Commanders of front troops. It was on their ability to manage large military groups that success or failure in operations, battles and engagements depended. The list includes all generals who permanently or temporarily held the position of front commander. 9 of the military leaders on the list died during the war.
1. Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny
Reserve (September-October 1941) North Caucasian (May-August 1942)

2. Ivan Khristoforovich (Hovhannes Khachaturovich) Bagramyan
1st Baltic (November 1943 - February 1945)
3rd Belorussian (April 19, 1945 - until the end of the war)
On June 24, 1945, I. Kh. Bagramyan headed the combined regiment of the 1st Baltic Front at the Victory Parade on Red Square in Moscow.

3. Joseph Rodionovich Apanasenko
Since January 1941, Commander of the Far Eastern Front, on February 22, 1941, I. R. Apanasenko was awarded the military rank of Army General. During his command Far Eastern Front they did a lot to strengthen the defense capability of the Soviet Far East
In June 1943, I. R. Apanasenko, after numerous requests to be sent to the active army, was appointed deputy commander of the Voronezh Front. During the battles near Belgorod on August 5, 1943, he was mortally wounded during an enemy air raid and died on the same day.

4. Pavel Artemyevich Artemyev
Front of the Mozhaisk defense line (July 18-July 30, 1941)
Moscow Reserve Front (October 9-October 12, 1941)
Commanded the parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941. From October 1941 to October 1943, he was commander of the Moscow defense zone.


5. Ivan Aleksandrovich Bogdanov
Reserve Armies Front (July 14-July 25, 1941)
With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he was appointed commander of the front of the reserve armies. Since November 1941, commander of the 39th Reserve Army in Torzhok, since December - deputy commander of the 39th Army of the Kalinin Front. In July 1942, after the evacuation of the commander of the 39th Army, Ivan Ivanovich Maslennikov, Ivan Aleksandrovich Bogdanov, who refused to evacuate, took over leadership of the army and led the breakthrough from encirclement. On July 16, 1942, while escaping from encirclement near the village of Krapivna, Kalinin Region, he was wounded. Having led 10,000 soldiers out of encirclement, he died in hospital on July 22 from his wounds.

6. Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky
3rd Belorussian (February-April 1945)


7. Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin
Voronezh (July 14-October 24, 1942)
South-West (October 25, 1942 - March 1943)
Voronezh (March - October 20, 1943)
1st Ukrainian (October 20, 1943 - February 29, 1944)
On February 29, 1944, N.F. Vatutin, together with his escort, went in two vehicles to the location of the 60th Army to check the progress of preparations for the next operation. As G.K. Zhukov recalled, upon entering one of the villages, “the cars came under fire from a UPA sabotage group. N.F. Vatutin jumped out of the car and, together with the officers, entered into a shootout, during which he was wounded in the thigh.” The seriously wounded military leader was taken by train to a Kiev hospital. The best doctors were summoned to Kyiv, among whom was the chief surgeon of the Red Army, N. N. Burdenko. Vatutin received a through wound to the thigh with bone fragmentation. Despite surgical intervention and the use of the latest penicillin during treatment, Vatutin developed gas gangrene. A council of doctors led by Professor Shamov proposed amputation, as the only remedy saving the wounded, but Vatutin refused. It was never possible to save Vatutin, and on April 15, 1944, he died in hospital from blood poisoning


8. Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov
Leningradsky (5-mid September 1941)

9. Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov
Leningradsky (June 1942-May 1945)
2nd Baltic (February-March 1945)


10. Philip Ivanovich Golikov
Bryansky (April-July 1942)
Voronezh (October 1942 - March 1943)

11. Vasily Nikolaevich Gordov
Stalingrad (July 23-August 12, 1942)

12. Andrey Ivanovich Eremenko
Western (June 30-July 2, 1941 and July 19-29, 1941)
Bryansky (August-October 1941)
South-Eastern (August-September 1942)
Stalingrad (September-December 1942)
Yuzhny (January-February 1943)
Kalininsky (April-October 1943)
1st Baltic (October-November 1943)
2nd Baltic (April 1944 - February 1945)
4th Ukrainian (from March 1945 until the end of the war)


13. Mikhail Grigorievich Efremov
Central (7 August - end of August 1941)
From the evening of April 13, all contact with the headquarters of the 33rd Army was lost. The army ceases to exist as single organism, and its individual parts are making their way to the east in scattered groups. On April 19, 1942, in battle, Army Commander M. G. Efremov, who fought like a real hero, was seriously wounded (receiving three wounds) and, not wanting to be captured, when the situation became critical, he called his wife, who served as his medical instructor, and shot him dead. her and yourself. Along with him, the army artillery commander, Major General P. N. Ofrosimov, and almost the entire army headquarters died. Modern researchers note the high spirit of perseverance in the army. The body of M. G. Efremov was first found by the Germans, who, having deep respect for the courageous general, buried him with military honors in the village of Slobodka on April 19, 1942. The 268th Infantry Division of the 12th Army Corps recorded on the map the place of the general’s death; the report came to the Americans after the war and is still in the NARA archive. According to the testimony of Lieutenant General Yu. A. Ryabov (veteran of the 33rd Army), the body of the army commander was brought on poles, but the German general demanded that he be transferred to a stretcher. During the funeral, he ordered the prisoners from Efremov’s army to be put in front of German soldiers and said: “Fight for Germany the way Efremov fought for Russia”


14. Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov
Reserve (August-September 1941)
Leningradsky (mid-September-October 1941)
Western (October 1941-August 1942)
1st Ukrainian (March-May 1944)
1st Belorussian (from November 1944 until the end of the war)
On May 8, 1945 at 22:43 (May 9 0:43 Moscow time) in Karlshorst (Berlin) Zhukov accepted the unconditional surrender of the troops of Nazi Germany from Hitler’s Field Marshal General Wilhelm Keitel.

On June 24, 1945, Marshal Zhukov took part in the Victory Parade of the Soviet Union over Germany in the Great Patriotic War, which took place in Moscow on Red Square. The parade was commanded by Marshal Rokossovsky.

APPEARANCE OF THE COMMANDER

Kirponos's rise to the top circle of Soviet commanders occurred after the end of the Soviet-Finnish War.

In December 1939, he was appointed commander of the 70th Infantry Division, which had previously suffered heavy losses and was put into reserve for reorganization.

M.P. Kirponos is the author and executor of the daring plan for the passage of Soviet troops across the ice to the rear of the Vyborg fortified area - main element most powerful "Mannerheim lines", which ensured the very rapid fall of Vyborg and the victorious end of the war.

The operation carried out by division commander Kirponos ensured the exit of Soviet troops - through the gap created by the “Mannerheim Line” - onto the Leningrad-Helsinki highway, which forced the Finnish leadership to conclude peace on the terms Soviet side. In fact, that Winter War Some territories that had belonged to Russia for 200 years and were given by the Bolsheviks in 1918 were returned.

The assault on the Vyborg fortified area began on March 4. And already on March 21, 1940, by Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces, the 70th division was awarded the Order of Lenin, while M.P. Kirponos and fifteen soldiers and commanders of his division were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

THE PATH TO BIG STARS

Mikhail Kirponos was born into a peasant family on January 9 (22), 1892, in the town of Vertievka, Nezhinsky district, Chernigov province. During the First World War, in 1915, he was mobilized and enlisted as a private in the reserve regiment in Kozlov (Michurinsk), where he graduated from the military paramedic school at the 145th evacuation hospital. He never had a chance to fight. Having reached the front in August 1917, he completely plunged into political passions, was elected to the Soldiers' Committee, and at the end of November 1917 he became chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the 26th rifle corps, where, following the line of the Bolshevik party, he negotiated with the command of the Austro-Hungarian corps on the cessation of hostilities and organized fraternization with the enemy.

During Civil War M.P. Kirponos took part in the partisan war against the Austro- German troops, fought with the Haidamaks. He was a regiment commander in the Shchors division, fought with the White Army and the Petliurists.

He showed an early tendency to pedagogical activity. He knew how to explain and expressed his thoughts vividly and with journalistic fervor. In 1920, Kiponos became assistant commissar of the Second Kyiv School of Chervonny elders. Then he studied a lot himself, in 1927 he graduated from the Military Academy. Frunze. His career was not rapid. He commanded a battalion and was the division's chief of staff. In 1934, Kirponos was appointed head and commissar of the Kazan Infantry School. Supreme Council Tatar ASSR. He remained in this post until December 1939, before his appointment as commander of the 70th division.

Those who knew Kirponos point to his exceptional accuracy, cordiality, courage in defending his opinion, courage in making responsible decisions, but also his everyday humanity.

In 1937, he, the commander of the Kazan School, gave his Kislovodsk permit to one of the platoon commanders, who, as he learned, needed treatment in Kislovodsk. The brigade commander spent that vacation in his small homeland.

But good man, as someone will say, this is not a profession. Great military leadership talent was required from the commander of the largest and, in Stalin’s opinion, most important military district...

Later they said that Kirpanos ended up in the position of commander of the Kyiv Special Military District and the Southwestern Front by chance, since after the repressions there was no one to choose from. This is probably partly true. But only partly. Everyone finds himself in the place and at the time that fate and history have prepared for him.

There is information that Stalin, when appointing Kirpanos, pointed out to him his political plan - to prepare the district for war, but in such a way as not to arouse suspicion among the Germans and not provoke their attack. Kirponos followed this verbal instruction as best he could. He tried to carry out the decision to create strike force in the depths of the district, at the expense of troops covering the border. But this plan was not approved.

DEFENSE OF Kyiv

The German side's plan to take Kyiv with one blow piercing the South-Western Front was not crowned with success. But that's what it was getting at. Zhitomir fell on July 7. Kleist's tank group broke out onto the Kiev highway. The distance to the Ukrainian capital is 130 kilometers. Four days later, on July 11, the enemy was stopped 20 kilometers from Kyiv, on the Irpen River. German side heavy positional battles were imposed.

Here Kirponos won a remarkable tactical victory, which will have further developments of considerable importance. The German command will soon lose hope that it will defeat the Southwestern Front with the forces of Army Group South and will involve part of the forces of Army Group Center in the Kyiv operation, diverting them from the Moscow direction for a month.

Conducting positional battles, M.P. Kirponos has already shown himself here outstanding commander: he showed exceptional restraint by not throwing reserves into battle when restraint had already failed S.M. Budyonny, who demanded that reserves be brought into battle, and Stalin. When the German forces were weakened many times and their pressure ceased, he brought in fresh divisions and overthrew the German units. Then the star of Colonel A.I. rose in the Golossevsky forest. Rodimtsev, commander airborne brigade, in the future a famous commander. A similar technique will be used in two years on a much larger scale on Kursk Bulge. By August 16, part of the suburbs of Kyiv was cleared of the Germans, the position from which the Germans launched the offensive on August 4 was restored, the situation stabilized.

DEATH OF A GENERAL

The order from Headquarters to abandon Kyiv arrived on September 18. But even on September 11, the armies of the Southwestern Front could not have escaped the encirclement.

Kirponos could have flown away on the last plane available to his headquarters. He sent the wounded on it.

Senior political instructor V.S. Zhadovsky, who was on special assignments with a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, witnessed the death of the front commander. His story is recorded, it begins with the words: “On the night of September 20, we retreated to the east. We walked on foot, since we abandoned our cars in the Voronka area... At about 8 o'clock in the morning on September 20, our column, not reaching 12 km from Lokhvitsa, took refuge in a deep ravine southeast and east of the Dryukovshchina farmstead, overgrown with dense bushes, oak trees, hazel trees, and maples. , linden trees. Its length is approximately 700 - 800 m, width 300 - 400 m and depth 25 meters... By 10 o'clock in the morning, from the direction of Lokhvitsa, the Germans opened strong mortar fire on the grove. At the same time, up to 20 vehicles with machine gunners came out to the ravine under the cover of 10 - 12 tanks. They surrounded the ravine in a tight ring, firing hurricane fire at it.

Many dead and wounded immediately appeared in the grove. In this situation, the Military Council made a decision: to make a gap through a counterattack and hand-to-hand combat, break out of the encirclement and escape from the ravine. The generals with rifles, grenades and petrol bottles went on the attack along with everyone else. But the forces were unequal. Under the devastating fire of the Germans, we had to retreat back into the ravine several times. There were three or four such attacks. During one of them, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos was wounded in left leg- his shin bone was broken below the knee. He had to be dragged into the ravine. There, together with Kirponos’s assistant, Major Gnenny, we cut his boot, took it off his foot and bandaged the wound. He could no longer move on his own and was forced to sit in dense bushes near a crack dug in the slope of a ravine...

Being wounded, M.P. Kirponos received information about the situation and gave appropriate instructions. The Nazis did not stop firing until dusk. At about 7 o'clock in the evening, near a spring near a gap, on the edge of which M.P. was sitting. Kirponos, an enemy mine exploded about 3 - 4 meters from him. Mikhail Petrovich grabbed his head and fell on his chest.

One fragment pierced the helmet on the left side of the head, the second hit the chest near the left pocket of the jacket. The wounds turned out to be fatal. After 1-1.5 minutes he died... On October 26, 1941, Major Gnenny and I arrived at the front headquarters, in the city of Valuiki, and verbally reported to the command of the Southwestern Front (new formation) the circumstances of the death of the Military Council and M.P. Kirponos. We handed over documents, the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union and personal belongings that belonged to M.P. to the front command. Kirponos. In a report written the next day, we reported where M.P.’s corpse was buried. Kirponos, what he is wearing and what injuries he has.”

In 1943, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos was reburied in Kyiv, in the university botanical garden, in the place where the entrance to the University metro station is now located. In 1958, his ashes were reburied again - in the park Eternal Glory.

We remember.
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The Southwestern Front included four armies:
5th Army Commander - Major General of Tank Forces M.I. Potapov
in September 1941, 15 kilometers southeast of Lokhvitsa there was captured

6th Army Commander - Lieutenant General I.N. Muzychenko
in August 1941 near Uman captured

12th Army Commander Major General P.G. Ponedelin
At the beginning of August 1941, south of Uman captured

26th Army Commander - Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko

As you can see, out of 4 army commanders, three were captured. Many members of the headquarters of these armies and corps commanders were also captured.

M.I. Potapov

Muzychenko in captivity

Captured Soviet generals P.G. Ponedelin and N.K. Kirillov

The mystery of the death and burial of Colonel General Kirponos Mikhail Petrovich - Commander of the Southwestern Fleet.

The command of the southwestern direction took measures to establish contact with General M.P. Kirponos and rescue him from danger together with the front headquarters.

Major General of the Reserve V.A. Sergeev, who at that time was on special assignments under Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, recalls:

...Having surrendered the main command westward, on September 11, while passing through Moscow, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko entered Headquarters Supreme Commander-in-Chief. He ordered us, the “guarantees,” to obtain data from the General Staff about the situation in the southwestern direction for the last hour. When we became familiar with the situation, I was informed that “the situation on the Southwestern Front is difficult, but not hopeless,” and that “with skillful and firm leadership it can be corrected.”

On September 13, we arrived at the headquarters of the southwestern direction, which at that time was located 20 kilometers from Poltava, in the Rest House of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. There S.K. Timoshenko met with a member of the Military Council of the direction N.S. Khrushchev. Without wasting a minute of time, they began to understand the situation, which turned out to be much more serious than it was described to us at the General Staff.

Communication between the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Direction and the troops of the Southwestern Front was often disrupted, so it was difficult to get an accurate idea of ​​what was happening at the front, and therefore to take radical measures to restore the situation.

Early in the morning of September 14, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko instructed me to contact the commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos and find out the situation on the spot. At this time, the headquarters of the Southwestern Front was in Priluki, where I immediately went. But we couldn’t get to Priluki.

When entering Lokhvitsa, the Germans fired at us, and I had to turn back. Not knowing the situation, I did not risk going to Priluki. On the way back, according to information received from different persons, I had some idea of ​​the state of affairs at the front. It turned out that the troops and front headquarters were already surrounded. Upon returning to the direction headquarters, I reported this to the Commander-in-Chief.

On September 15, the head of the operational department of the Southwestern Front, Major General I.Kh. Bagramyan, arrived in Poltava, at the headquarters of the direction. He reported that the enemy, with formations of the 1st and 2nd tank groups, having reached the area of ​​Lokhvitsa and Lubny, intercepted the last communications of the front. Units of the 21st, 5th, 37th and 26th armies were surrounded, having suffered heavy losses by this time. Having received the appropriate instructions, General I.Kh. Bagramyan flew to the front headquarters on September 16.

On the night of September 17, the Military Council and the headquarters of the southwestern direction left for Kharkov. Commander-in-Chief S.K. Timoshenko left me with General P.V. Kotelkov for special assignments in Akhtyrka with the task of collecting information about the situation and making decisions on the spot, depending on the circumstances. General Kotelkov remained in Akhtyrka, and on September 18 I went to the front.

In Gadyach I saw groups of soldiers and officers emerging from encirclement. According to their stories, it turned out that our troops were somewhere near Piryatin. I took a plane from the airport and flew along the route Gadyach, Lokhvitsa, Piryatin, Lubny, Gadyach. Flying over the Piryatin area, we saw large German tank columns moving towards each other from the north and south. It was not possible to find out the situation, but I determined that there was a free neck in the direction of Gadyach.

Returning to Gadyach, I organized a collection point in the courtyard of the district party committee for people leaving the encirclement. From those who left the Piryatin area, I learned that the front headquarters, led by M.P. Kirponos, was making its way in the direction of the village of Sencha.

Since there was no connection from Gadyach with the headquarters of the direction, I went to Zinkov, and from there I reported to Marshal Timoshenko about the situation in Gadyach and about the alleged whereabouts of M.P. Kirponos. Immediately I received instructions: not to stop searching for Kirponos. On the night of the 19th, Major General N.V. Feklenko arrived, sent to Gadyach by Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. I brought him up to date and went to the airfield.

Early in the morning of September 20, this time taking a liaison plane, I flew to the Senchi area. There we saw how German columns tanks and motorized infantry approached the village and the forest west of Sencha. In the forest we noticed a large group of our troops and several vehicles.

I tried to tell our troops the exit direction. He quickly drew on his map the direction to the Gadyach area and wrote in bold blue pencil: “Go along in the indicated direction, the path is clear." Then I rolled up the map, tied my pistol to it for weight, unraveled the long tail of the white bandage and threw it into the forest west of the village of Senchi.

Returning to Gadyach, I saw that N.V. Feklenko was questioning some captain, who, as it turned out, had come out of the Senchan forest. He reported that he saw in the area west of Sencha the entire command of the Southwestern Front, led by Colonel General M.P. Kirponos.

A report was immediately sent to S.K. Timoshenko about three officers being simultaneously sent to communicate with M.P. Kirponos. I still don’t know whether they met Kirponos or not.

Comrade Feklenko and I called our two tanks and an armored car and went to the village of Rashevka. At about 2-3 pm in the village council where we were staying, the telephone rang (by the way, telephone communication in the districts worked). When I identified myself, someone said in a frightened, trembling voice: “...K and B (apparently Kirponos and Burmistenko - V.S.) - in the forest near Sencha... there is a strong battle going on... the direction was reported...” That’s it, our the conversation ended. We never found out who called and where from.

Having found out in a similar way the whereabouts of M.P. Kirponos, we sent both of our tanks and armored cars to his rescue. All day on September 20, artillery and mortar cannonade thundered in the Senchi area. General Feklenko and I expected the tanks we sent to return until the evening of September 20, but they never returned.

At this time, German motorized infantry approached Rashevka. It was dangerous to stay further in the village. We left our adjutant, Senior Lieutenant Peenchikovsky, in the conditional appearance with the task: if M.P. Kirponos appeared, lead him to wade across the Psel River to the eastern bank, where N.V. Feklenko and I would wait for them.

When it became completely dark, Senior Lieutenant Peenchikovsky got out of the ambush, forded the river and, meeting us, reported, no one called and no one else showed up to appear.

In the period from September 18 to 29, more than 10 thousand people emerged from encirclement at our assembly points, including a group of generals I.Kh. Bagramyan, Alekseev, Sedelnikov, Arushanyan, Petukhov, as well as brigade commissar Mikhailov, Colonel N.S. .Skripko and many other officers. But we didn’t wait for M.P. Kirponos...

Few witnessed the tragic ending. Some of them, like M.A. Burmistenko and V.I. Tupikov, fell on the battlefield near the village of Dryukovshchina, others, like M.I. Potapov, were seriously wounded and unconsciously captured by the enemy, others, as personal the commander's guarantor, Major A.N. Gnenny, laid down their lives in subsequent battles on the Soviet-German front.

The last one, Major Gnenny Alexey Nikitovich, was at first considered missing in action and was included in the lists irrecoverable losses for Departments and Directorates of the Southwestern Front on October 20, 1941. However, already on October 26 he left the encirclement. July 5, 1942, Lieutenant Colonel A.N. Gnenny, commander of the 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment training center SWF ( battalion commander of front-line courses for junior lieutenants), was wounded during a bombing near the village of Petropavlovka and died in the hospital.

The fog of uncertainty shrouded the death of General Kirponos for many years. On this basis, various speculations about his death were born. The most enduring version was that Kirponos committed suicide at a critical moment. Be that as it may, General M.P. Kirponos did not escape the encirclement. Meanwhile, in Kyiv, at the Monument of Eternal Glory, the remains of the commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front rest.

The only surviving witness to the death of General M.P. Kirponos was senior political instructor V.S. Zhadovsky, who was on special assignments with a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front.

Below I will give three eyewitness accounts of the last hours of the life of the front commander, which raise a number of questions.

Author first - witness to the death of General M.P. Kirponos, who was on special assignments with the member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, Divisional Commissar Rykov, senior political instructor (reserve lieutenant colonel) Viktor Sergeevich Zhadovsky (Award list ).

And heresecond and thirdthe stories belong to Colonel General Ivan Semenovich Glebov, who at that time was a lieutenant colonel, deputy chief of the operations department of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front.

A reserve lieutenant colonel remembers Viktor Sergeevich Zhadovsky : November 1943

...On the night of September 20, we retreated to the east. We walked on foot, since we abandoned our cars in the Voronka area. They walked with the intention of reaching Sencha and there crossing the road to the eastern bank of the Sula River. During the night we fought through Voronki and headed towards Lokhvitsa.

At about 8 o'clock in the morning on September 20, our column, without reaching12 kmto Lokhvitsa, took refuge in a deep ravine southeast and east of the Dryukovshchina farmstead (Map 1:50000 ), overgrown with dense bushes, oak, hazel, maple, and linden trees. Its length is approximately 700 -800 m, width 300 -400 mand a depth of 25 meters.

As I know, the decision of the front command was this: to go into the ravine for a day, and with the onset of darkness, make a rush and break through the encirclement. A perimeter defense was immediately organized, surveillance was set up, and reconnaissance was sent out. Soon the scouts reported that all the roads around the Shumeikovo grove were occupied by the Germans.

By 10 o'clock in the morning, from the direction of Lokhvitsa, the Germans opened heavy mortar fire on the grove. At the same time, up to 20 vehicles with machine gunners came out to the ravine under the cover of 10 - 12 tanks. They surrounded the ravine in a tight ring, firing hurricane fire at it. Many dead and wounded immediately appeared in the grove. In this situation, the Military Council made a decision: to make a gap through a counterattack and hand-to-hand combat, break out of the encirclement and escape from the ravine. The generals with rifles, grenades and petrol bottles went on the attack along with everyone else. But the forces were unequal. Under the devastating fire of the Germans, we had to retreat back into the ravine several times. There were three or four such attacks.

During one of them, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos was wounded in his left leg - his tibia was broken below the knee.He had to be dragged into a ravine. There, together with Kirponos’s assistant, Major Gnenny, we cut his boot, took it off his foot and bandaged the wound. He could no longer move on his own and was forced to sit in dense bushes near a crack dug in the slope of the ravine.

“Eh, I’m unlucky on my left leg,” the Colonel General said then. (Not long before this, during a car accident in the Boryspil area, M.P. Kirponos also injured his left leg.)

Being wounded, M.P. Kirponos received information about the situation and gave appropriate instructions. The Nazis did not stop firing until dusk.

At about 7 o'clock in the evening, near the spring near the gap, on the edge of which M.P. Kirponos was sitting, at about 3 -4 metersan enemy mine exploded from him. Mikhail Petrovich grabbed his head and fell on his chest. One fragment pierced the helmet on the left side of the head, the second hit the chest near the left pocket of the jacket. The wounds turned out to be fatal. After 1 - 1.5 minutes he died.At that moment, near him were a member of the Military Council of the Front, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine M.A. Burmistenko with security from three people, M.P.Kirponos’s assistant, Major A.N.Gnenny and me.

So that the Germans could not identify the corpse and establish the fact of the death of the front commander, Major Gnenny and I took off Mikhail Petrovich’s drape overcoat, cut it up and burned it, cut off the buttonholes with insignia from the tunic, removed the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union No. 91, took documents out of his pocket, a comb, a scarf, letters, and the body was buried in a ditch at the bottom of a ravine.The grave was dug by me, Major Gnenny and three officers from the guard of Comrade. Burmistenko in his presence. More precisely, it was not a grave, but a deepened small hole located to the left of the path leading along the bottom of the ravine.

The next day, September 21, Major Gnenny and I gathered a group of officers, sergeants and soldiers and began to make our way to the east with them. We left the encirclement on October 23 in the area of ​​the city of Fatezh, Kursk region, armed, with personal documents and party cards, in military uniform, with insignia.

On October 26, 1941, Major Gnenny 4 and I arrived at the front headquarters in the city of Valuiki and verbally reported to the command of the Southwestern Front (new formation) the circumstances of the death of the Military Council and M.P. Kirponos. We handed over documents, the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union and personal belongings that belonged to M.P. Kirponos to the front command. In the memo, which was written the next day, we reported where the corpse of M.P. Kirponos was buried, what he was wearing and what injuries he had….

Yakubovsky Ivan Ignatievich

The earth is on fire.

The situation of our headquarters near Lokhvitsy was extremely difficult , - recalls one of the few surviving participants in the Shumeykov battle, the former assistant of the member of the Military Council E.P. Rykov, now lieutenant colonel of the reserve, Kiev resident V.S. Zhadovsky. —The headquarters of the Southwestern Front had no communication with the armies and the commander in chief. Moreover, there was no connection with the groups of generals Bagramyan and Alekseev, who were ordered to ensure the protection of the front and army departments and their crossing of the Sula River in the Sencha area. Together with these groups there was also a regiment for guarding the rear of the front under Colonel Rohatin. The regiment consisted of up to a thousand soldiers. They managed to break through the encirclement, but, unfortunately, did not provide any assistance to the front headquarters.

The headquarters column, drawn into the Shumeikovo grove, into a deep ravine, found itself trapped. The enemy was nearby. Sensing important prey, he followed on his heels. On September 20, at noon, a “frame” - an enemy reconnaissance aircraft - appeared over the grove. It was clear to us that a battle could not be avoided. Commanders, staff members and Red Army soldiers, armed with pistols, rifles and grenades, took up a perimeter defense along the edge of the grove. There are also several armored vehicles, anti-tank guns and quad anti-aircraft machine gun mounts located here.

Half an hour later the enemy made the first mortar raid on the grove. Then the tanks came, the fascist machine gunners rushed. A bloody battle began. The Nazis managed to break into our defenses, but we threw them back. A second enemy attack followed. Her reflection cost us great sacrifices. Pisarevsky died. Potapov is seriously shell-shocked and wounded. A shell fragment broke Kirponos's leg. This time he, along with other members of the front's Military Council, led the counterattacks, walking in their ranks with an SVT rifle. Kirponos, Potapov and Pisarevsky’s body were taken to the bottom of the ravine and laid on a path near the spring. And the battle continued. Around seven o'clock in the evening the last meeting of the Military Council of the front took place. The issue of breaking through the encirclement ring was being resolved. At this time, the enemy launched another mortar attack and one of the mines exploded at a spring in the center of the crowd. Many were killed. Kirponos received fatal wounds to the chest and head and died a few minutes later. By the evening, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (Bolsheviks) M. A. Burmistenko died. At night, during an attempt to escape from encirclement, V.I. Tupikov was killed.

Our ranks are thinning. Only on the night of September 23, a group of sixty people managed to escape to the north, to their own. Among them were myself and Major A.N. Gnenny. My friend died in 1942 near Voronezh, commanding a regiment.

Member of the Military Council of the South-Western direction

EXPLANATION

Major Gnenny A.N. and art. political instructor Zhadovsky V.S. regarding the death of Colonel General Comrade. Kirponos M.P. 19.9.41

On September 17, the Military Council and Headquarters of the Southwestern Front began a marching movement from the city of Piryatin to the east, and on September 19, at 11.00 (approximately), the column stopped to rest in the forest southeast of the village. Dryukovshchina (southwest of Lokhvits).
By 12.00, a concentration of tanks, vehicles with infantry, mortars and enemy guns was noticed in the area of ​​​​the heights. 160.
The Germans began their attack on the Dryukovshchina forest area at about 15.00 on 19.9.41. Up to 9 tanks, motorized infantry, artillery and mortars took part in the offensive.
The Military Council and, in particular, Colonel General Comrade Kirponos personally organized a counterattack, as a result of which the German offensive was suspended, but the fire of all types of enemy weapons increased significantly. The units participating in the counterattack retreated into the forest, where for the first time Comrade. Kirponos was wounded in the left leg. Organizing a second counterattack and upon returning after it to the hollow of the forest, Comrade. Kirponos was wounded by a mine fragment in the chest and during subsequent mine explosions he was wounded in the left front part of the head, after which he died at approximately 18.30 on September 19, 1941.
In addition to the two of us, witnesses to his death were: Member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, comrade. Burmistenko with his apparatus of workers, the Military Commissar of the Southwestern Federal Air Force - divisional commissar Comrade Galtsev ( Ivan Sergeevich -note), Art. political instructor Savelyev and a number of other comrades, whose names we don’t remember now.
Due to strong enemy mortar and machine gun fire and soon the appearance of close proximity from the group of comrade Kirponos of the German infantry, we had to step aside, which prevented us from burying Comrade. Kirponos immediately. The next day, i.e. 20.9.41, at approximately 7.30 we went to the place of death of comrade. Kirponos, and they found his corpse already turned over on his back, with his pockets searched by someone before us. We managed to find from him a small notebook with personal notes, glasses, 6 pieces of handkerchiefs, a FED camera and on his tunic a Gold Star medal for No. 91, which we took off and gave to you on 27.X.41. Other documents and items with comrade. There was no Kirponos.
In addition, in order to prevent the enemy from identifying the corpse of Comrade. Kirponos, we cut off the buttonholes and insignia from his uniform.
Comrade was buried. Kirponos, according to our assumptions, together with our other soldiers and commanders, on September 22-23, by the local population of the nearest villages here in the forest in the Dryukovshchina region.

For special assignments of the commander of the SWF
Major (signature) Gnenny

For special assignments member on the SWF Armed Forces

Senior political instructor (signature) Zhadovsky

Glebov Ivan Semyonovich, version No. 1:

The military council and front headquarters were supposed to go out under the cover of the 289th Infantry Division in the direction of Piryatin, Chernukha, Lokhvitsa, but they were unable to reach Chernukha, since the roads were already intercepted by enemy infantry and tanks. We had to retreat further south - to Kurenki, Piski, Gorodishche. But even there the crossings turned out to be occupied by the enemy.
On September 19, in Gorodishche, the Military Council of the front made a decision: with the onset of darkness, go out in the direction of Voronka, Lokhvitsa, where the troops of the Bryansk Front were supposed to launch a counterattack from the northeast. Contact with the armies and the General Staff was lost.
By decision of General Kirponos, several groups were created under the command of Major General I.Kh. Bagramyan, Colonel Rogachev (or Rogatin) and others, which were supposed to break through the enemy encirclement towards Senchi 2.
With the onset of darkness, the movement of the column began, which consisted of approximately 800 people, 5 - 7 armored vehicles, 3 - 4 anti-tank guns, 4 - 5 heavy machine guns.
By the morning of September 20, the column began to approach the village of Dryukovshchina, southwest of Lokhvitsa. At this time, a German plane flew over the column twice. Colonel General M.P. Kirponos decided not to move during the day, but to wait for darkness in a ravine with a grove, which is southeast and east of Dryukovshchina. On the southern and eastern slopes of the ravine, defense was organized by the forces that were at my disposal. Our reconnaissance established that a small group of German infantrymen was stationed in Dryukovshchina. Then several more vehicles with infantry and a group of motorcyclists arrived there from the south.
At about 10 o'clock in the morning, German tanks appeared coming from the east and northeast towards the ravine. At first there were ten of them, then six more came. After standing for about 40 minutes at a distance of two to three kilometers from us, they turned around on a wide front and moved towards average speed to the ravine, firing at its slopes and the edge of the grove, at anti-tank guns and armored vehicles. Within 20 - 30 minutes, our anti-tank guns and armored vehicles were destroyed. All of us, including Kirponos, Rykov and Burmistenko, hid in the grove. During the shelling, M.I. Potapov was seriously wounded by a shell explosion.
Having destroyed our armored vehicles, anti-tank guns and part of the people, the German tanks retreated 800 - 1000 m from the ravine. German machine gunners were grouped around them.
Member of the Military Council, Divisional Commissar E.P. Rykov, believing that the Germans did not have fuel and ammunition, proposed to immediately attack them, break through and go east. Colonel General M.P. Kirponos and M.A. Burmistenko did not object.
E.P. Rykov ordered me to raise people and attack the tanks.
At about 13:00, everyone who could moved to the southeastern and eastern edge of the ravine and, firing, began to move east. We managed to go only 300 - 400 meters. Seeing that we were suffering heavy losses, E.P. Rykov ordered to retreat back into the ravine. Having given the order to retreat, I stood up and wanted to also retreat after Rykov, but was wounded in the leg.
During this battle, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos and member of the Military Council M.A. Burmistenko were on the southeastern edge and observed the results of the battle.
We all retreated into the ravine. A paramedic met me at the edge of the grove and began to bandage me. At this time, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos, members of the Military Council Rykov, Burmistenko and a group of officers passed by, including Kirponos’s assistant, Major Gnenny, and Divisional Commissar Rykov’s assistant, Senior Political Commissar Zhadovsky. Having asked me how I felt, M.P. Kirponos said that they would be on the other side of the ravine. Soon enemy tanks approached the ravine again, followed by infantry with mortars and guns. A new combing of the ravine and grove with fire of all kinds began.

After that, I no longer met either the members of the Military Council or the front commander.

Two days later, the enemy tanks left the tract and only an infantry cordon remained. Taking advantage of this, a group of commanders of up to 30 people and I escaped from the ravine and began to go out to the east at night, bypassing populated areas and large roads. We went out to our troops at Mlintsa...

Glebov I.S. version No. 2, voiced in 1968

In those days I acted as the head of the operational department, since my boss I.Kh. Bagramyan was on the instructions of M. Kirponos with the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Tymoshenko with a special task.

The position of the head of the operational department of the front headquarters is a high, responsible, general one. But I was also no stranger: I graduated from the Military Academy General Staff(second recruitment), before the academy he commanded an artillery regiment, he began the war as deputy chief of artillery, and then as chief of staff of the 6th Rifle Corps. After the disbandment of the corps directorates, I was appointed deputy head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front. My boss I.Kh. Bagramyan almost on the same day as my appointment received the military rank of major general. So the new position didn’t scare me.

On September 14, 1941, at about 9-10 in the morning, the chief of staff of the front, Major General Vasily Ivanovich Tupikov, called me to his office - the smartest person, respected by all officers of the Department. The same V.I. Tupikov, who on the eve of the war was a Soviet military attaché in Germany and many times reported to the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff about military preparations and preparations for Germany’s war against the USSR, about a possible attack by Hitler on our country on the 20th of June 1941. His information was chief Intelligence Directorate F.I. Golikov reported to Stalin. Vasily Ivanovich recalled how he received a “whack” from F.I. Golikov for “excessive self-confidence.” He remained just as “self-confident” and decisive in his position as chief of staff of the front.

Arriving at his office, I noticed that he quickly signed some document and began to carefully examine the map lying in front of him on the table. Then he got up from the table, came up to me, silently shook my hand and said firmly:

- It's either now or never! You, Ivan Semenovich, know the situation at the front. Please read this document. Sit down at the table and read it carefully.

Taking the document in my hands, I immediately saw: " Comrade I.V. Stalin. Urgently. Of particular importance ".

Next, the difficult situation in which the Southwestern Front found itself, and the possible actions of the Germans in the next one or two days were outlined. The conclusion was drawn that if the troops were not withdrawn to the left bank of the Dnieper, then the disaster of the Southwestern Front was inevitable, no one and nothing could prevent it.

At the end of the document, Tupikov asked Stalin to allow the front to leave Kyiv, and today, that is, September 14, to begin the withdrawal of troops beyond the Dnieper, to its left bank. Tomorrow will be late.

Signed: V. Tupikov. 14.9.41

After reading the document, I raised my head and looked at the chief of staff. He walked around the office, hands behind his back, in deep thought. Then, stopping, he asked:

- Do you agree, Comrade Glebov, with my letter? Or do you have doubts?

Without hesitation, I answered:

- Agree. The commander's signature is required.

- The commander refused to sign. If you, Ivan Semenovich, agree with the contents of the document, then I ask you to take it, go to the control room and urgently, immediately hand it over to Moscow, to Stalin. Monitor the sending of the document. I am going with another copy to the commander and member of the Military Council.

Going to the control room with the document, I understood the full responsibility of what was happening: the current critical situation in the South-Western direction, and, as it turned out, differences in the front leadership in its assessment, and therefore in the nature of our further actions. Personally, I supported General Tupikov on these issues. The telegram was sent to Moscow immediately.

About a couple of hours later, M.P. called to the Bodo apparatus. Kirponos, M.A. Burmistenko and V.I. Tupikova. I, Glebov I.S., was also present.

Stalin.At Stalin's apparatus. Does Comrade Kirponos agree with the content of Tupikov’s telegram, his conclusions and proposal? Answer.

Burmistenko. There is a member of the Military Council at the apparatus, hello, Comrade Stalin. The commander and I do not agree with Tupikov’s panicky sentiments. We do not share his biased assessment of the situation and are ready to hold Kyiv at any cost.

Stalin. I demand an answer from Kirponos, the commander. Who commands the front - Kirponos or Burmistenko? Why is a member of the Military Council responsible for the commander, does he know more than anyone else? Doesn’t Kirponos have his own opinion? What happened to you after our conversation on August 8? Answer.

Kirponos. I command the front, Comrade Stalin. I do not agree with Tupikov’s assessment of the situation and proposals. I share Burmistenko’s opinion. We will take all measures to keep Kyiv. I am sending my thoughts on this matter to the General Staff today. Believe us, Comrade Stalin. I reported to you and repeat again: everything that is at our disposal will be used for the defense of Kyiv. We will complete your task - we will not surrender Kyiv to the enemy.

(At this time Tupikov turned pale, but controlled himself.)

Stalin. Why is Tupikov panicking? Ask him to the machine. Do you, Comrade Tupikov, still insist on your conclusions or have you changed your mind? Answer honestly, without panic.

Dead ends. Comrade Stalin, I still insist on my opinion. Front troops are on the verge of disaster. The withdrawal of troops to the left bank of the Dnieper is required to begin today, September 14. Tomorrow will be late. A plan for the withdrawal of troops and further actions has been developed and sent to the General Staff. I ask you, Comrade Stalin, to allow the withdrawal of troops today. That's all I wanted to say.

Stalin. Wait for an answer...

However, the response from Moscow was late. Only on the night of September 18 did we receive an order from the Chief of the General Staff to withdraw troops.

How did events develop after the conversation with Stalin? Returning to his office, V.I. Tupikov, looking at the map, said thoughtfully:

- I don’t understand, doesn’t the General Staff really understand the tragedy of the situation around our front? After all, we are actually in a mousetrap. The fate of the front troops is calculated not in days, but in hours.

I ask you, Ivan Semenovich, urgently contact Marshal Timoshenko and convey to him the contents of our conversation with Stalin. Tell Bagramyan to be at the front headquarters no later than September 16 with any written decision of Marshal Timoshenko. Bring to the army commanders their tasks regarding the plan for the withdrawal of troops beyond the Dnieper, execution - by order of the front commander M.P. Kirponos. Check personally the operation of the communications equipment and the entire control system. That's it, do it. I ask the chief of intelligence to come to me!

On the evening of September 16, I.Kh. returned to front headquarters. Bagramyan from the headquarters of the South-Western direction and brought a verbal order from Marshal Timoshenko: “The South-Western Front is allowed to leave the Kiev fortified area and immediately begin the withdrawal of troops to the rear defensive line.”

After heated conversations between Kirponos, Burmistenko, Tupikov and other generals of the Directorate, the commander firmly said: “I can’t do anything without a written order from Marshal Timoshenko or Moscow. You all remember and know the conversation with Stalin. The question is too serious. We are waiting for a response from Moscow. Oral decision Tymoshenko should be urgently handed over to the General Staff and asked what to do? That’s it. Let’s finish there.”

On the night of September 18, a response came from #ff/fontffffbr Moscow. The Chief of the General Staff said: “Stalin allows us to leave Kyiv and transport the front troops to the left bank of the Dnieper.”

All armies by this time knew their tasks and the order of withdrawal. The front administration (Military Council and front headquarters) set off in a separate column on the night of September 18. In the column were the commander of the front troops, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos, members of the Military Council M.A. Burmistenko, E.P. Rykov, Chief of Staff Major General V.I. Tupikov, headquarters, commander of the 5th Army, Major General M.I. Potapov, many other generals and officers.

We walked all night. The noise of aircraft engines, the rumble of tanks, the roar of explosions, and the chatter of anti-aircraft guns accompanied us, but there were no enemy attacks on the column. Apparently we haven't been discovered yet.

On the morning of September 19, we reached the village of Gorodishchi, a beautiful village located at the confluence of the Uday and Mnoga rivers. We made a stop: it was dangerous to move further during the day. In addition, single enemy planes appeared, and the dangerous “frame” was especially annoying. It looks like we've been discovered. So, expect bombing, or even worse.

They counted the people and everything that was in the column. It turned out to be not a lot: about three thousand people, six armored vehicles of the security regiment, eight anti-aircraft machine guns and, unfortunately, only one radio station, which was destroyed by a bomb explosion during the first bombing. We were left without contact with both the armies and the headquarters of the commander-in-chief. This was very disturbing and worrying. General Tupikov reported the situation. The danger was obvious: aviation bombed the convoy more and more often, the enemy discovered us and began to surround us. There is no connection. We need to decide: in what direction and how to break out of the ring?

M.P. Kirponos asked:

- What do we do?

Tupikov and Potapov proposed to make a breakthrough at Chernukh, someone insisted on going to Lokhvitsa. The commander ordered Bagramyan to lead the NKVD company and move to Sencha. One reconnaissance group was given the task of conducting reconnaissance in the direction of Lokhvitsa. Bagramyan set off with his squad immediately. I met him two or three days after the tragedy in Shumeikovo.

With the onset of darkness, our column moved in the general direction to Lokhvitsa. The night progressed mostly without incident.

At dawn on September 20, we stopped for the day in the Shumeikovo grove (12 km from Lokhvitsa). About a thousand people remained in the column, mostly officers. Shumeikovo Grove - 100-150 m wide, up to 1.5 km long. The grove was cut through by a ravine, at the bottom of which there was a spring.

At about nine in the morning on September 20, the scouts reported that all the roads around Shumeikovo were occupied by the Germans. Our detachment was discovered by fascist motorcyclists, infantry in vehicles, several tanks - and surrounded the grove. Without a team, we took up defensive positions along the edge of the grove. Tupikov ordered me to organize security for the Military Council of the front.

The first fire strike fell throughout the grove - guns, mortars, tanks were firing, machine guns were chattering. The fire continued for about forty minutes. Then the tanks appeared, firing on the move from cannons and machine guns, followed by machine gunners. Return fire was opened from our side. Two German tanks broke through close to the edge of the grove, but were hit and caught fire, the rest retreated back along with the machine gunners.

The second attack by German infantry with tanks was also repelled by fire from machine guns, machine guns and artillery. And then came the attacks one after another, which were repelled by hand-to-hand counterattacks. In one of these counterattacks, in which almost all the generals and officers participated, Commander Kirponos was wounded in the left leg. Together with his adjutant, Major Gnenny, and two other comrades, whose names I don’t remember, we carried the commander in our arms to a ravine, to a spring.

Around 7 pm on September 20The Germans opened mortar fire on the grove. One of the mines exploded near the commander, he was wounded in the chest and head. Kirponos grabbed his helmet-covered head with both hands and sank to the ground without a groan. After 1-2 minutes he died.All this happened before my eyes.

Major Gnenny, with tears in his eyes, removed the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, the order from his jacket, took documents from his pockets, cut off his shoulder straps, buttonholes and other insignia. After that, we hid Kirponos’s corpse in the bushes, camouflaging it with branches and leaves. They reported on the work done to Burmistenko.

Member of the Military Council M.A. Burmistenko, looking at his watch, said: “It will get dark in 40-50 minutes, we will be saved. We will gather a group and go for a breakthrough, we will make our way to our own.” But the plan failed. When Major Gnenny and I arrived at the agreed upon place and time (21:00), Burmistenko was not there. Before this, he participated in repelling another counterattack and apparently died. We did not find his body, since Mikhail Alekseevich was dressed in military uniform without insignia, and it was dangerous to search. The seriously wounded divisional commissar Evgeny Pavlovich Rykov and the unconscious commander of the 5th Army, General Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov, fell into the hands of the Nazis.

On the night of September 21, the Germans completely surrounded the grove and shot right through it. Tupikov gathered a group of officers and soldiers, everyone who was still alive.

- Let's make a breakthrough without noise , - said Vasily Ivanovich. -Follow me quietly.

Suddenly, without firing a shot, we rushed after the general towards the enemy. The Germans did not expect this and were a little confused. And when they came to their senses, many commanders and fighters of the group broke out of the dense ring of Fritz and made their way. I was among the lucky ones. Born in a shirt.

But General Vasily Ivanovich Tupikov was not among us - he died in a shootout near the Ovdievka farm, 2 km from the Shumeikovo grove. His corpse, as it later became known, was discovered and identified during an examination only in 1943. The reason for the belated search for Tupikov’s corpse was that his grave was located in a field that had been plowed and sown twice...

The words of Colonel General I.S. Glebov, or more precisely, his memories already in 1968, raise great doubts - apparently, after all, this is already part of a fantasy inspired by the past. Although it is worth noting that he told all this to another Colonel General, namely N. CHERVOV, also a participant in the war, who then worked in 1968 at the Department of Operational Art of the Military Academy of the General Staff, the head of which was Glebov.

As can be seen from the two stories, they are completely different in one respect, namely in the presence of Glebov at the time of the death of the Commander of the Southwestern Front. And Zhadovsky in his memoirs also makes no mention of the presence of the deputy chief of the operations department of the front headquarters, Glebov.
Based on everything, the words of Zhadovsky, as the only living witness to the death of the front commander remaining after the war, should be accepted as truth.
But here, too, not everything is clear. If there were no documents under Kirponos, then how can we understand next document. It's written Red Army soldier of the 91st Border Regiment of the NKVD troops Kachalin in October 1941 to the head of the NKVD troops and military rear guard of the Southwestern Front, Colonel Rogatin.

Memorandum

On September 21, 1941, on the second day after the battle, in a forest near the village of Avdievka (Ovdievka - approx.), I, left alone in the trench, at 12.00 went to look for my border guards. During the search, I found a murdered general of tall stature, full build, dressed in a dark gray drape overcoat, insignia - four stars, he had a gunshot wound in his head on the left side of the temporal part, on the right side his head was pierced, apparently by a large fragment .

While examining the corpse of the murdered general, I saw two Red Army soldiers led by a lieutenant, to whom I reported the discovery of the corpse of the murdered general. The lieutenant instructed me to check the murdered man for documents. In the side pocket of my jacket I found a party card and read the name of the murdered man - Kirponos. I gave my membership card to the lieutenant of the Red Army , whose last name I don’t know, just said in the presence of the whole group that he was from the 21st Army.

When I handed over my party card, the Germans began to approach, with whom we began a shootout, during which I was wounded in the leg. When the Germans fled, the lieutenant offered to look at the orders of the dead man. Since I could not go, the lieutenant went himself. Upon his return, he did not say whether he had removed the orders, but suggested that we prepare to leave this place. All night we moved together: me, a lieutenant, one senior political instructor and 2 Red Army soldiers, I don’t know their names and what units they are from.

At dawn we settled down in the haystacks. The lieutenant soon announced that he would go to the nearest farm and bring something to eat. He did not return to us from this farm...

Upon arrival in Akhtyrka on October 2, 1941, I wrote a report to the chief of recruitment of the 21st Army indicating the discovery of the murdered Colonel General Kirponos...

As can be seen from the reportAccording to the note, the lieutenant went to the farm and did not return. But he still had his party card, M.P. Kirponos. And if we assume that he was captured, then it is likely that the German command became aware of where the corpse of the commander of the Southwestern Front was located.
Is it possible to believe the testimony of border guard Kachalin? The answer is yes!!! If only because in the troops of the Southwestern Front during this period there was only one general with 4 stars, namely Colonel General M.P. Kirponos. And in the pocket of the murdered general a party card in the name of Kirponos was found. As can be seen from the previously cited explanatory note by Gnenny and Zhadovsky, the corpse of General Kirponos was searched by someone and there were no documents with him.Wasn’t it Kachalin’s group that searched Kirponos’s corpse?
In the newspaper “Lokhvitskoe Slovo” No. 9 dated December 3, 1941, published by the Germans in the occupied territory, a note “In the Valley of Death” was published, which says:

“...almost 500 senior commanders of the Red Army, they tried on their own to find a way out of the encirclement. Among this group of generals, division and corps commissars were famous general tank troops Potapov, corps commissar Borisovich-Muratov - author of valuable scientific works. Attempts of the generals to break out dark night were in vain..."

Did Stalin know how Colonel General Kirponos died and where he was buried? He knew, N.S. reported to him about it. Khrushchev.

From the report on the circumstances of the death

Colonel General M.P. Kirponos.

...After the death of Comrade KIRPONOS, Majors ZHADOVSKY and GNENNY took off his overcoat, cut off the buttonholes and insignia from his jacket, removed the gold star No. 91, and took the contents from his pockets. The overcoat was burned, the gold star No. 91 and the contents of the pocketshanded over personally by Majors ZHADOVSKY and GNENNY on October 27, 1941 to Comrade KHRUSHCHEV...

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
Comrade Stalin
I am sending Additional materials about the death of Colonel General Comrade. KIRPONOS M.P. ...
Attached:

1. Explanatory note t.t. GNENNY and ZHADOVSKY.
2. Report of the Special Department of the SWF
…
4. Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, taken by Comrade Gnenny from the corpse of Comrade Kirponos.

Sent to Comrade Stalin
10/XII-41 via T. Vorobyov

This is what Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev himself, a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, writes in his memoirs about this:

...The Germans were already tightening the ring around the headquarters from all sides. That's all the scant information.

Then generals, officers and soldiers began to emerge from there, individually and in groups, from the encirclement. Everyone made their own personal impressions and then gave their information about the situation in which they themselves were located. After some time, we received information that Kirponos had died. Some worker special department The front headquarters reported to me that he saw Kirponos’s corpse and even brought his personal belongings: a comb, a mirror. I had no doubt about its veracity. He said that there was an opportunity to penetrate those places again. And I asked him, if possible, to return and remove the Golden Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union from Kirponos’s jacket. He always wore it. And this man went! There were swamps there that were difficult for vehicles to navigate. And the man overcame them, returned and brought the Golden Star. When he handed it to me, I asked: “How can this be? There are probably looters operating there?” He replied that the commander's jacket was covered in blood, the flap of the breast pocket turned away and covered the Star so that it was not visible. “I,” he says, “as you told me, tore the Star from the jacket”….

In September 1943, the Senchansky district was liberated from Nazi invaders, and at the end of October, on the instructions of the General Staff, V.S. Zhadovsky, as the only surviving eyewitness to the death of Colonel General M.P. Kirponos and who knew the place of his burial, was instructed to go with a group of officers of the People's Commissariat of Defense to the place of M.P.'s death. Kirponos and find his remains. Was created special commission, which included: a representative of the Main Personnel Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense, Lieutenant Colonel B.N. Borodin, a representative of the newspaper "Red Star" Senior Lieutenant G.D. Krivich, a representative of the Poltava Regional Directorate of the NKVD A.V. Popov, a regional forensic expert, doctor P. A. Golitsyn, secretary of the Senchansky district party committee V.I. Kurys, head of the Senchansky regional department of the NKVD I.M. Vlasov and head of the Senchansky district hospital, doctor P.A. Rossokha. Local residents assisted in the work of the commission. The commission had in its hands an extract from the report of Gnenny and Zhadovsky, which indicated the burial place of M.P. Kirponos and the signs of the corpse. Arriving at the Shumeikovo tract, the commission found the grave, opened it and began examining the remains.

The report of the forensic medical opening of the grave (exhumation) and examination of the corpse dated November 6, 1943 states:

...the corpse “is dressed in a cream-colored underwear knitted-silk shirt that has not decayed in places, long johns of the same material, khaki cloth breeches with red edging... On the lower part of the left shin (near the foot) there is a bandage made of flannel footcloth... On the surviving parts The following damages can be noted on the corpse: In the anterior part of the left parietal bone there is a dark bluish spot measuring 7 x 2.5 centimeters, apparently, this is the remnant of a former hematoma. In the center of this spot there is a roughness of the bone with some depression in space into a 20-kopeck coin... The sternal end of the 2nd left rib is broken...

In the conclusion of the examination report, the Poltava regional forensic expert, doctor P.A. Golitsyn, and the head of the Senchansky regional hospital, doctor P.A. Rossokha, indicated:

...Based on the data of exhumation and forensic medical examination of the corpse of an unknown soldier, it should be concluded that this corpse belongs to the person command staff, judging by the general physical development, aged 40 to 45 years. Analyzing the nature of the injuries on the corpse, it must be assumed that the deceased suffered shrapnel gunshot wounds in the head area during his lifetime, chest and left shin. Of these injuries, wounds in the chest area, containing vital organs, should be considered the cause of his death...

In conclusion, the commission stated:

The corpse discovered in the grave is the corpse of the former commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front - Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General Comrade. Kirponos Mikhail Petrovich....The corpse of comrade Kirponos M.P. removed from the grave, placed in a coffin and deposited with the Senchansky district department of the NKVD until instructions are received on the procedure and place of the funeral...

According tocertificate from the commission of the Main Personnel Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, the general's corpse was transported to Kirponos from the burial place to the Senchi station, and from here by special train to Kiev, where he was buried with military honors on December 18, 1943. The funeral was filmed by cameramen from the film brigade of the Political Directorate of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

IN encyclopedic reference book Kiev (Kyiv, 1981) about the burial place of Colonel General Kirponos it is said that after the war the ashes of M.P. Kirponos was moved to Kyiv and buried in the University Botanical Garden named after Academician A.V. Fomin, and in 1958 his ashes were reburied in the Park of Eternal Glory.

There are many ambiguities and inaccuracies in Zhadovsky’s testimony:

In his explanations in November 1943, he indicates that it was he who dug the grave - “The grave was dug by me, Major Gnenny and three officers from Comrade Burmistenko’s guard in his presence. More precisely, it was not a grave, but a deepened small hole located to the left of the path , leading along the bottom of the ravine." But in the explanation given on October 27, 12941 by him and Major Gnenny (personally to N.S. Khrushchev in the city of Valuiki with a detailed written report on the injury of General M.P. Kirponos, the circumstances and place of death) it was written - “Comrade Kirponos was buried, according to our assumptions, together with our other soldiers and commanders, on September 22 - 23, the local population of the nearest villages here in the forest in the Dryukovshchina region" !!! That is, they didn’t bury him! The guarantor is also confused in the details: in the explanatory N.S. Khrushchev gives the date of death of General Kirponos as September 19, but in the 1943 explanation the date is already September 20.

So when was Colonel General M.P. actually killed? Kirponos? It is still not clear where he was originally buried and who buried him: the local population and the German command?

There is still no clear answer to these questions today.

The newspaper “Kyiv Pravda” No. 80 dated July 27, 2006 published an article by Doctor of Philosophy, ProfessorNinel Trofimovna Kostyuk, daughter of the Chairman of the Kyiv Regional Executive Committee Trofim Kostyuk, who died in 1941, “Truth and fiction about the defense of Kyiv”. In this article she refers to the book by Colonel General of the Internal Troops Viktor Ivanovich Alidin “Scorched Land” (M. 1993), in which he raised the question of the burial place of General Kirponos.

Before the war, V. Alidin worked as a senior official in the Kiev Regional Party Committee, took part in the defense of Kyiv and, having emerged from encirclement, headed the work of compiling and preserving archives coming from the occupied territories of Ukraine. In his book, V. Alidin claims that in 1942 the Germans transported the remains of Kirponos from the place of death to Kyiv and buried them in the botanical garden next to the university.

Further, N. Kostyuk writes that after some time she became familiar with the materials of another witness - a woman who claimed that she was present at the funeral of Kirponos by the Germans. This woman seemed to see him in a coffin with his face open. The Germans, she said, began filming the chronicle, but at that time the mined Khreshchatyk began to explode from explosions, and the funeral ritual was quickly compressed and completed. The explosions on Khreshchatyk began on September 24, 1941.

September 28, 1941 newspaper “ Ukrainian word”, which was published during the occupation in Kiev, published a message from the Fuhrer’s main apartment that in September 1941, while clearing the battlefield, the corpse of the commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front, Colonel General Kirponos, was found, who died in battle. It was also reported that his headquarters, as well as the headquarters of the 5th and 21st Soviet armies were destroyed.

Why did the Soviet government keep silent about the funeral of General M.P. Kirponos by the German command? Apparently, the honor of the uniform was more valuable to the Red Army command than the truth.

And subsequently, all materials on this issue were classified. This led to the distortion of history and the birth of all kinds of rumors.
The question still remains open of where the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General M.P. is actually buried. Kirponos.

This is the truth about a man who remained devoted to military duty to the end and fell on the battlefield in the fight against the enemies of our Motherland.

On a small mound near Lokhvitsa (Poltava region) in the Shumeikovo tract there is a majestic monument. An eight-meter bronze figure of a Soviet soldier in a cap and a fluttering raincoat. In his raised hand he holds a rifle with an attached bayonet, and in his eyes there is courage and determination to win. Behind the soldier's sculpture is the Stele of Glory.

The memorial complex was inaugurated on September 18, 1976. The authors are sculptors A.Yu. Belostotsky and V.P. Vinaykin, architects T.G. Dovzhenko and K.O. Sidorov.

Photos of those who were nearby:

Kirponos Mikhail Petrovich, commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front.

Burmistenko Mikhail Alekseevich, member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front.

...Burmistenko, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine and a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, disappeared completely without a trace. We made a lot of efforts to find traces of him. Only one thing became known from Burmistenko’s guards: they spent the last night in haystacks. In the evening they noticed how Burmistenko was destroying all the documents he had - tearing them up and burying them. We buried ourselves in the heaps for the night and settled down to sleep. In the morning, when they approached the mound where Burmistenko had spent the night, he was not there. Then they found the documents he had buried, including his identification card. He sent secret documents with his assistant Shuisky, and we received them. I came to the following conclusion: Burmistenko destroyed documents proving his identity. He believed that if he fell into the hands of the Germans, it would be established who he was and what his position was. He destroyed all such traces. We thought that he would still get out of the encirclement. After all, many generals came out, but Burmistenko did not appear. I think that he either shot himself to avoid falling into the hands of the enemy, or was killed while trying to escape the encirclement. He did not have any documents proving his identity. That's why he died without a trace. We waited a long time for him, but our expectations, unfortunately, were in vain... MarshalEremenko Andrey Ivanovich , commander of the Bryansk Front, wrote in his book “At the Beginning of the War”:

...Under the cover of darkness on September 21, when the enemy completely surrounded the grove, a group of our commanders tried to break out of the enemy ring or die in an unequal battle with the enemy. This group was led by Major General Tupikov. The group made an attempt to break through to the Avdeevka farm, which is 3 km from the Shumeikovo grove. On the way to this farm there is a deep ravine overgrown with oaks, lindens, and bushes. But the attempt apparently failed. The enemy surrounded the grove in a dense ring. Only a few commanders managed to get to the Avdeevka farm and escape.

A resident of this farm, P. A. Primolenny, said that on the night of September 21, a young commander knocked on his door and then entered his hut. He told Primolenny that he left the Shumeikovo grove with the “big boss.” They made their way under heavy enemy fire. We agreed to move in turns, crawl 20 m, and then signal “Forward!” make yourself known. But when there were 150 - 200 meters left to the forest, the young commander told the collective farmer Primolenny, “ big boss“Didn’t respond to the agreed signal, which means he died.

In a field, among unmown peas, not far from a small forest, a few days later the collective farmers of the Avdeevka farm Netsko, Mokienko, Grinko and others found the body of Major General Tupikov and buried him here. This was probably the “big boss” that the young commander told the collective farmer about...

Version of Tupikov’s death from local residents:

...the body was found by local residents in a corn field near the village of Ovdievka. Next to him was a tablet with maps and documents, and the pistol was in a holster. He was shot in the back of the head. The locals were surprised by the fact that the corpse was in the middle of a field and with a full set of documents. Those. There were no attempts by those retreating with him to search the body and take away documents...

...SurprisingThe locals were also upset by the fact that apart from the murdered Tupikov there were no more corpses on the field, the distance to the road was decent enough to talk about a stray German bullet from the road...

Clarification according to Tupikov: there is an act of exhumation and a survey of local residents with the names of who found the body when, details of the burial by the locals, an inventory of what was found during the exhumation in the grave. The Germans knew nothing about Tupikov’s burial...

In the local history museumShumeikovo tract contains a copy of the act of exhumation of Tupikov’s corpse. He was buried with all the documents, nothing was taken from his body, not even a gold watch.

From the book “Time. People. Power" by Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, member of the Military Council of the South-Western Front:

...Tupikov got to work. I liked his clarity and efficiency. Such an incident happened to him. Told me Bagramyan, who was his deputy, head of the operations department, spoke about this. When one day German bombers attacked our headquarters (and this happened every day), Bagramyan, very tired, lay down on the couch and closed his eyes, but did not fall asleep. It was impossible to sleep because the earth was shaking and humming. At that time, Tupikov was pacing the room and humming to himself: “Will I fall, pierced by an arrow, or will it fly by?” He took out a bottle from under the table with something in it, poured himself a glass, drank it and again continued to walk around, apparently pondering some questions. This happened more than once later. Tupikov was not a coward. Alas, when the front headquarters was surrounded. Dead End V didn't return. In my opinion, they didn’t even find his corpse. For us he remained missing...

NGO USSR. Field management

The last time I saw Major General TUPIKOV and Major General POTAPOV was 18.9.41in the grove 1 km northeast. Dryukovshchina /west of Sencha/.

In this grove there was the Military Council of the Southwestern Front and the headquarters of the 5th Army with reinforced security.

At 15:00 that day, enemy tanks and infantry appeared in front of the grove. The pr-k led the offensive and soon surrounded the grove, since it was small.

The only exit from the grove was to the east along the ravine.

During heavy machine-gun, artillery and mortar fire at the grove, Major General TUPIKOV and I were together, but at that time we lost sight of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front and the Armed Forces of the 5th Army, they were about 50 meters from us and then somewhere gone. Our attempts to find anyone from the Military Council of the Chechen Fleet and the 5th Army led nowhere.

I believe that they all died, including Major General POTAPOV.

Not finding anyone from the SWF Armed Forces, TUPIKOV and I decided to leave this grove; at that time Major General DOBYKIN and other commanders were with us.

Moving into the neighboring grove, we had to overcome a completely open area, heavily shelled by machine-gun and mortar fire. We all scattered into a chain and literally crawled over. Here I lost sight of Comrade TUPIKOV, moredidn't see him. Having reached the neighboring grove,I tried to call Comrade TUPIKOV in my voice, but I couldn’t find him anymore could not.

I believe that while crawling through a heavily shelled area, he was killed or seriously wounded, since no one else saw him.

p.p. Major General DANILOV.

Nearby on the shore of the pond there is a burial site of a hospital that was destroyed by the Germans. Naturally, the burial is hidden... No work is expected on it at all...

Rykov Evgeniy Pavlovich, divisional commissar, member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front.

According to a report from Comrade Mizerny dated December 26, 1941. divisional commissar Rykov died of wounds in a hospital on enemy territory.

From the book “Time. People. Power" by Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, member of the Military Council of the South-Western Front:

...I was informed that a member of the Military Council, Rykov, was wounded and ended up in a hospital, which remained in the territory occupied by the enemy. But you can get there because they work there Soviet doctors and nurses. I wanted to help Rykov out, but I understood that if anyone let anything slip about him, he would be destroyed by the enemy. And I sent people to kidnap Rykov and transport him to the territory occupied by Soviet troops. They left, but soon returned, saying that Rykov died in the hospital and was buried...

senior lieutenant Basov Anatoly Grigorievich - adjutant to the commander of the Southwestern Fleet Kirponos.

Kyiv, 8.1941, Tupikov, Rykov, Kirponos.

Ostapenko P.D. - driver of Kirponos.

All that remains of the old bridge over the river. Many...

The village of Gorodishche. The building where the last meeting of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front was held on September 19, 1941.

After the death of the entire group, the Germans made no attempts to bury the fallen in the tract. The peasants, at their own peril and risk (the tract is still full of unexploded German mines and scattered grenades), buried the dead and groups of fighters who broke through further. Thank you very much to them for interring the fallen and preserving the memories...

There is a rumor among the locals that Kirponos also had 6 kg of gold from the Kyiv State Bank with him. The gold was divided into three parts and awarded to the exiting groups. According to the residents, again, not a single group took away the gold / di's storyrewho memorial complex tractShumeikovo VyacheslavGvozdovsky/.

The new appointment suited Ivan Stepanovich Konev (27) quite well. Commanding the forces of the Kalinin Front was a rewarding job, and returning to command of the famous troops of the Western Front could not but cause jubilation. Konev had previously served on the Western Front and commanded it, but preferred not to remember these difficult times. However, his memories of the tragedies of the summer of 1941 were still too fresh. At that time, he commanded the famous 19th Army, transferred on the eve of the war to the North Caucasus Military District. The invincible army of two rifle and one mechanized corps was destined to become the strategic reserve of the Southwestern Front during critical periods of wartime. But in the chaos of Operation Barbarossa, Konev's once-proud army was hastily transported to the central sector and thrown piecemeal into battle west of Smolensk. Exhausted by the advancing German tank forces, the army scattered; Some of the divisions were destroyed in Smolensk, the rest, in confusion, went on the defensive east of Smolensk, where they helped to temporarily stop the indomitable German offensive.

After Stalin sent Zhukov to Leningrad in September 1941, Konev took command of the Western Front - only to see his front all but cease to exist during the October offensive German troops to Moscow. After the death of two-thirds of his troops in the encircled Vyazma, Konev was given command of the remnants of the right-flank formations of the Western Front, regrouped and renamed the Kalinin Front. Konev commanded the Kalinin Front during the defense of Moscow and led it during the partially successful winter counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Moscow. In the depths of winter, Konev's troops (the majority of the army) entered into a brutal duel with counterattacking German formations under the command of General Model. IN Once again Konev and Model crossed swords in August 1942, when Model was already commanding the 9th Army. Konev was looking for a new meeting with his sworn enemy, this time in the role of commander of the Western Front.

On August 26, having taken command of the Western Front from Zhukov, Konev immediately began preparing for the resumption of a life-and-death battle. Having carefully re-equipped his tank forces, with the September 11 directive he reorganized the mobile forces, turning them into a single powerful weapon, capable of continuing offensive operations throughout the depth of the enemy’s defense line (28). From the battle-hardened 6th Tank Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Corps, he formed a mobile cavalry-mechanized group and placed it under the command of the experienced cavalry corps commander, Major General V.V. Kryukov. At the same time, during September and early October, Konev's front headquarters issued a stream of directives and orders in order to eliminate the mistakes that caused such damage to the front during the August operation. The most important component of these orders was the introduction of new interaction procedures to make the actions of mobile groups coherent, to ensure constant communication between them and the infantry, artillery and aviation operating together (29).

Konev was proud of his combined forces. He believed that never before had such troops been so powerful and under the leadership of more experienced commanders. By October 15, they included 11 combined armies (30th, 29th, 31st, 20th, 5th, 33rd, 49th, 50th, 10th, 16th and 61st -yu), deployed along the front line from Rzhev to! north to Bryansk in the south. It was one of the strongest Soviet fronts. It included two elite guards rifle corps (5th and 8th), the armored core consisted of six tank corps (3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th and 10th), as well as the well-reequipped 3rd Tank Army of Lieutenant General P.S. Rybalko (30). General Kryukov's 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps and the famous 1st Guards Cavalry Corps completed the list, along with an impressive arsenal of covering artillery and engineering units allocated by Stavka (see the exact order of battle of the Western Front in the Appendices).

The initial directive from Headquarters to launch Operation Mars on October 12 reached Western Front headquarters on October 1, 1942, but bad weather prevented the plan from being carried out. Therefore, the Headquarters prepared a new directive, postponing the offensive until October 28, and sent it to Konev on October 10. With difficulty containing his growing impatience, Konev shared his hopes with the officers of his headquarters and ordered them to immediately begin the complex and time-consuming process of developing a plan for a new offensive. Since Stavka ordered detailed preparations for only the first stage of the offensive, headquarters officers concentrated all their attention on Operation Mars, while Konev alone considered general outline subsequent Operation Jupiter. From experience he knew too well how dangerous it is to awaken in people big hopes. But he could not get rid of thoughts about Jupiter, despite the fact that Operation Mars was to begin on October 28, just a few weeks later.

Five days later, Konev’s headquarters transformed general concept Operation Mars, developed by Headquarters, into a detailed front-line plan. Having received it from the head of the front headquarters, Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky, and after getting acquainted with him, Konev was pleased:

“The main blow was delivered by units of the 20th Army in the general direction of Gredyakino and Kateryushki. After breaking through the tactical depth of the enemy’s defense, it was planned to introduce a cavalry-mechanized group into the breakthrough. This group, in cooperation with the armies of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, was to play a decisive role in encircling and destroying the enemy’s Rzhev-Sychev group.

To ensure success in the direction of the main attack in the breakthrough sector of the 20th Army, a superiority of forces and means over the enemy in manpower and equipment was created by almost two to three times. The outline of the front line generally favored the offensive of the armies of the left wing of the Kalinin and right wing of the Western Front, despite strong fortifications and unfavorable terrain conditions for the attacking forces.

The 20th Army delivered the main blow with its right flank with the task of breaking through the enemy’s defenses on the Vasilki, Gredyakino, Prudy front, and capturing the first and second lines of defense at the Mal line. Petrakovo, Bol. and Mal. Kropotovo, Podosinovka, Zherebtsovo. In the future, the army was supposed to leave west of the Rzhev-Sychevka railway. On the first day of the operation, it was planned to transport a cavalry-mechanized group to the western bank of the river. Vazuza.

On the second day of the operation, the 326th, 42nd, 251st, 247th rifle divisions were supposed to capture the railway line, after which the first three divisions turned the offensive front to the north-west, and the last - to the south-west. Such a maneuver of troops was supposed to provide a corridor 15–18 km wide for introducing a cavalry-mechanized group into the breakthrough.

The further task of the cavalry-mechanized group by the front commander was determined as follows (Diagram 24):

6th Tank Corps to deliver a concentrated attack in the direction of Sychevka and capture this settlement in cooperation with units of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps advancing from the northeast;

The 20th Cavalry Division will advance on Andreevskoye, preventing enemy reserves from approaching from the southwest, and destroy enemy units departing from Sychevka;

The 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps (without the 20th Cavalry Division) should attack Chertolino in order to cut the Rzhev-Olenin railway and subsequently, in cooperation with units advancing from the front, destroy the enemy’s Rzhev grouping” (31).

Konev was well aware of how much work was required to turn this smooth scenario into a detailed operational plan for the operation. Headquarters developers faced serious problems. Apply powerful blows simultaneously with forcing large river difficult, even if, as Konev hoped, this river would freeze. In addition, after the first strike, the river was supposed to become a serious obstacle to advance and a bottleneck for transport transporting ammunition. On the right flank of the 20th Army, the Osuga River limited freedom of action and forced the offensive to be carried out in a narrow “corridor”. It also had to be crossed in order for the offensive to develop at the required speed. Drawing a demarcation line between the 20th and 31st armies along the Osuga River partially eliminated this difficulty, but the terrain was still by no means ideal for an offensive.

Konev also thought about the enemy. Although the German infantry divisions had not yet recovered from the August battles, they were already entrenched in a carefully prepared strong defensive line. When intelligence reported to Konev that the German 5th Panzer Division was still covering the front line of defense, he shuddered, remembering the damage that division had inflicted on the advancing Soviet troops in August. Moreover, other tank formations were hiding somewhere in the rear, but the scouts were unable to find out either their numbers or their exact location. Konev sincerely hoped that with the coordinated offensive of Soviet troops on all sectors of the Rzhev salient, these dangerous enemy reserves would be thrown into other places, but deep down he knew that they would be enough for his share.

Driving away terrible thoughts, Konev left the headquarters, leaving the officers to do their work.

75 years ago, exactly a month after the start of the Great Patriotic War, the commander of the Western Front, Army General Dmitry Pavlov, was shot.

Pavlov was executed in Moscow and buried at the NKVD training ground in Butovo.

Until recently, he, along with Georgy Zhukov, was considered the most powerful and promising commander of the Red Army.

“For cowardice, unauthorized abandonment of strategic points without permission from the high command, collapse of military command and control, inaction of the authorities,” the verdict read.

In the draft order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0250 announcing the verdict, communicated to the troops on July 28, these words were written by Stalin's hand.

Pavlov’s fate was shared simultaneously with him or a little later by six more generals: Chief of Staff of the Front Vladimir Klimovskikh, Chief of Artillery Nikolai Klich, Deputy Chief of the Air Force Andrei Tayursky, Chief of Communications Andrei Grigoriev, Commander of the 4th Army Alexander Korobkov and Commander of the 14th Mechanized Corps Stepan Oborin.

The head of the front air force, Major General Ivan Kopec, on June 22, according to some sources, committed suicide, according to others, he was killed while resisting the security officers who came for him.

Pavlov's wife, son, parents and mother-in-law were exiled to the Krasnoyarsk Territory as the family of a traitor to the motherland, although treason was not mentioned in the sentence. Apart from his son, no one returned from Siberia.

On July 31, 1957, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR overturned the verdicts against the command of the Western Front due to the absence of corpus delicti in the actions of the convicted. They were posthumously reinstated in titles and awards.

An important role was played by a note by Colonel General Leonid Sandalov, chief of staff of the 4th Army in June 1941.

Legally, the i's are dotted. Historians continue to argue about the extent of Pavlov’s personal guilt for the defeat of the Western Front, and why it was he who paid the price, although the situation with his neighbors in Ukraine and the Baltic states was no better.

Destruction

In the first 18 days of the war, the Western Front lost almost 418 thousand out of 625 thousand personnel, including 338.5 thousand prisoners, 3188 tanks, 1830 guns, 521 thousand small arms.

32 of the 44 divisions were surrounded, from which, according to the entry in the “Journal of Combat Operations of the Western Front,” “small groups and individuals” emerged.

34 generals and colonels in general positions were killed, captured or seriously injured.

On June 28, on the seventh day of the war, Minsk fell. The territories annexed at enormous reputational costs under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were completely lost in five days.

The Wehrmacht paid for this with the loss of 15,723 people killed and wounded.

On June 22, Stalin and the leadership of the USSR viewed the German attack as a major nuisance, but by no means a disaster. Directive No. 2 (07:15 June 22) demanded to “fall on enemy forces and destroy them,” and Directive No. 3 (21:15) - by June 24 to take possession of Suwalki and Lublin, that is, to transfer fighting into enemy territory.

Of the 10,743 Soviet aircraft in the border echelon, the first strike on the “peacefully sleeping airfields” destroyed about 800. There was still something to fight for.

In the first days of the war, Stalin was calm and active. Stupor, when he left for the Near Dacha, did not contact anyone, and, according to the recollections of Anastas Mikoyan, he said to the visiting members of the Politburo: “Lenin left us a proletarian Soviet state, and we lost it,” happened to him after the fall of Minsk, June 29-30.

Promoted by Soviet power

Dmitry Pavlov was born on October 23, 1897 in the village of Vonyukh, Kostroma Region, later renamed Pavlovo. Graduated from two classes, First world war rose to the rank of non-commissioned officer, and was captured in 1916.

Returning to Russia in January 1919, he was mobilized into the Red Army and almost immediately joined the RCP (b). He served in the “food battalion” in Kostroma, that is, he was involved in food appropriation. He fought with Makhno, then with the Basmachi in the vicinity of Khujand and Bukhara.

In 1931, he switched from a horse to a tank, having previously graduated from the Frunze Academy and courses at the Military Technical Academy.

Historian Vladimir Beshanov based on analysis curricula and the memories of teachers and students express doubts about the quality of education in Soviet military academies of that time, but most of Pavlov’s colleagues did not have this either. Georgy Zhukov studied only on short-term courses and used to say: “No matter the fool, he’s a graduate of the academy.”

In 1936-1937, Pavlov was an adviser to the Republican government of Spain under the pseudonym “General Pablo”. Upon returning, he received a Hero's star and was appointed head of the Automotive and Tank Directorate of the Red Army. Participated in the operation at Khalkhin Gol and the war with Finland. In June 1940 he headed the Western Special Military District.

The first tanker of the Union

Nikita Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs that in 1940 he was present at the tests of the T-34 tank and was amazed at how it, under Pavlov’s control, “flew through swamps and sands,” but in a conversation after the end of the races, the general “made a depressing impression, seemed to me underdeveloped human."

Some authors sarcastically ask what Pavlov was like, depressing Khrushchev, who was also not overly burdened with cultural baggage. Others point out that Pavlov probably really did not read Kant or even Marx, but there is one circumstance that prevents him from being considered primitive.

From the experience of fighting in Spain, Pavlov gained confidence in the need to create diesel tanks with bullet-proof armor and long-barreled guns, and managed to convince Voroshilov and Stalin himself, who wrote a resolution on his memo: “I am in favor.”

Thanks to Pavlov, on the eve of the war the Red Army received the KV and T-34 tanks, which had no analogues in the world, which were developed and built in Leningrad and Kharkov, respectively, and were put into service on the same day: December 19, 1939.

Only forward!

In all ZapOVO exercises under the leadership of Pavlov, only the offensive with “overcoming fortified areas” and “crossing water barriers” was practiced. The next maneuvers were planned for June 22, 1941.

At a meeting of the highest command staff of the Red Army in the presence of Stalin on December 23-31, 1940, the main reports were made by Zhukov and Pavlov.

Zhukov’s speech was entitled: “The character of modern offensive operation", Pavlov specified the tasks in relation to the mechanized corps, the main striking force of the Red Army.

“Tank corps, supported en masse by aviation, break into the enemy’s defensive zone, break his anti-tank defense system, and hit artillery along the way. A pair of tank corps will have to cover a tactical depth of about 30-35 kilometers within a couple of hours, followed by rifle units. Of course, the most important factor is the surprise factor,” Pavlov described his vision of the upcoming war.

He also thought about the details: “food trucks should not be taken into the breakthrough, meat can be obtained on the spot, bread must be found on the spot”; “take cans and barrels to the top of the tank, diesel fuel does not burn.”

According to the recollections of meeting participants, 43-year-old Pavlov, squat and broad-shouldered, “breathed volcanic energy.”

The only report on defense was made by the commander of the Moscow Military District, Ivan Tyulenev, and even then on containing the enemy in certain areas that would have to be exposed in order to concentrate forces for a general offensive.

Historian Igor Bunich indicates that of the 276 marshals, generals and admirals present, long life was destined only for every third person. The rest soon faced death in battle, in Hitler's camp or from a KGB bullet.

Mystery game

From Zhukov’s “Memories and Reflections” there is a widely known story about how, during the command and staff game on cards that followed the meeting, Pavlov repelled German aggression, commanding the so-called “red”, Zhukov advanced at the head of the “blue” and defeated Pavlov, acting almost like this the same way a real enemy will act in six months.

Why were the results of the game not taken into account when preparing the defense of Belarus? And why didn’t Stalin remove the “incompetent” Pavlov, but after a month and a half equalized him with Zhukov, awarding him the rank of army general?

Declassified documents cited by historian Pyotr Bobylev indicate that during the game, again, it was not defense, but offensive practice, and it took place in two stages: January 2-6 and January 8-11, 1941.

Germany could be attacked in two ways: from Belarus and the Baltic states to East Prussia and Northern Poland, or from Ukraine and Moldova to Romania with access to Hungary, the Czech Republic and Southern Poland.

The first option opened up the shortest route to Berlin, but in this theater there were significantly more German troops and fortifications, as well as complex water obstacles.

The second one moved final victory, but made it relatively easy to seize Romanian oil and knock Germany’s allies out of the war. The first phase of the game, where the Soviet offensive was led by Pavlov and repelled by Zhukov, demonstrated the difficulties of the “northern” option.

At the second stage, the military leaders switched roles. Stalin, who had already decided everything for himself, was not present, and People’s Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko and his deputy Semyon Budyonny, who supported the “southern” option, drew up conditions in such a way as to play along with the “reds” as much as possible.

The traditional version is correct in one thing: Pavlov really acted against Zhukov without success.

As is clear from the latest plan for the war with Germany, known as the “Vasilevsky note” and reported to Stalin on May 19, 1941, final choice was made in favor of the “southern” option.

But the leader, obviously, had no complaints against Pavlov in this regard: that was what was intended.

How did Pavlov command?

All day on June 21, 1941, Pavlov and Klimovskikh reported to Moscow about suspicious movement and noise on the other side of the border.

Although, by a secret order dated June 19, the district was transformed into a front with an order to the headquarters to move from Minsk to command post near the Obuz-Lesna station, Pavlov spent Saturday evening in the capital of the republic at a performance in the House of Officers, diligently demonstrating, as Army General Sergei Ivanov later wrote, “calmness, if not carelessness.”

The neighbor on the left, commander of the Kyiv district Mikhail Kirponos, was watching a football match at the same time, and then went to the theater.

Pavlov, of course, did not go to bed. At one o'clock in the morning on June 22, the People's Commissar of Defense called Minsk: “Well, how are you, calm?”

Pavlov reported that German columns had been continuously approaching the border for the past 24 hours, and that in many places the wire barriers had been removed from the German side.

“Be calm and don’t panic,” Tymoshenko replied. - Gather your headquarters this morning just in case, maybe something unpleasant will happen, but be careful, don’t risk any provocation. If there are isolated provocations, call.”

The next time Pavlov called with a message that the Germans were bombing and shelling Soviet territory and were crossing the border.

On the one hand, permission to do whatever it takes to professional language called loss of control.

According to many researchers, the order, which demonstrated the confusion of the command, marked the beginning of the demoralization of the troops and the collapse of the front.

On the other hand, before receiving Directive No. 2, which Zhukov began to write by hand only at 07:15 in Moscow, the only valid instruction was Directive No. 1 of 00:25, the main content of which was the requirement “not to succumb to any provocative actions” .

Pavlov, at worst, gave permission to open fire on the enemy, and more specific tasks I couldn’t supply them because I didn’t have them myself.

Failure near Grodno

Having received Directive No. 3, Pavlov at 23:40 on June 22 ordered his deputy, Lieutenant General Ivan Boldin, to form a group consisting of the 6th and 11th mechanized corps and the 6th cavalry corps (seven divisions and 1597 tanks, including 114 KV and 238 T-34) and hit the flank of the advancing Germans in the Grodno area.

“Due to the dispersion of formations, instability of control, and the influence of enemy aviation, it was not possible to concentrate the group at the appointed time. The goals of the counterattack were not achieved,” state the authors of the monograph “1941 - Lessons and Conclusions.”

The Volkovysk-Slonim highway was littered with abandoned tanks, burnt-out vehicles, and broken guns so that traffic was impossible. The columns of prisoners reached 10 km in length,” activists of the Belarusian search club “Fatherland” recorded from the words of local elders.

Judging by the memoirs of the commander of the 3rd Wehrmacht Panzer Group, Hermann Hoth, who opposed Boldin, he simply did not notice the counterattack in the Grodno area.

Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder in his “War Diary” mentioned Russian attacks in the direction of Grodno, but already at 18:00 on June 25 he wrote: “The situation south of Grodno has stabilized. Enemy attacks have been repulsed."

On June 24, Pavlov powerlessly cried out from front headquarters: “Why is the 6th MK not advancing, who is to blame? We must beat the enemy in an organized manner, and not run away without control.”

On the 25th he stated: “During the day, no data on the situation at the front was received by the front headquarters.”

Actually, this was the end of Pavlov’s independent leadership of the troops. Marshals Timoshenko and Kulik, who arrived from Moscow, took over control, but they also failed to take control of the situation.

Quick execution

On June 30, Pavlov was summoned to Moscow, where Molotov and Zhukov spoke with him, and was appointed deputy commander of the Western Front.

On July 4, special officers stopped the car of Pavlov, who was driving to the front headquarters in Gomel, near the city of Dovsk.

Investigators developed the case in a standard way, being interested not so much in the reasons for the failures of the Western Front, but in the suspect’s relationship with “enemies of the people Uborevich and Meretskov.”

Brutally beaten, Pavlov signed a confession that he was part of a conspiracy and deliberately opened the front to the enemy, but at the trial he renounced this part of his testimony.

Stalin decided to limit himself to accusations of incompetence and cowardice, probably considering it inappropriate in a difficult situation to increase panic by declaring that our fronts were commanded by traitors.

As everybody

Pavlov, of course, did not crown himself with military laurels, but he was no worse than others.

The tank battle that unfolded on June 23-30 in Ukraine under the leadership of the commander of the Southwestern Front, Mikhail Kirponos, and the Chief of the General Staff, Georgy Zhukov, who flew in from Moscow, took place in the Dubno-Lutsk-Brody area (3128 Soviet and 728 German tanks, more than at Prokhorovka), ended with the defeat of five mechanized corps of the Red Army. Losses amounted to 2648 and 260 tanks, respectively.

In the Baltics, the rate of advance of the Wehrmacht reached 50 km per day. Vilnius fell on June 24, Riga on June 30, Pskov on July 9, and by mid-July fighting was taking place a hundred kilometers from Leningrad.

Ivan Boldin, the second man on the Western Front, who was also directly responsible for the defeat at Grodno, and the commanders of the 3rd and 10th armies Vasily Kuznetsov and Konstantin Golubev were not held accountable and commanded the armies until the end of the war.

The reason is simple: at the beginning of July they were surrounded and inaccessible, and when they came out, the political necessity had disappeared. In addition, in 1941, only 63 were captured. Soviet general, so the rest had to be protected.

And in any case, not Pavlov pre-war years forbade even talking about defense.

It was not Pavlov who pushed airfields and warehouses to the very border instead of constructing trenches and minefields.

It was not he who came up with the idea that if the Germans attacked, the main blow would be delivered to Ukraine, as a result of which the 4th Army, which was located in what turned out to be the main Brest direction in reality, became the only first-echelon army that did not have an anti-tank artillery brigade.

Russian roulette

The announced demotion was not so great, considering that the People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko himself took command of the front.

Obviously, something changed in four days - and this was not connected with Pavlov’s actions, but with Stalin’s mood.

One version says that on June 30, the leader, who was in prostration at the dacha, had no time for Pavlov, but having come to his senses, he began to restore order in his characteristic manner.

Perhaps a political decision was made to exemplarily shoot one front commander, just as in the early 2000s to imprison an oligarch.

The choice fell on Pavlov because Stalin was especially shocked and outraged by the loss of Minsk. According to historian Alexey Kuznetsov, “Kiev was still far away, and ‘Vilnius’ didn’t sound so tragic.”

A certain role could have been played by the appointment of Lev Mekhlis, a particularly trusted Stalinist emissary, as a member of the Military Council of the Western Front, known for his habit, upon arriving at any new place, to send a proposal a few days later about who should be shot there.

Finally, Mark Solonin and some other researchers suggest a connection between the “Pavlov case” and the “Meretskov case.”

The former chief of the general staff, then commander of the Leningrad military district, Army General Kirill Meretskov, was arrested a few hours before the start of the war on the Red Arrow train on the way from Moscow to his place of duty.

In September he will be released, he will command Volkhovsky and Karelian fronts and will become a marshal. But by the time of Pavlov’s arrest, Meretskov had been in Lefortovo for almost two weeks, where he was beaten so much that the caring Stalin subsequently suggested that he report while sitting.

What and to whom Meretskov gave evidence is unknown, because his investigative file in 1955 was destroyed by order of KGB Chairman Ivan Serov.

Among the confessions extorted from Pavlov is this: allegedly in January 1940, on the Finnish front, while drinking with Meretskov, he said: “Even if Hitler comes, it won’t make us any worse.”

In the spring of 1944, with the entry of the Red Army into in certain directions to the state border, the country's top military-political leadership decided to create new fronts in new theaters of war, as well as to reorganize and rename the fronts that were part of the Red Army at the beginning of 1944.

Some facts suggest that the reasons for the reorganization of individual Red Army associations were their extremely unsuccessful actions in the military campaign of 1943.

At the beginning of April 1944. Stalin, having received a huge amount of information about the extremely unsuccessful activities of the command of the then Western Front, decided to send a representative delegation there to study the more detailed situation on the spot consisting of GKO member Malenkov (chairman), Colonel General Shcherbakov, Colonel General Shtemenko, Lieutenant General Kuznetsov and Lieutenant General Shimonaev.

Based on the results of the work of the GKO Commission on the Western Front, a devastating, detailed report was soon prepared addressed to Stalin, dated April 11, 1944, No. M-715.

Here are some of the most interesting sections from this report:

I. Unsatisfactory military operations of the Western Front over the past six months:

Starting from October 12, 1943 to April 1, 1944, the Western Front, under the command of Army General Sokolovsky, carried out eleven operations in the Orsha and Vitebsk directions, namely:

Orsha operation October 12-18, 1943
Orsha operation October 21-26, 1943
Orsha operation November 14-19, 1943
Orsha operation November 30 - December 2, 1943
Vitebsk operation December 23, 1943 - January 6, 1944
Bogushevsky operation January 8-24, 1944
Vitebsk operation February 3-16, 1944
Private operation in the Orsha direction February 22-25, 1944
Vitebsk operation February 29 - March 5, 1944
Orsha operation March 5-9, 1944
Bogushevsky operation March 21-29, 1944

All these operations ended unsuccessfully, and the front did not solve the tasks set by Headquarters. In none of the listed operations was the enemy’s defense broken through, at least to its tactical depth; the operation ended, at best, with an insignificant penetration into the enemy’s defense with large losses of our troops.

In these fruitless operations in the period from October 12, 1943 to April 1, 1944, in the areas of active operations alone, the front suffered losses in killed - 62,326 people, wounded - 219,419 people, and a total of 281,745 people killed and wounded. If we add to this the losses on passive sectors of the front, then during the period from October 1943 to April 1944, the Western Front lost 330,587 people. In addition, during the same time, 53,283 sick people were admitted to hospitals from the troops of the Western Front.
In the above operations from October 1943 to April 1944, the Western Front expended a very large amount of ammunition, namely 7261 wagons. During the year, from March 1943 to March 1944, the front used up 16,661 wagons of ammunition. During the same time, i.e. in a year. The Belorussian Front used up - 12,335 wagons, 1st Ukrainian Front- 10,945 cars. 4th Ukrainian Front - 8463 wagons, and each of the other fronts used up less ammunition than the listed fronts. Thus, the Western Front used up much more ammunition than any other front.
The unsuccessful actions of the Western Front over the past six months, large losses and high consumption of ammunition are explained not by the presence of a strong enemy and insurmountable defense in front of the front, but solely by unsatisfactory leadership on the part of the front command. During all operations, the Western Front always had a significant superiority in forces and means over the enemy, allowing us, of course, to count on success.

In the photo, a convoy of vehicles guarded by an armored car delivers ammunition to the front line. Western Front spring 1943

II. Major shortcomings in the work of artillery

In the 33rd, 31st and 5th armies there were repeated cases when artillery fired at areas (squares) given by the army artillery headquarters, but in fact there were no targets in these squares and the artillery fired at an empty place, and our infantry was shot enemy firing points from other areas.
In the operation of the 33rd Army on December 23, 1943, at the observation posts of some artillery regiments there were not officers, but ordinary soldiers. Not everywhere there were observers in the first echelon of infantry. As a result of this, the 199th Rifle Division was fired upon by its own artillery. In the same division, it came to the point that direct fire guns were firing at their own infantry.
During the offensive of the 33rd Army on February 3 this year. in a number of divisions the interaction of artillery with infantry was not organized. So, for example, the 144th Infantry Division advanced on Pavlyuchenki, and the artillery supporting it fired west of Pavlyuchenka. At the same time, during the offensive of the 222nd Rifle Division, the artillery supporting it was silent.
The unsatisfactory performance of the artillery on the Western Front is evidenced by many testimonies of captured Germans.

Artillery preparation is carried out according to a template. The beginning of the artillery preparation was indicated by a PC salvo, followed by a period of destruction and, at the end, an artillery raid along the front edge. The enemy got used to this pattern and, knowing the order of fire, skillfully maintained his manpower in shelters. Due to the fact that during the period of artillery preparation our artillery, as a rule, fired across the squares and did not suppress the enemy’s fire system, our infantry was met by the enemy with organized fire of all types, suffered heavy losses and in many cases could not advance forward from the very beginning.

III. Weaknesses in planning and preparation of operations

In some operations, rifle divisions and reinforcements were introduced into battle on the move. In the operation of the 5th Army on February 22-25, the 184th Infantry Division on the night of February 21 surrendered its defense sector to the 158th Infantry Division and by the morning of February 22nd reached the initial position for the offensive and from 8.00 of the same day, after a 10-minute artillery attack, moved into offensive and, of course, was not successful. In the operation of the 33rd Army on February 3-16, the 222nd, 164th, 144th and 215th rifle divisions received 1,500 reinforcements on the eve of the offensive and brought them into battle the next morning. The officers who arrived for replenishment received their units at starting position, and a few hours later led them on the offensive.

IV. ABOUT incorrect construction battle formations during the offensive
In most operations carried out by the front, the armies, especially the 33rd Army, advanced, deeply echeloned battle formations, and created an excessive density of manpower, thereby violating the order of Headquarters No. 306. This formation of battle formations led to the fact that 2-3 battalions in the division attacked, and the remaining battalions stood at the back of the head. Under these conditions, the striking force of the division was not used simultaneously, but was spent in parts and fire weapons were frozen. All this led to large losses even before the troops entered the battle, and having suffered such losses and being under continuous fire, the units lost their combat effectiveness even before the battle.

V. On the disadvantages of using tanks

Contrary to the experience of the war and the instructions of the Headquarters on the use of tank formations, the command of the Western Front threw its existing 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps against the undefeated enemy defenses, as a result of which the tank corps could not advance forward and suffered heavy losses. In the operation in the Orsha direction on November 14-19, the tank corps was brought into battle when the infantry on a 3 km front barely penetrated the defense to a depth of 2-3 km. In the operation of the 33rd Army in the Vitebsk direction on December 23, the entry of the tank corps into battle was planned after the infantry captured the river. Luchesa (18 km deep in defense). On this basis, the tank corps was not brought into battle when the infantry advanced in the first three days of the offensive to a depth of 8-10 km, and when the infantry was stopped by organized enemy fire from pre-prepared lines and the river continued to remain ahead. Luchesa, the tank corps rushes into battle and, after losing 60 tanks, without achieving success, is withdrawn to the infantry battle formations. In the operation in the Bogushevsky direction on January 8, the tank corps was brought into battle when the infantry essentially had no success. Having suffered up to 70% losses, the tank corps advanced with the infantry 2-4 km and was then withdrawn from the battle.

VIII. On the situation in the 33rd Army during the command of Colonel General Gordov

Contrary to the instructions of the Headquarters, which prohibited the use in battle special units Like ordinary infantry, Gordov often brought scouts, chemists and sappers into battle.
Among the most serious offenses of Gordov are the facts when Gordov sent the entire officer corps of the division and corps into a chain.
In his order dated September 4, 1943, addressed to the commander of the 173rd Infantry Division, Colonel Zaitsev, and the regimental commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Milovanov, Lieutenant Colonel Sizov, and Major Guslitser, Gordov demanded:
“Place the entire officer corps in battle formations and march through the forest in a chain, assigning small detachments to flush out the machine gunners from their nests.”
And further Gordov wrote in the order: “It is better for us to be killed today than not to complete the task.”
On September 4, 1943, Gordov ordered the chief of staff of the 70th infantry regiment, Major General Ikonnikov:
“Immediately send the entire corps administration into chain. Leave only the chief of the operations department at headquarters.”
Such unacceptable actions by Gordov led to disorganization of battle control and unjustifiable losses among the officers. Over the past six months, in the 33rd Army under the command of Gordov, 4 division commanders, 8 deputy division commanders and division chiefs of staff, 38 regiment commanders and their deputies, and 174 battalion commanders were killed and wounded.

in the photo Colonel General V.N. Gordov

Gordov criminally violated the order of the Headquarters prohibiting the execution of commanders without trial. Thus, on March 6, by order of Gordov, Major Trofimov was shot without trial or investigation, allegedly for evading battle. In fact, as the investigation established, Major Trofimov was not guilty.
During the fighting, Gordov's control was reduced to swearing and insults. Gordov often resorted to threats of execution towards his subordinates. This was the case with the commander of the 277th Infantry Division, Major General Gladyshev, and the commander of the 45th Infantry Division, Major General Poplavsky. According to a number of commanders who worked with Gordov, the inhumane attitude towards people and sheer hysteria tormented them so much that there were cases when commanders could not command their formations and units.
The front command ignored all these outrages in Gordov’s actions, did not correct him and continued to consider him the best army commander.

IX. About the front command

The front command does not tolerate criticism; attempts to criticize shortcomings are met with hostility. Characteristic in this regard are the resolutions of Army General Sokolovsky on the report of an officer of the General Staff, which highlighted the shortcomings in the preparation and management of the operation carried out by the 31st Army on October 29, 1943. These resolutions are as follows:
“The price of the document is very small, even on a good market day.”
“Lieutenant Colonel Nekrasov, apparently, did not think about what he was writing. The man, apparently, was used to chatting in general.”
"Lies!"
"Stupid lie."
"Lies".
“The writer does not understand the battle to break through the defense at all.”
"Words and no more!"
Such an atmosphere has been created at the front and people are so educated that they are afraid to raise questions about shortcomings with the front command. There were timid attempts on the part of individual commanders of the military branches to point out shortcomings in the actions of the military branches and address them in the order, but the front commander rejected such attempts.

The front commander, Comrade Sokolovsky, is cut off from his closest assistants - the commanders of the military branches and the heads of services; he does not receive them for many days and does not resolve their issues. Some deputy commanders were not aware of the missions of their respective branches of the military in connection with the operations being carried out, not to mention the fact that they were not involved in the development of the operations. For example: the commander of BT and MB, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Rodin, stated: “I have never been asked how best to use tanks. I am only a dispatcher and send tanks to one army or another. I learned the tasks of tank forces in the armies or from subordinate tankers."

Soon, based on the results of the commission’s work, an Order was issued by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for No. 220076 dated April 12, 1944
This order read:
Based on the GKO decree of April 12, 1944 on the work of the command and headquarters of the Western Front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ORDERS:

I.
1. Army General Sokolovsky should be removed from the post of commander of the Western Front, as having failed to command the front, and appointed him chief of staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

2. Lieutenant General Bulganin be reprimanded for the fact that he, being long time member of the Military Council of the Western Front, did not report to Headquarters about the presence of major shortcomings at the front.

3. Warn Lieutenant General Pokrovsky, chief of staff of the Western Front, that if he does not correct his mistakes, he will be demoted in rank and position.

4. Colonel General of the Artillery Camera is removed from his post as commander of the artillery of the Western Front and placed at the disposal of the commander of the artillery of the Red Army.

5. Colonel Ilnitsky should be removed from his post as head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front, reduced in rank to lieutenant colonel and assigned to another job with a demotion.

6. Warn Colonel General Gordov, removed from his post as commander of the 33rd Army, that if he repeats the mistakes he made in the 33rd Army, he will be reduced in rank and position.
II.
1. The Western Front in its current composition is divided into two fronts: the 2nd Belorussian Front consisting of the 31st, 49th and 50th armies and the 3rd Belorussian Front consisting of the 39th, 33rd and 5th armies.
Office of the 2nd Belorussian Front form on the basis of the 10th Army Directorate. Complete the formation and accept troops assigned to the front no later than April 25.

2. The current Belorussian Front should be called the 1st Belorussian Front.

3. Appoint Colonel General Petrov as commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front with his release from command of the 33rd Army; appoint Lieutenant General Mekhlis as a member of the Military Council of the 2nd Belorussian Front; chief of staff - Lieutenant General Bogolyubov with his release from the post of chief of staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

4. Appoint Colonel General Chernyakhovsky as commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front with his release from command of the 60th Army; appoint Major General Makarov as a member of the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front with his release from the post of head of the Political Directorate of the Western Front; chief of staff - Lieutenant General Pokrovsky with his release from the post of chief of staff of the Western Front.

5. Appoint Lieutenant General Kryuchenkin as commander of the 33rd Army with his release from command of the 69th Army.

6. Formation of two fronts and distribution of divisions, reinforcement units, aviation, rear units, institutions and property of the Western Front between the two fronts to be carried out under the control of the representative of the Headquarters, Colonel General Shtemenko.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
Stalin
Antonov http://www.forum-tvs.ru/index.php?showtopic=96392

This is the history of the creation of the Victory Fronts, the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts. The Western Front remained in the history of the Great Patriotic War as a front associated mainly with the severe defeats and losses suffered by the Red Army in the initial period of the war.