“Youth took us on a saber campaign!”

The civil war on Russian territory was of a highly mobile nature, which is why it was fought along railways and rivers. It was difficult to step aside, simply put, “there weren’t enough legs,” which is why very soon the Red Commissars put forward the slogan “Proletarian, on horseback!”

Two cavalry armies were created at once - the First - Semyon Budyonny and the Second - Oki Gorodovikov, which played a very important role in the defeat of the White Army. Even a new tactic for their use was born: when attacking enemy cavalry, carts rush ahead, then they turn around and mow down the enemy with machine-gun fire. Riders act in pairs: one chops with a saber, the other shoots the opponents of the first with a pistol or carbine.

“Move not along the highway, but through the forests!”

From Civil War the young Soviet cavalry emerged weakened. The horse composition worked well, so much so that good horses had to be purchased in Canada through Amtorg in the 20s.

In the pre-war years quantitative composition The Soviet cavalry was reduced in direct proportion to the increase in its mechanization. Thus, the same Oka Gorodovikov, who had been a cavalry inspector since 1938, speaking at a meeting of the top leadership of the Red Army on December 23-31, 1940, said that the main thing in modern warfare is the air force.

“Large forces of cavalry, with all their desire, even with seven stars in their foreheads, as they say, cannot do anything... I believe that cavalry under such conditions can move not along the highway, but through forests and other paths. Therefore, in modern environment... we must assume that superiority will be on the side that has air superiority. With this superiority, any branch of troops can move, fight and carry out the task. If there is no such superiority in the air, then any type of troops will not be able to move and will not complete their assigned tasks.” (RGVA, f. 4, op. 18, d. 58, l. 60 – 65.)

That is, he quite rightly believed that cavalry had every right to exist, subject to reliable air support. And he suggested moving in her absence not along the highway, but through forests.

“Fight strictly according to the regulations!”

The specific role of cavalry in the new conditions was also confirmed by the Field Manual of 1939: “The most appropriate use of cavalry formations together with tank formations, motorized infantry and aviation is in front of the front (in the absence of contact with the enemy), on the approaching flank, in the development of a breakthrough, in the rear enemy, in raids and pursuit. Cavalry formations are able to consolidate their success and hold the terrain. However, at the first opportunity they should be relieved of this task in order to preserve them for maneuver. The actions of a cavalry unit must in all cases be reliably covered from the air.” Well, since the military must fight strictly according to the regulations, then... in theory they should have fought in the 41st, if not for one “but”...

“It was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines!”

After all the reductions, the Red Army cavalry faced the war as four corps and 13 cavalry divisions. According to Oka Gorodovikov, who became inspector general and commander of the cavalry of the Red Army in June 1941, the cavalry corps of three divisions then consisted of 12 regiments, and had 172 BT-7 tanks and 48 armored vehicles in three tank regiments, 96 divisional guns, 48 ​​field and 60 anti-tank guns; heavy machine guns - 192 and light machine guns - 384, and a reinforced tank brigade consisting of 150 - 200 tanks.

But, as you know, the Great Patriotic War began with the defeat of Soviet aviation, because of which we became so short of aircraft that long-range DB-4 bombers were sent to attack enemy tank columns without fighter cover. What can we say about the cavalry, which in these harsh conditions, firstly, it became perhaps the only truly mobile force of the Red Army, independent of the condition of the roads or the supply of fuel, and secondly, it lost the air cover promised by the charter.

German “Stukas” with sirens turned on dived at the cavalrymen and the horses’ nerves could not stand it, they rushed to the sides and fell under bullets and bombs. Nevertheless, the red horsemen fought even in such conditions.

"Cossacks, Cossacks!"

Many horsemen after the war recalled that they used horses as vehicle, but they attacked the enemy exclusively on foot. Most of them practically didn’t have to swing their checkers.

The exception was the participants in raids behind enemy lines. During the day, their units defended themselves in the forests, and at night, on a tip from the partisans, they attacked the occupied villages. At the very first sounds of shots, the Germans ran out of their houses and immediately, shouting loudly in horror “Cossacks, Cossacks!”, fell under checkers. Then the horsemen retreated again and during the day, when German aircraft were looking for them, they hid in the forests for the time being!

The success of the actions of the same Cossack units of the Red Army is also evidenced by the fact that Hitler allowed the creation in the Wehrmacht of mounted Cossack units, united in the SS Cossack Corps under the command of the former ataman, and now General Krasnov, and the Don Cossacks themselves, who went over to their side, the creation on their lands (it is not known how sincerely) of the “Cossackia” republic. Brought to Yugoslavia to take part in actions against partisans, this corps established itself in such a way that for a long time there mothers frightened their children with Cossacks: “Look, the Cossack will come and take you away!”

War of engines and horses!

It should be noted that in the Red Army at the initial stage of the war there simply were no large mobile formations other than cavalry; tank troops could only be operationally used as a means of supporting infantry.

Thus, the only means allowing for deep envelopments, detours and raids behind enemy lines was cavalry. Even at the end of the war, when the nature of the fighting changed significantly compared to 1941–1942, eight cavalry corps successfully operated as part of the Red Army, seven of which bore the honorary title of guards.

In fact, cavalry, before the appearance in the Red Army of large independent mechanized formations and, we add, vehicles from the USA and England, was the only maneuverable means at the operational level of combat operations. It is clear that there were many problems with the use of cavalry. Feed for horses, supply of ammunition, bulkiness - all these were difficulties that military art had to overcome, but which was also often lacking. But our horsemen were not short of heroism.

— SUMMER GYMNASTER OF THE RED ARMY COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT STAFF: Introduced by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 005 of February 1, 1941.

The summer tunic is made of khaki cotton fabric with a turn-down collar fastened with one hook. At the ends of the collar, khaki-colored buttonholes with insignia are sewn.

The tunic has a chest placket with a three-button fastener and two stitched chest pockets with flaps on one button. The sleeves have cuffs with two buttons. Metal tunic buttons of the established pattern.

— THARS OF COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT STAFF OF THE RED ARMY: Introduced by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 005 of February 1, 1941.

Bloomers of the existing pattern without edging. Summer bloomers are made of khaki cotton fabric, and winter ones are made of wool blend fabric of the same color. The bloomers consist of two front and two back halves, have two side welt pockets and one back pocket, a waist cuff at the back and a strip at the bottom. The bloomers are fastened with five buttons and one hook.

— SHIRT OF PRIVATE AND JUNIOR COMMANDING STAFF OF THE RKKA: Introduced by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR No. 190 of July 19, 1929.

Summer shirt of the 1928 model for the ground and air forces of the Red Army. The shirt is made of cotton fabric (tunic), dark khaki color, with a turn-down collar, fastened in the middle with one metal hook and having buttonholes at the ends, in the shape of a parallelogram, in the color assigned to the branch of the military; Insignia of position and established encryption are placed on the buttonholes. The shirt is fastened with three buttons, parallel to which there are two patch pockets on the chest, covered with flaps fastened with one button. The sleeves end with cuffs fastened with two buttons, and at the place where they are sewn to the cuffs, the sleeves have two folds, located 7-8 cm apart from each other. Letrubes are made in six sizes.

Red Army cloth shirt arr. 1928 for the ground and air forces of the Red Army. The shirt is made from khaki-colored merino or coarse wool cloth with a stand-up collar, fastened in the middle with two metal hooks and having buttonholes at the ends, in the shape of a parallelogram, with sides 8 cm X 3.5 cm in the color assigned to the branch of the military; Insignia of position and established encryption are placed on the buttonholes. The shirt is fastened with three buttons, parallel to which there are two patch pockets on the chest, covered with flaps fastened with one button. The sleeves end with cuffs fastened with two buttons.

Note. Buttons on the shirt must be metal, oxidized, small in size with a star, of the type established by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR of 1924 No. 992.

Summer shirt with elbow pads, model 1931, for all branches of the military. The letrubah [type A] is made from a tunic (cotton diagonal) khaki color with two patch breast pockets covered by flaps, a turn-down collar fastened with one uniform button, and sleeves with cuffs. The waist of the shirt is sewn at the sides and at the shoulders in two parts: front and back. The front part of the waist from the neck to the bottom of the pockets has a cut covered with strips. The straps are located in the middle of the waist and are fastened with one button on the loop of a piece of fabric hemmed with inside top bar. The upper ends of the straps near the collar are fastened with one small uniform button, sewn at the top of the lower strap onto the through transverse loop of the upper strap. The collar does not have hooks and, under certain conditions provided for wearing the uniform, can be opened with the top button undone. The sleeves at the cuff sewing have two folds. At the back of the sleeves over the elbow seam there are patched elbow pads. On both sides of the collar, edged buttonholes are sewn in the color of the cloth assigned to the branch of the military. The buttonholes have the shape of a parallelogram with a finished length of 8 cm and a width of 3.25 cm, including the edging. The transverse ends of the buttonholes should be parallel to the bevel of the front ends of the collar. The established metal insignia for positions and badges according to the established encryption are placed on the buttonholes. […]

Basically, the flying jacket of type B […] differs from the flying jacket of type A in that the flying jacket of type B has an elongated strap in all heights by 4 cm; a hook and loop for fastening the collar and three through loops on the top placket […]. Three small general-army buttons are sewn onto the bottom bar in the places corresponding to the loops. A hook is sewn into the right end of the collar, and a loop into the left end.

Cloth shirt with welt pockets, model 1931, for all branches of the military. A cloth shirt consists of the following parts: a front part, in the middle, which has a placket fastened with three through loops on three metal buttons with a Red Army star, a back, a stand-up collar fastened in the middle with two metal hooks, two breast pocket flaps, fastened to the shirt with a Red Army button, sleeves without folds at the bottom with cuffs fastened with two loops and two Red Army buttons. Flap welt internal pockets.

Canceled by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 25 of January 15, 1943. All Red Army personnel will switch to new insignia - shoulder straps in the period from February 1 to February 15, 1943. Allow carrying to term existing form clothing with new insignia until the next issue of uniforms in accordance with the current deadlines and supply standards.

№1 -Private soldiers in tunics. 1941; №2 -Private soldiers in tunics. 1942; №3 №4 -St. a lieutenant in a tunic with everyday insignia; №5 -An officer in a tunic with field insignia; №6 -Illustration of an officer’s tunic from 1940-43.

Summer uniform of the Red Army for the period 1943-1945.

— GYMNASTERS: A new type of gymnasts was introduced by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 25 of January 15, 1943.

They presented the same tunics of the existing model with the following changes:

The collars of tunics of all types, instead of turn-down ones, are stand-up, soft, fastened with through loops in the front with two small uniform buttons.

The top placket is located in the middle and is fastened with three small uniform buttons with through loops.

Shoulder straps of the established type are fastened to the shoulders.

Sleeve insignia (officer's sleeve triangles) on tunics are abolished.

Tunics commanding staff Instead of patch pockets, they have welt (internal) pockets covered with flaps. No elbow pads.

Tunics for privates and sergeants - without pockets. With elbow pads - ().

On August 5, 1944, breast welt pockets were introduced on the tunics of women privates and sergeants.

On September 16, 1944, sergeants and Red Army soldiers were also officially allowed to have chest welt pockets, but only in case of receiving an unwearable officer's uniform after putting it in order. Throughout 1943, one could find old-style tunics with a turn-down collar, which were allowed to be worn until new uniforms were issued.

№1 -Privates in soldiers’ tunics (on the left is a private in an officer’s tunic) 1944; №2 -Two sergeants. On the left - in a soldier's tunic, on the right - in an officer's uniform; №3 -Illustration of soldiers' tunics arr. 1943; №4 -Soviet and American officers during a meeting on the Elbe; №5 -St. Sergeant in an officer's tunic; №6 -Illustration of officer's tunics mod. 1943

— PARTY UNITED: Senior and middle command and command personnel of all branches of the military

The uniform is single-breasted, with a detachable bodice, fastened at the left side with five large buttons. The collar is rigid, standing, fastened with two or three hooks and loops. The upper edge and ends of the collar are trimmed with piping. On the collar of the uniform, at an equal distance from its upper and lower edges and 1 cm from the ends, buttonholes (without edging) are sewn from instrument cloth (color according to the branch of service) 8.2 cm long and 2.7 cm wide. On the buttonholes, respectively The established form has one or two strips sewn with gold or silver thread, intertwined with silver or gold thread: strips 5.4 cm long and 6.5 mm wide with a gap between them of 0.5-1 mm. The sleeves of the uniform are two-seam, with straight stitched cuffs, edged along the upper edge and ends. On the cuffs of the sleeves, according to the established form, there are two or one vertical buttonholes (columns) embroidered in gold or silver. On the tail of the back there are sewn leaves, at the ends of which one large button is sewn. Piping along the edge of the left side, collar, leaf and cuffs, color - according to the branch of service. All buttons are shaped, brass.

The color of the edging for the infantry, quartermaster and military legal services is crimson, for artillery, auto-armored troops, medical and veterinary services - red, for aviation - blue, for cavalry - light blue and for engineering troops - black.

The color of the buttonholes for the infantry, quartermaster and military legal services is crimson, for artillery and auto-armored forces - black, for aviation - blue, for cavalry - light blue, for medical and veterinary services - dark green and for engineering troops - black. The color of sewing on the buttonholes for the quartermaster, military-legal, medical and veterinary services is silver, for all others - gold. Shoulder straps of the established type.

№1 -Lieutenant-artilleryman in full dress uniform; №2 -Servicemen of the 150th Idritskaya SD against the background of their assault flag, hoisted on May 1, 1945 over the Reichstag building in Berlin (Victory Banner). In the photo, participants in the storming of the Reichstag, escorting the flag to Moscow from the Berlin Tempelhof airfield on June 20, 1945 (from left to right): Captain K.Ya. Samsonov, Lance Sergeant M.V. Kantaria, Sergeant M.A. Egorov, senior sergeant M.Ya. Soyanov, captain S.A. Neustroev (06/20/1945); №3 -Illustration of a ceremonial uniform mod. 1943

Literature/documents:

• Types of fabrics used for sewing uniforms of the Red Army (article number, composition, color, application). ()
• Rules for wearing uniforms by Red Army personnel dated January 15, 1943. (download/open)
• A typical list of clothing belongings of junior commanders and rank and file of the Red Army for summer and winter in peacetime and war. Introduced by order of the NPO of the USSR No. 005 of February 1, 1941. ()

Cavalry is a mobile branch of troops capable of conducting combat operations over vast spaces and in difficult terrain. Forests and water barriers presented no obstacles to the cavalry.

Possessing high mobility and maneuverability combined with rapid and powerful blow, cavalry played in many battles decisive role. The ability to conduct independent actions in a significant separation from one’s own troops, to overcome a short time long distances, suddenly appearing on the flanks and behind enemy lines, quickly deploying for battle, moving from one action to another, both on horseback and on foot, provided the cavalry with the opportunity to successfully solve a variety of tactical and operational-strategic tasks.

Until the end of the 1930s, cavalry belonged to privileged families troops. It is no coincidence that it was from the cavalry commanders that a number of famous Soviet commanders subsequently emerged, including not only Marshals S.M. Budyonny, S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, but also the commanders of the Southern Front I.V. Tyulenev, I D. Cherevichenko, D. I. Ryabyshev and many other generals.

Soviet military works, official manuals and regulations devoted to the strategy of military operations provided for the possibility widespread use cavalry for the development of breakthrough and pursuit, mainly in close cooperation with armored and mechanized troops and aviation. “Sudden and decisive strikes with support and interaction with fire and technical means provide the cavalry greatest success", - stated in the Cavalry Battle Regulations adopted in 1940. (Cavalry combat regulations (BUK-40) Regiment, squadron, M. Voenizdat, 1941, p. 4)

The military cavalry was intended to conduct reconnaissance in the interests of its combined arms formations to a depth of 25-30 km. To this end rifle regiments had platoons of mounted reconnaissance troops, and rifle divisions had a cavalry squadron.

The Cavalry Combat Manual (BUK-40) also stated that “the combination of actions on foot and horseback, the rapid transition from foot to horse combat and vice versa are the main methods of cavalry action in battle.” (Cavalry combat regulations (BUK-40) Regiment, squadron, M. Voenizdat, 1941, p. 40)

The draft Field Manual of the Red Army (PU-39) especially emphasized: “Cavalry formations capable of carrying out rapid maneuver and a decisive strike must be used to carry out active actions to defeat the enemy.

It is most advisable to use cavalry formations together with tank formations, motorized infantry and aviation ahead of the front (in case of contact with the enemy), on the advancing flank, in developing a breakthrough, behind enemy lines, in raids and pursuit.

Cavalry formations are able to consolidate their success and hold the terrain. However, at the first opportunity they should be relieved of this task in order to preserve them for maneuver.

The actions of a cavalry unit must in all cases be reliably covered from the air.” (Gosvoenizdat NKO USSR, 1939, p. 29)

Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov in his “Memories and Reflections” wrote about combat training during his command of the 6th Cavalry Corps in Belarus in 1937-1938: “In the 6th Corps I had to do a lot of operational work. Most of all we practiced questions combat use cavalry as part of a cavalry-mechanized army. These were major problematic issues back then. We assumed that a cavalry-mechanized army consisting of 3-4 cavalry divisions, 2-3 tank brigades, a motorized rifle division, in close cooperation with bomber and fighter aircraft, and subsequently with airborne units, would be able to solve the largest operational tasks as part of the front, contributing to the successful implementation of strategic plans.” (Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. M.: APN, 1984, p. 147)

The leadership of the Red Army considered cavalry, first of all, as a highly mobile branch of troops, capable of penetrating deeply into enemy rear lines, enveloping his flanks and cutting off rear communications. The First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny, noting the important role of cavalry in maneuver warfare, at the same time advocated the technical re-equipment of the army and initiated the formation of cavalry-mechanized formations. Cavalry from behind rapid growth Mechanized troops and aviation began to lose their role as the main striking force of the Red Army, and the country began a stage of significant reduction in cavalry formations and units. Many of them were reorganized into mechanized units.

Summer 1940 The control of the 3rd Cavalry Corps of the BOVO and the 11th Cavalry Division are directed towards the formation of the control and units of the 6th Mechanized Corps. The administration of the 4th KK and the 34th Cavalry Division became the basis for the 8th Mechanized Corps KOVO. The commander of the cavalry corps, Lieutenant General Dmitry Ivanovich Ryabyshev, headed the mechanized corps and led it in June 1941 into battle against German tanks near Dubno. The 7th and 25th cavalry divisions are directed to form units of the 3rd and 1st mechanized corps. 16kd was directed towards the formation of armored forces of KOVO and ZakVO.

On January 1, 1941, the total number of cavalry in wartime states was: people - 230,150, horses - 193,830. (TsAMO, f.43, op.11547, d.9, l.118)

At the beginning of 1941, People's Commissar of Defense S. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov presented Stalin and Molotov with a note outlining the mobilization deployment scheme of the Red Army. On its basis, on February 12, 1941, a draft mobilization plan was drawn up. According to this document, 3 cavalry corps directorates, 10 cavalry and 4 mountain cavalry divisions, as well as 6 reserve regiments - 4 cavalry and 2 mountain cavalry, were to remain in the Red Army, the total number of cavalry was 116,907 people. (1941: in 2 books. Book 1, p. 607, 631, 633, 637, 641)

As part of the mobilization plan, on March 11, 1941, the 1st Special Cavalry Brigade was turned to the formation of the 46th tank division of the 21st mechanized corps; on March 18-19, the 4th Don Cossack Cavalry (brigade commander F.A. Parkhomenko) and the 19th Uzbek Cavalry were reorganized into the 220th and 221st motorized divisions. mountain cavalry (Colonel G.M. Roitenberg) divisions, 10 Terek-Stavropol Cossack (Major General N.Ya. Kirichenko), 12 Kuban Cossack (Major General G. T. Timofeev), 15 Kuban (Major General A.A. Filatov), ​​22 (Major General N.A. Dedaev) cavalry divisions.

The total number of cavalry of the Red Army according to wartime states as of June 22, 1941 was: people - 133,940, horses - 117,970.

The Red Army had 4 directorates of cavalry corps, 9 cavalry divisions and 4 mountain cavalry divisions, as well as three separate cavalry regiments (245, 246 and 247), three reserve cavalry regiments, including 2 reserve mountain cavalry regiments and one reserve cavalry artillery regiment (10, 21, 87 zkp and 47 zkap).

IN western districts on 6/22/41 the following were stationed: 2nd Cavalry Corps (5 and 9th Cavalry Corps - 11/26/41 transformed into 1st and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps) - corps commander Major General Belov - in the Odessa Military District in the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Comrat region; 5th Cavalry Corps (3rd and 14th cavalry corps - 12/25/41 transformed into 5th and 6th cavalry cavalry corps) - corps commander Major General Kamkov - in the Slavuta area, Zholkiev; 6th Cavalry Corps (6th and 36th cavalry corps - died near Bialystok) - corps commander Major General Nikitin - in Western Belarus– Lomza, Volkovysk, Graevo. 4th Cavalry Corps (18th, 20th and 21st Civil Division) - corps commander Lieutenant General Shapkin, was part of the troops of the Central Asian Military District. The headquarters of the corps, formed on March 18, 1941, was stationed in Tashkent. Separate cavalry divisions - 8, 24 and 32 cavalry divisions, 17th cavalry division. (TsAMO, f.43, op.11547, d.75, l.6-24)

The Cavalry Corps of the Red Army (consisting of two cavalry divisions) numbered 18,540 people, 15,552 horses, was armed with 128 light tanks, 44 armored vehicles, 64 field, 32 anti-tank and 40 anti-aircraft guns, 128 mortars of 50 and 82 mm caliber, 1,270 vehicles and 42 tractors . (TsAMO, f.43, op.11547, d.9, l.119)

Unlike the corps of rifle troops, any special units, except for the communications division, the cavalry corps did not have. The cavalry division, numbering 8,968 people, included four cavalry regiments, a horse artillery division consisting of two four-gun batteries of 76mm divisional guns and two four-gun batteries of 122mm howitzers, a tank regiment consisting of four squadrons of BT-7 tanks (64 vehicles), an anti-aircraft division consisting of two batteries of 76mm anti-aircraft guns and two complex anti-aircraft machine guns, a communications squadron with 18 armored vehicles, a sapper squadron, a decontamination squadron and other small support units. There were 21 tractors (tractors) for towing artillery and evacuating tanks. Transport - 635 vehicles. The number of horses in the division was 7625.

The cavalry regiment, numbering 1,428 people, consisted of four saber squadrons, a machine gun squadron (16 heavy machine guns and 4 mortars of 82mm caliber), regimental artillery (4 guns of 76mm caliber and 4 guns of 45mm), an anti-aircraft battery (3 guns of 37mm caliber and three M-machine gun mounts). 4), half-squadron of communications, engineer and chemical platoons and support units.

Unlike the cavalry division, the mountain cavalry division, numbering 6,558 people, did not have a tank regiment; its artillery batteries were armed with only 26 mountain cannons of 76mm caliber and mountain mortars of 107mm caliber. The number of horses in this division is 6827.

All cavalry units were kept in Peaceful time according to the states, practically no different from the wartime states, and were well staffed with trained personnel.

The enemy, in the early morning of June 22, 1941, with the entire mass of troops crossing the border of the USSR all the way from the Baltic to the Black Sea, led a rapid offensive with mobile mechanized units and forced units of the Red Army to retreat.

During border battles, regular cavalry corps fought defensive and rearguard battles, holding back the enemy's onslaught, covering the systematic withdrawal of rifle units and ensuring through their actions the mobilization of Red Army units. During the fighting, the cavalry divisions suffered heavy losses. The 6th and 36th cavalry divisions did not emerge from the battles surrounded on the Bialystok ledge, the rest suffered heavy losses. Since at the same time, for the same reasons, many tank and motorized divisions were disbanded, an urgent need arose for mobile formations with at least some striking force.

The situation required short time(1-1.5 months) to create cavalry mobile units for operations in the enemy’s rear, capturing his headquarters, destroying communications and disrupting the systematic delivery and supply of the enemy’s front. Light cavalry divisions of the “fighter type,” according to the authors of their project, were intended: for partisan operations behind enemy lines; to combat enemy airborne assaults in our rear; as a mobile command reserve.

The main organizational principle and requirements for a light cavalry division: mobility, maximum cross-country ability, absence of bulky rear areas (reliance on providing food from local resources), ease of control and, under all these conditions, combat effectiveness.

According to its organizational structure, the light cavalry division included: a division control with a radio platoon and a commandant platoon, three cavalry regiments and a chemical defense squadron. (TsAMO, f.43, op.11547, d.9, l.120)

In the light cavalry division (staff 7/3, 7/5) numbering 2931 people and 3133 horses, the cavalry regiments had: 4 saber and 1 machine gun squadron, a regimental battery consisting of four 76mm PA guns and four 45mm anti-tank guns (as anti-tank weapons) . The squadrons were armed with light and heavy machine guns, rifles and sabers. (TsAMO, f.43, op.11536, d.154, l.75-83)

Later, the cavalry regiment's staff included sapper-demolition and anti-aircraft machine-gun platoons. On August 9, by GKO Resolution No. 466ss, in order to increase firepower, a mortar battery of six 82mm mortars was added to the cavalry regiment, and one 50mm mortar was assigned to each saber platoon. In total, the cavalry division received 48 50mm mortars on packs and 18 82mm mortars on carts.

Now the cavalry regiment consisted of four saber squadrons, a machine gun squadron, a regimental battery (4 76mm PA guns and 4 45mm anti-tank guns), a mortar battery (6 82mm mortars), a radio platoon, a demolition engineer and an anti-aircraft machine gun platoon and service units.

The State Defense Committee, by Resolution No. GKO-23ss dated 07/04/41, began the formation of the first light cavalry divisions, enshrined in the General Staff Directives No. org/935 - org/941 dated 07/05/41 on the formation of 15 divisions - 1, 4, 43, 44, 45 , 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 cavalry division (the cavalry division received its combined arms numbers in mid-July 1941). (RGASPI, f.644, op.1, d.1, l.86)

Another 15 divisions - 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42 cd are formed according to Resolution No. GKO-48s of July 8, 1941. “On the formation of additional rifle divisions”, which sets a two-week period for the formation of the first six cavalry divisions - no later than July 23, and Resolution No. 207 of 7/19/42 indicates the numbers and locations of deployment. (RGASPI, f.644, op.1, d.1, l.154-155)

The organization of the “fighter type” cavalry division (staff 07/3, 07/4, 07/5) numbering 2,939 people and 3,147 horses was not designed for fighting in the general front line with its own troops, much less a protracted battle. Of the combat units, the light cavalry division of the “fighter type” included: 3 cavalry regiments - approximately the same organization as the personnel ones, but without air defense systems and without special units(sapper, communications, chemists); an armored car squadron consisting of 10 vehicles of the BA-10 type (practically, the vast majority of light divisions did not have this squadron). According to the staff, the divisions were armed with: rifles - 2628, PPD and PPSh - 200, light machine guns - 50, heavy machine guns - 36, 45mm anti-tank guns - 12, 76mm regimental guns - 12.

Light cavalry divisions had neither divisional artillery, nor divisional sappers and signalmen, and no rear support from divisional transports to regimental kitchens and regimental convoys. They were unable to transport ammunition, food and fodder, or feed their personnel.

Regimental and division commanders could control the battle of their formations only by methods XIX century- horse and foot messengers, trumpet and voice. There were a very limited number of radio stations for communication with higher headquarters.

On July 15, 1941, a directive letter from the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, summarizing the experience of the first three weeks of hostilities and signed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov, said: “Our army somewhat underestimates the importance of cavalry. Given the current situation on the fronts, when the enemy’s rear stretches for several hundred kilometers in forested areas and is completely unprotected from major sabotage actions on our part, raids by red cavalrymen along the enemy’s extended rear lines could play a decisive role in disrupting command and control and supply. German troops and, consequently, in the defeat of German troops. If our cavalry units, now hanging out at the front and in front of the front, were thrown into the enemy’s rear, the enemy would be placed in a critical situation, and our troops would receive enormous relief. Headquarters believes that for such raids behind enemy lines it would be enough to have several dozen light fighter-type cavalry divisions of three thousand people each, with a light convoy without overloading the rear. It would be necessary to begin gradually, but without any damage to combat operations, the reorganization of the existing cavalry corps and cavalry divisions into light fighter-type cavalry divisions of three thousand people each, and where there are no cavalry units, cavalry divisions of the mentioned lightweight type should be organized to carry out raids and strikes in the rear enemy. There can be no doubt that such cavalry divisions, operating behind enemy lines, will be surrounded by partisans, will receive great help from them and will increase their strength tenfold.” (Historical archive. 1992. No. 1, p. 56)

Already on July 13, by Headquarters directive No. 00304, for actions against the enemy’s rear and communications, 5 cavalry divisions formed in the North Caucasus began to be transferred to the front. Subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction, Timoshenko, 50 and 53 cavalry divisions are united in the Velikiye Luki, Kholm region into a cavalry group. The second group (43 and 47 cd), according to directive No. 00330 of July 14, was supposed to operate in the area of ​​​​Rechitsa, Shatsilki, Mozyr. 31kd is sent to the Novgorod, Luga region at the disposal of Voroshilov. (TsAMO, f.48a, op.3408, d.4, l.28, 29, 38)

On July 18, a directive from Headquarters was issued to organize a raid of a group (43, 47 and 32 cavalry divisions) under the command of the commander of the 32nd cavalry division, Colonel Batskalevich, to defeat the rear of the Bobruisk, Mogilev and Smolensk enemy groups. (TsAMO, f.48a, op.3408, d.4, l.50-52)

The actual use of “fighter-type” light cavalry divisions had nothing to do with the projects of the authors of their formation. These divisions, not suitable for combat (the first of them already in August 1941), were thrown towards the advancing German armored formations, which were approaching the Dnieper River along a broad front. In oncoming battles with German mechanized formations, most of these light cavalry formations suffered very heavy losses. Attempts to send these light cavalry divisions to operate behind enemy lines (43 and 47 cavalry divisions of Colonel Batskalevich’s group, 50 and 53 cavalry divisions of Colonel Dovator’s group), despite a number of successful tactical actions of the cavalry - a significant operational result not allowed. (TsAMO, f.43, op.11536, d.154, l.78)

On July 23, by order of the General Staff No. 4/1293/org, the remnants of the personnel 3 and 14 cavalry divisions of the South Western Front reorganized into four cavalry divisions light type(3, 19, 14, 22 cd), and on July 24, the 24th cavalry and 17 mountain cavalry divisions of the Transcaucasian Front, by order of the General Staff No. 783/org, were also reorganized into 24, 23, 17, 1 cd. A total of 2939 men and 3147 horses in each division. Division control according to the state 07/3, numbering 85 people and 93 horses, three cavalry regiments according to the state 07/4, numbering 940 people and 1018 horses each, an armored squadron according to the state 07/5, numbering 34 people. (TsAMO, f.48a, op.3408, d.15, l.272-275; l.280-282)

By Decrees of the State Defense Committee No. 205 of 7/23/41, 3 cavalry divisions are formed - 35, 38, 56 cavalry divisions and No. 459 of 08/11/41, another 26 divisions (staff 07/3, 07/4, 07/6, 07/7 - 3501 people) - 19, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 87, 89, 91 , 94 cd.

The bulk of the personnel of the light divisions came from the reserve and there was no time to put together units, and the horses came from stud farms and stud farms, with pasture, completely unaccustomed to hiking and not savvy. The divisions were sent to the front without receiving the required weapons, and there was also a shortage of small arms. The marching squadrons entered the battle without even having time to receive weapons, which further increased losses.

Already in July-August, in accordance with the decision of the Government, 48 light cavalry divisions were formed, and by the end of 1941 there were 82 in the Red Army (author - according to my calculations 80) cavalry divisions. A significant part of the cavalry divisions were formed in the former Cossack regions Don, Kuban and Terek, which were part of the North Caucasus Military District (NCMD).

The 43rd, 47th, 50th, 52nd and 53rd cavalry divisions, formed in the North Caucasian Military District, fought in the western strategic direction. The 40th, 42nd and 72nd cavalry divisions fought in Crimea. Most of the Don, Kuban, Terek and Stavropol cavalry formations had to fight the enemy in close proximity to the places of their formations. Fighting as part of Southern Front were led by the 35th (commander - Colonel S.F. Sklyarov), 38th (Major General N.Ya. Kirichenko), 56th (Colonel L.D. Ilyin) created in the summer and autumn of 1941 in the Rostov region 68th (Colonel N.A. Kirichenko), formed in the Krasnodar region - 62nd (Colonel I.F. Kuts), 64th (Colonel N.V. Simerov), 66th (Colonel V.I. Grigorovich), in Voroshilovsk (Stavropol) - 70th (Colonel N.M. Yurchik) cavalry divisions. Together with them, in the Rostov direction in the fall of 1941, the 26th, 28th, 30th, 34th and 49th cavalry divisions of the Red Army fought with the enemy. It should be noted that it was not possible to fully provide all light cavalry divisions with weapons and equipment, even with their extremely limited staff. Due to the parallel formation large quantity rifle, artillery and engineer-sapper formations, the material and technical supply warehouses of the North Caucasian Military District were significantly empty - there were not enough artillery pieces and mortars, machine guns and automatic rifles, radio stations, field bakeries and kitchens, baggage equipment and other weapons and military equipment. The cavalry divisions formed in the North Caucasian Military District in the fall of 1941 (60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 70 and 72) were even worse equipped.

In August 1941, it was decided to disband the 2nd and 5th Cavalry Corps that had remained by that time on the Southwestern and Southern fronts (the 6th Corps died in an unequal fight with German armored columns in the very first days of the war) and reorganize the entire cavalry of the Red Army into separate light cavalry divisions of the “fighter type”, the formation of which was widely deployed with the announcement of general mobilization in the USSR. (TsAMO, f. 43, op. 11536, d. 154, l. 77)

By Resolution No. GKO-446ss of August 9, 1941, a battery of six 82mm mortars (on carts) was introduced into the cavalry regiments, and one 50mm mortar (on packs) was introduced into each saber platoon of the regiment. (RGASPI, f.644, op.1, d.6, l.72)

In accordance with Resolution No. GKO-459ss of 08/11/41, cavalry divisions formed from August 1941 must have people - 3277 people, horses - 3553, rifles - 2826, heavy machine guns - 36, light machine guns - 50, PPSh - 200, cannons 45mm anti-tank guns - 12, 76mm PA guns - 12, 82mm mortars - 9, 50mm mortars - 48, trucks - 15 and special vehicles - 10. (RGASPI, f. 644, op. 1, d. 6, l. 151-153)

That is, in the regiment, instead of a mortar battery of 6 mortars of 82mm caliber, at first, a mortar platoon of 3 mortars of 82mm caliber was introduced into the regimental artillery battery.

By December 1941, ten cavalry divisions from the 76 divisions of the 1941 formation were disbanded and reorganized into other branches of the army: 2CD, formed from the 1st Odessa Cavalry Division of Major General I.E. Petrov (the remnants were included in the 2SD); disbanded without completing the formation of 19, 22 and 33 cd; 37kd - died in September near Chernigov; 45kd - died on 10/14/41, breaking out of encirclement near Vyazma; 43 and 47 cd cavalry group A.I. Batskalevich, who died surrounded (the remainder in September-October were used to replenish 32kd); 42 and 48 kd, which participated in the defense of Sevastopol (remains in September-October were used to replenish 40 kd). (NKO Order No. 00100 dated 22.5.42 “Exclusion from the Red Army of military formations, units and institutions as not subject to restoration”)

Cavalry divisions, arriving from formation at the front, were immediately brought into battle and suffered greater losses in tough battles. So, for example, 54kd, sent to the North-Western Front on July 25, entered the battle on August 3, emerging from encirclement with heavy losses, and was re-formed in August in the Valdai area. Created at the end of July by dividing the personnel of the 3rd and 14th cavalry divisions into light ones, the 19th and 22nd cavalry divisions were disbanded already in August, as they were sent to replenish the 3rd, 14th and 34th cavalry divisions. To support the former personnel divisions, as the most trained, more and more marching squadrons are sent from the rear areas, some from the newly formed divisions.

On August 19, 1941, in accordance with the order of the USSR NCO No. 0285-1941 and the instructions of the Deputy NCO of the USSR, Army Commissar 1st Rank E. Shchadenko, separate chemical defense squadrons were introduced into the staffs of all cavalry divisions, including mountain cavalry ones, according to the staff No. 07/6, consisting of two platoons - a chemical reconnaissance platoon and a degassing platoon, which, according to this order, were assigned the numbers of the same cavalry divisions to which they were included. And in September, the staff of the 06/22 divisional veterinary hospital of 10 people was approved. command staff, 7 people. MNF, 61 privates, a total of 78 people, 17 horses and 6 trucks.

On September 22, 1941, by order of NKO No. 0365 “On the introduction of the position of permanent deputy commanders of combat units and units of the Red Army,” the pre-war positions of deputy commanders of squadrons, batteries, artillery divisions, and regiments were restored. (TsAMO, f. 4, op. 11, d. 66, l. 68-69)

Only on December 16, 1941, a separate horse artillery division was introduced into the cavalry division (staff 06/105 - two 76 mm artillery batteries and two 120 mm mine batteries, later replaced by staff 06/214 with the exception of one artillery battery) and a separate artillery park (staff 06/104 - 143 people).

In November 1941, on the initiative of the Inspector General of the Red Army Cavalry, Deputy Head of the Main Directorate for the Formation and Recruitment of Troops, Colonel General O.I. Gorodovikov, the State Defense Committee November 13, 1941. issued Resolution No. 894 on the formation of 20 national cavalry divisions in Tajikistan (104 cavalry divisions), Turkmenistan (97, 98 cavalry divisions), Uzbekistan (99, 100, 101, 102, 103 cavalry divisions), Kazakhstan (96, 105, 106 cavalry divisions), Kyrgyzstan (107 , 108, 109 kd), Kalmykia (110 and 111 kd), Bashkiria (112, 113 kd), Checheno-Ingushetia (114 kd), Kabardino-Balkaria (115 kd), as well as 5 cavalry divisions in the Cossack region of the Don and the North Caucasus ( 10, 12, 13, 15, 116 cd), according to the states of a separate cavalry division of 3,500 people each.

10th, 12th and 13th Kuban Cossack divisions people's militia were formed in the North Caucasus Military District in Kuban. Don Cossack cavalry divisions were formed: 15kd - on the middle Don in the village of Mikhailovka, Novo-Annensky district of the Stalingrad Military District (the district was created on the basis of the administration of the Kharkov Military District on November 26, 1942), 116kd - by the North Caucasus Military District on the lower Don with a deployment in Salsk.

There were special requirements for the selection of personnel of national formations. The party-Komsomol layer was supposed to reach 25%. The age of cavalrymen should not exceed 40 years, in combat units - 35 years.

North Ossetia and Dagestan did not form their own national cavalry units, since most of those liable for military service were called up during the first mobilizations, as having undergone training in the Red Army.

The formation of cavalry divisions was entrusted to the military district, regional committees of the CPSU (b) and the Councils of People's Commissars of the republics.

Order of the commander of the North Caucasus Military District No. 00494 dated November 25, 1941 set specific tasks for the formation of 110 and 111 cavalry divisions in Kalmykia, each consisting of 3,500 people, consisting of the Division Directorate - according to the staff of 07/3, three cavalry regiments - according to the staff of 07/ 4, a separate armored squadron - according to the state 07/5, a separate chemical defense squadron - according to the state 07/6. (TsAMO, f. 143, op. 13049, d. 6, l. 45-47)

From December 1, 1941 according to the order of NKO No. 0444 dated November 26, 1941. “On the territorial composition of the military districts of the European part of the USSR”, the Stalingrad Military District (commander - Lieutenant General Vasily Filippovich Gerasimenko) is separated from the North Caucasus Military District: Stalingrad Region (excluding the Elansky, Uryupinsky and Novo-Annensky districts), Rostov Region with the border on south along the Don River to the border with the Stalingrad Region, Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Astrakhan District, western part of the West Kazakhstan Region (Dzhanybek, Kaztalovsky, Urdinsky, Furmanovsky districts). District headquarters - Stalingrad. The North Caucasus Military District (commander - Lieutenant General Reiter Max Andreevich) included: the southern part of the Rostov region (from the Don River), the Krasnodar Territory (with the Adygea Autonomous Region), the Ordzhonikidze Territory with the Kizlyar District, the Karachay and Cherkessk Autonomous Regions , Kabardino-Balkarian, Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. District headquarters - Armavir. Transfer to the commanders of the military districts military units, institutions and establishments transferring territorially to other military districts, to be completed by December 5, 1941. The administration of the Kharkov Military District has turned to the formation of the administration of the newly created Stalingrad Military District in its entirety. (TsAMO, f.4, op.11, d.66, l.253-255)

So the 110th and 111th separate cavalry divisions became part of the Stalingrad Military District, where they continued their formation.

Resolutions of the Kalmyk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic dated November 26 and December 2, 1941 determined the main organizational, economic and technical measures for the formation of the 110 and 111 Kalmyk cavalry divisions, aimed at staffing the rank and file by mobilizing military personnel aged 18 to 40 years old and accepting volunteers of these ages.

For the entire period of recruitment and training of fighters, divisions must be provided with food, fodder, uniforms and equipment at the expense of collective and state farms, handed over in excess of state plans.

The Council of People's Commissars of the Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic approved the cost estimate for uniforms and maintenance of cavalry divisions at the expense of public funds in the amount of 16,190,600 rubles. (TsAMO RF, f.St.VO, op. 4376, d.1, l.45, 48; NARC, f.r-131, op.1, d.1018, l.12, 13)

The mobilization of those liable for military service and the deployment of new divisions, their supply with all types of food, uniforms and training - all these issues were the focus of attention of local party and Soviet organizations. The Kalmyk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, under the leadership of First Secretary Pyotr Vasilyevich Lavrentyev, and the Council of People's Commissars of the Republic, headed by Chairman Naldzhi Lidzhinovich Garyaev, carried out organizational and mass political work to create national cavalry formations in the republic. The general management of the creation of cavalry formations was carried out by a specially created republican commission. The conscription of those liable for military service, the selection of horses, the provision of vehicles and equipment were carried out by commissions, which included the first secretaries of the ulus committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, chairmen executive committees and ulus military commissars.

Republican and ulus commissions were created to select people and horse stock. Party and Komsomol organizations of the Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic sent the best communists and Komsomol members, members of ulus party and Komsomol committees to the units being formed.

Collective and state farms of Kalmykia provided horses, saddles, food, fodder and other materials. Clothing, shoes and horse equipment, individual weapons (checkers, etc.) for the division’s soldiers were made at industrial enterprises and in the artels of the republic.

The staffing of command, political, sergeant and rank-and-file units took place with the help of the Kalmyk regional party committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the republic by ulus and republican military commissariats. Issues of forming the division were repeatedly considered at joint meetings of the bureau of the regional committee of the CPSU (b) and the Council of People's Commissars of the republic.

People's militia units became a good reserve for recruiting divisions, in which by the end of 1941 they were military training 2236 people, as well as more than 15 thousand conscripts who passed the general military training. Since a certain time was required to prepare the barracks stock, and people for the new divisions arrived immediately upon conscription, the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the Republic decided to bring them into cavalry groups (detachments), which were initially kept at collective and state farms, where they were subjected to primary training in military affairs.

Each fighter mobilized into the national cavalry units was required to have two pairs of underwear, one of them warm, boots, felt boots, a sheepskin coat, a cotton sweatshirt and trousers, a cavalry-style overcoat, mittens, a warm hat, a summer tunic and trousers, a blade and a whip. Even before the onset of cold weather, a collection of warm clothes was organized in the republic, some of them went to the 110th Cavalry Division, and by March 1, 1942, over 23 thousand pairs of felt boots, 3652 short fur coats, 964 fur vests, 8296 hats with ear flaps and many other uniforms arrived at military warehouses. (Kalmykia in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Documents and materials. Elista, 1966, pp. 70-71, 93)

The regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks showed special concern for establishing political and educational work with conscripts. According to the instructions of the bureau of the regional party committee, formulated in the decree “On universal compulsory military training” dated September 20, 1941, the political department of the military registration and enlistment office developed and sent out to all uluskom of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks a program of political training for citizens undergoing compulsory military training. General education centers were supplied with educational literature, visual aids and posters.

All these events improved the political and moral state of conscripts and created the prerequisites for their successful training upon arrival at the unit.

By orders of the republican commission, enterprises of the Kalmpromsoyuz, the industrial cooperative and the union of disabled people produced uniforms and horse equipment for the cavalry divisions formed on the territory of the republic. By February 1942, 10,872 sets of uniforms and 3,115 saddles were produced at these enterprises and in specially created workshops.

In the workshops of the city of Elista, in the forges of MTS, state farms and collective farms, by December 1941, 1,500 blades, 272 lances and 23,700 bottles with flammable liquid were produced. This made it possible to organize training for conscripts in equestrian and military affairs. Later, these blades and pikes were transferred to divisions for training purposes.

To provide the Red Army with combat horses, as well as wagons with harnesses, the creation of the “Horse - Red Army” and “Defense - Cart with Harness” funds was intensified on collective farms, state farms, state and cooperative enterprises and institutions.

It should be noted that the formation of Kalmyk cavalry divisions was carried out against the background when, by GKO resolution No. 1150ss of January 14, 1942. “On the mobilization of horses for the army” in the national economy of the country, during January and half of February, 150,000 horses were mobilized to staff 70 rifle divisions and 50 rifle brigades.

110 Separate Kalmyk Cavalry Division named after S.M. Budenny with headquarters in M. Derbety was formed as part of the 273 Sarpinsky, 292 Maloderbetovsky, 311 Privolzhsky cavalry regiments, a separate horse artillery division, a medical squadron, a separate chemical defense squadron, a separate half-squadron of communications, reconnaissance and sapper squadrons, a divisional veterinary hospital, a field postal station, transport unit and commandant platoon. The division created bodies of the military prosecutor's office, a military tribunal and a special department.

With the help of ulus and republican party and Soviet bodies, medical institutions, communications organizations, units were provided with special equipment for the first time until they received field technical communications equipment, chemistry, medical, veterinary and engineer equipment.

In the western uluses of Kalmykia, 111kd named after O.I. was formed. Gorodovikov with headquarters in the German-Khaginka (274 Elistinsky, 293 Bashantiysky, 312 Primorsky cavalry regiments).

December 22, 1941 the editorial of Pravda, entitled “On horseback!”, wrote that “if in the first strong blows inflicted on the fascists in the south and near Moscow, the cavalry played a significant role, but there is no doubt that an even more prominent role will belong to our glorious horsemen in the coming defeat and complete destruction of the fascist hordes. Now in the rear, powerful reserve armies of cavalry are training and preparing for decisive battles with the enemy...” (archive of the newspaper "Pravda", 12/22/1941)

The experience of cavalry combat in 1941 required the abandonment of light cavalry divisions numbering 3,000 people (July 1941 model) and on December 14, 1941. The Supreme Command Headquarters issued a directive emphasizing the fallacy of using mobile formations and units in disparate groups. Cavalry, as one of the mobile types of troops, was given special importance. The structure of cavalry corps, subordinate directly to the front command, and consisting of 4 divisions of 3,500 people each, is being returned. 5 anti-tank rifles are introduced into each saber squadron of a cavalry division. In addition, the cavalry corps should have included: a tank brigade; separate guards mortar division (12 RS installations); separate horse artillery division (12 - 76mm USV guns); mortar regiment (18 – 120mm and 18 – 82mm mortars); separate communications division. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Shchadenko was instructed to provide the troops with the staff of the cavalry corps departments and make appropriate changes to the staff of the cavalry divisions. (TsAMO, f. 148a, op. 3763, d. 93, l. 120, 121)

Horse corps were intended for joint operations with armored and mechanized forces “to develop success in breaking through defenses, to pursue a retreating enemy and to combat his operational reserves,” as required by the pre-war doctrine of “deep operations.”

January 4, 1942 The Supreme High Command Headquarters decides to change the existing staff in each cavalry division to have one battery of USV guns, two batteries of 120-mm mortars (8 pieces) and 528 PPSh. Accept the Serdyuk rifle grenade as a mandatory supply to the cavalry corps, for which each squadron must have at least 15 specially trained soldiers. (TsAMO, f. 148a, op. 3763, d. 131, l. 3-5)

During the implementation of this directive, on January 6, 1942, new staff numbers No. 06/230 were introduced for the management of the cavalry division and No. 06/233 for the cavalry regiment, but they were also revised several times in 1942 for better management and weapons maintenance (January - 4484, February - 4487, March - 4560, July - 4605). By the beginning of the summer German offensive in the south, the cavalry corps (with the exception of the 2nd Guards Corps) were not fully formed and especially not equipped with artillery weapons and tanks.

By letter of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commissar 1st Rank E. Shchadenko No. ORG/7/780355 dated January 15, 1942, in pursuance of GKO Resolution No. 894ss of November 13, 1941, for the preparation of secondary command staff for national formations, by January 25, 1942, at the Novocherkassk Cavalry School, it was instructed to form a squadron of cadets, numbering 150 people, including: Kalmyks - 100 people and Kabardino-Balkars - 50 people. (TsAMO, f.43, op.11547, d.11, l.16)

On February 17, 1942, in pursuance of the directive of E. Shchadenko, the headquarters of the Stalingrad District, by order No. OM/1/0758, for the timely preparation of marching reinforcements for the Kalmyk national cavalry divisions, began the formation of the 17th reserve cavalry regiment in the Priyutnoye area (southwest of Elista), numbering 964 permanent and 3286 people of variable strength (according to staff 06/170), which was supposed to be completed by March 15, 1942. (TsAMO, f. 143, op. 13049, d. 6, l. 5)

A large group of Kalmyks with higher or secondary education, good command of the Russian language, and drafted into the 110th and 111th Cavalry Divisions were sent to study at the Novocherkassk Cavalry School, where they formed three cadet platoons of a special “national” course (two more platoons were formed from cadets 114 and 115 cavalry divisions).

By Order of Headquarters No. 003 of 01/04/42, simultaneously with the creation of 14, 16 and 17 cavalry corps, in order to change the existing staff of the cavalry division, one USV battery remains in the horse artillery division, the other two receive 120mm mortars instead of cannons (8 pieces in total), the number automatic weapons increases to 528 PPSh. (TsAMO, f.43, op.11547, d.11, l.3)

To quickly replenish existing and replenish newly formed cavalry divisions by order of Headquarters Supreme High Command dated March 3, 1942 No. 043 is ordered to disband twenty cavalry divisions, of which: 11 cavalry divisions of the active armies (which have a large shortage) and 9 national cavalry divisions that have not yet completed the formation (96, 98, 101, 102, 103, 109, 111, 113 cd; instead of 114 cd, 255 are being formed separate Checheno-Ingush regiment). By order of the SVGK dated March 16, 1942. No. 054, in order to create the necessary resources for the timely provision of cavalry units, the 9th, 14th, 16th cavalry corps and another 12 cavalry divisions of the active armies are disbanded (due to large losses, including 70 cavalry divisions) and three national cavalry divisions that are being formed (100, 106 , 108 cd). The 10th Kuban Cossack Division was also disbanded.

At the same time, the 17th reserve cavalry regiment was disbanded without completing its formation. From that moment on, the 15th reserve cavalry regiment, stationed in Voroshilovsk, was preparing reinforcements for the 110th Separate Kalmyk Cavalry Division.

In order to strengthen the combat effectiveness of the cavalry and staff it with qualitatively better human and equine personnel, by order of the NKO dated July 15, 1942. No. 0144, the number of cavalry personnel is reduced from 333,477 people to 190,199 people, while the 97, 99, 104, 105, 107 national cavalry divisions of the Central Asian Military District are disbanded.

Thus, of the 20 national cavalry divisions that began forming in November 1941, 110 Kalmyk, 112 Bashkir, 115 Kabardino-Balkarian cavalry divisions and 255 Chechen-Ingush cavalry regiment, formed during the disbandment of the 114th cavalry regiment, took part in battles on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

During the Great Patriotic War, the military veterinary department of the Red Army was headed by V. M. Lekarev.

Lieutenant General of the Veterinary Service Lekarev Vasily Mikhailovich (1902-1955) - one of the organizers of Soviet military veterinary medicine, head of the Veterinary Administration of the Soviet Army (1941-1955)

As of June 22, 1941, the listed number of horses in the army totaled 0.5 million heads, which were served by 5.2 thousand veterinary personnel. On January 1, 1945, these figures, respectively, amounted to 2.0 million heads and 14.3 thousand people.

Despite the high degree of motorization of the army, horses served as combat weapons in the cavalry and reliable draft force in the artillery and other branches of the military and logistics services. The combat effectiveness and mobility of troops and their timely combat and logistics support largely depended on the equipping of formations and units with horses and their performance. The veterinary staff of military units and formations, both personnel and those called up from the reserve, performed their duties in difficult combat conditions with maximum effort, showing initiative and ingenuity. More than 90% of treated horses were returned to service from veterinary hospitals.

Even before the start of World War II, there was a reduction in the number of cavalry divisions in the Soviet Army from 32 in 1938 to 13 at the beginning of 1941.

In World War II, cavalry, however, showed its effectiveness in clashes with enemy formations that did not have much firepower. Cavalry took part in most major operations. In the summer and autumn of 1941, cavalry formations fought heavy defensive battles, covering the withdrawal of combined arms formations, launched counterattacks and counterattacks on the flanks and rear of the enemy groups breaking through, disorganized its control, supply of material resources and evacuation.

At the insistent demands of G.K. Zhukov, the Soviet command in the summer of 1941 began forming new cavalry divisions. By the end of 1941, 82 additional light cavalry divisions were deployed, which began to be consolidated into cavalry corps subordinate to front-line command. When conducting offensive operations, cavalry corps were used to develop a breakthrough, encircle large enemy groups, combat their operational reserves, disrupt communications, capture bridgeheads on water barriers and important areas (lines) in the rear, and pursue. IN defensive operations they formed a maneuver reserve for the front and were used, as a rule, to launch counterattacks.

In 1943, during the reorganization of the cavalry, a cavalry commander was appointed (S.M. Budyonny), a cavalry headquarters was formed (chief of staff General V.T. Obukhov, then General P.S. Karpachev), light cavalry divisions were abolished, divisions were enlarged, and their firepower, anti-tank weapons of the cavalry corps have been strengthened. Since 1943, what was envisaged back in 1943 began to be widely practiced. pre-war years the use of some cavalry corps as part of horse-mechanized groups, which were used to develop success. The increased firepower of the troops during the Great Patriotic War forced the cavalry to often fight in dismounted battle formations. When attacking the enemy, who hastily went over to the defensive, and when operating in his rear, an attack on horseback was also used.

The experience of using cavalry in the 2nd World War and the Great Patriotic War showed its great vulnerability when high degree saturating armies with artillery, mortars, automatic small arms, tanks and aircraft. The most effective under these conditions were the actions of tank and mechanized troops, which received significant development.

According to modern historian Alexei Isaev, the use of cavalry was twofold. Firstly, it was used as “quasi-motorized infantry” as part of mobile formations. This use of cavalry was due to a shortage of motorized infantry. Secondly, due to the weakness of the technical base of that time, motorized infantry could only operate in well-passable terrain. In the absence of roads or muddy roads, the mobility of motorized infantry dropped sharply. At the same time, the mobility of cavalry depended much less on the state of the terrain. The ratio of mobility of motorized infantry and cavalry is different and depends on specific physical and geographical conditions.

Cavalry also had one important advantage - lower supply requirements. In the absence of fuel, the motorized infantry will be forced to abandon their equipment, and the cavalry will continue to move. Accordingly, under certain conditions (impassable terrain, short duration of the operation), the use of cavalry made it possible to increase the depth of the offensive operation.

The disadvantage of cavalry is the need to feed horses all the time, while vehicles only require fuel when they are in use. Feed consumption increases greatly in cold weather, and in severe frosts in the field it is possible mass death horses. In general, we can say that cavalry and motorized infantry complemented each other well.

See also 8th SS Cavalry Division "Florian Geier"

Alexey Isaev. Ten myths of World War II, chapter about Soviet cavalry :

With checkers on tanks
“According to Krupp’s armor...”

It all started with an arrogant phrase in Heinz Guderian’s memoirs “Memoirs of a Soldier”: “The Polish Pomeranian cavalry brigade, due to ignorance of the design data and methods of operation of our tanks, attacked them with melee weapons and suffered monstrous losses.” These words were taken literally and creatively developed in fiction: “The blades of the brave Warsaw zholners clattered loudly on Krupp’s armor, and the pikes of the Polish cavalry broke on the same armor. Every living thing died under the tracks of the tanks...” The cavalrymen began to seem like some kind of violent madmen, rushing in horse formation at tanks with sabers and pikes. The battle between the mythical “zholners” and Guderian’s tanks became a symbol of the victory of technology over outdated weapons and tactics. Such attacks began to be attributed not only to the Poles, but also to the cavalry of the Red Army, and they were even depicted cutting tanks with sabers on film. The obvious strangeness of such an action: a soldier and an officer of the 1930s. - this is not a Mongol who came from the depths of centuries and not even a crusader. Being of sound mind and good memory, he will not try to chop metal objects with a saber. Although this was noticeable, it was not explained. For a long time, cavalrymen received the stigma of being brave but dull savages, unfamiliar with the properties of modern technology.

The next step was to expose the Red Army cavalry and cavalrymen in the leadership of the Soviet armed forces. The same Pikul, with childish fury, attacks the cavalrymen:

“All this happened, unfortunately. “Motorization” - in words, but in deeds - a mare in a harness. Meanwhile, there were many adepts of horse riding, and Budyonny openly proclaimed:

- And what? The horse and the cart will show themselves...

Another apostle of horse tactics, Efim Shchadenko, being deputy people's commissar, echoed the Kremlin cavalry in the Pravda newspaper:
“Stalin, as a great strategist and organizer of class battles, correctly assessed the cavalry in his time, he collectivized it, made it mass, and together with K.E. Voroshilov, he raised a horse on the mountain of the enemies of the proletarian revolution...”

Considering the popularity of the novelist Pikul in the 70s and 80s, it is not difficult to imagine the scale of the spread of the views of the Soviet marine writer on cavalry among the masses of his readers. The phrase “The horse and the cart will still show themselves...” became a catchphrase. It characterized not only S.M. Budyonny personally, but also the entire Red Army of the pre-war period.

If the sailor Valentin Pikul could still be forgiven for throwing mud at the cavalry in a work of art, then the repetition of similar phrases in scientific and even popular science works was completely surprising. Typical example:
"In the pre-war years, among Soviet command There has been a reassessment of the role of cavalry in modern warfare. While the main capitalist states have significantly reduced the cavalry of their armies, our numbers have increased. Speaking with a report “XX Years of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the Navy,” People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov said: “The cavalry in all the armies of the world is experiencing a crisis and in many armies has almost disappeared. We take a different point of view. We are convinced that our valiant cavalry will more than once make itself known as the powerful and invincible Red Cavalry. The Red Cavalry is still a victorious and crushing armed force and can and will solve great problems on all battle fronts."

The orgy of humiliation of the cavalry reached complete ecstasy in the 90s. The ideological blinders fell, and everyone who was not too lazy considered it necessary to demonstrate their “professionalism” and “progressive views.” Previously, he quite adequately assessed the role of the cavalry (apparently under the influence of instructions from the Central Committee), the famous domestic researcher initial period war V.A. Anfilov moved on to outright mockery. He writes: “According to the saying, “Whoever hurts, talks about it,” Inspector General of the Red Army Cavalry, Colonel General O.I. Gorodovikov spoke about the role of cavalry in defense..." Further more. After flipping through several pages of the same work, we are surprised to read about S.K.’s performance. Timoshenko at a meeting of the command staff in December 1940 made the following comment from Viktor Aleksandrovich: “I couldn’t, of course, former boss divisions in Budyonny's Cavalry Army did not do justice to the cavalry. “In modern warfare, cavalry occupies an important place among the main branches of the military,” he said, contrary to common sense, “although little was said about it here at our meeting (they did the right thing. - Author). In our vast theaters, cavalry will find wide use in solving the most important tasks of developing success and pursuing the enemy after the front has been broken through.” Particularly pleasing is the “profound” remark - “they did the right thing.” Critics of the cavalry were consistent and, in addition to savagery and backwardness, accused the cavalrymen of exterminating the advanced branches of the troops: “Not so long ago, Kulik gathered all the cavalrymen, and they jointly decided to disband the tank corps.” I remember the immortal:

“...and on the ruins of the chapel...

“What, did I destroy the chapel too?”
Was there a boy?

The thesis about the overestimation of the role of cavalry in the USSR is simply not true. In the pre-war years specific gravity cavalry formations were constantly declining.

A document that clearly characterizes the plans for the development of cavalry in the Red Army is the report people's commissar defense in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, dating from the fall of 1937, about long-term plan development of the Red Army in 1938-1942. I quote:
“a) The composition of the cavalry in peacetime by January 1, 1938. Cavalry in peacetime (by January 1, 1938) consists of: 2 cavalry divisions (5 mountain and 3 territorial), separate cavalry brigades, one separate and 8 reserve cavalry regiments and 7 cavalry corps directorates. The number of peacetime cavalry as of January 1, 1938 was 95,690 people.

B) Organizational events on cavalry 1938-1942

In 1938:

A) the number of cavalry divisions is proposed to be reduced by 7 (from 32 to 25), disbanding 7 cavalry divisions using their personnel to replenish the remaining divisions and to strengthen mechanized troops and artillery;

B) disband two departments of cavalry corps;

B) disband two reserve cavalry regiments;

D) in 3 cavalry corps, form one anti-aircraft artillery division (425 people each);

D) reduce the composition of the cavalry division from 6,600 people to 5,900 people;

E) leave the cavalry divisions of OKDVA (2) in reinforced strength (6800 people). The number of mountain cavalry divisions is 2620 people.”

The number of directorates of cavalry corps was reduced to 5, cavalry divisions - to 18 (of which 4 in the Far East), mountain cavalry divisions - to 5 and Cossack (territorial) cavalry divisions - to 2. As a result of the proposed transformations, “peacetime cavalry as a result reorganization is reduced by 57,130 people and will have 138,560 people” (ibid.).

The naked eye can see that the document consists entirely of sentences like “reduce” and “disband.” Perhaps, after 1938, which was rich in repression in the army, these plans, reasonable on all sides, were consigned to oblivion? Nothing of the kind; the process of disbanding the cavalry corps and reducing the cavalry as a whole went on without stopping.

In the fall of 1939, plans to reduce the cavalry received their practical implementation. Government approved proposal People's Commissariat Defense of November 21, 1939 provided for the presence of five cavalry corps consisting of 24 cavalry divisions, 2 separate cavalry brigades and 6 reserve cavalry regiments. According to the proposal of the NKO dated July 4, 1940, the number of cavalry corps was reduced to three, the number of cavalry divisions to twenty, the brigade remained alone and the reserve regiments to five. And this process continued until the spring of 1941. As a result, out of the 32 cavalry divisions and 7 corps directorates that existed in the USSR by 1938, by the beginning of the war there remained 4 corps and 13 cavalry divisions. Cavalry formations were reorganized into mechanized ones. In particular, such a fate befell the 4th Cavalry Corps, whose command and 34th division became the basis for the 8th Mechanized Corps. The commander of the cavalry corps, Lieutenant General Dmitry Ivanovich Ryabyshev, headed the mechanized corps and led it in June 1941 into battle against German tanks near Dubno.
Theory

The theory of the combat use of cavalry in the USSR was studied by people who looked at things quite soberly. This is, for example, a former cavalryman tsarist army, who became the Chief of the General Staff in the USSR, Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov. It was he who wrote the theory that became the basis for the practice of combat use of cavalry in the USSR. This was the work “Cavalry (Cavalry Sketches)” of 1923, which became the first major scientific study on cavalry tactics published after the Civil War. Work by B.M. Shaposhnikova caused a great discussion at meetings of cavalry commanders and in the press: whether cavalry in modern conditions retains its former importance or is just “riding infantry”.

Boris Mikhailovich quite intelligibly outlined the role of cavalry in the new conditions and measures to adapt it to these conditions:

“The changes made under the influence of modern weapons in the activities and structure of the cavalry are as follows:

In tactics. Modern power fire made it extremely difficult for cavalry to conduct mounted combat, reducing it to exceptional and rare cases. The normal type of cavalry combat is a combined battle, and the cavalry should not wait for action solely in the mounted formation, but, when starting a rifle battle, should conduct it with full tension, trying to solve problems with them if the situation is not favorable for mounting mounted attacks. Horse and foot combat are equivalent methods of action for the cavalry of our days.

In strategy. The power, destructiveness and range of modern weapons have made the operational work of cavalry more difficult, but have not diminished its importance and, on the contrary, it opens up a true field of successful activity for cavalry as an independent branch of the military. However, successful operational work of the cavalry will be possible only when the cavalry, in its tactical activities, demonstrates independence in solving problems in accordance with the modern combat situation, without shying away from decisive actions on foot.

In the organisation. The fight against modern weapons on the battlefield, bringing cavalry closer to infantry operations, requires changes in the organization of cavalry closer to infantry, planning a numerical increase in cavalry formations and the division of the latter for foot combat, similar to that adopted in infantry units. Attaching infantry units to the cavalry, even if they move quickly, is a palliative - the cavalry must independently fight the enemy infantry, achieving success on its own, so as not to limit its operational mobility.

In arms. The modern power of firearms to combat them requires the presence of equally powerful firearms in the cavalry. Because of this, the “armored cavalry” of our days must equip its riders with rifles with a bayonet, similar to infantry ones, a revolver, hand grenades and automatic rifles; increase the number of machine guns in both divisional and regimental commands, strengthen the artillery, both in number and caliber, by introducing a howitzer and anti-aircraft guns; strengthen ourselves by adding armored vehicles with cannons and machine guns, light vehicles with the same means of fire, tanks and the assistance of fire from air squadrons.”

Note that the opinion expressed hot on the heels of the Civil War (1923) was in no way influenced by the euphoria from the use of cavalry in 1918-1920. The tasks and scope of use of cavalry are quite clearly outlined and defined.

Also indicative is the opinion of S.M. Budyonny, often represented as a seasoned, stupid cavalryman, an enemy of the mechanization of the army. In fact, his position on the role of cavalry in the war was more than balanced: “The reasons for the rise or decline of cavalry should be sought in relation to the basic properties of this type of troops to the basic data of the situation of a certain historical period. In all cases, when the war acquired a maneuverable character and the operational situation required the presence of mobile troops and decisive actions, the cavalry masses became one of the decisive elements of the armed force. This is manifested by a well-known pattern throughout the history of cavalry; as soon as the possibility of a maneuverable war developed, the role of the cavalry immediately increased and certain operations were completed with its blows.” Semyon Mikhailovich points to the field of application of cavalry - maneuverable warfare, the conditions for which can arise at any stage of the historical development of tactics and technology. For him, cavalry is not a symbol taken from the Civil War, but it corresponds modern conditions means of warfare: “We are stubbornly fighting to preserve the powerful, independent Red Cavalry and to further strengthen it solely because we are sober, real estimate the situation convinces us of the undoubted need to have such cavalry in the system of our Armed Forces.”

There is no glorification of cavalry observed. “The Horse Will Still Show Itself” is the fruit of an analysis of the current state of the Armed Forces of the USSR and its potential opponents.
What do the documents say?

If we turn from theoretical research to documents, the preferred option for cavalry actions becomes quite clear. The cavalry combat regulations prescribed an attack on horseback only if “the situation is favorable (there are shelters, weakness or lack of enemy fire).” The main program document of the Red Army of the 30s, the Field Manual of the Red Army of 1936, stated: “The power of modern fire will often require cavalry to conduct foot combat. The cavalry must therefore be ready to operate on foot.” Almost word for word this phrase was repeated in the Field Manual of 1939. As we see, in general case cavalrymen were required to attack on foot, using the horse only as a means of transport.

Naturally, new means of fighting were introduced into the rules for the use of cavalry. The 1939 field manual indicated the need to use cavalry in conjunction with technical innovations: “It is most advisable to use cavalry formations together with tank formations, motorized infantry and aviation - ahead of the front (in the absence of contact with the enemy), on the approaching flank, in the development of a breakthrough, behind enemy lines, in raids and pursuit. Cavalry formations are able to consolidate their success and hold the terrain. However, at the first opportunity they should be relieved of this task in order to preserve them for maneuver. The actions of a cavalry unit must in all cases be reliably covered from the air.”
Practice

Perhaps all these phrases were forgotten in practice? Let's give the floor to veteran cavalrymen. Ivan Aleksandrovich Yakushin, lieutenant, commander of the anti-tank platoon of the 24th Guards Cavalry Regiment of the 5th Guards Cavalry Division, recalled: “How did the cavalry act in the Patriotic War? Horses were used as a means of transportation. There were, of course, battles on horseback - saber attacks, but this was rare. If the enemy is strong, sitting on a horse, it is impossible to cope with him, then the command is given to dismount, the horse handlers take the horses and leave. And the horsemen work like infantry. Each horse breeder took five horses with him and took them to a safe place. So there were several horse handlers per squadron. Sometimes the squadron commander said: “Leave two horse handlers for the entire squadron, and the rest in a chain to help.” The machine-gun carts preserved in the Soviet cavalry also found their place in the war. Ivan Aleksandrovich recalls: “Carts were also used only as a means of transportation. During mounted attacks, they did turn around and, as in the Civil War, scampered, but this was infrequent. [...] And as soon as the battle began, the machine gun was removed from the cart, the horse handlers took the horses away, the cart also left, but the machine gun remained.”

N.L. Dupak (8th Guards Cavalry Rivne Red Banner Order of Suvorov Division named after Morozov) recalls: “I only went to attack on horseback in school, but I didn’t do any cutting, and I never had to meet the enemy’s cavalry. There were such learned horses at the school that, even after hearing a pitiful “hurray,” they were already rushing forward, and you just need to hold them back. They snore... No, they didn’t have to. They fought dismounted. The horse handlers took the horses to shelters. True, they often paid dearly for this, since the Germans sometimes fired at them with mortars. There was only one horse breeder for a squad of 11 horses.”

Tactically, cavalry was closest to motorized infantry units and formations. Motorized infantry moved on vehicles on the march, and on foot in battle. At the same time, no one tells us scary tales about trucks with infantrymen ramming tanks and knocking their bumpers into “Krupp steel.” The mechanism of combat use of motorized infantry and cavalry in World War II was very similar. In the first case, the infantrymen disembarked from the trucks before the battle, and the drivers drove the vehicles into shelters. In the second case, the cavalrymen dismounted, and the horses were driven into shelters. The area of ​​application of an attack on horseback was reminiscent of the conditions for using armored personnel carriers like the German “Hanomag” - the enemy’s fire system was disrupted, his morale was low. In all other cases, mounted cavalry and armored personnel carriers did not appear on the battlefield. Both the Soviet cavalrymen with sabers drawn and the Germans attacking on coffin-shaped “ganomages” are nothing more than a cinematic cliche. The armor of armored personnel carriers was intended to protect against fragments of long-range artillery on starting positions, and not on the battlefield.
Who knocked on Krupp's armor

When the theory and practice of the combat use of cavalry in new conditions is built before us, a legitimate question arises: “What about the Poles? Who knocked sabers on tanks? In fact, the Polish cavalry in its tactics of use was no different from the Soviet cavalry of those years. Moreover, in the Polish cavalry, a mounted attack was not a regulated type of military action. According to the 1930 General Instructions for Combat, cavalry were to march on horseback and fight on foot. In practice, of course, there were exceptions. For example, if the enemy is taken by surprise or demoralized. One cannot expect any madness from cavalry with such a charter.

The main character of the episode mentioned by Guderian (which went down in history as the battle of Krojanty) was the Polish 18th Pomeranian Lancer Regiment. This regiment was formed on June 25, 1919 in Poznań under the name of the 4th Nadvislansky Lancers, and from February 1920 became the 18th Pomeranian. On August 22, 1939, the regiment received orders for mobilization, which ended less than a week before the war, on August 25. After mobilization, the regiment consisted of 35 officers, more than 800 sub-officers and privates, 850 horses, two 37-mm Bofors anti-tank guns (according to the staff there should have been twice as many), twelve 7.92-mm Maroshek anti-tank guns mod. 1935, twelve heavy machine guns and eighteen light machine guns. The new products of the century of the “motor war” were 2 motorcycles with sidecars and 2 radio stations. Soon the regiment was reinforced by a battery of the 11th Horse Artillery Division. The battery consisted of 180 artillerymen, 248 horses, four 75-mm cannons with 1,440 rounds of ammunition, and two heavy machine guns.

A regiment of Pomeranian lancers met the morning of September 1, 1939 at the border and for the first half of the day fought a completely traditional defensive battle. In the afternoon, the cavalrymen received orders to launch a counterattack and, taking advantage of the enemy’s transition to the defensive as a result of this attack, retreat back. For the counterattack, a maneuver detachment (1st and 2nd squadrons and two platoons of the 3rd and 4th squadrons) was allocated; it was supposed to go to the rear of the German infantry by 19.00, attack it, and then retreat to the line of fortifications in the area the town of Rytel, occupied by Polish infantry.

However, the roundabout maneuver led to unexpected results for both sides. The head outpost of the detachment discovered a battalion of German infantry, which was at a halt 300-400 m from the edge of the forest. The Poles decided to attack this enemy on horseback, using the effect of surprise. According to the old command “szable dlon!” (sabers out!) The lancers quickly and smoothly drew their blades, which shone in the red rays of the setting sun. The commander of the 18th regiment, Colonel Mastalez, took part in the attack. Obeying the trumpet signal, the lancers quickly rushed towards the enemy. The calculation for the surprise of the attack turned out to be correct: the Germans, who did not expect the attack, rushed scattered across the field in panic. The cavalrymen mercilessly cut down the fleeing infantrymen with sabers.

The triumph of the cavalry was interrupted by armored vehicles hitherto hidden in the forest. Driving out from behind the trees, these armored vehicles opened machine-gun fire. In addition to the armored car, one German gun also opened fire. Now the Poles were rushing across the field under deadly fire.

Having suffered heavy losses, the cavalrymen retreated behind the nearest wooded ridge, where barely half of the horsemen participating in the attack gathered. However, the losses in the cavalry attack were much less than one might imagine from the description of the battle. Three officers (including the regimental commander, Colonel Mastalezh) and 23 lancers were killed, one officer and about 50 lancers were seriously wounded. Most The losses of the 18th Uhlan Regiment on September 1, 1939, amounting to up to 60% of people, seven machine guns, two anti-tank guns, the regiment suffered in a combined arms defensive battle. Guderian's words in this case have nothing to do with reality. The Polish cavalrymen did not attack the tanks, but were themselves attacked by armored vehicles in the process of cutting down the unwary battalion. In a similar situation, ordinary infantry or dismounted cavalry would have suffered quite comparable losses. Moreover, the situation with flanking shelling from a gun could become piquant for a platoon of tanks entering the field. The story of cutting down Krupp armor turns out to be a fiction from beginning to end.
1941 Phoenix Bird of the Red Army

After all the reductions, the Red Army cavalry faced the war as part of 4 corps and 13 cavalry divisions. The regular cavalry divisions of 1941 had four cavalry regiments, a horse artillery division (eight 76 mm cannons and eight 122 mm howitzers), a tank regiment (64 BT tanks), an anti-aircraft division (eight 76 mm anti-aircraft guns and two batteries of anti-aircraft machine guns), communications squadron, sapper squadron and other rear units and institutions. The cavalry regiment, in turn, consisted of four saber squadrons, a machine gun squadron (16 heavy machine guns and four 82 mm mortars), regimental artillery (four 76 mm and four 45 mm guns), an anti-aircraft battery (three 37 mm guns and three quadruple "maxims"). The total staff strength of the cavalry division was 8968 people and 7625 horses, and the cavalry regiment was 1428 people and 1506 horses, respectively. A two-divisional cavalry corps roughly corresponded to a motorized division, having slightly less mobility and a lighter artillery salvo.

In June 1941, the 5th Cavalry Corps was stationed in the Kiev Special Military District as part of the 3rd Bessarabian. G.I. Kotovsky and 14th named after. Parkhomenko cavalry divisions, in the Odessa district there was the 2nd cavalry corps as part of the 5th named after. M.F. Blinov and the 9th Crimean Cavalry Divisions. All these formations were old formations of the Red Army with stable combat traditions.

The cavalry corps turned out to be the most stable formations of the Red Army in 1941. Unlike the mechanized corps, they were able to survive the endless retreats and encirclements of 1941. The cavalry corps of P.A. Belova and F.V. Kamkov became the “fire brigade” of the South-Western direction. The first later participated in an attempt to unblock the Kyiv “cauldron”. Guderian wrote the following about these events: “On September 18, a critical situation developed in the Romny area. Early in the morning, the noise of battle was heard on the eastern flank, which became increasingly intensified over the next period of time. Fresh enemy forces - the 9th Cavalry Division and another division together with tanks - were advancing from the east on Romny in three columns, approaching the city at a distance of 800 m. From the high prison tower located on the outskirts of the city, I had the opportunity to clearly observe how the enemy was advancing on the 24th tank corps was tasked with repelling the enemy's advance. To carry out this task, the corps had at its disposal two battalions of the 10th motorized division and several anti-aircraft batteries. Due to the superiority of enemy aviation, our aerial reconnaissance was in serious condition. Lieutenant Colonel von Barsevisch, who personally flew out on reconnaissance, barely escaped the Russian fighters. This was followed by an enemy air raid on Romny. In the end, we still managed to keep the city of Romny and the forward command post in our hands. [...] The threatened position of the city of Romny forced me on September 19 to move my command post back to Konotop. General von Geyer made this decision easier for us with his radiogram in which he wrote: “Translation command post from Romny will not be interpreted by the troops as a manifestation of cowardice on the part of the command of the tank group.” This time Guderian shows no excessive contempt for the charging cavalrymen. Romny was not the last battle of the 2nd Cavalry Corps. In the late autumn of 1941, the P.A. Corps. Belova played an important role in the battle of Moscow, where he received the rank of guards.

At the beginning of July 1941, the formation of the 50th and 53rd cavalry divisions began in camps near the village of Urupskaya and near Stavropol. The main personnel of the divisions were conscripts and volunteers from the Kuban villages of Prochnookopskaya, Labinskaya, Kurganaya, Sovetskaya, Voznesenskaya, Otradnaya, and Terek Cossacks from the Stavropol villages of Trunovskoye, Izobilnoye, Ust-Dzhegutinskoye, Novo-Mikhailovskoye, Troitskoye. On July 13, 1941, loading into trains began. Colonel Issa Aleksandrovich Pliev was appointed commander of the 50th division, and brigade commander Kondrat Semenovich Melnik was appointed commander of the 53rd division. On July 18, 1941, the divisions unloaded at the Staraya Toropa station, west of Rzhev. Thus began the history of another legendary cavalry corps - the 2nd Guards L.M. Dovatora.

Not only proven formations with long-standing military traditions won guards ranks, but also newly formed corps and divisions. The reason for this, perhaps, should be sought in the level of physical training required by each cavalryman, which inevitably had an impact on moral qualities fighter.
1942 Instead of a breakthrough - a raid

In 1942, the Soviet cavalry experienced the peak of its extensive development. At the beginning of 1942, the number of cavalry formations jumped up sharply. In table Figure 2 clearly shows the increase in the number of cavalry corps (kk), cavalry divisions (kd) at the beginning of the year and gradual stabilization by the fall of 1942. For comparison, the number of rifle formations (sd) is given.

Table 2. Dynamics of the number of cavalry formations of the Red Army in 1942
January February March April May June July August September November December kk 7 17 17 15 14 13 12 10 9 9 9 10 kd 82 87 86 68 60 53 46 37 32 32 31 31 sd 389 391 407 425 433 426 425 424 417 421 425 414

In the winter campaign of 1942, newly formed cavalry divisions were actively used in battles. A typical example is the battles in the southern sector of the front. E. von Mackensen, who fought there, later recalled: “At the time of taking command of the group in Stalino in the afternoon of January 29, the enemy was already dangerously close to the Dnepropetrovsk-Stalino railway and thereby to the vital (since it was the only) railway supply line of the 17th army and 1st tank army. Based on the circumstances, initially it could only be a matter of maintaining the necessary communications and organizing the first defense.” Only during a stubborn struggle with sappers from pontoon battalions thrown into battle did the Germans manage to hold out. His opponent was almost one cavalry: “In the past eight weeks of fighting, the corps fought with the Russians with 9 rifle, 10 cavalry divisions and 5 tank brigades.” German military leader in this case he is not mistaken, he was actually opposed by more cavalry than rifle divisions. Divisions of the 1st (33rd, 56th and 68th), 2nd (62nd, 64th, 70th) and 5th (34th, 60th) fought against von Mackensen's formation. I, 79th) cavalry corps, also the 30th separate cavalry division of the Southern Front. The reasons for such widespread use of cavalry in the Battle of Moscow are quite obvious. The Red Army at that time simply did not have large mobile formations. In the tank forces, the largest unit was the tank brigade, which could only be operationally used as infantry support. The unification of several tank brigades under one command, recommended at that time, also did not produce results. The only means allowing for deep envelopments and detours was cavalry.

According to the same scenario, introducing cavalry into a deep breakthrough, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps P.A. acted. Belova. The vicissitudes of the actions of the Western Front in the winter of 1942 are quite well covered in the memoirs and historical literature, and I will just allow myself to draw attention to a few important details. Belov's group was given truly ambitious tasks. The Western Front command directive dated January 2, 1942 stated: “A very favorable situation has been created for encircling the enemy’s 4th and 9th armies, and the main role should be played by Belov’s strike group, promptly interacting through the front headquarters with our Rzhev group.” [TsAMO. F.208. Op.2513. D.205. L.6] However, despite the losses suffered during the Soviet counter-offensive of December 1941, the troops of Army Group Center retained controllability.

The breakthroughs, which were entered first by the cavalry corps and then by the 33rd Army, were closed by the Germans through flank attacks. In fact, the troops who were surrounded had to switch to semi-partisan actions. The cavalrymen acted quite successfully in this capacity. Belov’s group received the order to leave for their units only on June 6 (!!!) 1942. Partisan units, of which P.A. Belov formed rifle formations, again split into separate units. The mobility of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, provided by horses, played an important role in the overall development of events. Thanks to this building P.A. Belov managed to take his own shortcut, breaking through the German barrier with his forehead, but in a roundabout way. On the contrary, the 33rd Army M.G. Efremova, lacking the maneuverability of cavalrymen, was defeated in April 1942 while trying to break through to her own forces in the 43rd Army zone. Horses were transport and, no matter how cynical it may sound, self-moving food supplies. This ensured greater stability of the cavalry in the not always successful offensive operations of 1942.

“Youth took us on a saber campaign!”

The civil war on Russian territory was of a highly mobile nature, which is why it was fought along railways and rivers. It was difficult to step aside, simply put, “there weren’t enough legs,” which is why very soon the Red Commissars put forward the slogan “Proletarian, on horseback!”

Two cavalry armies were created at once - the First - Semyon Budyonny and the Second - Oki Gorodovikov, which played a very important role in the defeat of the White Army. Even a new tactic for their use was born: when attacking enemy cavalry, carts rush ahead, then they turn around and mow down the enemy with machine-gun fire. Riders act in pairs: one chops with a saber, the other shoots the opponents of the first with a pistol or carbine.

“Move not along the highway, but through the forests!”

The young Soviet cavalry emerged from the Civil War weakened. The horse composition worked well, so much so that good horses had to be purchased in Canada through Amtorg in the 20s.

In the pre-war years, the quantitative composition of the Soviet cavalry decreased in direct proportion to the increase in its mechanization. Thus, the same Oka Gorodovikov, who had been a cavalry inspector since 1938, speaking at a meeting of the top leadership of the Red Army on December 23-31, 1940, said that the main thing in modern warfare is the air force.

“Large forces of cavalry, with all their desire, even with seven stars in their foreheads, as they say, cannot do anything... I believe that cavalry under such conditions can move not along the highway, but through forests and other paths. Therefore, in the modern situation... we must assume that superiority will be on the side that has air superiority. With this superiority, any branch of troops can move, fight and carry out the task. If there is no such superiority in the air, then any type of troops will not be able to move and will not complete their assigned tasks.” (RGVA, f. 4, op. 18, d. 58, l. 60 – 65.)

That is, he quite rightly believed that cavalry had every right to exist, subject to reliable air support. And he suggested moving in her absence not along the highway, but through forests.

“Fight strictly according to the regulations!”

The specific role of cavalry in the new conditions was also confirmed by the Field Manual of 1939: “The most appropriate use of cavalry formations together with tank formations, motorized infantry and aviation is in front of the front (in the absence of contact with the enemy), on the approaching flank, in the development of a breakthrough, in the rear enemy, in raids and pursuit. Cavalry formations are able to consolidate their success and hold the terrain. However, at the first opportunity they should be relieved of this task in order to preserve them for maneuver. The actions of a cavalry unit must in all cases be reliably covered from the air.” Well, since the military must fight strictly according to the regulations, then... in theory they should have fought in the 41st, if not for one “but”...

“It was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines!”

After all the reductions, the Red Army cavalry faced the war as four corps and 13 cavalry divisions. According to Oka Gorodovikov, who became inspector general and commander of the cavalry of the Red Army in June 1941, the cavalry corps of three divisional composition then consisted of 12 regiments, and had 172 BT-7 tanks and 48 armored vehicles in three tank regiments, 96 divisional guns, 48 field and 60 anti-tank guns; heavy machine guns - 192 and light machine guns - 384, and a reinforced tank brigade consisting of 150 - 200 tanks.

But, as you know, the Great Patriotic War began with the defeat of Soviet aviation, because of which we became so short of aircraft that long-range DB-4 bombers were sent to attack enemy tank columns without fighter cover. What can we say about the cavalry, which, in these difficult conditions, firstly, became perhaps the only truly mobile force of the Red Army, independent of the condition of the roads or the supply of fuel, and secondly, it lost what was promised by the charter air cover.

German “Stukas” with sirens turned on dived at the cavalrymen and the horses’ nerves could not stand it, they rushed to the sides and fell under bullets and bombs. Nevertheless, the red horsemen fought even in such conditions.

"Cossacks, Cossacks!"

Many horsemen after the war recalled that they used horses as a means of transport, but attacked the enemy exclusively on foot. Most of them practically didn’t have to swing their checkers.

The exception was the participants in raids behind enemy lines. During the day, their units defended themselves in the forests, and at night, on a tip from the partisans, they attacked the occupied villages. At the very first sounds of shots, the Germans ran out of their houses and immediately, shouting loudly in horror “Cossacks, Cossacks!”, fell under checkers. Then the horsemen retreated again and during the day, when German aircraft were looking for them, they hid in the forests for the time being!

The success of the actions of the same Cossack units of the Red Army is also evidenced by the fact that Hitler allowed the creation in the Wehrmacht of mounted Cossack units, united in the SS Cossack Corps under the command of the former ataman, and now General Krasnov, and the Don Cossacks themselves, who went over to their side, the creation on their lands (it is not known how sincerely) of the “Cossackia” republic. Brought to Yugoslavia to take part in actions against partisans, this corps established itself in such a way that for a long time there mothers frightened their children with Cossacks: “Look, the Cossack will come and take you away!”

War of engines and horses!

It should be noted that in the Red Army at the initial stage of the war there simply were no large mobile formations other than cavalry; tank troops could only be operationally used as a means of supporting infantry.

Thus, the only means allowing for deep envelopments, detours and raids behind enemy lines was cavalry. Even at the end of the war, when the nature of the fighting changed significantly compared to 1941–1942, eight cavalry corps successfully operated as part of the Red Army, seven of which bore the honorary title of guards.

In fact, cavalry, before the appearance in the Red Army of large independent mechanized formations and, we add, vehicles from the USA and England, was the only maneuverable means at the operational level of combat operations. It is clear that there were many problems with the use of cavalry. Feed for horses, supply of ammunition, bulkiness - all these were difficulties that military art had to overcome, but which was also often lacking. But our horsemen were not short of heroism.