The reasons why the Cossacks of all Cossack regions for the most part rejected the destructive ideas of Bolshevism and entered into an open struggle against them, and in completely unequal conditions, are still not entirely clear and constitute a mystery for many historians. After all, in everyday life, the Cossacks were the same farmers as 75% of the Russian population, bore the same state burdens, if not more, and were under the same administrative control of the state. With the beginning of the revolution that came after the abdication of the sovereign, the Cossacks within the regions and in the front-line units experienced various psychological stages. During the February rebellion in Petrograd, the Cossacks took a neutral position and remained outside spectators of the unfolding events. The Cossacks saw that despite the presence of significant armed forces in Petrograd, the government not only did not use them, but also strictly prohibited their use against the rebels. During the previous rebellion in 1905-1906, the Cossack troops were the main armed force that restored order in the country, as a result in public opinion they earned the contemptuous title of “whips” and “royal satraps and guardsmen.” Therefore, in the rebellion that arose in the Russian capital, the Cossacks were inert and left the government to decide the issue of restoring order with the help of other troops. After the abdication of the sovereign and the entry into control of the country by the Provisional Government, the Cossacks considered the continuity of power legitimate and were ready to support the new government. But gradually this attitude changed, and, observing the complete inactivity of the authorities and even the encouragement of unbridled revolutionary excesses, the Cossacks began to gradually move away from the destructive power, and the instructions of the Council of Cossack Troops, operating in Petrograd under the chairmanship of the ataman of the Orenburg army Dutov, became authoritative for them.

Inside the Cossack regions, the Cossacks also did not become intoxicated with revolutionary freedoms and, having made some local changes, continued to live as before, without causing any economic, much less social, upheaval. At the front, in military units, the Cossacks accepted the order for the army, which completely changed the foundations of military formations, with bewilderment and, under the new conditions, continued to maintain order and discipline in the units, most often electing their former commanders and superiors. There were no refusals to execute orders and there was no settling of personal scores with the command staff. But the tension gradually increased. The population of the Cossack regions and Cossack units at the front were subjected to active revolutionary propaganda, which involuntarily had to affect their psychology and forced them to listen carefully to the calls and demands of the revolutionary leaders. In the area of ​​the Don Army, one of the important revolutionary acts was the removal of the appointed ataman Count Grabbe, his replacement with an elected ataman of Cossack origin, General Kaledin, and the restoration of the convening of public representatives to the Military Circle, according to the custom that had existed since ancient times, until the reign of Emperor Peter I. After which their lives continued walking without much shock. The issue of relations with the non-Cossack population, which, psychologically, followed the same revolutionary paths as the population of the rest of Russia, became acute. At the front, powerful propaganda was carried out among the Cossack military units, accusing Ataman Kaledin of being counter-revolutionary and having a certain success among the Cossacks. The seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in Petrograd was accompanied by a decree addressed to the Cossacks, in which only geographical names were changed, and it was promised that the Cossacks would be freed from the yoke of generals and the burden of military service and equality and democratic freedoms would be established in everything. The Cossacks had nothing against this.

Rice. 1 Region of the Don Army

The Bolsheviks came to power under anti-war slogans and soon began to fulfill their promises. In November 1917, the Council of People's Commissars invited all warring countries to begin peace negotiations, but the Entente countries refused. Then Ulyanov sent a delegation to German-occupied Brest-Litovsk for separate peace negotiations with delegates from Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. Germany's ultimatum demands shocked the delegates and caused hesitation even among the Bolsheviks, who were not particularly patriotic, but Ulyanov accepted these conditions. The “obscene Peace of Brest-Litovsk” was concluded, according to which Russia lost about 1 million km² of territory, pledged to demobilize the army and navy, transfer ships and infrastructure of the Black Sea Fleet to Germany, pay an indemnity of 6 billion marks, recognize the independence of Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland. The Germans had a free hand to continue the war in the west. At the beginning of March, the German army along the entire front began to advance to occupy the territories given up by the Bolsheviks under the peace treaty. Moreover, Germany, in addition to the agreement, announced to Ulyanov that Ukraine should be considered a province of Germany, to which Ulyanov also agreed. There is a fact in this case that is not widely known. Russia's diplomatic defeat in Brest-Litovsk was caused not only by the corruption, inconsistency and adventurism of the Petrograd negotiators. The “joker” played a key role here. A new partner suddenly appeared in the group of contracting parties - the Ukrainian Central Rada, which, despite all the precariousness of its position, behind the back of the delegation from Petrograd, on February 9 (January 27), 1918, signed a separate peace treaty with Germany in Brest-Litovsk. The next day, the Soviet delegation interrupted the negotiations with the slogan “we will stop the war, but we will not sign peace.” In response, on February 18, German troops launched an offensive along the entire front line. At the same time, the German-Austrian side tightened the peace terms. In view of the complete inability of the Sovietized old army and the beginnings of the Red Army to resist even the limited advance of German troops and the need for a respite to strengthen the Bolshevik regime, on March 3, Russia also signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. After that, the “independent” Ukraine was occupied by the Germans and, as unnecessary, they threw Petliura “from the throne”, placing the puppet Hetman Skoropadsky on him. Thus, shortly before falling into oblivion, the Second Reich, under the leadership of Kaiser Wilhelm II, captured Ukraine and Crimea.

After the Bolsheviks concluded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, part of the territory of the Russian Empire turned into zones of occupation of the Central countries. Austro-German troops occupied Finland, the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine and eliminated the Soviets there. The Allies vigilantly monitored what was happening in Russia and also tried to ensure their interests connecting them with the former Russia. In addition, there were up to two million prisoners in Russia who could, with the consent of the Bolsheviks, be sent to their countries, and for the Entente powers it was important to prevent the return of prisoners of war to Germany and Austria-Hungary. Ports in the north of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, and in the Far East Vladivostok served as a means of communication between Russia and its allies. Large warehouses of property and military equipment, delivered by foreigners on orders from the Russian government, were concentrated in these ports. The accumulated cargo amounted to over a million tons, worth up to 2 and a half billion rubles. Cargoes were shamelessly stolen, including by local revolutionary committees. To ensure the safety of cargo, these ports were gradually occupied by the Allies. Since orders imported from England, France and Italy were sent through northern ports, they were occupied by 12,000 British and 11,000 Allied units. Imports from the USA and Japan went through Vladivostok. On July 6, 1918, the Entente declared Vladivostok an international zone, and the city was occupied by Japanese units of 57,000 and other allied units of 13,000 people. But they did not begin to overthrow the Bolshevik government. Only on July 29, the Bolshevik power in Vladivostok was overthrown by the White Czechs under the leadership of the Russian general M. K. Diterichs.

In domestic politics, the Bolsheviks issued decrees that destroyed all social structures: banks, national industry, private property, land ownership, and under the guise of nationalization, simple robbery was often carried out without any state leadership. The inevitable devastation began in the country, for which the Bolsheviks blamed the bourgeoisie and “rotten intellectuals,” and these classes were subjected to the most severe terror, bordering on destruction. It is still completely impossible to understand how this all-destroying force came to power in Russia, given that power was seized in a country that had a thousand-year history and culture. After all, with the same measures, international destructive forces hoped to produce an internal explosion in worried France, transferring up to 10 million francs to French banks for this purpose. But France, by the beginning of the twentieth century, had already exhausted its limit on revolutions and was tired of them. Unfortunately for the businessmen of the revolution, there were forces in the country that were able to unravel the insidious and far-reaching plans of the leaders of the proletariat and resist them. This was written about in more detail in Military Review in the article “How America saved Western Europe from the specter of world revolution.”

One of the main reasons that allowed the Bolsheviks to carry out a coup d'etat and then quite quickly seize power in many regions and cities of the Russian Empire was the support of numerous reserve and training battalions stationed throughout Russia that did not want to go to the front. It was Lenin’s promise of an immediate end to the war with Germany that predetermined the transition of the Russian army, which had decayed during the “Kerenschina,” to the side of the Bolsheviks, which ensured their victory. In most regions of the country, the establishment of Bolshevik power took place quickly and peacefully: out of 84 provincial and other large cities, only fifteen saw Soviet power established as a result of armed struggle. Having adopted the “Decree on Peace” on the second day of their stay in power, the Bolsheviks ensured the “triumphant march of Soviet power” across Russia from October 1917 to February 1918.

The relations between the Cossacks and the Bolshevik rulers were determined by the decrees of the Union of Cossack Troops and the Soviet government. On November 22, 1917, the Union of Cossack Troops presented a resolution in which it notified the Soviet government that:
- The Cossacks do not seek anything for themselves and do not demand anything for themselves outside the boundaries of their regions. But, guided by the democratic principles of self-determination of nationalities, it will not tolerate on its territories any power other than the people’s, formed by the free agreement of local nationalities without any external or outside influence.
- Sending punitive detachments against the Cossack regions, in particular against the Don, will bring civil war to the outskirts, where energetic work is underway to establish public order. This will cause a disruption in transport, will be an obstacle to the delivery of goods, coal, oil and steel to the cities of Russia and will worsen the food supply, leading to disorder in the breadbasket of Russia.
- The Cossacks oppose any introduction of foreign troops into the Cossack regions without the consent of the military and regional Cossack governments.
In response to the peace declaration of the Union of Cossack Troops, the Bolsheviks issued a decree to open military operations against the south, which read:
- Relying on the Black Sea Fleet, arm and organize the Red Guard to occupy the Donetsk coal region.
- From the north, from the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, move combined detachments to the south to the starting points: Gomel, Bryansk, Kharkov, Voronezh.
- The most active units should move from the Zhmerinka area to the east to occupy Donbass.

This decree created the germ of the fratricidal civil war of Soviet power against the Cossack regions. To survive, the Bolsheviks urgently needed Caucasian oil, Donetsk coal and bread from the southern outskirts. The outbreak of massive famine pushed Soviet Russia towards the rich south. The Don and Kuban governments did not have well-organized and sufficient forces at their disposal to protect the regions. The units returning from the front did not want to fight, they tried to disperse to the villages, and the young Cossack front-line soldiers entered into an open fight with the old men. In many villages this struggle became fierce, reprisals on both sides were brutal. But there were many Cossacks who came from the front, they were well armed and vociferous, had combat experience, and in most villages victory remained with the front-line youth, heavily infected with Bolshevism. It soon became clear that even in the Cossack regions, strong units could be created only on the basis of volunteerism. To maintain order in the Don and Kuban, their governments used detachments consisting of volunteers: students, cadets, cadets and youth. Many Cossack officers volunteered to form such volunteer (the Cossacks call them partisan) units, but this matter was poorly organized at the headquarters. Permission to form such detachments was given to almost everyone who asked. Many adventurers appeared, even robbers, who simply robbed the population for profit. However, the main threat to the Cossack regions turned out to be regiments returning from the front, since many of those who returned were infected with Bolshevism. The formation of volunteer Red Cossack units also began immediately after the Bolsheviks came to power. At the end of November 1917, at a meeting of representatives of the Cossack units of the Petrograd Military District, it was decided to create revolutionary detachments from the Cossacks of the 5th Cossack division, 1st, 4th and 14th Don regiments and send them to the Don, Kuban and Terek to defeat the counter-revolution and establish Soviet authorities. In January 1918, a congress of front-line Cossacks gathered in the village of Kamenskaya with the participation of delegates from 46 Cossack regiments. The Congress recognized Soviet power and created the Don Military Revolutionary Committee, which declared war on the ataman of the Don Army, General A.M. Kaledin, who opposed the Bolsheviks. Among the command staff of the Don Cossacks, two staff officers, military foreman Golubov and Mironov, were supporters of Bolshevik ideas, and Golubov’s closest collaborator was the sub-sergeant Podtyolkov. In January 1918, the 32nd Don Cossack Regiment returned to the Don from the Romanian Front. Having elected military sergeant F.K. as his commander. Mironov, the regiment supported the establishment of Soviet power, and decided not to go home until the counter-revolution led by Ataman Kaledin was defeated. But the most tragic role on the Don was played by Golubov, who in February occupied Novocherkassk with two regiments of Cossacks he propagated, dispersed the meeting of the Military Circle, arrested General Nazarov, who took office after the death of General Kaledin, and shot him. After a short time, this “hero” of the revolution was shot by the Cossacks right at the rally, and Podtyolkov, who had large sums of money with him, was captured by the Cossacks and, according to their verdict, hanged. Mironov's fate was also tragic. He managed to attract with him a significant number of Cossacks, with whom he fought on the side of the Reds, but, not being satisfied with their orders, he decided to go over with the Cossacks to the side of the fighting Don. Mironov was arrested by the Reds, sent to Moscow, where he was shot. But that will come later. In the meantime, there was great turmoil on the Don. If the Cossack population still hesitated, and only in some villages did the prudent voice of the old people gain the upper hand, then the non-Cossack population entirely sided with the Bolsheviks. The nonresident population in the Cossack regions always envied the Cossacks, who owned a large amount of land. Taking the side of the Bolsheviks, nonresidents hoped to take part in the division of the officers' and landowners' Cossack lands.

Other armed forces in the south were detachments of the emerging Volunteer Army, located in Rostov. On November 2, 1917, General Alekseev arrived on the Don, got in touch with Ataman Kaledin and asked him for permission to form volunteer detachments on the Don. General Alekseev’s goal was to take advantage of the southeastern base of the armed forces to gather the remaining steadfast officers, cadets, and old soldiers and organize them into the army necessary to restore order in Russia. Despite the complete lack of funds, Alekseev eagerly got down to business. On Barochnaya Street, the premises of one of the infirmaries were turned into an officers' dormitory, which became the cradle of volunteerism. Soon the first donation was received, 400 rubles. This is all that Russian society allocated to its defenders in November. But people simply walked to the Don, without any idea of ​​what awaited them, groping, in the darkness, across the solid Bolshevik sea. They went to where the centuries-old traditions of the Cossack freemen and the names of the leaders whom popular rumor associated with the Don served as a bright beacon. They came exhausted, hungry, ragged, but not discouraged. On December 6 (19), disguised as a peasant, with a false passport, General Kornilov arrived by rail in the Don. He wanted to go further to the Volga, and from there to Siberia. He considered it more correct for General Alekseev to remain in the south of Russia, and he would be given the opportunity to work in Siberia. He argued that in this case they would not interfere with each other and he would be able to organize a big business in Siberia. He was eager for space. But representatives of the “National Center” who arrived in Novocherkassk from Moscow insisted that Kornilov remain in the south of Russia and work together with Kaledin and Alekseev. An agreement was concluded between them, according to which General Alekseev took charge of all financial and political issues, General Kornilov took over the organization and command of the Volunteer Army, General Kaledin continued the formation of the Don Army and the management of the affairs of the Don Army. Kornilov had little faith in the success of work in the south of Russia, where he would have to create a white cause in the territories of the Cossack troops and depend on the military atamans. He said this: “I know Siberia, I believe in Siberia, things can be done there on a broad scale. Here Alekseev alone can easily handle the matter.” Kornilov was eager to go to Siberia with all his soul and heart, he wanted to be released and was not particularly interested in the work of forming the Volunteer Army. Kornilov’s fears that he would have friction and misunderstandings with Alekseev were justified from the first days of their work together. The forced stay of Kornilov in the south of Russia was a big political mistake of the “National Center”. But they believed that if Kornilov left, then many volunteers would follow him and the business started in Novocherkassk could fall apart. The formation of the Good Army progressed slowly, with an average of 75-80 volunteers signing up per day. There were few soldiers; mostly officers, cadets, students, cadets and high school students signed up. There were not enough weapons in the Don warehouses; they had to be taken away from soldiers traveling home on troop echelons passing through Rostov and Novocherkassk, or purchased through buyers in the same echelons. Lack of funds made work extremely difficult. The formation of the Don units progressed even worse. Generals Alekseev and Kornilov understood that the Cossacks did not want to go to restore order in Russia, but they were confident that the Cossacks would defend their lands. However, the situation in the Cossack regions of the southeast turned out to be much more difficult. The regiments returning from the front were completely neutral in the events taking place, and even showed a tendency towards Bolshevism, declaring that the Bolsheviks had not done anything bad to them.

In addition, inside the Cossack regions there was a difficult struggle against the non-resident population, and in the Kuban and Terek also against the highlanders. The military atamans had the opportunity to use well-trained teams of young Cossacks who were preparing to be sent to the front, and organize the conscription of successive ages of youth. General Kaledin could have had support in this from the elderly and front-line soldiers, who said: “We have served our duty, now we must call on others.” The formation of Cossack youth from conscription age could have given up to 2-3 divisions, which in those days was enough to maintain order on the Don, but this was not done. At the end of December, representatives of the British and French military missions arrived in Novocherkassk. They asked what had been done, what was planned to be done, after which they stated that they could help, but for now only with money, in the amount of 100 million rubles, in tranches of 10 million per month. The first payment was expected in January, but was never received, and then the situation completely changed. The initial funds for the formation of the Good Army consisted of donations, but they were scanty, mainly due to the unimaginable greed and stinginess of the Russian bourgeoisie and other propertied classes under the given circumstances. It should be said that the stinginess and stinginess of the Russian bourgeoisie is simply legendary. Back in 1909, during a discussion in the State Duma on the issue of the kulaks, P.A. Stolypin spoke prophetic words. He said: “... there is no more greedy and unscrupulous kulak and bourgeois than in Russia. It is no coincidence that in the Russian language the phrases “world-eater kulak and world-eater bourgeois” are used. If they do not change the type of their social behavior, great shocks await us...” He looked as if into water. They did not change social behavior. Almost all the organizers of the white movement point to the low usefulness of their appeals for material assistance to the property classes. However, by mid-January, a small (about 5 thousand people) but very combative and morally strong Volunteer Army had emerged. The Council of People's Commissars demanded the extradition or dispersal of volunteers. Kaledin and Krug answered: “There is no extradition from the Don!” The Bolsheviks, in order to eliminate the counter-revolutionaries, began to pull units loyal to them from the Western and Caucasian fronts to the Don region. They began to threaten the Don from Donbass, Voronezh, Torgovaya and Tikhoretskaya. In addition, the Bolsheviks tightened control on the railways and the influx of volunteers decreased sharply. At the end of January, the Bolsheviks occupied Bataysk and Taganrog, and on January 29, cavalry units moved from Donbass to Novocherkassk. The Don found himself defenseless against the Reds. Ataman Kaledin was confused, did not want bloodshed and decided to transfer his powers to the City Duma and democratic organizations, and then committed life with a shot in the heart. This was a sad but logical result of his activities. The First Don Circle gave pernach to the elected chieftain, but did not give him power.

The region was headed by a Military Government of 14 elders elected from each district. Their meetings had the character of a provincial duma and did not leave any trace in the history of the Don. On November 20, the government addressed the population with a very liberal declaration, convening a congress of the Cossack and peasant population on December 29 to organize the life of the Don region. At the beginning of January, a coalition government was created on a parity basis, 7 seats were given to the Cossacks, 7 to non-residents. The inclusion of demagogues-intellectuals and revolutionary democrats into the government finally led to the paralysis of power. Ataman Kaledin was ruined by his trust in the Don peasants and non-residents, his famous “parity”. He failed to glue the disparate pieces of the population of the Don region together. Under him, the Don split into two camps, Cossacks and Don peasants, along with non-resident workers and artisans. The latter, with few exceptions, were with the Bolsheviks. The Don peasantry, which made up 48% of the region's population, carried away by the broad promises of the Bolsheviks, was not satisfied with the measures of the Don government: the introduction of zemstvos in peasant districts, the attraction of peasants to participate in stanitsa self-government, their widespread admission into the Cossack class and the allocation of three million dessiatines of landowners' land. Under the influence of the incoming socialist element, the Don peasantry demanded a general division of all Cossack land. The numerically smallest working environment (10-11%) was concentrated in the most important centers, was the most restless and did not hide its sympathy for Soviet power. The revolutionary-democratic intelligentsia had not outlived its former psychology and, with amazing blindness, continued its destructive policy, which led to the death of democracy on a nationwide scale. The bloc of Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries reigned in all peasant and non-resident congresses, all kinds of dumas, councils, trade unions and inter-party meetings. There was not a single meeting where resolutions of no confidence in the ataman, the government and the Circle were not passed, or protests against their taking measures against anarchy, criminality and banditry.

They preached neutrality and reconciliation with that force that openly declared: “He who is not with us is against us.” In cities, workers' settlements and peasant settlements, the uprisings against the Cossacks did not subside. Attempts to place units of workers and peasants into Cossack regiments ended in disaster. They betrayed the Cossacks, went to the Bolsheviks and took Cossack officers with them to torture and death. The war took on the character of a class struggle. The Cossacks defended their Cossack rights from the Don workers and peasants. With the death of Ataman Kaledin and the occupation of Novocherkassk by the Bolsheviks, the period of the Great War and the transition to civil war ends in the south.

Rice. 2 Ataman Kaledin

On February 12, Bolshevik troops occupied Novocherkassk and military foreman Golubov, in “gratitude” for the fact that General Nazarov once saved him from prison, shot the new chieftain. Having lost all hope of holding Rostov, on the night of February 9 (22), the Good Army of 2,500 soldiers left the city for Aksai, and then moved to Kuban. After the establishment of Bolshevik power in Novocherkassk, terror began. Cossack units were prudently scattered throughout the city in small groups; domination in the city was in the hands of nonresidents and Bolsheviks. On suspicion of connections with the Good Army, officers were mercilessly executed. The robberies and robberies of the Bolsheviks made the Cossacks wary, even the Cossacks of the Golubovo regiments took a wait-and-see attitude. In the villages where nonresident and Don peasants seized power, the executive committees began dividing the Cossack lands. These outrages soon caused uprisings of the Cossacks in the villages adjacent to Novocherkassk. The leader of the Reds on the Don, Podtyolkov, and the head of the punitive detachment, Antonov, fled to Rostov, then were caught and executed. The occupation of Novocherkassk by the White Cossacks in April coincided with the occupation of Rostov by the Germans, and the return of the Volunteer Army to the Don region. But out of 252 villages of the Donskoy army, only 10 were liberated from the Bolsheviks. The Germans firmly occupied Rostov and Taganrog and the entire western part of the Donetsk district. The outposts of the Bavarian cavalry stood 12 versts from Novocherkassk. Under these conditions, Don was faced with four main tasks:
- immediately convene a new Circle, in which only delegates from the liberated villages could take part
- establish relations with the German authorities, find out their intentions and come to an agreement with them
- recreate the Don Army
- establish relationships with the Volunteer Army.

On April 28, a general meeting of the Don government and delegates from the villages and military units that took part in the expulsion of Soviet troops from the Don region took place. The composition of this Circle could not have any claim to resolving issues for the entire Army, which is why it limited its work to issues of organizing the struggle for the liberation of the Don. The meeting decided to declare itself the Don Rescue Circle. There were 130 people in it. Even on the democratic Don, this was the most popular assembly. The circle was called gray because there were no intelligentsia on it. At this time, the cowardly intelligentsia sat in cellars and basements, trembling for their lives or being mean to the commissars, signing up for service in the Soviets or trying to get a job in innocent institutions for education, food and finance. She had no time for elections in these troubled times, when both voters and deputies were risking their heads. The circle was elected without party struggle, there was no time for that. The circle was chosen and elected to it exclusively by Cossacks who passionately wanted to save their native Don and were ready to give their lives for this. And these were not empty words, because after the elections, having sent their delegates, the electors themselves dismantled their weapons and went to save the Don. This Circle did not have a political face and had one goal - to save the Don from the Bolsheviks, at any cost and at any cost. He was truly popular, meek, wise and businesslike. And this gray, from overcoat and coat cloth, that is, truly democratic, the Don saved the people's mind. Already by the time the full military circle was convened on August 15, 1918, the Don land was cleared of the Bolsheviks.

The second urgent task for the Don was to resolve relations with the Germans who occupied Ukraine and the western part of the lands of the Don Army. Ukraine also laid claim to the German-occupied Don lands: Donbass, Taganrog and Rostov. The attitude towards the Germans and towards Ukraine was the most pressing issue, and on April 29 the Circle decided to send a plenipotentiary embassy to the Germans in Kyiv in order to find out the reasons for their appearance on the territory of the Don. The negotiations took place in calm conditions. The Germans stated that they were not going to occupy the region and promised to clear the occupied villages, which they soon did. On the same day, the Circle decided to organize a real army, not from partisans, volunteers or vigilantes, but obeying laws and discipline. What Ataman Kaledin with his government and the Circle, consisting of talkative intellectuals, had been stomping around for almost a year, the gray Circle for saving the Don decided at two meetings. The Don Army was still only a project, and the command of the Volunteer Army already wanted to crush it under itself. But Krug answered clearly and specifically: “The supreme command of all military forces, without exception, operating on the territory of the Don Army must belong to the military ataman...”. This answer did not satisfy Denikin; he wanted to have large reinforcements of people and material in the person of the Don Cossacks, and not to have a “allied” army nearby. The circle worked intensively, meetings were held in the morning and evening. He was in a hurry to restore order and was not afraid of reproaches for his desire to return to the old regime. On May 1, the Circle decided: “Unlike the Bolshevik gangs, which do not wear any external insignia, all units participating in the defense of the Don must immediately take on their military appearance and wear shoulder straps and other insignia.” On May 3, as a result of a closed vote, Major General P.N. was elected military chieftain by 107 votes (13 against, 10 abstained). Krasnov. General Krasnov did not accept this election before the Circle adopted the laws that he considered necessary to introduce into the Donskoy army in order to be able to fulfill the tasks assigned to him by the Circle. Krasnov said at the Circle: “Creativity has never been the lot of the team. Raphael's Madonna was created by Raphael, and not by a committee of artists... You are the owners of the Don land, I am your manager. It's all about trust. If you trust me, you accept the laws I propose; if you do not accept them, it means that you do not trust me, you are afraid that I will use the power given to you to the detriment of the army. Then we have nothing to talk about. I cannot lead the army without your complete trust.” When asked by one of the members of the Circle whether he could suggest changing or altering anything in the laws proposed by the ataman, Krasnov replied: “You can. Articles 48,49,50. You can propose any flag except red, any coat of arms except the Jewish five-pointed star, any anthem except the international..." The very next day the Circle reviewed all the laws proposed by the ataman and adopted them. The circle restored the ancient pre-Petrine title “The Great Don Army”. The laws were an almost complete copy of the basic laws of the Russian Empire, with the difference that the rights and prerogatives of the emperor passed to... the ataman. And there was no time for sentimentality.

Before the eyes of the Don Rescue Circle stood the bloody ghosts of Ataman Kaledin, who had shot himself, and Ataman Nazarov, who had been shot. The Don lay in rubble, it was not only destroyed, but polluted by the Bolsheviks, and the German horses drank the water of the Quiet Don, a river sacred to the Cossacks. The work of the previous Circles led to this, with the decisions of which Kaledin and Nazarov fought, but could not win because they had no power. But these laws created many enemies for the chieftain. As soon as the Bolsheviks were expelled, the intelligentsia, hiding in cellars and basements, came out and started a liberal howl. These laws did not satisfy Denikin either, who saw in them a desire for independence. On May 5, the Circle dispersed, and the ataman was left alone to rule the army. That same evening, his adjutant Yesaul Kulgavov went to Kyiv with handwritten letters to Hetman Skoropadsky and Emperor Wilhelm. The result of the letter was that on May 8, a German delegation came to the ataman, with a statement that the Germans did not pursue any aggressive goals in relation to the Don and would leave Rostov and Taganrog as soon as they saw that complete order had been restored in the Don region. On May 9, Krasnov met with the Kuban ataman Filimonov and the Georgian delegation, and on May 15 in the village of Manychskaya with Alekseev and Denikin. The meeting revealed deep differences between the Don Ataman and the command of the Don Army in both tactics and strategy in the fight against the Bolsheviks. The goal of the rebel Cossacks was to liberate the land of the Don Army from the Bolsheviks. They had no further intentions of waging war outside their territory.

Rice. 3 Ataman Krasnov P.N.

By the time of the occupation of Novocherkassk and the election of the ataman by the Circle for the Salvation of the Don, all armed forces consisted of six infantry and two cavalry regiments of varying numbers. The junior officers were from the villages and were good, but there was a shortage of hundred and regimental commanders. Having experienced many insults and humiliations during the revolution, many senior commanders at first had distrust of the Cossack movement. The Cossacks were dressed in their semi-military dress, but boots were missing. Up to 30% were dressed in poles and bast shoes. Most wore shoulder straps, and everyone wore white stripes on their caps and hats to distinguish them from the Red Guard. The discipline was fraternal, the officers ate from the same pot with the Cossacks, because they were most often relatives. The headquarters were small; for economic purposes, the regiments had several public figures from the villages who resolved all logistical issues. The battle was fleeting. No trenches or fortifications were built. There were few entrenching tools, and natural laziness prevented the Cossacks from digging in. The tactics were simple. At dawn they began to attack in liquid chains. At this time, an outflanking column was moving along an intricate route towards the enemy’s flank and rear. If the enemy was ten times stronger, it was considered normal for an offensive. As soon as a bypass column appeared, the Reds began to retreat and then the Cossack cavalry rushed at them with a wild, soul-chilling whoop, knocked them over and took them prisoner. Sometimes the battle began with a feigned retreat of twenty versts (this is an old Cossack venter). The Reds rushed to pursue, and at this time the encircling columns closed behind them and the enemy found themselves in a fire pocket. With such tactics, Colonel Guselshchikov with regiments of 2-3 thousand people smashed and captured entire Red Guard divisions of 10-15 thousand people with convoys and artillery. Cossack custom required that officers go in front, so their losses were very high. For example, the division commander, General Mamantov, was wounded three times and still in chains. In the attack, the Cossacks were merciless, and they were also merciless towards the captured Red Guards. They were especially harsh towards captured Cossacks, who were considered traitors to the Don. Here the father used to sentence his son to death and did not want to say goodbye to him. It also happened the other way around. At this time, echelons of Red troops were still moving across the Don territory, fleeing to the east. But in June the railway line was cleared of the Reds, and in July, after the Bolsheviks were expelled from the Khopyorsky district, the entire territory of the Don was liberated from the Reds by the Cossacks themselves.

In other Cossack regions the situation was no easier than on the Don. The situation was especially difficult among the Caucasian tribes, where the Russian population was scattered. The North Caucasus was raging. The fall of the central government caused a shock more serious here than anywhere else. Reconciled by the tsarist power, but not having outlived the centuries-old strife and not having forgotten old grievances, the mixed-tribal population became agitated. The Russian element that united it, about 40% of the population consisted of two equal groups, Terek Cossacks and non-residents. But these groups were separated by social conditions, were settling their land scores and could not counter the Bolshevik threat with unity and strength. While Ataman Karaulov was alive, several Terek regiments and some ghost of power survived. On December 13, at the Prokhladnaya station, a crowd of Bolshevik soldiers, on the orders of the Vladikavkaz Soviet of Deputies, unhooked the ataman’s carriage, drove it to a distant dead end and opened fire on the carriage. Karaulov was killed. In fact, on the Terek, power passed to local councils and bands of soldiers of the Caucasian Front, who flowed in a continuous stream from the Transcaucasus and, not being able to penetrate further into their native places, due to the complete blockage of the Caucasian highways, settled like locusts across the Terek-Dagestan region. They terrorized the population, planted new councils or hired themselves into the service of existing ones, bringing fear, blood and destruction everywhere. This flow served as the most powerful conductor of Bolshevism, which swept the nonresident Russian population (due to the thirst for land), touched the Cossack intelligentsia (due to the thirst for power) and greatly confused the Terek Cossacks (due to the fear of “going against the people”). As for the mountaineers, they were extremely conservative in their way of life, which very little reflected social and land inequality. True to their customs and traditions, they were governed by their national councils and were alien to the ideas of Bolshevism. But the mountaineers quickly and willingly accepted the practical aspects of central anarchy and intensified violence and robbery. By disarming the passing troop trains, they had a lot of weapons and ammunition. On the basis of the Caucasian Native Corps, they formed national military formations.

Rice. 4 Cossack regions of Russia

After the death of Ataman Karaulov, an overwhelming struggle with the Bolshevik detachments that filled the region and the aggravation of controversial issues with neighbors - Kabardians, Chechens, Ossetians, Ingush - the Terek Army was turned into a republic, part of the RSFSR. Quantitatively, Terek Cossacks in the Terek region made up 20% of the population, nonresidents - 20%, Ossetians - 17%, Chechens - 16%, Kabardians - 12% and Ingush - 4%. The most active among other peoples were the smallest - the Ingush, who fielded a strong and well-armed detachment. They robbed everyone and kept Vladikavkaz in constant fear, which they captured and plundered in January. When Soviet power was established in Dagestan, as well as on the Terek, on March 9, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars set its first goal to break the Terek Cossacks, destroying their special advantages. Armed expeditions of mountaineers were sent to the villages, robberies, violence and murders were carried out, lands were taken away and handed over to the Ingush and Chechens. In this difficult situation, the Terek Cossacks lost heart. While the mountain peoples created their armed forces through improvisation, the natural Cossack army, which had 12 well-organized regiments, disintegrated, dispersed and disarmed at the request of the Bolsheviks. However, the excesses of the Reds led to the fact that on June 18, 1918, the uprising of the Terek Cossacks began under the leadership of Bicherakhov. The Cossacks defeat the Red troops and blockade their remnants in Grozny and Kizlyar. On July 20, in Mozdok, the Cossacks were convened for a congress, at which they decided on an armed uprising against Soviet power. The Terets established contact with the command of the Volunteer Army, the Terek Cossacks created a combat detachment of up to 12,000 people with 40 guns and resolutely took the path of fighting the Bolsheviks.

The Orenburg Army under the command of Ataman Dutov, the first to declare independence from the power of the Soviets, was the first to be invaded by detachments of workers and red soldiers, who began robbery and repression. Veteran of the fight against the Soviets, Orenburg Cossack General I.G. Akulinin recalled: “The stupid and cruel policy of the Bolsheviks, their undisguised hatred of the Cossacks, the desecration of Cossack shrines and, especially, bloody massacres, requisitions, indemnities and robbery in the villages - all this opened their eyes to the essence of Soviet power and forced them to take up arms. . The Bolsheviks could not lure the Cossacks with anything. The Cossacks had land, and they regained their freedom in the form of the broadest self-government in the first days of the February Revolution.” A turning point gradually occurred in the mood of the ordinary and front-line Cossacks; they increasingly began to speak out against the violence and tyranny of the new government. If in January 1918, Ataman Dutov, under pressure from Soviet troops, left Orenburg, and he had barely three hundred active fighters left, then on the night of April 4, sleeping Orenburg was raided by more than 1,000 Cossacks, and on July 3, power was restored in Orenburg passed into the hands of the ataman.

Fig.5 Ataman Dutov

In the area of ​​the Ural Cossacks, the resistance was more successful, despite the small number of the Troops. Uralsk was not occupied by the Bolsheviks. From the beginning of the birth of Bolshevism, the Ural Cossacks did not accept its ideology and back in March they easily dispersed the local Bolshevik revolutionary committees. The main reasons were that among the Urals there were no non-residents, there was a lot of land, and the Cossacks were Old Believers who more strictly guarded their religious and moral principles. The Cossack regions of Asian Russia generally occupied a special position. All of them were small in composition, most of them were historically formed in special conditions by state measures, for the purposes of state necessity, and their historical existence was determined by insignificant periods. Despite the fact that these troops did not have firmly established Cossack traditions, foundations and skills for forms of statehood, they all turned out to be hostile to the approaching Bolshevism. In mid-April 1918, the troops of Ataman Semyonov, about 1000 bayonets and sabers, went on the offensive from Manchuria to Transbaikalia, against 5.5 thousand for the Reds. At the same time, the uprising of the Transbaikal Cossacks began. By May, Semenov’s troops approached Chita, but were unable to take it immediately. The battles between Semyonov’s Cossacks and the red detachments, consisting mainly of former political prisoners and captured Hungarians, in Transbaikalia took place with varying degrees of success. However, at the end of July, the Cossacks defeated the Red troops and took Chita on August 28. Soon the Amur Cossacks drove the Bolsheviks out of their capital Blagoveshchensk, and the Ussuri Cossacks took Khabarovsk. Thus, under the command of their atamans: Transbaikal - Semenov, Ussuri - Kalmykov, Semirechensky - Annenkov, Ural - Tolstov, Siberian - Ivanov, Orenburg - Dutov, Astrakhan - Prince Tundutov, they entered into a decisive battle. In the fight against the Bolsheviks, the Cossack regions fought exclusively for their lands and law and order, and their actions, according to historians, were in the nature of a guerrilla war.

Rice. 6 White Cossacks

A huge role along the entire length of the Siberian railway was played by the troops of the Czechoslovak legions, formed by the Russian government from Czech and Slovak prisoners of war, numbering up to 45,000 people. By the beginning of the revolution, the Czech corps stood in the rear of the Southwestern Front in Ukraine. In the eyes of the Austro-Germans, legionnaires, like former prisoners of war, were traitors. When the Germans attacked Ukraine in March 1918, the Czechs offered strong resistance to them, but most Czechs did not see their place in Soviet Russia and wanted to return to the European front. According to the agreement with the Bolsheviks, Czech trains were sent towards Siberia to board ships in Vladivostok and send them to Europe. In addition to the Czechoslovaks, there were many captured Hungarians in Russia, who mostly sympathized with the Reds. The Czechoslovakians had a centuries-old and fierce hostility and enmity with the Hungarians (how can one not recall the immortal works of J. Hasek in this regard). Due to fear of attacks on the way by the Hungarian Red units, the Czechs resolutely refused to obey the Bolshevik order to surrender all weapons, which is why it was decided to disperse the Czech legions. They were divided into four groups with a distance between groups of echelons of 1000 kilometers, so that the echelons with Czechs stretched throughout Siberia from the Volga to Transbaikalia. The Czech legions played a colossal role in the Russian civil war, since after their rebellion the fight against the Soviets sharply intensified.

Rice. 7 Czech Legion on the way along the Trans-Siberian Railway

Despite the agreements, there were considerable misunderstandings in the relations between the Czechs, Hungarians and local revolutionary committees. As a result, on May 25, 1918, 4.5 thousand Czechs rebelled in Mariinsk, and on May 26, the Hungarians provoked an uprising of 8.8 thousand Czechs in Chelyabinsk. Then, with the support of Czechoslovak troops, the Bolshevik government was overthrown on May 26 in Novonikolaevsk, May 29 in Penza, May 30 in Syzran, May 31 in Tomsk and Kurgan, June 7 in Omsk, June 8 in Samara and June 18 in Krasnoyarsk. The formation of Russian combat units began in the liberated areas. On July 5, Russian and Czechoslovak troops occupy Ufa, and on July 25 they take Yekaterinburg. At the end of 1918, the Czechoslovak legionnaires themselves began a gradual retreat to the Far East. But, having participated in battles in Kolchak’s army, they would finally finish their retreat and leave Vladivostok for France only at the beginning of 1920. In such conditions, the Russian White movement began in the Volga region and Siberia, not counting the independent actions of the Ural and Orenburg Cossack troops, which began the fight against the Bolsheviks immediately after they came to power. On June 8, the Committee of the Constituent Assembly (Komuch) was created in Samara, liberated from the Reds. He declared himself a temporary revolutionary government, which was supposed to spread over the entire territory of Russia and transfer control of the country to a legally elected Constituent Assembly. The rising population of the Volga region began a successful struggle against the Bolsheviks, but in the liberated places control ended up in the hands of the fleeing fragments of the Provisional Government. These heirs and participants in destructive activities, having formed a government, carried out the same destructive work. At the same time, Komuch created his own armed forces - the People's Army. On June 9, Lieutenant Colonel Kappel began commanding a detachment of 350 people in Samara. In mid-June, the replenished detachment took Syzran, Stavropol Volzhsky (now Togliatti), and also inflicted a heavy defeat on the Reds near Melekes. On July 21, Kappel takes Simbirsk, defeating the superior forces of the Soviet commander Guy defending the city. As a result, by the beginning of August 1918, the territory of the Constituent Assembly extended from west to east for 750 versts from Syzran to Zlatoust, from north to south for 500 versts from Simbirsk to Volsk. On August 7, Kappel’s troops, having previously defeated the red river flotilla that came out to meet them at the mouth of the Kama, take Kazan. There they seize part of the gold reserves of the Russian Empire (650 million gold rubles in coins, 100 million rubles in credit notes, gold bars, platinum and other valuables), as well as huge warehouses with weapons, ammunition, medicines, and ammunition. This gave the Samara government a solid financial and material base. With the capture of Kazan, the Academy of the General Staff, located in the city, headed by General A.I. Andogsky, moved into the anti-Bolshevik camp in its entirety.

Rice. 8 Hero of Komuch Lieutenant Colonel A.V. Kappel

A government of industrialists was formed in Yekaterinburg, a Siberian government was formed in Omsk, and the government of Ataman Semyonov, who led the Transbaikal Army, was formed in Chita. The Allies dominated in Vladivostok. Then General Horvath arrived from Harbin, and as many as three authorities were formed: from the proteges of the Allies, General Horvath and from the railway board. Such fragmentation of the anti-Bolshevik front in the east required unification, and a meeting was convened in Ufa to select a single authoritative state power. The situation in the units of the anti-Bolshevik forces was unfavorable. The Czechs did not want to fight in Russia and demanded that they be sent to the European fronts against the Germans. There was no trust in the Siberian government and members of the Komuch among the troops and the people. In addition, the representative of England, General Knox, stated that until a firm government was created, the delivery of supplies from the British would be stopped. Under these conditions, Admiral Kolchak joined the government and in the fall he carried out a coup and was proclaimed head of government and supreme commander with the transfer of full power to him.

In the south of Russia events developed as follows. After the Reds occupied Novocherkassk in early 1918, the Volunteer Army retreated to Kuban. During the campaign to Ekaterinodar, the army, having endured all the difficulties of the winter campaign, later nicknamed the “ice campaign,” fought continuously. After the death of General Kornilov, who was killed near Yekaterinodar on March 31 (April 13), the army again made its way with a large number of prisoners to the territory of the Don, where by that time the Cossacks, who had rebelled against the Bolsheviks, had begun to clear their territory. Only by May the army found itself in conditions that allowed it to rest and replenish itself for the further fight against the Bolsheviks. Although the attitude of the Volunteer Army command towards the German army was irreconcilable, it, having no weapons, tearfully begged Ataman Krasnov to send the Volunteer Army weapons, shells and cartridges that it received from the German army. Ataman Krasnov, in his colorful expression, receiving military equipment from the hostile Germans, washed them in the clean waters of the Don and transferred part of the Volunteer Army. Kuban was still occupied by the Bolsheviks. In Kuban, the break with the center, which occurred on the Don due to the collapse of the Provisional Government, occurred earlier and more acutely. Back on October 5, with a strong protest from the Provisional Government, the regional Cossack Rada adopted a resolution on separating the region into an independent Kuban Republic. At the same time, the right to elect members of the self-government body was granted only to the Cossack, mountain population and old-time peasants, that is, almost half of the region’s population was deprived of voting rights. A military ataman, Colonel Filimonov, was placed at the head of the socialist government. The discord between the Cossack and nonresident populations took on increasingly acute forms. Not only the nonresident population, but also the front-line Cossacks stood up against the Rada and the government. Bolshevism came to this mass. The Kuban units returning from the front did not go to war against the government, did not want to fight the Bolsheviks and did not follow the orders of their elected authorities. An attempt, following the example of Don, to create a government based on “parity” ended in the same way, paralysis of power. Everywhere, in every village and village, the Red Guard from outside the city gathered, and they were joined by a part of the Cossack front-line soldiers, who were poorly subordinate to the center, but followed exactly its policy. These undisciplined, but well-armed and violent gangs began to impose Soviet power, redistribute land, confiscate grain surpluses and socialize, and simply rob wealthy Cossacks and behead the Cossacks - persecute officers, non-Bolshevik intelligentsia, priests, and authoritative old men. And above all, to disarmament. It is worthy of surprise with what complete non-resistance the Cossack villages, regiments and batteries gave up their rifles, machine guns, and guns. When the villages of the Yeisk department rebelled at the end of April, it was a completely unarmed militia. The Cossacks had no more than 10 rifles per hundred; the rest were armed with what they could. Some attached daggers or scythes to long sticks, others took pitchforks, others took spears, and others simply shovels and axes. Punitive detachments with... Cossack weapons came out against defenseless villages. By the beginning of April, all non-resident villages and 85 out of 87 villages were Bolshevik. But the Bolshevism of the villages was purely external. Often only the names changed: the ataman became a commissar, the village assembly became a council, the village board became an iskom.

Where executive committees were captured by non-residents, their decisions were sabotaged, re-elected every week. There was a stubborn, but passive, without inspiration or enthusiasm, struggle between the age-old way of Cossack democracy and life with the new government. There was a desire to preserve Cossack democracy, but there was no courage. All this, in addition, was heavily implicated in the pro-Ukrainian separatism of some Cossacks who had Dnieper roots. The pro-Ukrainian figure Luka Bych, who headed the Rada, declared: “Helping the Volunteer Army means preparing for the reabsorption of Kuban by Russia.” Under these conditions, Ataman Shkuro gathered the first partisan detachment, located in the Stavropol region, where the Council was meeting, intensified the struggle and presented the Council with an ultimatum. The uprising of the Kuban Cossacks quickly gained strength. In June, the 8,000-strong Volunteer Army began its second campaign against Kuban, which had completely rebelled against the Bolsheviks. This time White was lucky. General Denikin successively defeated Kalnin’s 30,000-strong army near Belaya Glina and Tikhoretskaya, then in a fierce battle near Yekaterinodar, Sorokin’s 30,000-strong army. On July 21, the Whites occupied Stavropol, and on August 17, Ekaterinodar. Blocked on the Taman Peninsula, a 30,000-strong group of Reds under the command of Kovtyukh, the so-called “Taman Army,” along the Black Sea coast fought its way across the Kuban River, where the remnants of the defeated armies of Kalnin and Sorokin fled. By the end of August, the territory of the Kuban army is completely cleared of the Bolsheviks, and the strength of the White Army reaches 40 thousand bayonets and sabers. However, having entered the territory of Kuban, Denikin issued a decree addressed to the Kuban ataman and the government, demanding:
- full tension on the part of Kuban for its speedy liberation from the Bolsheviks
- all priority units of the Kuban military forces should henceforth be part of the Volunteer Army to carry out national tasks
- in the future, no separatism should be shown on the part of the liberated Kuban Cossacks.

Such gross interference by the command of the Volunteer Army in the internal affairs of the Kuban Cossacks had a negative impact. General Denikin led an army that had no defined territory, no people under his control, and, even worse, no political ideology. The commander of the Don Army, General Denisov, even called the volunteers “wandering musicians” in his hearts. General Denikin's ideas were oriented towards armed struggle. Not having sufficient means for this, General Denikin demanded the subordination of the Cossack regions of the Don and Kuban to him in order to fight. Don was in better conditions and was not at all bound by Denikin's instructions. The German army was perceived on the Don as a real force that contributed to getting rid of Bolshevik domination and terror. The Don government entered into contact with the German command and established fruitful cooperation. Relations with the Germans resulted in a purely business form. The rate of the German mark was set at 75 kopecks of the Don currency, a price was made for a Russian rifle with 30 rounds of one pound of wheat or rye, and other supply agreements were concluded. From the German army through Kyiv in the first month and a half the Don Army received: 11,651 rifles, 88 machine guns, 46 guns, 109 thousand artillery shells, 11.5 million rifle cartridges, of which 35 thousand artillery shells and about 3 million rifle cartridges. At the same time, all the shame of peaceful relations with an irreconcilable enemy fell solely on Ataman Krasnov. As for the Supreme Command, according to the laws of the Don Army, it could only belong to the Military Ataman, and before his election - to the marching Ataman. This discrepancy led to the Don demanding the return of all the Don people from the Dorovol army. The relationship between the Don and the Good Army became not an alliance, but a relationship of fellow travelers.

In addition to tactics, there were also great differences within the white movement in strategy, policy and war goals. The goal of the Cossack masses was to liberate their land from the Bolshevik invasion, establish order in their region and provide the Russian people with the opportunity to arrange their destiny according to their own wishes. Meanwhile, the forms of civil war and the organization of the armed forces returned the art of war to the era of the 19th century. The successes of the troops then depended solely on the qualities of the commander who directly controlled the troops. Good commanders of the 19th century did not scatter the main forces, but directed them towards one main goal: the capture of the enemy’s political center. With the capture of the center, the government of the country is paralyzed and the conduct of the war becomes more complicated. The Council of People's Commissars, sitting in Moscow, was in extremely difficult conditions, reminiscent of the situation in Muscovite Rus' in the 14th-15th centuries, limited by the Oka and Volga rivers. Moscow was cut off from all types of supplies, and the goals of the Soviet rulers were reduced to obtaining basic food supplies and a piece of daily bread. In the pathetic calls of the leaders there were no longer any high motives emanating from the ideas of Marx; they sounded cynical, figurative and simple, as they once sounded in the speeches of the people's leader Pugachev: “Go, take everything and destroy everyone who stands in your way.” . People's Commissar of Military and Marine Bronstein (Trotsky), in his speech on June 9, 1918, indicated simple and clear goals: “Comrades! Among all the questions that trouble our hearts, there is one simple question - the question of our daily bread. All our thoughts, all our ideals are now dominated by one concern, one anxiety: how to survive tomorrow. Everyone involuntarily thinks about himself, about his family... My task is not at all to conduct only one campaign among you. We need to have a serious conversation about the country's food situation. According to our statistics, in 17, there was a surplus of grain in those places that produce and export grain, there were 882,000,000 poods. On the other hand, there are areas in the country where there is not enough of their own bread. If you calculate, it turns out that they are missing 322,000,000 poods. Therefore, in one part of the country there is a surplus of 882,000,000 pounds, and in the other, 322,000,000 pounds are not enough...

In the North Caucasus alone there is now a grain surplus of no less than 140,000,000 poods; in order to satisfy hunger, we need 15,000,000 poods per month for the whole country. Just think: 140,000,000 poods of surplus located only in the North Caucasus may be enough for ten months for the entire country. ...Let each of you now promise to provide immediate practical assistance so that we can organize a campaign for bread.” In fact, it was a direct call for robbery. Thanks to the complete absence of glasnost, the paralysis of public life and the complete fragmentation of the country, the Bolsheviks promoted people to leadership positions for whom, under normal conditions, there was only one place - prison. In such conditions, the task of the white command in the fight against the Bolsheviks should have had the shortest goal of capturing Moscow, without being distracted by any other secondary tasks. And to accomplish this main task it was necessary to attract the broadest sections of the people, primarily peasants. In reality, it was the other way around. The volunteer army, instead of marching on Moscow, was firmly stuck in the North Caucasus; the white Ural-Siberian troops could not cross the Volga. All revolutionary changes beneficial to the peasants and people, economic and political, were not recognized by the whites. The first step of their civilian representatives in the liberated territory was a decree that canceled all orders issued by the Provisional Government and the Council of People's Commissars, including those relating to property relations. General Denikin, having absolutely no plan for establishing a new order capable of satisfying the population, consciously or unconsciously, wanted to return Rus' to its original pre-revolutionary position, and the peasants were obliged to pay for the seized lands to their former owners. After this, could the whites count on the peasants supporting their activities? Of course not. The Cossacks refused to go beyond the Donskoy army. And they were right. Voronezh, Saratov and other peasants not only did not fight the Bolsheviks, but also went against the Cossacks. The Cossacks, not without difficulty, were able to cope with their Don peasants and non-residents, but they could not defeat the entire peasantry of central Russia and they understood this perfectly well.

As Russian and non-Russian history shows us, when fundamental changes and decisions are required, we need not just people, but extraordinary individuals, who, unfortunately, were not there during the Russian timelessness. The country needed a government capable of not only issuing decrees, but also having the intelligence and authority to ensure that these decrees were carried out by the people, preferably voluntarily. Such power does not depend on state forms, but is based, as a rule, solely on the abilities and authority of the leader. Bonaparte, having established power, did not look for any forms, but managed to force him to obey his will. He forced both representatives of the royal nobility and people from the sans-culottes to serve France. There were no such consolidating personalities in the white and red movements, and this led to an incredible split and bitterness in the ensuing civil war. But that's a completely different story.

Materials used:
Gordeev A.A. - History of the Cossacks
Mamonov V.F. and others - History of the Cossacks of the Urals. Orenburg-Chelyabinsk 1992
Shibanov N.S. – Orenburg Cossacks of the 20th century
Ryzhkova N.V. - Don Cossacks in the wars of the early twentieth century - 2008
Brusilov A.A. My memories. Voenizdat. M.1983
Krasnov P.N. The Great Don Army. "Patriot" M.1990
Lukomsky A.S. The birth of the Volunteer Army.M.1926
Denikin A.I. How the fight against the Bolsheviks began in the south of Russia. M. 1926

Beginning with a spontaneous popular uprising, the revolutionary events of 1917 entailed large-scale changes in the usual way of life of all segments of the population. And the Cossacks were no exception. Before the emperor had time to abdicate the throne, he was replaced by a new provisional government. It was unbearable for the freedom-loving and willful Cossacks to accept this state of affairs. Therefore, at a certain moment the situation got out of the control of the central government: instead of humbly bowing their heads, the Cossacks began to fight.

Kuban Republic

The collapse of the Russian Empire was marked not only by civil war and riots. Against the backdrop of a harsh redistribution of power and bloody reprisals against dissenters, several autonomous Cossack republics were proclaimed - Kuban, Don, Terek, Amur, and Ural. They arose largely due to the impotence of the central government, which failed to quickly suppress the riots in remote regions.

One of the most durable Cossack republics turned out to be Kuban. Without having much influence on the outcome of events at the very beginning of the revolution, during the Civil War its participants noticeably increased their power. And they didn’t just increase it, but established their own constitution and issued many decrees. The laws of the seceding Cossacks were objectionable to the central government, but were unquestioningly carried out locally.

While inferior to others in numbers, the Kuban Republic nevertheless represented a formidable military force. The Cossacks more than made up for the lack of men and weapons with daring. On the battlefield, they repeatedly managed to defeat officer companies that outnumbered them tens of times. Even under hurricane fire, the Kuban Cossacks moved in even and regular ranks, gradually pushing back the enemy and capturing a large number of prisoners. It is quite natural that this state of affairs raised the mood in the villages, and there were more and more people willing to take the side of the Kuban residents.

Don Republic

Like the Kuban Republic, the Don military government was formed shortly after the 1917 revolution. Blinded by the Bolsheviks' promises to end the war, the Don Cossacks initially maintained neutrality. This allowed the Red commissioners to occupy the Don with relative ease.

However, after the invaders began to harshly impose their orders and physically destroy all those resisting, the Cossacks came to their senses. Ataman A.M. Kaledin, at the head of the Don army, quickly organized powerful resistance and knocked the Reds out of their occupied positions. Soon after these events, independence was declared and a draft Constitution was adopted.

Despite the rosy prospect, the Don Cossacks suffered the same fate as their Kuban neighbors. In many ways, the split occurred due to the fact that they were involved in the political games of the white movement. Although one should not diminish the influence on such developments of the fact that the Don Cossacks refused to fight for the good of Russia. Having significant military power, they wanted to fight exclusively for themselves: for their honor and independence.

The situation was aggravated by the pronounced isolation of the people, which sometimes reached extremes. The Don Cossacks not only considered representatives of other nationalities as strangers, they in every possible way avoided any contact with them. Mixed marriages, close communication and any other everyday issues were prohibited. Cossack communities lived as isolated as possible.

Terek Cossack Army

The most unique among the Cossacks of Russia was, perhaps, the Terek Cossack Army. And the point here is not the fate of its representatives - it was similar for all representatives of the pre-revolutionary Cossacks. Having managed to organize the republic and develop a further plan of action, the Terek Cossacks were able to exist for only about two years, after which they, along with others, were abolished in 1920.

However, this did not prevent the Terek Cossacks from remaining the most colorful representatives of the class, and they invariably stood out due to their appearance and cultural customs. Living in close proximity to the Caucasian highlanders, the Tertsy entered into mixed marriages with them and accepted them into their army. This was reflected in the appearance of the Cossacks: dressed in Caucasian hats and burkas, with daggers at the ready, they did not at all resemble other cavalry troops.

It was the Terek Cossacks who became the first repressed ethnic group, which was forcibly evicted from their native villages. It didn’t even help that most of them fought for central power. Everyone suffered the same fate: to leave their native places alive or die, refusing to give up their homes to the Ingush, Chechens and other representatives of the newly formed North Caucasian republics.

Other Cossack troops

The revolution and the war that followed became a turning point in the lives of several million Russian Cossacks. Regardless of their region of residence and way of life, they had a common national identity and, for the most part, were not in solidarity with the new government. As a result, February 1917 had serious consequences for the Kuban, Don, Terek, Ural, Astrakhan and Orenburg Cossacks.

The abdication of Emperor Nicholas II from the throne brought confusion to the well-established centralized command of troops. The bulk of them were in a suspended and uncertain state for a long time, which did not benefit their awareness of themselves as a single community. The situation was aggravated by capitalist relations, which penetrated deeper and deeper into the Cossack environment, destroying it from the inside.

Today they are of great interest. They allow you to feel the spirit of that era.

The civil war in Siberia had its own characteristics. Siberia's territorial space was several times larger than the territory of European Russia. The peculiarity of the Siberian population was that it did not know serfdom, there were no large landowners' lands that constrained the peasants' possessions, and there was no land question. In Siberia, administrative and economic exploitation of the population was much weaker because the centers of administrative influence spread only along the Siberian railway line. Therefore, such influence almost did not extend to the internal life of the provinces located at a distance from the railway line, and the people only needed order and the opportunity for a quiet existence. Under such patriarchal conditions, revolutionary propaganda could only succeed in Siberia by force, which could not but cause resistance. And it inevitably arose. In June, Cossacks, volunteers and detachments of Czechoslovaks cleared the entire Siberian railway route from Chelyabinsk to Irkutsk of Bolsheviks. After this, an irreconcilable struggle began between the parties, as a result of which the advantage was established in the power structure formed in Omsk, which relied on an armed force of about 40,000, of which half were from the Ural, Siberian and Orenburg Cossacks. Anti-Bolshevik rebel detachments in Siberia fought under a white and green flag, since “according to the resolution of the Emergency Siberian Regional Congress, the colors of the flag of autonomous Siberia were established as white and green - as a symbol of the snows and forests of Siberia.”

Rice. 1 Flag of Siberia

It should be said that during the Russian Troubles of the twentieth century, not only Siberia declared autonomy, there was an endless parade of sovereignties. The same was true for the Cossacks. During the collapse of the Russian Empire and the Civil War, several Cossack state entities were proclaimed:
Kuban People's Republic
All-Great Don Army
Terek Cossack Republic
Ural Cossack Republic
Orenburg Cossack Circle
Siberian-Semirechensk Cossack Republic
Transbaikal Cossack Republic.

Of course, all these centrifugal chimeras arose, first of all, from the impotence of the central government, which happened again in the early 90s. In addition to the national-geographical divide, the Bolsheviks managed to organize an internal split: the previously united Cossacks were divided into “red” and “white”. Some of the Cossacks, primarily young people and front-line soldiers, were deceived by the promises and promises of the Bolsheviks, and left to fight for the Soviets.

Rice. 2 Red Cossacks

In the Southern Urals, the Red Guards, under the leadership of the Bolshevik worker V.K. Blucher, and the Red Orenburg Cossacks of the brothers Nikolai and Ivan Kashirin fought surrounded and retreated in battle from Vekhneuralsk to Beloretsk, and from there, repelling the attacks of the White Cossacks, they began a great campaign along the Ural Mountains near Kungur, to join the 3rd Red Army. Having fought along the rear of the whites for more than 1000 kilometers, the red fighters and Cossacks in the Askino area united with the red units. From them, the 30th Infantry Division was formed, the commander of which was appointed Blucher, and the former Cossack squadrons Kashirins were appointed deputy and brigade commander. All three receive the newly established Order of the Red Banner, with Blucher receiving it at No. 1. During this period, about 12 thousand Orenburg Cossacks fought on the side of Ataman Dutov, and up to 4 thousand Cossacks fought for Soviet power. The Bolsheviks created Cossack regiments, often on the basis of old regiments of the tsarist army. So, on the Don, the majority of the Cossacks of the 1st, 15th and 32nd Don Regiments went to the Red Army. In battles, the Red Cossacks emerged as the best fighting units of the Bolsheviks. In June, the Don Red partisans were consolidated into the 1st Socialist Cavalry Regiment (about 1000 sabers) led by Dumenko and his deputy Budyonny. In August, this regiment, replenished with cavalry from the Martyno-Orlovsky detachment, turned into the 1st Don Soviet Cavalry Brigade, led by the same commanders. Dumenko and Budyonny were the initiators of the creation of large cavalry formations in the Red Army. Since the summer of 1918, they persistently convinced the Soviet leadership of the need to create mounted divisions and corps. Their views were shared by K.E. Voroshilov, I.V. Stalin, A.I. Egorov and other leaders of the 10th Army. By order of the commander of the 10th Army K.E. Voroshilov No. 62 of November 28, 1918, Dumenko’s cavalry brigade was reorganized into the Consolidated Cavalry Division. The commander of the 32nd Cossack regiment, military foreman Mironov, also unconditionally sided with the new government. The Cossacks elected him military commissar of the Ust-Medveditsky district revolutionary committee. In the spring of 1918, to fight the Whites, Mironov organized several Cossack partisan detachments, which were then united into the 23rd Division of the Red Army. Mironov was appointed division commander. In September 1918 - February 1919, he successfully and famously crushed the white cavalry near Tambov and Voronezh, for which he was awarded the highest award of the Soviet Republic - the Order of the Red Banner No. 3. However, most of the Cossacks fought for the whites. The Bolshevik leadership saw that it was the Cossacks who made up the majority of the manpower of the white armies. This was especially typical for the south of Russia, where two-thirds of all Russian Cossacks were concentrated in the Don and Kuban. The civil war in the Cossack regions was fought with the most brutal methods; the extermination of prisoners and hostages was often practiced.

Rice. 3 Execution of captured Cossacks and hostages

Due to the small number of Red Cossacks, it seemed that all Cossacks were fighting with the rest of the non-Cossack population. By the end of 1918, it became obvious that in almost every army, approximately 80% of the combat-ready Cossacks were fighting the Bolsheviks and about 20% were fighting on the side of the Reds. On the fields of the civil war that broke out, Shkuro’s white Cossacks fought with Budyonny’s red Cossacks, Mironov’s red Cossacks fought with Mamantov’s white Cossacks, Dutov’s white Cossacks fought with Kashirin’s red Cossacks, and so on... A bloody whirlwind swept over the Cossack lands. The grief-stricken Cossack women said: “Divided into whites and reds and let’s chop each other down to the delight of the Jewish commissars.” This was only to the advantage of the Bolsheviks and the forces behind them. Such is the great Cossack tragedy. And she had her reasons. When the 3rd Extraordinary Circle of the Orenburg Cossack Army took place in Orenburg in September 1918, where the first results of the fight against the Soviets were summed up, Ataman of the 1st District K.A. Kargin, with brilliant simplicity and very accurately described the main sources and causes of Bolshevism among the Cossacks. “The Bolsheviks in Russia and in the army were a result of the fact that we have many poor people. And neither disciplinary regulations nor executions will eliminate the discord as long as we have poverty. Eliminate this poverty, give it the opportunity to live like a human being - and all these Bolshevisms and other “isms” will disappear.” However, it was already too late to philosophize and drastic punitive measures were planned at the Circle against supporters of the Bolsheviks, Cossacks, nonresidents and their families. It must be said that they were not much different from the punitive actions of the Reds. The gap among the Cossacks deepened. In addition to the Ural, Orenburg and Siberian Cossacks, Kolchak’s army included the Transbaikal and Ussuri Cossack troops, which found themselves under the patronage and support of the Japanese. Initially, the formation of the armed forces to fight against the Bolsheviks was based on the principle of voluntariness, but in August the mobilization of youth aged 19-20 was announced, and as a result, Kolchak’s army began to number up to 200,000 people. By August 1918, forces numbering up to 120,000 people were deployed on the Western Front of Siberia alone. Units of the troops were distributed into three armies: the Siberian under the command of Gaida, who broke with the Czechs and was promoted to general by Admiral Kolchak, the Western under the command of the glorious Cossack general Khanzhin and the Southern under the command of the ataman of the Orenburg army, General Dutov. The Ural Cossacks, having driven back the Reds, fought from Astrakhan to Novonikolaevsk, occupying a front stretching 500-600 versts. Against these troops, the Reds had from 80 to 100,000 people on the Eastern Front. However, having strengthened the troops by forced mobilization, the Reds went on the offensive and occupied Kazan on September 9, Simbirsk on the 12th, and Samara on October 10. By the Christmas holidays, Ufa was taken by the Reds, the Siberian armies began to retreat to the east and occupy the passes of the Ural Mountains, where the armies were supposed to be replenished, put themselves in order and prepare for the spring offensive. At the end of 1918, Dutov's Southern Army, formed mainly from Cossacks of the Orenburg Cossack Army, also suffered heavy losses, and left Orenburg in January 1919.

In the south, in the summer of 1918, 25 ages were mobilized into the Don Army and there were 27,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry, 175 guns, 610 machine guns, 20 aircraft, 4 armored trains in service, not counting the young standing army. By August the reorganization of the army was completed. The foot regiments had 2-3 battalions, 1000 bayonets and 8 machine guns in each battalion, the horse regiments were six hundred strong with 8 machine guns. The regiments were organized into brigades and divisions, divisions into corps, which were placed on 3 fronts: northern against Voronezh, eastern against Tsaritsyn and southeastern near the village of Velikoknyazheskaya. The special beauty and pride of the Don was the standing army of Cossacks of 19-20 years of age. It consisted of: 1st Don Cossack Division - 5 thousand swords, 1st Plastun Brigade - 8 thousand bayonets, 1st Rifle Brigade - 8 thousand bayonets, 1st Engineer Battalion - 1 thousand bayonets, technical troops - armored trains , airplanes, armored squads, etc. In total, up to 30 thousand excellent fighters. A river flotilla of 8 ships was created. After bloody battles on July 27, the Don units went beyond the army in the north and occupied the city of Boguchar, Voronezh province. The Don Army was free from the Red Guard, but the Cossacks categorically refused to go further. With great difficulty, the ataman managed to carry out the Circle’s resolution on crossing the borders of the Don Army, which was expressed in the order. But it was a dead letter. The Cossacks said: “We will go if the Russians also go.” But the Russian Volunteer Army was firmly stuck in the Kuban and could not go north. Denikin refused the ataman. He declared that he must remain in the Kuban until he liberated the entire North Caucasus from the Bolsheviks.

Rice. 4 Cossack regions of southern Russia

Under these conditions, the ataman looked carefully at Ukraine. As long as there was order in Ukraine, as long as there was friendship and alliance with the hetman, he was calm. The western border did not require a single soldier from the chieftain. There was a proper trade exchange with Ukraine. But there was no firm confidence that the hetman would survive. The hetman did not have an army; the Germans prevented him from creating one. There was a good division of Sich riflemen, several officer battalions, and a very smart hussar regiment. But these were ceremonial troops. There were a bunch of generals and officers who were appointed commanders of corps, divisions and regiments. They put on the original Ukrainian zhupans, issued the forelocks, hung crooked sabers, occupied the barracks, issued regulations with covers in Ukrainian and content in Russian, but there were no soldiers in the army. All order was ensured by German garrisons. Their menacing “Halt” silenced all the political mongrels. However, the hetman understood that it was impossible to rely on German troops forever and sought a defensive alliance with the Don, Kuban, Crimea and the peoples of the Caucasus against the Bolsheviks. The Germans supported him in this. On October 20, the hetman and the ataman held negotiations at the Skorokhodovo station and sent a letter to the command of the Volunteer Army, outlining their proposals. But the outstretched hand was rejected. So, the goals of Ukraine, the Don and the Volunteer Army had significant differences. The leaders of Ukraine and the Don considered the main goal to be the fight against the Bolsheviks, and the determination of the structure of Russia was postponed until victory. Denikin adhered to a completely different point of view. He believed that he was on the same path only with those who denied any autonomy and unconditionally shared the idea of ​​a united and indivisible Russia. In the conditions of the Russian Troubles, this was his enormous epistemological, ideological, organizational and political mistake, which determined the sad fate of the white movement.

The chieftain was faced with the fact of harsh reality. The Cossacks refused to go beyond the Donskoy army. And they were right. Voronezh, Saratov and other peasants not only did not fight the Bolsheviks, but also went against the Cossacks. The Cossacks, not without difficulty, were able to cope with their Don workers, peasants and non-residents, but they could not defeat all of central Russia and they understood this perfectly well. The ataman had the only means to force the Cossacks to march on Moscow. It was necessary to give them a break from the privations of combat and then force them to join the Russian people's army advancing on Moscow. He asked for volunteers twice and was refused twice. Then he began to create a new Russian southern army with funds from Ukraine and the Don. But Denikin prevented this matter in every possible way, calling it a German idea. However, the ataman needed this army due to the extreme fatigue of the Don army and the decisive refusal of the Cossacks to march to Russia. In Ukraine there were personnel for this army. After the aggravation of relations between the Volunteer Army and the Germans and Skoropadsky, the Germans began to prevent the movement of volunteers to the Kuban and quite a lot of people accumulated in Ukraine who were ready to fight the Bolsheviks, but did not have such an opportunity. From the very beginning, the Kiev union “Our Motherland” became the main supplier of personnel for the southern army. The monarchical orientation of this organization sharply narrowed the social base of the army, since monarchical ideas were very unpopular among the people. Thanks to socialist propaganda, the word tsar was still a bugbear for many people. With the name of the tsar, the peasants inextricably linked the idea of ​​​​the harsh collection of taxes, the sale of the last little cow for debts to the state, the dominance of landowners and capitalists, gold-chasing officers and the officer’s stick. In addition, they were afraid of the return of the landowners and punishment for the ruin of their estates. Ordinary Cossacks did not want restoration, because the concept of monarchy was associated with universal, long-term, forced military service, the obligation to equip themselves at their own expense and maintain combat horses that were not needed on the farm. Cossack officers associated tsarism with ideas about ruinous “benefits.” The Cossacks liked their new independent system, they were pleased that they themselves were discussing issues of power, land and mineral resources. The king and the monarchy were opposed to the concept of freedom. It is difficult to say what the intelligentsia wanted and what it feared, because it itself never knows. She is like that Baba Yaga who is “always against.” In addition, General Ivanov, also a monarchist, a very distinguished man, but already sick and elderly, took command of the southern army. As a result, little came of this venture.

And the Soviet government, suffering defeats everywhere, began in July 1918 to properly organize the Red Army. With the help of officers brought into it, scattered Soviet detachments were brought together into military formations. Military specialists were placed in command posts in regiments, brigades, divisions and corps. The Bolsheviks managed to create a split not only among the Cossacks, but also among the officers. It was divided into approximately three equal parts: for the whites, for the reds, and for no one. Here is another great tragedy.

Rice. 5 Mother's tragedy. One son is for the whites, and the other for the reds

The Don Army had to fight against a militarily organized enemy. By August, more than 70,000 soldiers, 230 guns and 450 machine guns were concentrated against the Don Army. The enemy's numerical superiority in forces created a difficult situation for the Don. This situation was aggravated by political turmoil. On August 15, after the liberation of the entire territory of the Don from the Bolsheviks, a Great Military Circle was convened in Novocherkassk from the entire population of the Don. This was no longer the former “gray” Circle of Don’s salvation. The intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia, public teachers, lawyers, clerks, clerks, and solicitors entered it, managed to capture the minds of the Cossacks, and the Circle was divided into districts, villages, and parties. At the Circle, from the very first meetings, opposition to Ataman Krasnov opened up, which had roots in the Volunteer Army. Ataman was accused of his friendly relations with the Germans, his desire for firm independent power and independence. And indeed, the ataman contrasted Cossack chauvinism with Bolshevism, Cossack nationalism with internationalism, and Don independence with Russian imperialism. Very few people then understood the significance of Don separatism as a transitional phenomenon. Denikin did not understand this either. Everything on the Don irritated him: the anthem, the flag, the coat of arms, the ataman, the Circle, discipline, satiety, order, Don patriotism. He considered all this a manifestation of separatism and fought against the Don and Kuban with all methods. As a result, he chopped off the branch on which he was sitting. As soon as the civil war ceased to be national and popular, it became a class war and could not be successful for the whites due to the large number of the poorer class. First the peasants, and then the Cossacks, fell away from the Volunteer Army and the white movement and it died. They talk about the Cossacks betraying Denikin, but this is not true, quite the opposite. If Denikin had not betrayed the Cossacks, if he had not cruelly offended their young national feeling, they would not have left him. In addition, the decision made by the ataman and the Military Circle to continue the war outside the Don intensified anti-war propaganda on the part of the Reds, and ideas began to spread among the Cossack units that the ataman and the government were pushing the Cossacks to conquests that were alien to them outside the Don, the possession of which the Bolsheviks were not encroaching on. . The Cossacks wanted to believe that the Bolsheviks really would not touch the Don territory and that it was possible to come to an agreement with them. The Cossacks reasoned reasonably: “We have liberated our lands from the Reds, let Russian soldiers and peasants lead the further struggle against them, and we can only help them.” In addition, for summer field work on the Don, workers were required, and because of this, the older ages had to be released and sent home, which greatly affected the size and combat effectiveness of the army. The bearded Cossacks firmly united and disciplined hundreds with their authority. But despite the machinations of the opposition, folk wisdom and national egoism prevailed on the Circle over the cunning attacks of political parties. The chieftain's policy was approved, and he himself was re-elected on September 12. Ataman firmly understood that Russia itself must be saved. He did not trust the Germans, much less the Allies. He knew that foreigners go to Russia not for Russia, but to snatch as much as possible from it. He also understood that Germany and France, for opposite reasons, needed a strong and powerful Russia, and England a weak, fragmented, federal one. He believed in Germany and France, he did not believe in England at all.

By the end of summer, the fighting on the border of the Don region centered around Tsaritsyn, which was also not part of the Don region. The defense there was led by the future Soviet leader I.V. Stalin, whose organizational abilities are now doubted only by the most ignorant and stubborn. Lulling the Cossacks to sleep with propaganda about the futility of their struggle outside the borders of the Don, the Bolsheviks concentrated large forces on this front. However, the first Red offensive was repulsed, and they retreated to Kamyshin and the lower Volga. While the Volunteer Army fought during the summer to clear the Kuban region from the army of paramedic Sorokin, the Don Army ensured its activities on all fronts against the Reds from Tsaritsyn to Taganrog. During the summer of 1918, the Don Army suffered heavy losses, up to 40% of the Cossacks and up to 70% of the officers. The quantitative superiority of the Reds and the vast front space did not allow the Cossack regiments to leave the front and go to the rear to rest. The Cossacks were in constant combat tension. Not only the people were tired, but the horse train was also exhausted. Difficult conditions and lack of proper hygiene began to cause infectious diseases, and typhus appeared among the troops. In addition, units of the Reds under the command of Zhloba, defeated in battles north of Stavropol, went towards Tsaritsyn. The appearance from the Caucasus of Sorokin's army, which had not been killed by volunteers, posed a threat from the flank and rear of the Don Army, which was waging a stubborn struggle against the garrison of 50,000 people occupying Tsaritsyn. With the onset of cold weather and general fatigue, the Don units began to retreat from Tsaritsyn.

But how were things in Kuban? The lack of weapons and fighters of the Volunteer Army was made up for with enthusiasm and daring. Across the open field, under hurricane fire, officer companies, striking the imagination of the enemy, moved in orderly chains and drove the Red troops ten times larger in number.

Rice. 6 Attack of the officer company

Successful battles, accompanied by the capture of a large number of prisoners, raised the spirits in the Kuban villages, and the Cossacks began to take up arms en masse. The Volunteer Army, which suffered heavy losses, was replenished with a large number of Kuban Cossacks, volunteers arriving from all over Russia and people from the partial mobilization of the population. The need for unified command of all forces fighting against the Bolsheviks was recognized by the entire command staff. In addition, it was necessary for the leaders of the White movement to take into account the all-Russian situation that had developed in the revolutionary process. Unfortunately, none of the leaders of the Good Army, who claimed the role of leaders on an all-Russian scale, possessed flexibility and dialectical philosophy. The dialectic of the Bolsheviks, who, in order to retain power, gave the Germans more than a third of the territory and population of European Russia, of course, could not serve as an example, but Denikin’s claims to the role of an immaculate and unyielding guardian of “one and indivisible Russia” in the conditions of the Troubles could only be ridiculous. In the conditions of a multifactorial and merciless struggle of “everyone against everyone,” he did not have the necessary flexibility and dialectics. Ataman Krasnov’s refusal to subordinate the administration of the Don region to Denikin was understood by him not only as the ataman’s personal vanity, but also as the independence of the Cossacks hidden in this. All parts of the Russian Empire that sought to restore order on their own were considered by Denikin to be enemies of the white movement. The local authorities of Kuban also did not recognize Denikin, and punitive detachments began to be sent against them from the first days of the struggle. Military efforts were scattered, significant forces were diverted from the main goal. The main sections of the population, objectively supporting the whites, not only did not join the struggle, but became his opponents. The front required a large number of male population, but it was also necessary to take into account the demands of internal work, and often the Cossacks who were at the front were released from units for certain periods of time. The Kuban government exempted some ages from mobilization, and General Denikin saw in this “dangerous preconditions and a manifestation of sovereignty.” The army was fed by the Kuban population. The Kuban government paid all the costs of supplying the Volunteer Army, which could not complain about the food supply. At the same time, according to the laws of war, the Volunteer Army appropriated to itself the right to all property seized from the Bolsheviks, cargo going to Red units, the right to requisition, and more. Other means of replenishing the treasury of the Good Army were indemnities imposed on villages that showed hostile actions towards it. To account for and distribute this property, General Denikin organized a commission of public figures from the military-industrial committee. The activities of this commission proceeded in such a way that a significant part of the cargo was spoiled, some was stolen, and there was abuse among the members of the commission that the commission was composed of mostly unprepared, useless, even harmful and ignorant people. The immutable law of any army is that everything beautiful, brave, heroic, noble goes to the front, and everything cowardly, shying away from battle, everything thirsting not for heroism and glory, but for profit and outward splendor, all speculators gather in the rear. People who have never seen a hundred-ruble ticket before are handling millions of rubles, they are dizzy from this money, they sell “loot” here, they have their heroes here. The front is ragged, barefoot, naked and hungry, and here people are sitting in cleverly sewn Circassian caps, colored caps, jackets and riding breeches. Here they drink wine, jingle gold and politick.

There are infirmaries with doctors, nurses and nurses. There is love and jealousy here. This was the case in all armies, and this was also the case in the white armies. Along with ideological people, selfish people joined the white movement. These selfish people settled firmly in the rear and flooded Ekaterinodar, Rostov and Novocherkassk. Their behavior hurt the sight and hearing of the army and the population. In addition, it was not clear to General Denikin why the Kuban government, liberating the region, replaced the rulers with the same people who were under the Bolsheviks, renaming them from commissars to atamans. He did not understand that the business qualities of each Cossack were determined in the conditions of Cossack democracy by the Cossacks themselves. However, not being able to restore order himself in the regions liberated from Bolshevik rule, General Denikin remained irreconcilable with the local Cossack order and with local national organizations that lived by their own customs in pre-revolutionary times. They were classified as hostile “independents,” and punitive measures were taken against them. All these reasons could not help attract the population to the side of the white army. At the same time, General Denikin, both during the Civil War and in emigration, thought a lot, but to no avail, about the completely inexplicable (from his point of view) epidemic spread of Bolshevism. Moreover, the Kuban army, territorially and by origin, was divided into an army of Black Sea Cossacks, resettled by order of Empress Catherine II after the destruction of the Dnieper army, and the Lineians, whose population consisted of settlers from the Don region and from the communities of the Volga Cossacks.

These two units, constituting one army, were different in character. Both parts contained their historical past. The Black Sea people were the heirs of the army of the Dnieper Cossacks and Zaporozhye, whose ancestors, due to their many times demonstrated political instability, were destroyed as an army. Moreover, the Russian authorities only completed the destruction of the Dnieper Army, and it was started by Poland, under the rule of whose kings the Dnieper Cossacks were for a long time. This unstable orientation of the Little Russians has brought many tragedies in the past; it is enough to recall the inglorious fate and death of their last talented hetman Mazepa. This violent past and other features of the Little Russian character imposed strong specifics on the behavior of the Kuban people in the civil war. The Kuban Rada split into two currents: Ukrainian and independent. The leaders of the Rada Bych and Ryabovol proposed merging with Ukraine, the independentists stood for the establishment of a federation in which Kuban would be completely independent. Both of them dreamed and sought to free themselves from Denikin’s tutelage. He, in turn, considered them all traitors. The moderate part of the Rada, front-line soldiers and Ataman Filimonov stuck to the volunteers. They wanted to free themselves from the Bolsheviks with the help of volunteers. But Ataman Filimonov had little authority among the Cossacks; they had other heroes: Pokrovsky, Shkuro, Ulagai, Pavlyuchenko. The Kuban people liked them very much, but their behavior was difficult to predict. The behavior of numerous Caucasian nationalities was even more unpredictable, which determined the great specificity of the civil war in the Caucasus. Frankly speaking, with all their zigzags and twists, the Reds used all this specificity much better than Denikin.

Many white hopes were associated with the name of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich Romanov. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich lived all this time in Crimea, without openly participating in political events. He was greatly depressed by the thought that by sending his telegram to the sovereign with a request for abdication, he contributed to the death of the monarchy and the destruction of Russia. The Grand Duke wanted to make amends for this and take part in military work. However, in response to General Alekseev’s lengthy letter, the Grand Duke responded with only one phrase: “Be at peace”... and General Alekseev died on September 25. The high command and the civilian part of the administration of the liberated territories were completely united in the hands of General Denikin.

Heavy continuous fighting exhausted both sides fighting in the Kuban. The Reds also had a struggle among the high command. The commander of the 11th Army, former paramedic Sorokin, was removed, and command passed to the Revolutionary Military Council. Finding no support in the army, Sorokin fled from Pyatigorsk in the direction of Stavropol. On October 17, he was caught, put in prison, where he was killed without any trial. After the murder of Sorkin, as a result of internal squabbles among the Red leaders and from impotent rage at the stubborn resistance of the Cossacks, also wanting to intimidate the population, a demonstrative execution of 106 hostages was carried out in Mineralnye Vody. Among those executed were General Radko-Dmitriev, a Bulgarian in Russian service, and General Ruzsky, who so persistently persuaded the last Russian Emperor to abdicate the throne. After the verdict, General Ruzsky was asked the question: “Do you now recognize the great Russian revolution?” He replied: “I see only one great robbery.” It is worth adding to this that the beginning of the robbery was laid by him at the headquarters of the Northern Front, where violence was carried out against the will of the emperor, who was forced to abdicate the throne. As for the bulk of the former officers located in the North Caucasus, they turned out to be absolutely inert to the events taking place, showing no desire to serve either the whites or the reds, which decided their fate. Almost all of them were destroyed “just in case” by the Reds.

In the Caucasus, the class struggle was heavily implicated in the national question. Among the numerous peoples who inhabited it, Georgia had the greatest political importance, and in an economic sense, Caucasian oil. Politically and territorially, Georgia found itself primarily under pressure from Turkey. Soviet power, but to the Brest-Litovsk Peace, ceded Kars, Ardahan and Batum to Turkey, which Georgia could not recognize. Turkey recognized the independence of Georgia, but presented territorial demands even more severe than the demands of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. Georgia refused to carry them out, the Turks went on the offensive and occupied Kars, heading towards Tiflis. Not recognizing Soviet power, Georgia sought to ensure the country's independence with armed force and began the formation of an army. But Georgia was governed by politicians who took an active part after the revolution as part of the Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. These same individuals now ingloriously tried to build the Georgian army on the same principles that at one time led the Russian army to disintegration. In the spring of 1918, the struggle for Caucasian oil began. The German command removed a cavalry brigade and several battalions from the Bulgarian front and transported them to Batum and Poti, which was leased by Germany for 60 years. However, the Turks were the first to appear in Baku and the fanaticism of Turkish Mohammedanism, the ideas and propaganda of the Reds, the power and money of the British and Germans clashed there. In Transcaucasia, since ancient times there was irreconcilable hostility between Armenians and Azerbaijanis (then they were called Turk-Tatars). After the Soviets established power, centuries-old hostilities were intensified by religion and politics. Two camps were created: the Soviet-Armenian proletariat and the Turkish-Tatars. Back in March 1918, one of the Soviet-Armenian regiments, returning from Persia, seized power in Baku and massacred entire neighborhoods of the Turk-Tatars, killing up to 10,000 people. For several months, power in the city remained in the hands of the Red Armenians. At the beginning of September, a Turkish corps under the command of Mursal Pasha arrived in Baku, dispersed the Baku commune and occupied the city. With the arrival of the Turks, the massacre of the Armenian population began. The Muslims were triumphant.

Germany, after the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, strengthened itself on the shores of the Azov and Black Seas, to the ports of which part of their fleet was introduced. In the coastal cities of the Black Sea, German sailors, who sympathetically followed the unequal struggle of the Good Army with the Bolsheviks, offered their help to the army headquarters, which was contemptuously rejected by Denikin. Georgia, separated from Russia by a mountain range, had a connection with the northern part of the Caucasus through a narrow strip of coast that made up the Black Sea province. Having annexed the Sukhumi district to its territory, Georgia deployed an armed detachment under the command of General Mazniev to Tuapse by September. This was a fatal decision when the yeast of the national interests of the newly emerged states with all their severity and intractability was poured into the Civil War. The Georgians sent a detachment of 3,000 people with 18 guns against the Volunteer Army towards Tuapse. On the coast, the Georgians began to build fortifications with a front to the north, and a small German landing force landed in Sochi and Adler. General Denikin began to reproach the representatives of Georgia for the difficult and humiliating situation of the Russian population on the territory of Georgia, the theft of Russian state property, the invasion and occupation by the Georgians, together with the Germans, of the Black Sea province. To which Georgia replied: “The volunteer army is a private organization... Under the current situation, the Sochi district should become part of Georgia...”. In this dispute between the leaders of the Dobrarmia and Georgia, the government of Kuban was entirely on the side of Georgia. The Kuban people had friendly relations with Georgia. It soon became clear that the Sochi district was occupied by Georgia with the consent of Kuban and that there were no misunderstandings between Kuban and Georgia.

Such turbulent events that developed in Transcaucasia did not leave any room there for the problems of the Russian Empire and its last stronghold, the Volunteer Army. Therefore, General Denikin finally turned his gaze to the East, where the government of Admiral Kolchak was formed. An embassy was sent to him, and then Denikin recognized Admiral Kolchak as the Supreme Ruler of national Russia.

Meanwhile, the defense of the Don continued on the front from Tsaritsyn to Taganrog. All summer and autumn, the Don Army, without any outside help, fought heavy and constant battles on the main directions from Voronezh and Tsaritsyn. Instead of the Red Guard gangs, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA), which had just been created through the efforts of military experts, was already fighting against the people's Don Army. By the end of 1918, the Red Army already had 299 regular regiments, including 97 regiments on the eastern front against Kolchak, 38 regiments on the northern front against the Finns and Germans, 65 regiments on the western front against the Polish-Lithuanian troops, 99 regiments on the southern front, of which there were 44 regiments on the Don front, 5 regiments on the Astrakhan front, 28 regiments on the Kursk-Bryansk front, and 22 regiments against Denikin and Kuban. The army was commanded by the Revolutionary Military Council, headed by Bronstein (Trotsky), and the Defense Council, headed by Ulyanov (Lenin), stood at the head of all military efforts of the country. The headquarters of the Southern Front in Kozlov received in October the task of wiping out the Don Cossacks from the face of the earth and occupying Rostov and Novocherkassk at all costs. The front was commanded by General Sytin. The front consisted of Sorokin's 11th Army, headquarters in Nevinnomyssk, operating against volunteers and Kuban, Antonov's 12th Army, headquarters in Astrakhan, Voroshilov's 10th Army, headquarters in Tsaritsyn, General Egorov's 9th Army, headquarters in Balashov, 8th Army of General Chernavin, headquarters in Voronezh. Sorokin, Antonov and Voroshilov were remnants of the previous electoral system, and Sorokin’s fate had already been decided, a replacement was being sought for Voroshilov, and all the other commanders were former staff officers and generals of the imperial army. Thus, the situation on the Don front was developing in a very formidable manner. The ataman and the army commanders, Generals Denisov and Ivanov, were aware that the times when one Cossack was enough for ten Red Guards were over and understood that the period of “handicraft” operations was over. The Don army was preparing to fight back. The offensive was stopped, the troops retreated from the Voronezh province and consolidated on a fortified strip along the border of the Don Army. Relying on the left flank on Ukraine, occupied by the Germans, and on the right on the inaccessible Trans-Volga region, the ataman hoped to hold the defense until spring, during which time he had strengthened and strengthened his army. But man proposes, but God disposes.

In November, extremely unfavorable events of a general political nature occurred for Don. The Allies defeated the Central Powers, Kaiser Wilhelm abdicated the throne, and a revolution and disintegration of the army began in Germany. German troops began to leave Russia. German soldiers did not obey their commanders; they were already ruled by their Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies. Just recently, stern German soldiers stopped crowds of workers and soldiers in Ukraine with the formidable “Halt,” but now they obediently allowed themselves to be disarmed by Ukrainian peasants. And then Ostap suffered. Ukraine began to boil, seethed with uprisings, each volost had its own “fathers” and the civil war rolled wildly across the country. Hetmanism, Gaidama, Petliurism, Makhnovism... All this was heavily implicated in Ukrainian nationalism and separatism. Many works have been written about this period and dozens of films have been made, including incredibly popular ones. If you remember “Wedding in Malinovka” or “Little Red Devils”, you can vividly imagine... the future of Ukraine.

And then Petlyura, uniting with Vinnichenko, raised a revolt of the Sich Riflemen. There was no one to suppress the rebellion. The hetman did not have his own army. The German Council of Deputies concluded a truce with Petliura, who drove up the trains and German soldiers loaded into them, abandoning their positions and weapons, and set off for their homeland. Under these conditions, the French command on the Black Sea promised the hetman 3-4 divisions. But in Versailles, on the Thames and the Potomac they looked at it completely differently. Big politicians saw a united Russia as a threat to Persia, India, the Middle and Far East. They wanted to see Russia destroyed, fragmented and burning over a slow fire. In Soviet Russia they followed the events with fear and trembling. Objectively, the victory of the Allies was the defeat of Bolshevism. Both the commissars and the Red Army soldiers understood this. Just as the Don people said that they could not fight against all of Russia, so the Red Army soldiers understood that they could not fight against the whole world. But there was no need to fight. Versailles did not want to save Russia, did not want to share the fruits of victory with it, so they postponed assistance. There was another reason. Although the British and French said that Bolshevism is a disease of defeated armies, but they are the victors and their armies are not touched by this terrible disease. But that was not the case. Their soldiers no longer wanted to fight with anyone, their armies were already corroded by the same terrible gangrene of war fatigue as the others. And when the Allies did not come to Ukraine, the Bolsheviks began to hope for victory. Hastily formed squads of officers and cadets were left to defend Ukraine and the hetman. The Hetman's troops were defeated, the Ukrainian Council of Ministers surrendered Kyiv to the Petliurists, bargaining for themselves and the officer squads the right to evacuation to the Don and Kuban. The hetman escaped.

Petlyura’s return to power was colorfully described in the novel “Days of the Turbins” by Mikhail Bulgakov: chaos, murder, violence against Russian officers and simply against Russians in Kyiv. And then the stubborn struggle against Russia, not only against the red one, but also against the white one. The Petliurites carried out terrible terror, massacres and genocide of Russians in the occupied territories. The Soviet command, having learned about this, moved Antonov’s army to Ukraine, which easily defeated the Petliura gangs and occupied Kharkov, and then Kyiv. Petlyura fled to Kamenets-Podolsk. In Ukraine, after the Germans left, huge reserves of military equipment remained, which went to the Reds. This gave them the opportunity to form the Ninth Army from the Ukrainian side and send it against the Don from the west. With the departure of German units from the borders of the Don and Ukraine, the situation of the Don became complicated in two respects: the army was deprived of replenishment with weapons and military supplies, and a new, western front stretching 600 miles was added. Ample opportunities opened up for the command of the Red Army to take advantage of the prevailing conditions, and they decided to first defeat the Don Army and then destroy the Kuban and Volunteer armies. All the attention of the ataman of the Don army was now turned to the western borders. But there was faith that the allies would come and help out. The intelligentsia was lovingly, enthusiastically disposed towards the allies and was looking forward to them. Thanks to the wide spread of Anglo-French education and literature, the British and French, despite the remoteness of these countries, were closer to the Russian educated heart than the Germans. And even more so the Russians, because this social layer is traditionally and firmly convinced that in our Fatherland there cannot be prophets by definition. The common people, including the Cossacks, had other priorities in this regard. The Germans enjoyed sympathy and were liked by ordinary Cossacks as a serious and hardworking people; ordinary people looked at the Frenchman as a frivolous creature with some contempt, and at the Englishman with great distrust. The Russian people were firmly convinced that during the period of Russian successes, “the Englishwoman always does shit.” It soon became clear that the Cossacks’ faith in their allies turned out to be an illusion and a chimera.

Denikin had an ambivalent attitude towards Don. While Germany was doing well, and supplies were coming to the Good Army from Ukraine through the Don, Denikin’s attitude towards Ataman Krasnov was cold, but restrained. But as soon as news of the Allied victory became known, everything changed. General Denikin began to take revenge on the ataman for his independence and show that everything was now in his hands. On November 13, in Yekaterinodar, Denikin convened a meeting of representatives of the Good Army, Don and Kuban, at which he demanded that 3 main issues be resolved. About unified power (dictatorship of General Denikin), unified command and unified representation before the allies. The meeting did not come to an agreement, and relations worsened even more, and with the arrival of the allies, a cruel intrigue began against the ataman and the Donskoy army. Ataman Krasnov has long been presented by Denikin’s agents among the Allies as a figure of “German orientation.” All the chieftain's attempts to change this characteristic were unsuccessful. In addition, when meeting foreigners, Krasnov always ordered the old Russian anthem to be played. At the same time, he said: “I have two possibilities. Either play “God Save the Tsar” in such cases, without attaching importance to the words, or a funeral march. I deeply believe in Russia, that’s why I can’t play a funeral march. I'm playing the Russian anthem." For this, Ataman was also considered a monarchist abroad. As a result, Don received no help from the allies. But the ataman had no time to fend off intrigues. The military situation changed dramatically, and the Donskoy army was threatened with death. Attaching particular importance to the territory of the Don, by November the Soviet government concentrated four armies of 125,000 soldiers with 468 guns and 1,337 machine guns against the Don Army. The rear of the Red armies were reliably covered by railway lines, which ensured the transfer of troops and maneuvering, and the Red units increased in number. The winter turned out to be early and cold. With the onset of cold weather, diseases developed and typhus began. The 60 thousand-strong Don Army began to melt and freeze numerically, and there was nowhere to take reinforcements. The manpower resources on the Don were completely exhausted, the Cossacks were mobilized from 18 to 52 years old, and even older ones acted as volunteers. It was clear that with the defeat of the Don Army, the Volunteer Army would also cease to exist. But the Don Cossacks held the front, which allowed General Denikin, taking advantage of the difficult situation on the Don, to conduct a behind-the-scenes struggle against Ataman Krasnov through members of the Military Circle. At the same time, the Bolsheviks resorted to their tried and tested method - the most tempting promises, behind which there was nothing but unheard of treachery. But these promises sounded very attractive and humane. The Bolsheviks promised the Cossacks peace and complete inviolability of the borders of the Don Army if the latter laid down their arms and went home.

They pointed out that the Allies would not help them; on the contrary, they were helping the Bolsheviks. The fight against enemy forces 2-3 times superior depressed the morale of the Cossacks, and the Reds’ promise to establish peaceful relations in some parts began to find supporters. Individual units began to leave the front, exposing it, and finally, the regiments of the Upper Don District decided to enter into negotiations with the Reds and stopped resistance. The truce was concluded on the basis of self-determination and friendship of peoples. Many Cossacks went home. Through gaps in the front, the Reds penetrated into the deep rear of the defending units and, without any pressure, the Cossacks of the Khopyorsky district rolled back. The Don Army, leaving the northern districts, retreated to the line of the Seversky Donets, surrendering village after village to the red Mironov Cossacks. The ataman did not have a single free Cossack; everything was sent to defend the western front. A threat arose over Novocherkassk. Only volunteers or allies could save the situation.

By the time the front of the Don Army collapsed, the regions of Kuban and the North Caucasus had already been liberated from the Reds. By November 1918, the armed forces in Kuban consisted of 35 thousand Kuban residents and 7 thousand volunteers. These forces were free, but General Denikin was in no hurry to provide assistance to the exhausted Don Cossacks. The situation and the allies required unified command. But not only the Cossacks, but also the Cossack officers and generals did not want to obey the tsarist generals. This conflict had to be resolved somehow. Under pressure from the allies, General Denikin invited the ataman and the Don government to gather for a meeting in order to clarify the relationship between the Don and the command of the Don Army. On December 26, 1918, Don commanders Denisov, Polyakov, Smagin, Ponomarev on the one hand and generals Denikin, Dragomirov, Romanovsky and Shcherbachev on the other gathered for a meeting in Torgovaya. The meeting was opened by a speech by General Denikin. Beginning by outlining the broad prospects of the fight against the Bolsheviks, he urged those present to forget personal grievances and insults. The issue of unified command for the entire command staff was a vital necessity, and it was clear to everyone that all armed forces, incomparably smaller in comparison with enemy units, must be united under one common leadership and directed towards one goal: the destruction of the center of Bolshevism and the occupation of Moscow. The negotiations were very difficult and constantly reached a dead end. There were too many differences between the command of the Volunteer Army and the Cossacks, in the field of politics, in tactics and in strategy. But still, with great difficulty and great concessions, Denikin managed to subjugate the Don Army.

During these difficult days, the chieftain accepted the Allied military mission led by General Pul. They inspected the troops in positions and in reserve, factories, workshops, and stud farms. The more Pul saw, the more he realized that immediate help was needed. But in London there was a completely different opinion. After his report, Poole was removed from leadership of the mission in the Caucasus and replaced by General Briggs, who did nothing without command from London. But there were no orders to help the Cossacks. England needed a Russia weakened, exhausted and plunged into permanent turmoil. The French mission, instead of helping, presented the ataman and the Don government with an ultimatum, in which it demanded the complete subordination of the ataman and the Don government to the French command on the Black Sea and full compensation for all losses of French citizens (read coal miners) in the Donbass. Under these conditions, persecution against the ataman and the Donskoy army continued in Yekaterinodar. General Denikin maintained contacts and conducted constant negotiations with the Chairman of the Circle, Kharlamov, and other figures from the opposition to the Ataman. However, understanding the seriousness of the situation of the Don Army, Denikin sent Mai-Maevsky’s division to the Mariupol area and 2 more Kuban divisions were echeloned and awaited the order to march. But there was no order; Denikin was waiting for the Circle’s decision regarding Ataman Krasnov.

The Great Military Circle met on February 1st. This was no longer the same circle as it was on August 15 in the days of victories. The faces were the same, but the expression was not the same. Then all the front-line soldiers had shoulder straps, orders and medals. Now all the Cossacks and junior officers were without shoulder straps. The circle, represented by its gray part, democratized and played like the Bolsheviks. On February 2, Krug expressed no confidence in the commander and chief of staff of the Don Army, Generals Denisov and Polyakov. In response, Ataman Krasnov was offended for his comrades-in-arms and resigned from his position as Ataman. The circle did not accept her at first. But behind the scenes, the dominant opinion was that without the resignation of the ataman, there would be no help from the allies and Denikin. After this, the Circle accepted the resignation. In his place, General Bogaevsky was elected ataman. On February 3, General Denikin visited the Circle, where he was greeted with thunderous applause. Now the Volunteer, Don, Kuban, Terek armies and the Black Sea Fleet were united under his command under the name of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia (AFSR).

The truce between the Severodonon Cossacks and the Bolsheviks lasted, but not for long. Just a few days after the truce, the Reds appeared in the villages and began to carry out savage massacres among the Cossacks. They began to take away grain, steal livestock, kill disobedient people and commit violence. In response, an uprising began on February 26, sweeping the villages of Kazanskaya, Migulinskaya, Veshenskaya and Elanskaya. The defeat of Germany, the elimination of Ataman Krasnov, the creation of the AFSR and the uprising of the Cossacks began a new stage in the fight against the Bolsheviks in the south of Russia. But that's a completely different story.

Materials used:
Gordeev A.A. - History of the Cossacks
Mamonov V.F. and others - History of the Cossacks of the Urals. Orenburg-Chelyabinsk 1992
Shibanov N.S. - Orenburg Cossacks of the 20th century
Ryzhkova N.V. - Don Cossacks in the wars of the early twentieth century - 2008
Brusilov A.A. My memories. Voenizdat. M.1983
Krasnov P.N. The Great Don Army. "Patriot" M.1990
Lukomsky A.S. The birth of the Volunteer Army.M.1926
Denikin A.I. How the fight against the Bolsheviks began in the south of Russia. M. 1926

Cossack Don: Five centuries of military glory Author unknown

Don Cossacks in the Civil War

On April 9, 1918, the Congress of Soviets of Workers, Peasants, Soldiers and Cossack Deputies of the Don Republic met in Rostov, which elected the highest bodies of local government - the Central Executive Committee, chaired by V.S. Kovalev and the Don Council of People's Commissars, chaired by F.G. Podtelkova.

Podtelkov Fedor Grigorievich (1886–1918), Cossack of the village of Ust-Khoperskaya. An active participant in the establishment of Soviet power on the Don at the initial stage of the Civil War. In January 1918 F.G. Podtelkov was elected chairman of the Don Cossack Military Revolutionary Committee, and in April of the same year at the First Congress of Soviets of the Don Region - chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Don Soviet Republic. In May 1918, the detachment of F.G. Podtelkov, who carried out the forced mobilization of the Cossacks of the northern districts of the Don region into the Red Army, was surrounded and captured by the Cossacks who rebelled against Soviet power. F.G. Podtelkov was sentenced to death and hanged.

Both Kovalev and Podtelkov were Cossacks. The Bolsheviks specifically nominated them to show that they were not opposed to the Cossacks. However, real power in Rostov was in the hands of local Bolsheviks, who relied on Red Guard detachments of workers, miners, nonresidents and peasants.

Wholesale searches and requisitions took place in the cities, officers, cadets and all others who were suspected of having connections with the partisans were shot. As spring approached, peasants began to seize and redistribute landowners' and military reserve lands. In some places spare village lands were captured.

The Cossacks could not stand it. With the beginning of spring, still scattered Cossack uprisings broke out in individual villages. Having learned about them, the Marching Ataman Popov led his “Detachment of Free Don Cossacks” from the Salsky steppes to the north, to the Don, to join the rebels.

While the Marching Ataman led his detachment to unite with the Cossacks of the rebel Suvorov village, the Cossacks rebelled near Novocherkassk. The Krivyanskaya village was the first to rise. Its Cossacks, under the command of military foreman Fetisov, broke into Novocherkassk and drove out the Bolsheviks. In Novocherkassk, the Cossacks created the Provisional Don Government, which included ordinary Cossacks with a rank no higher than a constable. But it was not possible to hold Novocherkassk then. Under the blows of Bolshevik detachments from Rostov, the Cossacks retreated to the village of Zaplavskaya and fortified themselves here, taking advantage of the spring flood of the Don. Here, in Zaplavskaya, they began to accumulate forces and form the Don Army.

Having united with the detachment of the Marching Ataman, the Provisional Don Government transferred P.Kh. Popov received all military power and united military forces. With the next assault on May 6, Novocherkassk was taken, and on May 8, the Cossacks, with the support of Colonel Drozdovsky’s detachment, repelled the Bolshevik counter-offensive and defended the city.

F.G. Podtelkov (standing on the right) (ROMK)

By mid-May 1918, only 10 villages were in the hands of the rebels, but the uprising was rapidly expanding. The government of the Don Soviet Republic fled to the village of Velikoknyazheskaya.

On May 11, in Novocherkassk, the rebel Cossacks opened the Don Rescue Circle. The circle elected a new Don Ataman. Pyotr Nikolaevich Krasnov was elected as such. In the pre-war years, Krasnov established himself as a talented writer and an excellent officer. During the First World War P.N. Krasnov emerged as one of the best cavalry generals in the Russian army, and went through the military path from regiment commander to corps commander.

The region of the Don Army was proclaimed a democratic republic under the name “The Great Don Army.” The highest authority on the Don remained the Great Military Circle, elected by all Cossacks, except those in compulsory military service. Cossack women received voting rights. In land policy, during the liquidation of landownership and private land ownership, land was first allocated to land-poor Cossack societies.

Sample document of the All-Great Don Army

In total, up to 94 thousand Cossacks were mobilized into the ranks of the troops to fight the Bolsheviks. Krasnov was considered the supreme leader of the Don armed forces. The Don Army was directly commanded by General S.V. Denisov.

The Don Army was divided into the “Young Army”, which began to be formed from young Cossacks who had not previously served and had not been at the front, and into the “Mobilized Army” from Cossacks of all other ages. The “Young Army” was supposed to be deployed from 12 cavalry and 4 foot regiments, trained in the Novocherkassk region and kept in reserve as the last reserve for a future campaign against Moscow. The “mobilized army” was formed in the districts. It was assumed that each village would field one regiment. But the villages on the Don were of different sizes, some could field a regiment or even two, others could field only a few hundred. Nevertheless, the total number of regiments in the Don Army was brought to 100 with great effort.

In order to supply such an army with weapons and ammunition, Krasnov was forced to make contact with the Germans who were stationed in the western regions of the region. Krasnov promised them the neutrality of the Don in the ongoing world war, and for this he offered to establish “correct trade.” The Germans received food on the Don, and in return supplied the Cossacks with Russian weapons and ammunition captured in Ukraine.

Feast of the Knights of St. George in the Officers' Assembly of Novocherkassk, late 1918 (NMIDC)

Krasnov himself did not consider the Germans allies. He openly said that the Germans were not allies of the Cossacks, that neither the Germans, nor the British, nor the French would save Russia, but would only ruin it and drench it in blood. Krasnov considered “volunteers” from the Kuban and Terek Cossacks who rebelled against the Bolsheviks as allies.

Krasnov considered the Bolsheviks to be obvious enemies. He said that as long as they are in power in Russia, the Don will not be part of Russia, but will live according to its own laws.

In August 1918, the Cossacks ousted the Bolsheviks from the territory of the region and began to occupy the borders.

The trouble was that the Don was not united in the fight against the Bolsheviks. Approximately 18% of combat-ready Don Cossacks supported the Bolsheviks. The Cossacks of the 1st, 4th, 5th, 15th, and 32nd Don regiments of the old army almost completely went over to their side. In total, the Don Cossacks made up approximately 20 regiments in the ranks of the Red Army. Prominent red military leaders emerged from among the Cossacks - F.K. Mironov, M.F. Blinov, K.F. Bulatkin.

Almost all of the Bolsheviks were supported by nonresident Don people, and Don peasants began to create their own units in the Red Army. It was from them that the famous red cavalry B.M. was created. Dumenko and S.M. Budyonny.

In general, the split on the Don was characterized by class. The overwhelming majority of Cossacks were against the Bolsheviks, and the overwhelming majority of non-Cossacks supported the Bolsheviks.

In November 1918, a revolution occurred in Germany. The First World War is over. The Germans began to return to their homeland. The supply of weapons and ammunition to the Don ceased.

In winter, the Bolsheviks, having mobilized a million-strong Red Army throughout the country, began an offensive to the west in order to break through to Europe and unleash a world revolution there, and to the south to finally suppress the Cossacks and “volunteers” who were preventing them from finally establishing themselves in Russia.

The Cossack regiments began to retreat. Many Cossacks, having passed their village, fell behind the regiment and remained at home. By the end of February, the Don Army rolled back from the north to the Donets and Manych. There were only 15 thousand fighters left in its ranks, and the same number of Cossacks were “hanging out” in the rear of the army. Krasnov, whom many saw as a German ally, resigned.

Confident in the invincibility of the Red Army, the Bolsheviks decided to crush the Cossacks once and for all and transfer the methods of “Red Terror” to the Don.

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Don Cossacks and the Revolution of 1905–1907 Cossack units in the fight against revolutionary uprisings. The tragic events of January 9, 1905 in St. Petersburg became the prologue to the first Russian revolution. The Don Cossacks were practically involved in violent revolutionary cataclysms to one degree or another during the period between the February and October revolutions. The formation of the highest bodies of Cossack government on the Don. Already in March 1917, the Provisional Government, taking into account the prevailing sentiments among the Cossacks, began to consider the issue of

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Cossacks and the October Revolution Don army Cossacks and the Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd. By the time of the Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd in October 1917, the capital’s garrison included the 1st, 4th and 14th Don Cossack regiments with a total number of 3,200

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VI. Don Cossacks in the 1920s–1930s

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Cossacks in emigration Exodus You go, my dear, to a foreign land, Take care of your Cossack honor! Siberian Cossack woman M.V. Volkova (Lithuania - Germany) The defeat of the White movement in the Civil War of 1917–1922 led to a mass exodus of Russian citizens abroad. ...With the downfall of all

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Reasons for the Bolshevik victory in the Civil War Since the population of Russia was predominantly composed of peasants, the position of this particular class determined the winner in the civil battle. Having received the land from the hands of the Soviet government, the peasantry began to redistribute it and little

The revolution of 1917 and the civil war that followed turned out to be turning points in the fate of several million Russians who called themselves Cossacks. This class-separated part of the rural population was peasant by origin, as well as by the nature of work and way of life. Class privileges and better (compared to other groups of farmers) land provision partially compensated for the heavy military service of the Cossacks.
According to the 1897 census, military Cossacks with families numbered 2,928,842 people, or 2.3% of the total population. The bulk of the Cossacks (63.6%) lived on the territory of 15 provinces, where there were 11 Cossack troops - Don, Kuban, Terek, Astrakhan, Ural, Orenburg, Siberian, Transbaikal, Amur and Ussuri. The most numerous were the Don Cossacks (1,026,263 people or about a third of the total number of Cossacks in the country). It accounted for up to 41% of the region's population. Then came Kubanskoye - 787,194 people. (41% of the population of the Kuban region). Transbaikal - 29.1% of the region's population, Orenburg - 22.8%, Terek - 17.9%, the same amount in Amur, Ural - 17.7%. At the turn of the century there was a significant increase in population: from 1894 to 1913. the population of the 4 largest troops increased by 52%.
The troops arose at different times and on different principles - for the Don Army, for example, the process of growing into the Russian state lasted from the 17th to the 19th centuries. The fate of some other Cossack troops was similar. Gradually, the free Cossacks turned into a military-service, feudal class. There was a kind of “nationalization” of the Cossacks. Seven of the eleven troops (in the eastern regions) were created by government decrees and were built as “state” from the very beginning. In principle, the Cossacks were an estate, however, today it is increasingly heard that it is also a subethnic group, characterized by a common historical memory, self-awareness and a sense of solidarity.
The growth of national self-awareness of the Cossacks - the so-called. “Cossack nationalism” was noticeably observed at the beginning of the twentieth century. The state, interested in the Cossacks as a military support, actively supported these sentiments and guaranteed certain privileges. In the conditions of growing land hunger that struck the peasantry, the class isolation of the troops turned out to be a successful means of protecting the lands.
Throughout its history, the Cossacks did not remain unchanged - each era had its own Cossack: at first he was a “free man”, then he was replaced by a “service man”, a warrior in the service of the state. Gradually, this type began to become a thing of the past. Already from the second half of the 19th century, the type of Cossack farmer became predominant, whom only the system and tradition forced to take up arms. At the beginning of the twentieth century, there was an increase in contradictions between the Cossack farmer and the Cossack warrior. It was the latter type that power tried to preserve and sometimes artificially cultivated.
Life changed, and, accordingly, the Cossacks changed. The tendency towards self-liquidation of the military class in its traditional form became more and more pronounced. The spirit of change seemed to be in the air - the first revolution aroused the Cossacks' interest in politics, the issues of spreading the Stolypin reform to Cossack territories, introducing zemstvos there, etc. were discussed at the highest level.
1917 was a landmark and fateful year for the Cossacks. The events of February had serious consequences: the abdication of the emperor, among other things, destroyed the centralized control of the Cossack troops. The bulk of the Cossacks were in an uncertain state for a long time, did not take part in political life - the habit of obedience, the authority of commanders, and a poor understanding of political programs affected them. Meanwhile, politicians had their own vision of the Cossacks’ positions, most likely due to the events of the first Russian revolution, when the Cossacks were involved in police service and suppressing unrest. Confidence in the counter-revolutionary nature of the Cossacks was characteristic of both the left and the right. Meanwhile, capitalist relations penetrated deeper and deeper into the Cossack environment, destroying the class “from within.” But the traditional awareness of oneself as a single community somewhat preserved this process.
However, soon enough, understandable confusion was replaced by independent proactive actions. Elections of atamans are being held for the first time. In mid-April, the Military Circle elected the military chieftain of the Orenburg Cossack army, Major General N.P. Maltsev. In May, the Great Military Circle created the Don Military Government headed by Generals A.M. Kaledin and M.P. Bogaevsky. The Ural Cossacks generally refused to elect an ataman, motivating their refusal by the desire to have not individual, but popular power.
In March 1917, on the initiative of member of the IV State Duma I.N. Efremov and deputy military chieftain M.P. Bogaevsky, a general Cossack congress was convened with the aim of creating a special body under the Provisional Government to defend the interests of the Cossack class. The Chairman of the Union of Cossack Troops was A.I. Dutov, an active supporter of preserving the identity of the Cossacks and their freedoms. The Union stood for strong power and supported the Provisional Government. At that time, A. Dutov called A. Kerensky “a bright citizen of the Russian land.”
In counterbalance, the radical left forces created an alternative body on March 25, 1917 - the Central Council of Labor Cossacks, headed by V.F. Kostenetsky. The positions of these bodies were diametrically opposed. They both claimed the right to represent the interests of the Cossacks, although neither one nor the other were genuine representatives of the interests of the majority, their election was also very conditional.
By the summer, the Cossack leaders were disappointed - both in the personality of the “fair citizen” and in the policies pursued by the Provisional Government. A few months of activity by the “democratic” government was enough for the country to be on the verge of collapse. A. Dutov’s speeches at the end of the summer of 1917, his reproaches to the powers that be are bitter, but fair. He was probably one of the few who even then took a firm political position. The main position of the Cossacks during this period can be defined by the word “waiting” or “waiting.” The stereotype of behavior - the authorities give orders - worked for some time. Apparently this is why the Chairman of the Union of Cossack Troops, military foreman A. Dutov, did not directly participate in L.G. Kornilov’s speech, but rather pointedly refused to condemn the “rebellious” commander in chief. He was not alone in this: in the end, 76.2% of the regiments, the Council of the Union of Cossack Troops, the Circles of the Don, Orenburg and some other troops declared support for the Kornilov speech. The Provisional Government was actually losing the Cossacks. Individual steps to correct the situation no longer helped. Having lost his post, A. Dutov was immediately elected at the Extraordinary Circle as ataman of the Orenburg army.
It is significant that in the conditions of a deepening crisis in various Cossack troops, their leaders adhered in principle to one line of behavior - the isolation of Cossack regions as a protective measure. At the first news of the Bolshevik uprising, the military governments (Don, Orenburg) assumed full state power and introduced martial law.
The bulk of the Cossacks remained politically inert, but still a certain part occupied a position different from the position of the atamans. The authoritarianism of the latter came into conflict with the democratic sentiments characteristic of the Cossacks. In the Orenburg Cossack army there was an attempt to create the so-called. “Cossack Democratic Party” (T.I. Sedelnikov, M.I. Sveshnikov), the executive committee of which later transformed into an opposition group of deputies of the Circle. Similar views were expressed by F.K. Mironov in an “Open Letter” to a member of the Don Military Government P.M. Ageev on December 15, 1917 about the demands of the Cossacks - “the re-election of members of the Military Circle on a democratic basis.”
Another common detail: the newly emerged leaders opposed themselves to the majority of the Cossack population and miscalculated in assessing the mood of the returning front-line soldiers. In general, front-line soldiers are a factor that worries everyone and can fundamentally influence the fragile balance that has arisen. The Bolsheviks considered it necessary to first disarm the front-line soldiers, arguing that the latter “could” join “the counter-revolution.” As part of the implementation of this decision, dozens of trains heading east were detained in Samara, which ultimately created an extremely explosive situation. The 1st and 8th preferential regiments of the Ural Army, who did not want to surrender their weapons, entered into battle with the local garrison near Voronezh. Front-line Cossack units began to arrive on the territory of the troops from the end of 1917. The atamans were unable to rely on the new arrivals: the Urals refused to support the White Guard being created in Uralsk, in Orenburg on the Krug the front-line soldiers expressed “displeasure” to the ataman for “mobilizing the Cossacks, .. caused a split among the Cossacks."
Almost everywhere, the Cossacks who returned from the front openly and persistently declared their neutrality. Their position was shared by the majority of Cossacks locally. The Cossack “leaders” did not find mass support. On the Don, Kaledin was forced to commit suicide; in the Orenburg region, Dutov was unable to rouse the Cossacks to fight and was forced to flee Orenburg with 7 like-minded people; an attempt by the cadets of the Omsk ensign school led to the arrest of the leadership of the Siberian Cossack Army. In Astrakhan, the performance under the leadership of the ataman of the Astrakhan army, General I.A. Biryukov, lasted from January 12 (25) to January 25 (February 7), 1918, after which he was shot. Everywhere the performances were small in number; they were mainly officers, cadets and small groups of ordinary Cossacks. Front-line soldiers even took part in the suppression.
A number of villages refused on principle to participate in what was happening - as was stated in the order to delegates to the Small Military Circle from a number of villages, “until the matter of the civil war is clarified, remain neutral.” However, the Cossacks still failed to remain neutral and not interfere in the civil war that began in the country. The peasantry at that stage can also be considered neutral, in the sense that the main part of it, having resolved the land issue one way or another during 1917, calmed down somewhat and was in no hurry to actively take anyone’s side. But if the opposing forces at that time had no time for the peasants, then they could not forget about the Cossacks. Thousands and tens of thousands of armed, military-trained people represented a force that was impossible not to take into account (in the fall of 1917, the army had 162 cavalry Cossack regiments, 171 separate hundreds and 24 foot battalions). The intense confrontation between the Reds and the Whites eventually reached the Cossack regions. First of all, this happened in the South and the Urals. The course of events was influenced by local conditions. Thus, the most fierce struggle was on the Don, where after October there was a mass exodus of anti-Bolshevik forces and, in addition, this region was closest to the center.

In the south, such detachments operated in the period 1920 - 1922. So. in July 1920, near Maykop, M. Fostikov created the Cossack “Russian Revival Army”. In Kuban, no earlier than October 1920, the so-called The 1st detachment of the Russian Partisan Army under the command of M.N. Zhukov, which existed until the spring of 1921. Since 1921, he also headed the “White Cross Organization,” which had underground cells in the north-west of Kuban. At the end of 1921 - beginning of 1922 on the border of the Voronezh province. and the Upper Don District there was a detachment of Cossack Yakov Fomin, the former commander of a cavalry squadron of the Red Army. In the first half of 1922, all these detachments were finished.
In the region bounded by the Volga and the Urals, there were a large number of small Cossack groups, the existence of which was limited mainly to 1921. They were characterized by constant movement: either to the north - to Saratov province, or to the south - to the Ural region. Passing along the borders of both counties and provinces, the rebels for some time seemed to fall out of the control of the security officers, “showing up” in a new place. These groups sought to unite. They received significant reinforcements from the Orenburg Cossacks, and young people at that. In April, the previously independent groups of Sarafankin and Safonov merged. After a series of defeats on September 1, the detachment joined Aistov’s detachment, which most likely arose in the Ural region back in 1920 on the initiative of several Red Army front-line soldiers. In October 1921, a number of previously disparate partisan detachments finally united, merging with Serov’s “Rising Troops of the Will of the People.”
To the east, in the Trans-Urals (mainly within the Chelyabinsk province), partisan detachments operated mainly in 1920. In September - October, the so-called. “Green Army” by Zvedin and Zvyagintsev. In mid-October, security officers in the area of ​​the village of Krasnenskaya discovered an organization of local Cossacks, which supplied weapons and food to deserters. In November, a similar organization of Cossacks arose in the village of Krasinsky, Verkhneuralsky district. The rebel groups are gradually being fragmented. The Cheka reports for the second half of 1921 constantly mentioned “small gangs of bandits” in the region.
The Cossacks of Siberia and the Far East acted later, since Soviet power was established there only in 1922. The Cossack partisan movement reached its scale in 1923 - 1924. This region is characterized by a special moment - the intervention in the events of Cossack detachments of the former White armies, who went abroad and are now moving over to the Soviet side. The insurgency here was over by 1927.
The most important indicator, in our opinion, of the crisis of the policies pursued by the communists was the period of uprisings under the red banner and Soviet slogans. Cossacks and peasants act together. The basis of the rebel forces were Red Army units. All the actions had similar features and were even interconnected to some extent: in July 1920, the 2nd Cavalry Division stationed in the Buzuluk area under the command of A. Sapozhkov rebelled, declaring itself the “First Red Army of Truth”; in December 1920 he led the performance in the song. Mikhailovskaya K. Vakulin (the so-called Vakulin-Popov detachment); in the spring of 1921, from a part of the Red Army located in the Buzuluk district to suppress the “rebellions of kulak gangs” (consequences of the activities of the “Army of Truth” there), the “First People's Revolutionary Army” of Okhranyuk-Chersky arose; in the fall of 1921, the Orlov-Kurilovsky regiment rebelled, calling itself the “Ataman division of the rebel [troops] groups of the will of the people,” commanded by one of Sapozhkov’s former commanders, V. Serov.
All the leaders of these rebel forces were combat commanders and had awards: K. Vakulin previously commanded the 23rd regiment of the Mironov division, awarded the Order of the Red Banner; A. Sapozhkov was the organizer of the defense of Uralsk from the Cossacks, for which he received a gold watch and personal gratitude from Trotsky. The main combat zone is the Volga region: from the Don regions to the Ural River, Orenburg. There was some rejection of the locality of the actions - the Orenburg Cossacks make up a significant part of Popov's rebels in the Volga region, the Ural Cossacks - among Serov. At the same time, suffering defeats from communist troops, the rebels always tried to retreat to the areas where these units were formed, the native lands of the majority of the rebels. The Cossacks brought elements of organization into the rebellion, playing the same role that they played earlier in the previous peasant wars - they created a combat-ready core.
The slogans and appeals of the rebels indicate that, while opposing the communists, they did not abandon the idea itself. Thus, A. Sapozhkov believed that “the policy of the Soviet government, together with the Communist Party, in its three-year course, went far to the right of the policy and declaration of rights that were put forward in October 1917.” The Serovites were already talking about slightly different ideals - about establishing the power of “the” people “on the principle of the great February Revolution.” But at the same time they declared that they were not against communism as such, “recognizing a great future for communism and its sacred idea.” K. Vakulin’s appeals also spoke about democracy.
All these speeches were labeled “anti-Soviet” for many years. Meanwhile, it should be admitted that they were “pro-Soviet”. In the sense that they advocated the Soviet form of government. The slogan “Soviets without communists” by and large does not carry with it the criminality that has been attributed to it for decades. In fact, the Soviets were supposed to be organs of power of the masses, not of parties. Perhaps these speeches should have been called “anti-communist”, again taking into account their slogans. However, the scale of the protests does not mean at all that the Cossack and peasant masses were against the course of the RCP(b). When speaking out against the communists, the Cossacks and peasants, first of all, had in mind “their” locals - it was the actions of specific individuals that were the reason for each action.
The uprisings of the Red Army were suppressed with exceptional cruelty - for example, 1500 people. Okhranyuk’s surrendered “people’s army soldiers” were mercilessly cut down with sabers for several days.
The city of Orenburg during this period can be considered as a kind of border. To the west, its population mainly supported the Soviet form of government, most of the measures of the Soviet government, protesting only against their “distortion” and blaming the communists for this. The main force of the rebel troops are Cossacks and peasants. To the east there were also performances, mainly in the Chelyabinsk province. These, almost entirely Cossack in composition, loudly called themselves “armies”, were quite disciplined, had all or almost all the mandatory attributes of real military formations - headquarters, banner, orders, etc. An important difference was the conduct of printed campaigning - they all published and distributed appeals. In the summer of 1920, the Blue National Army of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, the First People's Army, and the Green Army emerged. Around the same time, a detachment of S. Vydrin arose, declaring himself “the military commander of the free Orenburg Cossacks.” An analysis of the slogans and statements of the rebel Cossacks of the Chelyabinsk province (“Down with Soviet power”, “Long live the Constituent Assembly”) shows that in the eastern regions the population wanted to live more traditionally. In the occupied villages, the bodies of Soviet power were liquidated and atamans were again elected - as a provisional government. In policy statements, the power of the Soviets and the power of the Communists are interpreted as something unified. The call to fight for the power of the Constituent Assembly, which, most likely, was perceived as the antithesis of the power of the Soviets - a more legitimate power, had a wide spread and response among the masses.
It seems significant to us that the communist government always used lies in relation to dissenting allies. In not a single case were the true causes of the conflict revealed. Any protests against the communists were interpreted by the latter solely as a manifestation of unhealthy ambitions and so on. - but they never admitted their own mistakes. Accused of rebellion in 1919, F. Mironov was literally slandered. Trotsky’s leaflet said: “What was the reason for Mironov’s temporary accession to the revolution? Now it is completely clear: personal ambition, careerism, the desire to rise up on the backs of the working masses.” Both A. Sapozhkov and Okhranyuk were accused of excessive ambition and adventurism.
Distrust of the Cossacks also extended to the Cossack leaders. The policy in relation to them can be defined in one word - use. Actually, this cannot be assumed to be some kind of special attitude towards the Cossacks - the communists behaved similarly towards all allies - the Bashkir leaders led by Validov, Dumenko and others. The entry in the minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee on October 15, 1919 is indicative: “To request the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-East Front and the Don Executive Committee about ways to use the antagonism of the Donets and Kubans with Denikin for military-political purposes (using Mironov).” The fate of F. Mironov is generally typical for a Cossack commander: at the stage of active struggle for Soviet power, he was not even awarded - he never received the order to which he was nominated. Then, for “rebellion” he is sentenced to death and... forgiven. Literally mixed with dirt, Mironov “suddenly” turns out to be good. Trotsky proved himself to be an intelligent and unprincipled politician: Mironov is his name. In a telegram to I. Smilga on October 10, 1919, we read: “I am putting for discussion in the Politburo of the Central Committee on the issue of changing the policy towards the Don Cossacks. We give the Don and Kuban complete “autonomy”, our troops clear the Don. The Cossacks are completely breaking with Deninkin.” The calculation was made on Mironov’s authority - “Mironov and his comrades could act as mediators.” Mironov’s name was used for campaigning and appeals. This is followed by high appointments, awards, even honorary revolutionary weapons. And in the end, in February 1921, he was charged with conspiracy, and on April 2, he was executed.
As the outcome of the war became more and more obvious, authoritative partisan commanders and peasant leaders capable of leading themselves became unnecessary, and even dangerous. Thus, K. Vakulin’s mere statement that F. Mironov was on his side provided him with massive support. A. Sapozhkov clearly belonged to the type of non-party peasant leaders, capable of captivating people - what is his demand for his Red Army soldiers to either shoot him or give him and the entire command staff complete trust. The conviction that it was his personality that was the cementing principle for the division ultimately led him to conflict with party structures.
The words of A. Sapozhkov are indicative, he believed that “from the center there is an unacceptable attitude towards old, honored revolutionaries”: “A hero like Dumenko was shot. If Chapaev had not been killed, he would, of course, have been shot, just as Budyonny will undoubtedly be shot when they are able to do without him.”
In principle, we can talk about a targeted program carried out by the communist leadership at the final stage of the Civil War to discredit and remove (exterminate) the people’s commanders from the Cossack and peasant environment who emerged during the war, who enjoyed well-deserved authority, leaders who were capable of leading (maybe even appropriately) say, charismatic personalities).
The main result of the Civil War for the Cossacks was the completion of the process of “decossackization.” It should be recognized that in the early 20s. The Cossack population has already merged with the rest of the agricultural population - merged in terms of its status, range of interests and tasks. Just as the decree of Peter I on the tax-paying population, at one time, eliminated in principle the differences between groups of the agricultural population by unifying their status and responsibilities, in the same way, the policy pursued by the communist authorities towards farmers brought together previously so different groups, equalizing everyone , as citizens of the “Soviet Republic”.
At the same time, the Cossacks suffered irreparable losses - the officers were knocked out almost entirely, and a significant part of the Cossack intelligentsia died. Many villages were destroyed. A significant number of Cossacks ended up in exile. Political suspicion towards the Cossacks remained for a long time. Involvement, at least indirectly, in the white Cossacks or the insurgent movement left a stigma for the rest of his life. In a number of areas, a large number of Cossacks were deprived of voting rights. Anything reminiscent of the Cossacks was banned. Until the beginning of the 30s. there was a methodical search for those “culpable” before the Soviet regime; accusing someone of involvement in the “Cossack counter-revolution” remained the most serious and inevitably entailed repression.

Diaries of Ataman V.G. Naumenko, as a source on the history of the Civil War and the relationship of the Kuban Cossacks with General P.N. Wrangel

N.Khalizev. A book about our war. Part III. Chapter 4

The Cossacks returning from the fronts did not want a new war. In the trenches of the First World War, they changed their attitude towards non-residents, who, just like them, shed their blood. Their attitude towards the Tsar-Father and his generals, who turned the army (both Cossacks and peasants) into cannon fodder, also changed. The war dramatically changed the behavior and psychology of the Cossack; he did not want to shoot at his people. That is why, when the Soviets came to power in St. Petersburg with the Bolsheviks at their head, the government of the Kuban Cossack army failed to mobilize. Their troops consisted of motley volunteers.
The situation in the village of Korenovskaya at the end of January - beginning of February 1918 was difficult. The first Koronovsky Council, elected in December 1917, was arrested. Strizhakov, Purykhin, Kolchenko (They went to Petrograd and met with the first chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Vladimir Ilyich Lenin) were taken into custody, they were sent to Yekaterinodar /Part.AKK f.2830, no.40./
Ataman rule was restored in the village. The Kuban Rada (government of the Kuban region) demanded to urgently organize hundreds in the nearest villages and deploy them in Korenovskaya under the overall command of Colonel Pokrovsky (before the massacre of the parliamentarians, he was a captain). But the majority of villages at their meetings decided to refuse these demands.
The verdict of the meeting of the village of Dyadkovskaya on January 28, 1918 speaks “about the organization of self-defense units against volunteers.” Verdict of the meeting of the Platnirovskaya village of February 2, 1918. speaks “about sending delegates to the Congress of Soviets in the village of Kirpilskaya.” A Council was created in the village of Razdolnaya. In the village of Berezanskaya, “on February 3, 1918, the congress of Cossack and peasant deputies demands the disarmament of officers and cadets who have poured into Kuban.” The verdict of the meeting of the Sergievskaya village condemned the decision of the Platnirovites and decided to support the Rada’s decision to fight the Bolsheviks./GAKK, AoUVD f. 17/s r-411, op.2./
In Art. Korenovskaya, in the first half of February, under the command of Pokrovsky (he was the first to start terror in the Kuban, shooting the envoys, Sedin and Strilko in Yekaterinodar), a detachment was created. The backbone of this detachment was the Korenovtsy Cossacks, led by V. Pariev and U. Urazka. On February 16, I.L. Sorokin’s troops approached the village of Korenovskaya. The whites, offering almost no resistance, fled...
Not everyone was happy about the arrival of the Reds. “Pope Petro (Nazarenko) stood on his knees for three hours and anathematized all the Bolsheviks and their descendants.”/GAKK f.17/s p-411, op.2.s 14./ Soon he was killed.
On February 18, 1918, in the morning, Sorokin’s train arrived at Stanichnaya station. Front-line soldiers and gorodoviki (Bolsheviks) met him. At 12 o'clock there was a general meeting in the courtyard of the former administration, where the Council of Cossack, Peasant and Red Army Deputies was elected again (2nd time). Dr. Boguslavsky and 75 members of the Council were elected Chairman of the Council. If you read this list, the majority in the Council was given to old-timer Cossacks and front-line soldiers: Murai I., Krasnyuk P., Zozulya A., Dmitrenko A., Kanyuka G., Us F., Desyuk I., Gaida M., Bugai N., Bugai E., Tsys I., Khit Kh., Ohten M., Zabolotniy A., Dmitriev S., Adamenko the old man, Avdeenko Luka, Deinega and others./GAKKf.17/s, op.2./ . We have met these names more than once among the heroes who defended their land in previous wars. Many joined the Red detachments.

At a time when the Reds were fighting for Yekaterinodar, fighting with the troops of V.L. Pokrovsky, Kornilov’s volunteer detachments approached Korenovskaya (about 5 thousand). They advanced from Zhuravskaya to the center along the Malyovanaya road. For the first time, the Kornilovites met stubborn resistance. Kornilov had 5 guns, 2 cars, the Reds had an armored train, which retreated, fearing that the Whites would dismantle the rails. From 4 am to 5 pm there was a battle, but the Kornilov regiment under the command of General A.P. Bogaevsky passed almost without a fight through the Krasnyukova rowing from the Dyadkovskaya side. Panic began among the defenders; they retreated to Platnirovskaya station.

General Afrikan Petrovich Bogaevsky (after Krasnov he would become the ataman of the Don Army) described our village as follows in his memoirs:
“Extensive, like most Kuban villages, Korenovskaya with clean houses, an old church and even a monument to the Cossacks - participants in the Russian-Turkish war, had the appearance of a county town. However, the unpaved streets were a real swamp at this time of year. A significant part of the village’s population were nonresidents, and this partly explains the tenacity of Korenovskaya’s defense. The long-term enmity between the Cossacks and non-residents, which did not have such an acute character on the Don, where the non-Cossack population lived for the most part in separate settlements, but in small numbers in the villages, was especially strong in the Kuban: here non-residents in most cases were farm laborers and tenants from the rich Cossacks and, envying them, did not love them the same way as the peasants - landowners in the rest of Russia. They were from other cities and made up a significant part of the Bolsheviks.”

L.G. Kornilov drove into the village in a car and stopped on the third block at the priest Nikolai Volotsky (no one shot him for this). On the evening of March 5, he left in the direction of the village of Sergievskaya, but the Red forces were concentrating on the Platnirovskaya-Sergievskaya line. Before this, from March 1 to March 2 (old style), 1918, the troops of Avtonomov and I.L. Sorokin attacked Ekaterinodar, drove Pokrovsky’s troops out of the city, but did not pursue. Soviet power was established throughout the Kuban region. This probably could have ended the civil war, but it did not happen. Having received the news that the Kuban Rada had left Yekaterinodar, Kornilov and his army freely moved to Razdolnaya and further to the villages of Voronezh and Ust-Labinsk, where they crossed the Kuban. /Memories, Korenovsk. Museum. Recorded by Grigoriev. The same is stated in the memoirs of General Bogaevsky/.
Soviet power was re-established in the village of Korenovskaya. The Council had to be re-elected because many died, some were shot, and some left with the Kornilovites; they did not want to “lie under the mound.”

Korenovskaya in the civil war

Brane field.

Washed with dew, warmed by light,
Everything suddenly comes to life, begins to move.
Awakened by the trill, tossed by the wind,
Two armies rush towards battle.
Was the Russian gaze lacking beauty?
Nature played with beauty,
But blood will be shed here, and Evil rejoiced.
Whom did death await under the mound?
Two brothers strive for bloody moments:
Fate, you are a villain, fate is treacherous.
The deadly shine of steel, damask steel,
And time will rush away forever...
Two armies clashed, two Truths scolded:
“St. George brings us victory!”
“No, holiness will only be achieved in the equality of all,”
And death swung and mowed down and mowed down...
And neighing, and groaning, and wheezing of horses
They rush over the field in a terrible way.
The horses gathered in a herd without ideas,
Left without whites and reds.

N. Khalizev

The Kornilovites tried to mobilize in the villages. But neither calls to join the fight against the Soviets, nor 150 rubles. per month, with everything ready, they did not seduce the war-weary Koronovites. After the battle for the village on March 4, 1918, the Koronovites did not want to join the ranks of volunteers. Having received the news that the Sorokinites defeated the troops of the Kuban Rada and took Yekaterinodar, Kornilov gave the order to move to Ust-Laba. About 300 Koronovites fought in the red troops of A.I. Avtonomov and I.L. Sorokin, under the command of G.I. Mironenko. This is an indicator that the Cossacks (especially returning front-line soldiers) accepted Soviet power as their own. With weapons in their hands, they defended the government, which finally ended the hateful war that had been grinding human lives for three years. The Kornilovites forcibly requisitioned food from the Koronovites for the needs of the army. This caused protests, which were suppressed by shootings and floggings. Kornilov said: “The more terror, the more victory.”
After the volunteers left the village, another hundred Cossacks under the command of Zozulya went to Yekaterinodar.
The Korenovites very soon had to face the Kornilovites again. Volunteers teamed up with the troops of the Kuban government, which fled from Ekaterinodar. This meeting took place near the villages of Novodmitrievskaya and Kaluga. The Kuban people tried to defend cooperation with the Volunteer Army on parity rights. “They,” wrote A. Denikin, “talked about the constitution, the sovereign Kuban, autonomy, etc.” / Essays on the Russian Time of Troubles. 1922 /
It was agreed that all troops would obey Kornilov. The united troops turned towards Ekaterinodar. On March 28, the Kornilovites began the battle for Yekaterinodar. On the morning of March 31, in front of Adjutant Dolinsky, a shell that exploded nearby mortally wounded the commander of the White volunteer army. By order of Alekseev, A.I. Denikin took command of the army.

The turmoil continues.

Soviet power lasted into Art. Korenovskaya not for long, from 02/18/18. to 07/18/18, and 4.03. and 5.03 (old style) the Kornilovites had power in the village. Korenovtsy in the spring of 1918. They sowed together and more land was sown. It seemed that the war was over. But an uprising of officers Gulik and Tsybulsky broke out in Taman. It would have been suppressed by the Taman army under the command of Matveev, but the Whites turned to the Germans, who provided them with assistance. A new war began - a civil one.

Korenovites felt
themselves deceived again.
The Bolsheviks promised - the end
war, but it continued!

The Germans transported an infantry regiment to Taman, and at the same time German units and the troops of Ataman Krasnov also moved from Rostov-on-Don. It was too early to lay down arms and start building a new life. The intervention of foreigners: Germans, Czechs, British, French, Americans, Japanese fanned the fire of the already extinct white resistance. The sincere desire of the Soviet government for peace was trampled upon by foreign states and whites. They paid money and armed the Russians in order to destroy Russia with the hands of the Russian people, they awakened the Troubles.
Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich / uncle of Nicholas II / in the “Book of Memories” in Paris, wrote: “.. Apparently the “allies” were going to turn Russia into a British colony..., the British Foreign Office revealed a daring intention to deal a fatal blow to Russia ,...the leaders of the White movement,...pretending that they did not notice the intrigues of the allies, they called for a holy war against the Soviets, on the other hand, none other than the internationalist Lenin stood guard over Russian national interests..."/Book of Memoirs., M., 1991, p.256-257/(Paris, before his death)
The Reds were forced to defend Kuban from invasion. Avtonomov gave the order to I.L. Sorokin to concentrate troops in the Bataysk area. The Korenovites felt deceived again. The Soviets promised an end to the war, but it, although through no fault of theirs, continued. The Red armies and the cities of Russia, where famine began, needed food. Bread was transported by wagons from barns and backhouses located near the railway station to large cities. This also caused dissatisfaction among many. “The Reds are robbing” - the “smart” people started the rumor. The troubled spring ended with the May redistribution of land, which was now given to non-residents (peasants from St. Petersburg). This redistribution did not suit the Cossacks, from whom their surplus land was taken; now land was received not for the Cossack, but for the number of eaters and girls too.
The summer of 1918 was rainy, it seemed to continue the leitmotif of despondency, threats and injustice. Thunderstorms rumbled continuously. This oppressed the Koronovites even more. In July 1918, the sounds of the roar of guns were woven into the peals of frequent thunderstorms. The replacement of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the North Caucasus, Avtonomov, with Kalnin, led to the defeat of the Reds. The new campaign of the Whites to Kuban turned out to be successful.​

Material and financial assistance from the British to the troops of A.I. Denikin, as well as the dissatisfaction of the Cossacks with the results of the redistribution of land, pushed them into the white army, with each advance forward it replenished its ranks. Now the Cossacks saw in Denikin’s people those who would return to them the tithes of land they had lost in redistribution. The newly appointed commander-in-chief I.L. Sorokin began fighting with the White troops. The battle near Korenovskaya was fierce. The village changed hands several times. As a result of artillery shelling, many huts were destroyed by fire from Denikin’s batteries. The 1st revolutionary Kuban Cavalry Regiment under the command of the free Cossack G.I. Mironenko distinguished itself in battles with the Whites. The regiment, created back in April 1918, liberated the village from the White Cossacks several times in mounted attacks. The backbone of this army consisted of Koronovites and Razdolnenians. It is not their fault that military luck failed them in July 1918. /The Sharia column of the Reds, which included the 1st revolutionary Kuban Cavalry Regiment, crushed the army (Musavatists) of Bicherakhov and General Mistulov on the Terek. For this, G.I. Mironenko was awarded the Order of the Red Banner (considered Hero of Russia) and a silver saber. This means that the Koronovites knew how to fight. Subsequently, the 1st revolutionary Kuban Cavalry Regiment with the Vyselkovsky and Yeisk regiments formed the 33rd Kuban Red Army Division. It was the actions of this division near Liski that decided the outcome of the battle for Voronezh in 1919. (the commander of the Vyselkovsky regiment was Lunin, then N. Maslakov, and the commissar was our fellow countryman Purykhin Trofim Terentievich, who died in August 1919 near the village of Podgornaya; one of the streets in Korenovsk was named after him)/. Mironenko G.I. with his horsemen overthrew the regiments of Drozdovsky and Kazanovich, only the retreat to Vyselki saved them from complete destruction. Now it is quite difficult to restore the situation in July 1918 near the village of Korenovskaya.

According to GAKK f.r-411. and other sources, the following picture emerges:

On July 13, a detachment of Latvian riflemen, reinforced by volunteers and a hundred Circassians, burst into Korenovskaya. On July 15, the Reds knocked out this “international” A. Bogaevsky from the village;
- On July 16, Colonel Andreev’s rifle unit, reinforced by two English armored cars, entered Korenovskaya. 19-20 they retreated;
- On July 23, selected regiments of Drozdovsky and Kazanovich burst into our village, but G.I. Mironenko’s cavalry almost completely destroyed these units, throwing the whites out of their native village. The 1st Revolutionary Regiment of Mironenko defeated the regiments of Drozdovsky and Kazanovich and drove their remnants to the village of Vyselki. For some time, the front stabilized, but the Reds did not have enough strength to develop an offensive; they needed reinforcements and ammunition. The army soldiers are half-starved. The Red front begins to “crack.” Some commanders do not follow the orders of the commander in chief. (Zhloba, “Steel Division” goes to the Kalmyk steppes).
And the Whites were receiving supplies of ammunition from the British, they regrouped and retook Korenovskaya, then continued their attack on Yekaterinodar. 07/25/1918 Denikin's troops finally capture the village of Korenovskaya. The Red retreat became uncontrollable.
The Taman army was cut off from the main forces. They were forced to retreat to Tuapse, and then fight through Belorechenskaya to join the army of Sorokin (“Iron Stream”, Serafimovich).
Many mistakes and miscalculations were made by the commanding staff of the Red troops, but the main reason for the defeat was the loss of mass support from the Kuban Cossacks. In the spring of 1918, the Cossacks followed the Soviets because they gave peace to the country. But the residents of Kuban did not feel this world. The Kornilovites and foreigners started a civil war in the Kuban. The Soviet government did not give the Kuban people any reassurance. Requisitions, robbery (Golubov’s gangs), redistribution of land not in favor of the Cossacks - these were the main reasons that pushed the Cossacks into the camp of Denikin’s camp. However, money also played a role, 150 rubles. At that time it was a decent amount, the Cossacks are still not averse to earning extra money.
The white movement was alien to peasant Russia. The workers and peasants understood that the victory of the whites meant a return to the power of the landowners, to the old order, to the return of the land that the Bolsheviks had given them. To the domination of some over others. Many Cossacks, who fought against it as part of the Red Army, also understood this.

White retreat.

The defeat of the whites near Yegorlykskaya on February 25, 1920. marked the beginning of a great retreat. The Whites, putting up fierce resistance, retreated to the Eya River. Near Kushchevskaya a desperate attempt was made to stop the Red Army. But the battles are lost. Uborevich's Ninth (9A) Army rolled on like an asphalt roller, not giving the Whites the slightest rest. With a blow to the flank, she overthrew the Whites near Tikhoretskaya and is rushing through Staroleushkovskaya to Medvedovskaya. The 10A and 50th Taman Army complete their defeat with a frontal attack on Tikhoretskaya. Fierce resistance is crushed, the whites are fleeing. The horsemen of S.M. Budyonny and G.D. Gai are rushing to Ust-Labinskaya to intercept the retreating enemy. In February 1920, the Whites were preparing a spring offensive, but on February 25 the Red Army went on the offensive. There was a decisive turning point in the civil war. By this time, many Koronovites, who had previously gone to the whites, had returned home from the enemy’s strife. The units covering Yekaterinodar are also fleeing criminally. Thousands of carts and a lot of valuable goods were abandoned.
Denikin concentrates 20 thousand sabers at Berezanskaya. He sets Sidorin the task of defeating the Reds and returning Tikhoretskaya. But the 9th Army with all its might falls on the Beisug group of Denikin’s troops. The cavalry corps of D.P. Zhloba attacked Sidorin’s cavalry. Rodionov's 33rd Kuban Division beats the enemy at Zhuravka. Both in the cavalry corps of Zhloba and in the cavalry brigade of P. Belov, the main backbone is made up of Kuban Cossacks. The Sidorin Donets felt uncomfortable in the Kuban. / R. Govorovsky. Kuban. Spring of the twentieth... Documentary story.//Cossack news No. 10-13, 1999// The front inexorably rolled back towards Korenovskaya. Denikin, as in the summer of 1918, hoped for a change in the course of events. But parts of the Kuban Cossacks are increasingly going over to the side of the Reds (Shapkin’s squadrons). And even earlier, the Cossacks of Musiya Pilyuk, having defeated Colonel Zakharov’s punitive forces at Maryanskaya, went into partisans. At Korenovskaya there is a gathering of white troops. Confusion and chaos at Stanichnaya station.
​

Trains do not have time to take refugees away from Stanichnaya station, whoever is here... (Picture from the encyclopedia)​

Who isn't here? The crowd is rushing about, all in echelons. A mass of military men who had strayed from their units. The officers are arguing about whether the Kuban residents will finally go over to the side of the Reds or not. The soldiers grab, shake, and drag the station chief somewhere. He, beaten, hides from the crowd. Meanwhile, the officers calculated that Korenovskaya had changed hands nine times since 1918. / Dissertation. Proskurin A. N. / The tenth transfer of Korenovskaya, now finally to the Reds, took place on March 13th. Exactly two years ago, on the same slushy day, the Kornilovites of the 1st Kuban campaign left the village, going to Ust-Laba. But then no one was hanging on their tail. Now, on March 13, 1920, the regiments of Corps Commander Ovchinnikov and the cavalry of S.M. Budyonny and Guy were literally pressing on their heels.
As in 1918, it froze at night and thawed during the day, a dirty spring both at the beginning of the white movement and at the end of it. Kuban nature itself seemed to be telling the participants in the white movement that war against one’s own people was a wrong, vile thing. One of the ardent opponents of the Reds, A.G. Shkuro, already in exile, wrote about the retreat of those days: “Entire divisions, having drunk too much with looted alcohol and vodka, are fleeing without a fight.” / Notes of a White Partisan. M, 1994./There he promised to cut out the Bludgeon (Cheryomushki), who rebelled against the whites.
Therefore, the white cause was doomed. In addition, even earlier, contradictions between Denikin and the Kuban Rada led to a clash. The Rada was dispersed in 1919, regimental priest A.I. Kalabukhov was hanged, the chairman of the Kuban Regional Rada N.S. Ryabovol was shot dead in Rostov by a Denikin officer. Only a year before the summer of 1919, the Kuban Cossacks supported Denikin’s troops, then mass desertion from the White Army began, and partisan detachments began to emerge. A.I. Denikin wrote in his memoirs: “...at the end of 1918, the Kuban people made up two-thirds of the army, and by the end of the summer of 1919 there were only 15% of them...” Thus, presenting the white movement as something unified is not entirely correctly. All of them were united by hatred for the Bolsheviks and for the future, which dared to live without masters, for those who strived for equality.
The units covering Yekaterinodar are also fleeing. Thousands of carts of goods looted by the Cossacks, according to custom, were abandoned and left by the road.
​

Almost in the spring of 1920, the civil war in Kuban was over. After the capitulation of the 60,000-strong White Army of General Morozov on May 21, the Kuban Cossacks and many Koronovites returned to peaceful labor; the Soviet government declared them an amnesty.
But in August, S.G. Ulagai’s troops landed near Novorossiysk, Primorsko-Akhtarskaya and Taman. Wrangel believed that Kuban would again be an economic springboard for the Whites. In the Maykop, Labinsk, Batalpashinsky departments, General Fostikov M.A. organized the "Renaissance Army". However, the bulk of the Cossacks did not support the whites. And after this uprising, in June 1921. The Soviet government granted an amnesty to everyone who laid down their arms. The heroic past of the Cossacks and their service to Russia deserve special attention from creatively thinking people. Without the Cossacks, Russia would not exist in the form in which it is. Russian Orthodoxy was defended not only by asceticism and devotion to God, but also by weapons. A Russian soldier and a Cossack, with a bayonet and a sharp sword, managed to defend Orthodoxy - the soul of the Russian people. We must also remember this, and understand that love, equality and brotherhood, as the ethical component of Orthodoxy, were the essence of the Cossack. And the Cossack was ready to defend this Truth with arms in hand from any enemies.
It is not the Cossacks’ fault that they reacted especially painfully to insults, often with weapons in their hands. They were pushed to this by those who were eager for power, who used the Cossacks for their own selfish interests. Six years of battles in which millions took part, they had to be fed and clothed. People fell in the fields from fatigue, and in the cities they died at the machines from hunger.
The Russian people paid a huge price for the desire of the young Russian bourgeoisie for power and the interference of foreigners in our lives. In these battles, he realized that power should be in the hands of the people, only they can use it for the benefit of all.
As we see, the intentions of the Bolsheviks and Kornilovites were the same in 1917 - to seize power, but the goals were directly opposite. Some want to continue the war in the name of the interests of the bourgeoisie of England, France and the Russian elite (these interests were clearly stated in the Secret Agreements on the post-war division of spoils, later published by the Bolsheviks), while others are against the war.
(Already!) On November 8, the Council of People's Commissars, headed by Lenin, ordered Dukhonin (commander-in-chief) to “appeal to the military authorities of the enemy armies with a proposal to immediately suspend hostilities in order to open peace negotiations” (telephone message dated November 8, 1917). There is nothing to feed the army; famine begins in the cities.
Due to the opposition from Headquarters, negotiations began only on November 19 (that’s why Dukhonin was killed by a brutal crowd of soldiers at Headquarters).
November 19, 1917 L.G. Kornilov leaves his “prison” in Bykhov and, together with the Tekins “guarding” him, heads to the Don to start a war with those who want to stop the bloodshed.
We are assured that the white officers were faithful to their oath. To whom? They did not support the king. To the people? The people came to power and want to end the war. No, gentlemen officers cannot allow him to do this. Now they are trying to convince us that the leaders of the white movement were patriots. A patriot is a defender of the people and the Fatherland. This is how it is necessary to distort consciousness in order to call those who started a war against their people in their Fatherland patriots. I agree that this was a tragedy for millions of people, but the way out of the tragedy can be different. In 1991 We also suffered a tragedy. The people understood that they were being robbed, that under the guise of democracy they had seized power and property, but the greatness of the Russian people lies precisely in the fact that they do not value property, or power either. In order for him to take up arms, he must be brought either to a mental breakdown or to despair, but among the Soviet people everything was normal mentally.
However, it is easy to explain who imposes on us the view of the White Guard as martyrs for an idea. This point of view is imposed on us by those who, in 1991, carried out the plans of foreign states to divide “European Russia into four or more states.”

A sane person cannot have a single argument to justify the actions of Kaledin, Krasnov, Kornilov, Kolchak:
- “the officers could not bear the “obscene” peace with Germany.” But the “obscene” peace was concluded only on March 1, 1918, and fighting on the Don began in November 1917, in the Kuban in February 1918;
- the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly occurred on January 6, 1918, also could not be the reason that pushed for armed resistance.

There is only one explanation - the top of the Cossacks, the generals of the tsarist army, were striving for power. They (Alekseev, Kornilov, Denikin, Kolchak) longed to become the arbiters of the destinies of Russia. And they didn’t care what they used to “enter” the Mother See; on a white horse or on a boat on a sea of ​​human blood, the blood of his people. And Kornilov, and Alekseev, and Denikin are themselves from the people. With their talent, courage, courage they reached unattainable heights of power. They achieved this position through sweat, blood, and hardship. The very idea of ​​equality (Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lenin received a worker's salary) was madness for them. They saw more negative things in their people.
The Cossack elite strived for separation from Russia, for autonomy, independence, but separatism, both then and now, is destructive for ordinary people.
The Bolsheviks believed that the sacred fire of the revolution would awaken the mind and creative powers of man. They believed in their people, in people.
This belief in the best qualities of man made them forgive their opponents in the first months of Soviet power. The cadets, Cossacks, Ataman Krasnov, all those who in October, and much later, took up arms to overthrow the Soviet regime, were released on their word of honor that they would no longer take up arms.
At the end of 1917, the Bolsheviks tried to “unite the nation” ... “solder with Love.” And it was not their fault that peace turned out to be unnecessary neither to the governments of “enlightened Europe” nor to military professionals. Now, of course, we rightly condemn the terrible repressions, but we forget that they were often in response to conspiracies and uprisings.
No one destroyed the generals at the beginning of 1918, they were simply made equal to everyone else, they could not survive this. Having secured the support of foreigners (financial and military), the White Guards, like a pack of predators, bared their fangs and bristled their “skins,” rushed into battle. It was as if mammoths, opponents of Soviet power, directed their tusks (guns, planes, machine guns, armies) into the heart of wounded Russia. And she, their Motherland, needed support, she was dying of typhus and hunger generated by THEIR war (1st World War). Generated by the activities of THEIR government (the Provisional Government). January and February 1918 (as well as the two subsequent years) were a time of survival. The Germans, in view of the treacherous policy of another lover of proxy war - Trotsky, whom Lenin very often called a “political prostitute,” rushed into the depths of Russia. Only emergency measures to create a new army and provide it with food stopped their advance. A dying country is forced to pay huge amounts of indemnities and reparations. And at this time, the top of the Cossacks are beating Russia from below (in the groin or gut). Believe me, it is very painful. One can, of course, understand and forgive the masses of Cossacks who perceived the activities of food detachments as robbery. They defended themselves from the Bolsheviks, who were saving Russia from starvation and from the Germans.
But how to make peace with those who understood everything, but raised the officers and Cossacks against their people? However, our people are not vindictive. During the Caucasian War, many Cossacks had kunaks among the highlanders. We have already forgiven our rulers who unleashed the civil - Chechen war. All that remains is to make Kornilov, Shkuro, Krasnov, Denikin heroes and erect monuments to them. Well, apparently, the insanity in the mind is truly insanity, its distortion has reached its apogee. Let's glorify those who carried out the bloody massacre and “washed Russia with blood.” Us to the salvation of the Fatherland
The voice of conscience calls
Towards the bright goal of our life
We are getting closer: March forward!

From Kuban to Baikal,
Along the steppes, forests and mountains
Rolled with a powerful shaft
Russian guns conversation.

Belgium.
A.G.