On July 12, 1943, the largest oncoming tank battle took place in the Prokhorovka area Second World War.The event, which was included in all history textbooks of the Second World War under the name of the Battle of Prokhorovka, developed on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge from July 10 to July 16, 1943 near Prokhorovka. It was on July 10, after failure in their advance to Oboyan, that the Germans directed their main attack on the Prokhorovka railway station.
The offensive was carried out by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (commander Hausser), which included the divisions "Totenkopf", "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and "Reich". In a few days they broke through two lines of fortifications of Soviet troops and reached the third - 10 km southwest of the Prokhorovka station. After a fierce battle, the Germans occupied the Komsomolsiy state farm and the northern bank of the Psel River. On July 11, the enemy advanced to the outskirts of Prokhorovka, breaking through the defenses of the 2nd Tank Corps and the 183rd Rifle Division. The Soviet divisions sent to the breakthrough area were able to stop the Germans. The attacks of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps with the aim of reaching the Prokhorovka-Kartashovka line did not achieve any results.
The Soviet command decided to launch a powerful counterattack on the morning of July 12 and destroy the enemy troops wedged into the defense. For this operation it was planned to involve the 5th, 6th, 7th Guards Armies, as well as the 5th Guards and 1st Tank Armies. However, due to the complicated situation, only the 5th Guards Tank (commander P.A. Rotmistrov) and 5th Guards (commander A.S. Zhadov) armies could participate in the counterattack. The 5th Guards Tank Army included the 18th Tank Corps, the 29th Tank Corps, and the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps. The army was reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps.
Early in the morning of July 12, several dozen German tanks made a breakthrough in the Melekhovo direction. The Germans managed to occupy the villages of Ryndinka, Vypolzovka and Rzhavets. Soviet attack aircraft attacked the tanks of the Adolf Hitler division. The strike group of German troops conducted its offensive on several sectors of the front.
At 8:30 a.m. on July 12, formations of the 5th Guards Combined Arms and 5th Guards Tank Armies, after a 15-minute artillery preparation, launched a counterattack. The tanks of the Adolf Hitler division came under heavy fire from Soviet guns. Armored avalanches moved towards each other. About 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in the battles on both sides. The largest oncoming tank battle in history took place on a field near Prokhorovka between the railway and the bend of the Psel River. The 170th and 181st tank brigades of the 18th Tank Corps, the 25th, 31st and 32nd tank brigades of the 29th Tank Corps, with the support of units of the 9th Guards Airborne Division and the 42nd, went on the attack. th Guards Division.
In the bend of the Psel River, units of the 95th Guards Rifle Division fought a heavy battle with the SS division “Totenkopf”. On the left flank of the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, as well as the 183rd Rifle Division of the 69th Army, went on the offensive. The enemy was attacked from the air by aircraft of the 2nd and parts of the 17th Air Armies, as well as long-range aviation. This is how the commander of the 2nd Air Army, Air Marshal S.A. Krasovsky, describes these events: “On the morning of July 12, our bombers and attack aircraft dropped thousands of anti-tank bombs on the battle formations of enemy tank forces... The ground units supported echelon bombing operations, striking at concentrations of tanks enemy in the Gryaznoye area, Oktyabrsky village, Mal. Mayachki, Pokrovka, Yakovlevo...”
On the field near Prokhorovka, real tank duels began. It was a confrontation not only between tactics and the skill of the crews, but also between the tanks themselves.
In the German units, medium tanks T-IV modifications G and H (hull armor thickness - 80 mm, turret - 50 mm) and heavy T-VIE "Tiger" tanks (hull armor thickness 100 mm, turret - 110 mm) fought. Both of these tanks had powerful long-barreled guns (75 mm and 88 mm caliber), which penetrated almost any point of the armor protection of Soviet tanks (with the exception of the heavy IS-2 tank at a distance of over 500 meters). The Soviet T-34 tanks that took part in the battle had an advantage over all German tanks in speed and maneuverability, but the thickness of their armor was inferior to the Tiger, and their guns were less powerful than those on German medium and heavy tanks.
Our tanks wedged themselves into the battle formations of the German troops, trying to gain an advantage through speed and maneuverability, and shoot the enemy from close range into the side armor. Very soon the battle formations were mixed. Close combat at short distances deprived the Germans of the advantages of powerful guns. It was crowded due to the mass of armored vehicles that could not turn around and maneuver. They collided, their ammunition exploded, and tank turrets torn off by the explosion flew up tens of meters. The smoke and soot made it difficult to see what was happening; dozens of bombers, attack aircraft and fighters were flying over the battlefield. Soviet aviation dominated the air.
The commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, P.A. Rotmistrov, recalled the events near Prokhorovka: “Until late in the evening, there was an incessant roar of engines, the clanging of tracks, and exploding shells on the battlefield. Hundreds of tanks and self-propelled guns were burning. Clouds of dust and smoke clouded the sky...”
In the middle of the day, the most intense and stubborn battles took place on the northern slopes of height 226.6 and along the railway. Here, fighters of the 95th Guards Rifle Division repelled attempts by the SS Totenkopf division to break through the defenses in a northern direction. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps ousted the Germans west of the railway and began a rapid offensive against the villages of Kalinin and Teterevino. In the afternoon, the advanced units of the SS Reich division were able to advance, occupying the Belenikhino station and the Storozhevoy village. At the end of the day, the “Dead Head” division, having received reinforcements with powerful aviation and artillery support, broke through the defenses of the 95th and 52nd rifle divisions and reached the villages of Vesely and Polezhaev. Enemy tanks tried to break through to the Prokhorovka-Kartashovka road, but the enemy was stopped by the heroic efforts of the soldiers of the 95th Guards Rifle Division. A platoon under the command of Senior Lieutenant P. Shpetny destroyed 7 enemy tanks. The platoon commander, who was seriously wounded, threw himself under the tank with grenades. P. Shpetny was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. “The breakthrough of German tanks into this area created a dangerous situation on the flanks of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps,” A.S. Zhadov wrote in his memoirs.
The fighting on July 12 led to huge losses in the Adolf Hitler and Death's Head divisions, which greatly weakened their combat capabilities.
In his book “Memories and Reflections,” Marshal G.K. Zhukov writes: “During July 12, the greatest battle of tankers, artillerymen, riflemen and pilots took place on the Voronezh front, especially fierce in the Prokhorovsk direction, where the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of General P.A. operated most successfully. Rotmistrov."
Over the next three days, fierce fighting took place south of Prokhorovka. In this sector, the 3rd Panzer Corps of the Kempf Army Group tried to break through the defenses of the 69th Army in the area between the Seversky and Lipovy Donets rivers. However, Soviet troops held back the onslaught of the Germans.
On July 16, the Germans stopped their attacking actions and began to retreat towards Belgorod.Troops of the Voronezh and reserve Steppe fronts began to pursue German units.
The German Citadel plan failed. The Wehrmacht's tank forces were badly battered and could no longer restore their former strength. The period of retreat of German troops began.
During the entire post-war period, no study was carried out in which the chronological framework was clearly and clearly established, the course of the battle was outlined, the scale, the exact number of armored vehicles used, and their losses on both sides were fully and objectively assessed.
They say that motor oil is thicker than blood (especially if it is oil from Continent LLC). A lot of both were shed in this battle...
In the literature published until recently, these issues are covered, as a rule, without analysis or references to the combat documents of the formations participating in the battle. At best, the authors cite the opinions of the participants in this event to support their point of view without critically understanding them. A large number of articles, usually published on holiday dates, contributed significantly to the confusion with numbers and facts. Some journalists did not bother to seriously and painstakingly deal with these issues.
Thus, over time, the history of the battle acquired a large number of inaccuracies and myths, turning into a legend. But no matter how it was, this does not detract from the great feat of the Red Army soldiers!
Tank counterattack. Still from the film “Liberation: Arc of Fire.” 1968
There is silence over the Prokhorovsky field. Only from time to time you can hear the bell ringing, calling parishioners to worship in the Church of Peter and Paul, which was built with public donations in memory of the soldiers who died on the Kursk Bulge.
Gertsovka, Cherkasskoe, Lukhanino, Luchki, Yakovlevo, Belenikhino, Mikhailovka, Melekhovo... These names now hardly say anything to the younger generation. And 70 years ago, a terrible battle was raging here; the largest oncoming tank battle took place in the Prokhorovka area. Everything that could burn was burning; everything was covered in dust, fumes and smoke from burning tanks, villages, forests and grain fields. The earth was scorched to such an extent that not a single blade of grass remained on it. Soviet guards and the elite of the Wehrmacht - the SS tank divisions - met head-on here.
Before the Prokhorovsky tank battle, there were fierce clashes between the tank forces of both sides in the 13th Army of the Central Front, in which up to 1000 tanks took part in the most critical moments.
But tank battles took on the largest scale in the Voronezh Front. Here, in the first days of the battle, the forces of the 4th Tank Army and the 3rd Tank Corps of the Germans collided with three corps of the 1st Tank Army, the 2nd and 5th Guards Separate Tank Corps.
“LET'S HAVE LUNCH IN KURSK!”
The fighting on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge actually began on July 4, when German units attempted to knock down military outposts in the zone of the 6th Guards Army.
But the main events unfolded early in the morning of July 5, when the Germans launched the first massive attack with their tank formations in the direction of Oboyan.
On the morning of July 5, the commander of the Adolf Hitler division, Obergruppenführer Joseph Dietrich, drove up to his Tigers, and some officer shouted to him: “Let's have lunch in Kursk!”
But the SS men did not have to have lunch or dinner in Kursk. Only by the end of the day on July 5 did they manage to break through the defensive line of the 6th Army. Exhausted soldiers of the German assault battalions took refuge in the captured trenches to eat dry rations and get some sleep.
On the right flank of Army Group South, Task Force Kempf crossed the river. Seversky Donets and attacked the 7th Guards Army.
Tiger gunner of the 503rd heavy tank battalion of the 3rd Panzer Corps Gerhard Niemann: “Another anti-tank gun about 40 meters ahead of us. The gun crew flees in panic, with the exception of one man. He leans towards the sight and shoots. A terrible blow to the fighting compartment. The driver maneuvers, maneuver - and another gun is crushed by our tracks. And again a terrible blow, this time to the rear of the tank. Our engine sneezes, but nevertheless continues to work.”
On July 6 and 7, the 1st Tank Army took the main attack. In a few hours of battle, all that was left of its 538th and 1008th anti-tank fighter regiments, as they say, were only numbers. On July 7, the Germans launched a concentric attack in the direction of Oboyan. Only in the area between Syrtsev and Yakovlev on a front stretching five to six kilometers, the commander of the 4th German Tank Army, Hoth, deployed up to 400 tanks, supporting their offensive with a massive air and artillery strike.
Commander of the 1st Tank Army, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Mikhail Katukov: “We got out of the gap and climbed a small hill where a command post was equipped. It was half past four in the afternoon. But it seemed that a solar eclipse had arrived. The sun disappeared behind clouds of dust. And ahead in the twilight bursts of shots could be seen, the earth took off and crumbled, engines roared and tracks clanged. As soon as enemy tanks approached our positions, they were met by dense artillery and tank fire. Leaving damaged and burning vehicles on the battlefield, the enemy rolled back and went on the attack again.”
By the end of July 8, Soviet troops, after heavy defensive battles, retreated to the second army line of defense.
300 KILOMETER MARCH
The decision to strengthen the Voronezh Front was made on July 6, despite violent protests from the commander of the Steppe Front, I.S. Koneva. Stalin gave the order to move the 5th Guards Tank Army to the rear of the troops of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, as well as to strengthen the Voronezh Front with the 2nd Tank Corps.
The 5th Guards Tank Army had about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns, including T-34-501 medium tanks and T-70-261 light tanks. On the night of July 6-7, the army moved to the front line. The march took place around the clock under the cover of aviation from the 2nd Air Army.
Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Pavel Rotmistrov: “Already at 8 o’clock in the morning it became hot, and clouds of dust rose into the sky. By noon, dust covered roadside bushes, wheat fields, tanks and trucks in a thick layer, the dark red disk of the sun was barely visible through the gray dust curtain. Tanks, self-propelled guns and tractors (pulling guns), armored infantry vehicles and trucks moved forward in an endless stream. The soldiers' faces were covered with dust and soot from the exhaust pipes. It was unbearably hot. The soldiers were thirsty, and their tunics, soaked with sweat, stuck to their bodies. It was especially difficult for the driver mechanics during the march. The tank crews tried to make their task as easy as possible. Every now and then someone would replace the drivers, and during short rest stops they would be allowed to sleep.”
The aviation of the 2nd Air Army so reliably covered the 5th Guards Tank Army on the march that German intelligence was never able to detect its arrival. Having traveled 200 km, the army arrived in the area southwest of Stary Oskol on the morning of July 8. Then, having put the material part in order, the army corps again made a 100-kilometer throw and, by the end of July 9, concentrated in the area of Bobryshev, Vesely, Aleksandrovsky, strictly at the appointed time.
MAN MAIN CHANGES THE DIRECTION OF THE MAIN IMPACT
On the morning of July 8, an even more fierce struggle broke out in the Oboyan and Korochan directions. The main feature of the struggle that day was that the Soviet troops, repelling massive enemy attacks, themselves began to launch strong counterattacks on the flanks of the 4th German Tank Army.
As in previous days, the most fierce fighting broke out in the area of the Simferopol-Moscow highway, where units of the SS Panzer Division "Gross Germany", the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions, reinforced by individual companies and battalions of the Tigers and Ferdinands, were advancing. Units of the 1st Tank Army again bore the brunt of enemy attacks. In this direction, the enemy simultaneously deployed up to 400 tanks, and fierce fighting continued here all day.
Intense fighting also continued in the Korochan direction, where by the end of the day the Kempf army group broke through in a narrow wedge in the Melekhov area.
The commander of the 19th German Panzer Division, Lieutenant General Gustav Schmidt: “Despite the heavy losses suffered by the enemy, and the fact that entire sections of trenches and trenches were burned out by flamethrower tanks, we were unable to dislodge the group entrenched there from the northern part of the defensive line enemy force up to a battalion. The Russians settled in the trench system, knocked out our flamethrower tanks with anti-tank rifle fire and put up fanatical resistance.”
On the morning of July 9, a German strike force of several hundred tanks, with massive air support, resumed the offensive in a 10-kilometer area. By the end of the day, she broke through to the third line of defense. And in the Korochan direction, the enemy broke into the second line of defense.
Nevertheless, the stubborn resistance of the troops of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards armies in the Oboyan direction forced the command of Army Group South to change the direction of the main attack, moving it from the Simferopol-Moscow highway to the east to the Prokhorovka area. This movement of the main attack, in addition to the fact that several days of fierce fighting on the highway did not give the Germans the desired results, was also determined by the nature of the terrain. From the Prokhorovka area, a wide strip of heights stretches in a northwestern direction, which dominate the surrounding area and are convenient for the operations of large tank masses.
The general plan of the command of Army Group South was to launch three strong strikes in a comprehensive manner, which should have led to the encirclement and destruction of two groups of Soviet troops and to the opening of offensive routes to Kursk.
To develop the success, it was planned to introduce fresh forces into the battle - the 24th Panzer Corps as part of the SS Viking division and the 17th Panzer Division, which on July 10 were urgently transferred from Donbass to Kharkov. The German command scheduled the start of the attack on Kursk from the north and south for the morning of July 11.
In turn, the command of the Voronezh Front, having received the approval of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, decided to prepare and conduct a counter-offensive with the aim of encircling and defeating enemy groups advancing in the Oboyan and Prokhorovsky directions. Formations of the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Army were concentrated against the main group of SS tank divisions in the Prokhorovsk direction. The start of the general counteroffensive was scheduled for the morning of July 12.
On July 11, all three German groups of E. Manstein went on the offensive, and later than everyone else, clearly expecting the attention of the Soviet command to be diverted to other directions, the main group launched an offensive in the Prokhorovsk direction - the tank divisions of the 2nd SS Corps under the command of Obergruppenführer Paul Hauser, awarded the highest award of the Third Reich "Oak leaves to the Knight's Cross".
By the end of the day, a large group of tanks from the SS Reich Division managed to break through to the village of Storozhevoye, posing a threat to the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army. To eliminate this threat, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was sent in. Fierce oncoming tank battles continued throughout the night. As a result, the main strike group of the 4th German Tank Army, having launched an offensive on a front of only about 8 km, reached the approaches to Prokhorovka in a narrow strip and was forced to suspend the offensive, occupying the line from which the 5th Guards Tank Army planned to launch its counteroffensive.
The second strike group - the SS Panzer Division "Gross Germany", the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions - achieved even less success. Our troops successfully repulsed their attacks.
However, northeast of Belgorod, where the Kempf army group was advancing, a threatening situation had arisen. The enemy's 6th and 7th tank divisions broke through to the north in a narrow wedge. Their forward units were only 18 km from the main group of SS tank divisions, which were advancing southwest of Prokhorovka.
To eliminate the breakthrough of German tanks against the Kempf army group, part of the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army was sent: two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and one brigade of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.
In addition, the Soviet command decided to begin the planned counter-offensive two hours earlier, although preparations for the counter-offensive were not yet completed. However, the situation forced us to act immediately and decisively. Any delay was beneficial only to the enemy.
PROKHOROVKA
At 8.30 on July 12, Soviet strike groups launched a counteroffensive against the troops of the 4th German Tank Army. However, due to the German breakthrough to Prokhorovka, the diversion of significant forces of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards armies to eliminate the threat to their rear and the postponement of the start of the counteroffensive, Soviet troops launched an attack without artillery and air support. As the English historian Robin Cross writes: “Artillery preparation schedules were torn to shreds and rewritten again.”
Manstein threw all his available forces into repelling the attacks of the Soviet troops, because he clearly understood that the success of the offensive of the Soviet troops could lead to the complete defeat of the entire strike force of the German Army Group South. A fierce struggle broke out on a huge front with a total length of more than 200 km.
The most fierce fighting during July 12 broke out on the so-called Prokhorov bridgehead. From the north it was limited by the river. Psel, and from the south - a railway embankment near the village of Belenikino. This strip of terrain measuring up to 7 km along the front and up to 8 km in depth was captured by the enemy as a result of intense fighting during July 11. The main enemy group deployed and operated on the bridgehead as part of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 320 tanks and assault guns, including several dozen Tiger, Panther and Ferdinand vehicles. It was against this grouping that the Soviet command delivered its main blow with the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army and part of the forces of the 5th Guards Army.
The battlefield was clearly visible from Rotmistrov's observation post.
Pavel Rotmistrov: “A few minutes later, the tanks of the first echelon of our 29th and 18th corps, firing on the move, crashed head-on into the battle formations of the Nazi troops, literally piercing the enemy’s battle formation with a swift through attack. The Nazis, obviously, did not expect to encounter such a large mass of our combat vehicles and such a decisive attack. Control in the enemy's advanced units was clearly disrupted. His "Tigers" and "Panthers", deprived of their fire advantage in close combat, which they enjoyed at the beginning of the offensive in a clash with our other tank formations, were now successfully hit by Soviet T-34 and even T-70 tanks from short distances. The battlefield swirled with smoke and dust, and the ground shook from powerful explosions. The tanks ran at each other and, having grappled, could no longer disperse, they fought to the death until one of them burst into flames or stopped with broken tracks. But even damaged tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire.”
West of Prokhorovka along the left bank of the Psel River, units of the 18th Tank Corps went on the offensive. His tank brigades disrupted the battle formations of the advancing enemy tank units, stopped them and began to move forward themselves.
Deputy commander of the tank battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps, Evgeniy Shkurdalov: “I only saw what was, so to speak, within the boundaries of my tank battalion. The 170th Tank Brigade was ahead of us. With tremendous speed, it wedged itself into the location of the heavy German tanks that were in the first wave, and the German tanks penetrated our tanks. The tanks were very close to each other, and therefore they literally shot at point-blank range, simply shooting at each other. This brigade burned down in just five minutes—sixty-five vehicles.”
Radio operator of the command tank of the Adolf Hitler tank division, Wilhelm Res: “Russian tanks were rushing at full throttle. In our area they were prevented by an anti-tank ditch. At full speed they flew into this ditch, due to their speed they covered three or four meters in it, but then seemed to freeze in a slightly inclined position with the gun raised up. Literally for a moment! Taking advantage of this, many of our tank commanders fired directly at point-blank range.”
Evgeniy Shkurdalov: “I knocked out the first tank when I was moving along the landing along the railway, and literally at a distance of a hundred meters I saw a Tiger tank, which stood sideways to me and fired at our tanks. Apparently he knocked out quite a few of our vehicles, since the vehicles were moving sideways towards him, and he fired at the sides of our vehicles. I took aim with a sub-caliber projectile and fired. The tank caught fire. I fired again and the tank caught fire even more. The crew jumped out, but somehow I had no time for them. I bypassed this tank, then knocked out the T-III tank and the Panther. When I knocked out the Panther, you know, there was a feeling of delight that you see, I did such a heroic deed.”
The 29th Tank Corps, with the support of units of the 9th Guards Airborne Division, launched a counteroffensive along the railway and highway southwest of Prokhorovka. As noted in the corps' combat log, the attack began without artillery bombardment of the line occupied by the enemy and without air cover. This enabled the enemy to open concentrated fire on the corps’ combat formations and bomb its tank and infantry units with impunity, which led to large losses and a decrease in the tempo of the attack, and this, in turn, enabled the enemy to conduct effective artillery and tank fire from the spot.
Wilhelm Res: “Suddenly one T-34 broke through and moved straight towards us. Our first radio operator began handing shells to me one at a time so that I could put them in the cannon. At this time, our commander above kept shouting: “Shot! Shot!" - because the tank was moving closer and closer. And only after the fourth – “Shot” – did I hear: “Thank God!”
Then, after some time, we determined that the T-34 had stopped just eight meters from us! At the top of the tower he had, as if stamped, 5-centimeter holes located at the same distance from each other, as if they had been measured with a compass. The battle formations of the parties were mixed up. Our tankers successfully hit the enemy from close ranges, but they themselves suffered heavy losses.”
From the documents of the Central Administration of the Russian Ministry of Defense: “The T-34 tank of the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps, Captain Skripkin, crashed into the Tiger formation and knocked out two enemy tanks before an 88-mm shell hit his T turret -34, and the other penetrated the side armor. The Soviet tank caught fire, and the wounded Skripkin was pulled out of the wrecked car by his driver, Sergeant Nikolaev, and radio operator Zyryanov. They took cover in a crater, but still one of the Tigers noticed them and moved towards them. Then Nikolaev and his loader Chernov again jumped into the burning car, started it and aimed it straight at the Tiger. Both tanks exploded upon collision.”
The impact of Soviet armor and new tanks with a full set of ammunition thoroughly shook Hauser's battle-weary divisions, and the German offensive stopped.
From the report of the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the Kursk Bulge region, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Vasilevsky, to Stalin: “Yesterday I personally observed a tank battle of our 18th and 29th corps with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack southwest of Prokhorovka. At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the PCs we had took part in the battle. As a result, the entire battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks within an hour.”
As a result of the counteroffensive of the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army southwest of Prokhorovka, the offensive of the SS tank divisions “Totenkopf” and “Adolf Hitler” to the northeast was thwarted; these divisions suffered such losses that they could no longer launch a serious offensive.
Units of the SS tank division "Reich" also suffered heavy losses from attacks by units of the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, which launched a counteroffensive south of Prokhorovka.
In the breakthrough area of the Army Group "Kempf" south and southeast of Prokhorovka, fierce fighting also continued throughout the day on July 12, as a result of which the attack of the Army Group "Kempf" to the north was stopped by tankers of the 5th Guards Tank and units of the 69th Army .
LOSSES AND RESULTS
On the night of July 13, Rotmistrov took the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal Georgy Zhukov, to the headquarters of the 29th Tank Corps. On the way, Zhukov stopped the car several times to personally inspect the sites of recent battles. At one point, he got out of the car and looked for a long time at the burnt-out Panther, rammed by a T-70 tank. A few tens of meters away stood a Tiger and a T-34 locked in a deadly embrace. “This is what a through tank attack means,” Zhukov said quietly, as if to himself, taking off his cap.
Data on the losses of the parties, in particular tanks, vary dramatically in different sources. Manstein, in his book “Lost Victories,” writes that in total, during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, Soviet troops lost 1,800 tanks. The collection “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Wars, Combat Actions and Military Conflicts” talks about 1,600 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns disabled during the defensive battle on the Kursk Bulge.
A very remarkable attempt to calculate German tank losses was made by the English historian Robin Cross in his book “The Citadel. Battle of Kursk". If we put his diagram into a table, we get the following picture: (see the table for the number and losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the 4th German Tank Army in the period July 4–17, 1943).
Cross's data differs from Soviet sources, which may be understandable to a certain extent. Thus, it is known that on the evening of July 6, Vatutin reported to Stalin that during the fierce battles that lasted all day, 322 enemy tanks were destroyed (Kross had 244).
But there are also completely incomprehensible discrepancies in the numbers. For example, aerial photography taken on July 7 at 13.15, only in the area of Syrtsev, Krasnaya Polyana along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway, where the SS Panzer Division “Great Germany” from the 48th Panzer Corps was advancing, recorded 200 burning enemy tanks. According to Cross, on July 7, 48 Tank lost only three tanks (?!).
Or another fact. According to Soviet sources, as a result of bombing attacks on concentrated enemy troops (SS Great Germany and 11th TD) on the morning of July 9, many fires broke out throughout the area of the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. It was German tanks, self-propelled guns, cars, motorcycles, tanks, fuel and ammunition depots that were burning. According to Cross, on July 9 there were no losses at all in the German 4th Tank Army, although, as he himself writes, on July 9 it fought stubbornly, overcoming fierce resistance from Soviet troops. But it was precisely by the evening of July 9 that Manstein decided to abandon the attack on Oboyan and began to look for other ways to break through to Kursk from the south.
The same can be said about Cross's data for July 10 and 11, according to which there were no losses in the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This is also surprising, since it was on these days that the divisions of this corps delivered the main blow and, after fierce fighting, were able to break through to Prokhorovka. And it was on July 11 that Hero of the Soviet Union Guard Sergeant M.F. accomplished his feat. Borisov, who destroyed seven German tanks.
After archival documents were opened, it became possible to more accurately assess Soviet losses in the tank battle of Prokhorovka. According to the combat log of the 29th Tank Corps for July 12, of the 212 tanks and self-propelled guns that entered the battle, 150 vehicles (more than 70%) were lost by the end of the day, of which 117 (55%) were irretrievably lost. According to combat report No. 38 of the commander of the 18th Tank Corps dated July 13, 1943, corps losses amounted to 55 tanks, or 30% of their original strength. Thus, it is possible to obtain a more or less accurate figure for the losses suffered by the 5th Guards Tank Army in the battle of Prokhorovka against the SS divisions “Adolf Hitler” and “Totenkopf” - over 200 tanks and self-propelled guns.
As for the German losses at Prokhorovka, there is an absolutely fantastic discrepancy in the numbers.
According to Soviet sources, when the battles near Kursk died down and broken military equipment began to be removed from the battlefields, more than 400 broken and burned German tanks were counted in a small area southwest of Prokhorovka, where an oncoming tank battle unfolded on July 12. Rotmistrov claimed in his memoirs that on July 12, in battles with the 5th Guards Tank Army, the enemy lost over 350 tanks and more than 10 thousand people killed.
But in the late 1990s, German military historian Karl-Heinz Friser published sensational data he obtained after studying German archives. According to these data, the Germans lost four tanks in the battle of Prokhorovka. After additional research, he came to the conclusion that in fact the losses were even less - three tanks.
Documentary evidence refutes these absurd conclusions. Thus, the combat log of the 29th Tank Corps states that enemy losses included 68 tanks (it is interesting to note that this coincides with Cross’s data). A combat report from the headquarters of the 33rd Guards Corps to the commander of the 5th Guards Army dated July 13, 1943 states that the 97th Guards Rifle Division destroyed 47 tanks over the past 24 hours. It is further reported that during the night of July 12, the enemy removed his damaged tanks, the number of which exceeded 200 vehicles. The 18th Tank Corps chalked up several dozen destroyed enemy tanks.
One can agree with Cross’s statement that tank losses are generally difficult to calculate, since disabled vehicles were repaired and went into battle again. In addition, enemy losses are usually always exaggerated. Nevertheless, it can be assumed with a high degree of probability that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps lost at least over 100 tanks in the battle of Prokhorovka (excluding the losses of the SS Reich Panzer Division, which operated south of Prokhorovka). In total, according to Cross, the losses of the 4th German Tank Army from July 4 to July 14 amounted to about 600 tanks and self-propelled guns out of 916 at the start of Operation Citadel. This almost coincides with the data of the German historian Engelmann, who, citing Manstein’s report, claims that in the period from July 5 to July 13, the German 4th Tank Army lost 612 armored vehicles. The losses of the 3rd German Tank Corps by July 15 amounted to 240 tanks out of 310 available.
The total losses of the parties in the oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka, taking into account the actions of Soviet troops against the 4th German Tank Army and the Kempf Army Group, are estimated as follows. On the Soviet side, 500 were lost, on the German side - 300 tanks and self-propelled guns. Cross claims that after the Battle of Prokhorov, Hauser's sappers blew up damaged German equipment that was beyond repair and standing in no man's land. After August 1, German repair shops in Kharkov and Bogodukhov accumulated such a quantity of faulty equipment that they had to be sent even to Kyiv for repairs.
Of course, the German Army Group South suffered its greatest losses in the first seven days of fighting, even before the battle of Prokhorovka. But the main significance of the Prokhorovsky battle lies not even in the damage caused to the German tank formations, but in the fact that the Soviet soldiers dealt a powerful blow and managed to stop the SS tank divisions rushing to Kursk. This undermined the morale of the elite of the German tank forces, after which they finally lost faith in the victory of German weapons.
| Number and losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the 4th German Tank Army July 4–17, 1943 | |||||||
| date | The number of tanks in the 2nd SS Tank Tank | Number of tanks in the 48th Tank Tank | Total | Tank losses in the 2nd SS Tank Tank | Tank losses in the 48th Tank Tank | Total | Notes |
| 04.07 | 470 | 446 | 916 | 39 | – | 39 | 48th TK – ? |
| 05.07 | 431 | 453 | 884 | 21 | – | 21 | 48th TK – ? |
| 06.07 | 410 | 455 | 865 | 110 | 134 | 244 |
|
| 07.07 | 300 | 321 | 621 | 2 | 3 | 5 |
|
| 08.07 | 308 | 318 | 626 | 30 | 95 | 125 |
|
| 09.07 | 278 | 223 | 501 | – | – | – | ? |
| 10.07 | 292 | 227 | 519 | – | 6 | 6 | 2nd SS Tank - ? |
| 11.07 | 309 | 221 | 530 | – | 33 | 33 | 2nd SS Tank - ? |
| 12.07 | 320 | 188 | 508 | 68 | – | 68 | 48th TK – ? |
| 13.07 | 252 | 253 | 505 | – | 36 | 36 | 2nd SS Tank - ? |
| 14.07 | 271 | 217 | 488 | 11 | 9 | 20 |
|
| 15.07 | 260 | 206 | 466 | – | – | – | ? |
| 16.07 | 298 | 232 | 530 | – | – | ? |
|
| 17.07 | 312 | 279 | 591 | no data | no data | – |
|
| Total tanks lost in the 4th Tank Army |
|
| 280 | 316 | 596 |
|
|
Official Soviet historiography called the battle of Prokhorovka legendary. A battle broke out on the battlefield, which was recognized as the greatest oncoming tank battle in history, without, however, specifying the number of armored vehicles participating in it.
For a long time, the main story about this episode of the war was I. Markin’s book “The Battle of Kursk,” published in 1953. Then, already in the seventies, the epic film “Liberation” was shot, one of the episodes of which was dedicated to the Battle of Kursk. And its main part was. Without exaggeration, it can be said that Soviet people studied the history of the war from these works of art. For the first ten years there was no information at all about the world's greatest tank battle.
Legendary means mythical. These words are synonyms. Historians are forced to turn to myths when other sources are unavailable. The battle of Prokhorovka took place not in Old Testament times, but in 1943. The reluctance of honored military leaders to tell details about events so distant in time indicates that they made tactical, strategic or other miscalculations.
At the beginning of the summer of 1943, in the area of the city of Kursk, the front line was formed in such a way that an arc-shaped protrusion was formed deep into the German defense. The German General Staff reacted to this situation in a rather stereotypical manner. Their task was to cut off, encircle, and subsequently defeat the Soviet group, consisting of the Central and Voronezh fronts. According to the Citadel plan, the Germans were going to launch counter strikes in the direction from Orel and Belgorod.
The enemy's intentions were guessed. The Soviet command took measures to prevent a breakthrough of the defense and was preparing a retaliatory strike, which was supposed to follow after exhausting the advancing German troops. Both warring sides made movements of armored forces to implement their plans.
It is reliably known that on July 10, the Second SS under the command of Gruppenführer Paul Hausser collided with units of the Fifth Panzer of Pavel Rotmistrov, who was preparing for an offensive. The resulting confrontation lasted almost a week. It culminated on July 12th.
What is true in this information and what is fiction?
Apparently, the battle of Prokhorovka came as a surprise, both to the Soviet and German commands. Tanks are used for the offensive, their main function is to support infantry and overcome defense lines. The number of Soviet armored vehicles outnumbered the enemy, so at first glance, a counter battle was unprofitable for the Germans. However, the enemy skillfully took advantage of the favorable terrain, which made it possible to fire from long distances. Soviet T-34-75 tanks, which had an advantage in maneuver, were inferior to the Tigers in turret armament. In addition, every third person in this battle was a light reconnaissance T-70.
The factor of surprise was also important; the Germans discovered the enemy earlier and were the first to attack. Their best coordination of actions was due to well-organized radio communications.
In such difficult conditions the battle of Prokhorovka began. The losses were huge, and their ratio was not in favor of the Soviet troops.
According to the plan of the commander of the Voronezh Front Vatutin and member of the military council Khrushchev, the result of the counterattack should have been the defeat of the German group that was trying to make a breakthrough. This did not happen, and the operation was declared a failure. However, it later turned out that there was still a benefit from it, and a huge one. The Wehrmacht suffered catastrophic losses, the German command lost the initiative, and the offensive plan was thwarted, albeit at the cost of great blood. Then a fictitious plan for the battle of Prokhorovka appeared in hindsight, and the operation was declared a major military success.
So, the official description of these events near Kursk is based on three myths:
Myth one: a premeditated operation. Although this was not the case. The battle occurred due to lack of awareness of the enemy's plans.
Myth two: the main reason for the loss of tanks by both sides was the oncoming battle. That wasn't true either. Most of the armored vehicles, both German and Soviet, were hit by anti-tank artillery.
Myth three: the battle took place continuously and on one field - Prokhorovsky. And that was not the case. The battle consisted of many separate combat episodes, from July 10 to July 17, 1943.
After five days of defensive battles south of Kursk, the command of the Voronezh Front reported to Headquarters that the German offensive was running out of steam and the moment had come to take active action.
In the evening, the command of the Voronezh Front received an order from Headquarters to conduct a counterattack against a large group of German search forces. Clustered in the Mal area. Beacons, Ozerovsky. To carry out a counterattack, the front was reinforced by two armies, the 5th Guards, under the command of A. Zhadov, and the 5th Guards Tank, under the command of P. Rotmistrov. transferred from the Steppe Front. The plan for carrying out a counterattack, developed at the headquarters of the Voronezh Front with the participation of the representative of the Headquarters A. Vasilevsky VI army commanders, was as follows. The main core of the 5th Guards Tank Army, reinforced by two breakthrough tank regiments, was supposed to, with the support of two self-propelled artillery regiments and a regiment of guards rocket mortars and all available attack aircraft, cut in two the SS tank corps, whose forces seemed to have dried up in the previous laziness. At the same time, it was planned to reach the Pokrovka-Yakovlevo line. then turn to the East and West, cutting off the retreat routes for the German troops and encircling the resolved groups with the assistance of units of the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 2nd Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.
However, preparations for a counterattack, which began on July 10-11, were thwarted by the Germans, who themselves inflicted powerful blows on our defense in this section of the bottom. One is in the direction of Oboyan, and the second is towards Prokhorovka. The first strike, according to the Germans, was more of a distracting nature, and nevertheless, its strength and surprise led to the fact that some units of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies retreated 1-2 km in the direction of Oboyan.
The offensive began in different sectors in the direction of Prokhorovka, when the 2nd battalion of the SS tank regiment “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” (LSSAH), together with the 3rd battalion under the command of I. Peiper, with a sudden attack captured the height of 252.2, dominating the Teterevino-Prokhorovka road. After 10 minutes, the Tiger company of the Totenkopf division began to cross the Psel River, trying to expand the bridgehead between the villages of Krasny Oktyabr and Mikhailovka.
South-West of Prokhorovka in the direction of the village. Yasnaya Polyana led the attack from the SS division Das Reich. Due to the sudden disorganized withdrawal of some infantry units of the 5th Guards Army and the 2nd Tank Corps, the artillery preparation of the Soviet counteroffensive, which began on July 10, was disrupted. Many batteries were left without infantry cover and suffered losses both in deployment positions and on the move. The front found itself in a very difficult situation.
Only the quick introduction of the 42nd Infantry Division into the battle, as well as the transfer of all available artillery to direct fire, made it possible to stop the advance of German tanks.
Group "Kempf" consisted of the 6th and 19th Panzer Divisions, which had about 180 tanks, which were opposed by 100 domestic tanks. On the night of July 11, the Germans launched a surprise attack from the Melekhovo area to the north and northwest with the goal of breaking through to Prokhorovka. The infantry units of the 9th Guards and 305th Rifle Divisions defending in this direction, who did not expect such a powerful blow, retreated. To cover the exposed section of the front, on the night of July 11-12, 10 IPTABr from the Stanki reserve were transferred. In addition, the 1510th IPTAP and a separate anti-tank rifle battalion were involved in this area. These forces, together with infantry units of the 35th Guards Rifle Corps, did not allow the development of an offensive in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka. In this area, the Germans managed to break through only to the Sev River. Donets in the Novo-Oskonnoye region.
July 12, 1943. Decisive day.
Opponents' plans for the decisive day.
The commander of the SS Panzer Corps, Paul Hausser, assigned the following tasks to his three divisions:
LSSAH - bypass the village. Storozhevoye from the north and reach the line Petrovka - st. Prokhorovka. at the same time strengthening its position at an altitude of 252.2.
Das Reich - push back the opposing Soviet troops to the line east of Ivanovka.
Totenkopf - conduct an offensive along the Prokhorovka-Kartashevka road.
This was an offensive in the direction of the station. Prokhorovka from three directions in order to overcome the last line of Soviet defense and prepare the “gate” for entering the reserves of Army Group “South” into the breakthrough.
At the same time, the Command of the Voronezh Front, considering the German offensive thwarted and the crisis overcome, was about to launch a planned counter-offensive on Luchki and Yakovleve. At this point, the 5th hectare tank army began to concentrate two tank corps, which included about 580 tanks, P. Rotmistrov chose the line of deployment of the first echelon of the army to the west and southwest of the station. Prokhorovka at the front 15 km. Units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Corps also prepared for snowflakes.
By 5 o'clock in the morning. A diversionary strike by the Germans from the south.At this time, the German troops of the Kempf group, trying to develop their offensive in a northern direction, struck in the defense zone of the 69th Army. By 5 o'clock in the morning, units of the 81st and 92nd Guards Rifle Divisions of the 69th Army were thrown back from the defensive line near the river. Northern Donets - Cossack and the Germans managed to capture the villages of Rzhavets, Ryndinka, Vypolzovka. A threat arose to the left flank of the deploying 5th Guards Tank Army and, by order of Headquarters representative A. Vasilevsky, front commander N. Vatutin gave the order to send the mobile reserve of the 5th Guards Tank Army to the defense zone of the 69th Army.
At 8 a.m.A reserve group under the command of General Trufanov launched a counterattack on the units of the German troops of the Kempf group that had broken through.
Thanks to the persistent defense of the Red Army units, the Germans' 3rd Tank Corps (300 tanks and 25 assault guns) never managed to break through to Rotmistrov's positions from the south.
At 7:45.Immediately after dawn on July 12, light rain began, which slightly delayed the start of the German offensive on Prokhorovka, but did not prevent the Soviet 18th Tank Corps under General Bakharov from launching an attack on the 2nd LSSAH battalion on the outskirts of the Oktyabrsky state farm with the forces of one tank brigade. Up to 40 Soviet tanks launched an attack on the village of Mikhailovka, but were repulsed by a division of assault guns and retreated.
From 8 o'clock in the morningLuftwaffe aircraft began intensive bombing of Soviet positions near Prokhorovka.
AT 8.30 AMthe main forces of the German troops as part of the tank divisions Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Das Reich and Totenkonf. numbering up to 500 tanks and self-propelled guns (including 42 Tiger tanks), went on the offensive in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka in the highway and railway zone. This grouping was supported by all available air forces. However, in the first phase of this offensive, only up to half of the armored forces available to the German troops were involved - one battalion each of the LSSAH and Das Reich divisions, two Tiger companies and one T-34 company, with a total of about 230 tanks. 70 assault guns and 39 Marder anti-tank self-propelled guns.
At 9:00After a 15-minute artillery barrage, the German group was, in turn, attacked by the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army. The 18th Tank Corps of General Bakharov broke into the Oktyabrsky state farm at high speed, and despite heavy losses, captured it. However, near the villages of Andreevka and Vasilyevka, he met an enemy tank group, which included 15 Tiger tanks and a battalion of assault guns. Two platoons of "Tigers" (H. Wendarf and M. Wittmann) opened fire on Soviet tanks from a standing position from a distance of 1000-1200 m. The assault guns, maneuvering, fired from short stops. Having lost about 40 tanks, units of the 18th. were able to capture Vasilyevka, but were unable to develop the offensive further and at 18 o’clock they went on the defensive. From their fire, the Germans lost one Tiger and seven assault guns burnt out, as well as three Tigers, six medium tanks and up to 10 self-propelled guns knocked out and damaged.
At approximately 11:30The 29th Panzer Corps began the battle for height 252.5 where it was met by tanks of the SS Division “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”. Throughout the day, the corps fought a maneuver battle, but after 16 hours it was pushed back by the approaching tanks of the SS Totenkopf division and, with the onset of darkness, went on the defensive.
At 14.30The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, advancing in the direction of Kalinin, suddenly encountered the advancing SS tank division Das Reich. Because. that the 29th Tank Corps was stuck in battles for height 252.5. The Germans struck the 2nd Guards Tank Corps on its exposed flank and forced it to retreat to its original position. During these battles, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps lost 24 of the 41 tanks brought into battle knocked out and damaged. Of these, 12 cars burned down.
The 2nd Tank Corps, which provided the junction between the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 29th Tank Corps, was able to somewhat push back the German units in front of it, but came under fire from assault and anti-tank guns pulled up from the second line, suffered losses and stopped.
12 a.m. German attack from the north.
By noon on July 12, it became clear to the German command that the frontal attack on Prokhorovka had failed. Then they decided, having crossed Psel, to go with part of their forces north of Prokhorovka to the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army, for which the 11th Tank Division and the remaining units of the extra SS Totemkopf * tank (96 tanks and self-propelled guns. motorized infantry regiment, up to 200) were allocated MOTORCYCLISTS). The group broke through the battle formations of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division and by 1 p.m. captured height 226.6.
But on the northern slopes of the heights, the Germans ran into stubborn resistance from Colonel Lyakhov’s 95th Guards Rifle Division. The division was hastily reinforced with an anti-tank artillery reserve, consisting of one IPTAP and two separate DIVISIONS of captured guns (one division was equipped with 88 mm anti-aircraft guns). Until 6 p.m., the division successfully defended itself against advancing tanks. But at 20:00. After a massive air raid, due to the lack of ammunition and large losses of personnel, the division, under the attacks of approaching German motorized rifle units, retreated beyond the village of Polezhaev. Artillery reserves had already been deployed here and the German offensive was stopped.
The 5th Guards Army also failed to complete its assigned tasks. Faced with massive fire from German artillery and tanks, the infantry units advanced forward to a distance of 1-3 km, after which they went on the defensive. In the offensive zones of the 1st Tank Army, 6th Guards Army. The 69th Army and the 7th Guards Army also did not achieve decisive success.
From 13 to 15 JulyGerman units continued to conduct offensive operations, but by that time they had already lost the battle. On July 13, the Fuhrer informed the commanders of Army Group South (Field Marshal von Manstein) and Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Kluge) that he had decided to abandon the continuation of Operation Citadel. This decision was also influenced by the successful landing of the Allies in Sicily, which took place during the Battle of Kursk.
CONCLUSIONS:
The battles near Prokhorovka in the post-war years were declared “the largest tank battle of the Second World War.” At the same time, most authors, when describing it, agreed that “more than 1000 tanks came to hand-to-hand combat in a small field not far from Prokhorovka.” Today this field is even shown to passing tourists, but analysis of even domestic wartime documents proves that this legend correlates with them, to put it mildly, very roughly.
The so-called “tank battle near Prokhorovka did not take place on any separate field, as was commonly believed. The operation was carried out on a front with a length of more than 35 km (and taking into account the southern direction - even more) and consisted of a number of separate battles with the use of tanks by both sides. In total, according to estimates from the command of the Voronezh Front, 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns from both sides took part here. Moreover, the 5th Guards Tank Army, operating in a zone with a length of 17-19 km, together with attached units, at the beginning of the battles, numbered from 680 to 720 tanks and self-propelled guns. and the German group - up to 540 tanks and self-propelled guns.
The main events here took place on July 12, which accounted for the maximum losses of equipment and personnel on both sides. In the battles of July 11-13, the Germans lost to the west and southwest of Prokhorovka, according to reports from the front command, about 320 tanks and assault guns (according to other sources - from 180 to 218) knocked out, abandoned and destroyed, the Kempf group - 80 tanks, and the 5th Guards Tank Army (excluding the losses of General Trufanov’s group) - 328 tanks and self-propelled guns (see table). For unknown reasons, the front's report does not contain accurate information about the losses of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps operating here, which are estimated at 55-70 vehicles damaged and destroyed. Despite the large concentration of tanks on both sides, the main losses were inflicted not by enemy tanks, but by enemy anti-tank and assault artillery.
The counterattack of the troops of the Voronezh Front did not end in the destruction of the wedged German group and therefore was considered a failure immediately after completion, but since it allowed the German offensive to bypass the city of Oboyan to Kursk to be thwarted, its results were later considered a success. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the number of German tanks participating in the battle and their losses, given in the report of the command of the Voronezh Front (commander N. Vatutin, member of the military council - N. Khrushchev), are very different from the reports of the commanders of the units subordinate to them . And from this we can conclude that the scale of the so-called “Prokhorov Battle” could have been greatly inflated by the front command. to justify the large losses of personnel and equipment of front units during the failed offensive.
Episode 2. Prokhorovka. Legend and Reality
The Battle of Kursk is often referred to as the turning point of the Second World War, effectively decided on July 12, 1943 in the largest tank battle in the Prokhorovka area. This thesis is found mainly in Soviet historiography. Supposedly, the leading edge of the entire course of World War II was the wide isthmus between the Psel River and the Prokhorovka railway station near Belgorod. In a truly titanic duel between two steel armadas, no less than 1,500 tanks collided in a limited space. From the Soviet point of view, this represented a collision of two moving avalanches - 800 Soviet tanks against 750-800 German ones. On July 12, 400 German tanks were destroyed and units of the SS Panzer Corps suffered losses. Marshal Konev melodramatically called this battle "the swan song of the German tank forces."
The creator of the myth about Prokhorovka is Lieutenant General Rotmistrov, who commanded the 5th Guards Tank Army, which on July 12 suffered the heaviest losses of its entire existence. Since he needed to justify himself to Stalin, he composed a legend about the great victory over the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This myth was also adopted by Western historians and continues to this day.
Commander-5th Guards TA Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov
“By chance, just at the same time, German tanks launched an attack from the opposite side of the field. Huge masses of tanks rushed into a head-on collision. Taking advantage of the confusion, the T-34 crews attacked the Tigers and Panthers, firing at a short distance on the sides or rear, where ammunition was stored. The failure of the German offensive at Prokhorovka marked the end of Operation Citadel. More than 300 German tanks were destroyed on July 12. The Battle of Kursk tore the heart out of the German army. The Soviet success at Kursk, in which so much was at stake, was the most important success in the entire war.”
In German historiography, the vision of this battle is even more dramatized. In “the largest tank battle in history,” “two armored formations with a very complex structure faced each other in open close combat in an area no more than 500 meters wide and 1000 meters deep.
What the Battle of Prokhorovka was like in reality.
Firstly, it should be noted that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps on July 12, 1943 could not have lost 300 or (like Rotmistrov) 400 tanks;
In total, in the entire Operation Citadel, his total losses amounted to only 33 tanks and assault guns, which is clearly evident from German documents. He could not resist the Soviet troops on equal terms, even without losing the Panthers and Ferdinands, because they were not in his composition;
In addition, Rotmistrov’s statement about the destruction of 70 Tigers is a fiction. On that day, only 15 tanks of this type were ready for use, of which only five saw action in the Prokhorovka area. In total, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, by decree on July 12, had a total of 211 tanks, 58 assault guns, and 43 tank destroyers (self-propelled guns) in working order. However, since the SS Panzergrenadier Division "Totenkopf" was advancing to the north on that day - above the Psel River, the 5th Guards Tank Army had to be confronted by 117 serviceable and combat-ready tanks, 37 assault guns and 32 tank destroyers, as well as another 186 combat vehicles.
Rotmistrov had 838 combat vehicles ready for battle on the morning of July 12 and another 96 tanks were on the way. He thought about his five corps and withdrew the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps into reserve and gave it about 100 tanks to protect his left flank from the forces of the Wehrmacht 3rd Tank Corps advancing from the south. 186 tanks and self-propelled guns of the Leibstandarte and Reich divisions were involved in the battle against 672 Soviet ones. Rotmistrov’s operational plan can be characterized by two directions of the main attack:
The main blow was delivered frontally from the northeast against the SS panzergrenadier division Leibstandarte. It was applied from Prokhorovka between the railway embankment and the Psel River. However, since the river was swampy, there was only one section of 3 kilometers left for maneuver. In this area, to the right of Psel, the 18th Tank Corps was concentrated, and to the left of the railway embankment, the 29th Tank Corps. This meant that on the first day of the battle, more than 400 combat vehicles went to 56 tanks, 20 tank destroyers and 10 Leibstandarte assault guns. The Russian superiority was approximately fivefold.
At the same time, another blow was to be delivered to the German flank at the junction between the Leibstandarte and Reich divisions. Here the 2nd Guards Tank Corps advanced, supported by the 2nd Tank Corps. In total, about 200 Soviet tanks were ready to go against the German division, which consisted of 61 combat-ready tanks, 27 assault guns and twelve tank destroyers.
In addition, we should not forget about the formations of the Voronezh Front, especially the 69th Army, which fought in this direction. In the battle zone of the 5th Guards Tank Army, in addition to reserve units, formations of the 5th Guards Army, for example, the 9th Guards Parachute Division, also operated. Vatutin also sent Rotmistrov 5 artillery and 2 mortar regiments, reinforced with anti-tank units, and 10 anti-tank artillery brigades. As a result, in the Prokhorovka area the density of fire was such that the chances of surviving outside armor protection were minimal. The Soviet counterattack was supported by two air armies, while the German side could only occasionally count on air support at the climax of the battle. The 8th Air Corps was supposed to allocate two-thirds of the aircraft at its disposal for operations on other fronts, in particular in the offensive zone of the 9th Army.
In this regard, the psychological aspect should not be neglected. In the 2nd SS Panzer Corps since July 5, soldiers were in continuous combat and experienced serious supply difficulties. Now they found fresh Soviet units, namely the elite units of the Fifth Guards Tank Army led by P.A. Rotmistrov, a famous tank specialist in the Red Army. The Germans were afraid of the principles of warfare by Russian troops, the distinctive feature of which was an avalanche-like massive attack without taking into account losses. It was not just the overwhelming numerical superiority that caused concern. The attacking soldiers often fell into a kind of trance and did not react to the danger at all. What role vodka played in the fighting on the Eastern Front was no secret to the Germans; Russian historiography, apparently, only recently began to consider this topic. According to two American military historians, such a violent attack near Prokhorovka on July 12 was not without the use of psychotropic drugs.
This may be a partial explanation for the mysterious events that occurred at altitude 252.2. For the rest it was a complete surprise. It was an outstanding achievement by Rotmistrov and his staff to quickly and quietly bring an armada of tanks and other vehicles into battle. This was supposed to be the logical conclusion of a three-day march with a length of 330-380 km. German intelligence indeed expected a counterattack, but not on such a scale.
The day of July 11 ended with local success for the Leibstandarte panzergrenadier division. The next day, the division was tasked with overcoming the anti-tank ditch. Then it swept over the height of 252.2 like a “giant wave”. Having occupied the heights, the Leibstandarte went to the Oktyabrsky state farm, where it encountered resistance from the 9th Guards Airborne Division 2.5 kilometers from Prokhorovka. But at the same time, they themselves exposed the flanks of their position. On the right flank, the Leibstandarte could be supported by the motorized division "Das Reich". An even more dangerous situation arose on the left wing, which was almost hanging in the air.
The commander of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, Obergruppenführer P. Hausser (left), sets a task for the artillery commander of the SS division Totenkopf, SS Brigadeführer Priss
Since the attack of the SS motorized division Totenkopf was not in the east, but rather in the north, the striking wedges dispersed. A gap was created, which was monitored by the Leibstandarte intelligence department, but was unlikely to be controlled by it. An enemy strike along the Psl could lead to fatal consequences at this stage. Therefore, the Leibstandarte was tasked with stopping the enemy’s advance.
The 2nd SS Panzer Corps went on the offensive the next day. The first blow, under the noticeable impact of the entire artillery of the corps, was the attack of the “Totenkopf” division on the Pselsky bridgehead and the dominant height of 226.6. Only after capturing the heights north of the Psel River could the other two divisions continue their attack. The Leibstandarte formations advanced scatteredly. On the right southern wing of the railway embankment the 1st SS Motorized Regiment operated; to the left, closer to height 252.2, the 2nd SS Motorized Regiment operated. The tank regiment redeployed to a bridgehead beyond Height 252.2 to recuperate. But the regiment actually consisted of only one battalion with three companies, and one battalion of heavy tanks with four combat-ready Tigers. The second battalion, equipped with Panther tanks, was sent to the zone of operation of the Das Reich division.
It is necessary to note the following bright point - in the space between the Prokhorovka station and the Psel River there was no German tank army with 800 combat-ready tanks, as Soviet historians claim, but only one tank battalion. Also a legend is the fact that on the morning of July 12, two tank armadas met in battle, attacking in close formation, like knights clad in armor.
According to Rotmistrov, at 7:30 (8:30 Moscow time) the attacks of the Leibstandarte tankmen began - “In deep silence, the enemy appeared behind us, without receiving a worthy response, because we had seven difficult days of fighting and sleep, as a rule, was very short".
At that time, the 3rd tank battalion of the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment was operating on the front line, whose commander was Sturmbannführer Jochen Peiper (someday I will finish his biography, he was a damn interesting person), who became known later (during the offensive in the Ardennes).
Joachim Piper
The day before, his formation occupied the trenches at an altitude of 252.2. On this hill on the morning of July 12, the following scene played out: “We were almost all asleep when they suddenly, with the support of aviation, threw all their tanks and motorized infantry at us. It was hell. They were around us, above us, and between us. We fought against each other." The first German tankman who saw the approaching columns of Soviet tanks was Obersturmführer Rudolf von Ribbentrop (son of the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs J. von Ribbentrop - A.K.)
Rudolf von Ribbentrop
When he looked up at 252.2 that morning, he saw a purple flare that meant "Attention, tanks." While the other two tank companies continued to stand behind the ditch, he led his company's seven Panzer IV tanks into the attack. Suddenly he saw a huge tank column coming towards him. “Having walked 100 - 200 meters, we were shocked - 15, 20, 30, 40, and then simply countless numbers of Russian T-34s appeared in front of us. Now this wall of tanks was coming at us. Vehicle after vehicle, wave after wave, building up "Incredible pressure was coming towards us at maximum speed. Seven German tanks had no chance against superior forces. Four of them were immediately captured, while the other three tanks escaped."
At this moment, the 29th Tank Corps, led by Major General Kirichenko, consisting of 212 combat vehicles, entered the battle. The attack was carried out by the 31st and 32nd tank brigades and the 53rd motorized rifle brigade, with the support of a self-propelled gun regiment and the 26th Guards Airborne Regiment. When the tanks passed the peak of height 252.2 at maximum speed, they went down the slope to attack two German tank companies that were stationed in the lowlands and opened fire on them. The Russians mistook the German tanks for Tigers and wanted to destroy them using their technical superiority. A German eyewitness reported: “Those who saw all this believed in the kamikaze attack that the Russians were forced to undertake. If the Russian tanks had continued to break through, the collapse of the German front would have followed.”
However, in a matter of minutes everything changed, and the seemingly inevitable success turned into a disaster for the attackers. The reason for this was incredible Soviet carelessness. The Russians forgot about their anti-tank ditches. The aforementioned obstacles, 2 meters deep, were dug by Soviet sappers below the level of Hill 252.2 along the entire line of the German - and now Soviet - attack. The German soldiers saw the following picture: “All the new T-34s were going up the hill, and then picking up speed and falling into their own anti-tank ditches before seeing us.” Ribbentrop was saved by the fact that he managed to slip between Soviet tanks in his tank, covered with a dense cloud of dust: “Well, obviously, these were T-34s trying to get out of their own ditches. The Russians were concentrated on the bridge and presented an easy target for encirclement; most of their tanks were shot down. It was a Hell of fire, smoke, dead and wounded, as well as burning T-34s!” - he wrote.
On the opposite side of the ditch, there were only two German tank companies that could not stop this steel avalanche. But now there was no “shooting at a moving target.” Finally, four Tiger tanks, which were located on the left flank of the division, were brought into battle. The 2nd SS Panzer Regiment managed to carry out a counterattack before noon to capture Hill 252.2 and the Oktyabrsky state farm. The front edge of this height looked like a tank cemetery. Here were the most charred wrecks of more than 100 Soviet tanks and several armored personnel carriers from Peiper's battalion.
As can be seen from the logistics of the Leibstandarte division, on July 12, the division captured more than 190 abandoned Soviet tanks. Most of them were found in a small area on the indicated hill. However, this number seemed so incredible that Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser, commander of the II SS Panzer Corps, went to the front line to see it with his own eyes. According to the latest Russian information, the 29th Tank Corps alone lost 172 of its 219 tanks and assault guns on July 12, 118 of which were permanently lost. The casualties in manpower amounted to 1,991 people, of which 1,033 were dead and missing.
"Pappa" Hausser. Judging by his profile photo, he has already taken an excursion to the Borodino field
While at height 252.2, the frontal offensive of the 19th Panzer Corps was repulsed, the critical situation on the left flank of the Leibstandarte division reached its climax. Here, the offensive of units of the 18th Tank Corps of Major General Bakharov, advancing in the area of the Psel River with forces of 170, 110 and 181 tank brigades, was supported by the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade and a number of front-line units, such as the 36th Guards Tank Regiment, equipped with British tanks." Churchill."
Commander of the 18th Tank Corps, Major General B.S. Bakharov
From the German point of view, this unexpected attack was the worst case scenario, namely, the attack was delivered into the previously described gap between the SS motorized divisions "Totenkopf" and "Leibstandarte". The 18th Soviet Tank Corps penetrated almost unhindered into enemy positions. The left flank of the 2nd SS Panzer Regiment was in disarray, and a clear front line no longer existed. Both sides lost control, control, and the course of the battle fell apart into many separate battles in which it was difficult to determine “who is attacking and who is defending.”
Commander of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division, SS Oberführer Theodor Wisch
Soviet ideas about this battle are full of myths, and in the next episode the level of drama reaches its climax. On the morning of July 12, the second battalion of the 181st Armored Brigade of the 18th Tank Corps joined the offensive along the Petrovka-Psel line. A shell fired from a Tiger tank hit the T-34 tank of the guard battalion commander, Captain Skripkin. The tank driver Alexander Nikolaev replaced him in the burning car.
Senior lieutenant (captain during the Battle of Kursk) P.A. Skripkin,
commander of the 1st tank battalion 181st brigade 18th tank with his daughter Galya. 1941
This episode is traditionally interpreted as follows: “The tank driver Alexander Nikolaev jumped back into the burning tank, started the engine and rushed towards the enemy. The tank rushed like a flaming fireball towards the enemy. The Tiger stopped and prepared to retreat. But it was too late. "A burning Soviet tank crashed into a German tank at full speed. The explosion shook the earth. The courage of the Soviet tank crews shocked the Germans, and they retreated."
Tank driver Alexander Nikolaev
This episode became the hallmark of the Battle of Kursk. Artists captured this dramatic scene on artistic canvases, directors - on movie screens. But what did this incident look like in reality? The mechanic-driver of the allegedly exploded Tiger, Scharführer Georg Letzsch, describes the events as follows: “In the morning the company was on the left flank of the second tank division. Suddenly, about 50 enemy tanks, protected by a small forest, attacked us on a wide front [...] I knocked out 2 tanks "T-34, one of which, blazing like a torch, was rushing towards me. At the last moment I was able to dodge the burning mass of metal, which was coming at me with great speed." The attack by the 18th Tank Corps was repelled with heavy losses, including (according to Soviet data) 55 tanks.
The attack of Soviet troops in the southeast of the Prokhorovka-Belgorod railway embankment developed no less unsuccessfully. At the Stalinskoe 1 state farm there was an SS panzergrenadier regiment operating on the right wing of the Leibstandarte division, without any tank support and with lightly armored Marder tank destroyers as reinforcement. They were opposed by the 25th Tank Brigade of the 19th Tank Corps, with the support of the 1446th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment of the 28th Guards Airborne Regiment and part of the formations of the 169th Tank Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps.
To the south was the extended right flank of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which was covered by the Das Reich division. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps operated in this direction. Their attacks, planned in the Yasnaya Polyana-Kalinin direction, were repulsed after heavy fighting. Then German troops counterattacked and captured the village of Storozhevoye, located on the left wing.
The most significant successes were achieved on July 12 by the motorized SS division "Totenkopf", which, contrary to Soviet ideas, did not fight with the 5th Guards Tank Army of General Rotmistrov in the Prokhorovka area. In fact, all the tanks operated on the opposite bank of the Psel and attacked north from there. Despite the losses suffered, the division planned to counterattack in the Mikhailovka area in order to knock over the Soviet tanks, which were striking at the Leibstandarte division, with a blow in the back. But this attempt failed due to the swampy banks of the river. Only in the Kozlovka area did some infantry units remain, operating as part of the 6th SS Motorized Regiment. They remained on the south bank to provide a reserve.
SS Gruppenführer Max Simon - commander of the "Totenkopf" division
Also incorrect is Rotmistrov’s statement that on July 12 he launched an attack on the “Dead Head” positions with the forces of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and with the help of his reserves. Although he sent the 24th Guards Tank Brigade and the 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade on an offensive north of the Psel River. But, as American historians write, these formations were delayed on the march and took part in the battle only the next day.
The "Dead Head" division at this time attacked the positions of the 5th Guards Army of General Alexei Semenovich Zhadov, reinforced by units of the 6th Guards Army and the 31st Tank Corps. By mid-day, crushing Russian attacks in the direction of the Prokhorovka-Kartashevka road were repulsed, which made Rotmistrov nervous. He was afraid of losing control of his formations due to the threat to his flanks and rear. This northernmost attack became the symbol of the entire day of July 12th. The German forces were initially surprised by the strength of the Soviet counteroffensive and huddled together to defend themselves, but then abruptly launched a counterattack and drove back the Soviet formations with heavy losses, leaving the Russians unable to continue their offensive in the afternoon.