37th Army on the southern front. Thirty-seventh Army

Shtarm 37 17.7 - Yagodny, 18.7 - Vladimirskaya, 20.7 - Kerchik (Isaev)
The 179th and 537th MZA divisions covered 37A on the Don.

TsAMO, f.224, op.774, d.3, l.341 (received input.2849 9.9.42)

Combat report No. 3 artillery headquarters 37A by 10.00 17.7.42 map 100000

1. Army units on the night of 16/17/42. According to the combat order of Headquarters 37 No. 0038, they made a march to reach the lower Don line.
2. The army’s artillery concentrated after the night march:
a) 727lap and the 37th PTR battalion took up a battle formation in the Khalimonovka, Verkh.Kovalevka area, with the task of covering the roads in the direction of Korolevka, Semenovsky.
b) 839 OA RAD - on the northern outskirts of Platovo.
c) 43gmp - Kovalevka, Khalimonovka.
d) the artillery of the divisions after the night march concentrated in the areas:
230sd -Nizh.Derevechka, village Verkh.Derevechka.
295sd - Queen.
275sd - Pervomaika, Voroshilov confectionery.
102nd - Kovalevka, Anikin.
3. 4th Guards AAP at 20.00 16.7.42 left the army and left for the 56th Army along the route given by the artillery headquarters of the Southern Front.
4. Anti-aircraft weapons of the army from 16 to 17.7.42 covered the army’s transition and by the morning of 17.7.42 they took up the battle formation:
a) 179 OZAD consisting of 2 batteries of 3 85mm cannons in the area of the Voroshilov confectionery plant.
537 MZA division consisting of 2 batteries of 4 37mm guns in the Yagodny area (8 km northwest of Plotv).

TsAMO, f.224, op.774, d.3, l.343

Combat report No. 4 artillery headquarters 37A by 18.00 18.7.42 map 200000

1. On the night of July 17-18, 1942, units of the army marched to reach the Lower Don line, continuing to carry out the combat order of Headquarters 37 No. 0038.
2. The army’s artillery concentrated after the march:
a) 727iptap, 37 OB PTR took up a battle formation on the northern outskirts of Vladimirskaya, in readiness to repel tank attacks from the Rusko-Prokhorovsky, Krasny Partizan farm.
b) 839 OA RAD - on the southern outskirts of Vladimirskaya.
c) 43rd GMP - the eastern outskirts of Vladimirskaya, with the task of being ready to repel possible attacks of individual motorized mechanized units from the directions: Russko-Prokhorovsky, Krasny Partizan.
d) the artillery of the divisions after the march concentrated in the areas where the divisions were concentrated:
230sd - Pavlovka, Kiselev, Verginsky.
275sd - Krasny Sulin.
295th Rifle Division - Russko-Prokhorovsky, B. Fedorovka.
102nd - M. Gnilushinskaya, Vladimirskaya.
3. Anti-aircraft weapons of the army from 17 to 18.7.42 covered the movement of army units and by the morning they took up a battle formation:
a) 179 rear air defense - Krasny Sulin.
b) 537 MZA division - Vladimirskaya.
c) 774 ZPR - in the Krivyanskaya area.
d) 7 Yu-88 aircraft bombed Zverevo station twice and set fire to a train with ammunition at this station. One Yu-88 was shot down in the same area. The plane burned down, the crew of three people was captured.

Head of the Operations Department, Major Papazov

TsAMO, f.224, op.774, d.3, l.349

Combat report No. 05 artillery headquarters 37A 14.00 20.7.42 map 100,000 and 200,000

1. The enemy in the afternoon of July 19, 1942. continued to be active, with the support of artillery fire and intense air raids by the end of 7/19/42. occupied M. Fedorovka, B. Fedorovka and Vladimirskaya. Enemy aviation showed great intensity, using combined air strikes different types, bombing and shooting from a dive battle formations our troops.
2. Army troops in the previous grouping continue to carry out headquarters order No. 039 dated July 18, 1942 and are conducting holding battles with enemy tanks and motorized infantry.
3. Ground artillery:
a) 727iptap 18.7.42. at 20.00 he left the army to jointly cover crossings with detachments of the 102nd Rifle Division in the Vinogradny, Ust-Bystryanskaya sector.
b) 37th PTR battalion 19.7.42. occupied a battle formation on the northern, northeastern outskirts of Vladimirskaya and from 17.00 waged a holding battle with enemy tanks.
By the morning of 20.7.42, the battalion concentrated in Kadamovsky and from 4.00 departed for the Novoselovka, Artemovsky area with the task of covering the roads to Grushovka, Sadki, Vladimirskaya, Krasny Sulin.
c) 43gmp from the morning of 19.7.42. occupied a battle formation on the slopes of nameless heights 500 meters south of Vladimirskaya. At 17.50, two divisions fired a salvo at a concentration of enemy tanks and infantry in Yaseneva Gully. At 21.30 a salvo was fired from the 261st GMD on the northern outskirts of Vladimirskaya.
At 7.20 on 7/20/42. the regiment arrived in the Kadamovsky district and took up battle formation: 259GMD - Kadamovsky; 260gmd - Your Work; 261gmd - Novo-Nikolaevka with the task of preventing the enemy from advancing from Nov. Tsarevka and Plemkhoz Pridonsky to Novo-Nikolaevka, preventing the enemy from crossing the Mokry Kerchik River, and preventing the enemy from advancing from Artemovsky to Kadamovsky. The regiment has losses in personnel, transport and combat installations, which are being clarified.
Availability of ammunition - 1285 items. Fuel and lubricants - 1 refill. Food - on 7/22/42, in 261GMD - on 7/25/42.
d) 268aap 19.7.42 occupied the battle formation: 1st and 3rd divisions - in the Vladimirovskaya area, 2nd division - in the Shakhty area. The 3rd Division fired at enemy tanks and motorcyclists in the afternoon. As a result of fire on tanks approaching Vladimirskaya at 18.30, 3 tanks were knocked out and 1 enemy tank was destroyed.
20.7.42 The regiment arrived in the Kadamovsky district, where it took up battle formation: 1.3/268 aap - divisions in the Svoi Trud area, Rubezhnye Kurg, Kadamovsky, 2/268 - concentrated in Shakhty.
Losses: wounded - 4 people, killed - 1 middle commander. As a result of the bombing by enemy aircraft, one tractor was burned, 3 tractors were hit, and 3 cars were burned.
Security. Ammunition: 122mm 31g. - 160 pcs. Serviceable tractors - 13. Fuel and lubricants - 1 filling station.
e) no information was received about the action of the 3rd Guards Artillery. The artillery of the 295th and 230th infantry divisions did not fire.
4. Air defense artillery.
537 division MZA 19.7.42 covering Vladimirskaya, repelled enemy air raids. From 6.00 20.7.42 covers the headquarters command post - Kadamovsky. Losses: wounded - 18 people, killed - 1 person.
179 back covered 19.7.42. the main group of troops in the area of \u200b\u200bhigh 201. There was no fire.
From 14.00 20.7.42 occupies air defense and anti-aircraft defense in the Kadamovsky district. 37mm and 85mm ammunition is not enough.
5. Losses of the UNA army headquarters: as a result of the bombing on 7/19/42. Lieutenant Colonel Kovalenko was seriously wounded, Captain Inashvili was slightly wounded and remained in service.
6. Communication with divisions - liaison officers.

Head of the Operations Department, Major Papazov

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.25

Private combat order No. 057 pcs. art. 37A 16.00 20.7.42, card 200000

1. Information about the enemy, composition and tasks of 37A, according to the combat order of headquarters No. 040/OP dated 20.7.42.
2. Artillery of the 3rd Guards Regiment with the 23rd Anti-Tank Fighter Brigade and the 49th GMP during 7/21/42. provides corps defense of the line: Mokryi Log, Svoi Trud, Kamenolomnya Commune and from 4.00 on 7/22/42. until the end of the crossing of army units across the Don River (approximately the outcome of 7/23/42), strengthening 1.3/268 arm.ap, provides artillery defense Anti-tank and air defense crossings across the Don River in the Razdorskaya, Melikhovskaya and Bagaevskaya areas, according to the special combat order of the artillery headquarters of the 37th Army No. 073 dated 7/20/42.
3. Artillery of the 295th SD - with the 2/268th Arm.ap and the 43rd GMP division from the morning of 7/21/42. provides stubborn defense of the division during 21 and 22.7.42. line: Kanygin, level 150, separate building (2 km north of Kerchik (Isaev)), with the task of covering the crossings at Razdorskaya, Melikhovskaya, under no circumstances allowing enemy tanks and infantry to break through from the directions:
a) along the river from Vinogradny to Razdorskaya and the road parallel to the river (2 km to the west);
b) from Mokryi Log and Kerchik to the breeding farm Pridonsky, Razdorskaya.
c) along the Wet Kerchik River from Novaya Tsarevka and Novo-Nikolaevka to Kerchik (Isaev), Melikhovskaya;
d) create a layered anti-tank missile defense system, strengthening it with infantry and fighter squads;
e) prevent the enemy from crossing the Sukh. Donets River at Vinogradny, Kanygina, Razdorskaya and through Mokry Kerchik from Novo-Nikolaevskaya to the mouth.
District OP 2/268 arm.ap 21.7.42 - forest north of Melikhovo and from dawn on July 22, 1942. in the groves on the left bank of the Don River (2 km south of Melikhovo). NP - on the right bank of the Don River by order of the 295th Rifle Division.
1.3/268 arm.ap on the night of 21/22/7/42. crosses to the left bank of the Don River with units of the 3rd Guards Army and strengthens the defense of the Melikhovskaya, Bagaevskaya crossings with the OP on the left bank of the Don River.
4. Artillery of the 41st MSBR - cover with a strong anti-tank missile defense in the direction of Novo-Nikolaevka, Kerchik (Isaev); Novocherkassk - Melikhovo; Novocherkassk - Zaplavskaya. Prevent enemy crossings across the Mokraya Kadamovka River in the section from Novocherkassky to Zaplavskaya. (25 samples)
5. Artillery of the 230sd with the 43gmp division - providing the defense of the division during 7/21/42 and 7/22/42. line: mark 122, Kadamovsky Kurgan, Persianovka - with the task of preventing the enemy from reaching the Bagaevskaya crossing and the Novocherkassk direction, under no circumstances allowing enemy tanks to break through the front line of defense, covering with strong anti-tank defense the directions: Kadamovsky - Zaplavskaya and the roads from Shakhty to Novocherkassk. Prevent the enemy from crossing the Grushevka and Mokraya Kadamovka rivers in your defense zone.
6. Upon crossing the Don River, 3rd Guards and with the beginning of the withdrawal on the night of 23.7.42 295 and 230 SD and 41MSR to the crossings: Razdorskaya, Melikhovskaya and Bagaevskaya, rearguards left by divisions, reinforced by PA, anti-tank and anti-tank rifle batteries, the rest of the artillery deploy to the OP: cannon batteries - at the anti-tank crossings, howitzer batteries and mortars - on the left bank of the Don River with the task of reliably covering the crossings in their areas, thereby strengthening the previously created defense of the crossings with artillery of the 3rd Guards. Select groups of riflemen, all machine guns, at least 50% of anti-tank missiles and individual DA guns, using them to strengthen the air defense of crossings and unit concentration points.
Transfer the assigned divisions of the 43rd GMP to the left bank of the Don River on the night of July 23, 1942. first of all, where to deploy to cover the crossings.
7. 1/43rd GMP - in the army commander's reserve by 4.00 on 7/21/42. concentrate in the forest (2 km northeast of Bessergenevskaya (Zaplavskaya) in readiness for action in the direction: Zaplavskaya - Kerchik (Isaev); Zaplavskaya - Novo-Cherkassky and Zaplavskaya - Krivyanskaya, crossing the Don River at Bagaevskaya on the night of the 22nd 23.7.42 together with the headquarters, after the crossing it is deployed on the south-eastern outskirts of Bagaevskaya to cover the crossing.
8. 37 separate battalion PTR to carry out special tasks to cover the road junction in the Kireevo, Kadamovsky and Artemovskaya area, by dawn 7/21/42. concentrate in the reserve of the Zaplavskaya commander in readiness for anti-tank missile defense along the northern outskirts of Zaplavskaya and deployment in the directions: Zaplavskaya - Kerchik (Isaev), Zaplavskaya - Novo-Cherkassky; Zaplavskaya - Krivyanskaya.
9. Army anti-aircraft group: 537 MZA division and 179 rear during 20.7.42 provides air defense and anti-aircraft defense Kadamovsky. During 21.7.42 - Zaplavskaya air defense and from 4.00 on 22.7.42. until the end of July 23, 1942. Air defense crossings.
179 back - Melikhovo, battery 537 of the MZA division - Bagaevskaya and battery of the MZA 3gv.sk - Razdorskaya and Melikhovo crossings.
One battery of MZA 537 of the division covers the Zaplavskaya headquarters command post until 21.00 on July 22, 1942, after which, together with the headquarters, it is transported to the left bank of the Don River, strengthening the air defense of the Bagaevskaya crossing.
10. Artillery 56A to supply units 37A will be sent by order of the commander of the Southern Front at nightfall on 7/20/42. Persianovka station, where ammunition supplies need to be replenished.
We begin, at the same time, to provide all the equipment with traction and at least 2 fuel refills, using all local resources and flights.
11. Army Artillery Headquarters 7/20/42 - Kadamovsky (Yagodin) from 4.00 21.7.42. - Zaplavskaya, from 23.7.42. - Pavlov.

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.27

To the commander of the 43rd GMP

headquarters art.37A 20.7.42 18.50

One division of the GMP, allocated to support the 295th Rifle Division, by 4.00 on 21.7.42 with three salvos, concentrate Kanygin (6 km north of Razdorskaya) in readiness to prevent the advance of enemy tanks and infantry from Vinogradny to (28) crossings Razdorskaya and Melikhovskaya and to Mokryi Log.
At the Olkhovsky line (3 km to the north-west) by 4.00 on 21.7.42, an anti-tank rifle battalion was deployed. Establish a connection with him. Our tank brigade is in Mokryi Log. From 21.7.42 from Vinogradny to Mokryi Log the 74th Rifle Division defended. Communication with the headquarters through (29) headquarters of the 295th SD - Pukhlyakov.
Complete the task until you receive an order from the army commander or commander of the 295th Rifle Division.

(handwritten original)

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.80

To the commander of the 37th PTR battalion

Combat spread. No. 21 headquarters art. 37A 21.7.42 6.35 (signed in receipt 6.40)

Immediately sound the alarm and occupy the anti-tank station on the northern outskirts of Kanygin, the road junction and height 129, preventing the tanks from breaking through to the Razdorskaya and Melikhovo crossings. Ready 8.30 21.7.42.
In the Kanygin, Razdorskaya area, contact the 261st division of the RS 43gmp. At the line Kanygin, the Pridonsky breeding farm and 5 km to the west, the 295 rifle division occupies the defense and 6 km to the north - 74 rifle division.
At 21.00 on 20.7.42 our tank brigade and 727ap fought with tanks in Mokryi Log. Complete the task in connection with 295SD and leave with it. Its headquarters is Pukhlyakov.

TsAMO, f.228, op.703, d.217, l.313

Reconnaissance report from artillery headquarters 37A 7/21/42. by 10.00 card 200000

First. The enemy during the afternoon of 20.7.42. continued to push our units in the western and southern directions with advanced units of motorized infantry and tanks, and by the end of the day he was fighting on the lines: Gorny, Tabunshchikov, south of Sadki, Mokry Log. During the night he conducted combat reconnaissance of the same areas.

a) at 18.00 on 20.7.42, motorized infantry of an unknown number with machine gunners and up to 15-20 tanks fought for Mokryi Log.
b) to a motorized regiment with 50-60 tanks from the Sadki, Dudkin line they tried to spread southward to Artemovsky.
c) at 20.00 20.7.42. up to 25 tanks with motorized infantry occupied Gorny and Tabunshchikov after an intense battle.
Third. During the day of July 20, 1942, enemy aircraft conducted reconnaissance and intensive bombing of the combat formations of our units and rear areas. For the entire day of July 20, 1942, up to 370 aircraft sorties were recorded. From the morning of July 21, 1942. enemy reconnaissance aircraft conducted reconnaissance of the areas: Shakhty, Kadamovsky. Zaplavskaya.
Conclusion: The enemy is actively trying to speed up the interception of escape routes for army troops beyond the Don River. The main blow is delivered along the northern bank of the Don River.

Head of the intelligence department, Major Kravchenko

TsAMO, f.228, op.709, d.523, l.256

Reconnaissance report No. 05 Shtarm 37 to 10.00 21.7.42, map: 200000

First. During the second half of the day of July 20, 1942, the enemy continued to push our units in the western and southern directions with advanced motorized infantry units and tanks, and by the end of the day he was fighting on the lines of Gorny, Tabunshchikov, south of Sadki, Mokry Log.
During the night he conducted combat reconnaissance in the same areas.
Second. By combat and observation it was established:
a) At 18.00 on 20.7.42, motorized infantry of unknown strength with machine gunners and up to 15-20 tanks fought for Mokryi Log;
b) Before the motorized regiment and 50-60 tanks from the Sadki, Dudkin line they tried to spread southward to Artemovsky;
c) At 20.00 on 20.7.42, up to 25 tanks with motorized infantry, after an intense battle, occupied Gorny and Tabunshchikov.
Third. During the day of July 20, 1942, enemy aircraft conducted reconnaissance and intensive bombing of the combat positions of our units and rear areas. For the entire day of 7/20/42, up to 370 sorties were recorded. Since the morning of 21.7.42, enemy reconnaissance aircraft conducted reconnaissance of the Shakhty, Kadamovsky, and Zaplavskaya areas.
Conclusion: The enemy is actively trying to speed up the interception of the troops' escape routes beyond the Don River, placing their main emphasis along the northern bank of the Don River.

TsAMO, f.228, op.774, d.3, l.352 (out.01362, in.2855 9.9.42)

To the Chief of Artillery Staff of the Southern Front, Colonel Kvashnevsky at 14.00 22.7.42

I'm telling you.
1. The enemy’s motorized units continued on 7/21/42 to develop an offensive in the southern and southwestern direction and by the end of 7/21/42, with the active influence of tanks and aircraft, the enemy occupied Plemkhoz Pridonsky, Khutunok, from Persiyanovka.
2. Army units, conducting holding battles with the enemy, simultaneously carried out headquarters order No. 040 dated July 20, 1942.
Artillery:
a) 727iptap arrived in the Zaplavskaya area on 7/21/42, where we assigned the task, and also provided technical support.
b) 268arm.ap - 15 guns were transported in the Melikhovskaya area and are on the move on the approach to Karpovka 12.00 22.7.42. One gun 20.7.42 was knocked out by a tank, and two guns are being sought.
c) 43rd GMP - two divisions crossed, one occupies a battle formation in the area of the Bagaevskaya crossing, the second is concentrated in the Novoselovka area. There is no information about one division, but the last one, while on 7/21/42 in Khutunok, was attacked by enemy tanks, where, according to preliminary data, 3 installations were destroyed, there is no information about the rest.
d) 5 and 593 ap are being ferried on the morning of 7/22/42. The remaining division 370ap presumably withdrew to the 12th army sector.
e) 49GMP was transported in the Bagaevskaya area in the morning, I don’t have any more precise data yet.
f) I have not received any data from NAC-3; the latter has not known anything about its units for the last three days.
e) 839orad - crossed the Don River. We will send you additional information.

TsAMO, f.228, op.774, d.3, l.350

Combat report No. 06 artillery headquarters 37A by 18.00 22.7.42 map 200000

1. The enemy from the morning of 22.7.42. continued to spread to the south and southwest with the goal of capturing crossings on the Don River. At 11.00, enemy tanks and motorized infantry of unknown numbers, supported by artillery fire and under aviation cover, captured Melikhovskaya. The enemy's attempt to cross the Don River was unsuccessful.
Enemy aircraft, using active attack and bomber aircraft, attacked transporting units and crossings.
Army troops crossed the Don River during the night and accumulated in concentration areas by 17.00.
On the night of July 21-22, 1942, the army artillery crossed the Don River, after which it concentrated:
a) 727iptap consisting of 7 76mm guns, having crossed the Bagaevskaya crossing, took up a battle formation with the task of anti-tank crossing of the crossing in the Bagaevskaya area. During the day there was no fire.
b) 268aap consisting of 16 122mm guns, having crossed the Melikhovo crossing, one battery occupied the OP in the Karpovka area, which during the day conducted rare methodical fire on the accumulation of enemy vehicles and infantry in the Melikhovskaya area. The remaining guns, left without fuel, were dispersed along the route Karpovka, Kalinin. There are 12 serviceable tractors in the regiment. The presence of ammunition is 50 pieces.
c) 43rd Marine Division completely crossed over in two divisions and concentrated: one division in the Bagaevskaya area, the other division in the Susatsky area with the task of covering the withdrawal of our units to the left bank of the Don River. The 3rd division, which remained on July 21, 1942 in the 230th division in Khutunok, did not provide information about its location.
d) 49GMP, having crossed the Don River, partially concentrated in the Susatsky area.
e) The 37th separate army battalion of PTR crossed the Don River only with its economic unit, the location of the rest of the personnel has not been established.
f) 839 OA RAD, having crossed the Don River, concentrates in the Pavlovsk region.
g) artillery 230sd: 370ap, oiptd and omd, remaining 7/21/42. in Khutunok, were cut off by enemy tanks and, presumably, retreated to the 12th Army sector. The area of concentration and the presence of the division's artillery is being clarified.
h) artillery of the 295th SD, having crossed the Don River consisting of PA 76mm -3, DA 76mm - 4, 122mm -4 guns, are on the march to the concentration area of Slobodskaya, Kuznetsovka.
i) there is no data on the condition and area of concentration of the 3rd Guards artillery. The chief of artillery of the corps has had no information about his units for the last three days.
j) the army artillery is experiencing an acute shortage of ammunition.

TsAMO, f.228, op.703, d.217, l.317

Reconnaissance report of artillery headquarters 37A 7/23/42 by 10.00, map 200000 (input 9.9.42)

First. The enemy, with motorized infantry and tanks, reached the northern bank of the Don River, conducted reconnaissance of the crossings during the night, and from dawn on July 23, 1942. up to 2 companies crossed the Don River in the Pukhlyakov area.
Second. It was established by combat and observation:
a) 18.00-19.00 22.7.42 before a company of machine gunners, with the support of armored vehicles and three tankettes, tried to cross the Don River in the Melikhovo area. Our artillery and infantry drove the enemy back to their original position. As a result of the battle, up to 30 people and one armored vehicle were destroyed.
b) in the morning of July 23, 1942. up to two companies of infantry crossed the Don River in the Pukhlyakov area, and by 7.30 they were fighting in the area of Lake Zolotoye.
Third. According to data from the front, enemy motorized infantry of unspecified number was on 7/22/42. crossed the Don River in the Nikolaevskaya area, by 14.00 they captured Pirozhok and Dubentsovskaya.
Fourth. 23.7.42 In the Zaplavskaya area, a prisoner belonging to the "Great Germany" motorized regiment of the "Great Germany" motorized division was captured. The "Greater Germany" division includes 3 motorized regiments and one mechanized artillery regiment. All three regiments are called "Greater Germany".
Fifth. Artillery reconnaissance and observation established:
The action of enemy artillery was noted: 22.7.42 one 105mm gun from the direction of Melikhovo towards the village of Karpovka. Consumption - 12 shells.
Action of mortars: 22.7.42. 81mm mortar battery consisting of 4 mortars fired at south coast Don river Consumption - up to 20 min.
Sixth. Since the morning, enemy aircraft had been reconnaissance of the location of our units.
Conclusion: The enemy is trying to cross the Don River with advanced units. From the morning of July 24, 1942. we must expect more active enemy actions in the southern direction.

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.33

To the commander of the 727th light artillery regiment

Combat disposition No. 074 headquarters art. 37A 7/23/42 10/12, map 200000

1. Upon receipt of this, immediately move 5 guns of the regiment with its headquarters to the southern outskirts of Susatsky, where it will come under the command of the commander of the 295th Rifle Division.
Mission: destroy the enemy who has crossed up to 2 companies in the Pukhlyakov area and be prepared to destroy individual enemy tanks.
2. Leave one 2-gun battery of the regiment at the Bagaevskaya crossing with the task of preventing the enemy from targeting the crossings if our units withdraw from the right bank of the Don River.
Have your deputy with the battery and transfer it to the 230sd. Take all shells and mines of the 12th Army under guard and issue them on my orders to repel the enemy who has broken through. Headquarters 230sd - Elkin.

Deputy Commander - Head of 37A City Artillery Nedelin

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.34

To the commander of the 49th GMP

Combat disposition No. 075 headquarters art. 37A 23.7.42 11.30, map 200000

1. Having received this, advance 270GMD to the Susatsky area, where to occupy the OP in the Krasny Dvigatel gardens and fire a salvo at Pukhlyakov and the crossing - communication with the commander of 295SD - the southern outskirts of Susatsky, after the salvo concentrate in the area of the southern outskirts of Susatsky, coming under the command of the commander of 295SD.
2. Immediately move the 271st GMD to the Bagaevskaya area and be ready to fire a volley at the Bagaevskaya crossing if the enemy approaches, but ours are there now. Organize observation and get in touch with 230sd. Headquarters 230sd - Elkin.
3. The remaining two installations of 269GMD should be concentrated in Kalinin, with the latter having a commander in reserve.

TsAMO, f.224, op.774, d.3, l.364 (entry 2365 from 2.8.42)

Head of the Southern Front to General Zhuk

1. 268ap - two guns are fighting to eliminate the enemy south of Pukhlyakov. OP - Karpovka. Fourteen - Kalinin district. No shells. We got fuel.
2. 727ap - two guns guarding the Bagaevskaya crossing. The crossing continues by ferry. The bridge is blown up. Five are fighting with the 295th Rifle Division near Pukhlyakov. Shells - 0.5 b/k.
3. Artillery 295 - 17 guns collected. Large loss of people. There are absolutely no shells.
4. 74 and 230 - additionally.
5. 49GMP - one division fired a salvo at Pukhlyakov and Susatsky concentrated. The other one went to the rear without permission. Elkin returns with me in 230sd. The third division was taken by the group commander (Colonel Nesterenko).
6. 43GMP without fuel and without permission retreated to the rear. I am taking measures to return and provide fuel.
7. I ask immediately:
a) submit shells of all types Vesely and, if possible, Nizhne-Soleny.
b) prohibit the commander of the GM Units group from giving orders to the regiments assigned to me without me. They run to the rear from any rumors, citing the group commander. I'll shoot like cowards.

Nedelin 14.50 23.7.42 (handwritten original)

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.64

To the commander 268ap

Combat disposition headquarters art.37A 23.7.42 17.30, card 200000 (received 18.00)

1. From now on, until you receive ammunition, have one battery at the OP in the Karpovka area. Having subordinated the 230sd, the remaining 14 guns were deployed for anti-tank missile defense in the landing area near Kalinin and Saraisky. Repair tractors and machines, providing yourself with fuel. (65)
2. Deploy all platoons of regiment and division commands division by division in the defense zone of the 74th, 295th and 230th infantry divisions.
Objective: to immediately detect enemy concentrations and preparations for their crossings. ABOUT important purposes and the preparation of crossings, immediately report to me through the division radio station. (66)
3. Rear headquarters before the deployment of all materiel - Kalinin, communication with artillery headquarters via radio communication of the 295th rifle division.

army chart gm (there is no signature on the copy)

NSh UNA major signature Zelinsky

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.41

To the commander of the 537th MZA division

headquarters art.37A No. 24/v 23.7.42 19.30, map 200000

Upon receipt of this, take 300 pieces of shells and transfer the division to Nizhne-Solyony to guard the headquarters command post.
Find the army artillery headquarters in Nizhne-Soleny.

Nachart 37A um signature Nedelin (handwritten original)

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.44

Nachartu LF Mr. T. Zhuk

pcs.art.37A 23.7.42 23.00

The situation with ammunition is very difficult. All the people were dispersed, they picked up what they could at the crossings, but it was very little.
I urgently ask you to let go:
122mm guns model 31g; 122mm howitzers 10/30; 76mm PA, 76mm YES, 45mm PTO, screw cartridges.

23.7.42 nachart 37A Mr. signature Nedelin

TsAMO, f.224, op.774, d.3, l.353

Combat report No. 07 artillery headquarters 37A by 24.00 23.7.42 map 200000

1. The enemy showed no activity during the night from 22 to 23.7.42 and continued to remain on the right bank of the Don River.
From the morning of July 23, 1942. up to two companies of enemy infantry crossed the Don River in the Pukhlyakovo area and fought at the line of Lake Zolotoye.
2. Army troops moved into the defense area during the night and day in accordance with headquarters order No. 041/OP.
3. Army artillery:
a) 268aap consisting of 15 guns, of which 14 are serviceable guns, one battery at the outpost in Karpovka subordinate to 230sd (230 rifle division 30 km south). The remaining guns are deployed for anti-tank missile defense in the area of landings and Kalinin, Saraisky (30 km from the banks of the Don). Availability of ammunition - 50 rounds, fuel 1 refill, tractors in working order - 12.
Reconnaissance units of 268ap were deployed to conduct reconnaissance in the defense areas of the 74th, 295th and 230th infantry divisions.
b) 727 ISPTAP consisting of 7 guns - one battery is assigned to the 230th infantry rifle division in the Bagaevskaya area and 5 guns are assigned to the 295th infantry division with the task of anti-tank missile defense of the division's defense area; by the end of the day they are concentrated in the Susatsky area. Availability of ammunition - 0.5 b/k.
c) 49GMP - 270GMD attached to 295SD concentrated in Susatsky, during the day it fired two salvos into the Pukhlyakov and Razdorskaya areas, where there was a concentration of enemy motorized infantry and tanks. The 271st GMD was attached to the 230SD, concentrated in the division area, and did not fire.
d) 43GMP - 259 GMD is concentrated in Verkhne-Soleny; 261GMD - concentrated in Veseloye. Availability of ammunition - 3 salvos, fuel - 1 refueling.
e) artillery of the 295th SD - consisting of 76mm DA - 4 guns, 122mm - 6 guns, concentrated in the division's defense area - no data on the work was received. Availability of ammunition: 76mm - 40, 122mm - 40.
e) no information was received about the artillery of the 230th, 74th and 156th infantry divisions and the 3rd Guards Rifle Division.
839 OA RAD by the end of the day 23.7.42. concentrated in the Nizh.Soleny region.
There is no information about the 37th Army PTR Battalion. (354)
g) ammunition by the end of the day on July 23, 1942. and on the morning of July 24, 1942. entered the army: from the 24th army - 85240 screw cartridges, 76mm YES - 150, 82mm - 680.
An order was received to receive from 24A 76mm DA - 300, 76mm PA - 125, 122mm 10/30g. - 900. Receivers have been sent. There are absolutely no shells for 122mm guns of 1931.

Head of the Operations Department, Major Papazov (original)

TsAMO, f.224, op.774, d.3, l.355 (input 2364 2.8.42)

Combat report No. 08 artillery headquarters 37A by 24.00 23.7.42 map 200000

1. The enemy in the Razdorskaya, Pukhlyakov, Melikhovskaya sector during the day continued to hold the crossings with advanced units and fought on the southern bank of the Don River.
By the end of the day, he pushed our units in the direction of Susatsky. In other sectors of the front the enemy did not show any intensity.
2. Units of the army, defending the occupied line, fought holding battles with individual enemy groups that had crossed to the left bank of the Don River.
3. Army artillery:
a) 268aap with one battery at the outpost in the Karpovka area conducted rare methodical fire on the crossing in the Melikhovo area. The remaining batteries, due to an insufficient number of shells, were pulled into the depths of the defense in the 74th, 295th, 230th infantry divisions, conducting reconnaissance. Ammunition supply - 50 rounds, fuel - 1 refill.
b) the 727th Iptap attached to the 295th SD occupied a battle formation: three guns in the bush area (northeast of 5 km Karpovka), two guns in the northern outskirts of Kostylevsky, with the task of preventing the enemy from crossing in the Pukhlyakov area and the anti-tank defense of the Pukhlyakovsky, Razdorskaya, Semikarakorskaya roads.
During the day he conducted methodical fire on the crossing area. Two guns requiring repair (pulled) to the rear - Krasny Kut with the task of immediate repair, after which they were urgently deployed to the OP with the task of anti-aircraft defense of the dam and Vesely. Availability of ammunition - 0.5 b/k.
c) 49GMP and two divisions of 43GMP are attached to 295SD - concentrated in the Susatsky area with the task of preventing enemy crossings in the Razdorskaya, Pukhlyakovsky, Melikhovskaya area. During the day, 7 divisional salvoes were fired at areas where enemy motorized infantry and tanks were concentrated in the crossing areas. As a result of the fire along Pukhlyakovsky, large fires arose and strong explosions were noted (apparently from ammunition and individual tanks).
d) 1230gap - attached to 156sd and occupies the battle formation:
1st division in the area of the eastern outskirts of Topilinsky.
2nd division in the area of the southern outskirts of M. Mechetinsky.
During the day, the regiment fired at individual enemy reconnaissance groups and tanks. Availability of ammunition - 1 b/k. (356)
The regiment has 18 152mm 37g. guns and only 8 S-65 tractors. Ten guns are not provided with traction. In addition, the regiment is not sufficiently provided with other means of transport; it has only 5 vehicles.
Artillery 156sd - no data on work received.
e) artillery of the 74th SD - takes up battle formation.
1/6 ap - occupies an OP in the Novo-Zolotovskaya area. (is it true?)
2/6 ap - in the Semikarakorskaya, Molchanov (?) area.
One PA and DA battery are reassigned to 295sd. No job information was received.
f) artillery 295sd with attached 727 Istr.PTAP, one battery 268armap, two batteries 74sd, two divisions 43gmp and 49gmp. Having a common task to prevent enemy crossings in the area of Razdorskaya, Pukhlyakovsky, Melikhovskaya and with our fire to eliminate the enemy groups that crossed to the left bank of the Don River.
593ap occupies a battle formation: 1/593 northwestern outskirts of Susatsky, 2/593 northeast of Kostylevsky. During the day, he fired at the Pukhlyakovsky crossing area. Data on the work of the attached artillery is shown above.
Availability of ammunition: 76mm - 122 rounds, 122mm - 190 rounds. Fuel - 0.5 refueling.
h) 230SD artillery is available: 45mm - 3, 76mm PA - 3, 76mm DA -4 (crossed out) and 122mm - 6 (crossed out). There was no fire.
According to unspecified data, one 370ap division, a VET division and a mortar division crossed in the Aksaysk area - they are moving in the direction of the division’s concentration.
i) 839 OA RAD is concentrated in the Nizh. Soleny area, received orders to concentrate in the Karakashev area. There is no information about the location of the 37th separate army battalion of PTR.
4. The army artillery does not have maps of the given area of operation and the availability of communication means is completely unsatisfactory.
There is a great need for ammunition of all types.
5. Communication with divisions via radio in a combined arms system is very difficult to manage.

Head of the Operations Department, Major Papazov (original)

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.37

Nachartu 295sd

Combat disposition No. 076 headquarters art. 37A 24.7.42 0.30, map 200000

The army commander ordered:
1. In order to disrupt the enemy’s crossings across the Don River at dawn on 7/24/42 (3:30-4:00), fire volleys from the RS 49GMP division assigned to you in possible directions:
a) Pukhlyakov - first of all;
b) Razdorskaya - immediately after reloading, and if the second division of 49GMP arrives, then at the same time;
c) Melikhovskaya - 43GMP division is suitable.
After these salvos, be ready for the next ones.
2. Move all your artillery and the attached 727ap forward, establish surveillance of the indicated crossings and prevent the enemy from crossing the Don River under any circumstances.
3. I am sending you 3 vehicles of shells, and I have 727ap shells.
Immediately find the headquarters of 110kd - Azhinov and get from them 100,000 screw cartridges and 100 pcs. 76mm cannon shells 27g. I am enclosing the transfer order (not on file).
4. Report immediately about the salvoes fired, the work of the 727ap and your artillery. If available, radio communication is according to our table.

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.48

To the commander of the 43rd GMP

Combat disposition No. 76 pcs. art. 37A 24.7.42 0.50

Upon receipt of this, immediately (inaudible) a division from Verkh. Soleny should be sent to Karpovka with two salvos. At 4.00-4.30 on 24.7.42, fire a salvo along the southern outskirts of Melikhovo and the crossing, preventing the enemy from attempting to cross the Don River. After firing a salvo (49), concentrate the division on the eastern outskirts of Karpovka, reload and be ready for the second salvo, monitoring the Melikhovskaya crossing.
Fire the first and second salvos on your own orders. The first is mandatory, the second, when the enemy appears.
Contact with the commander of 295SD - southern outskirts of Susatsky. (50) Execution to convey the radio through the headquarters of the 295th SD and by messenger.

Nachart 37A Mr. signature Nedelin (2.40 24.7 Gorokhov)

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.39

To the commander of 230sd, NAD-230

Combat disposition No. 078 headquarters art. 37A 24.7.42 3.50, map 200000

The army commander ordered:
1. Immediately remove the 727ap battery and the RS division assigned to you from the Bagaevskaya crossing and send Susatsky by forced march to the disposal of the commander of the 295th rifle division.
2. In your area of the Don River, strengthen surveillance of the enemy and prevent him from crossing the Don River.
Use anti-tank guns, PA and 82mm mortars. There are mines at the Bagaevskaya crossing.
When detecting the advance of enemy forces or attempts to begin a crossing, immediately radio to send a RS division from the army commander's reserve.
3. Urgently send information about weapons and ammunition - there is nothing from you.

Deputy KV - nachart 37A city artillery Nedelin

TsAMO, f.224, op.760, d.46, l.585

Certificate No. 3404 for the 37th Army by 8.00 7/24/42

1. Units of the army, having cleared the left bank of the Don River from the enemy by the end of day 23.7, continued to occupy defenses along the left bank of the Don River at the Titov, Bagaevskaya line, finishing their concentration and putting themselves in order.
2. The enemy fought in the first half of the day on July 23rd with a force of up to two companies on the southern bank of the Don River in the Pukhlyakov area. In other sectors of the front, small groups tried to cross the Don River. In front of the army front there are units of the “Gross Germany” motorized division, the 3rd tank division and, presumably, the 22nd infantry division. According to the testimony of the prisoner, Konstantinovskaya concentrated up to 140 tanks, up to a motorized infantry regiment, light and heavy mechanized artillery regiments, 5 anti-aircraft batteries, a sapper battalion with pontoon transport equipment. During the day, enemy aircraft carried out reconnaissance flights and bombarded the combat formations of the troops.
3. The position of the army units is the same.
In the 156th SD sector, the enemy fired artillery and mortars at the combat formations of units from Konstantinovskaya in the Mal area. and Bol. Mechetnoy. Our artillery fire destroyed one gun, up to a company of infantry, and suppressed one battery. In the Titov area, two tanks were knocked out by PT rifle fire, and two ME-109s were shot down in the division zone.
110kd - during the day 23.7 fought with the enemy who had crossed over in the Pukhlyakov area and took up defense (in separate units) at the line: 273kp - Razdorskaya, Melikhovo; 292kp – Melikhovskaya, Bagaevskaya; 311kp - Azhinov, Kudinov, as a result of the battle, up to 80 infantry were destroyed, 7 vehicles were destroyed. Division losses: 1 killed, 17 wounded. KP – Azhinov

... Colonel Krasichkov (original)

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.43

To the commander of 230sd 24.7.42 8.15

Immediately send the 727ap battery assigned to you, the RS 43gmp division from Bagaevskaya to Susatsky at the disposal of the commander of the 295th division. Deliver the execution.

Varennikov, Nedelin (signature) (2 copies)

TsAMO, f.224, op.703, d.217, l.316

Reconnaissance report by 10.00 24.7.42 artillery headquarters 37A, map 200000 (input 9.9.42)

First. At 2.00, up to 2 infantry battalions in the Melikhovo area, with the support of artillery and mortar fire, crossed the Don River and are fighting on the southern bank of the Don River. An attempt to cross the enemy in the Konstantinovskaya area was repulsed by our units. In other areas he did not take any active action.
Second. According to the neighbor on the right:
a) 14.00 23.7.42 from the Dubentsovskaya area in motion up to 140 vehicles and 18 tankettes spread in a southerly direction and by 17.00 5 enemy tanks and motorized infantry of an unknown number entered M. Orlovka.
b) according to the data of headquarters 156, the enemy during 21 and 22.7.42. concentrated the 3rd Tank Division in the areas: Kastyrochny, Ust-Kagalnitsky, Kamyshny, Konstantinovskaya.
Enemy artillery fired sparsely at Durnovsky, Visly, Mal. and Bol. Mechetnoy.
Third. During the night and morning, enemy aircraft conducted reconnaissance and bombing of combat formations and the rear of our units.
Fourth. According to a survey of the captured battery commander, Lieutenant Müdder Otto, captured in the area of elevation 5.8 east of 3 km Vedernikov, belonging to the 12th anti-aircraft division of the 3rd tank division, up to two tank battalions with a total of 140 tanks are concentrated in the Konstantinovskaya area. The tanks are located on the outskirts and are camouflaged. In addition, up to an infantry regiment, a saber battalion, has been concentrated pontoon bridges, 5 anti-aircraft batteries (12 heavy and 33 light anti-aircraft guns) and an artillery regiment consisting of 24 light and 24 heavy guns. The division has mission 21 and 22 or 23.7.42. cross the Don River.

for the head of the intelligence department, Captain Lindo

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.57

To the commander of the 49th GMP

pcs. art. 37A No. 78 24.7.42 11.07, card 200000

Immediately go to Susatsky with the second division of the military regiment. Unite your two divisions and fire volleys at the crossing enemy at Razdorskaya, Pukhlyakov and Melikhovskaya. Come under the command of the commander of the 295th Rifle Division. Headquarters 295SD - southern outskirts of Susatsky.

nachart 37A signature Nedelin (received by Sukhinin 11.10 24.7.42)

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.42

To the commander of the 74th Rifle Division 24.7.42 12.40

To immediately transfer one battery from its left flank to Susatsky by order of the commander of the 295th Rifle Division. Provide ammunition.

Varennikov, Nedelin (2 copies without signatures)

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.43To the commander of the 43rd GMP 24.7.42 16.05

Having received this, immediately leave with the second division of the regiment at the disposal of the commander of the 295th Rifle Division and two divisions to fire volleys at the advancing enemy in the area of the Razdorskaya and Pukhlyakov crossings.
After the salvo, reload and have one division in the Voroshilov area, and return the second division to Verkhne-Soleny.

starting 37 years old painting by Nedelin (painting by Gorokhov in receipt)

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.62

Chart 295sd to Suvorov

Combat disposition No. 081 headquarters art. 37A 24.7.42 16.45, map 200000

I demand to prevent the enemy from spreading and building crossings. Destroy the enemy who has broken through with fire. Three divisions of 49gmp, two divisions of 43gmp, another battery of 727ap, a battery of 74sd have been sent to you, and a battery of sp 74sd will arrive.
Combine everything, and, regardless of anything, throw out the enemy.
The shells were sent for the second time: 122 howubs - 188, 76 - 150, 82mm - 680, 45 - 300, screw cartridge - 110 thousand.
Urgently convey what else is needed first.
You will have 76 PA (76mm shells) by nightfall.
After the salvo, send one of the 43GMP divisions to Verkhne-Soleny, and leave the other with you.
Keep all three divisions of 49GMP with you. Hurry them so that they immediately bring new volleys from Vesely.
Force the artillery to fire (63) up to and including direct fire.
Keep an eye on the river; if they start building bridges, immediately destroy and disperse them.
Report according to our table through Bolotina. Assign your adjutants instead of absent staff officers and let them be on duty at the radio.

Nachart 37A Mr. signature Nedelin

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.40

To the commander 727ap

Combat disposition No. 081 headquarters art. 37A 24.7.42 17.35, map 200000

Through the commander of the 230th SD, I convey the order: return the battery from Bagaevskaya to you and the entire regiment be subordinate to the 295th SD.
We have received an order from the front to leave the military regiment (entrusted to you).
Through your sub-service point (housekeeping department), you have been ordered to transfer your additional personnel and rear units with the remnants of the 37th PTR battalion to Krasny Kut (5 km west of Vesely). You will carry your own shells.

Nachart 37A Mr. Artillery Nedelin (handwritten original)

TsAMO, f.224, op.760, d.46, l.594

(417sp 156sd) has the task of reaching the B. Orlovka line by the end of day 24.7.

TsAMO, f.224, op.703, d.217, l.315

Reconnaissance report by 20.00 24.7.42 artillery headquarters 37A, map 200000 (input 9.9.42)

First. During the first half of the day, the enemy in the Melikhovskaya, Pukhlyakov, Razdorskaya sector continued to hold the crossings with advanced units and fought on the southern bank of the Don River. There were no significant changes in other sectors of the front.
Second. Military reconnaissance and observation established:
a) the enemy, with the strength of up to an infantry regiment, with the support of artillery, mortars and aviation, continued to fight on the southern bank of the Don River, trying to advance in the direction of Karpovka and Susatsky.
b) a company of machine gunners crossed the Don River from Razdorskaya, somewhat pushing back our units in the direction of Susatsky.
c) Pirozhok, Titov, Dubentsovka are occupied by the enemy in unknown numbers.
d) M. Orlovka is occupied by an enemy infantry company with 4 tankettes and one medium tank. The enemy is firing artillery at Bolshaya Orlovka.
Third. Artillery reconnaissance and observation established:
a) during the day, columns of infantry, vehicles and motorcycles move along the road from the north to Razdorskaya.
b) during the day the enemy fired mortar and artillery fire from the Razdorskaya 105mm battery on the southwestern and northeastern outskirts of Susatsky.
Fourth. In the first half of the day, enemy aircraft conducted reconnaissance flights and bombed the combat formations of units and rear areas of our troops. In total, up to 110 sorties were recorded.
Conclusion: The enemy transported motorized infantry and tanks from the Melikhovskaya, Nikolaevskaya area, with the goal of reaching the Vesely and Proletarskaya crossings.

for the head of the intelligence department, Captain Lindo

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.60

Nachartu 295sd

headquarters art.37A 24.7.42 21.10, map 200000

1. If Gorokhov and Sukhinin do not reach the crossings, hit them as much as they can.
2. The entire economy of Suvorov and Nalyvaichenko should be hit at the crossings.
3. I give Gutin a task - and Gutin on crossings. In addition, they will work from above.
4. Demand from the owner that his children move forward.
5. Tomorrow the entire 74sd is coming to you. Tell Romanov to unite the 5 divisions of the RS and our economy.

nachart signature Nedelin

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.55

To the commander of the 49th GMP

Combat disposition No. 085 headquarters art. 37A 24.7.42 24.00, map 200000

In pursuance of the order of the commander of 37A, the castle military commander ordered:
All three divisions should be ready to fire volleys at 04:00 on 25/7/42 at the crossings in the defense sector of the 295th Rifle Division.
All units must be charged in advance.
Have recharging points not far from the OP areas, after which you will be immediately ready for action again.

Chief of Staff of the UNA Zelinsky (received NSh 49gmp Mr. Yakushev 01.00 25.7)

To the commander of 268 armed forces

headquarters art.37A 25.7.42 1.20, map 200000

According to the data just received, up to 400 shells are being thrown to you by your transport and the transport of the front, which can arrive by the morning of July 25, 1942. Verkhne-Soleny. Immediately send your representative to the artillery headquarters to receive transport. Upon receipt of the first batch of ammunition, immediately deploy the regiment battery by battery in the direction of Razdorskaya, Pukhlyakov, entering full subordination to the 295th Rifle Division.

nachart 37A Mr signature Nedelin

NSh UNA 37A Zelinsky (signed as received by Malyshev 7/25/42)

TsAMO, f.228, op.703, d.217, l.314

Reconnaissance report by 10.00 25.7.42 artillery headquarters 37A, map 200000

for the head of the intelligence department, Captain Lindo

TsAMO, f.228, op.709, d.523, l.261

Reconnaissance report No. 0370 by 10.00 25.7.42 Shtarm 37 Verkh. Soleny, map: 200000

First. During the night, the enemy continued to hold the crossings in the Melikhovskaya, Pukhlyakov, Razdorskaya sector and fought in small groups north of Kostylev and northwest of Karpovka.
In the Melikhovskaya and Razdorskaya sector, a total of up to three infantry battalions are fighting, supported by artillery and mortar fire from the northern bank of the Don River. In other areas he did not show any active actions.
Second. It was established by combat and observation:
a) 21.00 24.7 a small group of machine gunners penetrated into Kostylev, Susatsky, fought with our units;
b) a 105mm artillery battery and up to two enemy mortar batteries fired during the night in the area of Lake Khomutets (7 km northwest of Susatsky) and in Karpovka;
c) From the second half of the day until dark, the enemy covered the troop crossings in the Pukhlyakov, Razdorskaya sector with smoke;
d) In the Kostylev area, documents of a killed soldier belonging to a motorized regiment of the “Greater Germany” division were collected;
e) 16.00-17.00 24.7 in the Kalinin area (on the Don River) the enemy brings up timber and transportation means.
Third. According to front aviation data, there is intensive movement of vehicles from Nikolaevskaya to the south in the direction of Martynovka.
Fourth. Enemy aircraft conducted reconnaissance flights and bombing at the troops and rear of our troops at night and in the morning.
Conclusion: The enemy continues to be active in the Melikhovskaya, Razdorskaya sector with the aim of reaching the Vesely crossings.
From dawn on July 26, we should expect active enemy actions from the Konstantinovskaya area in the general direction of Bol. Orlovka.

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.56

To the commander 727ap

headquarters art.37A 25.7.42 11.50, card 200000 (accepted 12.00)

Block the PTO road from Susatsky in the direction of crossings across the Don River, destroy the tanks.
3 guns that are being repaired in Krasny Kut, after repair, should immediately be placed in a gun position at the northern entrance to the Manychsky Canal crossing.

Nachart 37A Mr. signature Nedelin

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.61

To the commander 268ap

headquarters art.37A 25.7.42 (signed as received by Malyshev)

1. Immediately stand on the OP in readiness for action. Join the 295th SD. Have contact with the 295th and 74th Infantry Division.
2. Particular attention to the fire impact of the Razdorskaya, Pukhlyakovo, Melikhovo crossings.
Send a report that you are ready to work.

NSh painting Zelinsky

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.113

To the commander 268ap

headquarters art.37A 25.7.42 (time not specified), map 200000

Take order of battle:
One division in the area of the northern outskirts of Nizh. Soleny, with the task of protecting the road Saraisky - Nizhne-Soleny and preventing the enemy from approaching Kalinin and along the exits from Susatsky.
Another division will be deployed to the OP in the area of the 1st section of the stud plant, which is 4 kilometers northwest of Nizh. Soleny. Task: PTO of the Susatsky road, confectionery plant No. 35 and Nizh. Soleny.
Equipment that has no traction to be placed on the OP southern edge of the dam in the Vesely area.
Establish contact with the 295th SD command post - CP in the Kalinin - Saraisky area.
At the same time, he was sent to the Kalinin region rifle regiment 102SD, with which it will be necessary to maintain contact and provide fire for the defense occupied by the specified joint venture.

NSh painting Zelinsky

Our task force is at the old place, later - Verkh. Khomutets. Zelinsky

TsAMO, f.224, op.774, d.3, l.359

Combat report No. 09 of the 37A artillery headquarters at 20.00 on July 25, 1942. card 200000

1. Enemy 25.7.42 at 14.00, with a force of up to 2 infantry battalions and 25 tanks, Susatsky captured, but did not show activity in other sectors of the front.
2. Army troops are defending the previous line of defense with the left and right flanks; in the Susatsky sector, 295SD fought holding battles with enemy motorized infantry and tanks that had broken through.
3. Army artillery:
a) the artillery of the 156th and 74th infantry divisions occupied the same battle formation and conducted rare methodical fire at individual enemy reconnaissance groups. No updated data on the results of the work of this artillery have been received.
b) artillery 295sd, reinforced by one battery 268ap, 727 ISPTAP consisting of 4 guns and one battery 6ap 74sd, two divisions 43, completely 49gmp fired during the day on enemy crossings, tanks and individual enemy groups that had broken through.
c) 593ap fired at enemy infantry concentrations, individual groups of machine gunners and individual tanks in the areas of the Razdorskaya and Pukhlyakov crossings and in the areas on the approaches to Susatsky and Nizhne-Soleny. By the end of the day, he withdrew and took up position in the Saraisky and Nizhne-Soleny areas.
d) 268ap with one battery occupying an OP in the Karpovka area, conducted methodical fire in the area of the Razdorskaya, Pukhlyakov crossings, the remaining 4 guns, due to the lack of means of traction, were pulled to the Vesyoloye area with the task of anti-tank defense of the dam, the remaining 10 guns occupied the anti-tank station due to the lack of ammunition in the Kalinin region.
By the end of the day, he retreated and took up a battle formation on the northern outskirts of Nizhne-Soleny: two batteries in the area of the 1st section of the stud farm (northwest 4 km of Nizhne-Soleny) and one battery in the area of stud farm No. 35. The remaining 8 guns, which do not have traction and with faulty traction, are concentrated in Vesely with the task of anti-tank defense of the dam. The regiment received 260 rounds of ammunition.
e) 727 ISPTAP, occupying a battle formation with 4 guns in the Susatsky area, fired at enemy infantry and tanks throughout the day, the remaining 3 guns requiring repair were sent to the rear for repairs.
As a result of the battle and a separate air raid, two guns, two tractors were completely disabled and cars were burned. By the end of the day, the regiment withdrew and took up a battle formation: 3 guns in the area of the northern outskirts of Nizhne-Soleny, two guns at the anti-tank station north of the Manychstroy dam.
e) 43rd GMP - fired 3 salvos during the day. By the end of the day it was concentrated in the Verkhne-Soleny area.
g) 49GMP fired 2 salvos in the areas and at 16.00 left our subordination, and instead of the departed one, 25GMP arrived, which is concentrated by B. Mechetinskaya (B. Mechetnovsky?) and one division - Kazminsky.
h) the 230sd artillery, remaining in the same composition, did not fire.
i) the artillery of the 275th and 102nd infantry divisions is concentrated in the area where the divisions are located; no data has been received on the actions of the artillery.

Head of the Operations Department, Major Papazov (original)

TsAMO, f.224, op.760, d.46, l.614

Certificate No. 3433 for the 37th Army by 20.00 25.7.42

1. During the day, units of the army defended their occupied lines on the left and right flanks. The center fought stubbornly with the enemy, repelling repeated attacks by infantry and tanks at the Kostylev, Susatsky line.
2. The enemy, with a force of up to 60 medium and small tanks, with the support of bomber aircraft, captured Susatsky at 14.40, bypassing it from the west and east. By 17.00 the enemy was fighting at the Susatsky line, trying to build on their success in the southern and south-eastern direction. By 19.00, 5 tanks, with aviation support, occupied Kalinin and approached Saraisky.
In the Komarov area, by 15.00 25.7, up to an enemy infantry battalion was noted.
Enemy aircraft carried out reconnaissance flights and bombed the Susatsky and Kalinin areas, the road to Verkh. Soleny and the battle formations of the 74th and 295th Infantry Division troops. In total, up to 100 sorties were recorded.
2. Position of the army units: the 74th Rifle Division, which had the task of attacking the Razdorskaya crossing in the morning from Semikarakorskaya, approached the forest, which is east of the second road going from Razdorskaya to Shavelnitsky, met stubborn resistance from the enemy and fought in the forest, where it was attacked by the regiment infantry with 18 tanks and by 18.00, having suffered heavy losses, retreated to its original position. Stand – Cormorants.
The 295th Rifle Division with the 15th Tank Brigade fought with enemy tanks and infantry at the Kostylev, Susatsky line. Having suffered heavy losses, it retreated in the direction of Saraisky. The situation is being clarified.
The 102nd Rifle Division was concentrated in the area of Bol. Orlovka, Zolotarev. 519sp on the march with the task of occupying the defense of the Kalinin region.
The 275th Rifle Division was concentrated by Komarov, Pavlov, Bolotov. The position of the rest of the army remains unchanged.
4. Army tasks: during the night to restore the position in the center and with night attacks in cooperation with the 91st and 302nd infantry divisions to destroy the enemy in the Mal. Orlovka, Komarov area.

Major Kuzmin.

In the Razdorskaya area, a prisoner of the 4th squadron of the 10th cavalry regiment of the 60th cavalry division of the 1st Romanian cavalry corps.

TsAMO, f.228, op.709, d.523, l.262

Reconnaissance report No. 0371 by 20.00 25.7.42 Shtarm 37 Verkh. Soleny, map: 200000

First. The enemy, units of the motorized division "Great Germany" with tanks, approached Susatsky and bypassed it from the east and south. In the Konstantinovskaya section, units of 3TD are conducting reconnaissance of the southern coast and the location of our units. On the morning of July 25, the enemy at the Melikhovo crossing was driven back to the northern bank of the Don River. There were no significant changes in other areas.
Second. It was established by combat and observation:
a) Nikolaevskaya, large cluster vehicles, tanks and motorized infantry of unknown numbers. Trench work is being carried out on the western outskirts of Pirozhok, where up to two battalions of tanks are located. From the Kalininsky area, the enemy fired mortar fire at Bol. Orlovka. On the road from Kerchik to Razdorskaya, tanks and pontoon units were transferred.
Plemkhoz Pridonsky concentrated an unspecified number of tanks, motorized infantry and an artillery park. Krestovsky concentrated a large number of vehicles with infantry and motorcycles. Airplanes were landing there in the ravine;
b) At 11.00 a movement of up to 20-25 tanks was established from Razdorskaya to Susatsky and Susatsky bypasses from the east and west.
Third. On July 24, in the Konstantinovskaya area, two prisoners belonging to the 3rd company of the 2nd battalion of the 3rd motorized regiment of the 3rd tank division were captured. In the Razdorskaya area, a Romanian soldier belonging to the 4th squadron of the 10th cavalry regiment of the 6th cavalry division of the 1st cavalry corps was captured.
Fourth. Aerial reconnaissance of Front 25.7 established a concentration of up to 2,000 vehicles in Konstantinovskaya.
Fifth. In the morning, enemy aircraft conducted reconnaissance and bombing of the combat positions of our units near the Susatsky, Kalinin, Verkh. and Nizh. Soleny districts, by 18.00 up to 100 sorties were recorded.
Conclusion: Units of the “Greater Germany” motorized division and the 3rd tank division are operating in front of the army front. On the morning of July 26, we should expect active actions by enemy motorized infantry and tanks from the direction Razdorskaya to Vesely and from Konstantinovskaya to Bol. Orlovka.

TsAMO, f.1282(102sd), op.1, d.1, l.76

Extract from the order for the rear 37A No. 0046 dated July 26, 42, Verkh. Khomutets, card 200000

…2. For fuels and lubricants – Mechetinskaya station – 2 filling stations;
Artillery ammunition - Mechetinskaya station - 1 ammunition.
Second. The additional divisions should be located:
102nd – Novoselovka (Sal river);
275sd – Novo-Nikolaevka;
156sd – Tapilin;
74sd – Kirsanovsky;
295sd – Cheerful;
230sd – Pozdeevka;
110kd – Staro-Kuzhetsky (Staro-Kuznetsovsky).
Sixth. a) to ensure the evacuation of sick and wounded people, deploy BCP No. 493 in the Karakashev region for army units. By 18.00 26.7.42. remove all the wounded from the military rear.
b) the remaining sanitary institutions should be deployed:
PEP 133 – Tselina station;
GOPEP 12 – N. Yamota;
GOPEP 99 – Zhuravlevka;
CEO and ODR – Red Star.

TsAMO, f.228, op.709, d.523, l.263

Reconnaissance report No. 0372 by 10.00 26.7.42 Shtarm 37 Verkh. Soleny, map: 200000

First. During the night, the enemy continued to concentrate motorized infantry and tanks in the Susatsky, Kalinin area, while simultaneously conducting reconnaissance in the direction of Saraisky. In other areas nothing significant happened.
Second. Unit combat and observation established:
a) 14.00 25.7 the enemy, with a force of up to a battalion with 25 tanks, occupied Susatsky and at 20.30 reconnaissance groups approached Kalinin, by the morning of 26.7 they captured Kalinin;
b) From 6.00 to 7.00 three tankettes and three medium tanks conducted reconnaissance of Saraisky. From 7.00 from the southern outskirts of Kalinin, an artillery battery fired at Saraisky.
Third. Enemy aircraft carried out reconnaissance flights and bombed units and rear areas of our troops.
Conclusion: no change.

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.105

Commanders of 230, 102, 295, 74, 156, 275, 347 RD and 110KD

pcs. art. 37A 26.7.42 13.15, card 200000

All division commanders must take emergency measures and transport shells from Karakashev (6 km east of Vesely), where army vehicles are delivering from the rear.

Nedelin's signature

TsAMO, f.224, op.774, d.3, l.361 (input 2360 from 2.8.42)

Combat report No. 10 of the 37A artillery headquarters at 14.00 on 26.7.42. card 200000

1. The enemy in the Susatsky, Kalinin sector continues to advance in the southern and southwestern directions. In the M. Orlovka sector, he is conducting holding battles with our units.
2. Army troops on the left and right flanks continue to defend their previous lines; in the Kalinin sector they are conducting holding battles with the advancing enemy.
3. Army artillery:
a) artillery of the 275th SD - occupies a battle formation in the area of departmental confectionery plant No. 36, Komarov, Komarov Kurgan, fired at individual enemy groups in the M. Orlovka area.
b) no data was received on the work of the artillery of the 156th and 74th infantry divisions.
c) artillery of the 295th SD - occupies the battle formation Saraisky, a bend in the road 4 km southeast of Saraisky, fires at the advancing enemy infantry and tanks.
d) 230SD artillery in the previous grouping - the battle order remains unchanged. No job information was received.
e) 102nd artillery on the march to the division's concentration area - Verkh. Soleny.
f) 268 Armed Forces - the battle formation occupies four batteries in the Nizh. Soleny area, factory No. 35, 1st section of the factory, subordinate to the 295th division. He fired at a concentration of enemy infantry and tanks. The remaining 7 guns, due to the lack of traction and the presence of faulty traction, occupy the battle formation in the northern outskirts of Veseloye.
g) 1230gap - the 1st division is attached to the 275df, occupies a battle formation on the western outskirts of Bolshaya Orlovka, firing at the accumulation of separate enemy groups in the M. Orlovka area, the 2nd division is attached to the 102df and is on the march to the concentration area - south of 6 km Nizhne -Salty.
h) 727iptap - with three guns the PTO occupies the service in the area of the northern outskirts of Nizhne-Soleny, with two guns in the Manychstroy area the PTO serves.
i) 43rd Marine Division, attached to the 295th Infantry Division, is concentrated in the area: 1st Division in the V. Soleny area, fired 3 salvos. The 2nd division to Vesely and the 3rd division to Manych-Balabinsky did not fire.
Two divisions of the 25th GMP are concentrated in the V. Soleny area. Fired at enemy tanks and infantry. A total of five salvos were fired. The 3rd Division is concentrated in the Kazminsky area under the command of the 156th Rifle Division. (362) Fired one salvo at M. Orlovka.

Head of the Operations Department, Major Papazov (original) (departure 27.7.42)

TsAMO, f.228, op.709, d.523, l.264

Reconnaissance report No. 0373 by 10.00 27.7.42 Shtarm 37 Verkh.Khomutets, map: 200000

First. From 18.00 on 26.7, the enemy, with a force of up to two motorized regiments with 60 tanks, launched an offensive from the Kalinin, Saraisky area in the general direction of Vesely. No information was received from other sectors of the front.
Second. Unit combat and observation established: 18.30 26.7 up to two motorized regiments and 60 tanks captured Verkh. and Nizhny Soleny and by 19.30 26.7 reached the line northeast of 2 km Manych-Balabinsky, where the motorized infantry and tanks were stopped by artillery fire. The fight continues.
Third. Enemy aircraft carried out reconnaissance flights, bombing and shelling of retreating units and the rear of our troops.
Fourth. Air reconnaissance of Front 26.7 established up to 15 boats and 15 vessels near Razdorskaya on the left bank of the Don River.
Prisoners of the 3rd regiment of the 3rd tank division, taken in the Konstantinovskaya area 22.7 showed: the division consists of 5 regiments: two tank and three motorized rifle regiments 3, 394 and K-3, the prisoners of war do not know the numbers of the tank regiments. The division left Kharkov to the southeast at the end of June. The division suffers up to 10% losses from bombing and artillery fire.
A captured Romanian soldier of the 4th squadron of the 10th cavalry regiment of the 1st cavalry division, taken in the Razdorskaya area on 7/22/42. showed that the Romanian cavalry squadron was attached to the German division, the number of which the prisoner did not know, the entire Colarash regiment remained in Romania.
Conclusion. Without change.
(resolution on prisoners, on the document: what kind of nonsense?)

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.96

To the commander of 268 arm.ap

No. 98 pcs. art. 37A 27.7.42 24.00, card 200000

1. 102sd with 268aap and 43gmp defends at the line: (claim) Sadkov gully, Vesely, having defense along the southern bank of the Manych Canal.
2. The military regiment is assigned to the commander of the 102nd rifle division, with the task of preventing the enemy from crossing the canal. Get in touch with the 102sd headquarters (south-eastern outskirts of Vesely).
3. District OP - Protsikov. Readiness to open fire 4.00 28.7.42.
4. Take measures to provide yourself with ammunition.

Nachart 37A Mr. signature Nedelin

TsAMO, f.224, op.774, d.3, l.366 (entry 2359 from 2.8.42) 28.7.42 17.25

Major Conscientious.

I ask you to immediately deliver to Major General Zhuk by any means the following information that he transmitted to you via ST, but there was a break and I was informed that they could not deliver the second half of the information to you. Information 12.40 28.7.42 years.
At dawn on July 27, 1942, the enemy did not show much activity at the army front, limiting himself to occasional artillery fire in the Vesely area. Freedom continues to be held by enemy infantry. The situation there is being clarified. According to unverified data, this morning enemy infantry entered Karakashev, allegedly crossing the canal. Representatives were sent to the site with the task of checking and, if necessary, using the RS.
Our farm:
0156 with division 1230 and division 25GMP is following your letter via radio data, communication has temporarily stopped.
0275 and 074 there is no latest data.
0102 occupies defense from the Bol.Sadkovka gully along the southern bank of the canal, including Vesely. Gutin also supports 43 GMP. Farm 0102 is grouped 1-2 km south of Vesely. This farm temporarily includes: farm 295, 1 battery 74sd and something from 275, which Pavlenko brought. I will provide additional detailed information about this and other farms when the representatives I sent to the unit return. Gutin occupies with one son the northern slopes 110.6, 6 km northeast of Verkh. Khomutets, with another son the Protsikov district (northern outskirts and center). Gutin has 12 units left after yesterday's battle. The disadvantage of 0102's defense is the small number of troops, as a result of which the right flank along the southern bank of the canal is poorly controlled. An attempt at crossing was made yesterday 2 km east of the Vesely dam, but was repulsed, and up to 10 boats were sunk. Now he sent his people to the place.
347 is defended exclusively by Vesely along the left bank of the Manych, south of Svoboda, Mal.Zapadenka and Krasnoe Znamya. So far, only one son has come to the scene. It supports division 1230 with an outpost on the northern outskirts and in the center of Pozdneevka and two divisions of 25gmp.
We managed to pull out Division 1230 at the very last moment of retreat to the southern bank of the canal from the area of the 156th Bolshoi Mechetnaya Rifle Division. On the march, he was attacked by armored cars, drove them away with anti-tank rifle fire, in the evening he was attacked by tanks, lost one unit, but brought 8 out of 9 units to the southern coast and yesterday took the most active actions in the battle.
727 fought yesterday in the Manych-Balabinsky area. He knocked out up to 10 tanks, destroyed a lot of infantry, but he himself lost a lot. 4 units were crushed by tanks. Now he has two faulty pieces left. Taken to the Pishvanov area, where two units are being repaired. Yesterday I picked up one stray battery consisting of 3 units of 1181ap 9A. She worked great for us for a day. I would like to ask permission to include her in 727ap, but today the owner arrived and took her away. If possible, give it to us. (366 samples)
262 on the march approaches our apartment. The owner visited me yesterday. He has 18 units, but exclusively with tractors. By evening he will gather in the forest south of Verkh.Khomutets, and at night he will go to the OP. Now I convey my requests to Comrade Zhuk and ask you to answer each question specifically.
1. The situation with our bases worries me very much, especially in connection with the sharp change in the situation in the area of our left neighbor. I think that we can only keep small flights on wheels at Mechetinskaya, Kozlovaya Balka and Ataman, the main one needs to be relocated somewhere in the Beloglinskaya or Levushkovskaya area. I ask for immediate instructions on the situation.
2. Due to the arrival of 262 and the availability of 1230, the 152mm is large, and we only have 200 pieces left. Urgent leave required. Gutin also has 100 pieces, and there is a lot of materiel. Vacation needed.
85mm anti-aircraft are completely absent, a few hundred 37mm remain. Enemy aircraft literally commit outrages with impunity. There is no PT cartridge, but there are very many machine guns. The screw cartridges are running out. An urgent release of this is needed. While you are able to submit, indicate where you can get it at least in separate cars.
727 has proven to be an excellent regiment; it cannot be allowed to wither away. Please release at least 3-5 units of 76mm 42 or 39 years old. We will find transport and people.
3. Ammunition for the RS began to be obtained with great difficulty. Although they had cases of accurate shooting, we still rely on them. The 25th Regiment is an excellent regiment, somewhat weaker than the 43rd. I ask you to improve the issue with the supply of ammunition.
4. The situation with topographic maps is extremely difficult. There are no scales. We are drawing from tracing paper, and now we have been given the task of 839 OA RAD to take photographs. But this is not a way out. Help as much as you can, because... I can’t get anything through my operations department.
5. All artillery has suffered heavy losses in men and command personnel. Is there anything you can do to help?
6. All communications are broken by tanks or lost. Is there anything you can do to help? Additional information about 839, it is mostly preserved. All.
According to the latest data, by 17.00 the situation at Svoboda and Karakashev is deteriorating; according to unverified data, tanks crossed there due to weak defenses. The situation is being clarified.

Nedelin 28.7.42 17.25 (original)

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.92

To the commander of the 1230gap RGK

No. 99 pcs. art. 37A 28.7.42 20.30

1. The regiment from 21.00 on 28.7.42 is subordinate to the commander of the 230th Rifle Division. Stand 230 - approximately height 106.
2. The area from Popov and landings northeast of 2 km. Remove the materiel without tractors overnight. New building (12 km south of V. Khomutets).
3. Take measures to provide yourself with ammunition.

Nachart 37A Mr. signature Nedelin

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.93

To the commander 268ap

No. 100 pcs. art. 37A 28.7.42 20.40

The military regiment is resubordinated to the commander of the 295th Rifle Division, occupying the defense (claim) Zherebkov, Kazachiy Khomutets and 4 km southwest of it along the slopes of unknown heights.
OP area - Yamutinskaya gully (4 km north of the village named after the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District).
Readiness 4.99 7/29/42. Implements without tractors will be taken to the south-eastern outskirts of the farm named after the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District.
Take measures to provide ammunition.

Nachart signature Nedelin

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.90

To the commander of the 262nd Gap RGK

No. 102 pcs. art. 37A 28.7.42 21.00, card 200000

1. By the end of July 28, 1942, the enemy had captured Karakashev, Vesely, Krasny Kut, and Krasnoe Znamya.
2. The military regiment is subordinate to the commander of the 347th Rifle Division, which has been defending since the morning of July 29 at the line of the unnamed high. 6 km north of Karakashev, Kireevsky, V. Khomutets. Stand 347 - V. Khomutets.
3. Area of the OP regiment: forest 4 km south of Verkh.Khomutets, Lesnoy. Be ready to deploy one division to the left in the direction of Bol.Talovaya. In the same (91) direction, especially strengthen security measures and technical support. Disguise the entire battle formation, especially from air reconnaissance.
4. During the night on 7/29/42, complete reconnaissance and occupation of the OP and NP. General readiness to fire 4.00 29.7.42.
No later than 24.00 on 28.7.42, find and establish contact with the commander of the 347th Rifle Division.
5. Take measures to provide yourself with ammunition.

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.94

To the commander of the 25th GMP

No. 103 pcs. art. 37A 28.7.42 21.35, card 200000

1. The military regiment is reassigned to the 230th Rifle Division, defending the line Protsikov, Bol.Talovaya, Tselina (center), Mal.Talovaya. Headquarters - approximately on height 106 (6 km south of Protsikov).
2. Concentrate rear areas and bases - Chernyshevka (5 km southeast of Popov).
3. Contact the commander of the 230sd and take measures to provide yourself with ammunition.
Special attention from the VET along the road from Vesely.
Shtarm - Zhuravlevka (30 km southeast of Verkh. Khomutets)

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8939, d.16, l.212

Explanatory note on form 3 as of July 28.

1. The strength of the 102nd Rifle Division as of July 28 is approximately 600-700 people, taking into account the convoy. The majority of military personnel do not have personal weapons.
2. The 156th Infantry Division has had combat losses in recent days, but due to the lack of communication, as well as the 230th Infantry Division, 275th and 74th Infantry Division, it is not possible to determine their number.
3. Workers from the manning and headquarters departments have been sent to all divisions to collect information about the composition of the troops, upon receipt of which a report will be sent.
Head of the staffing department, Major Zaguryani.
Head of the 1st department of the educational institution, Major Kogan.

TsAMO, f.224, op.760, d.46, l.663

Information by 8.00 29.7 according to data by 24.00 28.7

110 cd 30% of the composition (without horses and ammunition) in motion south of Vesyly in the direction of Verkh. Khomutets. The situation is being clarified.
Shtarm 37 from 7.00 29.7 Zhuravlevka

Major Kuzmin

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8947, d.9, l.1

Order No. 0122 July 29

1. Colonel Samokhvalov, acting as commander of the 102nd Infantry Division, is relieved of his position and is allowed to serve as Chief of Staff of the 347th Infantry Division.
2. Chief of Staff of the 347th Infantry Division, Colonel F.G. Mitelman. relieved of his position and allowed to serve as commander of the 102nd Infantry Division.

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.79

43gmp

No. 090 pcs. art. 37A 29.7.42 18.10, card 200000

According to the 295th Rifle Division, from 16.30-17.00, tanks of unknown numbers burst into Kazachiy Khomutets and Zapolos, a battle is underway.
The Commander of the Army ordered: to fire one divisional salvo at Zapolos, having previously specified on the spot (at least four installations).
Four installations will be transferred to the area of the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District in readiness to support the right flank of the 347th Rifle Division. At the same time, establish a connection with 295sd. KP - 295 - New Israel. Deliver the execution immediately.

NS Lieutenant Colonel Zelinsky

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.77

To the commander 268ap, to the chart 295sd

No. 105 pcs. art. 37A 29.7.42 22.30, card 200000

One battery with 7 shells should be placed at the anti-tank station in the north-western outskirts of the military council named after the North Caucasus Military District.
Strengthen her with 10 PTR rifles. The unit that does not have shells, concentrate Tolstoyanka in readiness to immediately move forward to receive ammunition. During the night, be ready to send transport for shells at the direction of artillery supplies.
Mat.part for repair concentrate Grateful.

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.78

To the 295th Rifle Division, Colonel Suvorov

No. 106 pcs. art. 37A 29.7.42 22.40, card 200000

With an almost complete absence of artillery, you were unable to organize a joint march of infantry and regimental battery. Your PA battery is running wild all day. I warn you about responsibility. Find the battery and place it on the OP. We have not received any requests for ammunition from you. Take all measures and send them to the station yourself. Farewell. Kerosene, diesel fuel and lubricant are available at MTS Olshanka (20 km southeast of Verkh. Khomutets).
You sent all the equipment for repairs to Mechetinskaya, but what about the supervision of the repairs? Will they leave you with this equipment without traction, calculations, etc. Do not forget about your responsibility.

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.86

To the commander of the 347th Rifle Division

No. 107 pcs. art. 37A 30.7.42 11.50, card 200000

The army commander ordered:
One division of 262gap RGK, providing it with at least 0.5 b/k ammunition, upon receipt of this, immediately transfer it to the subordination of the commander of 295sd and move to the area of the northwestern outskirts of the military council of the North Caucasus Military District, contact the commander of 295sd, receive tasks and the area of the OP and immediately prepare for battle. Stand 295 - New Israel.
Deliver the execution.

Nachart 37A Mr. signature Nedelin

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.85

Nachartu 230sd

No. 108 pcs. art. 37A 30.7.42 13.30, card 200000

Division 1230gap RGK, which voluntarily left its positions from the Popov area, should immediately be found, returned to the outpost, and measures should be taken to provide ammunition. Deliver the execution.
Return the regiment commander and send him to army headquarters.

Nachart 37A Mr. signature Nedelin

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.87

Colonel Krisainin

No. 110 pcs. art. 37A 30.7.42 18.05, card 200000

1. Immediately go in search of the 567th MZA division. Find the division and bring it to Zhuravlevka.
2. Conduct an investigation into the reasons for the failure to comply with my order for the division to arrive at 3.00 on 7/29/42 to the defense of Zhuravlevka.

Nachart 37A Mr. signature Nedelin

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.70

To the commander 268ap

No. 112 pcs. art. 37A 30.7.42 20.00, card 200000

By preliminary order of the army commander, 37A withdraws to a new defensive line: Kagalnitskaya, (inaudible), Krakovo (inaudible)
Appointed by a special signal that will be given to division commanders.
All material that does not have ammunition and is faulty should be concentrated in the 4th department of the Yulovsky storage farm. Organize a perimeter defense, with special attention to the Proletarskoye direction.
Deploy one battery from (not legible) (not legible) to the OP, which is in the Yuzhnoye region, and operate as part of the 295th Rifle Division.
Upon receipt of ammunition, immediately deploy the entire regiment in the 295th Rifle Division.
Artillery Headquarters 37A - Prokhladny

Nachart 37A g-m (there is no signature on the copy) (received 23.00)

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8939, d.16, l.214

Explanatory note on form 30 for July 30.

1. The information shows the parts and connections included in 37A as of 30.7.
2. As a result of battles carried out by formations from July 25 to July 30 this year. there are losses of personnel, cavalry and materiel (not taken into account in the information presented).
3. There is no information for 110kd and rear army units, due to their location on the route of movement and the lack of data. On 7/29/42, 110 cd each, there were, in addition to the division command, 17 horsemen and, according to approximate data, up to 100 people, including the convoy.
In the 102nd rifle division there are up to 100-120 active bayonets.
In 295sd - 250-300 active bayonets; 41msbr - 100-120 active bayonets, 182zsp - 100 active bayonets.
Sending and receiving people into divisions without weapons is not possible due to the lack of the latter.
Information on 347sd is shown approximate; One rifle regiment is not included in the information due to the lack of information about its location and fate.

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8939, d.10, l.126 (f.444 (f.392-37A), op.8939 (8936), d.10, l.126)

Order to the troops 37A No. 00277 dated July 30, 1942.

"On the formation of barrage detachments and penal companies within the army."

In pursuance of NKO order No. 227 of July 28, 1942, I order:
1. Within the army, form five well-armed barrage detachments, each numbering 120 people. Detachment detachments should be formed and assigned to commanders:
a) Two barrage detachments based on courses for junior lieutenants. Appoint senior lieutenant Shilenko and senior lieutenant Ryzhkov as commanders of these detachments;
b) One barrier detachment - on the basis of the border guard battalion of the 25th border regiment, appoint the commander of the same battalion, Captain Karpov, as the detachment commander;
c) Two barrage detachments at the expense of the personnel of the 201st army reserve rifle regiment. Appoint the commanders of the 201ozsp companies as detachment commanders: senior lieutenant G.M. Petrenko, senior lieutenant L.M. Skorlygina.
2. The formation of barrage detachments is entrusted to the head of the manning department and the head of the army personnel department.
3. My deputy for artillery, Major General of Artillery Nedelin, must provide the barrage detachments with appropriate weapons. Each barrier detachment should be armed with 25% automatic weapons, at least 2 machine guns, the rest with semi-automatic rifles and grenades.
4. Form barrage detachments by the end of the day on 2.8.42.
5. The commander of the 201st army zsp should staff the barrage detachments with disciplined and morally stable soldiers and commanders.
6. Within the army at 201 army zsp, form three penal companies, numbering from 150 to 200 people. Military personnel of army units not included in the rifle divisions who are guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, as well as ordinary and junior commanding officers of rifle divisions who have gone beyond the division's zone, are sent to the penal companies formed under 201AZSP.
The head of the army personnel department should staff the penal companies with commanding officers.
The commander of 201AZSP should send penal units to the front line according to my instructions.
Penal companies should be staffed with ordinary soldiers and junior commanders who have committed violations of discipline due to cowardice or instability.
7. Form one penal company for each rifle division. Penal companies should be staffed with privates and junior commanding officers who have committed violations of discipline due to cowardice or instability.
Division commanders are to staff penal companies with the best, most stable members of the command staff by their order.
8. Report to me on the formation of barrage detachments and penal companies on August 3, 1942. through the head of the staffing department.
9. In the future, information on the combat and numerical strength should be submitted by 10.00 of each even number.

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.72

To the commander of the 43rd GMP

No. 116 pcs. art. 37A 31.7.42 14.35, card 200000

Immediately send one division to Vladikars, conduct reconnaissance, and immediately fire a salvo when enemy columns are detected. According to the new order, from 20.30 the 230th Rifle Division attacks the enemy in a southerly direction. Your regiment is assigned to 230SD, contact us immediately and receive the task. Stand 230sd d.b. (should be) Lenina or Kalinovskaya (inaudible).
Nachart Mr. signature Nedelin

NS signature Zelinsky

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.73

To the commander 268ap

No. 117 pcs. art. 37A 31.7.42 14.40, card 200000

Today at 20.30 the regiment entrusted to you advances in a southern direction from the 347th Rifle Division. Contact her immediately, she is entrusted with covering for you.
Depending on this, organize a detachment yourself in readiness to break through small enemy detachments.
Headquarters 347SD - Pushkin Klkh.

Nachart Mr. signature Nedelin

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.74

To the commander 727ap

No. 118 pcs. art. 37A 31.7.42 14.50, card 200000

Immediately send two guns to Blagodarnoye. The vehicle for the third gun, which you will receive, takes 300 shells with you.
Each gun must have a fully combat crew.
In addition, send one vehicle and armed soldiers with grenades, machine guns and PTR rifles.
You must arrive in person with the indicated payment. For yourself and the rest of the staff, leave your deputy at the concentration site.

Nachart Mr. signature Nedelin

NS signature Zelinsky (painting 15.40 Lieutenant Colonel Go...)

TsAMO, f.37A, op.8960, d.13, l.75?

To the commander 268ap

No. 119 pcs. art. 37A 31.7.42 15.30, card 200000

From 20.30 on 31.7.42, the 347th Rifle Division attacks the enemy in the southern direction of platform 147 km, Seyatel and crosses at Tatsin, immediately switching to defense with a front to the north along the southern bank of the Sr. Egorlyk river at the line: Sysoevo-Aleksandrovskoe, New way(college named after Voroshilov). Shtadiv - western outskirts of Blagodarnoe.
The military regiment (entrusted to you) will initially concentrate on the southern outskirts of Bogoroditskoye, and subsequently, at the direction of the 347th Rifle Division. Take measures to provide ammunition.

Started by Mr. signature Nedelin (painting 15.40 Lieutenant Colonel Go...)

TsAMO, f.224, op.811, no.52

Major General Razuvaev

Addition to information by 18.00 31.7.42.

1. Units of the 37th Army at 12.00 31.7 occupy a defensive line: 9th department of the stud farm (5 km south of Mechetinsky), stud farm Tolstovka, Golovanovka, Prelestny, Vesely. The enemy does not show active actions in front of the army front.
2. According to liaison officers of the 3rd Guards Corps, at 15.00 the enemy occupied Salsk, Shablievka, Ekatironovka. Two border regiments and the 374th Rifle Division are retreating in a south-eastern direction. Observation established: a convoy of vehicles with infantry was moving from Salsk along the road to Sandata, the number has not been established.

Colonel Kotov (printed 31.7)

Correct: Deputy Head of the Operations Department, Lieutenant Colonel Smirnov (signature)

In August 1941, the troops of the 37th Army defending the Kiev fortified area (KIUR) were called “Vlasovites”.

On July 7-8, 1941, German tank formations broke through the defenses of Soviet troops south of Novograd-Volynsky, captured Berdichev, Zhitomir, and by July 11 reached the Irpen River - 20 km west of Kyiv).

"July 11, 1941 Kyiv, Comrade Khrushchev
Reliable information has been received that all of you, from the commander of the Southwestern Front to the members of the Military Council, are in a state of panic and intend to withdraw troops to the left bank of the Dnieper.
I warn you that if you take even one step towards the withdrawal of troops to the left bank of the Dnieper, you do not defend the areas of the fortified areas on the right bank of the Dnieper to the last opportunity, you will all suffer cruel punishment as cowards and deserters.
Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. Stalin".

The heroic defense of the garrisons of the Kyiv fortified area and counterattacks of the 5th and 6th armies thwarted attempts to take the city on the move. The Germans stopped their attack on Kyiv and continued their attacks northeast of the city, where the 5th Army held the defense in the positions of the Korosten fortified area, which “fettered” 10 German divisions here for a month and a half. In the 20th of July, counterattacks were launched by the 26th Army, stabilizing the front at the Fastov-Belaya Tserkov line. 30 July troops of the 6th German army struck at the junction of the Kyiv fortified area and the 26th Army and forced the Soviet troops to retreat. At the same time, the 1st Panzer Group launched an offensive to the south.
However, on August 10, the enemy broke into the southwestern suburbs of Kyiv, where the troops of the 37th Army defending the city (which A.A. Vlasov was appointed to command), urgently formed just the day before, and 35 thousand militia fighters forced the Germans to retreat. The combat log of the Wehrmacht High Command noted that the attack on Kyiv had stopped.
Moreover, the 37th Army managed to organize a counterattack and drove the enemy back. By August 16, the army had generally restored its original position. The enemy's attempt to capture Kiev failed this time too.

On August 12, Hitler ordered: “The attack on Kyiv must be suspended. As soon as the supply of ammunition allows, the city must be destroyed by air bombing.”. In the area of the Kyiv fortified area fighting took on a positional character, and Reichenau again directed his efforts against the 5th Army.

When German troops stumbled upon the defense of Kyiv organized by Vlasov, Smolensk, Rostov and Velikiye Luki had already been surrendered to the enemy, and Odessa was surrounded. Retreating, our troops blew up the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station, the Western Front perished near Minsk, its commander, General D. Pavlov, was arrested, and Voroshilov and Budyonny were recalled to Moscow. Around the same time, Colonel General A. Eremenko confidently declared to Stalin that in the coming days he would certainly defeat the “scoundrel Guderian” at Orel and Bryansk.
Against this background, the Germans “received in the face” from the 37th Army throughout August and September, bearing colossal losses.

The Germans no longer dared to storm the city; 13 enemy divisions and 4 brigades were pinned down on the approaches to Kyiv.

From Directive of the Headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 00322 dated 28.8.41:
"37 armies (87, 171, 206, 147, 284, 295, 165 SD, 28 State Guards Division, 64 SK Division and KIUR units), defending with their flanks the eastern bank of the river in the area (claim) of St. Glybov, Svaromye and Bortnichi, Protsev and the center - a fortified line on the Borki front, the Irpen, Belgorodka, Tarasovka, Pirogovo rivers, hold on to Kyiv at all costs .
Shtarm - Kyiv...
Commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel General Kirponos
Member of the Military Council of the SWF Burmistenko
Chief of Staff of the Southwestern Front, Major General Tupikov"
(F. 229, op. 161, d. 11, pp. 323-326. Original)

Active defensive actions of Soviet troops near Kiev delayed the enemy’s 1st Tank Group for more than two weeks. She was unable to launch an offensive in a southern direction, bypassing the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts, within the time limit set for her.
The report of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army to Hitler on July 23 stated that the combat capabilities of infantry divisions had decreased by an average of 20%, and of tank and motorized divisions by 50%.

As a result, the left wing of Army Group South did not fulfill its task of eliminating the Kyiv group of Soviet troops, primarily the 5th Army and the Kyiv fortified area. This was one of the reasons for Hitler's decision to turn significant forces of Army Group Center from the Moscow direction to the south to attack the flank of the Southwestern Front.

According to military historians, just near Kiev (72 days of defensive operation), the Germans lost about 100 thousand killed and wounded. The long and stubborn defense of Kyiv played an important role in thwarting the German “blitzkrieg” plan.

REFERENCE
The 37th Army of the 1st Formation was formed on August 8, 1941 as part of the Southwestern Front on the basis of the Kyiv fortified region and the reserves of the Supreme High Command Headquarters. It included the 147th, 171st, 175th, 206th, 284th and 295th rifle divisions, the Kiev fortified area, artillery and other formations and units.
After its formation, the army occupied defense at the Svyatilnoye - Svaromye line - west of Kyiv - and further along the left bank of the Dnieper, to the town of Zherebyatin.
During the Kyiv strategic operation, army troops were attacked by superior enemy forces and suffered heavy losses, together with part of the other front forces, were surrounded by the enemy and, after stubborn fighting, by order of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, they left Kyiv on September 19. Some of the army troops in separate groups left the encirclement and united with the front troops.
The army was disbanded on September 25, 1941.
Army Commander - Major General Vlasov A. A. (July-September 1941)
Member of the Military Council of the Army - Divisional Commissar Popov N.K. (August-September 1941)
Chief of Army Staff - Major General Dobroserdov K. L. (July-September 1941)

In published archival documents and in the post-war memoirs of many commanders they did not mention Vlasov - they wrote - “commander” (without indicating his full name).
Bagramyan simply wrote: " The new commander was not there", and who he was, did not indicate where he was - also. He wrote about the chief of staff Dobroserdov, he wrote about Potapov - the commander of Army 5, but Vlasov was never mentioned.

COMBAT ORDER No. 08. STORM 37 Kyiv. 23.8.41 10.00
Card 100,000
According to the directive of the Southwestern Federal District dated August 21, 1941 No. 131, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 212 airborne bases are allocated to the east. river bank Dnieper. By the morning of August 24, 2041, the 28th State Duma was concentrated in the forest in the Dacha region of Pushcha-Voditsa.
The 37th Army is leading a partial regrouping.
I order:
1. 28th State Guards Division, after concentrating in the Dacha region of Pushcha-Voditsa, replace units of the 3rd Airborne Infantry Division and take up defense on the front of Borki, (leg.) Belgorodka. Change...["blurred" text; 28 lines missing - V.T.]…
6. The exit of VDB units should be carried out only in their regular organization without special units assigned to them.
7. The change of parts of the airborne battalion should be carried out under the cover of night darkness, ensure all camouflage measures are used.
Withdrawal of VDB units from Kyiv districts to the east. river bank Dnieper can also be produced only under the cover of night darkness.
8. By 2.00 on August 25, 1941, inform all division commanders about the implementation of this order.
By the morning of August 24, 1941, the Airborne Forces commanders must provide information on the combat strength of the units being withdrawn beyond the river. Dnepr, and units remaining in KIUR.

Commander of the 37th Army
(signature)

Member of the Military Council
Brigade Commissar Lutai

Chief of Army Staff
Major General Dobroserdov

F. 229, op. 9776ss, no. 62, pp. 4, 5. Typewritten copy.

COMBAT ORDER No. 011. STORM 37 Kyiv. 11.00 2.9.41
Card 100,000 and 200,000
In order to better management units operating in the Oster area and coordinating their actions, I order all units to be united into the Oster group under a single command.
I appoint Captain Donchenko as the head of the combat section of the Oster group. The composition of the group: 30 Pontbat, the remnants of a company of the river flotilla, a platoon of the NKVD regiment, two companies of tanks, a company of the 146th Infantry Division and a gunboat on the Desna River.
Mission: defend the eastern bank of the river. Desna in the Beliki, Evminka section, preventing enemy crossings across the river. Gum.
From the company of the 146th Infantry Division, select a mobile group (on 3 vehicles) of 40-45 people with two machine guns to prevent possible attempts by the enemy to cross the river. Gum.
Conduct continuous reconnaissance in the northern direction: Atrohi, Bondarevka, Sokolovka.
Maintain close contact with active units in the Okuninovo area.

Commander of the 37th Army
(signature)

Member of the Military Council
Brigade Commissar Lutai

Chief of staff
Major General Dobroserdov

F. 229, op. 9776ss, no. 62, l. 386. Typewritten copy.

BATTLE ORDER No. 021. STORM 37 Kyiv. 4.9.41
Card 100,000
A number of inspections of the progress of defensive work in army units established that barriers in front of the front line of defense are poorly developed, and in some cases, like the 284th Infantry Division in the Pirogovo and Zhukovka sector, are completely absent.
The barriers are not built in a continuous line (206 and 147 infantry divisions), which makes it possible for small groups of the enemy to penetrate our location with impunity.
Barriers for the most part are monotonous in nature, and such obstacles as snares, trippers, traps, wolf pits, surprises, anti-personnel mines, hedgehogs, Bruno spirals, hanging rattling objects (tin cans) on wires are rarely used, and in some parts they are not used at all.
Units are not involved in constructing barriers, entrusting all this work only to sappers.
The commander ordered:
1. Create along the entire front edge continuous strip barriers, using easily installed obstacles, previously prepared in the rear (snares, hedgehogs, Bruno spirals, surprises, sketched wire, MZP) in open areas and areas subject to fire by fire.
2. Work should be carried out every night to install barriers in several rows, paying special attention to the joints and flanks.
3. Construction work should be assigned to the unit, under the guidance of sapper instructors. Daytime Use on workpieces and carrying materials to the leading edge.
4. All barriers related to demolition work, entrust it to the sappers.
5. The commander of the 284th Rifle Division, within two days, arrange barriers along the front edge in the Pirogovo, Zhukovka sector.
6. All formation commanders take the strengthening of barriers in front of the front line of defense under personal control.
7. I will command the army to organize control and assistance to units in carrying out work, supplying units with the necessary material. Report daily on the progress of work.
8. Submit a summary of completed work with a diagram through the army command daily by 18.00.

Chief of Army Staff
Major General Dobroserdov

Military commissar of headquarters
(No signature)

Head of Operations Department
Lieutenant Colonel Kovalev

F. 229, op. 9776ss, no. 62, l. 412. Original.

PRIVATE COMBAT ORDER No. 02. STORM 37 Kyiv. 13.40 5.9.41
Card 100,000
1. In the Okuninovsky direction, the pr-k pushed our units back to line 107.4, level. Neusha, further to the southwest, north. env. Chernin. His advance to the south and southeast has been suspended.
2. 228 Infantry Division, defending the edge of the forest east of the heights 119.0, 124.8, 118.6 - to date its position has not been established.
124 SD - presumably to the west. pub. forests 1 km west of Novo-Olshantsy, the left flank is saddled by the highway.
41st Infantry Division - front to the north-west, right flank - Otter swamp, left flank - tract. Neusha.
131st Infantry Division - front to the north-west 1.5 km east of Novoselka.
171st Infantry Division firmly defends the left bank of the river. Dnieper, right flank of the trees. Chernin, not allowing the project to spread to the south.
The rest of the front's participation remains unchanged.
3. The group of troops of the Okuninov direction has the task of preventing the enemy from spreading to the north, east and southeast and south.
4. The commander of the 146th Infantry Division should set out in vehicles from the Knyazhichi district to the Oster district, receive from Captain Donchenko the Ostersky combat sector consisting of: 30 Pontbat, 91st NKVD regiment, remnants of the river flotilla company, 2 special command, 15th VNOS company , intelligence Battalion 41 Infantry Division, 2 companies of tanks, 114 rear and organize a strong defense of the left bank of the river. Desna on the front of Beliki, Oster, Evminki.
From the troops of the Oster combat sector, have a mobile reserve in vehicles.
5. Organize reconnaissance in the northern direction of Morovsk, Sokolovka, Bondari; to the west - Kosachevka, St. Karpilovskaya Guta, Novoselki, Chernin.
6. Establish contact to the north with units of the 5th Army.
7. Send reports to the army headquarters in Kyiv:
a) concentrated in the Oster district;
b) upon occupying a combat position.
In the future, send by 16.00 and 2.00.
Contact the commander of the 37th Army and receive a further task from him.

Commander of the 37th Army
(signature)

Member of the Military Council
Brigade Commissar Lutai

Chief of Army Staff

F. 229, op. 9776ss, no. 62, pp. 388, 389. Uncertified typewritten copy.

Lutai and Dobroserdov have both positions and surnames, and commander-37 has only a position and signature.
And so in all the documents of the 37th Army

It is difficult to say whether Kyiv would have survived at the beginning of August 1941 if Vlasov had not been at the head of its defense. Due to the relatively small number of troops in the army, Vlasov gave his units maximum mobility. They were transferred from one section of the front to another using specially formed transport columns, trains and urban transport. Trams delivered reserves and ammunition from Brovary to the city, almost to the very front line.
Mine command post Vlasov located it in the open area of the former Prague Hotel on Vladimirskaya Street. At that time, from the roof of the hotel the city and its suburbs were visible at a glance.

Khrushchev N.S.: “He (Vlasov) put together his army from units retreating and breaking out of the German encirclement and in fact proved that we made the right choice. He always calmly stood under fire, provided firm and reasonable leadership of the defense of Kiev. He fulfilled his duty and did not allow the Germans take Kiev with a frontal attack on the move. And when Kiev eventually fell, it was as a result of encirclement and concentration German troops much eastern city. And not because Vlasov did not provide a tough defense".
Of course, Khrushchev was forced to defend Vlasov, but it seems that Vlasov actually did not make any mistakes in the defense of Kyiv.

On September 15, German tank wedges united across the Dnieper in the Lokhvitsa area and four armies (5th, 21st, 26th, 37th) found themselves in a cauldron.

On September 17, 1941, the Military Council of the 37th Army telegraphed:
“The 37th Army is in an operational environment. On the western bank, the defense of the Kyiv fortified area was broken through on September 16 of this year as a result of an enemy offensive south of Fastov, the reserve was exhausted, and the battle continued. On the eastern bank, on the front of Rusakov, Svarovye, Nizhnyaya Dubynya, units, offering resistance, retreat to Brovary. In the south, with a blow in the direction of Kobrino, Boryspil, Pravets, the enemy broke through the defenses of various small detachments and people's militia. The threat of crossings to Kyiv from the east. During twenty-day battles, units are few in number, very tired, and need rest and large amounts of fresh reinforcement. There is no connection with neighbors. Front with breaks. The eastern bank cannot be held without strong reserves... I ask for instructions.”.
The telegram was addressed to the commander-in-chief of the South-Western direction, but was sent in a roundabout way through Moscow - there was no direct connection with the front headquarters!

And it is not surprising that the command of the South-Western direction ignored this telegram for the whole day.
On September 17, 1941, the Headquarters of the South-Western Direction reported to Moscow:
"To the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army
Military Council of the South-Western direction 22.00 16.9 Akhtyrka left with a group of commanders to direct the actions of troops in the direction of Romny. A control point is being equipped for the main headquarters: Pokotilovka 6 km southwest. Kharkiv.
Chief of Staff of YuZN Pokrovsky
№ 385
(F. 251, op. 646, d. 483, l. 322. Original)

Without any confirmation that Headquarters had sanctioned the verbal order of Timoshenko, who had departed for a new location (transmitted through Bagramyan), Kirponos turned directly to Moscow:
"To Comrade Stalin, personally
Copy: To the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front, Comrade Timoshenko
Commander-in-Chief Timoshenko through his deputy. beginning front headquarters conveyed verbal instructions: the main task is the withdrawal of the front armies to the river. Psel with the defeat of mobile groups in the directions of Romny and Dubna. Leave a minimum of forces to cover the Dnieper and Kyiv. The written directives of the Commander-in-Chief do not give any instructions about withdrawing to the river. Psel and are allowed to take only part of the forces from the Kyiv UR. There is a contradiction in what to do? I believe that the withdrawal of front troops to the river. Psel is correct on that2 condition it is necessary to leave completely KIUR, Kyiv and r. Dnieper.
We urgently ask for your instructions.
Kirponos, Burmistenko, Rykov, Bagramyan
№ 15788
(F. 251, op. 646, d. 483, l. 325. Typewritten copy)

Only on September 18, M. Kirponos received a telegram from Shaposhnikov (Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 002087 17.9.41 23.40 (F. 251, op. 646, d. 483, l. 330. typewritten copy) and gave the order for the armies to leave the encirclement.
Vlasov was ordered to leave the encirclement following the 5th Army in the direction of Yagotin - Piryatin. In the 37th Army, the front headquarters also kept in touch with the army through Moscow! - this order was never received, and only on the night of September 19 the main forces began to withdraw from their positions.
The 37th Army, which directly occupied the city, withdrew from it by order of Headquarters on September 19, 1941 (see: History of the Second World War 1939-1945. M., 1975. T. 4. P. 84-85; Zhukov G.K. Memoirs and Reflections, 2 vols. M., 1978, Vol. 1, pp. 318-320).-109.

Vlasov’s army found itself in two areas: one 40-50 km southeast, the other 10-15 km northeast of Kyiv. She was able to hold out until September 21-23.

Finding themselves surrounded, Vlasov and the remnants of the 37th Army marched on foot from Kyiv to Kursk. Stalin, by the way, did not put Vlasov on trial, knowing that Vlasov was not to blame for the surrender of Kyiv.

In his letter “Why I took the path of fighting Bolshevism,” Vlasov, while in captivity, will say in 1943:
“Under difficult conditions, my army coped with the defense of Kyiv and successfully defended the capital of Ukraine for two months. However, the incurable diseases of the Red Army took their toll. The front was broken through in the area of neighboring armies. Kyiv was surrounded. By order of the high command, I had to leave the fortified area."

"Soviet infantry is fighting near Kiev"

Actions of the 37th Army on the bridgehead south of Kremenchug in September-October 1943

26. Order of the commander of the Steppe Front to the commander of the 37th and 69th armies dated September 24, 1943

Copy: Comrade STALIN

Deputy NGSh comrade ANTONOV

24.9.43, 16:15.

I ORDER:

1. By 24:00 on September 25, 1943, take over the combat sector of the 69th Army and by the morning of September 26

replace the 93rd, 94th and 305th SD of the 69th Army.

89th Guards The SD and reinforcement units of the 69th Army remain subordinate to the commander of the 37th Army until further notice.

The task of the 37th Army is to carry out the task assigned to the 69th Army by my order No. 00668/op dated September 20, 1943.

2. The headquarters of the 37th Army will be located in Cherbovka, Komarovka by the morning of September 25th.

3. All communications equipment of the 69th Army until the morning of September 27, 1943 remained at the disposal of Headquarters 37.

4. The department of the 69th Army from 12:00 on September 26 is transferred to the reserve of Headquarters in accordance with a special directive.

5. Receipt, execution report NR 00673/op.

Susaykov

To the commander of 57 SK

259 1943 22:45

Card 1: 100,000

1. The enemy with units of 320, 106 and 198 Infantry Divisions hastily retreats across the river. Dnieper. By 18.00 on September 25, 1943, his rearguards offered little resistance at the line: Bulakha, Komendantovka 2nd, Lilipenki, Prosyanikovka.

2. 57 SK (62, 92, 110 Guards SD) with 417 Iptap, 1685 Iptap, 447/315 GMP, replacing units of the 94 and 93 Guards on the move. SD, moving through their battle formations, continue to pursue the enemy with an accelerated march in the general direction of Komarovka, Chapaevka, Ozery, Soloshino.

By the end of September 26, 1943, the main forces of the 92nd and 62nd Guards. SD reach the line: Motrino, Ozyory, Prosyanikovka; forward detachments to the river. Dnieper and by the morning of September 27, 1943, crossing the river. Dnieper, seize a bridgehead on the western bank of the river. Dnieper in the areas: Derievka, Koshikova beam.

Shtakor - Komarovka until 12:00 9/26/43, then along the axis of movement - Chapaevka, Pavlovka, Ozery.

Dividing lines: on the right – Vel. Solontsy, Bilokoni, Butenki, Vasilievka, Aleksandrovka, Motrino, Derievka; on the left – Zelenovka, Kobelyaki, (law) Mishurin Rog.

3. 92 Guards SD from 8:00 on September 26, 1943, with an accelerated march, pursue the enemy in the general direction - Breusovka, Derievka and, replacing the 94th Guards units on the move. SD, by the end of September 26, 1943, reach the line: Motrino, (claim) Ozery.

Advance detachments go to the river. Dnieper and by the morning of September 27, 1943, having crossed the river. Dnieper, seize a bridgehead in the Derievka area, holding it until the main forces arrive.

Shtadiv - Veliki, further along the axis of movement - Aleksandrovka, Murmuri, Dobinevka, the western outskirts of Grigoro-Brigadirova.

The dividing line on the right is the dividing line of the body; left: (legal) Cherbovka, (legal) Komarovka, Koinashi, Khmarina, Chapaevka, (legal) Lakes, south-east. outskirts of Derievka.

4. 62 Guards SD from 8:00 on 9/26/43 with an accelerated march to pursue the enemy in the general direction of Kobelyaki, Sukhaya, Soloshino and, replacing the 93rd Guards units on the move. SD, by the end of September 26, 1943, reach the line: Ozyory, Prosyanikovka; forward detachments go to the river. Dnieper and by the morning of September 27, 1943, having crossed the river. Dnieper, seize a bridgehead on the western bank of the river. Dnieper in the section at elevation. 72.0, Pertsev beam, holding it until the main forces approach.

The headquarters is the southwestern outskirts of Komarovka, further along the axis of movement - Lyashenki, Sukhaya, Morozy.

Demarcation lines: on the right - the demarcation line from the 92nd Guards. sd, on the left – the dividing line of the hull.

5. 110 guards SD, continuing the march in the second echelon of the corps, by 16:00 on September 27, 1943, concentrated in the area of Baranniki, Zabegailovka, Kovalenki.

Baranniki Station.

Routes: 1) Progress, Kustolovo-Kushchi, Bogdanovka, Khmarino, Ulinovka; 2) Stalinskoye, Komarovka, Kobelyaki, Lyashenki, Sukhak. Big rest from 7:00 to 9:00 on September 27, 1943 in the area of Galagurovka, Kobelyaki, Nikolaevka.

Station - Dzhanzhevka.

6. Division commanders to pursue the enemy and capture bridgeheads on the western bank of the river. Dnepr to create forward detachments, one in each division, which will include: a rifle battalion, an artillery division, two anti-tank batteries, a platoon of sappers and light crossing facilities.

7. Execution of reports according to the timesheet of urgent reports. Exit to the river The Dnieper and the capture of the bridgehead - a special report.

8. VPU from the morning of September 26, 1943, Dobinevka. Shtarm – Kustolovo-Kushchi.

Member of the Military Council Colonel BAGNYUK

Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant Colonel DIKOV

28. Order from the commander of the Steppe Front to the commander of the 37th Army to cross the Dnieper on the move

Troops of the 7th Guards. and 57 armies successfully cross the river. Dnieper. The enemy in the previous grouping was unable to organize a dense defense along the right bank of the river. Dnieper.

I ORDER:

1. With the army reaching the river. Immediately cross the Dnieper on a wide front in order to disperse the enemy’s attention and forces and, by the morning of 9/27/43, capture and secure a bridgehead on the front: Uspenskoye, Dacha, elev. 155.7, Derievka, Kutsevolovka, elev. 144.1 and 136.7.

When crossing, make wide and bold use of all available means of transportation, including barrels.

2. The captured areas on the opposite bank of the Dnieper should be immediately consolidated, reinforcing the crossed units with artillery in every possible way, and expanding the bridgehead in every possible way.

The units that have crossed must be in constant readiness to repel major enemy counterattacks.

3. Move anti-aircraft artillery divisions to the crossings to reliably protect them from enemy air strikes.

4. The dividing line on the right: Uspenskoye, Zybkoye. On the left are Mishurin Rog, Likhvka, Matrenovka, all points except Zybkoye for the 37th Army.

5. Submit the forcing plan to me by 22:00 on September 26, 1943.

6. Receipt and execution communicate.

SUSAIKOV

29. From the report of the Deputy Commander of the 37th Army for Engineering Troops to the Chief of Engineering Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front on engineering support for crossing the river. Dnieper from the march of the 37th Army in the period from September 28 to October 18, 1943

Sov. secret

"APPROVED"

Commander of the 37th Army, Lieutenant General SHAROKHIN

Member of the Military Council of the 37th Army Colonel ANOSHIN

The crossing of the Dnieper River by the 37th Army in the Koleberda, Perevolochnaya sector on the move, army units fighting to a tactically advantageous line on the right bank and consolidation on it, the subsequent crossing of the main forces of the army to the enemy’s shore, fierce battles to hold the bridgehead and crossing to this the bridgehead of the 5th Guards and 5th Tank Armies - constitute an outstanding, complex and courageous operation of the Red Army units in the Patriotic War.

This operation is instructive from all points of view, since it gave a lot of new things to both operational art and the issue of engineering support for crossing and crossing large military and tank formations through such a powerful water barrier as the Dnieper.

Situation

Enemy units defeated in battles in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction retreated to the river under attacks from the troops of the Steppe Front. Dnieper. Covered by strong rearguards on tactically advantageous lines, the remnants of the main German forces reached the Kremenchug region.

The 37th Army concentrated northeast of Kharkov. It consisted of guards rifle divisions, fully equipped, armed and sufficiently trained.

The army's engineering units were:

The 112th separate engineering battalion, which arrived after the fighting in Kuban, and the 116th separate engineering battalion, which completed a 1.5-month combat training program.

Divisional sapper battalions and regimental sapper platoons had a full staff with a significant layer of fighters, sergeants, and officers with rich combat experience. The political and moral state of the engineering and sapper units was high. These units were fully staffed with officers.

The engineering equipment assigned to the army formations and units according to the report cards was issued before the start of active operations, since it was delayed in arriving from front-line and central warehouses.

The army units did not have their own transport facilities, with the exception of 5 A-3 boats, which were stored in a military-technical warehouse, and 15 MPL boats, which were in the divisional engineer battalions.

From the area of their location, the army troops marched through Kharkov, Lyubotin, Kobelyaki, Breusovka, with the ultimate task of changing the leading battles of the 69th Army units on the move, throwing the enemy behind the river. Dnieper, cross this water barrier and reach Right Bank Ukraine.

While retreating, the enemy destroyed all the bridges. Intense traffic on the roads of transport troops and frequent rains made certain sections of the roads difficult to pass. Army and division engineers worked hard to rebuild and repair bridges and improve difficult road sections.

Strengthening the army with front-line engineering units

Anticipating a complex and responsible army operation to cross the river. Dnieper, the front began to strengthen the army, giving it front-line engineering units. On the way to the river. Dnepr On September 25, 1943, in the Varvarovka region, the 19th and 6th separate motorized pontoon-bridge battalions were assigned to the operational subordination of the army. The 19th separate motorized pontoon-bridge battalion had 2/3 of the N2P ferry fleet and 2 boats, and moved from the Poltava region on its own vehicles. The 6th separate motorized pontoon-bridge battalion was equipped with a captured German fleet of type “B” (a total of 33 half-pontoons) with two boats and 9 assault boats; the park moved by slow-moving tractors, was located in the Krasnograd region and at the same time lifted only 50% of its property.

According to the order of the chief of the engineering troops of the Steppe Front, the 69th army engineering battalion with 2/3 of the A-3 airborne transport fleet and the 328th separate engineering battalion, upon the withdrawal of the 69th army from the battles, were operationally resubordinated to the headquarters of the 37th engineering troops th army. The 69th Army Engineer Battalion came under operational control of the headquarters of our army's engineering troops on September 26, 1943 in the Kustolovo, Kushcha area. Two-thirds of its A-3 hydrocarbon fleet was located on the bridge across the river. Vorskla, and the 328th separate engineer battalion on the night of September 27, 1943 in this place completed the construction of a permanent bridge. The commander of the 69th Army Engineer Battalion was ordered to urgently remove the bridge, bring the park's property into a stowed position and transfer it to the Breusovka area and further, under special instructions, to the river. Dnieper.

The 8th engineer-sapper brigade of the High Command Reserve, which supported the actions of the 69th Army, as part of the brigade headquarters, 127th and 128th engineer-sapper battalions, became operationally subordinate to the 37th Army in the Breusovka area. Its fleet of hydrocarbons A-3 was located 200 km away. Dnepr, and the brigade commander, having collected all the brigade’s available vehicles, personally went to the park.

The 46th and 49th engineer battalions of the 60th engineer brigade of the High Command Reserve arrived under the operational control of our army on September 29, 1943 in the Soloshino region.

Already immediately upon entering the river. Dnepr, the headquarters of the engineering troops of the 37th Army received the arriving engineering reinforcement units, getting to know them on the move, concentrated them in areas adjacent to the river, aiming them at completing tasks to force the water barrier and took decisive measures to pull up the crossing facilities, stretching for hundreds of kilometers from the area where the actions are taking place.

In this regard, the situation was complicated by the lack of vehicles and especially fuel. The Army Military Council on the evening of September 27, 1943 made a special decision to allocate the minimum required amount of fuel for pontoon battalions and for vehicles delivering the ferry fleet.

Study of the river The headquarters of the engineering troops, together with the Operations Department of the army, began to use the Dnieper as a water barrier in order to force it a month before the start of active operations on the river. Based on the descriptions and materials available in the Hydrometeorological Department of the army, which were found in various organizations in the city of Kharkov, maps, tables and legends on the river regime were worked out. Dnieper and tactical and topographical descriptions of the area adjacent to the river in the Kremenchug, Dnepropetrovsk section.

The study of these materials, in addition to targeting the officers of the army engineering troops to perform the upcoming tasks of crossing the river, naturally facilitated the drawing up of preliminary and preparatory work plans for the crossing and forced us to think through the organization of the crossing itself. Pre-compiled characteristics of the river. The Dnieper turned out to be far from corresponding to the true state of affairs, for example, the width of the river in various sections was assumed to be from 1 to 1.5 km, but in fact the maximum width of 700 m and the minimum of 400 m prevailed; According to the descriptions, there were supposed to be a number of fords across the river, but in fact, throughout the entire crossing section, the depth along the fairway averaged 6–7 m.

The available maps incorrectly depicted the river's floodplain and the branching of its branches. The lack of aerial photography of the floodplain in the crossing area was a major drawback, which in many ways made it difficult to accept the right decision by choice of crossing points.

Engineering reconnaissance, organized on a wide front of the crossing, at the beginning of actions provided starting data only on our bank (convenient approaches to the river, starting areas and starting lines, and advantageous descents to the river). Engineering reconnaissance was completely unable to collect the necessary information on the right bank, since it did not have enough time and funds.

Practice has emphasized that engineering reconnaissance of a large water barrier, carried out by the best trained officers of the engineering troops, must be carried out continuously at all stages of crossing and crossing (reconnaissance for crossing by landing force, ferry crossing, bridge construction points, reconnaissance of materials, traffic routes on the left and right banks) .

On the Koleberda site, Perevolochnaya river. The Dnieper runs through a valley 25–30 km wide. The right bank of the valley commands over the left, having an average elevation above the river mirror of 65–90 m, and the left - only by 20–40 m.

The negative aspects of the terrain in the forcing zone were:

1. The enemy had advantageous observation points from which he could view the entire valley of the left bank. The enemy's ground observation posts gave him the opportunity to view the waiting and starting areas for crossing our troops and the routes of movement between these areas, as well as the routes of movement to crossing points. For most of the crossing section, the mirror of the river was visible to the enemy. Individual enemy observation posts could be located on the very commanding bank of the river.

There were no natural observation points on the left bank of the valley from which one could view the tactical depth of the right bank.

2. The enemy had a large selection of areas of artillery and mortar positions, sheltered from ground observation from the left bank.

Areas of firing positions on the left bank could only be selected in areas of settlements and forest areas adjacent directly to the river.

3. Movement routes behind enemy lines were closed from our ground observation. The enemy had full possibility of covert maneuver of troops along column routes.

4. Right bank of the river. Dnieper against Koleberd, Semenka, Soloshino and Perevolochnaya - sandy. Deep and shifting sands hampered the movement of all types of transport.

Approaches to the left bank of the river. The Dnieper in the Soloshino and Perevolochnaya areas is also sandy, requiring the installation of traffic routes for all wheeled loads. In addition, in the Semenka and Soloshino areas, the river valley was swamped in some areas.

5. Between the river Podloznaya and Mishurin Rog, the high and steep right bank of the valley approaches directly to the river itself.

6. Tactically advantageous natural boundaries on the right bank of the river. The Dnieper, which had to be occupied to ensure the development of the crossing, was located 10–15 km from the river.

7. The heights southwest of Derievka and Kutsevolovka and west of Mishurin Rog formed a basin, which, along with its negative aspects in tactical terms, provided sufficient camouflage for the troops crossing the river.

In the crossing zone to the right bank of the river. Only one profiled road, Mishurin Rog-Likhovka, approached the Dnieper. The rest of the roads were country roads, passing through quicksand within a strip of 2–3 km from the coast; to the south of this strip the roads ran in clayey and chernozem soils with steep ascents and descents in numerous gullies.

Along the left bank of the valley, profiled roads approached Grigoro-Brigadirova, Soloshino and Perevolochnaya. There were only paths from the waiting areas to the river. Rolling movement along the river was possible only along parallels to the river. The Dnieper is 5-10 km from it.

8. There were no characteristic bends of the Dnieper River in our direction.

9. The materials needed for the construction of piers and bridges were located 10–15 km from the river (...).

a) in the Semenka area - 4 pontoons of the N2P fleet of the 19th separate motorized pontoon-bridge battalion;

b) in the Soloshino area - 4 pontoons of the N2P park of the 19th separate motorized pontoon-bridge battalion;

c) in the Perevolochnaya area - 6 A-3 boats of the 8th engineer brigade.

Crossing the river Dnieper forward detachments

Decision of the commander of the 37th Army

The commander of the 37th Army decided:

force the river Dnieper by units of the 92nd and 62nd Guards Rifle Divisions immediately as soon as they reach the river;

make the crossing at dawn on the wide front of Semenki, Perevolochnaya;

to force the crossing, use all the standard transport means available in the army and local materials at hand;

the enemy units landed on the shore to advance in order to occupy, strengthen and defend the bridgehead of Derievka, Kutsevolovka, klkh. Nezamozhnik, southern outskirts of Mishurin Rog;

by all means and means, intensively transfer the main forces of the army and reinforcement units to the right bank.

Decision of the Deputy Commander of the 37th Army for Engineering Troops

Based on the decision of the commander of the 37th Army and personally carried out reconnaissance, the deputy commander of the 37th Army for engineering troops made the following decision:

1. Landing points when crossing the river. Dnepr install:

a) in the Semenka area - through an island with a height of 60.8;

b) in the Soloshino area - through an island with a height of 63.0;

c) in the Perevolochnaya area - on the shallows of the right bank of the river. Dnieper, which is south of the western outskirts of Perevolochnaya.

2. Distribute available transportation means (...).

3. Use improvised means in areas where they are prepared.

4. Distribute newly arriving crossing facilities among crossing points in accordance with the situation and the success demonstrated at them.

Crossing the river Dnieper forward detachments

The advanced units of the 92nd and 62nd Guards Rifle Divisions by 15:00 on September 27, 1943 reached directly to the bank of the river. Dnieper in the areas of Botsula, Soloshino and Perevolochnaya. Units of the 89th Guards Rifle Division and two rifle regiments of the 92nd Guards Rifle Division fought at the Prishib, Salovka, Karpovka line.

The Germans defended the right bank of the river with machine gun and mortar fire from the islands with heights 60.8, 63.0 and from the Mishurin Rog area. The enemy fired targeted artillery fire along the left bank from the areas of Dernovka and west of Mishurin Rog.

Engineering reconnaissance of landing crossing points, bringing forwarding equipment to the waiting areas and preparing crossing means from scrap materials were the task of this day.

Naturally, crossing points were chosen near the starting areas and the starting line that were advantageous for crossing. Engineering reconnaissance of the 116th separate engineer battalion, 62nd and 92nd Guards Rifle Divisions operating at that time reported that in the area of Semenka, Botsula, from where the approach to the river was hidden forest area, convenient landing and ferry crossing points can be the section of the river opposite the island with a height of 60.8; in the Soloshino area, favorable crossing points are located opposite the island with an altitude of 63.0 and downstream on the section of the river to the mouth of the river. Sneaky. These points were approved by the army command for sending forward detachments across the river. In Soloshino, rifle regiments of the 62nd Guards Rifle Division, under the leadership of sappers, began to prepare rafts for 3-5 people from available timber.

The tactical situation required the immediate start of crossing the river. Dnieper, and in the hands of the chief of the army’s engineering troops there were no crossing facilities necessary to carry out this task pulled up to the river. Pontoon battalions with their parks, A-3 airborne forces parks of the 8th and 69th armies, having no fuel, stretched along impassable roads after the rains 40-200 km from the river. The commander of the 37th Army, Lieutenant General Sharokhin, who personally made every effort to concentrate transport equipment for the troops, ordered the provision of fuel to the 19th separate motorized pontoon-bridge battalion, seizing it from some parts of the army. On the night of September 28, 1943, units of the 19th separate motorized pontoon-bridge battalion arrived in Grigoro-Brigadirova and Soloshino with equipment for two 16-ton ferries and 6 A-3 boats with upper structures for landing. This is all the presence of standard transport means, on which the army, ready for battle, began to cross the wide Dnieper.

Tactics subordinates technology. Start crossing the river. Dnieper at 4 o'clock on September 28, 1943 in the Semenki and Soloshino areas; to use 6 pontoons of the N2P fleet, 6 A-3 boats, 8 small fishing wooden boats and 20 rafts from scrap materials for infantry landings - this was the decision of the commander of the 37th Army, which was brilliantly justified during the major operation that unfolded.

At 4:00 on September 28, 1943, 3 pontoons of the N2P park, having 50 landing troops each, rowed to the northeastern shore of the island with a height of 63.0 and 6 A-3 boats with machine gunners and riflemen began to cross the Dnieper heading towards the mouth R. Sneaky.

The first flight passes in complete silence. Troops from 3 pontoons and a second voyage landed on the island. In a short and swift battle, the guards of the 62nd Guards Rifle Division destroy a reinforced company of German combat guards, who overestimated the inaccessibility of the river and underestimated the offensive capabilities of our troops. But the beginning of the forcing is already known to the enemy. Enemy mortar and artillery fire is open on our left bank and along the river itself, although the morning fog prevents it from being targeted. The masking of silence no longer matters; To speed up the boost, the pontoons switch to motorized motion. Our artillery also entered the battle, suppressing previously detected enemy firing points.

The crossing on the A-3 boats is going well. Successfully chosen embarkation and disembarkation points were hidden from enemy observation by the high banks of the river. His artillery and mortar fire on the area of the left bank and along the river at this point was ineffective.

By 12:00 on September 28, 1943, the 127th engineer battalion with a fleet of A-3 airborne forces arrived in the Perevolochnaya area and launched 6 landing boats, and then one 3-boat ferry. By 20:00 on September 28, 1943, this third landing crossing point transported two rifle battalions and part of the regimental and 45-mm artillery to the right bank. At the same point, 8 wooden local boats, found in the Perevolochnaya area, operated.

By the end of September 28, 1943 - the first day of crossing the river. Dnieper - the 128th Rifle Regiment and two battalions of the 184th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 62nd Guards Rifle Division were transported to its right bank. Overcoming enemy resistance, our units reached the lake line. Liman, mark 72.0, mark 40.4, lake. A ledge that is 1 km northeast of Mishurin Rog. On the night of September 29, 1943, the crossing of the river by units of the 62nd Guards Rifle Division at Soloshino and Perevolochnaya continued at an intense pace. All available transportation facilities were put into operation. 186th Guards rifle corps, who began the crossing at nightfall, used up to 20 units for the crossing. rafts made from scrap materials. The rafts, which were difficult to control on the water, were carried away by the river current up to 2 km. Further crossing on them was also impractical because the return flight of the rafts for the landing party would have required at least half of the people transported on them.

The A-3 fleet of the 69th Army is also starting to work. Ferries on the property of the N2P park are also being introduced to ferry divisional artillery and units of mechanically-powered anti-tank artillery regiments, which were served by the 19th separate motorized pontoon-bridge battalion. The landing crossing point in the Soloshino area was served by the 69th Army Engineer Battalion, and in the Perevolochnaya area the 127th Engineer Battalion worked. The 116th separate engineering battalion was assigned to reinforce the 19th separate motorized pontoon-bridge battalion with personnel, to build loading and unloading piers, equip entrances to them, to carry out commandant service and regulate traffic at crossings in the Soloshino area.

Throughout this area, the enemy conducted continuous intense artillery and mortar fire throughout the night, with the most concentrated fire on the island with a height of 63.0.

By 11:30 on September 29, 1943, the rifle, machine gun and mortar units of the 62nd Guards Rifle Division were completely transferred to the right bank.

The B-type fleet of the 6th separate motorized pontoon-bridge battalion, which was slowly moving on tractor traction, was transferred to automatic traction by Dodge and Studebaker vehicles on 9/27/43 and by 17:00 on 9/28/43 it consisted of 2 half-pontoons concentrated in Grigoro-Brigadirovanka to ensure the crossing of the 92nd Guards Rifle Division. The 112th separate engineering battalion was assigned to the 92nd Guards Rifle Division to strengthen the personnel of the 6th pontoon-bridge battalion, to equip traffic routes, to build piers and carry out commandant service and regulate traffic at the crossing point.

Units of the 92nd Guards Rifle Division fought with the enemy at the line Prishib, Karpovka and approached the crossing points against the island with a height of 60.8 at dawn on September 28, 1943. The enemy discovered the crossing, and after the first voyage on three pontoons of the 19th separate The crossing of the motorized pontoon-bridge battalion had to be stopped, having lost 2 pontoons. Strong machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire from the enemy did not allow the floating craft to appear on the water, and only on the night of September 29, 1943, the crossing in this area continued with the crossing facilities of the 6th separate motorized pontoon-bridge battalion, which continued throughout day 29.9.43

A reinforced enemy rifle company defended the island with a height of 60.8. The advanced units of the 92nd Guards Rifle Division that landed on this island encountered strong fire resistance. One pontoon with a landing party at dawn on September 29, 1943, in the dark, landed troops directly on the right bank east of the island with a height of 60.8. The fire of this unit along the arm between the island and the shore accelerated the capture of the island by our units. The ford from the island through the arm ensured the withdrawal of our troops to the right bank. By 18:00 on September 29, 1943, two rifle battalions occupied the island with a height of 60.8 and reached the area northwest of height 73.8.

By the end of 9/28/43, the 89th Belgorod-Kharkov Guards Rifle Division cleared the eastern bank of the enemy and from 19:00 on 9/29/43, using 4 A-3 boats and rafts made from scrap materials, began crossing the river. Dnieper in the Koleberda section, (legal) lake. Moldovan and by 24 hours, under heavy enemy fire, had transported two rifle companies to the right bank.

On 9/28/43 the army received 21 wooden boats, and on 9/29/43 18 folding boats, all of which required repairs, and only from the evening of 9/30/43 they were used at landing crossing points in the Soloshino area.

So, the crossing of the river began. The Dnieper at 4:00 on September 28, 1943 in the Soloshino area by units of the 62nd Guards Rifle Division only at two points increased in speed and expanded along the front. At 12 o'clock on the same day, the crossing began at the Perevolochnaya point. The unsuccessfully started crossing by units of the 92nd Guards Rifle Division in the Semenka area yielded success on the night of September 29, 1943. At the same time, units of the 89th Guards Rifle Division, with a lack of crossing means, under heavy enemy fire, crossed with two rifle companies. retained a section of the right bank.

Crossing of main forces and reinforcement units

The suddenness of crossing the river. Dnieper by the advanced units of the army at dawn on September 28, 1943, their strong offensive impulse clearly indicated success, which needed to be developed and consolidated in short time. To speed up the crossing of the main forces of divisions, reinforcements - artillery and tanks - and to establish uninterrupted, ever-increasing supply and evacuation - this is the difficult task of engineering support at this turning point and crisis stage of the operation.

The enemy, providing strong fire resistance to the advanced units of the 89th and 92nd Guards Rifle Divisions and holding Mishurin Rog, counterattacked with infantry units of the 62nd Guards Rifle Division, fighting on the Kutsevolovka line; it was expected that his counterattacks would also be strengthened by tanks.

The army did not have the forces and means to quickly build bridges for the main forces to cross over them, as was usually the case for engineering support for crossing water barriers. It was not expected that these forces and means would be received in the near future. The situation and conditions forced this task to be solved only by using landing and ferry crossings.

Infantry landing crossings

Landing crossing points No. 3 - Soloshino and No. 4 - Perevolochnaya were stabilized as crossing points of the main direction. They worked continuously until commissioning at the same bridge points. The means of crossing were: folding wooden boats, wooden boats that arrived from the front and assembled in the crossing areas, and inflatable boats of the A-3 type.

At the same time, up to 30 landing units were at work at one landing crossing point. At the same time, the front of the landing point reached one kilometer. A rifle regiment was brought to the starting lines, and its rifle battalions were alternately called to the landing points and transported to opposite bank. The pre-made boat breakdown of the landing force, as well as the numbering of the boats, turned out to be impractical, since the boats returning after the landing did not end up at their original dump points, and their capacity was different.

Folding wooden boats enjoyed the greatest advantage among sappers and transporting units over other types of boats. Sufficiently spacious - 10 people with weapons and in the original equipment - quickly moving through the water, even against the current, easily controlled, with a shallow draft, and therefore navigable in shallow waters - these boats made 1.5–2 times more trips along compared to A-3 boats at a lower cost physical strength oarsmen If we add to this their portability during transportation, the greatest ease of carrying compared to all other types of boats, and quick installation working position, then one should only wish to constantly have these boats in the troops - in divisions and in armies.

Light ferries were equipped on two folding boats with improvised materials. While maintaining the positive qualities of the boats, these ferries did a tremendous job at the divisional feeding and evacuation points. These boats should be designed to be as portable as they are. superstructure for two- (and) three-boat ferries.

In addition to personnel and their weapons, the A-3 landing boats transported: heavy machine guns, mortars, 45-mm guns and 76-mm regimental guns. Along the beds, boards were laid under the wheels of the gun, and in the middle of the boat - under its trunk. Operating in pairs, A-3 boats transported the limber and the gun itself in one flight. For loading and unloading guns or gigs on boats, park planks were used as gangways.

The crossing of these guns by boat saved the time of heavy ferries, which transported divisional artillery, vehicles, tanks and horses. The biggest drawback of the A-3 boats is their easy susceptibility to fragments of mines and shells. Such damage to boats is difficult to repair.

At the landing point of crossing No. 3 - Soloshino, more than 60,000 personnel were transported, and at crossing No. 4 - Perevolochnaya - up to 30,000 people (see tables of operation of crossing points).

On some days, the work of the crossing points reached the highest tension. The crews of the A-3 boats made 25 or more flights per day without a shift.

These crossing points were served by army and attached front-line engineering battalions.

Landing crossing point No. 2 - Semenki was served by the 6th separate motorized pontoon-bridge battalion and the 112th separate engineer battalion.

Crossing point No. 1 - Koleberda was served by sappers of the 89th Guards Rifle Division.

Crossed the river Dnieper units of the 89th and 92nd Guards Rifle Divisions in the Uspenskoye and Derievka areas could not build on their success on the right bank. The terrain of the enemy's defense had a clear advantage over the terrain of our units' operations. In addition, the enemy had equipped his engineering defense with a well-thought-out fire system in advance.

It should be noted that in the Uspenskoye and Derievka section the Germans crossed the river. Dnieper from the right bank in 1941; in this direction were their main crossing points for the main forces, and the Mishurin Rog area was their secondary direction demonstrating the crossing.

By decision of the army commander, units of the 89th and 92nd Guards Rifle Divisions that had crossed to the right bank, leaving cover to be replaced by units of the 53rd Army, were withdrawn to their original position on the left bank. Then they were transported to the right bank in the Soloshino and Perevolochnaya areas to develop success in the main direction. Their actions in the directions of Uspenskoye and Derievka had a great positive significance as actions that pinned down significant enemy forces, and this contributed to the development of success in the battle for a bridgehead in the areas of Kutsevolovka and Mishurin Rog.

Results of engineering support for crossing the river. Dnieper in the zone of action of the 37th Army

Having crossed the river Starting on the Dnieper on September 28, the 37th Army fought heavy battles with enemy infantry and tank formations for 18 days to retain and expand the bridgehead on the right bank and held this bridgehead.

The battles for the bridgehead took place at the line that ensured the operation of landing and ferry crossings, construction and guidance across the river. Dnieper 3 bridges.

With the extremely intense work of all the engineering units available in the army, on all available crossing facilities and across bridges, all formations and reinforcement units of the 37th Army were transported to the right-bank bridgehead held by the army troops. By order of the front commander, the 5th Guards Army, 5th Tank Army, 1st Mechanized Corps, 7th Mechanized Corps and two rifle divisions of the neighboring left 7 1st Guards Army (...).

Conclusions on engineering support for crossing the river. Dnieper in the zone of action of the 37th Army

Final conclusions on operational support for crossing the river. The Dnieper in the zone of action of the 37th Army can only be done after an appropriate assessment by combined arms generals of the entire operation as a whole.

For the objectivity of conclusions and assessment of engineering support, one should keep in mind a number of features associated with the actions of army troops and engineering units, which both positively and negatively influenced the progress of engineering support.

The following preliminary conclusions suggest themselves, although they do not claim to be complete:

A. For organizational issues

1. Reinforcement engineering units and transportation facilities began to enter the army with a great delay. As soon as they arrived, they were immediately put into action. The pontoon officers did not know the officers of the rifle units in order to jointly agree on interaction.

In the future, it is necessary to provide engineering units with crossing facilities to troops at least 2 times before the war to reach obstacles. The engineering units assigned to the troops with transportation means must move behind the combat formations of the troops, having their own engineering reconnaissance in the combat formations.

2. The number of crossing facilities to ensure the crossing of a water barrier by forward detachments should be based on the calculation - to transport one rifle regiment to the opposite bank in 30 minutes.

3. The presence in the army of its own transport facilities in the amount of at least one new light fleet and 25 folding boats is dictated by all the experience of the war. In the army's active operations zone, water obstacles are encountered in most cases. Having its own ferry facilities, which will be maintained by army engineering units, the army will be able to frequently train troops and engineer units. The army can store this transportation equipment at a military-technical warehouse.

4. Units of the 37th Army crossed the river. Dnepr on the move, using the heavy transport vehicles of the N2P fleet to throw forward detachments. IN in this case, given the favorable tactical situation and the absence of other transportation means, this decision was undoubtedly correct. In the future, when crossing wide rivers in a similar situation, the use of landing pontoons of the N2P park for the first throw or their commissioning when success is indicated should be considered mandatory. Having a large lifting force and a capacity of 50–60 soldiers, they are very effective for crossing infantry troops.

5. Ferrying means arrived to the army late (if you evaluate and track the changes in the tactical situation at the front during the battle step by step). The arriving equipment was immediately put into work on the gradually expanding forcing front. It was not possible to develop success in the Uspenskoye and Derievka directions. Success was seen in the Kutsevolovka and Annovka directions. Newly arriving crossing facilities were introduced to strengthen crossings in these directions.

The conclusion from this is obvious: when crossing wide rivers on a wide front, it is imperative to have large reserves of crossing means for crossing the main forces, maneuvering these means in the crossing area. Maneuvering heavy ferry parks along the river is very difficult if they are launched. A reserve of materials and crossing property for bridges is required in an amount of no less than 30% of the property and funds that make up the bridge.

6. Insecurity required quantity boats and outboard engines of the army crossing strip should be considered a mistake, which could lead to the loss of the success of the crossing (paragraph 149 of the “Guide to Crossing Rivers” - 1942). When crossing wide rivers, towing boats placed in pontoon units will not be able to ensure the crossing of artillery and reinforcement units. The number of boats and outboard motors for light ferries when crossing wide rivers in the army zone must be counted on the simultaneous lifting by towing means of up to one division of a divisional artillery regiment. Only in this situation can one count on the success of crossing the main forces by ferry (...).

B. Conclusions on the assessment of transportation facilities

1. Folding landing boats showed only positive qualities during the landing crossing of rifle units and in light ferries.

2. The A-3 boats, when crossing a wide water barrier while working under enemy fire, showed only negative aspects: they are poorly maneuverable, without a reserve of buoyancy in the event of bullet, and even more so, fragmentation hits.

3. The N2P park, for all its positive qualities, performed negatively in bridge supports. During bombing or artillery shelling by the enemy, one damaged abutment pulled the entire floating part to the bottom of the river. To avoid this, it is necessary to develop connections between the purlins between the abutments that can be quickly disconnected and release the damaged section of the bridge.

4. Positive aspects were revealed by DMP-42 parks. Easy to operate, they do not sink when damaged by enemy shells and bombs.

Experience in engineering support for river crossing. The Dnieper by units of the 37th Army in the Koleberda, Perevolochnaya sector on the move deserves the most careful and thoughtful study not only by officers of engineering units, but also by officers of all branches of the military.

Deputy Commander of the 37th Army for Engineering Troops, Major General of the Engineering Troops GOLDOVICH

Chief of Staff of the Engineering Troops of the 37th Guards Army, Colonel FOKIN

TsAMO. F. 240, op. 74741с, no. 20, pp. 3-88.

Cited from: Collection of combat documents of the Great Patriotic War.

Issue 30. M.: VNU GSh, 1957. Pp. 48–66.

30. Excerpts from the order of the commander of the 37th Army on the lessons and experience of combat operations of the army troops for the period October-November 1943.

Army troops, having successfully crossed the river. Dnieper, captured a vast bridgehead on the right bank and, together with other armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, are fighting to liberate the southern and right bank Ukraine from the Nazi invaders.

The army personnel showed a lot of courage, perseverance, skill and perseverance in fulfilling the tasks assigned to the army, both during the period of crossing the river. Dnieper, and in battles for the bridgehead.

Army troops passed from the river with fierce battles. Dnieper to the west over 120 km, liberating 205 settlements.

During October and the first ten days of November, the army inflicted heavy losses on the Nazi troops: up to 22 thousand soldiers and officers were killed, 287 tanks, 34 self-propelled guns, 45 armored vehicles, over 70 guns, up to 100 machine guns and much other enemy equipment were shot down and burned. During October and November, our troops captured large trophies: tanks - 53, self-propelled guns - 6, armored vehicles - 2, guns - 71, machine guns - 295, vehicles - 155, shells - 110 thousand, mines - 15 thousand, rifle cartridges - 4200 thousand, gasoline - 210 tons and much more.

But at the same time with the existing successes during the past battles on the right bank of the river. Dnepr, a number of significant shortcomings were revealed in the combat operations of formations, units and subunits of all types of troops, in the organization of battle control, in combat and material support for troops.

The main disadvantages are:

1. Infantry. When attacked, does not comply with the basic requirements of the statutes. The anticipation of the offensive is crowded, there are no rushes. On initial position there was no digging in for an attack, there was no organization of the attack and assignment of tasks to small units, and the infantry was not consolidated on the achieved lines. There is no maneuver on the battlefield. The attack is usually carried out head-on. There is no desire to reach the enemy's flank and rear.

The battle formations did not meet the requirements of NKO Order No. 306 of October 8, 1942 and the BUP, Parts I and II, which led to the loss of control of units and units, and to unnecessary losses of people and materiel during the offensive. Target designations, statutory commands and assignment of tasks to soldiers, machine gun crews by squad and even platoon commanders are, as a rule, absent. Soldiers and even commanders do not know their tasks, so they often act blindly. The basic rule has been forgotten: “everyone must understand his own maneuver.”

Infantry firepower, machine guns, anti-tank rifles and small-caliber artillery are used ineptly. Volley fire is not used. Machine gun fire is not used to support infantry. Infantry means of combating enemy tanks are poorly used - anti-tank rifles, KS bottles, anti-tank grenades. (...) Enemy reconnaissance, despite a number of orders and instructions, is poorly organized, especially during the battles near Krivoy Rog on October 20–29, 1943, and, as a rule, is not conducted during the period of attack and pursuit of the enemy. Commander observation of the battlefield is poorly organized.

When organizing pursuit, mobile advance detachments are not allocated. The pursuit is carried out indiscriminately by the entire battle formation without securing the lines, as a result of which the units and formations are stretched, are not kept together in the hands of the commander and are often not ready to repel enemy counterattacks and all kinds of accidents.

3. Tanks. The past battles revealed exceptionally poor organization of interaction between infantry and artillery and tanks. The tanks break away from the infantry and fight on their own. When advancing on the battlefield, they do not maneuver, do not bypass anti-tank areas, do not study hidden approaches, are afraid of hollows and gullies, go to the crests of heights, stop and are shot by enemy anti-tank missiles with impunity.

The battle formations of tank units are built according to a template, without taking into account the nature of enemy actions and the terrain. Reconnaissance of tanks on the battlefield together with infantry is not carried out, as a result of which tanks are blown up in minefields and suffer losses from enemy artillery fire, due to bad organization interaction tanks are not accompanied or supported by artillery. NPO Order No. 325 dated November 16, 1942 is not being implemented.

I ORDER:

1. Commanders of formations and units should study the experience and lessons of the battles for the capture and expansion of the bridgehead on the right bank of the river. Dnepr and draw appropriate practical conclusions.

Explain to all personnel, within the required scope, the shortcomings and positive aspects of past battles. Conduct debriefings and classes (during a lull in the battle) with officers of all ranks on specific materials from the battles.

2. Decisively improve the organization of interaction between military branches in all types of combat.

Artillery of all calibers supplied for direct fire should be no further from the front edge: 45 mm PA - 300 m, 76 mm DA - IPTAP and 122 mm - 500–800 m; guns for direct fire should be placed in groups under the command of the artillery chiefs of rifle regiments or division commanders.

From the book The Struggle of General Kornilov. August 1917–April 1918 [L/F] author Denikin Anton Ivanovich

Chapter XI Military reforms of Kerensky - Verkhovsky - Verderevsky. State of the army in September, October. Occupation of Moonsund by the Germans After Kornilov’s speech at the head of the War Ministry, Kerensky appointed Verkhovsky, whom he had promoted to general, and headed

author Egorov Dmitry

6.2. Actions of the troops of the 3rd Army south of Grodno Several times I have seen in the literature a mention that after crossing the Neman, part of the forces of the 3rd Tank Group was turned south to support units of the 9th Army leading an attack on Grodno. To be honest, I believed it myself.

From the book 1941. The defeat of the Western Front author Egorov Dmitry

7.1. The end of active operations of Soviet troops on the Augustow Canal. The introduction of a cavalry-mechanized group into battle. The actions of the troops of the left flank of the 3rd Army south of Grodno. Early in the morning, the 213th Regiment of the 56th Infantry Division suddenly broke through to the Neman near the village of Gozha.

From the book German-Italian combat operations. 1941–1943 author Moshchansky Ilya Borisovich

Battle of Tunisia Fighting in North Africa (November 8, 1942 - May 12, 1943) After the defeat of the French Republic in July 1940, control over the North African colonies of this country, including Tunisia, was exercised by the collaborationist government

author Goncharov Vladislav Lvovich

ACTIONS OF THE 2ND UKRAINIAN FRONT IN SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1943