Battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody- one of the largest tank battles in history, taking place during the Great Patriotic War in June 1941 in the triangle of cities of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody. Also known as the Battle of Brody, the tank battle of Dubno, Lutsk, Rivne, the counterattack of the mechanized corps Southwestern Front etc. Time interval from June 23, 1941 to June 30, 1941. The battle pitted the Soviet 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd mechanized corps and the German 11th, 13th, 14th, 16th tank divisions.
22nd of June in these 5 Soviet corps there were 33 KV-2, 136 KV-1, 48 T-35, 171 T-34, 2.415 T-26, OT-26, T-27, T-36, T-37, BT -5, BT-7. A total of 2,803 Soviet tanks. That is, more than a quarter of the tank forces concentrated in the 5 western military districts of the USSR. [Military Historical Journal, N11, 1993] It is also worth noting that the Soviet 4th Mechanized Corps fought west of Brody - the most powerful of the Soviet ones - 892 tanks, of which 89 KV-1 and 327 T-34. On June 24, the 8th Tank Division (325 tanks, including 50 KV and 140 T-34s as of June 22) from its composition was reassigned to the 15th Mechanized Corps.
22nd of June in the opposing 4 German tanks s divisions there were 80 Pz-IV, 195 Pz-III (50mm), 89 Pz-III (37mm), 179 Pz-II, 42 BefPz. This is about a sixth of all German tanks allocated to the entire Eastern Front. In addition, from June 28, the 9th German Tank Division entered this battle (as of June 22 - 20 Pz-IV, 60 Pz-III (50mm), 11 Pz-III (37mm), 32 Pz-II, 8 Pz- I, 12 Bef-Pz)
(below, for the sake of distinction, Soviet units are called tank, German - panzer. Accordingly, Soviet - rifle and motorized rifle (formally - motorized), German - infantry and motorized)
June 23 The 10th and 37th tank divisions of the 15th mechanized corps of Major General I.I. Karpezo attacked the right flank of the German group with the aim of breaking the ring around the 124th rifle division in the Milyatin area. At the same time, the 212th Motorized Rifle Division of the corps had to be left in the rear due to a lack of trucks. Swampy terrain and Luftwaffe airstrikes slowed the advance of the Panzer divisions (19th tank regiment completely stuck in the swamp and did not take part in the battles of that day), and the German 197th Infantry Division managed to organize a strong anti-tank defense on its flank. An attack by a small number of T-34s threw the Germans into fear, but by the evening the 11th Panzer Division arrived in time.
June 24 The 11th Panzer Division advanced towards Dubno, overcoming the resistance of the 37th Panzer Division and inflicting heavy losses. The 10th Panzer Division, defending and counterattacking, was stopped near Lopatin by German infantry defenses. On the same day, the 8th Mechanized Corps was sent to the Brody area. According to the recollections of the corps commander, Lieutenant General. D.I. Ryabyshev, up to half of the light tanks were lost along the way (i.e., about 300 BT).
June 25 The 13th and 14th Panzer Divisions took Lutsk and began advancing towards Rivne. They encountered units of the 9th Mechanized Corps. At the same time, units of the badly damaged 22nd Mechanized Corps took up defensive positions near Lutsk along with the 27th Rifle Corps. The 20th, 35th, 40th, 43rd tank divisions of the 9th and 19th mechanized corps arrived in the Rivne area. They were supposed to attack the 11th Panzer Division. From another direction, the same division was to be attacked by the 12th and 34th tank divisions of the 8th mechanized corps.
June 26 began Soviet counteroffensive. The actions of the mechanized corps were not coordinated, and not all units of the 9th and 19th mechanized corps managed to arrive at the site of the fighting. Only tank units took part in the battle with little support from motorized rifles. They managed to cut the Lutsk-Rovno road, and units of the 43rd Panzer Division took Dubno, but only after the main part of the 11th Panzer Division left it, heading east.
The Germans, sensing a threat, deployed the 13th Panzer Division south of Lutsk, despite original plan movement to the east. In addition, the Germans sent the 75th, 111th, 299th Infantry Divisions to clear the communications of the 11th Panzer Division.
The 15th mechanized corps went to join the 8th mechanized corps. Meanwhile, the commander of the 8th Mechanized Corps ordered the 34th Panzer Division and the advance detachment of the 12th Panzer Division to cut the highway along which the 11th and 16th Panzer Divisions were supplied. And from the direction of Lvov, the 8th Tank Division of the 4th Mechanized Corps went east to join in the counterattack.
27th of June the offensive of the 9th mechanized corps of Rokossovsky and the 19th mechanized corps of Feklenko began to slow down. Their advanced units were almost destroyed and the remaining units were forced to retreat. The remnants of the forward detachments of the mechanized corps were cut off at a distance of about 10 kilometers. The 13th Panzer Division was sent to their final destruction, which flanked them and then turned east towards Rivne. It turned out that the 13th Panzer Division went to the rear of the remnants of four tank divisions, and in the next two days, Soviet units moved east after the German division. The 11th Panzer captured the main crossing in the Ostrog area and Soviet command was forced to collect all possible (but small) reserves to block the 13th and 11th Panzer Divisions.
On the southern flank of the German group Soviet offensive developed somewhat more successfully. There the 12th and 34th tanks, the 7th motorized rifle division 8th Mechanized Corps and 14th Cavalry Division. The 8th Tank Division from the 4th Mechanized Corps finally arrived to replenish the 10th Tank Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps. However, only about half of the original number of tanks remained in these units (about 800 tanks). The 12th and 34th Panzer Divisions advanced approximately 5 kilometers, but were unable to penetrate the 111th Infantry Division's defenses. Then the Germans moved forward the 13th Panzer Division and after it the 111th Infantry Division. They were able to create a corridor between the 9th and 19th mechanized corps, which operated north of Dubno, and the 8th mechanized corps, which attacked south of Dubno. The 7th Motorized Rifle Division was attacked from the rear by the 16th Panzer, and the 75th Infantry struck the 12th Panzer, cutting off its main units from the forward detachments.
June 28 The 13th Panzer Division reached the Rovno area, but had no infantry support as the Germans threw infantry into the Dubno area. The 9th and 22nd mechanized corps were able to move away from Dubno and take up defensive positions north and southeast of Lutsk. This created a “balcony” that delayed Army Group South on its way to Kyiv. It is believed that as a result of this Hitler decided to change strategic decision and send additional forces to the south, removing them from the Moscow direction.
June 28 units of the 12th and 34th tank divisions fought west of Dubno, but the main tank units tried to retreat.
Meanwhile, the 5th mechanized corps arrived in the Ostrog area (as of June 22 - 1070 tanks, without KVs and T-34s. According to other sources, only the 109th motorized rifle division and the tank regiment of the 5th mechanized corps fought near Ostrog) which managed to stop the advance 11th Panzer Division. On the same day, the defense south of Brody was strengthened by units of the 37th rifle corps. But the Germans also sent the 9th Panzer Division to the left flank of the Soviet defense (in the Lvov area). This maneuver completely destroyed the left flank of the defense Soviet units.
By this time, Soviet tanks had almost no ammunition and fuel left.
Difficulties turned into disasters June 29. In the morning, the 13th Panzer moved east from Rovno, while Soviet troops retreated north and south of the city, parallel to the movement of the Germans. Soviet tanks They were increasingly left without fuel, and the German infantry destroyed the remnants of the 12th and 34th Panzer Divisions.
June 30th The 9th Panzer Division attacked the remnants of the 3rd Cavalry Division. She then cut off the 8th and 10th Panzer Divisions, completing their encirclement. By this time, the commander of the 6th Soviet Army ordered all his units to withdraw to positions east of Lvov. And at that time the Germans were gathering units of the 13th and 14th Panzer Divisions south of Lutsk in order to create a fist for a strike in the direction of Zhitomir and Berdichev.
TO July 1 The Soviet mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front were practically destroyed. About 10% of the tanks remained in the 22nd, 10-15% in the 8th and 15th, and about 30% in the 9th and 19th. In several better position It turned out to be the 4th mechanized corps under the command of General A.A. Vlasov (the same one) - he managed to withdraw with about 40% of the tanks.
However, compared to others Soviet fronts The South-Western managed to inflict significant damage on the Germans with its mechanized units.
In conclusion, a quote from the memoirs of those events by an officer of the 11th Panzer Division - at that time Senior Lieutenant Heinz Guderian.
« Personally, the Russian soldier was well trained and was a tough fighter. Shooting training was excellent - many of our soldiers were killed by shots to the head. His equipment was simple but effective. Russian soldiers wore earth-brown uniforms, which camouflaged them well. Their food was spartan, unlike ours. They had to face our professional tactics of the German armored divisions. That is, with maneuverability, unexpected attacks, night attacks and the interaction of tanks and infantry.
As for Russian tactics in border battles. In our impression, Russian companies and platoons were left to their own devices. They did not have cooperation with artillery and tanks. No reconnaissance was used at all. There was no radio communication between headquarters and units. Therefore, our attacks were often unexpected for them«.
According to Colonel Glanz, fierce, although unsuccessful, Soviet counterattacks delayed the German Army Group South for at least a week. Thus, this helped force Hitler to redirect part of the forces of Army Group Center from the Moscow direction to strengthening the Ukrainian one. Colonel Glanz also points out that the border battles in Western Ukraine also showed that German tank crews are not invincible. This gave many Soviet commanders, for example Rokossovsky, expensive, but useful experience conducting tank warfare.
Battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody(also known as Battle of Brody, tank battle near Dubno-Lutsk-Rivne, counterattack of mechanized corps of the South-Western Front etc.) - the largest tank battle of the Second World War, which took place from June 23 to June 30, 1941. It was attended by five mechanized corps of the Red Army (2803 tanks) of the Southwestern Front against four German tank divisions (585 tanks) of the Wehrmacht Army Group South, united in the First Tank Group. Subsequently, another tank division of the Red Army (325 tanks) and one tank division of the Wehrmacht (143 tanks) entered the battle. Thus, 3,128 Soviet and 728 German tanks (+ 71 German assault guns) fought in an oncoming tank battle.
Encyclopedic YouTube
Actions of the parties in counterattacks since June 27
The commander of the 5th Army, Major General M.I. Potapov, still in the midst of the battles of the previous day, not knowing about the breakthrough of the German 13th TD near Lutsk, gives the order to the tank division of the 9th MK, which was at that time in the Novoselki region -Olyka, stop moving west and turn south to Dubno. The corps completed the maneuver only at two o'clock in the morning on June 27, having taken the starting positions for the attack along the Putilovka River. On the morning of the same day, the 19th Mechanized Corps also received an order to resume a counterattack from Rivne to Mlynov and Dubno. Units of the 15th mechanized corps were supposed to reach Berestechko. On June 26-27, the Germans transported infantry units across the Ikva River and concentrated the 13th Tank, 299th Infantry, and 111th Infantry Divisions against the 9th and 19th Mechanized Corps.
The offensive of the 9th MK Red Army floundered after the German 299th Infantry Division, advancing in the direction of Ostrozhets-Olyk, attacked the open western flank of the 35th TD of the Red Army at Malin. The withdrawal of this division to Olyka threatened the encirclement of the 20th TD of the Red Army, which was fighting with the motorized infantry brigade of the 13th TD in Dolgoshey and Petushki. With fighting, the 20th TD breaks through to Klevan. The tank divisions of the 19th MK Red Army were unable to go on the offensive, and with difficulty repelled the attacks of the tank regiment of the reconnaissance battalion and the motorcycle battalion of the enemy's 13th TD on Rovno. The Soviet 228th Infantry Division, which had only a quarter of its ammunition on June 25, after two days of fighting found itself without ammunition, semi-encircled near Radov and during the retreat to Zdolbunov it was attacked by reconnaissance units of the German 13th and 11th TD and 111th Infantry Division; during the retreat it was All artillery was abandoned. The division was saved from defeat only by the fact that the German 13th tank division and 11th tank division attacked in diverging directions and did not seek to destroy the 228th division. During the retreat and under air strikes, some of the tanks, vehicles and guns of the 19th Mechanized Corps were lost. The 36th Rifle Corps was incapable of combat and did not have a unified leadership (the headquarters made its way through the forests to its divisions from near Mizoch), so it was also unable to go on the attack. The German 111th Infantry Division was approaching the Dubno district from Mlynov. Near Lutsk, the German 298th Infantry Division launched an offensive with the support of tanks from the 14th Panzer Division.
It was planned to organize an offensive from the southern direction, towards Dubno, by the forces of the 8th and 15th mechanized corps of the Red Army with the 8th tank division of the 4th mechanized corps. At two o'clock in the afternoon on June 27, only the hastily organized combined detachments of the 24th Tank Regiment of Lieutenant Colonel Volkov and the 34th Tank Division under the command of the brigade commissar were able to go on the offensive.
- Gun weight - 7 tons, Caliber - 88 mm, Projectile weight - 9.5 kg,
- Ground range - 14500 m,/air range. - 10700 m
- Beginning projectile flight speed - 820 m/s, rate of fire - 15-20 rounds per minute.
1 / 5
"d) The armies of the Southwestern Front, firmly holding the border with Hungary, with concentric attacks in general direction to Lublin with forces of 5A and 6A, at least five mechanized corps and all front aviation, encircle and destroy the enemy group advancing on the Vladimir-Volynsky, Krystynopol front, and capture the Lublin region by the end of June 26. Safely secure yourself from the Krakow direction.”
Actions of the parties in counterattacks from June 24 to 27
On June 24, the 19th tank and 215th motorized rifle divisions of the 22nd mechanized corps went on the offensive north of the Vladimir-Volynsky - Lutsk highway from the Voinitsa - Boguslavskaya line. The attack was unsuccessful; the division's light tanks ran into anti-tank guns deployed by the Germans. The 19th TD lost more than 50% of its tanks and began to retreat to the Torchin area. The 1st anti-tank artillery brigade Moskalenko also moved here. The 41st Tank Division of the 22nd MK did not participate in the counterattack.
By the morning of June 26, 1941, the situation was as follows. The 131st Infantry Division, having retreated from Lutsk at night, occupied the front from Rozhishche to Lutsk; troops of the 19th Tank Division, 135th Infantry Division and 1st Artillery Brigade retreated behind its positions through Rozhishche. Lutsk was occupied by the German 13th TD, the 14th TD was located at Torchin. Further from Lutsk to Torgovitsa there was a gaping hole, which during the day had to be plugged by the tank divisions of the 9th MK, which were located in the Olyka-Klevan region in the morning. The Germans brought the 299th Infantry Division to Merchant. From Torgovitsa to Mlynov he occupied defense along the Moto River rifle regiment 40th TD 19th MK Red Army. The rifle regiment of the 228th Infantry Division of the 36th Infantry Division of the Red Army took up defense near Mlynov, and the German 111th Infantry Division acted against it. Tank regiments of the 40th TD and infantry regiment The 228th Infantry Division was in the forest near Radov in reserve. In the Pogoreltsy area he acted motorized rifle regiment 43rd TD, in the Mladechny area, rifle regiment of the 228th infantry regiment. The German 11th Tank Division occupied the Dubno-Verba district against them. Further from Surmichi to Sudobichi there was a gaping hole; the 140th Infantry Division of the 36th Infantry Division had not yet reached this line. Further from Sudobichi to Kremenets the 146th Infantry Division of the 36th Infantry Division defends. And in the Kremenets area - the 14th cavalry division of the 5th cavalry division.
From the morning of June 26 German divisions continued the offensive. In the morning, the German 13th TD withdraws units of the 131st Infantry Division beyond the intersection of the Lutsk-Rivne and Rozhishche-Mlynov roads, and turns to Mlynov. Positions near Lutsk are transferred to the 14th TD. Rokossovsky's tank divisions were supposed to reach the area of the breakthrough of the German 13th TD in the afternoon, but for now the road was open. Moving along it, the 13th TD in the afternoon reached the rear of the Soviet 40th TD, which was fighting with the 299th Infantry Division at Torgovitsa and the 111th Infantry Division at Mlynov. This breakthrough led to the disorderly withdrawal of the 40th TD and the 228th SD regiment to Radov and further north.
The German 11th TD advances in two battle groups, the tank group pushes back Soviet infantry 43rd TD and 228th SD Regiment to Krylov and Radov, occupies Varkovichi. The German motorized brigade of the 11th TD, moving through Surmichi, meets the marching columns of the Soviet 140th Infantry Division southeast of Lipa, which cannot withstand the sudden collision and retreat in disarray to the south, to Tartak. The 43rd Tank Division of the 19th Mechanized Corps, with 79 tanks of the 86th Tank Regiment, broke through the defensive positions of the German 11th Tank Division and by 6 o'clock in the evening broke into the outskirts of Dubno, reaching the Ikva River. Due to the retreat on the left flank of the 140th Division of the 36th Rifle Corps, and on the right of the 40th Tank Division, both flanks of the 43rd Tank Division became unprotected, and units of the division, by order of the corps commander, began to retreat from Dubno after midnight to the area to the west Smooth. From the south, from the Toporov area, the 19th tank regiment of the 10th tank division of the 15th mechanized corps of General I. I. Karpezo was advancing on Radekhov with the task of defeating the enemy and connecting with units of the 124th and 87th rifle divisions surrounded in the Voinitsa area and Milyatin. In the first half of the day on June 26, the 37th Tank Division of the Mechanized Corps crossed the Radostavka River and advanced forward. The 10th Panzer Division encountered anti-tank defenses at Kholuyev and was forced to withdraw. The corps units were subjected to a massive German air raid, during which the commander, Major General Carpezo, was seriously wounded. The 8th mechanized corps of General D.I. Ryabyshev, having completed a 500-kilometer march since the beginning of the war and leaving half of the tanks and part of the artillery on the road due to breakdowns and air strikes, by the evening of June 25 began to concentrate in the Busk area, southwest of Brody.
On the morning of June 26, the mechanized corps entered Brody with the further task of advancing on Dubno. Corps reconnaissance discovered German defense on the Ikva River and on the Sytenka River, as well as parts of the 212th Motorized Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps, which had moved out from Brody the day before. On the morning of June 26, the 12th Tank Division of Major General Mishanin crossed the Slonovka River and, having restored the bridge, attacked and captured the city of Leshnev by 16.00. On the right flank, the 34th Tank Division of Colonel I.V. Vasiliev destroyed the enemy column, taking about 200 prisoners and capturing 4 tanks. By the end of the day, the divisions of the 8th Mechanized Corps had advanced 8-15 km in the direction of Berestechko, displacing units of the 57th Infantry and a motorized brigade of the 16th Tank Division of the enemy, which had withdrawn and consolidated behind the Plyashevka River. The tank regiment of the 16th TD continued the offensive in the direction of Kozin. The Germans are sending to district of battles 670th anti-tank battalion and a battery of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. The 212th Motorized Rifle Division of the Red Army did not receive an order to support the attack of the 8th MK. By evening, the enemy was already trying to counterattack parts of the mechanized corps. On the night of June 27, the mechanized corps received an order to leave the battle and begin concentration behind the 37th sk.
The Battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody (also known as the Battle of Brody, the tank battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Rovno, the counterattack of the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front, etc.) - the largest tank battle in history, which took place from June 23 to 30 1941. It was attended by five mechanized corps of the Red Army (2803 tanks) of the Southwestern Front against four German tank divisions (585 tanks) of the Wehrmacht Army Group South, united in the First Tank Group. Subsequently, another tank division of the Red Army (325 tanks) and one tank division of the Wehrmacht (143 tanks) entered the battle. Thus, 3,128 Soviet and 728 German tanks (+ 71 German assault guns) fought in an oncoming tank battle.
The Red Army formations, which had overwhelming technical superiority in this section of the front, were unable to inflict significant losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment, and were also unable to seize the strategic offensive initiative and change the course of hostilities in their favor. Tactical superiority of the Wehrmacht and problems in the Red Army (poorly organized supply system for tank corps, lack of air cover and complete loss operational management) allowed German troops to win the battle, as a result of which the Red Army lost a huge number of tanks.
Burning T-34 in a field near Dubno.
Armored vehicles of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army
On June 22, 1941, as part of the entire German Army Group South, in the area of the offensive this battle, there were 728 tanks, including at least 115 unarmed Sd.Kfz “command tanks”. 265 and about 150 tanks armed with 20 mm cannons and/or machine guns and (T-I and T-II). Thus, the Germans actually had 455 tanks (T-38(t), T-III and T-IV) in the generally accepted sense of the word.
The total listed number of tanks in the mechanized corps of the Soviet Southwestern Front was 3,429 (in addition, a certain number of tanks were in the rifle divisions of the front). However, three of the six corps were practically at the stage of formation, and only the 4th, 8th and 9th mechanized corps could be considered as fully combat-ready formations. They included 1,515 tanks, which was more than three times the number of German cannon-armed tanks opposing them. In addition, these three combat-ready corps included 271 tanks of the T-34 and KV types, which were not only far superior in armament and armor to the best German tanks at that time, but were also almost invulnerable to standard Wehrmacht anti-tank weapons.
Previous Events
On June 22, 1941, after a breakthrough in the zone of General Potapov’s 5th Army at the junction with Muzychenko’s 6th Army, Kleist’s 1st Tank Group advanced in the direction of Radekhov and Berestechko. The General Staff decided to encircle the main enemy grouping in the Southwestern Front with strikes in the direction of Rava-Russkaya Lublin and Kovel Lublin and subsequently help the Western Front.
The USSR NGO Directive No. 3 dated June 22, 1941, endorsed by Zhukov, stated:
d) The armies of the Southwestern Front, firmly holding the border with Hungary, with concentric attacks in the general direction of Lublin with forces 5A and 6A, at least five mechanized corps and all front aviation, encircle and destroy the enemy group advancing on the Vladimir-Volynsky, Krystynopol front, by the end of June 26, capture the Lublin region. Safely provide for yourself from the Krakow direction.
During the discussion of the directive at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front, it was considered that an encirclement operation with access to Lublin was impossible.
The proposal of the chief of staff of the Southwestern Front, General Purkaev, is to withdraw troops and create solid line defense by old border, and then a counterattack was also rejected.
We decided to strike with three mechanized corps (15th, 4th, 8th mechanized corps) from the Radzekhov Rava-Russkaya front to Krasnostav and one mechanized corps (22nd mechanized corps) from the Verba Vladimir-Volynsky front to Krasnostav. The goal of the strike is not encirclement (as the directive required), but the defeat of the enemy’s main forces in a counter battle.
In pursuance decisions taken, On June 23, the 15th mechanized corps of Karpezo advanced from the south to Radzekhov without the 212th motorized rifle division, which was left to cover Brod. During clashes with the German 11th Panzer Division, units reported the destruction of 20 German tanks and armored vehicles and 16 anti-tank guns. The Radzekhs could not be held; in the afternoon the Germans captured the crossings on the Styr River near Berestechko.
The breakthrough to Berestechko forced the headquarters of the Southwestern Front to abandon its previous decision; the 8th MK from near Yavorov received an order to move to Brody at 15:30 on June 23.
During June 24, the front headquarters, together with the representative of the General Headquarters, Zhukov, decided to launch a counterattack on the German group with the forces of four mechanized corps while simultaneously creating a rear line of defense with rifle corps of front-line subordination - the 31st, 36th and 37th. In reality, these units were in the process of moving to the front and entered into battle as they arrived without mutual coordination. Some units did not take part in the counterattack. The goal of the counterattack of the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front was to defeat the 1st Panzer Group of Kleist. During the subsequent battle, the German troops of the 1st Tgr and 6th Army were counterattacked by the Soviet 22nd, 9th and 19th mechanized corps from the north, and the 8th and 15th mechanized corps from the south, entering an oncoming tank battle with the German 11th, 13th, 14th and 16th Panzer Divisions.
Destroyed T-26 tanks of the 19th Tank Division of the 22nd Mechanized Corps on the Voinitsa-Lutsk highway.
On June 24, the 19th tank and 215th motorized rifle divisions of the 22nd mechanized corps went on the offensive north of the Vladimir-Volynsky - Lutsk highway from the Voinitsa - Boguslavskaya line. The attack was unsuccessful; the division's light tanks ran into anti-tank guns deployed by the Germans. The 19th TD lost more than 50% of its tanks and began to retreat to the Torchin area. Moskalenko’s 1st anti-tank artillery brigade also moved here. The 41st Tank Division of the 22nd MK did not participate in the counterattack. The defense on the Styr River near Lutsk was occupied by the advanced 131st Motorized Division of the 9th Mechanized Corps of General Rokossovsky.
The 19th Mechanized Corps of Major General Feklenko advanced to the border from the evening of June 22, reaching the Ikva River in the Mlynov area with advanced units on the evening of June 24. On the morning of June 25, the reconnaissance battalion of the German 11th Panzer Division attacked the forward company of the 40th Panzer Division, which was guarding the crossing at Mlynov, and pushed it back. The 43rd Tank Division of the Mechanized Corps was approaching the Rivne area, subject to air attacks.
By the morning of June 26, 1941, the situation was as follows. The 131st Infantry Division, having retreated from Lutsk at night, occupied the front from Rozhishche to Lutsk; troops of the 19th Tank Division, 135th Infantry Division and 1st Artillery Brigade retreated behind its positions through Rozhishche. Lutsk was occupied by the German 13th TD, the 14th TD was located at Torchin. Further from Lutsk to Torgovitsa there was no defense; during the day the defense was to be occupied by the tank divisions of the 9th MK, which were located in the Olyka-Klevan area in the morning. The Germans brought the 299th Infantry Division to Merchant. From Torgovitsa to Mlynov, the motorized rifle regiment of the 40th TD of the 19th MK Red Army occupied the defense along the river. The rifle regiment of the 228th Infantry Division of the 36th Infantry Division of the Red Army took up defense near Mlynov, and the German 111th Infantry Division acted against it. The tank regiments of the 40th TD and the infantry regiment of the 228th Infantry Division were in the forest near Radov in reserve. In the Pogoreltsy area the motorized rifle regiment of the 43rd TD operated, in the Mladechny area the rifle regiment of the 228th infantry regiment operated. The German 11th Tank Division occupied the Dubno-Verba area against them. Further from Surmichi to Sudobichi there was no defense; the 140th Infantry Division of the 36th Infantry Division had not yet reached this line. Further, from Sudobichi to Kremenets, the 146th Infantry Division of the 36th Infantry Division defended. In the Kremenets area the defense was held by the 14th cavalry division of the 5th cavalry division.
On the morning of June 26, German divisions continued their offensive. In the morning, the German 13th TD threw back units of the 131st Infantry Division beyond the intersection of the Lutsk-Rovno and Rozhishche-Mlynov roads, and turned towards Mlynov. The positions near Lutsk were transferred to the 14th TD. Rokossovsky's tank divisions were supposed to reach the area of the breakthrough of the German 13th TD in the afternoon, and before that the road was open. Moving along it, the 13th TD in the afternoon reached the rear of the Soviet 40th TD, which was fighting with the 299th Infantry Division at Torgovitsa and the 111th Infantry Division at Mlynov. This breakthrough led to the disorderly withdrawal of the 40th TD and the 228th SD regiment to Radov and further north.
The German 11th TD advanced in two battle groups, the tank group drove back the Soviet infantry of the 43rd TD and the 228th SD regiment to Krylov and Radov, and occupied Varkovichi. The German motorized brigade of the 11th TD, moving through Surmichi, met the marching columns of the Soviet 140th Infantry Division southeast of Lipa, which could not withstand the sudden collision and retreated in disarray to the south, to Tartak. The 43rd Tank Division of the 19th Mechanized Corps, with 79 tanks of the 86th Tank Regiment, broke through the defensive positions of the German 11th Tank Division and by 6 o'clock in the evening broke into the outskirts of Dubno, reaching the Ikva River. Due to the retreat on the left flank of the 140th Division of the 36th Rifle Corps, and on the right of the 40th Tank Division, both flanks of the 43rd Tank Division became unprotected, and units of the division, by order of the corps commander, began to retreat from Dubno after midnight to the area to the west Smooth. From the south, from the Toporov area, the 19th tank regiment of the 10th tank division of the 15th mechanized corps of General I. I. Karpezo was advancing on Radekhov with the task of defeating the enemy and connecting with units of the 124th and 87th rifle divisions surrounded in the Voinitsa area and Milyatin. In the first half of the day on June 26, the 37th Tank Division of the Mechanized Corps crossed the Radostavka River and advanced forward. The 10th Panzer Division encountered anti-tank defenses at Kholuyev and was forced to withdraw. The corps units were subjected to a massive German air raid, during which the commander, Major General Carpezo, was seriously wounded. The 8th Mechanized Corps of General D.I. Ryabyshev, having completed a 500-kilometer march since the beginning of the war and leaving half of the tanks and part of the artillery on the road due to breakdowns and air strikes, by the evening of June 25 began to concentrate in the Busk area, southwest of Brody.
On the morning of June 26, the mechanized corps entered Brody with the further task of advancing on Dubno. Corps reconnaissance discovered German defenses on the Ikva River and the Sytenka River, as well as parts of the 212th Motorized Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps, which had moved out from Brody the day before. On the morning of June 26, the 12th Tank Division of Major General Mishanin crossed the Slonovka River and, having restored the bridge, attacked and captured the city of Leshnev by 16.00. On the right flank, the 34th Tank Division of Colonel I.V. Vasilyev destroyed the enemy column, taking about 200 prisoners and capturing 4 tanks. By the end of the day, the divisions of the 8th Mechanized Corps had advanced 8-15 km in the direction of Berestechko, displacing units of the 57th Infantry and a motorized brigade of the 16th Tank Division of the enemy, which had withdrawn and consolidated behind the Plyashevka River. The tank regiment of the 16th TD continued the offensive in the direction of Kozin. The Germans sent the 670th anti-tank battalion and a battery of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns to the battle area. The 212th Motorized Rifle Division of the Red Army did not receive an order to support the attack of the 8th MK. By evening, the enemy was already trying to counterattack parts of the mechanized corps. On the night of June 27, the mechanized corps received an order to leave the battle and begin concentration behind the 37th sk.
The commander of the 5th Army, Major General M.I. Potapov, still in the midst of the battles of the previous day, not knowing about the breakthrough of the German 13th TD near Lutsk, gives the order to the tank division of the 9th MK, which was at that time in the Novoselki region -Olyka, stop moving west and turn south to Dubno. The corps completed the maneuver only at two o'clock in the morning on June 27, having taken the starting positions for the attack along the Putilovka River. On the morning of the same day, the 19th Mechanized Corps also received an order to resume a counterattack from Rivne to Mlynov and Dubno. Units of the 15th mechanized corps were supposed to reach Berestechko. On June 26-27, the Germans transported infantry units across the Ikva River and concentrated the 13th Tank, 299th Infantry, and 111th Infantry Divisions against the 9th and 19th Mechanized Corps.
At dawn on June 27, the 24th Tank Regiment of the 20th Tank Division of Colonel Katukov from the 9th Mechanized Corps attacked units of the 13th German Tank Division on the move, capturing about 300 prisoners. During the day, the division itself lost 33 BT tanks. The offensive of the 9th MK Red Army floundered after the German 299th Infantry Division, advancing in the direction of Ostrozhets-Olyk, attacked the open western flank of the 35th TD of the Red Army at Malin. The withdrawal of this division to Olyka threatened the encirclement of the 20th TD of the Red Army, which was fighting with the motorized infantry brigade of the 13th TD in Dolgoshey and Petushki. With fighting, the 20th TD breaks through to Klevan. The tank divisions of the 19th MK Red Army were unable to go on the offensive, and with difficulty repelled the attacks of the tank regiment of the reconnaissance battalion and the motorcycle battalion of the enemy's 13th TD on Rovno. The Soviet 228th Infantry Division, which had only a quarter of its ammunition on June 25, after two days of fighting found itself without ammunition, semi-encircled near Radov and during the retreat to Zdolbunov it was attacked by reconnaissance units of the German 13th and 11th TD and 111th Infantry Division; during the retreat it was All artillery was abandoned. The division was saved from defeat only by the fact that the German 13th tank division and 11th tank division attacked in diverging directions and did not seek to destroy the 228th division. During the retreat and under air strikes, some of the tanks, vehicles and guns of the 19th Mechanized Corps were lost. The 36th Rifle Corps was incapable of combat and did not have a unified leadership (the headquarters made its way through the forests to its divisions from near Mizoch), so it was also unable to go on the attack. The German 111th Infantry Division was approaching the Dubno district from Mlynov. Near Lutsk, the German 298th Infantry Division launched an offensive with the support of tanks from the 14th Panzer Division.
It was planned to organize an offensive from the southern direction, towards Dubno, by the forces of the 8th and 15th mechanized corps of the Red Army with the 8th tank division of the 4th mechanized corps. At two o'clock in the afternoon on June 27, only the hastily organized combined detachments of the 24th Tank Regiment of Lieutenant Colonel Volkov and the 34th Tank Division under the command of Brigade Commissar N.K. Popel were able to go on the offensive. By this time, the remaining parts of the division were only being transferred to a new direction.
The attack in the direction of Dubno was unexpected for the Germans, and having crushed the defensive barriers, Popel’s group entered the outskirts of Dubno in the evening, capturing the rear reserves of the enemy’s 11th Panzer Division and several dozen intact tanks. During the night, the Germans transferred units of the 16th Motorized, 75th and 111th Infantry Divisions to the breakthrough site and closed the gap, interrupting the supply routes of Popel’s group. Attempts by the approaching units of the 8th Mechanized Corps of the Red Army to make a new hole in the defense failed, and under attacks from aviation, artillery and superior enemy forces, it had to go on the defensive. On the left flank, having broken through the defenses of the 212th Motorized Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps, about 40 German tanks reached the headquarters of the Soviet 12th Tank Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps. The division commander, Major General T. A. Mishanin, sent a reserve to meet them - 6 KV tanks and 4 T-34s, which managed to stop the breakthrough.
The offensive of the 15th MK Red Army was unsuccessful. Having suffered heavy losses from anti-tank gun fire, its units were unable to cross the Ostrovka River and were thrown back to their original positions along the Radostavka River. On June 29, the 15th Mechanized Corps was ordered to be replaced by units of the 37th Rifle Corps and retreat to the Zolochev Heights in the area of Byala Kamen - Sasuv - Zolochev - Lyatske. Contrary to the order, the withdrawal began without a change of units of the 37th Rifle Corps and without notifying the commander of the 8th MK Ryabyshev, and therefore the German troops freely bypassed the flank of the 8th Mechanized Corps. On June 29, the Germans occupied Busk and Brody, held by one battalion of the Soviet 212th Motorized Division. On the right flank of the 8th Mechanized Corps, without offering resistance to the Germans, units of the 140th and 146th Rifle Divisions of the 36th Rifle Corps and the 14th Cavalry Division withdrew.
The 8th Mk Red Army, which found itself surrounded by the enemy, managed to retreat in an organized manner to the line of the Zolochev Heights, breaking through the German barriers. Popel's detachment remained cut off deep behind enemy lines, taking up a perimeter defense in the Dubno area. The defense continued until July 2, and only when the ammunition and fuel ran out did the detachment, having destroyed the remaining equipment, begin to break out of the encirclement. Having traveled more than 200 km behind enemy lines, Popel’s group and the units of the 124th Rifle Division of the 5th Army that joined it reached the location of the 15th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army. In total, over a thousand people emerged from the encirclement, the losses of the 34th division and the units attached to it amounted to 5,363 people missing and about a thousand killed, the division commander, Colonel I.V. Vasiliev, died.
Factors
Compared to German tank crews, Soviet tank crews in the first days of the 1941 war had no combat experience and had very little experience training, even the drivers of Soviet tanks had about 2-5 hours of driving practice, while the Germans at one time, even at the Kazan Tank School, had about 50 hours of driving practice.
The superior armor of the T-34 and KV turned out to be untenable against German 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, which the Germans took advantage of, shooting up to 20-30 tanks at long distances in an hour. Subsequently, these guns were installed as standard on Tiger tanks and others.
Almost complete or completely complete absence armor-piercing shells from the Soviet tank crews who took part in the battle.
Extremely inept and illiterate conduct of Soviet tank attacks in the absence of high-quality standard radio communications of groups and individual combat vehicles with general coordination of forces (in comparison with the qualitatively different state of radio communications in German tank troops ah), led to large losses of Soviet crews and equipment, including on the march.
“The failures of the Soviet tank forces are not explained by the poor quality of materials or weapons, but by the inability of command and lack of maneuvering experience... […] brigade-division-corps commanders are not able to solve operational problems. This is especially true for interaction various types armed forces..” - said during interrogation, who was captured near Senno former commander howitzer battery of the 14th tank division, captain Ya. I. Dzhugashvili.
Losses
Losses on June 30, 1941, SWF: 2648 tanks (85%) against German 260 vehicles. And if the Germans had the opportunity to repair their cars and had trophies (using them under white crosses), then the Soviet losses were irrevocable. During 15 days of the war, losses amounted to: 4381 tanks out of 5826.
German losses by September 4, 1941 (1st Panzer Group of Kleist): 222 repairable vehicles + 186 irreparable.
Consequences
The shock formations of the Southwestern Front were unable to carry out a unified offensive. The actions of the Soviet mechanized corps were reduced to isolated counterattacks in different directions. The result of the counterattacks was a week's delay in the advance of Kleist's 1st Panzer Group and the disruption of the enemy's plans to break through to Kyiv and encircle the 6th, 12th and 26th Armies of the Southwestern Front in the Lvov salient. The German command, through competent leadership, managed to repel the Soviet counterattack and defeat the armies of the Southwestern Front.
Unable to bear the shame of defeat, on June 28, 1941, Corps Commissar N.N. Vashugin, a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, shot himself.
If collected for round table Military historians from different countries and ask them a question about which tank battle was the greatest in the world, then the answers will be different... Historian Soviet school of course he will call KURSK ARC , there the number of tanks and self-propelled guns, according to average data, was from the Red Army - 3444 , from the Wehrmacht - 2733 combat vehicles. ( Although the figures given by different researchers are given with such a spread that it is not easy to even average, we can only mention that even in our sources, our losses in tanks vary by 100% ).
The Israeli will say that it was Yom Kippur War in October 1973. Then on the Northern Front 1200 Syrian tanks attacked 180 Israeli, and lost at the same time 800 . And on the Southern Front 500 The Egyptians fought against 240 IDF tanks. (The Egyptians were luckier than the Syrians, they lost only 200 tanks). Then hundreds of Iraqi vehicles arrived (according to some sources - up to 1500 ) and everything started to spin to the fullest. In total, during this conflict, the Israelis lost 810 armored vehicles, and Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Algeria and Cuba - 1775 cars But, as I said above, the data in different sources varies greatly.
Well, in real life such a battle took place on June 23-27, 1941 - the largest tank battle in the history of the War took place in the area of Dubno, Lutsk and Rivne. In this battle, six Soviet mechanized corps faced a German tank group.
It really was largest tank battle in world history , which lasted a week. More than four thousand tanks mixed in a fiery whirlwind... On the Brody-Rivne-Lutsk section, the Soviet 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd and 4th mechanized corps and the German 11th mechanized corps collided. 13th, 14th, 16th and 9th tank divisions.
According to averaged data from different sources, the balance of power was as follows...
Red Army:
The 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd corps consisted of 33 KV-2, 136 KV-1, 48 T-35, 171 T-34, 2,415 T-26, OT -26, T-27, T-36, T-37, BT-5, BT-7. In total - 2,803 combat vehicles. [Military Historical Journal, N11, 1993]. West of Brody, their flank was covered by the 4th Mechanized Corps, which was the most powerful of the then mechanized corps of the Red Army and the whole World. It contained 892 tanks, of which 89 KV-1 and 327 T-34. On June 24, the 8th Tank Division (325 tanks, including 50 KV and 140 T-34s as of June 22) from its composition was reassigned to the 15th Mechanized Corps.
TOTAL: 3,695 tanks
VERMACHT:
In the 4 German tank divisions that formed the backbone of the Wehrmacht tank group, there were 80 Pz-IV, 195 Pz-III (50mm), 89 Pz-III (37mm), 179 Pz-II, 42 BefPz. (commander), and on June 28 in The 9th German Tank Division entered the battle, this also includes 20 Pz-IV, 60 Pz-III (50mm), 11 Pz-III (37mm), 32 Pz-II, 8 Pz-I, 12 Bef-Pz).
TOTAL: 628 tanks
By the way, Soviet tanks were mostly either no worse than German ones, or superior to them in armor and caliber. Otherwise, look below comparison table. The numbers are given by gun caliber and frontal armor.
This battle was preceded by an appointment June 23, 1941 ., Georgy Zhukov , member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It was as a representative of the Headquarters on the Southwestern Front that Army General G.K. Zhukov organized this counterattack. Moreover, his position was very comfortable. On the one hand, he was a representative of Headquarters and could give any order, and on the other, M.P. Kirponos, I.N. Muzychenko and M.I. Potapov were responsible for everything.
Experienced wolves of war confronted our generals Gerd von Rundstedt And Ewald von Kleist . The first to attack the flanks of the enemy group were the 22nd, 4th and 15th mechanized corps. Then the 9th, 19th and 8th mechanized corps, advanced from the 2nd echelon of the front, were introduced into the battle. By the way, the 9th Mechanized Corps was commanded by the future Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, released from prison a year ago. He immediately showed himself to be a knowledgeable and proactive commander. When he realized that the motorized division under his command could only follow... on foot, Rokossovsky, at his own peril and risk, took all the vehicles from the district reserve in Shepetovka, and there were almost two hundred of them, put infantry on them and moved them like motorized infantry them in front of the body. The approach of his units to the Lutsk region saved the aggravated situation there. They stopped the enemy tanks that broke through there.
The tankers fought like heroes, sparing neither strength nor life, but bad organization The high command reduced everything to nothing. Units and formations entered the battle after a 300-400 km march in parts, without being able to wait for the complete concentration of forces and the arrival of combined arms support formations. The equipment on the march broke down, and there was no normal communication. And orders from front headquarters drove them forward. And all the time German aircraft were hovering over them. Here, the consequences of stupidity or betrayal of those responsible for aviation in this theater of operations were felt. Just before the war, most of the front-line airfields began to be modernized, and numerous aircraft were assembled at the few remaining suitable sites, and there was an order to place the planes wing to wing, supposedly for better protection from saboteurs. At dawn on June 22, 1941, this oil painting "Junkersam" I really liked it, but our aviation has greatly decreased in number.
And the saboteurs from the regiment "Brandenburg" these measures, by the way, did not interfere at all. Well, front-line air defense was then generally in its infancy in the Red Army. So, even before entering the battle with German ground units, our tanks suffered heavy losses from air raids. How many of our 7,500 aircraft died without taking off is still a mystery, shrouded in darkness. And German air defense was used very competently, although not quite standardly. Von Rundstedt and Von Kleist remembered how Guderian came up with the idea of bringing the FlaK 88 into battle formations. Although the armor of the Russian KV monsters was much thicker than the French boxes, the anti-aircraft guns (albeit not from a kilometer away like Renault) were quite able to stop the Russian tanks, although they could knock out the KV with Almost no one succeeded in the first projectile.
On June 26, the 9th and 19th mechanized corps from the Lutsk region, Rivne, and the 8th and 15th from Brody district attacked the flanks of the German group that broke through to Lutsk and Dubno. Units of the 19th Mechanized Corps pushed back the 11th Nazi Panzer Division 25 km. However, as a result weak interaction between the 9th and 19th mechanized corps and the slow reaction to the rapidly changing combat situation of the front headquarters, our advancing tanks were forced to stop by the end of June 27 and retreat to Rivne, where tank battles lasted until June 29. The actions of the 8th Mechanized Corps were more successful: on June 26, it, having defeated enemy troops north of Brody, advanced 20 km. But then the Headquarters woke up, and due to the aggravated situation near Dubno, on June 27 the 8th Mechanized Corps was assigned new task- strike from Berestechko in the direction of Dubno. And here Soviet tank crews behaved like heroes, completely defeating units of the 16th Panzerdivision, the corps fought 40 km, liberated Dubno and went to the rear of the 3rd German motorized corps. But the command was unable to provide the corps with fuel and ammunition, and their offensive capabilities were exhausted. By this time German command brought an additional 7 divisions into the battle in the Rivne direction.
And near Ostrog, parts of the 5th Mechanized Corps and the 37th Rifle Corps received orders to stop the advance of the 11th German Tank Division. But the Germans also sent the 9th Panzer Division to the left flank of the Soviet defense (in the Lvov area). Given the complete superiority of the Luftwaffe in the air, this maneuver fatally destroyed the left flank of the Soviet defense. And the most tragic thing is that by this time the Soviet tanks had almost no ammunition and fuel left.
27th of June combined detachment from 34th Panzer Division Under the command of brigade commissar N.K. Popel, in the evening he struck Dubno, captured the rear reserves of the 11th Panzer Division and several dozen intact German tanks, but the 8th Mechanized Corps was unable to come to the rescue and consolidate the success. Popel's detachment remained cut off deep behind enemy lines; at first the tankers took up a perimeter defense in the Dubno area and held out until July 2, and when the shells ran out, destroying the remaining equipment, the detachment began to break out of the encirclement. Having walked along the rear for more than 200 km, Popel’s group reached their own. Nikolai Poppel, by the way, went through the entire war and retired with the rank of lieutenant general of tank forces.
The difficulties of all Soviet group turned into a disaster. On the morning of June 29 The 13th Panzerdivision advanced east of Rovno, while Soviet troops withdrew north and south of the city, paralleling the German movement. Soviet tanks were increasingly left without fuel, and German infantry destroyed the remnants of the 12th and 34th Panzer Divisions. On June 30, the 9th Panzer Division attacked the remnants of the 3rd Cavalry Division. She then cut off the 8th and 10th Panzer Divisions, completing their encirclement. By this time, the commander of the 6th Soviet Army ordered all his units to withdraw to positions east of Lvov. And at that time the Germans were gathering parts of the 13th and 14th Panzerdivisions south of Lutsk in order to create a fist for a strike in the direction of Zhitomir and Berdichev.
By July 1, the Soviet mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front were practically destroyed. About 10% of the tanks remained in the 22nd, 15% in the 8th and 15th, and about 30% in the 9th and 19th. The 4th Mechanized Corps under the command of General A.A. Vlasov (the same one) found himself in a slightly better position - he managed to withdraw with about 40% of the tanks.
Bertolt Brecht was right when he said that good soldiers only needed bad generals to correct their mistakes with your blood. Total losses in tanks during these days the Red Army amounted to about 2500 cars This includes both combat and non-combat combat losses. Moreover, all the tanks - knocked out, stalled, and burned - went to the Germans. And just for Great Patriotic War from 131700 tanks and self-propelled guns, BTV of the Red Army lost 96500 combat units. The Germans, accordingly, lost out of 49,500 BT units 45000 combat units, 75% of them are on Eastern Front. The figures, of course, are taken from various sources and are accurate, taking into account the delta of up to 15%.
The main thing is that our tank crews did not burn in tanks and shed their blood in vain. They delayed the German advance for at least a week; it was precisely this week that the Germans constantly missed.
The headquarters of the Southwestern Front was unable to properly organize the management and supply of the most powerful tank group in the World at that time, and this is precisely the reason for the failure of this operation. And the inspirer and leader of the counteroffensive, Army General G.K. Zhukov, after tank corps got stuck, and it became clear that the counteroffensive was failing, he left for Moscow.
Corps Commissar N.N. Vashugin, a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, shot himself at the end of the battle. He did not prepare, plan or carry out this battle, he did not bear direct blame for the failure, but his conscience did not allow him to do otherwise. After the Crimean shame, Comrade Mekhlis did not shoot himself, but blamed everything on Kozlov and Tolbukhin. After the bloody and unsuccessful assault on Grozny, where thousands of boys died, Pasha Mercedes did not reach for his service pistol. Yes... Conscience is a piece of goods.
And to our Heroes Eternal Glory And Everlasting memory. Soldiers win wars.
And now I apologize for the scary photos, my heart hurt when I looked at them, but this is the Truth of History. And let the critics not tell me that I smooth out the sharp and unsuccessful moments Military History. True, I am sure that now they will accuse me of praising the Wehrmacht.
APPLICATION
Popel, Nikolai Kirillovich
Military commissar of the 11th mechanized (tank) brigade since 1938. Participated in the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939. Until June 3, 1940, military commissar of the 1st Leningrad Artillery School. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, brigade commissar, political commander of the 8th mechanized corps. He led the mobile group of the 8th MK in the battles for Dubno. He fought in the encirclement near Dubno and emerged from the encirclement with part of his troops.
From August 25, 1941 to December 8, 1941, member of the military council of the 38th Army. Since September 1942, military commissar of the 3rd mechanized corps. From January 30, 1943 until the end of the war, member of the military council of the 1st Tank Army (reformed into the 1st Guards tank army). After the war he wrote memoirs. The literary critic E.V. Cardin was involved in recording and processing the memoirs of Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Nikolai Popel. These memories eventually grew into two books: "In difficult times" And "The tanks turned west", which were released in 1959 and 1960, respectively.
88 mm anti-aircraft gun FlaK-18/36/37/41
Of all the artillery systems of the Second World War, perhaps the most famous was the German Flak 36/37 anti-aircraft gun of 88 mm caliber. However, this gun became most famous as an anti-tank weapon. Project of a semi-automatic anti-aircraft gun of 88 mm caliber with high initial speed The projectile was developed at the Krupp factories in 1928. In order to overcome limitations Treaty of Versailles all work on the production of samples was carried out at the Swedish factories of Bofors, with which Krupp had bilateral agreements. The gun was put into production at the Krupp factories in 1933; after Hitler came to power, Germany openly spat on the Treaty of Versailles.
The prototype of the Flak 36 was the Flak 18 anti-aircraft gun of the same caliber, developed back in the first world war and mounted on a four-wheel towed platform. It was originally designed exclusively as an anti-aircraft gun. However, circumstances were such that several Flak 18 guns sent to Spain as part of the legion "Condor", the Germans had to use to protect their own positions from the advancing Republican tanks. This experience was subsequently taken into account when modernizing the new gun, which was produced in two versions, Flak 36 and Flak 37. An important advantage of the guns was the presence of a mechanism for automatically ejecting spent cartridges, which allowed trained personnel to ensure a rate of fire of up to 20 rounds per minute. But in order to load a gun with a 15-kilogram shell every three seconds, each gun needed 11 people, four or five of whom were exclusively engaged in feeding shells. Putting together such a large team in the field was far from easy, and getting the position and gloves of a loader - the one who put the projectile in the gun lock - was a high honor and proof of qualifications.
Basic tactical and technical data:
In the first weeks of the Great Patriotic War, when the German tank spearheads of Army Groups “Center” and “North” closed their pincers near Minsk and rushed to Smolensk and Pskov (aiming at Moscow and Leningrad), on our Southwestern Front, repelling the attacks of the German Army Group "South", a grandiose tank battle unfolded. The largest tank battle in the history of World War II and the first tank battle of the Great Patriotic War took place on June 22 - July 10, 1941 and was clear evidence of the high offensive activity of the Soviet troops, their desire to wrest the initiative from the hands of the enemy, which he seized as a result of an unexpected attack.
This battle is little covered in memoirs, and in military historical works it is usually referred to as “the battles of Brody” or simply “ border battles" However, it was by no means an ordinary event and not a private operation. The battle took place in several western regions Ukraine, in a huge pentagon between the cities of Lutsk, Rivne, Ostrog, Kamenets, Brody with the center in Dubno. About 2,500 Soviet and German tanks clashed in oncoming battles. Its outcome had a significant impact on the disruption of plans German command for the “lightning-fast” destruction of the Red Army in the south. Breakthrough German troops the march to Kyiv was disrupted. Encirclement and destruction of the troops of the Southwestern Front and capture industrial areas Ukraine did not take place as scheduled.
This work examines the battle from the point of view of the initial decisions of the Soviet and German high commands, which determined the course and results of the first tank battle. We want to show as much as possible general progress battles, clashes of ideas and plans, operational-tactical decisions and initiatives of Soviet and German commanders of formations and units that took part in the battle.
Ideas, plans, decisions
German attack plan on the USSR and defense plan Soviet side were worked out and approved in final versions almost simultaneously, and this is not accidental. The coincidence in time is explained by the constantly increasing tension in the world caused by the successes of Germany at the beginning of the Second World War.
In December 1940 - January 1941. In Moscow, the Soviet leadership held a meeting with military leaders and operational games, and a little earlier in Berlin, the Nazi leadership of Germany held a similar meeting and games. Their result was the plans mentioned above.
IN German plan"Barbarossa" (Directive No. 21) is formulated common goal: “The main forces of the Russians located in Western Russia must be destroyed in operations through deep, rapid extension of tank wedges. Retreat of combat-ready enemy troops to wide open spaces Russian territory must be prevented."
German strategists, in accordance with the military doctrine of “blitzkrieg,” placed their main emphasis on the use of tank and mechanized formations. Army Group “South”, operating south of the Pripyat marshes, was given the task: “... through concentric attacks, with the main forces on the flanks, destroy the Russian troops located in Ukraine even before the latter reach the Dnieper. To this end main blow is applied from the Lublin region in the general direction of Kyiv ... "
According to F. Paulus, one of the authors of the plan, a participant in the meeting and the head of the games, the final version of actions in Ukraine included two amendments. Hitler demanded that the Russians be encircled from the north, and Halder ordered tank wedges to prevent the Russians from retreating and creating a defense west of the Dnieper.
Based on these instructions, the headquarters of Army Group South (commander Field Marshal von Rundstedt) developed an offensive plan (Diagram 1).
Scheme 1. Plan German offensive north (Army Group Center) and south (Army Group South) of the Pripyat marshes.
His plan: with an enveloping blow from the Pripyat swamps to Kyiv, and then turning south along the Dnieper, to encircle the main forces of the Southwestern Front, while cutting off communications Southern Front, and with an auxiliary strike on Lvov (and further) to encircle Soviet troops in right-bank Ukraine. The exit to Kyiv was planned in 3–4 days, the encirclement in 7–8 days.
The offensive zone for tank and motorized divisions in the direction of the main attack was carefully selected. German generals attracted the areas of Rivne - Lutsk - Dubno, where the forests along the river. The Goryns were interspersed with flat fields, and the plain extended to the southwest, from Rivne and Dubno, and to the northwest, to Lutsk. In the south, this fairly open area, quite suitable for tank operations, was protected by forests, and in the north, by the Polesie (or Pripyat) swampy lowland with almost complete roadlessness. It is not surprising that the main German attack, originally planned for Lvov, was moved to this zone. The main roads from the border to Novograd-Volynsky, Rivne and further to Zhitomir and Kyiv passed along it.
Army Group South deployed along the line Lublin - the mouth of the Danube (780 km). At the Wlodawa-Przemysl line there were the 6th and 17th field armies of Field Marshal Reichenau and General Stülpnagel, as well as the 1st Panzer Group (1st Tgr) of General Kleist. The Hungarian corps advanced to the border with Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Three more armies (11th German, 3rd and 4th Romanian) occupied a line along the Prut and Danube rivers (Diagram 2).
The 6th Army of Reichenau and the 1st Tgr Kleist were given the task: in cooperation with the 17th Army, to attack the Russians from Wlodawa to Krystynopol and through Vladimir-Volynsky, Sokal, Dubno to break through to the Dnieper. Therefore, Rundstedt concentrated attack tank and motorized divisions in the Ustilug - Sokal - Krystyonopol sector, creating here, at the junction of the 5th and 6th Soviet armies, three and even five times superiority in forces and means. The German 6th Field Army had 12 divisions, Kleist's tank group had 3 motorized corps (3rd, 14th and 48th), which included 5 tank divisions (9th, 11th, 13th, 14th). Yu and 16th) and 4 motorized (16th, 25th, SS Viking and SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler). In total, there were 57 divisions in Army Group South, they were supported by the 4th air fleet General Dör (1300 aircraft).
On the night of June 18, Rundstedt began to move divisions into the waiting and starting areas, which for infantry divisions were 7–20 km from the border, and for tank divisions 20–30 km. The nomination ended on June 21. Starting positions were located closer to the border and were engaged on the night of June 22. The Germans managed to reach them by 3 o'clock in the morning.
On the evening of June 21, the commanders of the prepared German formations received a conditional password: “The Tale of Heroes. Wotan. Neckar 15” - the signal for the attack, transmitted at 4 o’clock in the morning. On the night of June 21-22, the commander of the 48th motorized corps reported to Rundstedt: “Sokal is not darkened. The Russians set up their pillboxes in full light. They don't seem to suggest anything..."
On June 22, 1941, at 4.00 Rundstedt launched simultaneous artillery and air strikes and at 4.15 moved the infantry divisions. At about 9 o'clock Kleist began to introduce tank divisions into battle. Halder wrote in his diary on June 22: “The offensive of our troops came as a complete surprise to the enemy... units (Soviet - Auto.) were taken by surprise in a barracks position, the planes stood at the airfields, covered with tarpaulin; the advanced units, suddenly attacked, asked the command what to do... After the initial “tetanus”... the enemy moved on to hostilities...” (F. Halder. Military Diary. Vol. 3, book 1).