaged in useful, but purely peaceful affairs - the production of ladies' umbrellas, lawn mowers, country houses, studying at universities or pig farming. By redistributing human resources and significantly increasing the employment of women, which would free up men for the front, it was planned to make up for the losses of the Wehrmacht and expand military production. As a result of total mobilization, 3.1 million people were registered by the end of March (84% were women). In addition, the places of the German “proletarians” at the machines, in the mines and in the fields were taken by foreign workers, prisoners of war and “Ostarbeiters” massively exported from the occupied territories.

Intensified conscription began in the occupied territories, Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks were sent to the front, and former Red Army soldiers were recruited in the camps.

For this occasion, we had to reconsider some aspects of racial policy. The term “subhuman” was categorically removed from use, and almost all the peoples of the “one family” were recognized as Aryan and accepted into service in the Wehrmacht and SS. Goebbels issued an order in which he forbade “directly or indirectly” humiliating representatives of the eastern peoples and insulting their self-esteem: “We cannot portray these people, who hope for their liberation with our help, as animals, barbarians and the like and then expect that they will be interested in a German victory." It is no coincidence that it was in January 1943 that three million leaflets were printed with the “Smolensk Appeal of the Russian Committee,” signed by the traitor general A.A. Vlasov, who called for cooperation with Germany in overthrowing the “Stalin clique” and fighting Bolshevism “for the construction of a New Europe.” In this appeal, amazing things were brought to the attention of the Russian people: “Germany does not encroach on the living space of the Russian people and their national-political freedom”; Germany is concerned about creating a paradise in Europe, and the Wehrmacht, having “destroyed the regime of terror and violence,” will provide the Russians with “justice and protection of the working people from all exploitation.”

By the end of spring, it was planned to draft 800 thousand people into the armed forces, however, it turned out - only 600 thousand. The number of formations of the “eastern troops” and “auxiliary service volunteers” - all “our former people” - reached 450 thousand people.

At the same time, measures were taken in Germany to mobilize military-economic resources, redistribute industrial capacities, reserves of raw materials, fuel, and energy in the interests of the military industry. Many civilian sectors of the economy were curtailed. Hitler finally decided to partially transfer the economy to a war footing (many factories continued to produce consumer goods and work for export, which practically did not decrease). It’s hard to believe, but in 1942 the share of defense products accounted for 26% of all industrial production and only in 1943, through the efforts of the Minister of Armaments Albert Speer, rose to 38%, that is, the degree of militarization of the German economy at the height of World War II was equal to the military expenditures of the Soviet Union in years of “socialist construction”: in 1940, the total share of USSR expenditures on military needs amounted to 52% of the budget, 26% of industrial production was spent on strengthening defense.

The mobilization was accompanied by a noisy propaganda campaign under the motto: “Rise up, people, let the storm break!” Fashion stores, nightclubs, jewelry stores, and cultural institutions were closed. Glamor magazines stopped coming out. Sports spectacles and all “luxury living” were prohibited. The copper bas-reliefs from the Brandenburg Gate were solemnly dismantled and sent for melting down.

“We undertake to do in our lives and work everything that is necessary for victory,” Dr. Goebbels said. - The Fuhrer expects from us such achievements that will eclipse everything that has happened so far. We want to meet his requirements. We are proud of him, and he should be able to be proud of us. Only in times of great crises and upheavals in national life do true men, as well as true women, show themselves in action... The nation is ready for anything. The Fuhrer ordered, we follow him. In this hour of national understanding and internal upsurge, we will believe in victory even more truly and unshakably.” But in general, the hardships of “total war” in German do not impress Soviet people too much. What is “total war” for a German, is peaceful everyday life and hard work for a Soviet person.

In the ideological struggle, statements made in Casablanca played into Goebbels’ hands.

On January 14, 1943, an Anglo-American conference opened in Morocco, at which issues of future joint strategy were discussed, specifically: “How to win the war?” The delegations were led by US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Stalin, citing being very busy, refused to come, but in his written message he expressed confidence that the combined forces of Great Britain and the United States would open a second front in Europe no later than spring.

Hopes were not justified. On the recommendation of the British Chiefs of Staff, the Allies recognized the Mediterranean Sea as the main theater of military operations for 1943. The main tasks are a landing on Sicily no later than July, the withdrawal of Italy from the war, and the creation of conditions for neutral Turkey to be drawn into the war on the side of the coalition. An invasion of Europe across the English Channel was considered impossible unless there suddenly was a “general collapse of Germany.” They were in no hurry to inform Moscow about this decision - they knew that Uncle Joe would not like it. A directive was also adopted to launch a large-scale air offensive against the Third Reich, with the goal of “the progressive destruction and disruption of the military, industrial and economic system of Germany and the undermining of the morale of the German people to such an extent that their ability to carry out armed resistance will inevitably weaken.” The Soviet Union was planned to provide the maximum possible volume of supplies under Lend-Lease (provided that it did not turn out to be “unacceptably expensive”).

At the final press conference held on January 24, Roosevelt voiced an unprecedented demand for unconditional surrender in interstate relations: “Peace can come only after the complete destruction of German and Japanese power... The destruction of German, Japanese and Italian military power means the unconditional surrender of Germany, Japan and Italy . This means a reasonable guarantee for the future of international peace. At the same time, we are talking about the destruction not of the population of Germany, Japan or Italy, but of the dominant ideology in these countries, which preaches aggression and enslavement of peoples.”

The English historian M. Howard claims that Churchill happily agreed to this idea in order to provide moral support to the Russians, since “due to the failure of the Western Allies to undertake the offensive in the West that Stalin demanded, the Prime Minister considered it especially important that the Russians should have no reason to fear that they will be left in the lurch by concluding a compromise peace between Germany and the West.”

But the German author believes that the Anglo-Saxons had every reason to fear that Stalin would conclude a separate peace with Hitler: “They not only feared that due to the delay in opening a second front, Stalin might make peace in order to escape from the war, but they also assumed that Hitler, especially after Stalingrad, would probably grab this opportunity of salvation with both hands... They seriously thought about how to prevent the premature collapse of a large military coalition.” Roosevelt and Churchill feared that “Stalin would finally run out of patience with the Allies and might offer Germany peace based on the status quo.” Or Hitler, who finds himself in a hopeless situation, will himself begin to seek peace on reasonable terms, as both Mussolini and Ribbentrop encouraged him to do.

Another danger was that the USSR would “liberate” Europe alone, before the Allies “sewed on the last button” and gathered the strength to land on the continent. So what should we do then? Save Germany from communism?

Howard notes in passing that “the question of whether such a decision would weaken or strengthen the enemy’s will to resist did not appear to be seriously discussed,” saying that there were no experts at the conference capable of illuminating the issue from this point of view. However, it is not at all like Roosevelt to make half-baked statements.

The demand for unconditional surrender meant that there would be no peace negotiations with or without Hitler, with the Nazis, or with any other German government. It meant that the war would be waged until the complete occupation of Germany and its future fate would be decided by the victors. The demand deprived the German opposition of support, which hoped to bring the country out of the war by eliminating the Fuhrer and changing the regime.

The reaction of the Germans can be predicted without any experts. The Germans got it right.

“This impudent demand was met by the German people and especially the army with strong indignation,” Guderian choked with anger. “From now on, it became absolutely clear to every soldier that our opponents were filled with a passion to destroy the German people, that their struggle was directed not only against Hitler and so-called Nazism, as they claimed for propaganda purposes, but also against business, and therefore unpleasant industrial competitors.” And Manstein is indignant: “The Allies’ statement in Casablanca left no doubt about their desire to destroy not only Hitler and his regime, but Germany in general.” (Ay, guys! How about the extermination of the Slavs and the “Germanization of space right up to the Urals”? But under this order is not your signature, Erich Eduardovich: “The Jewish-Bolshevik system must be eradicated once and for all. The German soldier faces the task not only defeat the military power of this system. He also acts as a bearer of the people's idea and an avenger for all the atrocities that were inflicted on him and the German people").

The demand for unconditional surrender led to fierce resistance, forcing the Germans to fight to the end and ultimately prolonging the war. Stalin, separating the “Hitlers” from the “German state,” did not pose the question this way and for some time tried to play his own game, through appeals from the “Free Germany” committee, expressing his readiness to make peace with a “truly national German government,” which, having gotten rid of Hitler, “ will immediately cease hostilities, recall German troops to the imperial borders and enter into negotiations, renouncing all conquests.” These statements did not have the desired effect, a military coup did not happen in Berlin, and in October 1943 the Soviet government officially joined the demand for unconditional surrender.

The measures taken to mobilize human and industrial resources allowed Germany to restore the power of the armed forces.

In the first half of 1943, the German ground and air forces managed to form 50 divisions. In particular, by order of Hitler, the 6th Army and 20 divisions with “Stalingrad” numbers were restored. The SS troops received new panzergrenadier divisions “Hohenstaufen” and “Frundsberg” (purebred Aryans) and a mountain rifle, anti-partisan, Muslim division “Handschar”.

During the same period, the industry produced 12,263 aircraft (including 10,449 combat ones), 4,463 armored vehicles, 32 thousand guns and 13 thousand mortars, 139 submarines. Compared to 1942, the production of tanks almost doubled, aircraft - 2.2 times, guns and mortars - 2.3 times; It was possible to increase the production of shells and mines to 19 million pieces per month. The production of anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, aircraft cannons and machine guns increased. Anti-tank divisions began to receive 75-mm RaK 40 anti-tank guns in large quantities, which pierced 120-mm armor from 1000 meters. New design developments in the field of weapons were launched into series, primarily the second generation of tanks. Aviation units received new types of aircraft: the multi-purpose Focke-Wulf-190A-3, armed with four cannons and two machine guns, the modified Messerschmitt-109G-6 fighter, which was faster than all Soviet aircraft, the improved Junkers-88 bomber, the attack aircraft " Henschel-126V". Prepared for the summer offensive were the modernized Junkers-87D-5 dive bombers with an increased wing span and wing-mounted 20-mm cannons, as well as the Ju-87G tank destroyer, under the wing of which two 37-mm cannons were suspended; On the initiative of the famous ace Hans-Ulrich Rudel, the first “tank squadron” was formed from these vehicles in June.

On May 29, Minister Speer, who visited the research center in Peenemünde, where he was shown the spectacular launches of V-1 and V-2 combat missiles, publicly announced about. the creation in Germany of a “weapon of retaliation”, which would soon fall on England. From that time until the fall of Berlin, German propaganda continuously trumpeted the Fuhrer's "secret weapon", a miracle weapon that would change the course of the war.

However, by the time the set date for the start of Operation Citadel was established, the reorganization and replenishment of the tank divisions withdrawn to the rear with men and equipment was still in full swing. Restoring the army's combat capability required great expense and time. The “Stalingrad” divisions, due to a lack of equipment, property, and transport, were considered uncombat-ready in July. Therefore, on April 26, Hitler ordered a more thorough elaboration of the plan, and three days later he moved the start date of the offensive to May 5, and then to May 9.

But the further it went, the more dubious the chances of success looked. Air and ground reconnaissance data indicated that the Russians were not wasting time and were thoroughly preparing for the meeting precisely where the Germans were gathering their “fists” of strike forces. Consequently, the Wehrmacht had to “act in a way that has so far been constantly avoided” - to break through the powerful, deep-echeloned defense of an enemy prepared to fight back in the spirit of the battles of the First World War. Thinking about this, the Führer toiled with his stomach and, in thoughtful solitude, gave himself enemas.

On May 3 and 4, a meeting was held in Munich at which the prospects for a summer offensive were again discussed. Present: the High Command of the Armed Forces, the Chief of the General Staff of the OKH, the Minister of Armaments, the commanders of the Center and South groups, the Chief Inspector of Tank Forces, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and other interested persons. General Zeitzler was still full of enthusiasm to “weaken the advancing impulse of the Russian army.” Field Marshal von Kluge believed in victory and dreamed of glory. Field Marshal von Manstein seriously doubted - time had passed, strength was not enough. Colonel General Model directly suggested not to do what the enemy expects from you, and either come up with something new, or abandon the offensive altogether. General Guderian categorically objected to the aimless, in his opinion, squandering of resources - we will lose everything and remain naked.

Hitler continued to hesitate and proposed postponing the operation for a month, and during this time doubling the number of tanks, but he never made any decision, limiting himself to the absolutely correct remark: “There should be no failure!” A week later, he postponed the start of the offensive to June 12.

While the Fuhrer was thinking, in Tunisia on May 13, the Italian-German Army Group Africa, deprived of supplies, commanded by General Hans von Arnim, capitulated. The Wehrmacht in one fell swoop lost six divisions (including the 10th, 15th, 21st tank) and 94 thousand German soldiers. 140 thousand Italians, led by the newly minted Field Marshal Messe, also surrendered into captivity.

“We are the masters of the coast of North Africa,” General Alexander telegraphed to the British Prime Minister. The Mediterranean Sea became re-opened to Allied shipping, and the Allies began preparations for Operation Hasco.

Italy, finding itself at the “front line,” insisted on stopping actions in the East and saving the situation in the South. This time Mussolini was supported by the governments of Hungary and Romania.

For Hitler, peace with Stalin was physiologically impossible. The Fuhrer came to a different conclusion: Operation Citadel would happen. Anglo-American troops would need at least 6-8 weeks to prepare a landing on Sicily, Sardinia or the Balkans - the most obvious targets - (as it turned out). During this time, the Wehrmacht must defeat the Russians at Kursk, turn to the West and throw the allies into the sea. In the event of “treason” against Italy, Field Marshal Rommel was instructed to develop a plan for its occupation.

“We must attack for political reasons,” the head of the OKB, Field Marshal Keitel, an unreasoning executor of the Fuhrer’s will, summed it up at one of the meetings.

Operation Citadel was turning from a short pre-emptive strike “as part of a strategic defense” into the main goal of the summer campaign, into a general battle in which Germany was going to put everything at stake. At Kursk now “the fate of the war itself was being decided.”

The main role in achieving rapid success was to be played by armored forces. The Fuhrer decided to radically transform them, rearm them, and raise the level of production to 1,500 tanks a month. To solve this problem, he returned from the reserve the “father of the Panzerwaffe,” General Guderian, who was in oblivion after the failure of Operation Typhoon and, out of idleness, was already looking for an estate somewhere in East Prussia. In February 1943, Hitler summoned Guderian to Vinnitsa and appointed him inspector of armored forces, giving him the broadest powers and subordinating him personally. “Fleet Heinz” enthusiastically took on the assigned task, because “Hitler said that from now on I must put my ideas into practice.”

Starting from February-March, 88-mm Nashorn anti-tank self-propelled guns, quite successful 105-mm and 150-mm Vespe and Hummel self-propelled howitzers, and exotic Brummber assault tanks began rolling off assembly lines. But the main hope rested on the massive use of new tanks such as the Tiger and Panther and Ferdinand fighters.

The gloomy German genius produced the most formidable combat vehicles of the Second World War.

Heavy tank Pz. The VI Tiger, launched into production in August 1942, had no worthy opponents on the battlefield; it was the strongest tank in the world. The tank's hull, with a fairly simple outline, was made of rolled steel. The lack of rational slope angles for the armor was compensated by its thickness (in principle, with the increase in the caliber of anti-tank guns, the slope of the armor became less important): front plate - 100 mm, side plate - 80 mm, top of the hull - 26 mm. The legendary 88-mm anti-aircraft gun, equipped with a muzzle brake and electric trigger, was installed in the tiger turret. An armor-piercing projectile fired from it with an initial speed of 810 m/s hit any enemy tanks at distances of 2000–1500 meters, penetrating 85–100 mm of armor (the Soviet KB-1S carried armor 60–75 mm thick, the T-34 - 47 mm). The deadly accurate gun and excellent optics ensured a 100% hit rate on a stationary target with the first shot at a distance of 1000 meters. The rate of fire reached 6–8 rounds per minute.

A progressive transmission with hydraulic servos and torsion bar suspension made the Tiger an easy-to-control machine with a smooth, completely silent ride. Its driver did not expend much physical effort, and it was not difficult to master the control of the tank. Gears were switched literally with two fingers, the maneuver was carried out by lightly turning the steering wheel. The driver did not require great qualifications, and he could be replaced by any crew member. “The driver-mechanic of the Tiger,” recalls Otto Carius, “sat at the control levers and could control the 60-ton colossus as easily as a car. In other tanks, it was necessary to exert a lot of effort to control (the driver of the T-34 kept a sledgehammer at hand to switch levers).”

A new tactical unit was created specifically for the “tiger” - a heavy tank battalion, which was a separate military unit that could act either independently or be attached to other formations. The vehicle was tested in combat in Russia and North Africa, was tested, and methods of its tactical use and organization of logistics were worked out. On March 5, 1943, the “five hundredth” heavy battalions were transferred to a new staff, which provided for the presence of three tank companies with a total of 45 “tigers”. Hitler firmly believed in the power of his heavy tanks, “one battalion of which is worth an entire normal tank division.”

The first serial medium tank Pz. V "Panther" left the factory floor on January 11, 1943. The body of the vehicle was welded from rolled armor plates installed at rational angles of inclination. The thickness of the frontal armor was

85 mm, side and stern - 40 mm. The main weapon, apart from two machine guns, was a 75-mm cannon with a conical bore 70 calibers long. Its armor-piercing projectile penetrated a vertically mounted armor plate 140 mm thick from a distance of 1000 meters. Practical rate of fire is 6–8 rounds per minute. The sights and viewing devices were of very high quality. The tank had good maneuverability and maneuverability. In terms of its characteristics, the Panther was superior to all allied tanks. Convinced of its outstanding combat capabilities, Hitler demanded the production of 600 vehicles per month, for which it was planned to remove the Pz tank from the assembly line. IV. The first military units equipped with Panthers were the 51st and 52nd tank battalions.

In the future, the Panthers were supposed to completely replace Pz-type vehicles in combat units. III and Pz. IV. However, Guderian intervened, believing that until the production of new, twice as labor-intensive combat vehicles reached the required level, the Wehrmacht risked being left without tanks altogether. As a result, it was decided to rearm only one battalion in each tank regiment with Panthers and continue production of the Pz. IV.

Moreover, the “four” were not at all the same as at the beginning of the war. The latest modifications, instead of the previous short-barreled “cigarette butt,” were armed with a 75-mm cannon with a barrel length of 48 calibers. The thickness of the frontal armor was increased to 80 mm, and 5-mm screens were installed on the hull and turret to protect against cumulative shells. After modernization, the reliable, easy-to-use 25-ton Pz. IV in all respects, except perhaps cross-country ability, was superior to the Soviet “thirty-four”.

The Ferdinand tank destroyer was a Tiger designed by Ferdinand Porsche that was not accepted for service, on which an armored box with an 88-mm gun was installed instead of a turret. The thickness of the frontal armor was 200 mm, the sides - 80 mm. The vehicle had a crew of 6 people and weighed 65 tons. Despite its large mass, low speed and low maneuverability, it was a formidable weapon, invulnerable to frontal attacks. Hitler, prone to gigantomania, was delighted by the display of these monsters on March 19, but they did not make much of an impression on Guderian: “... I had to find a use for them, although from a tactical point of view I did not share Hitler’s admiration for this “structure” his favorite Porsche." In two months, 90 vehicles were produced, which equipped the 653rd and 654th “tank destroyer” divisions, consolidated into the 656th anti-tank regiment.

In 1943, the Panzerwaffe had an undeniable qualitative superiority over its opponents. The trouble was that the increase in production and the supply of military equipment to the troops was much slower than desired.

In the year since they were put on the assembly line, 377 Tiger tanks were built (in the first half of 1943 - 260), and 54 were already lost forever. The costs of producing one “tiger” reached 300 thousand Reichsmarks and were comparable to the costs of producing three “fours”. On the eve of Operation Citadel, the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front had three heavy tank battalions and four Tiger companies.

The Panther was just being put into production and was an unfinished machine; it often failed due to technical breakdowns, for example, an engine fire. Despite the fact that Guderian openly called it a “crude design” with all the disadvantages that accompany such a definition, Hitler was determined to use the Panthers in the upcoming offensive. However, industry was unable to supply the troops with the required number of combat vehicles. At a meeting held on May 10, Speer promised that by May 31, 324 Pz tanks would be produced. V, but by the end of May the Wehrmacht received only 190 vehicles. The lack of equipment, in turn, delayed the training of crews and maintenance personnel. Only by June 15 was the formation of the only 39th “Panther” regiment completed, which included two tank battalions - 200 “Panthers” and 4 repair and recovery vehicles.

The Wehrmacht was no longer able to fully revive its former power. By the summer, the German tank division included a two-battalion tank regiment. In the first battalion, two companies were armed with Pz tanks. IV, one - Pz. III. In the second battalion, the Pz. IV had only one company. In total, the division had 51 Pz units. IV and 66 Pz. III. In reality, the number of combat vehicles differed from the standard one and rarely exceeded 100 tanks. The staff of the infantry divisions had to be reduced by 4,000 people; it now amounted to 12,708 soldiers and officers, but even this number was not available in most formations. In the rear units and even in combat units, “voluntary assistants” from among the citizens of the occupied countries were widely used, the number of whom in the Wehrmacht exceeded half a million people.

“Possibility of supporting the advancing troops with aviation, heavy artillery of the OKH reserve, special engineer units, etc. never before since the start of the war have they reached such a low level,” reports B. Müller-Hillebrand.

Nevertheless, the armed forces of the German Empire were a powerful military machine capable of carrying out large offensive operations.

On July 1, 1943, the armed forces numbered 9.4 million. Of these, there were 6.8 million in the ground forces, including the reserve army, and more than 2 million in the air force; There were 650 thousand personnel in the navy, 433 thousand “supermen” in the SS troops.

There were almost 7.6 million people in the active army. Ground forces (together with the Luftwaffe and SS) consisted of 276 divisions (including 21 motorized and 23 tank) and 2 brigades. The total number of tanks and assault guns was 5,305 units, or 6,127 if French and Soviet captured armored vehicles were taken into account.

There were 194 crew divisions operating on the Soviet-German front (including 16 tank, 12 motorized and 12 airfield divisions). They were armed with 3,968 tanks and assault guns (including 126 captured ones). In addition, there were 9 Romanian divisions on the front line, with their fighting spirit badly damaged, and 5 Hungarian divisions were used to guard the rear, “however, even there they did not show proper reliability.” The total number is approximately 5 million adversaries.

Operation Citadel involved 50 divisions, including 12 tank and 7 motorized - up to 70% of the Wehrmacht's tank divisions - over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2758 tanks and self-propelled guns. These divisions were replenished first and by the beginning of the operation they were largely equipped with personnel and military equipment. In tank divisions, the absolute majority were Pz. III and Pz. IV; There were 148 “tigers”, 200 “panthers”. Their actions were supported by over 1800 aircraft of the 4th and 6th air fleets.

The Germans began creating strike groups back in March. In the second half of April, two new armies were concentrated on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge. By April 18, the 9th Army under the command of General Model deployed north of Kursk. By April 25, General Hoth's 4th Panzer Army occupied a section of the front south of Kursk.

Intense work was carried out at all levels to recruit units and train troops. “After the units were reorganized and re-equipped,” recalls General Routh, the corps commander, “the army group began intensively preparing troops for the attack (practically and theoretically). Particular emphasis was placed on the types of actions that awaited the soldiers. Field exercises were conducted using live ammunition and shells; the Luftwaffe used real bombs during the exercises. All this made it possible to bring the combat readiness of the troops to the highest level. Staff exercises and terrain orientation were carried out constantly. We organized special training on building bridges and removing minefields... The divisions located in the attack zone sent up to two-thirds of their personnel to the rear, where round-the-clock training took place. The soldiers were tested with tanks and crossed Russian minefields.” All the nuances of the upcoming offensive were carefully thought out and played out on maps and models down to the level of platoon commanders.

To mislead the enemy, a number of camouflage measures were carried out: moving units exclusively at night, simulating preparations for strikes in false directions, where mock-ups of military equipment were displayed, spreading rumors, and conducting defensive work in places of upcoming breakthroughs. But against the backdrop of repeated delays, these were “meaningless movements,” since the fact of the presence of strike groups that “completed their concentration in the initial position and waited for two months for the order to begin the offensive spoke for itself.”

On June 21, Hitler again postponed the cherished date and scheduled the operation for July 3, and on June 25 he set the most final of all dates - July 5. Preparations have entered their final phase.

By this time, many front-line generals had lost all desire to attack, as they say, they had burned out.

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Operation Citadel is one of the most striking and terrible events of the Second World War. On July 5, 1943, German troops launched a full-scale offensive in the Kursk area. With the support of artillery and aviation, tank formations launched a powerful blow in the direction of Prokhorovka. Their task was to break through the defenses and encircle the Soviet group. This was the beginning of the end of the Second World War, Operation Citadel.

Revenge for the lost Stalingrad

1943 The Germans continue to retreat along the entire front. Having been defeated at Moscow and Stalingrad, they still hope to change the course of the war. Adolf Hitler wants to take revenge on the Kursk Bulge. The Fuhrer is personally involved in the development of the operation, which he called “Citadel”. With attacks from the north, west, south, the Germans want to destroy the powerful Soviet group, and then launch an offensive on the Don, Volga and Moscow.

The Fuhrer's strategic plans

The small Prokhorovka station of the Southern Railway of Russia... It was here, according to the plan of the German command, that the decisive battle was to take place. It was planned that German tanks would go behind the rear of the Soviet troops, encircle them and destroy them. For this purpose, a powerful tank armada was brought here. The tanks had already been brought to the front lines. The Germans were preparing for the decisive push, the plan for Operation Citadel was ready to be executed. They knew that the Soviet command had brought huge tank forces here. However, Soviet T-34 tanks were inferior in armor thickness and firepower to the latest German Tigers.

According to intelligence

The outcome of the battle could only be decided by accurate information about the enemy’s forces and plans. Even before the war, the British managed to get hold of the German Enigma encryption machine. With its help, they deciphered secret German codes and obtained extremely important military information.

According to the agreement between England and the USSR, which was concluded at the very beginning of the war, both sides undertook to inform each other about Hitler's plans. The secret center for deciphering German codes was located in Bletchley Park, 60 miles from London. Carefully vetted, qualified specialists processed the intercepted encoded information here.

It was impossible to imagine that a foreign intelligence agent could penetrate here. And yet he penetrated. His name was John Cairncross. This man belonged to the legendary group of Soviet intelligence officers, the “Cambridge Five”. The information that John Cairncross will convey to Moscow will be invaluable.

Secret information from Cairncross

943 At the Kursk Bulge, the fascists decided to take revenge for the defeats inflicted on them. This time they were confident of victory. But the German command did not yet know that Germany’s military operations were already known in the Kremlin. Top secret information from John Cairncross contained details of the latest German military technology. The Soviet command became aware of details about the power, maneuverability and armor protection of combat vehicles. The agent reported on the latest tests at German testing grounds.

For the first time, information was received about new and powerful Tiger tanks, which the Soviet command had no idea about. The Germans created a type of armor in which the armor-piercing shells of the Red Army were powerless. Thanks to such secret information, the Soviet Union was able to quickly produce new shells capable of making holes in fascist tank armor.

The intelligence officer's information about the metal composition of the armor and its properties was received in April 1943, three months before the start of the Battle of Kursk.

Preparing for the upcoming battle

The Soviet side was able to take emergency measures to develop new weapons that would penetrate this armor. The tests were carried out in the strictest secrecy. At that time, the entire industry of the Soviet Union worked for the war. After the completion of the tests, mass production of shells capable of destroying German “tigers” began.

At the same time, Soviet tanks were modernized. In record time, the rear provided the army with the necessary weapons. There was a continuous stream of military equipment and military equipment heading to the site of the future battle. Thousands of German aircraft were based near the front line. The Fuhrer assigned a special role to Luftwaffe pilots in the operation on the Kursk Bulge.

"Citadel" (military operation) as the Wehrmacht's last chance

On July 1, 1943, Adolf Hitler returned to his "Wolf's Lair" command post in East Prussia. There will be no more delay. The day of Operation Citadel is set: July 4th. A. Hitler said: “We need a victory at Kursk to dispel the darkness in the hearts of our allies. Remembering the previous names of military operations, we can say that this is nothing. Only the Citadel will become the turning point of great Germany.”

Despite the intensifying Allied bombing, some Nazi troops were transferred to the east. Although many divisions were understrength, the total number of troops participating in Operation Citadel was quite impressive. Among them are the most experienced soldiers and officers, a large number of soldiers from the famous SS troops. The morale of the German military personnel was high.

Only victory will turn the tide of the war

Hitler decreed that Operation Citadel would be 100% a German affair. This confidence was reinforced by the large amount of modern equipment that arrived at the front every day. Unusually powerful Luftwaffe forces were concentrated at the airfields. In reality, all the weapons that Hitler intended to bring into battle in this battle were comparable to the amount prepared for the attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941.

However, the sheer scale of the upcoming battle worried Adolf Hitler, and he ordered that no public announcement of the upcoming Operation Citadel be made in advance. The Fuhrer said: “The mere thought of this turns me over, but I see no other way out.”

Morale of the Red Army

Germany faced an enemy that bore no resemblance to the pitiful battalions that had so easily surrendered in the early stages of the war. The myth of the invincibility of the German army was dispelled at Stalingrad. The defense capability of the Soviet side was strengthened. As a result, the superiority of our defense industry over the German military industry became noticeable. This superiority was manifested not only in quantity, but also in quality. In German military factories, products that did not meet accuracy standards were rejected. There was no culling at Soviet factories. Unusable shells were used as warheads for missiles. German infantrymen hardly cursed anything more than Soviet Katyushas.

Operation Citadel begins

At dawn on July 5, 1943, the Germans were waiting for the signal to attack. The first signal was given, but from the Soviet side. Having secret information about the start of the secret operation "Citadel", the Soviet command decided to strike first. More than 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns clashed in a decisive battle on both sides in the Battle of Prokhorovka. The Germans did not expect that our T-34 tanks would be able to hit the strong, heavy-duty armor of the Tigers. In fifty days, the Nazis lost half a million of their soldiers, 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns and 1,700 aircraft on these fields. These losses for Nazi Germany turned out to be irreparable.

Didn't take it by surprise

Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (1896-1974) learned quite early about the upcoming Operation Citadel. Zhukov's headquarters guessed about the offensive. Hitler was very tempted to take revenge after the Battle of Stalingrad.

During May and June 1943, Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov ordered the laying of three deep belts of minefields along the perimeter of the arc.

Before the start of this monumental battle, Soviet troops had numerical superiority. Against 900 thousand German soldiers, G. K. Zhukov fielded 1 million 400 thousand. The superiority of the Soviet troops was especially noticeable in artillery. They had 20 thousand guns, which is twice as many as the enemy. The Red Army deployed 3,600 tanks against 2,700 German ones, 2,400 planes against 2,000 Luftwaffe planes.

Anxiety before the attack

By July 4, two large attacking groups were brought to full combat readiness. An atmosphere of gloomy anticipation reigned in the German troops, the reason for this was Operation Citadel. The Second World War gave many people the bitter taste of defeat and the sweet taste of victory. Everyone knew that even for the greatest victories, soldiers always pay a high price. Tomorrow may not always come.

Ten minutes before the German columns were supposed to begin moving, the Soviet side began artillery counter-preparation. It was an ominous warning.

Start of the offensive

Large attacking groups entered the battle. The skies filled with the roar of aircraft engines as thousands of aircraft from the two German fleets took to the air.

On the first day, the 9th Army, whose armored forces were commanded by Field Marshal Otto Moritz Walter Model (1891-1945), advanced from the north to the south, advancing seven miles. The movement of the army from the south was led by Field Marshal General Manstein, Erich von (1887-1973). She walked 11 miles deep into Soviet territory. It was an encouraging success that barely resembled a blitzkrieg. The Soviet minefields turned out to be very deep, and the troops dug in were well prepared for defense.

Imperfections of German technology

The offensive continued, and the German troops encountered increasing difficulties. First of all, it turned out that the technical characteristics of their tanks were worse than promised. The mechanical part of the “tigers” increasingly failed.

By the end of the first day, out of 200 of these tanks, only 40 were fully suitable for combat. In the air, numerical superiority gradually also passed to the Russians.

By the third day, the Germans had disabled more than 450 Soviet tanks. But the enemy still had superiority in armored forces. The Germans were especially disheartened by the fact that Soviet military technology, without any doubt, overtook the German one. The Soviets succeeded where Germany failed.

The T-34 tank, previously familiar to the Germans, was equipped with a heavy 122-mm cannon. The Nazis heard rumors of even more formidable machines. The German offensive was difficult. Although slowly, Hitler’s two armies gradually moved closer together. Especially Field Marshal Manstein, Erich von, had a slight advantage.

The Soviet style of command underwent noticeable radical changes. Marshal G. K. Zhukov's field commanders mastered the art of tactical withdrawal and probing counterattacks, and they lured German tanks into traps.

The Soviets also invented other methods. They created the so-called front package - a complex tactical grouping designed for both offense and defense.

His first line consisted of formidable Katyusha installations, followed by heavy artillery positions. When the latter did their job, the heavy tanks moved forward, carrying with them the infantry, which moved on board the lighter tanks. Operation Citadel began to crack. The constant order of attack of the front package allowed the Germans to develop the necessary countermeasures. But this did not help, such attacks still caused serious damage to the Wehrmacht soldiers.

After a week of brutal and uncompromising fighting, the German armored forces were significantly weakened, and the German command was forced to withdraw some of its units from the line of fire. This was required for a respite and regrouping of troops.

Battle of Prokhorovka

The Battle of Kursk (Operation Citadel) marked a decisive turning point in World War II. Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive, and nothing could stop this impulse. From this moment on, Hitler's troops would never go on the offensive again. They will only retreat. Two large columns collided with each other. The result was a battle unprecedented in scale. Never before or since have such a number of tanks - more than one and a half thousand - taken part in one battle. This unprepared clash was not justified by strategic decisions.

Once the battle began, there was no tactical planning and no clear unified command. The tanks fought separately, firing directly. The equipment collided with the enemy’s equipment, mercilessly crushing it, or dying under its tracks. Among the tank crews of the Red Army, this battle became a legend and went down in history as a death raid.

Eternal memory to the heroes

From July 5 to July 16, 1943, Operation Citadel continued. The Second World War saw many glorious military victories. However, this battle occupies a special place in human memory.

Today only monuments remind of past battles on Kursk land. Thousands of people contributed to this momentous victory, earning the admiration and memory of posterity.