War Log
Western Front
for the month of June 1941
Store "permanently" for years
"Declassified"
Entry act N: 7357
"8" 11 2000
Chr. funds (signature)
USSR MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
Operations Department of the Western Front Headquarters
War Log
for the month of June.
Fund 208
inventory 2511
N: cases 206
boxes 6028 (crossed out) 5556
Started June 22, 1941
Completed June 30, 1941
on 73 sheets
=====
/Cover/
Secret
copy N: 2
WESTERN FRONT HEADQUARTERS
Stamp 1: Headquarters Operations Directorate
Belarusian Military District
Entrance. N: 002296
"28" October 1946
Stamp 2: Headquarters Operations Directorate
Belarusian Military District
Inv. N: 392
MILITARY ACTION
June 22, 1941. Around one o'clock in the morning in Moscow, an encrypted message was received with an order to immediately put troops on combat readiness in case of a German attack expected in the morning.
At approximately 2–2.30, a similar order was issued to the armies in code; units of the SD were ordered to immediately occupy the SD. At the signal "Thunderstorm" the "Red Package" was put into effect, containing a plan for covering the state border.
Encryptions from the district headquarters to the army headquarters were received, as it turned out, too late. The 3rd and 4th armies managed to decipher the order and make some instructions, and the 10th army deciphered the warning after the start of hostilities.
By the beginning of the war, the troops of the Western Special Military District occupied the position:
District headquarters in Minsk. Commander of the district troops, Army General Pavlov, deputy. commanders Lieutenant General Boldin I.V. and Lieutenant General Kurdyumov. Chief of Staff of the District, Major General Klimovskikh. Air Force Commander, Aviation Major General Kopec. Pom. com. troops for universities, Major General Khabarov, for the Urals, Major General Mikhailin, for air defense, Major General of Artillery Sazonov. Head of the Operations Department, Major General Semenov, Deputy. beginning headquarters for the rear, Colonel Vinogradov. Chief of Communications Major General Grigoriev, Chief of Eng. troops Major General Vasiliev, chief of artillery Major General Klich.
Storm 3 – Grodno. Commander-3 Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov Chief of Staff, Major General Kondratyev.
The army included the 4th sk - shtakor Grodno, the corps commander, Major General Egorov, and the corps chief of staff, Colonel Chizhik.
56th Infantry Division in the Porechye region. Division commander, Major General Bondovsky.
27th Infantry Division in the Augustow area. Division commander, Major General Stepanov.
11th MK headquarters in Volkovysk. Corps Commander Major General tank troops Mostovenko. Chief of Staff Colonel Mukhin.
29 TD, which had about 200 T-26s in Grodno. Division commander Colonel Studnev.
33 TD (understaffed) in Sokolka.
204th Motorized Rifle Division (understaffed) in Volkovysk.
7 anti-tank art. Ruzhanstok brigade.
11th garden - Lida.
10th Army - Shtarm Bialystok. Army Commander Major General Golubev. Chief of Staff, Major General Lyapin.
1st sk – headquarters of the Bialystok corps. Corps commander Major General Rubtsov F.
Wreed. Nashtakora Colonel Sokolov.
2nd Infantry Division in the Osovets area. Wreed. Division commander Colonel Dyukov.
8th Infantry Division in the Staviski area. Division commander Colonel Fomin.
5 sk - corps headquarters in Belsk. Corps commander Major General Garnov A.V. Chief of Staff Colonel Bobkov.
13th Infantry Division - in the Zamirov area. Division commander, Major General Naumov A.Z.
86th Infantry Division in the Tsekhanovets area. Division commander Colonel Zashibalov.
113th Infantry Division - in the Semyatichi area. Division commander, Major General Alaverdov.
6 cavalry corps - headquarters of the Lomza corps. Corps commander Major General Nikitin I.S. Chief of Staff Colonel Pankov.
6 cavalry division in the Lomza region. Division commander, Major General Konstantinov.
36 cd. – in the Volkovysk region. Division commander, Major General Zybin.
6 mk - Bialystok headquarters. The corps commander is Major General Khatskilevich. Chief of Staff Colonel Koval.
The hull was fully equipped with KV and T-34.
4 td – Bialystok. The division commander is Major General of Tank Forces Potaturchev.
7 td – Khoroshch. Division commander, Major General Borzilov.
29th Motorized Rifle Division - on the eve of the transition from Slonim to the Bialystok area. Division commander, Major General Bikzhanov.
155th Infantry Division - in the Baranovichi region. Division commander, Major General Alexandrov.
9 garden in the Bialystok area. The division commander was Aviation Major General Chernykh (the division had over 200 MIG-3s). The equipment was concentrated at field airfields in the area of Seburczyn, Wysoko-Mazowiecki, and Bielsk.
13 microns - (completely understaffed, located in formation stages).
Belsk Corps Headquarters. Corps commander Major General Akhlyustin.
25 td – in the Lapa area. 31 TD in the Botsky area.
208 hell in the Gainovka area.
6th anti-tank brigade in the Mikhalovo area.
4th army. Shtarm Kobrin. Army commander, Major General Korobkov. Chief of Staff Colonel Sandalov.
The army included: 28 sk - headquarters of the Brest corps. Corps commander Major General Popov. Chief of Staff Colonel Lukin.
49th Infantry Division in the Vysoko-Litovsk area. Division commander Colonel Popsuy-Shapko.
42nd Infantry Division in the Brest Fortress. Division commander, Major General Lazarenko.
75th Infantry Division in the Maloryt area Division commander, Major General Nedvigin.
14 mk - headquarters of the Kobrin corps. Corps commander Major General Oborin.
22 td (actually only 29 tbr) to Brest.
30 td (actually only the former 32 tbr) in Pruzhany.
205th Motorized Rifle Division in the Kartuz-Bereza area.
10 garden in Pruzhany.
13th Army (newly formed department).
Shtarm – Mogilev. Army commander Lieutenant General Filatov. Chief of Staff Brigade Commander Petrushevsky.
44 sk - corps headquarters moved from Smolensk to Minsk. Corps commander divisional commander Yushkevich. Chief of Staff of the Corps Colonel Vinogradov.
64th Infantry Division from Smolensk by railway. transported to the Minsk region. Division commander, Major General Mavrichev.
The 161st Infantry Division completed its march from Mogilev to Minsk in marching order. Division commander Colonel Mikhailov.
47 sk - was supposed to move from Bobruisk to Obuz-Lesna (Baranovichi region), but managed to send only part of the headquarters and corps units. Corps commander Major General Povetkin. Chief of Staff of the Corps, Major General Tikhomirov.
121st Infantry Division moved from Bobruisk to the Obuz-Lesna area. Division commander, Major General Zykov.
143rd Infantry Division was transported by rail. from Gomel to Byten district. Division commander, Major General Safronov.
55th Infantry Division - Slutsk. Division commander Colonel Ivanyuk.
20 micron (newly formed, without materiel), headquarters of the Borisov corps. Corps commander Major General Nikitin. Chief of Staff Colonel Dubovoy.
26 TD - Minsk, 38 TD - Borisov, 210 MRD (former 4 KD) - Osipovichi.
21 sk from Vitebsk was transported to Lida. Corps commander Major General Borisov. Chief of Staff, Major General Zakutny.
50th Infantry Division in the Dunilovichi area on the march from Polotsk to the Krevo area. Division commander, Major General Evdokimov.
The 17th Infantry Division completed the march in marching order from Polotsk to the Lida region. Division commander, Major General Batsanov.
The 37th Infantry Division completed its concentration from the Lepel-Vitebsk area to the B. Solechniki, Voronovo area. Division commander Colonel Chikharin.
24th Infantry Division in the Molodechno region. Division commander, Major General Galitsky.
2 speed The corps headquarters was returning to Minsk from an exercise in the Bialystok region. Corps commander Major General Ermakov. Chief of Staff Colonel Pairn.
100th Infantry Division - Minsk. Division commander, Major General Russiyanov.
17 MK (newly formed without equipment) headquarters of the Baranovichi corps. Corps commander, Major General of Tank Forces Petrov. Chief of Staff Colonel Bakhmetyev.
27th Infantry Division - Novogrudok, 36th Infantry Division - Nesvizh, 209th Motorized Rifle Division - Ivye.
4th Airborne Division (7, 8th and 214th Airborne Brigade) – Pukhovichi. Corps commander, Major General Zhidov. Beginning headquarters Colonel Kazankin.
8th anti-tank brigade in Lida.
3 ak (42, 52 ad DD) in the Smolensk area. Corps commander Colonel Skripko.
12 bad in the Vitebsk region.
13 dbad – Bobruisk. Division commander, Major General
43rd – Mogilev region.
59 IAD (newly formed) 184 IAP in Machulin (Minsk).
Troops were pulled up to the border in accordance with instructions General Staff Red Army.
No written orders or instructions were given to the corps and divisions.
Division commanders received instructions orally from the district chief of staff, Major General Klimovskikh. It was explained to the personnel that they were going to big exercises. The troops took with them all training equipment (devices, targets, etc.)
At 4.00 22.6, the district headquarters began to receive continuous reports, mainly from the air defense system, about bombings.
(4.00 22.6, Combat report of Shtarm 3 N: 2/OP and Shtarm 10 N: 1)
At 4.00 22.6 German units opened artillery fire on our troops located near the border. At 5.00 we went on the offensive along the entire front.
Two squadrons of German aircraft bombed the mountains. Grodno.
At 4.00 the city of Brest was bombed.
(4.10 Kobrin, air defense point, Air Defense Control)
Our I.A. is fighting in the Karolin area (3 km southwest of Grodno).
On 5.25 Lida was bombed by two groups of aircraft (one group of 2 aircraft, the second of 3).
At 4.30 the town of Volkovysk was bombed by one plane.
At 4.30 the wire connection with the 3rd, 10th and 4th armies was broken.
According to a report from the air defense department
At 4.00 - 4.30 the Belsk company air defense post was defeated, there were casualties.
4.00 – 4.30 the Borisovshchizna airfield (Volkovysk village) was bombed.
At 6.37 one DO-17 bombed Lida, dropping 5 bombs from a high altitude. Bombs fell outside the city...
A passenger train was destroyed in Lida.
INFORMATION FROM THE NEIGHBOR – AT 4.00 – 4.30
Lutsk, Dubno and Beretskovo were bombed (transmitted through the company post Pinsk (at 7.07, German troops crossed the border of Western Ukraine).
At 7.40 KOVO in the areas of Sarny, Lvov, Chernovitsy, Pinsk there is a mass flight of aviation.
7.00 – 8.00 enemy tanks in the Tsiekhanovets area (observation of aviation). Com. troops instructed the Air Force - bomber regiments to bomb enemy tanks.
7.55 one DO-17 bombed the railway. Lida.
8.10 30 planes bombed Kobrin.
6.00 bombed and shot at. Novy Dvor airfield was hit by heavy fire.
8-30 transmitted from GRODNO - the army headquarters has been destroyed. A city without protection. There is no connection. Grodno asks for help from Minsk. 6 raids were carried out in groups of 32 aircraft. DO-17 and Misserschmidt took part in the raids.
8.25 a.m. 17 troops were dropped east of Bialystok.
At 8.20 - 8.30 Kobrin was bombed by 40-48 aircraft.
Yu-87 bombed a military town and a railway station. from a dive. One enemy plane and one ours were shot down.
At 8.40 1 DO-17 was transmitted over Slonim.
9.00 – Novoselki, Sopotskin, railway bridge. Grodno is burning from the bombing.
8.50 – Pinsk reported that German planes are heading towards Minsk. Height, quantity unknown.
9.00 – Communication with Kobrin is restored.
9.45 – 9 fighter aircraft took off from the Loshitsa airfield to patrol Minsk.
9.45 – 4 planes drop bombs over Grodno.
9.51 – over Baranovichi 1st development. 3AD is firing.
9.56 – 9 planes bomb Pinsk airfield.
9.30 – communication with Grodno was restored for a few minutes.
10.01 – 30 planes bomb Lunno.
10.13 – 9, 10, 11 garden repels attacks on instructions from the commander of the Army Air Forces.
13 Bad bombs tanks in the Tsiekhanovets area. One bap bombs Suwalki. Another regiment is coming to continue.
10.13 – NP N: 0413 – Shundra Course 210 altitude 1700. One DO-17.
At 10.25 enemy ground troops approach Lipsk. Our people are leaving.
10.30 – Lipsk is occupied by the enemy.
At 10.41 in the Grodno-Chernikov area a large group of planes bound for Kyiv.
10.55 – communication with Grodno is restored.
10.40 21 bombers bombed Grodno.
11.05 over Grodno separated by 20-30 s
Planes bomb Grodno at intervals of 2-3 meters.
3A fires. Our aviation is not involved.
11.10 – Radio contact has been restored with Shtarm 10.
11.20 – Radio communication is established with the NW and 10th armies.
12.00 – The railway is destroyed. Grodno bridge.
12.05 – Lida Airfield 9 aircraft. DO-17s are bombing.
12.00 – Near Khoza 15 km village. Grodno motor-mechanical parts.
13.00 – Pinsk. During 2 enemy air raids, 14 aircraft were burned. Several vehicles have tank holes, but the P-2s are all intact. 2 people were killed, approx. wounded. 10 people. (Major Altovich)
12.50 – Vitebsk. 9 unknown airplanes. Course – 90.
4 ARMY. (Military report of Headquarters-4 N: 05) By 10.00, army units (49 and 75 Rifle Division) continued to enter the defense areas.
The garrison of the Brest fortress - 42 and 6 infantry divisions - suffered heavy damage from enemy aviation and artillery, as a result of which the 6th infantry division was forced to give up Brest in battle by 7.00 on 22.6, and scattered units of the 42nd infantry division are gathering at the Kurneshe, Velke, Cherne line (450 infantry rifle divisions with 472 ap in the Zhabinka, Korolin, Khvetskovichi area) And they put themselves in order. The enemy is superior in the air. Army air regiments have heavy losses (30-40%).
The headquarters in KOBRIN was destroyed. The chief of staff of the army, Colonel Sandalov, gave the order:
a) 28 sk - to prevent further advance of the enemy towards Zhabinka.
b) 14 MK - consisting of 22 and 30 TD, concentrating in the Vidomlya, Zhabinka area to attack the enemy in the Brest direction and destroy him along with 28 IC and 10 Garden and restore the situation.
205 MSD, remaining in place, throw one joint venture on the river. Mukhovets (southwest of Zaprudye) (covering the direction to Kartuz-Bereza).
Shtarm fl. Bukhovichi. Moves to Zaprudye.
Around 13-14 o'clock the beginning. of the operational department of headquarters 3 A, Colonel Peshkov reported:
“8.00 units of Major General Sakhno (56th Infantry Division) fought in the Lipsk-Sopotskin area.
At 9.00 the enemy captured Sopotskin "Lipsk. At 10-11.00 our units retreated in the general direction of Grodno. The latest information is that the battle is going on in the north of Gozha.
To eliminate the breakthrough, at 9.00 military unit 1822 (29 TD), Colonel Studnev was tasked with eliminating the enemy’s breakthrough, striking in the general direction of Sopotskin, together with Major General Sakhno.
The units of Major General Stepanov (27th Rifle Division) fought at the Augustow-Graevo line at 7.30 - 8.00.
The units of Major General Bondovsky (85th Infantry Division) occupy the river line with one regiment. Lososno in the Grodno, Belany sector, his second regiment in the Malakhovichi, Gibulichi area. Artillery regiment at 11.00 on the move to Svisloch to Khlistovichi, there is no information about the third regiment (85th infantry regiment).
Enemy aircraft systematically bomb Grodno and headquarters, carried out a large raid on the airfields of Korolin, Grodno, Novy Dvor, Sopotskin, Lipsk and other fire points.
An airborne force of unknown strength was dropped in Martsekanets.
At the turn of Sopotskin, fl. Egorka enemy infantry is not numerous. The enemy uses mass artillery. fire in interaction with aviation. The numbers of the enemy regiments have not been established."
13.54 (Air defense station Shafransky). Enemy troops landed in the Bryansk area. They are shelling Bielsk from artillery. The number of troops has not been established.
14.07 (Order from Nashtakor to the commander of the 3A communications delegate)
To Commander 3A
2. How many of which opponents and where.
Where is MK and the result of the attack of Studnev’s division.
3. Use anti-tank artillery against tanks. brigades.
4. Contact 10 A and report the position on its front; the use of Khatskilevich depends on this.
What is the supply of ammunition and fuel?
Klimovsky.
14.15 Commander 4 A
“The military commanders ordered the units that had broken through to be decisively destroyed, for which purpose, first of all, use Aborin’s corps. Regarding the delay, be guided by the “red package.” Use aviation together with mechanical units.
I pay exceptional attention to maintaining communication (Radio, VNOS posts, delegates on airplanes).
Inform every 2 hours. I place responsibility for this on you.
Establish contact as a delegate with Golubev and tell him to report the situation at the front using all means available to him."
14.57 (Environment [outside] Air Defense Post) 12.00 15 DO-17 bombed Grodno.
13.20 2 four-engine DO-19 bombed Grodno.
13.58 air battle over Grodno 2 ME-110 with 1 P-154 [there is information that this is a U-2 manager. N: 0147, registered 14.3.1941 (RS 6) - http://aviaforum.ru/threads/samolet-p-154.28316/page-2 ]. 1 P-154 shot down. The fate of the pilot is unknown.
14.52 (Environment of VNOS post) – NP N: 0708 up to 16 bombers heading 90 over Stolpce.
15.07 (aka) over Lida heading 180 60-DO-17.
(Telegraph report from 29 TD) At 12.00 the columns of 29 TD reached the high line. 188 1/2 km west. Naumovka, Lobno, Ogorodniki.
According to intelligence information, infantry is advancing from the Markov area to Golynka to a battalion with tanks and from the Bogatory Lesne area to Selno to a tank battalion with infantry. The enemy is fighting with UR units.
29 TD continues to complete the assigned task.
(Combat Report N: 1 Station 85-Sola).
Card 100,000 – stand-85.
The 141st joint venture went on the defensive at the front at the mouth of the river. Lososna, edge of the forest in the south. Noviki.
Reconnaissance is being carried out in the direction of Sopotskin, Golynka. 4 people were injured.
OP 223 gap in the area once. Lososna.
103 sp occupies the grove southeast. Gnoynitsa, Malakhovichi. Conducts reconnaissance on Novy Dvor. 3 killed, 14 wounded.
59 joint ventures are concentrated in the southern forest. Sacret, the regiment has one and a half company left, two machine guns. The rest are on guard duty, protecting the bridge.
2/59 joint venture - guarding Shtarm-3.
(B/report 85 SD N: 1). In the Dmitrovka area, our ZA shot down an enemy bomber, and our reconnaissance aircraft was shot down near a bridge in the Soly area.
14.15 (Around the post. VNOS) - Kobrin was set on fire by bombing.
On April 16, 10 airborne troops were dropped in the Velke-Berestowica area.
16.10 (By telegraph Colonel Sandalov NSh 4 Army). By 15.00 6th Infantry Division was withdrawing from Brest to Zhabinka, the enemy forces in front of it were not established.
By 12.00 42nd Infantry Division was in the area of Kurnitsa, Velke-Cherniavtsa. The corps commander had orders to cover the gap between the corps and the 49th Infantry Division. I have no information about the situation of the latter.
75th Infantry Division headquarters in the same location - Maloryto. I have no clear information about the position of the parts.
22 td 15.00 Zhabinka.
30 TD Vedomlya came out.
The 22nd TD was preparing a counterattack in the Brest direction. I have no results.
205 md area Zaprudye, Kartuz-Bereza is preparing the rear line of the river. Muchovets.
We change point 1 km..... I have contact with the headquarters of Oborin and Popov by radio, armored cars and cars.
17.00-17.10 (RO Samoilovich) an airborne force of 1000 people landed in the Raduţ, Nacha area (data not verified).
One regiment of IA and B. aviation was sent to liquidate the landing.
19.15 Communication with Pinsk was restored.
19.17 (air defense environment). 5 and 15 zen. District air defense batteries fired at 4 XE-111s.
At 19.25 radio contact with Bialystok was established.
19.27 (VOSO controller Afanasiev) 30 enemy aircraft flew from Volkovysk to Baranovichi.
On the way, at the Voitekhevich junction, a train with the families of command personnel was broken up.
17.40 Kartuz-Bereza was bombed.
19.23 (Air defense post outskirts) Volkovysk NP was defeated by a raid by three groups of enemy aircraft.
19.23 (Environment of air defense post Shafransk). 50 DO-17s bombed a cement plant and the Ross airfield. The airfield was completely destroyed. From the same planes, at 19.37, troops landed in Nov. Dvor (numbers not determined).
19.23 An ammunition depot in Russia was blown up.
20.54 10 DO-17s bombard Slonim.
21.29 34 bombers and 20 fighters go to Volkovysk.
At 8-9.00 the Pinsk flotilla in full force goes to Brest.
In the area of Zelva, Mezherechye landing of 50 people.
There are no enemy aircraft in the Johannisburg, Treuburg area. Troops too. The southern outskirts of Suwalki are destroyed, the northern outskirts are on fire. Slonim is bombed.
21.26 – Pruzhany 40 bombings. 150 fighters to Volkovysk and Slonim.
21.35 – Ruzhany Course 90, 20 bombers.
Mihali east Pruzhany course 60 many planes.
21.40 bombing of the Pruzhany airfield by XE-111.
22.25 6 bombers are bombing over Bobruisk. FOR open fire, one enemy plane was shot down.
23.05 5 bombers from Bobruisk went at a course of 150.
00.10 Volkovysk NP N: 1153 course 90 German bombers are continuously passing.
24.00 the enemy intensively bombs the station. Oranges.
(Operational report of Shtafront N: 1)
By 17.00, units of the Western Front, conducting holding battles, retreated to the line: Kelbasin, Dabrovo, Osovets, Graevo, Kolno, Lomzha, Petrovo, Chizhev village, west. Belsk.
3rd army. Army units withdrew by 17.00:
The 56th Infantry Division fought with one regiment south of Khoza, with motorized infantry in front of it. The second regiment fought with enemy infantry and tanks in the area of Naurkovich, Bokhareti; third at 9.00 - at the Lipsk, Dabrovo turn.
According to the report of Army Commander-3, the division almost does not exist.
The 85th Infantry Division occupied defense along the eastern bank of the river. Lososna in the Grodno, Belany sector, having one regiment in the Malohoviche area.
At 13:00 the 27th Infantry Division was defending at the Augustow-Grayevo line. No more recent data was available.
The 29th TD attacked in the direction of Sopotskin, stopped the enemy offensive and by 13.45 was fighting in the Lobny-Ogorodniki area.
Headquarters in the forest south of Putryshka.
The 10th Army conducted holding battles throughout the day and by 17.40 occupied the front of Goyondz, Osovets, Nova-Ves and presumably Vasosh, Maly-Plonsk, eastern. river bank Narev, st. Snyadovo, Prosyanitsa, Chivev-Sutki, Kuchin s.v.m. Tsekhanovets.
......
(Missed for now)
......
CONCLUSION
As a result of nine days of stubborn fighting, the enemy managed to invade our territory to a depth of 350-400 km and reach the line of the river. Berezina.
Main and best troops The Western Front, having suffered heavy losses in personnel and equipment, found themselves surrounded in the area: Grodno, Gainovka (*), formerly. state border. Individual detachments and groups managed to escape from the encirclement; the most numerous of them were the 155th, 143rd and 24th Infantry Divisions. Small groups and individuals emerged from the remaining formations. At the border of the river Berezina and to the south only the following came out with heavy losses: 50, 100, 161, 64, 108, 143, 155, 56, 75 – SD, 20 and 14 MK, 4 VDK and small remnants (up to 1000 people)
=====
* - the city of Gainovka in 1941 was in the Brest region south of Bialystok, approximately halfway from Bialystok to Brest. Nowadays Hajnówka is in Poland, part of the Podlaskie Voivodeship.
On the map the area "Grodno, Gainovka, former state border" looks like this
(circled in blue): 
– Approx. zhistory.
/67/
24, 6 and 42 sd. All units required reorganization and replenishment.
A characteristic feature of the German attacks was their rapid advance, not paying attention to their flanks and rear. Tank and motorized formations moved until their fuel was completely consumed.
The average rate of German advance in the first five days was up to 60 km per day. And for the entire period from 22 to 30.6. inclusive up to 45 km per day. The immediate encirclement of our units was created by the enemy with relatively small forces allocated from the main forces, which struck in the directions: Alytus, Vilna, Minsk and Brest, Slutsk, Bobruisk.
The German offensive was so rapid that it did not make it possible to properly organize defense and provide strong resistance on the lines of the Minsk and Slutsk UR.
The second characteristic feature is the active and fierce actions of aviation and small landing detachments in deep rear areas and communications with the aim of paralyzing the control and supply of our troops operating at the front.
The enemy concentrates almost all of his available forces in the directions of the main attacks, limiting himself to insignificant units in other directions or even having no forces there at all, but only conducting reconnaissance.
In the fight against our aviation, enemy aircraft concentrated their main efforts on attacks on airfields, reaching our aircraft there.
During the 9 days of the war, the Western Front Air Force lost: 1,358 aircraft, of which 679 were destroyed by the enemy at airfields.
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Western Front
Lieutenant General _____ (Malandin)
Senior assistant to the head of the Operations Department
Major _________ (Petrov)
Appendix: Composition of ZAPOVO troops at the beginning of the war (6/22/41) (*)
Right: ________ (*)
Otp. 3 copies
copy N: 1 – General Staff
copy N: 2-3 – in the affairs of the Operations Department
print. Mulyarzhevich.
=====
* - Added in pencil – Approx. zhistory.
/69/
(Map on sheet 1 - “The position of the troops of the Western Front on the first day of the war.”
On the zhistory website there is a detailed resolution - the “weight” in jpg is about 2 MB).
COMPOSITION OF THE TROOPS OF THE ZAP. OVO AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR (22.6.41)
4 sk (56, 85, 27 sd);
11 microns (29, 33 TD, 204 motorized rifle division, 7 tank brigade)
__ (33 TD and 204 MSD not equipped.)
11 garden
==========================
TOTAL:
ex. sk - 1,
sd - 3
ex. mk - 1,
td – 2 (one is not complete)
MSD – 1 (not complete)
garden – 1
1 sk (2, 8 sd)
5 sk (13, 86, 113 sd)
155 sd
6 kk (6, 36 cd)
6 mk (4 td, 7 td, 29 msd)
13 MK (25, 31 TD, 208 MSD)
__ (Under development)
9 garden
==========================
TOTAL:
ex. sk -2,
SD – 6
ex. kk – 1,
cd – 2,
ex. mk - 2,
td – 4 (two not formed)
msd – 2 (one not formed)
garden – 1
28 sk (49, 6, 42, 75 sd)
14 microns (22, 30 td, 205 msd)
__ (22 and 30 TD - not fully staffed)
10 garden
==========================
TOTAL:
ex. sk - 1,
sd – 4
ex. mk - 1,
TD – 2 (not staffed)
msd – 1,
garden – 1
Directorate of the 13th Army.
44 sk (64, 161, 108 sd)
47 sk (121, 143, 55 sd)
21 sk (50, 17, 37, 24 sd)
2 sk (100 sd)
20 mk (26, 38 td, 210 msd) (Without hardware)
17 microns (27, 36 ID, 209 MSD) (Without hardware)
4 VDK (7, 8, 214 VDBR)
8th brigade
3 ak (42, 52 ad DD)
12 bad
13 dbad
43 yad
59 yad
==========================
TOTAL:
ex. Arm. - 1,
ex. sk - 4,
SD – 11
ex. mk - 2,
td – 4 (Without hardware parts),
MSD – 2 (Without hardware parts),
vdk – 1,
ptbr – 1,
ex. ak – 1,
hell dd – 2,
bad – 1,
dbad – 1,
iad - 2
==========================
Total:
ex. Arm. - 4,
ex. sk - 8,
sd – 24
ex. kk – 1,
cd – 2,
ex. mk - 6,
td – 12 (nine in the formation stage),
MSD – 6 (four in the process of formation),
vdk – 1,
garden – 3,
ex. ak – 1,
hell dd – 2,
bad – 1,
dbad – 1,
iad – 2
All 8 belonged to the 4th Field Army of Field Marshal Hans Günther von Kluge and made up the 7th, 9th and 13th Army Corps. It was on the southern (left) flank of the army that the Germans achieved their greatest success on the first day of hostilities. When the 113th was badly damaged during the first strike - from air raids and artillery fire rifle division was collected and brought into relative order, its units moved to the north-west to take up defense in accordance with their plan for covering the state border. Despite seriously injured, Divisional Commander Major General Kh. N. Alaverdov showed composure and will. He was a competent, trained commander, who shortly before the war graduated with honors from the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army. But a few hours later, on the march, his division was suddenly attacked in the flank by the advanced units of the 9th Army Corps of the Wehrmacht (corps commander - Lieutenant General Geyer). We had to deploy into battle formation under extremely unfavorable conditions. 113th suffered brutal defeat and, as a single organism, ceased to exist. Its individual detachments continued to fight the enemy on the southern edges of Belovezhskaya Pushcha for several more days. Having crushed and dismembered the Soviet division, the vanguard of the 9th Corps moved further and reached the line of the Nuzhets River. There he was stopped by units of the 13th mechanized corps of General P.N. Akhlyustin and the 9th railway brigade of Major V.E. Matishev, who deployed for defense. There are no other details of the defeat of the 113th, there is only some data on the command staff. Missing: Deputy division commander for combat units, Colonel Ya. I. Goncharov, chief of staff, Colonel K. V. Kiryushin, chief captain N. N. Demidov, head of the 2nd department, captain M. K. Kishkin, chief of communications, Major N. S. Kretov. Also known: Deputy. commander for political affairs, regimental commissar P. M. Novikov, commander of the 679th Infantry Regiment, Major K. K. Dzhakhua, political officer of the same regiment, battalion commissar Novikov, commander of the 725th Infantry Regiment, Colonel M. V. Tumashev, commander of the 451st Light Artillery regiment major V.V. Ignatiev, deputy. commander of the 513th joint venture, Major Kh. E. Murzakaev. A.G. Korotkevich from the 679th regiment recalled that the 3rd battalion was in the Tsekhanovia region in a fortified area and then retreated to Belsk. According to P. G. Polynsky from the 725th Regiment, the 1st Battalion, in which he served, was in the Siemiatyche area and was bombed at dawn on June 22. At 4 o'clock a single plane arrived, saw the light (the cooks were already preparing breakfast) and launched a bomb attack. He killed all the cooks, smashed the boilers and kitchens. Everyone jumped up, quickly dressed, and took apart their rifles. There was panic until the commanders came running; they reported that Germany attacked the USSR. The commanders led them to an ammunition depot 2 km from the camp, but they were only halfway there when the depot blew up. All that was left was what was available: three clips per rifle, one disc per handbrake. At the Bug they dug in and took up defensive positions and had orders not to shoot. Planes flew overhead to bomb Brest. The battalion commander (surname lost) sent Polynsky to the regimental headquarters to find out the passwords and the location of the regiment's assembly. He walked through ravines and burning rye, under fire. There was no headquarters at the old location; there were only a few people, “lighthouses.” They asked which battalion they were from and ordered me to sit until the morning. He returned and reported everything to the battalion commander. We stayed until midnight, then moved east, towards Brest.
General move fighting on the Western Front
On the morning of June 25, in the Kartuz-Bereza area - the battalion found itself in the zone of the neighboring 4th Army - there was a big battle. P. G. Polynsky was seriously wounded in the arm and leg; the leg was later amputated. On the morning of June 26, he crawled and looked for something to eat. Someone in a soldier's uniform approached him, introduced himself as a political instructor, and asked which battalion he was from. He called the number, the “political instructor” replied that their commander was wounded in the stomach and taken prisoner. He advised him to surrender himself, and then went east. Private Polynsky was picked up by the Germans on the battlefield and handed over to the infirmary of a prisoner of war camp in the Grodno region. I saw my battalion commander, who was actually wounded in the stomach, but the officers were kept separately.
The arrested Army General D. G. Pavlov, speaking during interrogation about the first hours of the war, also said that, as the head of the operational department of the headquarters, Semenov, reported to him, “in the Semyatiche area, the communications battalion of the 113th division was caught and surrounded by the enemy.” There is also information about an artillery battery of the 513th Infantry Regiment, which held the defense near the town of Berezino for four days. The battery commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant S. M. Zhuravlev was shell-shocked and captured in an unequal battle. After reading about Berezino, I was somewhat surprised. The town is located approximately 80 km west of Minsk, where the Minsk-Mogilev highway crosses the Berezina River. Where is the Bug and where is the Berezina? But it turned out that the command of the troops defending the capital of Belarus organized a formation point in the town of Cherven to assemble combat-ready detachments from the residual groups of the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies that reached the Minsk region. In particular, artillerymen from the 444th Corps Artillery Regiment (4th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Army) ended up there. As cadet of the 1st training battery F.F. Ipatov recalled, after the battles on the Neman River, their unit, which had lost all its equipment and crossed the river on timber rafts, reached Minsk. During the retreat, they picked up an abandoned 45-mm anti-tank gun. The commandant of the city, subordinate to the head of the Minsk garrison, Major General I. N. Russiyanov (commander of the 100th Order of Lenin Rifle Division), sent them to Cherven, from where they left to defend the bridge in Berezino. I. T. Loganov from the 27th Infantry Division remembers that on June 26, on the Berezina, their group joined the Russiyanovsky formation. It is also known that the commander of the 4th Airborne Corps, Major General A.S. Zhadov, having an order to hold the Berezin with its militarily important bridge, managed to allocate for this only the 7th Brigade and the 3rd Battalion of the 214th brigades. There were clearly few forces, and the corps commander subjugated all the troops that were gathering on the Berezina. In the area of the bridge, he set up a barrier that stopped all military personnel leaving for the river and directed them to strengthen the defense. Soon, from these disparate groups and just single fighters, a consolidated regiment was formed, subordinate to the command of the corps. This fact was also noted in the operational report of the front headquarters No. 16 dated July 3, 1941: “In the Berezino area, five battalions were formed from groups and individuals leaving the front, which occupied defensive areas along the eastern bank of the river. Berezina". Therefore, it seems quite likely that the regimental battery and some other units from the 113th division could, after retreating to the east and a short respite, take up defensive positions on the Berezina and fight as part of General Zhadov’s group of forces. It was also established that Major Murzakaev at the end of July led the 407th regiment of the 108th division, which defended Minsk and broke out of encirclement; Colonel Tumashev commanded the 444th regiment of the same division, and became a general on November 2, 1944; In August, Major Ignatiev was listed in the command reserve of the Western Front; on July 11, 1945, he was awarded the rank of major general of artillery. But these facts do nothing to clarify the actions of the 113th Division on the first day of the war.
4.2. 86th Infantry Division
To the northwest of the breakthrough site was the defense sector of the 86th Infantry Division. The situation there was also difficult, although not so dramatic. West of Zambruv (the headquarters of the 5th Corps was located in the city), the 169th Infantry Regiment (commander - Major M.S. Kotlov) defended the position of the 64th UR with two battalions. The position of the infantry in the afternoon was somewhat eased by the 124th GAP RGK (commander - Major Divizenko), which was transferred to the subordination of the chief of artillery of the corps, Major General G. P. Kozlov. The rapid fire of four heavy divisions on concentrations of enemy troops caused him significant damage. In the area of the border railway station Chizhev, the 330th Infantry Regiment occupied the defense. The beginning of the war found him on the march from the Zambrów area, where divisional exercises had taken place the day before, to his summer camp near Ciechanowiec. According to the former political instructor of the 7th company A.I. Klimoshin, combat mission they were given a deputy on the go. division commander, regimental commissar V.N. Davydov. The regiment had to make a forced march to Chizhev and deploy on the Zaremba - Chizhev - Smolekhi section. The 3rd battalion (commander - Captain Ananyev, deputy for political affairs - senior political instructor Dotsenko) had the task of taking up defense in the Zaremba - Koscielne area, if possible using nine unfinished pillboxes of the 64th UR. Also on the move we received new PPD submachine guns and cartridges. The UR position in the Zaremba area was occupied by the Germans. At 8 o'clock the 330th regiment counterattacked the enemy on the move; Several attacks in attempts to restore the situation did not produce results, since the infantry did not have any fire support, and the losses turned out to be serious. The 3rd Battalion dug in about 500 m from the pillboxes and began to dig in. The Germans, of course, did not stop there and tried to continue the offensive, knocking down Soviet units from their occupied line. They launched three attacks with the expectation of an external effect - psychic, like those famous shots in the film "Chapaev". Chains in full height, sleeves rolled up, rifles at the ready, non-commissioned officers' machine guns at their hips. All attackers were killed by heavy fire from hand weapons and heavy machine guns; The commander of the machine gun platoon of the 7th company, a participant in the Finnish campaign, Shavrov personally “worked” for the 1st number of the crew. Having left dozens of corpses in front of our trenches, the German troops stopped their attacks. Political instructor Klimoshin does not remember what happened next: in one of the counterattacks, he was seriously wounded in the chest, penetrating the lung, and was out of action for five months.
In cooperation with the 109th reconnaissance battalion, the border commandant's office and border outposts, the 330th joint venture stopped the enemy's advance in the Zaremba-Smolekhi sector. In his report, his commander, Colonel S.I. Lyashenko, reported that a border outpost and a regimental school were fighting in the village of Nur, since the rifle regiment of the left-flank 113th division had not yet arrived. The 1st battalion of the regiment has an elbow connection and interacts with the battalion of the 169th regiment. At 11:30, after a lengthy artillery barrage, the enemy, with the forces of the 7th and 23rd divisions of the 7th Army Corps with attached tank units, went on the offensive in the center of the defense sector of the 330th regiment, broke through its front edge and began to develop an offensive in the direction of Chizhev . He sought to bypass the battalion junction of the 64th fortified region to capture the city of Chizhev, cut the Zambruv-Chizhev-Tsekhanowets rockade and go to the rear of the Soviet troops.
Tsekhanovets is located on the left tributary of the Western Bug - the Nuzhets River - southeast of the railway. Chizhev station. Despite the fact that the headquarters of the 86th Red Banner Division with special forces was located in the town, it itself was located in the defense sector of the neighboring division. At the beginning of 1941, M. A. Zashibalov’s formation changed its deployment area, giving way to the 113th Infantry Division, but the control remained in the same place. Now we had to improvise with the defense of Tsekhanovets. Until the arrival of the 113th SD regiment, it was to be protected by the regimental school of the 330th regiment, the headquarters units of the 86th division and its 96th separate battalion communications. So, at least, the division commander set the task to the head of the school through his deputy regimental commissar V.N. Davydov. When he returned, he reported that unit banners, party documents, and secret records had been sent to Minsk. The regimental school has 420 active bayonets with six “maxims” and is fighting the enemy advancing from the towns of Drokhichin and Nur. On that day, most of the cadets, the head of the school, Major Minasov, and his deputy, Senior Lieutenant Deev, died in fierce battles. Deev's wife Fatima with her one-year-old son was in position and also fired at the enemy, like many other wives of commanders. The 113th regiment, which was entrusted with the defense of the Tsekhanovets covering sector, did not arrive and could not complete its task, since the division itself suffered heavy losses and was unable to provide any organized resistance to the enemy. But this turned out to be late in the evening; and the division learned about the fate of the regimental school only on June 23.
But there is a second version of the events that took place in the Tsekhanovets area. At 03:30, the Germans began artillery preparation, and aircraft launched strikes on border settlements. The village of Shepetovo, where the command and headquarters of the 88th border detachment and the barracks of the 248th light artillery regiment were located, was subjected to a particularly heavy artillery and air raid; the regiment itself was located in Chervony Bor. The enemy's mobile groups rushed in the directions Malkinia-Gurna - Chizhev, and panic began in Ciechanowiec. The division headquarters officers, together with their wives, left in vehicles in the direction of the town of Bransk. In the palace, the former estate of Count A.V. Suvorov during his service in Poland, and then the estate of Count Stazhensky, where the headquarters was located, a fire broke out, during which the documents and the division's Banner were burned. N. S. Gvozdikov recalled: “Tsekhanovets was burning... A “frame” continuously flew over the headquarters, correcting the firing of the German artillery. The shells landed closer and closer to the division headquarters. It exploded near the pond. The sculpture standing there flew into the air. Here the shell exploded in courtyard, the column supporting the balcony collapsed. The editorial machine and the printing house with a lorry rushed into the forest.”
No attempt was made to evacuate secret documents regional department of the NKVD, some of which were then dismantled by local residents (these documents are in the local museum in the restored palace building). Attempts to remove weapons and ammunition from warehouses ended in failure - the vehicles were fired upon and destroyed. There were many wounded in the city, who were placed in the church and in the cemetery area, where sanitary stations were organized. They were unable to evacuate the wounded; they were captured and subsequently taken by the Germans to a prisoner of war camp. Left without a fight, Tsekhanovets was occupied by a small detachment of the enemy, about thirty scooter riders, who arrived from the direction of the village of Nur at about 10 o’clock in the morning. The head of the school of the 330th joint venture, together with his deputy, destroyed some of the documents, loaded the rest onto a cart and, together with cadets, border guards and Red Army soldiers from the 64th fortified area numbering up to five hundred people, began to retreat in the direction of Shepetovo and crossed the Tsekhanovets - Chizhev highway. In front of the village of Trynishi-Moshevo, leaving the forest, the detachment found itself in an open clearing; further retreat was blocked by a German barrier of up to half a hundred people with machine guns. During an attempt to break through to help the barrier from the village of Boguty, 2 km from Tryniši, a column of vehicles with infantry, supported by several units of armored vehicles, approached. By evening, every single one of the Soviet soldiers was dead; The head of the school, his deputy and other commanders, having destroyed documents and being in a hopeless situation, shot themselves. In 1990, after discovering the burial site, the Poles installed a birch crosses; On November 28, 1991, the burial was opened, the remains of Soviet soldiers and officers were transferred with all honors to the military cemetery in Zambrów.
The position of the 86th Division was significantly complicated by the fact that it could not provide strong fire resistance to the enemy, since its artillery was still on the march from the Chervony Bor training ground. Yes, according to former commander 2nd Battalion 383rd howitzer regiment retired lieutenant colonel I. S. Turovets, his unit moved along the route Snyadovo - Zambrów. During the passage of the control column through Zambrów, a hitch arose - someone threw a grenade into the back of the lead vehicle from an upper floor window, and several soldiers were killed and wounded. Outside the city, the division was awaited by the division commander M. A. Zashibalov and its former artillery chief M. G. Boykov (member of the Council of Nationalities Supreme Council THE USSR). Colonel Boykov received a new assignment before the war (presumably, the command of the 108th division of the 44th corps) and came from Vyazma to get his things. But since the newly appointed chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel B.I. Volchanetsky, left for exams at the Academy, he assumed his previous position. The officers clarified the task to the division commander and allocated him three truckloads of ammunition. On the road, halfway to Chizhev, the artillerymen met the 3rd battalion of the 169th regiment. His commander, Senior Lieutenant V.D. Popov, was completely at a loss and did not know what to do. On the advice of Senior Lieutenant I.S. Turovets, the infantry deployed on both sides of the road and began to dig in.
Town and railroad station Chizhev, to which the 2nd Division was heading, had already been under artillery fire for several hours, was heavily destroyed and engulfed in fires. The tractors with guns turned off the road towards the border. Shooting thundered ahead: there was a fierce battle going on. Continuous attacks German troops with difficulty, with only machine guns, he held back the thinned battalion of the 330th regiment. His commander asked to break the bridge over the Brok River. But before the artillerymen had time to fire even one salvo, the captain, assistant chief of staff of the 383rd Civil Aviation Regiment, arrived and assigned them a new task. The division was reassigned to the acting the commander of the 284th Infantry Regiment, who came from Shepetovo, from his winter quarters, to Major M. M. Danilov. At approximately 16:00 on June 22, howitzer batteries deployed in an area where the enemy showed almost no activity. Only on the morning of June 23 did they detect and suppress an enemy battery by flashes, and then, together with the 284th Regiment, repelled an infantry attack.
The low activity of the Germans in the sector of this regiment against the backdrop of heavy fighting in other parts of the division may have the following explanation. After the enemy broke through the defenses of the 330th regiment and advanced to Chizhev around noon (possibly later), the 284th Infantry Regiment reached the Andzheevo area, took up defense there and prepared for a counterattack in the direction of Prosenitsa, Dombrova, Zaremba and the village of Nur. After this, units of the 330th and 284th regiments counterattacked the flank of the enemy units that had broken through and tried to push them back beyond the state border, but to no avail. It is not clear why the howitzer division did not support the infantry with fire. It is possible that there was no close combat contact with the enemy, since in front of the regiment’s front, the remnants of the 330th units that survived in the area where the defense was broken through may have been fighting. It also remains unclear where the 2nd battalion of the 330th joint venture was located and why it did not fight. The 1st number of the machine gun crew, I. I. Yakovlev, still asks a painful question: “... I still don’t understand why our battalion lay on the defensive all day and did not go into battle?”
By 19 o'clock in the evening, the 2nd battalion of the 169th regiment retreated to the prepared front line of the Prosenitsa battalion center of the 64th UR. The 1st battalion occupied its previous position in the area of the Zalesye distillery, the 3rd battalion moved from the Zambruv-Chizhev road to the right, to the Shumovo area, to the 2nd echelon. The 284th joint venture was withdrawn from the battle to the 2nd echelon of the division to the line: the western outskirts of Andzheevo - Yablonovo - Mrozy. After 19 hours in front of the front of the 86th Division, the Germans stopped the offensive and temporarily went on the defensive. Since the main line of defense was more or less covered, the division command had to take care of its left flank, behind which the German units that had broken through into the depths of the defense of the neighboring 113th division were advancing. Only the right decision It would be possible to bend the flank; the most suitable line of defense in this place was the Nuzhets River. But at 21:00, the corps commander, Major General A.V. Garnov, said by telephone: Major Ivanov had left for the division with an order to leave their positions from 23:30, retreat across the Narev River and take up a strong defense there. The battalion commanders of the OPABs of the Zambruvsky fortified area approached the commander of the 330th regiment with a request to take them under his command. With the consent of the division commander, the Urov battalions were included in the 330th joint venture without disbandment, as separate units. The pillboxes that had weapons were blown up by divisional sappers; however, as we were able to establish, due to a communication breakdown, the garrisons of some pillboxes did not receive orders to withdraw and remained on the border. A.G. Nizov from the 12th artillery battalion recalled that communication with the battalion headquarters was interrupted immediately, and there was no communication between the pillboxes either. “The advanced units of the Germans, of course, immediately went forward, but still we caused them a lot of losses... Through the PDN periscope it was visible how, literally in a marching manner, the Germans were moving deeper and deeper into our territory, and there was no way to fire at them - they were marching outside the firing range of our pillbox.” Only on June 27 did the garrison leave its pillbox and, together with the border guards (they were joined by part of the personnel of the commandant’s office of the 88th border detachment, headed by its chief of staff, Senior Lieutenant Shepelenko), moved east.
The situation in the Tsekhanovets area and the fate of the units remaining there remained unclear to the command of the 86th division. Colonel M.A. Zashibalov ordered the head of the 2nd department of headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel I.I. Aleksandrov, to go to Tsekhanovets and withdraw all survivors, including the teams of military camps, along the Shepetovo - Surazh route. Upon arrival at the division, Major Ivanov briefly familiarized the officers with the situation. From him we learned about heavy losses suffered by the 113th Infantry Division.
4.3. Right flank
1st Rifle Corps
On the right flank of the 10th Army, where there was a junction with the 3rd Army (the Shchuchin-Sokulka demarcation line), the 42nd Army Corps of the 9th Army of the Wehrmacht, commanded by Lieutenant General Walter Kunze, acted against the Soviet troops. The first day of fighting of the 1st Rifle Corps is reflected in the operational report of its headquarters. From the document, which was in the German archive as a trophy, it is clear that parts of the corps fought holding battles near the border, and were relatively successful. However, the 8th Infantry Division (commanded by Colonel N.I. Fomin) did not have time to occupy the forward position of the fortified area, as did its right neighbor, the 239th Regiment of the 27th Division. It was also indicated that the corps headquarters had no contact with the headquarters of the 10th Army either by telephone or radio. In addition to the report compiled at 19:00 on June 22, the following can be reported. The headquarters of the 8th Infantry Division was attacked by enemy aircraft at dawn, but its functionality was not affected. As the head of the 4th division of the headquarters, M.A. Mamchenko, recalled, the head of the operational department, Captain Makarov, organized the issuance of orders to units to withdraw them to the foothills of the fortified area, the division commander and the headquarters operational group, led by his chief, Lieutenant Colonel M.A. Kontsev, went to the troops . The headquarters workers who remained on site were busy evacuating documents.
The most fierce fighting broke out in the sector of the 310th Infantry Regiment of the 8th Division. One and a half kilometers southeast of the town of Kolno, where the 310th joint venture was stationed, there was an unnamed height dominating the surrounding area (150 m above sea level). Having received the order to speak, the acting The commander, Captain B. Ya. Popov, decided to deploy the regiment in the area of this height. The defense was occupied by the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the regiment, an artillery battery, a regimental school and a training company. TO army units units of the 2nd commandant's office of the 87th Lomza detachment of the NKVD border troops, led by the commandant of the site, Captain Biryukov, joined. M.V. Chekotov recalled that a company and commandant platoon of the 202nd engineer battalion joined the infantry and border guards. The battalion was subordinate to the 72nd UNS, with which it was transferred to western border from the 1st Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army(OKDVA). According to Chekotov, their unit was located on the edge of a small forest 5–6 km from Kolno, with a unit of the 310th regiment on the right and a border post on the left. Somewhere in the same places there were pillboxes of the 92nd OPAB of the Osovets fortified area, commanded by Lieutenant Kiselev. The buildings of the regimental headquarters and commandant's office in Kolno, barracks and stables were destroyed and set on fire by enemy artillery fire. The border guards sent two reconnaissance groups towards the border. One of them is under the command of Deputy. Political instructor Nikiforov, moving towards the village of Chervonnoe, collided with a group of German motorcyclists. In a short battle, the scouts destroyed 8 enemy soldiers and died. The second group, led by Sergeant Ivanov, conducted a search in the direction of the village of Zabelye. She also entered the battle, but managed to return to her location. According to intelligence data, up to two infantry regiments with artillery and two tanks were moving from the border in two directions - from the west along the Myshinets-Kolno highway and from the northwest along the Vincent-Kolno highway. Having allowed the enemy to approach about 300 m, the infantrymen and border guards opened fire. The enemy was taken by surprise and failed to deploy into battle formation. Having lost dozens of soldiers and officers killed and wounded, the Germans retreated beyond Kolno. An hour later, after putting things in order and regrouping, the attack was repeated. The battle was fierce; separate enemy groups infiltrated the city, but were destroyed.
The German command brought fresh units to Kolno and intensified the onslaught. An hours-long bloody confrontation began. The Germans rushed forward, but were driven back by the fire of cannons, battalion and company mortars and small arms. It is unknown where a wedge heel appeared on the battlefield. With bursts from a large-caliber machine gun and flamethrower salvos, it greatly pleased the Red Army soldiers, but soon it was hit right through by a shell and burst into flames. The actions of the 310th regiment were supported by the 62nd light artillery regiment (commander - Major V.N. Prokofiev), which was not at the training camp in Chervony Bor. The defenders of Kolno successfully repelled two attacks. The third followed from the front and flanks with the support of tanks. Three vehicles broke through to our trenches. The fire from the regimental battery cut off the infantry, and the deputy commandant, political instructor Gorin, got close to one of the tanks and blew it up with a bunch of grenades. Another four tanks were disabled by artillerymen and infantrymen. Attacks from the flanks failed. The border guard foreman of the commandant's office Charcot distinguished himself. Having quietly made his way to the German position, from which their gun was firing directly, he destroyed the gun crew with machine gun fire, and then disabled the gun with a grenade.
The sun had already passed midday, but the intensity of the violent confrontation did not subside. Kolno changed hands several times. The German command intensified attacks, and the regiment's resistance was broken. Many soldiers were captured, and the wounded were run over by tanks. The remnants of the 310th joint venture again retreated beyond Kolno, to the line of an unnamed height. But at 17 o'clock its 1st battalion (battalion commander - senior lieutenant A.E. Kamenev) returned to the regiment. As mortarman I.P. Reshetilov recalled, despite the acute shortage of ammunition, the enemy’s advance was stopped. Returning from the Chervony Bor training ground, at noon the 1st battalion immediately attacked the advanced enemy infantry units, drove them out of the village of Rakovo and a few hours later approached Kolno. However, the further advance of the battalion was stopped by heavy fire from the town. As battalion commander Kamenev himself wrote, the companies suffered heavy losses, company commander-2 Sikorsky was killed, and company commander-3 Zhdanovich was seriously wounded. By order of the battalion commander, the infantry began to dig in in the field in front of Kolno, preparing to drive the enemy out of Kolno with a night attack and restore the border line in the area. On the evening of June 22, the chief of staff of the regiment, Major I.N. Novikov, arrived at the battalion; on behalf of the corps commander, he ordered to stop the attacks and withdraw the units to Kozhenista. The regiment's headquarters was located in the Borkovo area. Again there were many wounded, but this time they were saved. From the village of Kozheniste, the Poles took everyone by horse-drawn transport to an evacuation hospital, from where they were transported by rail to the east, to the city of Orel, where the “Dzerzhintsy” (the division was named after the first Chairman of the Cheka) were placed in a hospital named after MOPR.
The battle for Kolno lasted ten hours. More than an infantry regiment was put out of action (according to Soviet data). The border guards lost 32 people killed, wounded and missing. Data on the losses of the 310th regiment are not known. During a lull, the border guards again sent out a reconnaissance group. When she returned, she reported that Soviet troops had abandoned Lomza, and the detachment headquarters had retreated to Bialystok. Soon the order to withdraw came from there. The “Green Caps” began to carry it out, while the infantry remained in their positions.
A tense situation also developed on the right flank of the 1st Corps. The situation was complicated by the clearly unfortunate location of some units, which was poorly aligned with the outline of the demarcation line between the 3rd and 10th armies. It turned out that some units of the corps divisions (regimental school of the 200th joint venture of the 2nd division, 229th joint venture of the 8th division, etc.) were located in the zone of the 3rd Army. The enemy struck along the Graevo - Osovets line on the Graevo - Shchuchin front, captured unoccupied pillboxes near Graevo and by 8 o'clock overcame the resistance of the 239th regiment of the 27th Infantry Division. The regiment, part of its forces, retreated in disarray into the zone of the 10th Army. With the first artillery shelling Soviet territory Great damage was caused to the 229th Infantry Regiment (commander - Major V.V. Pridachin), whose barracks were located in the town of Shchuchin. Only the training company and the machine gun platoon, located in a summer camp closer to the state border, were not damaged. An eyewitness wrote: “The shelling has already ended. The barracks were finished, everything turned into a pile of bloody stones... Not far from the ruins, the few who managed to jump out when the shelling began were sitting right on the ground. Some of them were in underwear, with bandages through which blood stains appeared. However, it wasn’t the blood that struck me, but their eyes... I later saw people like that after a heavy bombing or heavy fire. This special eyes people who have not yet understood whether they are in the next world or, miraculously, in this one.” The cadets, together with the machine gunners, moved to support the border post, but did not have time: the shooting on the border died down. Having taken up defensive positions, they destroyed a German reconnaissance group of scooters, approximately 50 riflemen, then, being outflanked on both flanks, retreated to the east. But the regiment, having taken a position in the fortified area (the corps headquarters probably made a mistake in thinking that the entire 8th division was late in occupying the forefield), repulsed enemy attacks and retreated by order only the next day - June 23.
The main forces of the 2nd Infantry Division (acting commander - Colonel K.P. Dyukov) by the morning of June 22 were in the area of the Osovets fortress. The 261st Infantry Regiment and the 59th Reconnaissance Battalion blocked the Graevo - Osovets road in the area of Ruda. During the day, the division prepared defense along the line of the Bobr River, mainly on the line of the Osovets fortress position, and entered the battle on June 23, when units of the 27th Infantry Division, unable to hold on to the border, retreated towards the Sokolka station - also across the Bobr River. In particular, the 200th joint venture (commander - Major G.D. Mavrin) occupied a position in the area of the Lomzhinsky redoubt: the right flank was the Osovets fortress, the left flank was the bend of the Bobr River, the distance along the front was 6 km. In the afternoon, two divisions of the 75th GAP of the 27th division retreated to the fortress, Colonel K.P. Dyukov ordered to give them ammunition and food. At 14:00 a new massive raid was made on Osovets, which lasted more than an hour. After its completion, the artillery moved to the Ruda area and southeast of the village of Penchikovo, where it began to equip firing positions to support the retreating units of the 239th Infantry Regiment. The 261st regiment included fighters and commanders of the 92nd OPAB of the Osovets UR, who had withdrawn from the border; Lieutenant V.A. Kiselev of the regiment commander, Major A.S. Solodkov appointed platoon commander of a machine gun company. Only late in the evening did the 164th Light Artillery Regiment (commander - Colonel Radziwill), which had suffered heavy losses from air attacks, approach the fortress. The students of the Frunze Academy, by order of the higher command, left Osovets and went to Moscow to complete their studies, among them was the then unknown senior lieutenant D. A. Dragunsky. Colonel Dragunsky ended the war in Berlin as commander of the 55th Guards Vasilkovskaya Brigade of the 3rd Tank Army and, despite his short stature, took part in the Victory Parade. After the war, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General of Tank Forces D. A. Dragunsky was the head of the Shot course and, concurrently, the Chairman of the Soviet Anti-Zionist Committee.
After enemy aircraft burned the town of Vizna, the headquarters of the 1st Corps moved to a pine grove across the Beaver River. When General F.D. Rubtsov arrived from the 8th Division, Chief of Staff Colonel A.M. Sokolov informed him of the lack of communication with Osovets and army headquarters. Rubtsov attached his note to the operational summary prepared by the headquarters. In it he informed the army commander about strong impact enemy aviation and the lack of air defense systems (Golubev left the corps 176th anti-aircraft division in Bialystok) and approached him with a request to allocate two flights of fighters in the morning of June 23 to cover the bridges in Wizna and Strenkova Góra. At the end he wrote: “The 262nd KAP, due to lack of tractors and vehicles, left 12 guns in Krasny Bor. Please provide assistance. We have been fighting all day to contact you, but to no avail.” This note, together with the operational summary, was sent in a package to the headquarters, along with it (it is not clear, however, how and when) got to the Germans and is now stored in TsAMO under one inventory number: fund 353, inventory 59087, file 2.
Experienced in the matter of “encircling and destroying,” the German command concentrated its attack units on the flanks of the Bialystok group. If the left wing of the 10th Army was broken through almost immediately, the divisions of the 1st echelon of the 3rd Army suffered severe losses, trying to stop the advance of a much superior enemy, then at the very tip of the ledge the situation was much calmer. There, in a strip of over 70 km (from the swampy floodplain of the right tributaries of the Narev in the north to the Bialystok-Warsaw highway in the south), the 221st Security Division and barrage “ersatz” units advanced, or rather imitated the offensive of large forces - albeit with the support of tanks and aviation. It must be admitted that they did this very plausibly, which misled the opposing Soviet troops and their command. All day on June 22, these small detachments pinned down the 13th Division of the 5th Rifle Corps and the 6th Chongar Kuban-Tersk Cavalry Division along with the corps command in the area from Ostrow-Mazowiecki to Novogrud. In the zone of the 151st Infantry Regiment of the 8th SD (regiment commander - Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Stepanov) only 2-3 enemy battalions operated. The Wehrmacht generals believed that soon after the start of hostilities, Russian troops would leave an area inconvenient for defense. Bialystok salient without a fight, so the big surprise for them was the fierce resistance on all, even secondary, sectors of the front. “The reasons for such enemy actions are not clear,” wrote the Chief of the German General Staff, General Halder, in his diary. The head of reconnaissance of the 8th division, Major Krugol, in a BA-10 armored vehicle of the 2nd reconnaissance battalion, assisted in repelling attacks at the border outpost adjacent to the division headquarters. Units of the 13th Infantry Division of Major General A.Z. Naumov successfully held the border line, despite the fact that on the evening of June 21, all regimental and battalion commanders left for Bialystok for a meeting and returned only when the fighting was in full swing. The only exception was battalion commander 2 of the 119th Infantry Regiment, Senior Lieutenant Kovalev, whose unit was building fortifications. The 229th joint venture, reinforced by the 130th corps artillery regiment, held the defense side by side with several squadrons of the 6th cavalry division of General M.P. Konstantinov. M. M. Dzhagarov recalled: “The artillery duel of our divisions with enemy artillery, which began in the afternoon, continued until late evening... The enemy brought more and more military units into battle. Attacks by motorized infantry and tank units followed one after another. Aircraft in flights, squadrons and air detachments constantly hovered over our positions. But not a single tank, not a single soldier in a dark helmet and gray-green uniform broke through into our battle formations". The corps' 47th separate instrumental reconnaissance artillery division (commander - Captain A. M. Savvanovich) made a great contribution to the excellent performance of the artillerymen. But for the sake of objectivity, it must be clarified that full-fledged artillery support appeared among the infantry of the 8th division only in the afternoon. While the 130th corps and 117th howitzer artillery regiments, under continuous air attacks, struggled to make their way from Lomza to the north, the rifle units suffered heavy losses, repelling attacks mainly with the fire of light cannons from regimental artillery and mortars. As P.V. Pavlov pointed out in his memoirs of the PNSh of the 117th GAP, the regiment returned to the division only in the evening of June 22. Thus, by the end of the day on June 22, the 1st Rifle Corps managed to solve the problem of containing the enemy near the border.
4.4. Center
6th Cavalry Division
The westernmost tip of the Bialystok salient was a triangle with the city of Lomza in the center of it. In the Lomza direction, part of the forces of the 87th Infantry Division (from the north-west) and units of the 221st Security Division (from the south-west) crossed the state border of the USSR. In the combat report of the headquarters of the 10th Army No. 1 at 10:05 it is written: “Tanks appeared from the direction of Ostroleka towards Lomza... the enemy bombed Lomza and forward airfields.” In these places, by the morning of June 22, there were very significant forces of the Red Army, which, however, did not have a single command: the 6th Cavalry Division, the right-flank units of the 13th Infantry Division, the garrisons of the armed pillboxes of the Osovets UR; a large amount of artillery was concentrated in Chervony Bor. At the Tarnovo site, not far from the Rouge (Rus) River, the entire 129th was located fighter wing, at the airfield 5 km from Lomza - two I-16 squadrons of the 124th regiment. Also at the summer camp near Lomza, the well-equipped and equipped 106th Motorized Regiment of the 29th MD of the 6th Mechanized Corps met the war. Directly near the border there were outposts of the 87th border detachment of the NKVD troops. Subsequently, the 106th MP departed to the north, near Grodno; The divisional artillery regiments dispersed to their formations, the RGK artillery regiments followed them.
Having suffered relatively minor losses from air strikes, the 6th CD concentrated in the Gelchinsky forest, which is located on the northern slope of the Chervonobor ridge. Her 38th communications squadron, with difficulty squeezing through the crowded carts and those simply hastily leaving Lomza local residents the main street of the town, I arrived here. Having deployed the RSB radio station mounted on the chassis of a three-axle GAZ-AAA, which was attached to the stand, the radio operators began exchanging encrypted radiograms with an unknown correspondent. At first everything went fine. The first radiogram went on the air at 08:25. The answer was read by the division communications chief, Major Grusha, and the division commander, Major General M.P. Konstantinov, who approached. Then they left, apparently to give orders, and returned after some time. There was no answer to the second call (either the code was changed, or the radio “at the other end” was bombed). Senior Sergeant Z. P. Ryabchenko, who was on shift, caught a TASS broadcast in microphone mode: “The General asked to turn it up louder in a fallen voice, at exactly 12:00 Comrade Molotov spoke and announced to consider the Soviet Union in a state of war with Germany, that’s when we found out about the beginning of the war. The general and the major said goodbye to us, and said in parting that “it will be very difficult for you, sons, this war will be like no other war.”
The former chief of staff of the 94th North Donetsk Cavalry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel V. A. Grechanichenko, recalled that they received an oral order from the division commander with the following content: to take up defense at the line railway Lomza - Paws and do not allow the enemy from the side of Ostroleka and Zambrów. At approximately 10 o'clock, the 94th Regiment (commander - Lieutenant Colonel N.G. Petrosyants) was the first to come into contact with the enemy; a shootout ensued. Soon, units of the 48th Beloglinsky Kuban and 152nd Rostov Terek Cossack regiments of Lieutenant Colonels Rudnitsky and Belousov approached the battlefield. The 48th CP took up defensive positions on the right flank of the 94th regiment. I.E. Shcherbina, a former private in the sapper platoon of the 152nd Cavalry Regiment, wrote: “On June 22, 1941, at five o’clock in the morning, we were given a combat alarm to the sounds of bombs and shells exploding; it was the Germans who were shelling our military targets. And so we went to take up firing positions to protect our borders from German troops. And when we got to the river, the bridges there had already been blown up, then the divisional and regimental sappers quickly built a pontoon bridge, transported all the military units and equipment and took up defense there and held off the onslaught of German troops until late at night, and our units held back this onslaught. And then, when everything calmed down, at night they gave us the command: “On horseback, leave these lines and move to defend the city of Bialystok.”
The Germans' attempt to break through to Lomza on the move was repulsed: the Cossacks dismounted and, taking up defensive positions on a wide front, entered the battle. Despite the seemingly superior enemy forces, they repelled all his attacks, drove back the German infantry with fire and counterattacked with their sabers drawn. Directly near Lomza, the tank squadron of the divisional 35th TP, the 3rd command post of Lieutenant Colonel D.M. Alekseev (to the north) and three squadrons of the 48th and 94th regiments (to the southwest) fought.
From the combat report of the headquarters of the 10th Army No. 1 at 14:40: “The enemy, advancing along the entire front, by 13:30 occupied with infantry Graevo, Marki, Maly Plock, Novogrud, Myastkovo, Khoromany, Naubory, Yasenitsa, lag. Gonsiorovo, Tsekhanovets, Siemiatychi, having tanks in the directions: Ostroleka, Lomza; Brock, Andrzejevo; Lazow, Ciechanowiec.”
In the archives of I. I. Shapiro, I discovered several reports and orders from corps headquarters and division headquarters, rewritten from God knows where, unfortunately, incomplete. As described, probably by the chief of staff of the 6th CD, Lieutenant Colonel G.M. Danilov, the situation in the Lomza area in the first half of the day looked like this (abbreviations corrected):
10.15. 6 KD Gelchin forest, headquarters 6 KD northern outskirts of Gelchin.
48 CP on the left is Zavady, the western outskirts of Poguzhe, the northern outskirts of Gelchin.
94 CP on the right is Zavady, on the left is Gelchin, railway station. Koziki, Chervony Bur tract.
15 Ring Road on the right is Boguszyce, on the left is Sezputy Merki organizing VET.
Prevent enemy mobile units from reaching the Gelchin line, the western outskirts of the villages of Koziki, Sezhputy, and Zagaine.
13.00. Enemy units occupy Maly Plock, Khluzne, Kuzzhia, Novogrud.
Moving from the direction of the Kurte junction.
The 3rd command post on the Murava, Kistalniki line prevents the enemy from reaching the Staviski, Lomza line.
2/35, interacting with 3 CP, does not allow the enemy from the direction of Wlodzhi, Chlyudne to the southeast. The remaining squadrons of 35 TP and the platoon of PTO 94 CP cover the highways Novogrud - Lomza, Ostrolenka - Lomza and Lomza - Snyadovo.
2 and 3/48 with a platoon of heavy machine guns and 2 guns operate in the direction of Vezhbovo, Dembovo, Klechkovo with the task of preventing the enemy east of the river. Rus.
94 CP without 2 squadrons and 4/48 CP in the northwestern and western part of the Gelchin forest.
152 CP - in the forest south of Ro... (inaudible).”
It is presented competently and in detail, one can feel the style of an experienced staff officer, but nothing is said about the activity of enemy aviation. The fact that Lomza did not have significant pressure from enemy ground forces did not mean that the Red Army troops were not subject to air attacks. Luftwaffe squadrons, encountering almost no opposition from the Soviet Air Force, tormented and tormented convoys walking along the roads with impunity, bombed the battle formations of units, warehouses and military camps. Therefore, Soviet troops suffered serious damage here, on the secondary sector of the front. V.N. Logunov, a cadet of the 59th communications battalion of the 13th SD, recalled: “When we approached the border near the Snyadovo metro station, we saw traces of the just ended border battle: broken and burnt tanks, guns, armored personnel carriers among the corpses of people and horses.” Z. P. Ryabchenko recalled: “As soon as we left, saber squadrons galloped ahead of us, and suddenly one Messerschmitt appeared, made a turn, dropped about twenty meters to the side and fired a machine-gun burst, and itself flew after a single rider. The car stopped abruptly, Sasha and I jumped out of the booth and saw the lieutenant and the driver with broken legs. Fortunately, a convoy appeared, we loaded them onto britzkas and never met again. There are only two of us left, we don’t know what to do. We stood there for about two hours, Sasha, although poorly, could drive the car, he couldn’t leave the walkie-talkie. Nobody pays attention to us, not a single officer, pilots, tankmen ride on horses, walk on foot, like a herd of sheep. We ran out of gas, but we still made it to the edge of the forest. Then some foreman joined us and advised us to blow up the radio. There were a lot of weapons lying around the forest: shells, grenades; there was brand new equipment on the roadsides: cars, tanks, howitzers, but there was no gasoline.”
Lomza itself was not touched by enemy aircraft (only the cavalry barracks were attacked from the air), but long-range artillery shells exploded on the streets from time to time. Behind the Narev there was incessant cannonade and rifle and machine-gun fire. After the cavalry left, the city was deserted; as the son of the head of the department of headquarters of the 87th PO, Captain I.P. Govorov, retired Colonel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs V.I. Govorov, recalled, there was no one left in it except the headquarters of the detachment, located in the building of the former theological seminary, its guards and the families of the command staff. He wrote: “We were loaded into two or three trucks and taken first to the forest near the city, and then taken to Bialystok...” And at the very end: “I don’t know why the Germans could not enter Lomza until the evening, in which, apart from border detachment and cavalry there were no other troops in the regiment?” This is probably why it didn’t happen that the Germans were stopped by superior forces of the Red Army units west of Lomza. However, there is some mention that Lomza was taken in the morning (possibly by some advanced detachment), but then driven back. D. G. Pavlov testified: “At about 7 o’clock Golubev sent a radiogram that there was a machine-gun firefight going on along the entire front and all attempts by the enemy to penetrate deeper into our territory had been repulsed by him. General Semenov, the deputy chief of staff of the front, reported to me that Lomza had been taken by the enemy, but with a counterattack from the 6th Cavalry Division the enemy was driven out of Lomza again.” This was probably the case, especially since this is also reflected in the documents of the front headquarters.
From the operational report of the headquarters of the Western Front No. 2: “The 6th Cavalry Corps captured Lomza and is fighting on the line of Lomzhytsia, Zawady (1-2 km west of Lomza).”
By the evening of June 22, the situation in the Lomza area had not undergone significant changes. Enemy troops were stopped west of the city. The headquarters of the 6th Cavalry Corps was located in a forest 2 km east of Podgorze. The enemy forces advancing on the cavalry positions from the Maly Plock - Montvita - Myastkovo - Kurzh - Tronchin line were assessed as “up to an infantry division”. Parts of the corps, together with the 172nd Infantry Regiment of the 13th Infantry Division - its location was Chervony Bor - defended the front of Rogenice Wielkie (10 km northwest of Lomza) - Krupki (6 km west of Lomza) - Myastkovo - Klechkovo. From 18:30, the commander of the 6th subordinated the 87th border detachment with the task: by 19:00 to take up defense along the eastern bank of the Gats River on the Lyutostan - Lady - Zhelednya - highway front. Place the headquarters of the border detachment in the forest southeast of Lyutostan. With this decision, General M.P. Konstantinov intended to cover a section of the eastern slope of the Chervonoborskaya ridge northwest of Zambruv. North of Lyutostan, before the confluence of the Gats River with the Narew, there is a large impassable swamp, which made the position of the border guards more durable. As of 18:40, the 3rd squadron of the 94th regiment, one rifle company The Red Army and the border outpost defended Piski. Border outpost No. 1 in the village of Buchin was surrounded by the enemy and required reinforcements.
4.5. Advancement of the 36th Cavalry Division
36th cavalry division at this time it advanced to its own concentration area, determined by the mobilization plan - near Zabludov. According to Combat Order No. 1, signed at 5 a.m., providing cover for the concentration was entrusted to the 42nd Cavalry Regiment with its subordinate 8th Tank Regiment. All regiments followed their own routes, the division headquarters with the 7th separate communications squadron was located at the head of the 24th command post (commander - Colonel I.I. Orlovsky), the 33rd sapper squadron brought up the rear. Upon arrival in Volkovysk, the 3rd OKAD and anti-aircraft gunners were to receive instructions from the division supply chief, Colonel Kozakov, about the further route, while Kozakov himself with a platoon of the regimental school of the 24th Cavalry Regiment was left in the city to receive reinforcements and form the 2nd echelon of the division. E. S. Zybin instructed Colonel Kalyuzhny to organize the evacuation of the families of command personnel.
Before the line of Bolshaya Berestovitsa, Svisloch, the 24th and 102nd regiments, together with the headquarters, were repeatedly attacked by small (3-5 aircraft) groups of enemy aircraft, the losses were insignificant. Then the cavalry entered the Supraselskaya Pushcha, and the impact of aviation ceased altogether.
On the night of June 23, the main forces of the 36th CD entered the concentration area in an organized manner. There was only no information about the artillery division, anti-aircraft units and the only radio station in the division, 5-AK (on the 22nd it was supposed to return from Lomza, from training camps conducted by the corps communications chief, but never returned).
4.6. Commissioning of the 13th Mechanized Corps into battle
Events continued to develop much more dramatically in the southern part of the Bialystok bulge. The ferocity of the fighting, which had somewhat decreased on the left flank of the 10th Army after the defeat of the 113th Division, increased again when the vanguards of the infantry divisions of the 4th German army collided with units of the 13th mechanized corps (295 tanks, 34 armored vehicles). The strongest was the 25th tank division Colonel N.M. Nikiforov: 228 tanks and 3 BA. However, a combination of circumstances led to the fact that its main forces entered the battle only the next day, June 23.
The most combat-ready units of the 31st Panzer Division blocked the Drohichin-Bielsk-Bialystok road. That was all the division commander could do. In fact, the 31st existed only on paper - a connection of the 2nd stage, and there is confirmation of this in the documents. Tank regiments have 40 units of armored vehicles with almost spent motor resources (29 of them are in the 62nd TP), motorized rifles have 4–5 rifles per platoon. The artillery regiment is almost fully equipped with guns, but there are no tractors, and only a few crews transferred from the 124th GAP RGK can shoot. The rest were called up two months ago. But we have to fight, and Colonel S.A. Kolikhovich put all his available forces into defense. The 31st motorized pontoon battalion was still in the formation stage at the beginning of the war. In addition to the battalion commander, Senior Lieutenant A.F. Kapusta, there were only three officers in the battalion: the nachkhim, the company commander, junior lieutenant Kukoverov, and the chief of finance. There was no materiel, the personnel was represented by only one company, formed from “Westerners”, that is, conscripts from Western Belarus, an illiterate contingent, and a devout one at that. The head of the chemical service of the 31st PMB was Lieutenant N. S. Steputenko, who had just graduated from the Kalinin Chemical Defense University. According to him, they received an order: to take a defensive line along the Nuzhets River near the Botsky-Gainovka road, 5 km west of Botsky. Next to the sappers, cadets of the regimental school of the 31st motorized regiment were digging in. Among the black buttonholes of the tankers, blue aviation ones also flashed. A. T. Kishko from the 157th airfield service battalion recalled that they held the defense somewhere near Belsk; the Dolubovo airfield, where the BAO served, was located just near Botsek. Also in Dolubovo there was the second tank regiment of the division, the 148th (commander - Lieutenant Colonel G.P. Maslov). The regiment's former commander, retired colonel-engineer V. Chulkov, recalled that it was fully staffed.
Commander of the 25th Tank Division N. M. Nikiforov
On June 10, a significant part of the tank commanders and driver mechanics left on a business trip to the Kharkov Machine-Building Plant to receive T-34 tanks and train on them for a month. Chulkov wrote: “The Germans did not give us this month. As a result, our regiment entered the war armed with only 11 T-26 tanks (light, thin-armored), 3 BA-10 armored vehicles (on the chassis of a three-axle GAZ-AAA truck), 30 cars and 50 rifles.” . Next to the military camp, literally 300 m away, there was a field airfield of the 126th aviation regiment, equipped with MiG-3 aircraft. On Saturday, June 21, Lieutenant Colonel G.P. Maslov appointed military technician Chulkov as regimental duty officer, and he himself went to Brest to meet his family. He was never seen in the regiment again. At 22:00 Chulkov took up duty, and at about four o’clock in the morning on June 22 he went to check on guard duty. “The weather was great. The last nightingale trills were heard. There is not the slightest worry in my soul. But then the ear, and then the eye, was attracted by a flight of aircraft of some unusual configuration, which appeared over the forest almost at low level flight. In a few seconds the planes reached our airfield and explosions were heard. Flames, smoke, clods of earth, and some debris shot up high. It was clear that the planes were on fire. By the time I reached the regiment's location, two more units were bombed over the airfield. A flock of winged robbers was still flying behind them.” At the regiment's location, all the Red Army soldiers ran out of the barracks, looking at the sky, and only when the planes began shelling with machine guns did they fall to the ground. The military technician gave the command: “To the park, to the cars! Start the engines! Crews of tanks, armored vehicles and motor vehicles rushed to carry out the order. After about half an hour, the raids stopped, our newest fighters turned into piles of burning debris. An Air Force captain came to the regiment and, when asked why not a single plane was raised, he answered: “All the pilots went to Belsk for the day off, to visit their families, and when they arrived at the airfield, all the planes had already burned down.” About an hour and a half later, an order was received from the division commander, following which the regimental chief of staff formed a company of T-26 tanks and sent them towards the border. The “Horseless” began to prepare the second defensive line. Then they moved to new lines twice more, and after some time, not controlled by anyone from above, almost unarmed, they scattered in groups through the forests and swamps.
The tankers of the 31st Division and the Air Force rear personnel did not really have time to dig in on the defensive line: at about 8 o’clock in the morning the Germans reached the Nuzhets River, and a fierce battle ensued. The enemy's vanguard was reinforced with tanks and motorcyclists. One after another, the tanks of the 31st Division stopped and were shrouded in smoke, the explosions of shells and mines raised the ground in the positions of motorized infantry and pontoons. The enemy lost 7 tanks, 12 motorcycles, and up to thirty of his soldiers were killed. In the afternoon, around 2 p.m., the division's defenses were broken through. Panic began, the survivors retreated 10 kilometers beyond Botsky, into the forest, and in the direction of Bialystok. The aviators are lucky. They escaped death when surrounded, not all of them, of course, and in Vyazma, after being re-equipped, they went about their usual business: maintaining the aviation regiment. Kolikhovich’s people mostly lost their lives in the battles near Bielsk, in Belovezhskaya Pushcha and in the Porozovo - Novy Dvor area. Many were “lucky” to be captured.
According to TsAMO, there were no tanks of new designs in the units of the 13th Corps. There were 196 cannon and 48 machine gun T-26s, one tractor based on the T-26, 15 BT, 19 flamethrower tanks, 16 wedges and 34 armored vehicles. But combatants say the opposite. Both the 25th and 31st tank divisions had several T-34 and KV vehicles. The equipment was not new, it had already been used. It was probably handed over from the 6th Mechanized Corps so that the mechanics could practice their driving techniques. With the outbreak of war, new tanks were also thrown into battle. According to the testimony of a former sergeant from the 1st battalion of the 50th TP T. Ya. Krinitsky, the KV tank was crewed by the commander of the 25th division N. M. Nikiforov.
If you carefully examine the map of the eastern lands of Poland (where the Bialystok bulge once was), you can see that between Ciechanowiec and Bocki there was a vast piece of border land. This was also a covering area for the 113th Infantry Division. Having passed southwest of Tsiekhanovets through the now non-existent defense line of the defeated formation, the 263rd division of the 9th Wehrmacht Army Corps quickly advanced along the road going to Bransk and further to Lapy and Bialystok, that is, to the rear of the 5th Rifle Corps. The enemy could reach Bialystok already at the end of the day on June 22; but that did not happen. As General Geyer himself recalled, by the end of June the 263rd Infantry Division had captured only Bransk, despite the fact that its advanced detachment managed to capture the entire bridge across the Nuzhets River. He wrote: “It was a brilliant success - considering that a significant part of the march from the Bug took place on the night of June 23, and also that in Bransk these units had to withstand a heavy night and morning battle.”
In small Bransk, just in the path of the advanced units of the Wehrmacht, there was only one combat military unit of the Red Army: the 25th reconnaissance battalion of the 25th tank division. He took the first blow from a tenfold superior enemy. It consisted of tanks, armored vehicles and several IZH-9 motorcycles with Degtyarev light machine guns on wheelchairs. But what does one battalion mean compared to a full-blooded German infantry division, also reinforced with armored vehicles? In a desperate, unequal battle, the battalion was cut into pieces and pressed against the Nuzhets River. The battle took place in Bransk itself, along its southwestern outskirts and across the Nuzhets River, in the area of the battalion’s technical park. Units of the 25th ORB fiercely resisted and tried to escape in any direction - north or east. One of the companies, commanded by Lieutenant Isaychenko, swam across the river (there were no boats, and the town and technical park in the area of the bridge were on fire, the bridge itself was under heavy fire, and it was impossible to cross it), fought a few kilometers from edges of the forest. As Private I.I. Shchikolkov recalled, two ZIS-5 vehicles loaded with boxes of ammunition were stuck nearby in a swampy meadow. By evening, the company retreated to the forest, carrying out the seriously wounded company commander: he died an hour later. In the forest we encountered a KV tank, it was unknown who it belonged to. The tank soon left, and the company independently began to fight its way out of the encirclement. They encountered the Germans in the forest and again suffered heavy losses during the battle. Isaychenko’s company was probably a motorcycle company, but did not use equipment and fought as infantry. But the battalion had two more companies: armored vehicles and tanks. Alas, I do not know about their actions. One can only assume that only the coming darkness put an end to this massacre. In general, the history of the reconnaissance battalion from Bransk is very difficult to decipher. There are few of him left alive former soldiers, it is not possible to establish the fate of the commanders and their actions in the first hours of the war. It is still unclear where battalion commander Captain N.K. Dmitriev disappeared and how he ended up in his former 155th Rifle Division, which was part of the 47th Rifle Corps. E.K. Ivanov, who lives in Ukraine, the son of the missing political instructor K.N. Ivanov from the 25th ORB, does not make any contacts. He collected a lot of materials on the 13th and 47th buildings, collaborated with I.I. Shapiro for a long time and fruitfully, but, probably, my person does not suit him for some reason.
One should not think that the corps command was indifferent to the fate of the dying battalion. Major General P.N. Akhlyustin sent the 18th motorcycle regiment of Captain Gromov to the rescue. According to some evidence, it can be assumed that his vanguard managed to break through to Bransk. In separate units, motorcyclists took up defense along the river bank, dug in and met the enemy with machine-gun fire, despite the limited amount of ammunition. Shooter F.A. Kazanin said that they were given only 10 cartridges for a carbine, 41 cartridges for a machine gun and 70 for a machine gun. They left the motorcycles in a copse on the northern bank of Nuzhets, while they themselves moved to the southern bank and dug cells in a rye field. There were always three soldiers assigned to the motorcycle: a driver, a machine gunner and a shooter (at the same time he was considered a substitute for the driver). The Germans burned some of the motorcycles with return fire from mortars; in the evening the crews were forced to retreat to north shore. The main forces of the 18th MCP moved towards Bransk later. According to platoon commander M.S. Sadovshchikov, about 100 motorcycles with crews and three light tanks were driven by the regiment commander himself. There was very little ammunition; cartridges were literally divided individually. On the way to Bransk, the group encountered enemy armored personnel carriers and machine gunners on motorcycles blocking the road. As I. I. Sergeev recalled, when the regiment’s column was drawn into a dense forest, its vanguard was shot by sudden artillery fire and, apparently, the tanks marching in the head were set on fire. A heavy oncoming battle ensued, during which it was not possible to break through to Bransk. Many soldiers and command staff died. Among them were, as Sadovshchikov recalled, the commander of the 4th company Tsvetkov and his driver, the commander of the 2nd company, senior lieutenant Tverdokhlebov (in fact, he survived), junior lieutenant Mokalov. Gromov with the remnants of the people retreated to Belsk.
By the beginning of the war, seven of the eight tank battalions of the 25th Division were assembled in the town of Raisk. Only the 4th Battalion of the 50th tank regiment(battalion commander - senior lieutenant Ya. S. Zadorozhny) was separated from the main forces, in a camp near Shepetovo. In the morning, an alarm was declared at the battalions' locations, although there were some annoying problems. A participant in the events recalled: “The bugler sounded the alarm, we ran to the quarters, took equipment, gas masks, flare guns - who was entitled to what. And they ran to the cars, take the discs and load [them] with cartridges. Boxes of cartridges were located in front of the vehicles, and the sentry did not let them near. The senior chief of the ammunition depot arrived and said - the cartridges cannot be taken, there is no order from the People's Commissar of Defense. Lieutenant Colonel Skazhenyuk arrived, swore loudly, and said: “War.” Then they took cartridges, filled several discs, and boxes with cartridges [placed] on the tanks.”
From the 113th Tank Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Yu. P. Skazhenyuk was its commander), N. M. Nikiforov sent a detachment led by Major Koshkin, 35–37 tanks, to Bransk. But for reasons that have not yet been clarified, he transited through the town and went to Belsk, where he took the fight. Perhaps the reason for such an annoying “overlay” was a false order on the radio, transmitted by saboteurs-“listeners” from the “Brandenburg-800” regiment. Otherwise, the 113th Regiment during the day of June 22 was assigned in parts to the infantry, which did not have the means to fight tanks. According to M.E. Gurin, where the regiment’s soldiers fought, the Germans left up to fifty tanks, armored vehicles and assault guns destroyed. Two more battalions of the 113th TP also went to Belsk, but later. One battalion of the 113th TP (or part of the battalion) accompanied a convoy of vehicles with families of command personnel (50th and 113th regiments) along country roads, apparently through Nowy Pekuty to Lapy, but somewhere along the way this convoy was destroyed by aircraft, many families died, some fled. The tanks retreated into the forest, then changed their positions all night, and early in the morning of June 23 they entered into a fierce battle with the Germans in some rye field.
The 50th Regiment (commanded by Major M.S. Pozhidaev) spent the first day of the war mostly idle. Only his 4th and 3rd (battalion commander - senior lieutenant A.I. Shevchenko) battalions were sent to the rescue of the infantry. Near the Brok River they fell into a swamp, some of the tanks got stuck and were burned by artillery fire.
V. A. Perfilyev from the 3rd battalion recalled: “I was a tank commander, and after the loss of a vehicle, I was a turret gunner on another vehicle. The camp was alerted on June 22 at 6 am. It was not bombed. On alert, the vehicle crews loaded the tanks with shells, fuses for them, machine guns and cartridges for them. After an hour and a half, the regiment moved to the assembly point - a large forest to the right of the highway. From the assembly point, tanks left in groups in different directions, as they said, to support the infantry. 2 tanks [from] our platoon, including mine, were placed on the highway near the bridge over the Myanka River - the enemy was expected to advance from the direction of Bransk. There was no contact with the enemy. Lunch was brought from the camp. The night from the 22nd to the 23rd regiment (the rest of it) spent between the highway and the village of Men.”
Tank commander M.I. Trusov claimed that the first offensive of the battalion in which he served was on June 22 towards Belsk. Perhaps he confused Bielsk with Bransk, but it is almost impossible to verify. “On June 22, the alarm was raised and we ran to our tanks. My tank was a training tank. On Friday, the gas tank was removed from it, and military technician Simonenko took it somewhere to solder. He brought it late on Saturday evening, and he decided that we would put it on the tank on Monday. The opening of the camp was scheduled for Sunday. I had to install the tank in the tank in the morning with my crew with the help of a military technician. The military technician said that our unit had gone to the city of Belsk.” When the repaired tank followed the battalion, while moving, it fell into the location of some infantry regiment, and the major, the commander of the infantry, kept him with him. “Then 2 more tanks joined us, and with 3 tanks and infantrymen [we] drove the Germans out of some populated area. After that, I took my tank to Belsk. A thoroughly battered tank. I brought him near Belsk. Near Belsk, wounded tank crews, infantrymen, and artillerymen began to crawl out of the rye, and the remaining tanks began to move out. There were a lot of wounded on the armor of my car. Then they were taken onto an on-board vehicle. Then separate skirmishes with the Germans began.” I have not yet been able to identify this episode, but it is possible that Trusov’s tank was subjugated by the commander of his own 25th MRR, Major S.I. Yesionov (Eslanov).
In the 25th Motorized Rifle Regiment, the regimental school was the first to enter the battle in the Bransk area. The cadets excitedly and enthusiastically counterattacked the enemy, but suffered such losses that the unit virtually ceased to exist. The reconnaissance unit of the 50th regiment, according to the “horseless” BT commander Sergeant P. S. Koptyaev, did not manage to receive either weapons or equipment by the beginning of the war. Therefore, its commander, senior lieutenant Tverdokhleb (almost the namesake of company commander-2 from the 18th MCP), Pozhidaev “puzzled” the repair of a bridge across one of the many rivers in this area. He gave the company commander instructions: repair the bridge, then the division’s tanks will appear from the north, sit on their armor and go into battle. But the tanks appeared from the south and, moreover, with crosses on the sides and turrets. The unarmed soldiers were mowed down by machine-gun fire, the survivors crowded into a lorry and fled.
The 208th Motorized Division (commander - Colonel V.I. Nichiporovich) operated on the left flank of the corps; she had to enter the battle without completing her formation either. As V.I. Nichiporovich reported on July 2, 1942 to the command of the Western Front, the 128th Tank Regiment (commander - Major N.A. Chebrov) did not have a single tank, 2 thousand Red Army soldiers of this regiment did not have any weapons, the rest of the division were 70–80% armed. On June 22, the division received the task of defending along the line Bryansk - Belsk - Orlya - Gainovka - Belovezh; due to the disorderly withdrawal of the 113th, 49th and partly 86th divisions of the 1st line, this defense stretched over 90 km in separate sections. Only a few former soldiers of the 208th responded to newspaper advertisements given by I.I. Shapiro. But only one of the letters contained specific information: military unit 2812 was located in Gainovka, and one of its commanders was Major Komandyshko. Decoding of military unit 2812 - 760th motorized rifle regiment, Chief of Staff Major D.K. Komandyshko, went missing in June 1941. This is basically how June 22 ended for units of the 13th Mechanized Corps.
4.7. Preliminary result
The decision to form a front-line cavalry-mechanized group
It should be admitted that in the first days of the fighting, the headquarters of the 10th Army and its commander K.D. Golubev showed composure and restraint, despite the fact that due to the continuous bombing of Bialystok, the army command moved first to the forest near Staroseltsy, then to the forest near Grudek, and a day later - to the Valily station, finding ourselves at a distance of more than 100 km from the front line. Having subjugated the 13th Corps and advanced it to Nuzhets, Golubev delayed the breakthrough of the German infantry ram to Volkovysk for several days. He did not do anything more, since during those short periods of time when the headquarters of the 10th established radio contact with the district command, he received instructions from D. G. Pavlov to keep the 6th Mechanized Corps (number of 1021 tanks) in the forests in reserve around Bialystok until the main operational directions of the enemy troops were clarified. In the evening, the front headquarters sent combat report No. 007 to the General Staff. As of 6 p.m., General V. E. Klimovskikh reported: “First. The position of the 3rd Army according to the report at 17.00 22.641, there is no new data... Second. On the front of the 1st Army, the enemy captured the line of Graevo (Grayevo), Kolno, Lomzha, Petkovo, Chizhev, Tsekhanovets. There is no data on the position west of Belsk, southwest and south.”
In such a situation, Moscow made a decision, embodied in NPO Directive No. 3. Subparagraph c) of the 1st paragraph stated: “The armies of the Western Front, holding back the enemy in the Warsaw direction, launch a powerful counterattack to the forces and at least two mechanized corps and front aviation in the flank and rear of the Suwalki enemy group, destroy it together with Northwestern Front and by the end of June 24, capture the Suwalki area.” The task set was absolutely inconsistent with the current situation, but it was unthinkable to challenge it.
Soviet tanks destroyed in the Slonim area
Having accepted the Directive for execution, the commander of the Western Front gave the troops the order to take up a tough defense in the center of the defensive zone and launch a counterattack on the right flank towards Grodno and Suwalki. At 23:40 on June 22, Lieutenant General I.V. Boldin, who was already at the headquarters of the 10th Army, where he arrived to clarify the situation, received an order during negotiations with Pavlov: “You should organize a strike group as part of Khatskilevich’s corps plus 36th Cavalry Division, Mostovenko's units and strike at general direction Bialystok, Lipsk, south of Grodno with the task of destroying the enemy on the left bank of the Neman River and preventing his units from entering the Volkovysk region, after which the entire group will come under the command of Kuznetsov. This is your immediate task. Lead it personally. Tell Golubev to take the line Osovets, Bobr, Vizna, Sokoly, Belsk and further to Kleshel. All this must be accomplished today overnight, in an organized manner and at a rapid pace...” Also, D. G. Pavlov ordered that special attention be paid to ensuring that the “economy” of the front artillery chief was all withdrawn from Chervony Bor. Boldin replied that all the artillery had been withdrawn and had taken part in the fighting. To coordinate the actions of the 3rd and 10th armies and control the implementation of the KMG counterattack, the deputy left for Bialystok. People's Commissar of Defense for Artillery, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Kulik (he arrived at army headquarters the next day, June 23). The headquarters of Boldin's group intended to be formed from officers seconded from the departments of the 6th Mechanized Corps and the 6th Cavalry Corps. He ordered the transfer of the corps' tank divisions to a concentration area determined 10 km northwest of Bialystok by the morning of June 23. The 29th motorized division of the corps was supposed to concentrate in Sokolka in order to deploy in battle formation to cover preparations for the offensive. The permanent location of her regiments was Slonim, Obuz-Lesna and the former monastery in Zhirovitsy, but on the night of June 22 they were in summer camps at a considerable distance from each other. The 106th motorized regiment was in the forest northwest of Bialystok (near Lomza - see above), the 128th MP and the 77th artillery regiment (according to the memoirs of N.S. Khalilov) were in the area north of Brest. This seems fantastic to me, the Brest area and a significant area to the north of it is the zone of the 4th Army. More likely, we're talking about about Berestovitsy (Bolshaya or Malaya), although the fighters said that it was 13 km to Brest, and 3 km to the border. However, that didn’t happen during that war.
Personal archive D. N. Egorova - I. I. Shapiro, letter.
Western Front formed on June 22, 1941 on the basis of the order of the USSR NKO dated June 22, 1941 on the basis of the Western Special Military District consisting of the 3rd, 4th, 10th and 13th armies. Later it included the 1st shock, 5, 11, 16 (from May 1, 1943 - 11th guards army), 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 29, 30 (from May 1, 1943 10th Guards Army), 31, 32, 33, 39, 43, 49, 50, 61, 68th Army, 3rd and 4th Tank, 1st Air Armies.
Front troops took part in the strategic defensive operation 1941 in Belarus, in the Battle of Smolensk (July 10 - September 10, 1941), in the Moscow Battle (September 30, 1941 - April 20, 1942)
During the Moscow strategic offensive operation(December 5, 1941 - April 20, 1942) front troops, in cooperation with troops of the Kalinin and Southwestern Fronts, inflicted the first major defeat on the troops of Army Group Center and threw the enemy back 100-250 km from Moscow.
During the Rzhev-Vyazemsk strategic operation (January 8-April 20, 1942), front troops, in cooperation with formations of the Kalinin Front and with the assistance of troops of the North-Western and Bryansk fronts, pushed back the enemy in the western direction by 80-250 km, liberated Moscow and Tula region, many areas of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions.
From July 30 to August 23, 1942, the troops of the Western Front, together with the Kalinin Front, carried out Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, eliminated the enemy's bridgehead on the left bank of the Volga in the Rzhev area.
In the Rzhev-Vyazma operation (March 2-31, 1943), troops of the Western Front, together with troops of the Kalinin Front, eliminated the Rzhev-Vyazma bulge in the defense of German troops, moving the front line from Moscow another 130-160 km.
During the Battle of Kursk in July-August 1943, the troops of the left flank of the front, together with the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, participated in the Oryol strategic operation (July 12-August 18, 1943) to eliminate the enemy group. At the same time, the main forces of the front, taking advantage of the advantageous enveloping position, carried out the Smolensk strategic operation. As a result of a successfully carried out operation, front troops advanced west to a depth of 200-250 km and liberated part of the territory of the Kalinin region and the Smolensk region.
During the offensive in the Vitebsk and Orsha directions at the end of 1943 - beginning of 1944, front troops entered the territory eastern regions Belarus.
Based on the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters dated April 12, 1944, April 24, 1944. the front was renamed the 3rd Belorussian Front. Three of his armies were transferred to the 2nd Belorussian Front.
Front commanders: Army General D. G. Pavlov (June 1941); Lieutenant General Eremenko A. I. ( June July 1941); Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko S.K. (July-September 1941); Lieutenant General, from September 1941 - Colonel General I. S. Konev ( September October 1941 and August 1942 - February 1943); General of the Army Zhukov G.K. (October 1941 - August 1942); Colonel General, from August 1943 - Army General V. D. Sokolovsky (February 1943 - April 1944); Colonel General Chernyakhovsky I. D. (April 1944)
Members of the Front Military Council: corps commissar A. Ya. Fominykh (June-July 1941); Army Commissar 1st Rank, from October 1942 - Lieutenant General Mehlis L. Z. (July 1941 and December 1943 - April 1944); Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus Ponomarenko P.K. (July 1941); Lieutenant General N. A. Bulganin (July 1941 - December 1943); Lieutenant General V. E. Makarov (April 1944)
Chiefs of the front headquarters: Major General V. E. Klimovskikh (June 1941); Lieutenant General Malandin G.K. (July 1941); Lieutenant General, from June 1942 - Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky (July 1941 - January 1942 and May 1942 - February 1943); Major General Golushkevich V.S. (January-May 1942); Lieutenant General A.P. Pokrovsky (February 1943 - April 1944)
Commander of the ZapOVO troops, Army General Dmitry Grigorievich PavlovBorn 23.10 (4.11). 1897 in the village. The smell is now Kostroma region. Member of the 1st World War In 1957, he was rehabilitated by a General Staff commission “for lack of evidence of a crime.” | |
Chief of Staff of ZapOVO, Major General Vladimir Efimovich KlimovskikhBorn on May 27, 1885 in Kokand. In military service since 1913. Participant of the 1st World War in the positions of: head of a team of mounted reconnaissance officers, company commander, battalion commander. In the Red Army since 1918. In the Civil War he participated as an assistant chief of staff of the army, chief of staff of a division, head of a department of army headquarters, head of a division, group of troops. After the Civil War, he was chief of staff of a rifle corps, head of a department, and assistant chief of staff of military districts. From December 1932 to June 1936 was teaching at the Frunze Military Academy. Since July 1936 - Assistant Army Inspector, since February 1938. - Senior Lecturer at the Military Academy of the General Staff. Since September 1939 was deputy chief of staff from July 1940. - Chief of Staff of the Belarusian Special Military District. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War - chief of staff of the Western Front. Major General (1940). Awarded the Order Red Banner, Weapon of Honor. |
Deputy Commander of the ZapOVO troops - Lieutenant General Ivan Vasilievich Boldin
Member of the Military Council of the ZapOVO - corps commissar A.Ya. Fominykh.
Chief of Artillery - Lieutenant General N.A. Klich
Head of the Signal Corps - Major General Grigoriev A.T.
According to "Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the Commander of the ZAPOVO troops" N503859/cc/s [no later than May 20, 1941]:
Border with PribOVO - Oshmeny, Druskeniki, Margerabovo, Letzen, all points except Margerabov for ZapOVO inclusive.
Border with KOVO - Pinsk, Wlodawa, Demblin, all with the exception of Demblin for ZAPOVO inclusive.
Cover area N1 - 3rd army
Compound:
3rd Army Directorate;
control 4
body page;
56, 27, 85
And 24
division line;
control 11
mechanized corps
29
And 33
tank divisions;
204
motorized division;
6
anti-tank artillery brigade;
11
border parts.
Army Headquarters - Grodno
Task- strong defense of the Grodno fortified area and field fortifications on the Kanchiamietis front, before Shchuchin claim. cover the Lida, Grodno and Bialystok directions.
Cover area N2 - 10th army
Compound:
10th Army Directorate;
control 1
And 5th Rifle Corps
8, 13, 86
And 2
division page;
control 6 cavalry corps
6
And 36
kaval divisions;
control 6 mech cases
4
And 7
tank divisions
29
motorized division;
9
mixed aviation division;
border parts.
Army headquarters - Bialystok.
Have the 6th cavalry corps in the Tykocin, Sokoly, Menlyanin area.
Border left- claim. Slozhim., Svisloch, Surals, Chileevo and further along the Bug river
Task- strong defense of the Osowiec and Zambrowski fortified areas and field fortifications within the borders, covering the direction to Bialystok and especially from Johannisburg, Ostroleka and Ostrow Mazowiecki.
Cover area N3 - 13th Army
Compound:
control 2 pages case
113
And 49
division page;
control 13 mech hulls
25
And 31
tank divisions;
208
motorized division;
border parts.
Army Headquarters Belsk
Border left- lawsuit Kossovo, Hainuvka, Drohochin, Gura Kalwaria.
Task- with the defense of field fortifications, firmly cover from Kossy and Sokolow the direction to Bielsk.
Cover area N4 - 4th army
Compound:
4th Army Directorate;
control 28 pages
6, 42, 75
And 100
division line;
control 14 mechanized corps
22
And 30
tank division
205
motorized division;
garrison of the Brest fortified area;
10
mixed aviation division;
border parts.
Border left-border of the village of Kovo.
Task- strong defense of the Brest fortified area and field fortifications along the eastern bank of the Bug River, to cover the concentration and deployment of the army.
The district command has at its immediate disposal:
21
17
rifle division and 50
page division
47
rifle corps, consisting of 55
rifle division, 121
And 155
page divisions
44
rifle corps, consisting of 108
page division , 64
page division and 161
division lines, 37
And 143
page divisions
Anti-tank brigades - 7
-I am in the area of Blasostovitsa, Grudsk, Yaluvka; 8
-I - in the Lida area
Mechanized corps:
17 microns, composed of 27
And 36
tank divisions and 209
motorized division in the Volkovysk area
20 microns- included 26
And 38
tank divisions and 210
motorized division in the Oshmyany area.
4
airborne corps in the area of Pukhovichi, Osipovichi.
Aviation - 59
And 60
ist.aviation division; 12
And 13
bomber divisions.
3
aviation corps - composed of 42
And 52
long-range bomber air divisions and 61
fighter division. The corps is used on assignments from the High Command.
_____________________________________________________
In the 13th and 11th MK, according to Pavlov, one division each was trained, and the rest, having received recruits, had only a training unit, and even then not everywhere. The 14th MK had only one poorly trained motorized division and rifle regiments of tank divisions.
(Institute military history RF Ministry of Defense: Documents and materials; 1941 - lessons and conclusions. M. 1992; Müller-Gillerband B. Ground Army Germany, 1933-1945; TsAMO. F.208. Op.25899.D.93.L.5 (strength of the front with the Pinsk flotilla)| Strengths and means | Western Front (only working equipment is taken into account) | Army Group “Center” (without 3 Tgr) | Ratio |
| Personnel, thousand people | 678 | 629,9 | 1,1: 1 |
| Guns and mortars (without 50 mm), pcs. | 10296 | 12500 | 1:1,2 |
| Tanks | 2189 (2201 if added according to MK) | 810 | 2,7: 1 |
| Combat aircraft | 1539 | 1677 | 1: 1,1 |
In the first echelon, the Germans concentrated 28 divisions, of which 4 were tank divisions.
In the first echelon of the covering armies it was planned to have only 13 rifle divisions (WWII, M, 1998).
And here is the data published in “Classified as Classified”:
The number of troops at the beginning of the Belarusian defensive operation was 625,000 people + 2,300 (Pinsk military flotilla)
(Difference by 50,700 people.)
During the fighting, 45 additional divisions were added to the Soviet forces. The duration of the operation is 18 days. The width of the combat front is 450-800 km. The depth of withdrawal of Soviet troops is 450-600 km. Average daily losses are 23,210 people.
Certificate on the deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in case of war in the West
June 13, 1941
...
Western Front
I Ground Forces
44 divisions, including SD-24, TD-12, MD-6, KD-2
II Air Force
21st air regiment
3A: 8 divisions, of which: SD - 5, TD - 2, MD - 1
10A: sd - 5 ( where did the cavalry divisions, the 6th MK and the 29th motor division go?)
13A: 11 divisions, of which: sd -6, td - 2, md - 1, cd - 2
4A: 12 divisions, of which: SD - 6, TD - 4, MD - 2
front reserve - 8 divisions, of which: SD - 2, TD - 4, MD - 2
____________________________________________________________________
From the certificate “on the conduct of training for assigned personnel in rifle divisions in 1941”:
ZAPOVO:
64 sd
108 sd- (beginning of training camp - June 1) 6000 people
143 sd- (beginning of training camp - June 1) 6000 people
161 sd- (beginning of training camp - June 1) 6000 people
_____________________________________________________________________
From the certificate it turns out that the 44th Reserve Corps was replenished. None of the 1st echelon divisions were replenished.
Approximately, the number of ZapOVO divisions was 9327 people per hp. (History of the 2nd World War, 12 volumes) with a staff strength of 14,483 people.
_____________________________________________
Directive of the NPO of the USSR and the General Staff of the Red Army to the Commander of the ZapOVO troops [no later than June 22, 1941]
1. To increase the combat readiness of troops in the districts, bring all deep rifle divisions and rifle corps directorates with corps units to the camp in the areas provided for them by the cover plan (NCO directive N503859/cc/ov/).
2. Leave the border divisions in place, having their withdrawal to the border in their assigned areas, if necessary, this will be done by my special order.
3. 44th corps, as part of the corps control 108, 64, 161 and 143rd divisions and corps units - withdraw to the Baranovichi region, at your discretion.
Move the 37th infantry division to the Lida area, incorporating it into the 21st infantry corps.
4. The withdrawal of these troops should be completed by July 1, 1941.
5. Submit a withdrawal plan indicating the order and timing of withdrawal for each connection by courier... [June 41]
People's Commissar of Defense S. Timoshenko
Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov
_______________________________________________
So, the real location of our units on June 22, 1941. The data is compiled from orders and memories of military leaders. The most detailed location of parts 4A is indicated in Sandalovo’s book “The First Days of the War.”
3rd army
Army headquarters in Grodno.
| Compound | Commander | Headquarters location | Parts location |
| 4th rifle corps | |||
| 56 rifle division | major general Sakhnov S.P. | area Augustow Canal 213th Infantry Regiment in the Sapotskin area (took part in the construction of the Grodno UR) |
|
| 27 rifle division | |||
| 85 rifle division | west of Grodno | ||
| 24 rifle division | Galitsky K.N. | ||
| 11 mechanized corps (237 tanks including 31 KV and T-34) | general Mostovenko D.K. | Volkovysk | |
| 29 tank division | Steklov | Grodno district | |
| 204 motorized division | Volkovysk | Volkovysk |
6
anti-tank artillery brigade - Mikhalovo area;
garrison of the Grodno fortified area;
11
mixed aviation division;
86
border detachment.
124
GAP RGK
10th army
Commander Major General Golubev Konstantin Dmitrievich,
Chief of Staff - Major General Pyotr Ivanovich Lyapin.
Army headquarters - Bialystok.
| Compound | Commander | Headquarters location | Parts location |
| 5 rifle corps | major general Garnov A.V. | Zambrow | |
| 86 rifle division | Tsekhanovets | Ciechanowiec district | |
| 13 rifle division | Snyadovo | Śniadowo-Zambrów district | |
| 6 cavalry corps | Nikitin I.S. | Lomza | Lomza district |
| 6 cavalry division | Lomza | Lomza | |
| 36 cavalry division | Volkovysk | Volkovysk | |
| 6 mechanized building (1021 tanks including 14 KV and 338 T-34) | major general Khatskilevich Mikhail Georgievich | Bialystok | |
| 4 tank division | Bialystok | Bialystok area | |
| 7th Panzer Division | major general Borzilov | Bialystok area | Bialystok area |
| 29 motorized division | Bialystok | Bialystok area |
garrisons of the Osovetsky and Zambrovo fortified areas;
9
mixed aviation division - Bialystok area;
border parts.
4th army
Commander - Major General Korobkov A.A.
Chief of Staff - Colonel Sandalov Leonid Mikhailovich
Army Headquarters - Kobrin
| Compound | Commander | Headquarters location | Parts location |
| 28th Rifle Corps | major general Popov Vasily Stepanovich | Brest | |
| 6 rifle division | Popsuy-Shapko M.A. | Brest | Brest |
| 42 rifle division | major general Lazarenko I.S. | Brest | Brest, Zhabinka |
| 75 rifle division | general Nedvigin S.I. | Malorita | Mednaya district, Chersk, Malorita |
| 14th mechanized corps (520 tanks) | general Oborin S.I., chief of staff - Colonel Tutarinov I.V. | Kobrin | |
| 22 tank division | general Puganov V.P. | Brest | Brest |
| 30 tank division (174 T-26 tanks) | Colonel Bogdanov S.I., chief of staff - colonel Bolotov N.N. | Pruzhany | Pruzhany |
| 205 motorized division | Colonel Kudyurov F.F. | Bereza-Kartuzskaya | Bereza-Kartuzskaya |
The 49th Division was transferred to 4A from 13A.
10
mixed aviation division (commander - Colonel Belov M.G.)
(of new types of aircraft: Yak-1 - 20, Il-2 - 8, Pe-2 - 5)
33rd (Pruzhany) and 123rd (Kobrin) fighter regiments,
74th Assault aviation regiment- field airfield southeast of Vysokoye
39th Bomber Regiment (Pinsk);
30
mixed air division (241 aircraft):
138 fighters (I-16 - 44, I-153 - 74 and Yak-1 - 20 aircraft)
55 attack aircraft (I-15 - 47 and IL-2 - 8 aircraft)
48 bombers (SB - 43 and Pe-2 - 5 aircraft)
Kobrin air defense brigade district:
218th and 298th air defense divisions of the RGK,
28th separate anti-aircraft artillery battery,
11th VNOS Battalion
(anti-aircraft units of the brigade area, as well as anti-aircraft divisions of the 4th Army formations, were located in the Krupki district camp, 115 km northeast of Minsk, 450 km from the border (!?))
Brest UR:
16th, 17th, 18th machine gun and artillery battalions
Brest border detachment(commander - Kuznetsov A.P.)
120 gap RGK - Kossovo
As Sandalov writes, “the troops of the 4th Army did not have an operational formation, however, the actual location of its formations by June 22, 1941 can be imagined as a formation in two echelons: the first echelon - four rifle and one tank divisions; the second echelon - one tank and one motorized division."
* * *13th Army
Commander Lieutenant General Filatov Petr Mikhailovich
Chief of Staff - Brigade Commander A.V. Petrushevsky
On June 22, the Army Headquarters was in Mogilev due to which,
113 SD and 13 MK were transferred to 10A,
49 SD was transferred to 4A
2nd Rifle Corps
(commander - Major General Ermakov A.N.) - In Minsk
100
Major General Russiyanov I.N.) - In Minsk
161
rifle division (commander - Colonel Mikhailov A.I.)
21
rifle corps(commander - Major General Borisov V.B.) in the area of Druskeniki, Yasidomlya, Skidel, Dembrovo
17
rifle division (commander - Major General Batsanov T.K.)
50
rifle division (commander - Major General Evdokimov V.P.)
37
rifle division (commander - Colonel Chekharin A.E.) - Lida district
47
rifle corps(commander - General Povetkin S.I.) - in Bobruisk
in the area of Pruzhany, Zaprudy, Kartuzbereza, Bluden
55
rifle division (commander - Colonel Ivanov D.I.) - Slutsk
121
rifle division (commander - Major General Zykov P.M.)
143
rifle division (commander - Major General Safonov D.P.)
44
rifle corps(commander - major general Yushkevich V.A.) - Baranovichi district
108
rifle division (commander - Major General Mavrichev A.I.) - district of Minsk
64
rifle division (commander - Colonel Iovlev S.I.) - district of Minsk
8
anti-tank artillery brigade (commander - Strelbitsky I.S.) - in the Lida region
7
anti-tank artillery brigade in the area of the village of Blasostowica, Grudsk, Yaluvka
17
mechanized corps(36 tanks, commander - General Petrov) - Baranavichy district
27
tank division - in Novogrudok
36
tank division - Nesvizh region
209
motorized division - in Ivye
20
mechanized corps(93 tanks) - Borisov district
26
tank division - in Minsk
38
tank division - Borisov
210
motorized division - Osipovichi
12
13
bomber division
3rd aviation corps (commander - Colonel Skripko N.S.)
4th airborne corps (commander - General Zhadov A.S.) - Pukhovichi district
Pinsk flotilla(commander - Admiral Rogachev D.D.)
Western Front Air Force
A total of 16 airfields for the base of 9, 10 and 11 gardens
Tirnovo (12 km from the border) - 131 aircraft (66 Mig-3 and 65 I-153)
Dolubovo (22 km from the border) - 83 aircraft (50 Mig-3 and 33 I-16)
Wysokie Mazowiec (16 km from the border) - 101 aircraft (70 Mig-3 and 31 I-16)
All aircraft on the ground at these airfields were destroyed.
In total, 732 aircraft were destroyed on the Western Front on the first day of the war.
| Aviation formations (mixed and bomber) | Enemy aircraft shot down | Shot down in air battles | Shot down by anti-aircraft artillery | Destroyed on earth | Didn't return from mission |
| 9 garden | 74 | 74 | - | 278 | - |
| 10 garden | 23 | 23 | - | 157 | - |
| 11 garden | 34 | 34 | - | 93 | - |
| 12 bad | - | 2 | - | - | |
| 13 bad | - | 15 | - | 46 | |
| 3rd Air Corps | 2 | 1 | - | 7 | |
| Total: | 133 | 18 | 528 | 53 |
Aviation of the Western Front |
||||||||||
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|
| 9th garden | Bialystok (administration hell) | MiG-3, I-16 | 2/0 | 5/2 | 5 | - | - | - | - | |
| 41 IAP | Bialystok, Seburcin | MiG-3, MiG-1 | 56/14 | 27/27 | 27 | - | - | - | 16 | |
| I-16, I-15 | 22/4 | 36/18 | 36 | 25 | 25 | - | - | |||
| 124 iap | Bialystok | MiG-3 | 70/8 | 16/16 | 16 | - | - | - | 29 | |
| M.Mezowiecki | I-16 | 29/2 | 24/24 | 24 | - | - | - | - | ||
| 126 iap | Belsk, Dolubovo | MiG-3 | 50/12 | 21/21 | 21 | 4 | 4 | - | 31 | |
| I-16 | 23/10 | 42/13 | 42 | - | - | - | - | |||
| 129 iap | Zabludovo, Tarnovo village | MiG-3 | 61/5 | - | - | - | - | 34 | ||
| I-153 | 57/8 | 40/40 | 40 | 11 | 11 | - | - | |||
| 13 bap | Ros, Borisovshizna | SB, Ar-2 | 51/11 | 45/40 | 45 | 15 | 5 | - | - | |
| Pe-2 | 8/0 | - | - | - | - | - | ||||
| Total in the air division | MiG-3, MiG-1, I-16, I-15, I-153, SB, Pe-2, Ar-2 | 429/74 | 256/201 | 256 | 55 | 45 | 0 | 110 | ||
| 10th garden | Kobrin (control hell) | SB | 1/0 | 3/1 | - | - | - | - | - | |
| 33 IAP | Pruzhany | I-16 | 44/7 | 70/37 | 70 | 29 | 29 | - | - | |
| 74 hat | Pruzhany | I-153, I-15bis | 62/2 | 70/60 | 70 | 21 | 21 | - | - | |
| IL-2 | 8/0 | - | - | - | - | - | ||||
| 123 iap | Strigovo, Name Day | I-153 | 61/8 | 71/53 | 71 | 6 | 6 | - | - | |
| Yak-1 | 20/0 | - | - | - | - | - | ||||
| 39 bap | Pinsk, Zhabitsy | SB | 43/2 | 49/39 | 49 | 18 | 18 | - | - | |
| Pe-2 | 9/0 | - | - | - | - | - | ||||
| Total in the air division | SB, Pe-2, Yak-1, I-16, I-15, I-153 | 248/19 | 263/190 | 260 | 74 | 74 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 11th garden | Lida (control hell) | SB, I-16, I-153 | 4/0 | 8/4 | 8 | - | - | - | - | |
| 122 iap | Lida | I-16, I-15bis | 71/11 | 50/50 | 50 | 5 | 5 | - | - | |
| 127 iap | Skidel, Lesishche | I-153, I-15 | 72/7 | 53/53 | 53 | 39 | 21 | - | - | |
| 16 bap | Stomach, Cherlena | SB | 24/1 | 46/23 | 46 | 17 | 17 | 17 | - | |
| Pe-2 | 37/0 | - | - | - | - | 39 | ||||
| Total in the air division | SB, Pe-2, I-16, I-15bis, I-153 | 208/19 | 157/130 | 157 | 61 | 43 | 17 | 39 | ||
| 12th bad | Vitebsk (administration hell) | SB | 1/0 | 4/1 | 4 | - | - | - | - | |
| 43 bap | Vitebsk | Su-2 | 46/1 | 71/33 | 33 | 26 | 26 | - | 38 | |
| 128 bap | Ulla | SB | 41/1 | 68/31 | 31 | - | - | - | 37 | |
| 6 bap | Vitebsk | SB | 18/2 | 54/16 | 25 | - | - | - | 29 | |
| 209 bap | Balbasovo, Betskoye | Su-2 | 25/1 | 3/3 | 3 | - | - | - | ||
| 215 bap | Smolensk, Travniki | I-15bis | 15/1 | 10/10 | 10 | - | - | - | ||
| Total in the air division | SB, Su-2, I-15bis | 146/6 | 210/94 | 106 | 26 | 26 | 0 | 104 | ||
| 13th bad | Bobruisk (administration hell) | SB | 1/0 | 3/1 | 3 | - | - | - | - | |
| 24 bap | Bobruisk, Teikichi, Telushe | SB | 41/6 | 49/35 | 49 | 27 | 19 | - | - | |
| 97 bap | Bobruisk | Su-2 | 51/26 | 49/25 | 25 | - | - | - | 24 | |
| 121 bap | Bykhov | SB | 56/9 | 51/39 | 39 | - | - | - | 12 | |
| 125 bap | Bykhov | SB | 38/6 | 55/32 | 43 | 11 | 11 | - | 12 | |
| 130 bap | Bobrovichi, Gnoevo | SB | 38/8 | 51/30 | 51 | 12 | 12 | - | - | |
| Total in the air division | SB, Su-2 | 225/55 | 258/162 | 210 | 50 | 42 | 0 | 48 | ||
| 43rd IAD | Balbasovo (administration hell) | I-16 | 2/0 | 4/2 | 4 | - | - | - | - | |
| 160 iap | Balbasovo, Prongeevka | I-153, I-15 | 66/5 | 75/39 | 39 | - | - | - | 36 | |
| 161 iap | Balbasovo, Zubovo | I-16 | 62/3 | 59/17 | 17 | - | - | - | 42 | |
| 162 iap | Mogilev, Yedlino | I-16 | 54/4 | 95/13 | 13 | - | - | - | 82 | |
| 163 iap | Mogilev, Lubnice | I-16 | 59/3 | 82/10 | 10 | - | - | - | 72 | |
| Total in the air division | I-16, I-153, I-15 | 243/15 | 315/81 | 83 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 232 | ||
| 313th rap | Horsefly | SB | 20/1 | 67/20 | 38 | 12 | 5 | - | 29 | |
| 314th rap | Baranovichi | SB | 5/0 | 35/5 | 35 | - | - | - | - | |
| Yak-2, Yak-4 | 28/0 | - | - | - | - | 12 | ||||
| 161st reserve up | Lepel | I-16, I-153, I-15 | 42/8 | 65/34 | 65 | 7 | 7 | - | - | |
| 162nd reserve up | Zyabrovka, Bronnoe, Kholmich | I-16, I-153, SB | 64/8 | 76/56 | 76 | - | - | - | - | |
| Total per department up | SB, Yak-2, Yak-4, I-16, I-153, I-15 | 159/17 | 243/115 | 214 | 19 | 12 | 0 | 41 | ||
| Total for the Air Force of the military district | 1658/205 | 1702/973 | 1286 | 285 | 242 | 17 | 574 | |||
| Including new types | MiG-3, MiG-1, Yak-1, Pe-2, Il-2, Yak-2, Yak-4 | 347/39 | 64/64 | 64 | 4 | 4 | 16 1 | |||
2 - Name of deployment points
3 - Aircraft types
4 - Number of combat aircraft (denominator - including faulty aircraft)
5 - Total number of crews (denominator - including the number of combat-ready crews capable of simultaneously taking to the air to carry out a combat mission, depending on the availability of serviceable combat aircraft and combat-ready crews in the aviation regiments)
6-10 - Crews prepared for combat operations:
6 - during the day in normal weather conditions
7 - at night in normal weather conditions
8 - during the day in difficult weather conditions
9 - at night in difficult weather conditions
10 - retrained or commissioned upon arrival from colleges