The battle on the Kursk Bulge lasted 50 days. As a result of this operation, the strategic initiative finally passed to the side of the Red Army and until the end of the war it was carried out mainly in the form of offensive actions on its part. On the day of the 75th anniversary of the start of the legendary battle, the website of the Zvezda TV channel collected ten little-known facts about the Battle of Kursk. 1. Initially the battle was not planned as offensive When planning the spring-summer military campaign of 1943, the Soviet command was faced with a difficult choice: which method of action to prefer - to attack or defend. In their reports on the situation in the Kursk Bulge area, Zhukov and Vasilevsky proposed to bleed the enemy in a defensive battle and then launch a counteroffensive. A number of military leaders opposed it - Vatutin, Malinovsky, Timoshenko, Voroshilov - but Stalin supported the decision to defend, fearing that as a result of our offensive the Nazis would be able to break through the front line. The final decision was made in late May - early June, when.

“The actual course of events showed that the decision on deliberate defense was the most rational type of strategic action,” emphasizes military historian, candidate of historical sciences Yuri Popov.

2. The number of troops in the battle exceeded the scale of the Battle of Stalingrad The Battle of Kursk is still considered one of the largest battles of World War II. More than four million people were involved in it on both sides (for comparison: during the Battle of Stalingrad, just over 2.1 million people participated at various stages of the fighting). According to the General Staff of the Red Army, during the offensive alone from July 12 to August 23, 35 German divisions were defeated, including 22 infantry, 11 tank and two motorized. The remaining 42 divisions suffered heavy losses and largely lost their combat effectiveness. In the Battle of Kursk, the German command used 20 tank and motorized divisions out of a total of 26 divisions available at that time on the Soviet-German front. After Kursk, 13 of them were completely destroyed. 3. Information about the enemy’s plans was promptly received from intelligence officers from abroad Soviet military intelligence managed to timely reveal the preparations of the German army for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge. Foreign residencies obtained information in advance about Germany’s preparations for the spring-summer campaign of 1943. Thus, on March 22, GRU resident in Switzerland Sandor Rado reported that “...an attack on Kursk may involve using the SS tank corps (an organization banned in the Russian Federation - approx. edit.), which is currently receiving replenishment." And intelligence officers in England (GRU resident Major General I. A. Sklyarov) obtained an analytical report prepared for Churchill, “Assessment of possible German intentions and actions in the Russian campaign of 1943.”

“The Germans will concentrate forces to eliminate the Kursk salient,” the document said.

Thus, the information obtained by the scouts in early April revealed in advance the plan of the enemy’s summer campaign and made it possible to forestall the enemy’s attack. 4. The Kursk Bulge became a large-scale baptism of fire for Smersh The counterintelligence agencies "Smersh" were formed in April 1943 - three months before the start of the historic battle. "Death to Spies!" - Stalin so succinctly and at the same time succinctly defined the main task of this special service. But the Smershevites not only reliably protected units and formations of the Red Army from enemy agents and saboteurs, but also, which was used by the Soviet command, conducted radio games with the enemy, carried out combinations to bring German agents to our side. The book “Fire Arc”: The Battle of Kursk through the eyes of Lubyanka,” published based on materials from the Central Archives of the FSB of Russia, talks about a whole series of operations by security officers during that period.
Thus, in order to misinform the German command, the Smersh department of the Central Front and the Smersh department of the Oryol Military District conducted a successful radio game “Experience”. It lasted from May 1943 to August 1944. The work of the radio station was legendary on behalf of the reconnaissance group of Abwehr agents and misled the German command about the plans of the Red Army, including in the Kursk region. In total, 92 radiograms were transmitted to the enemy, 51 were received. Several German agents were called to our side and neutralized, and cargo dropped from the plane was received (weapons, money, fictitious documents, uniforms). . 5. On the Prokhorovsky field, the number of tanks fought against their quality What is considered to be the largest battle of armored vehicles of the entire Second World War began near this settlement. On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in it. The Wehrmacht had superiority over the Red Army due to the greater efficiency of its equipment. Let's say the T-34 had only a 76-mm cannon, and the T-70 had a 45-mm gun. The Churchill III tanks, received by the USSR from England, had a 57-millimeter gun, but this vehicle was characterized by low speed and poor maneuverability. In turn, the German heavy tank T-VIH "Tiger" had an 88-mm cannon, with a shot from which it penetrated the armor of the thirty-four at a distance of up to two kilometers.
Our tank could penetrate armor 61 millimeters thick at a distance of a kilometer. By the way, the frontal armor of the same T-IVH reached a thickness of 80 millimeters. It was possible to fight with hope of success in such conditions only in close combat, which was used, however, at the cost of heavy losses. Nevertheless, at Prokhorovka, the Wehrmacht lost 75% of its tank resources. For Germany, such losses were a disaster and proved difficult to recover almost until the very end of the war. 6. General Katukov’s cognac did not reach the Reichstag During the Battle of Kursk, for the first time during the war, the Soviet command used large tank formations in echelon to hold a defensive line on a wide front. One of the armies was commanded by Lieutenant General Mikhail Katukov, the future twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Armored Forces. Subsequently, in his book “At the Edge of the Main Strike,” he, in addition to the difficult moments of his front-line epic, also recalled one funny incident related to the events of the Battle of Kursk.

“In June 1941, after leaving the hospital, on the way to the front I dropped into a store and bought a bottle of cognac, deciding that I would drink it with my comrades as soon as I achieved my first victory over the Nazis,” the front-line soldier wrote. - Since then, this treasured bottle has traveled with me on all fronts. And finally the long-awaited day has arrived. We arrived at the checkpoint. The waitress quickly fried the eggs, and I took a bottle out of my suitcase. We sat down with our comrades at a simple wooden table. They poured cognac, which brought back pleasant memories of peaceful pre-war life. And the main toast - “For victory! To Berlin!”

7. Kozhedub and Maresyev crushed the enemy in the sky above Kursk During the Battle of Kursk, many Soviet soldiers showed heroism.

“Every day of fighting gave many examples of courage, bravery, and perseverance of our soldiers, sergeants and officers,” notes retired Colonel General Alexey Kirillovich Mironov, a participant in the Great Patriotic War. “They consciously sacrificed themselves, trying to prevent the enemy from passing through their defense sector.”

Over 100 thousand participants in those battles were awarded orders and medals, 231 became Hero of the Soviet Union. 132 formations and units received the guards rank, and 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachev. Future three times Hero of the Soviet Union. Alexey Maresyev also took part in the battles. On July 20, 1943, during an air battle with superior enemy forces, he saved the lives of two Soviet pilots by destroying two enemy FW-190 fighters at once. On August 24, 1943, the deputy squadron commander of the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment, Senior Lieutenant A.P. Maresyev, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 8. Defeat at the Battle of Kursk came as a shock to Hitler After the failure at the Kursk Bulge, the Fuhrer was furious: he lost his best formations, not yet knowing that in the fall he would have to leave the entire Left Bank Ukraine. Without betraying his character, Hitler immediately laid the blame for the Kursk failure on the field marshals and generals who exercised direct command of the troops. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, subsequently wrote:

“This was the last attempt to maintain our initiative in the East. With its failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. Therefore, Operation Citadel is a decisive, turning point in the war on the Eastern Front."

A German historian from the military-historical department of the Bundeswehr, Manfred Pay, wrote:

“The irony of history is that Soviet generals began to assimilate and develop the art of operational leadership of troops, which was highly appreciated by the German side, and the Germans themselves, under pressure from Hitler, switched to Soviet positions of tough defense - according to the principle “at all costs.”

By the way, the fate of the elite SS tank divisions that took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge - “Leibstandarte”, “Totenkopf” and “Reich” - later turned out even more sad. All three units took part in battles with the Red Army in Hungary, were defeated, and the remnants made their way into the American zone of occupation. However, the SS tank crews were handed over to the Soviet side, and they were punished as war criminals. 9. The victory at Kursk brought the opening of the Second Front closer As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces on the Soviet-German front, more favorable conditions were created for the deployment of American-British troops in Italy, the disintegration of the fascist bloc began - the Mussolini regime collapsed, Italy came out of the war on the side of Germany. Under the influence of the victories of the Red Army, the scale of the resistance movement in the countries occupied by German troops increased, and the authority of the USSR as the leading force in the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened. In August 1943, the US Committee of Chiefs of Staff prepared an analytical document in which it assessed the role of the USSR in the war.

“Russia occupies a dominant position,” the report noted, “and is a decisive factor in the impending defeat of the Axis countries in Europe.”

It is no coincidence that President Roosevelt realized the danger of further delaying the opening of the Second Front. On the eve of the Tehran Conference he told his son:

“If things in Russia continue to go as they are now, then perhaps next spring the Second Front will not be needed.”

It is interesting that a month after the end of the Battle of Kursk, Roosevelt already had his own plan for the dismemberment of Germany. He presented it just at the conference in Tehran. 10. For the fireworks in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod, the entire supply of blank shells in Moscow was used up During the Battle of Kursk, two key cities of the country were liberated - Orel and Belgorod. Joseph Stalin ordered an artillery salute to be held on this occasion in Moscow - the first in the entire war. It was estimated that in order for the fireworks to be heard throughout the city, about 100 anti-aircraft guns would need to be deployed. There were such fire weapons, but the organizers of the ceremonial action had only 1,200 blank shells at their disposal (during the war they were not kept in reserve in the Moscow air defense garrison). Therefore, out of 100 guns, only 12 salvos could be fired. True, the Kremlin mountain cannon division (24 guns) was also involved in the salute, blank shells for which were available. However, the effect of the action may not have been as expected. The solution was to increase the interval between salvos: at midnight on August 5, all 124 guns were fired every 30 seconds. And so that the fireworks could be heard everywhere in Moscow, groups of guns were placed in stadiums and vacant lots in different areas of the capital.

August 23 is the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the defeat of the Wehrmacht forces by Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge. The Red Army was led to this important victory by almost two months of intense and bloody battles, the outcome of which was by no means a foregone conclusion. The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest battles in world history. Let's remember about it in a little more detail.

Fact 1

The salient in the center of the Soviet-German front to the west of Kursk was formed during the stubborn battles of February–March 1943 for Kharkov. The Kursk Bulge was up to 150 km deep and 200 km wide. This ledge is called the Kursk Bulge.

Battle of Kursk

Fact 2

The Battle of Kursk is one of the key battles of the Second World War, not only because of the scale of the fighting that took place on the fields between Orel and Belgorod in the summer of 1943. Victory in this battle meant the final turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet troops, which began after the Battle of Stalingrad. With this victory, the Red Army, having exhausted the enemy, finally seized the strategic initiative. This means that from now on we are advancing. The defense was over.

Another consequence - political - was the final confidence of the Allies in victory over Germany. At a conference held in November–December 1943 in Tehran on the initiative of F. Roosevelt, the post-war plan for the dismemberment of Germany was already discussed.

Scheme of the Battle of Kursk

Fact 3

1943 was a year of difficult choices for the command of both sides. Defend or attack? And if we attack, how large-scale tasks should we set ourselves? Both the Germans and the Russians had to answer these questions one way or another.

Back in April, G.K. Zhukov sent his report to Headquarters on possible military actions in the coming months. According to Zhukov, the best solution for the Soviet troops in the current situation would be to wear down the enemy on their defense by destroying as many tanks as possible, and then bring in reserves and go on a general offensive. Zhukov's considerations formed the basis of the campaign plan for the summer of 1943, after it was discovered that Hitler's army was preparing for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge.

As a result, the decision of the Soviet command was to create a deeply echeloned (8 lines) defense on the most likely areas of the German offensive - on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge.

In a situation with a similar choice, the German command decided to attack in order to maintain the initiative in their hands. Nevertheless, even then, Hitler outlined the objectives of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge not to seize territory, but to exhaust the Soviet troops and improve the balance of forces. Thus, the advancing German army was preparing for a strategic defense, while the defending Soviet troops intended to attack decisively.

Construction of defensive lines

Fact 4

Although the Soviet command correctly identified the main directions of German attacks, mistakes were inevitable with such a scale of planning.

Thus, the Headquarters believed that a stronger group would attack in the Orel area against the Central Front. In reality, the southern group operating against the Voronezh Front turned out to be stronger.

In addition, the direction of the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was not accurately determined.

Fact 5

Operation Citadel was the name of the German command’s plan to encircle and destroy the Soviet armies in the Kursk salient. It was planned to deliver converging attacks from the north from the Orel area and from the south from the Belgorod area. The impact wedges were supposed to connect near Kursk. The maneuver with the turn of Hoth's tank corps towards Prokhorovka, where the steppe terrain favors the action of large tank formations, was planned in advance by the German command. It was here that the Germans, reinforced with new tanks, hoped to crush the Soviet tank forces.

Soviet tank crews inspect a damaged Tiger

Fact 6

The battle of Prokhorovka is often called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not so. It is believed that the multi-day battle that took place in the first week of the war (June 23–30) 1941 was larger in terms of the number of tanks participating. It occurred in Western Ukraine between the cities of Brody, Lutsk and Dubno. While about 1,500 tanks from both sides fought at Prokhorovka, more than 3,200 tanks took part in the battle of 1941.

Fact 7

In the Battle of Kursk, and in particular in the battle of Prokhorovka, the Germans especially relied on the strength of their new armored vehicles - Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But perhaps the most unusual new product was the “Goliath” wedges. This tracked self-propelled mine without a crew was controlled remotely via wire. It was intended to destroy tanks, infantry and buildings. However, these wedges were expensive, slow-moving and vulnerable, and therefore did not provide much help to the Germans.

Memorial in honor of the heroes of the Battle of Kursk

Battle of Kursk became one of the most important stages on the path to the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany. In terms of scope, intensity and results, it ranks among the largest battles of the Second World War. The battle lasted less than two months. During this time, in a relatively small area, there was a fierce clash between huge masses of troops using the most modern military equipment of that time. More than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and up to 12 thousand combat aircraft were involved in the battles on both sides. From the Wehrmacht side, more than 100 divisions took part in it, which accounted for over 43 percent of the divisions located on the Soviet-German front. The tank battles that were victorious for the Soviet Army were the greatest in the Second World War. " If the battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the Nazi army, then the battle of Kursk confronted it with disaster».

The hopes of the military-political leadership did not come true " third reich» for success Operation Citadel . During this battle, Soviet troops defeated 30 divisions, the Wehrmacht lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3 thousand guns and more than 3.7 thousand aircraft.

Construction of defensive lines. Kursk Bulge, 1943

Particularly severe defeats were inflicted on the Nazi tank formations. Of the 20 tank and motorized divisions that took part in the Battle of Kursk, 7 were defeated, and the rest suffered significant losses. Nazi Germany could no longer fully compensate for this damage. To the Inspector General of the German Armored Forces Colonel General Guderian I had to admit:

« As a result of the failure of the Citadel Offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to large losses in men and equipment. Their timely restoration for conducting defensive actions on the eastern front, as well as for organizing defense in the West, in case of the landing that the Allies threatened to land next spring, was called into question... and there were no more calm days on the eastern front. The initiative has completely passed to the enemy...».

Before Operation Citadel. From right to left: G. Kluge, V. Model, E. Manstein. 1943

Before Operation Citadel. From right to left: G. Kluge, V. Model, E. Manstein. 1943

Soviet troops are ready to meet the enemy. Kursk Bulge, 1943 ( see comments to the article)

The failure of the offensive strategy in the East forced the Wehrmacht command to seek new ways of waging war in order to try to save fascism from the impending defeat. It hoped to transform the war into positional forms, to gain time, hoping to split the anti-Hitler coalition. West German historian W. Hubach writes: " On the eastern front, the Germans made a last attempt to seize the initiative, but to no avail. The failed Operation Citadel proved to be the beginning of the end for the German army. Since then, the German front in the East has never stabilized.».

The crushing defeat of the Nazi armies on the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union. The victory at Kursk was the result of a great feat of the Soviet Armed Forces and the selfless labor of the Soviet people. This was a new triumph of the wise policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government.

Near Kursk. At the observation post of the commander of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps. From left to right: N. S. Khrushchev, commander of the 6th Guards Army, Lieutenant General I. M. Chistyakov, corps commander, Major General N. B. Ibyansky (July 1943)

Planning Operation Citadel , the Nazis had high hopes for new equipment - tanks " tiger" And " panther", assault guns " Ferdinand", airplanes " Focke-Wulf-190A" They believed that the new weapons entering the Wehrmacht would surpass Soviet military equipment and ensure victory. However, this did not happen. Soviet designers created new models of tanks, self-propelled artillery units, aircraft, and anti-tank artillery, which in terms of their tactical and technical characteristics were not inferior to, and often surpassed, similar enemy systems.

Fighting on the Kursk Bulge , Soviet soldiers constantly felt the support of the working class, the collective farm peasantry, and the intelligentsia, who armed the army with excellent military equipment and provided it with everything necessary for victory. Figuratively speaking, in this grandiose battle, a metal worker, a designer, an engineer, and a grain grower fought shoulder to shoulder with an infantryman, a tankman, an artilleryman, a pilot, and a sapper. The military feat of the soldiers merged with the selfless work of home front workers. The unity of the rear and the front, forged by the Communist Party, created an unshakable foundation for the military successes of the Soviet Armed Forces. Much credit for the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk belonged to the Soviet partisans, who launched active operations behind enemy lines.

Battle of Kursk was of great importance for the course and outcome of events on the Soviet-German front in 1943. It created favorable conditions for the general offensive of the Soviet Army.

had the greatest international significance. It had a great impact on the further course of the Second World War. As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces, favorable conditions were created for the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy in early July 1943. The defeat of the Wehrmacht at Kursk directly influenced the plans of the fascist German command related to the occupation of Sweden. The previously developed plan for the invasion of Hitler's troops into this country was canceled due to the fact that the Soviet-German front absorbed all the enemy's reserves. Back on June 14, 1943, the Swedish envoy in Moscow stated: “ Sweden understands perfectly well that if it still remains out of the war, it is only thanks to the military successes of the USSR. Sweden is grateful to the Soviet Union for this and speaks directly about it».

Increased losses on the fronts, especially in the East, the severe consequences of total mobilization and the growing liberation movement in European countries affected the internal situation in Germany, the morale of German soldiers and the entire population. Distrust in the government increased in the country, critical statements against the fascist party and government leadership became more frequent, and doubts about achieving victory grew. Hitler further intensified repression to strengthen the “internal front.” But neither the bloody terror of the Gestapo nor the colossal efforts of Goebbels’s propaganda machine could neutralize the impact that the defeat at Kursk had on the morale of the population and the Wehrmacht soldiers.

Near Kursk. Direct fire at the advancing enemy

Huge losses of military equipment and weapons placed new demands on the German military industry and further complicated the situation with human resources. Attracting foreign workers into industry, agriculture and transport, for whom Hitler’s “ new order"was deeply hostile, undermined the rear of the fascist state.

After the defeat in Battle of Kursk Germany's influence on the states of the fascist bloc weakened even more, the internal political situation of the satellite countries worsened, and the foreign policy isolation of the Reich increased. The catastrophic result of the Battle of Kursk for the fascist elite predetermined the further cooling of relations between Germany and neutral countries. These countries have reduced supplies of raw materials and materials " third reich».

Victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk raised the authority of the Soviet Union even higher as a decisive force opposing fascism. The whole world looked with hope at the socialist power and its army, bringing deliverance to humanity from the Nazi plague.

Victorious completion of the Battle of Kursk strengthened the struggle of the peoples of enslaved Europe for freedom and independence, intensified the activities of numerous groups of the Resistance movement, including in Germany itself. Under the influence of the victories at Kursk, the peoples of the countries of the anti-fascist coalition began to demand even more decisively for the rapid opening of a second front in Europe.

The successes of the Soviet Army affected the position of the ruling circles of the USA and England. In the midst of the Battle of Kursk President Roosevelt in a special message to the head of the Soviet government he wrote: “ During a month of gigantic battles, your armed forces, with their skill, their courage, their dedication and their tenacity, not only stopped the long-planned German offensive, but also launched a successful counter-offensive, which has far-reaching consequences..."

The Soviet Union can be justly proud of its heroic victories. In the Battle of Kursk The superiority of Soviet military leadership and military art manifested itself with renewed vigor. It showed that the Soviet Armed Forces are a well-coordinated organism in which all types and types of troops are harmoniously combined.

The defense of Soviet troops near Kursk withstood severe tests and achieved my goals. The Soviet Army was enriched with the experience of organizing a deeply layered defense, stable in anti-tank and anti-aircraft terms, as well as the experience of decisive maneuver of forces and means. Pre-created strategic reserves were widely used, most of which were included in the specially created Steppe District (front). His troops increased the depth of defense on a strategic scale and took an active part in the defensive battle and counter-offensive. For the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the total depth of the operational formation of defensive fronts reached 50–70 km. The massing of forces and assets in the directions of expected enemy attacks, as well as the overall operational density of troops in defense, have increased. The strength of defense has increased significantly due to the saturation of troops with military equipment and weapons.

Anti-tank defense reached a depth of up to 35 km, the density of artillery anti-tank fire increased, barriers, mining, anti-tank reserves and mobile barrage units found wider use.

German prisoners after the collapse of Operation Citadel. 1943

German prisoners after the collapse of Operation Citadel. 1943

A major role in increasing the stability of the defense was played by the maneuver of second echelons and reserves, which was carried out from the depths and along the front. For example, during the defensive operation on the Voronezh Front, the regrouping involved about 35 percent of all rifle divisions, over 40 percent of anti-tank artillery units and almost all individual tank and mechanized brigades.

In the Battle of Kursk For the third time during the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces successfully carried out a strategic counteroffensive. If the preparation for a counteroffensive near Moscow and Stalingrad took place in a situation of heavy defensive battles with superior enemy forces, then different conditions developed near Kursk. Thanks to the successes of the Soviet military economy and targeted organizational measures to prepare reserves, the balance of forces had already developed in favor of the Soviet Army by the beginning of the defensive battle.

During the counteroffensive, Soviet troops showed high skill in organizing and conducting offensive operations in summer conditions. The correct choice of the moment of transition from defense to counteroffensive, close operational-strategic interaction of five fronts, a successful breakthrough of the enemy’s defense prepared in advance, the skillful conduct of a simultaneous offensive on a wide front with strikes in several directions, the massive use of armored forces, aviation and artillery - all this had of enormous importance for the defeat of the strategic groupings of the Wehrmacht.

In the counteroffensive, for the first time during the war, second echelons of fronts began to be created as part of one or two combined arms armies (Voronezh Front) and powerful groupings of mobile troops. This allowed the front commanders to build up attacks of the first echelon and develop success in depth or towards the flanks, break through intermediate defensive lines, and also repel strong counterattacks of Nazi troops.

The art of war was enriched in the Battle of Kursk all types of armed forces and branches of the military. In defense, artillery was more decisively massed in the direction of the enemy's main attacks, which ensured the creation of higher operational densities compared to previous defensive operations. The role of artillery in the counteroffensive increased. The density of guns and mortars in the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops reached 150 - 230 guns, and the maximum was 250 guns per kilometer of front.

Soviet tank troops in the Battle of Kursk successfully solved the most complex and varied tasks both in defense and offensive. If until the summer of 1943 tank corps and armies were used in defensive operations primarily to carry out counterattacks, then in the Battle of Kursk they were also used to hold defensive lines. This achieved greater depth of operational defense and increased its stability.

During the counteroffensive, armored and mechanized troops were used en masse, being the main means of front and army commanders in completing a breakthrough of enemy defenses and developing tactical success into operational success. At the same time, the experience of combat operations in the Oryol operation showed the inexpediency of using tank corps and armies to break through positional defenses, since they suffered heavy losses in carrying out these tasks. In the Belgorod-Kharkov direction, the completion of the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone was carried out by advanced tank brigades, and the main forces of tank armies and corps were used for operations in operational depth.

Soviet military art in the use of aviation has risen to a new level. IN Battle of Kursk The massing of front-line and long-range aviation forces in the main axes was carried out more decisively, and their interaction with ground forces improved.

A new form of using aviation in a counteroffensive was fully applied - an air offensive, in which attack and bomber aircraft continuously impacted enemy groups and targets, providing support to ground forces. In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet aviation finally gained strategic air supremacy and thereby contributed to the creation of favorable conditions for subsequent offensive operations.

Successfully passed the test at the Battle of Kursk organizational forms of military branches and special forces. The tank armies of the new organization, as well as artillery corps and other formations, played an important role in achieving victory.

In the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet command demonstrated a creative, innovative approach to solving the most important tasks of the strategy , operational art and tactics, its superiority over the Nazi military school.

Strategic, front-line, army and military logistics agencies have acquired extensive experience in providing comprehensive support to troops. A characteristic feature of the organization of the rear was the approach of rear units and institutions to the front line. This ensured an uninterrupted supply of troops with material resources and timely evacuation of the wounded and sick.

The enormous scope and intensity of the fighting required a large amount of material resources, primarily ammunition and fuel. During the Battle of Kursk, the troops of the Central, Voronezh, Steppe, Bryansk, South-Western and left wing of the Western Fronts were supplied by rail with 141,354 wagons with ammunition, fuel, food and other supplies from central bases and warehouses. By air, 1,828 tons of various supplies were delivered to the troops of the Central Front alone.

The medical service of fronts, armies and formations has been enriched with experience in carrying out preventive and sanitary and hygienic measures, skillful maneuver of the forces and means of medical institutions, and the widespread use of specialized medical care. Despite the significant losses suffered by the troops, many wounded during the Battle of Kursk, thanks to the efforts of military doctors, returned to duty.

Hitler's strategists for planning, organizing and leading Operation Citadel used old, standard methods and methods that did not correspond to the new situation and were well known to the Soviet command. This is recognized by a number of bourgeois historians. So, the English historian A. Clark at work "Barbarossa" notes that the fascist German command again relied on a lightning strike with the widespread use of new military equipment: Junkers, short intensive artillery preparation, close interaction between a mass of tanks and infantry... without due consideration of the changed conditions, except for a simple arithmetic increase in the relevant components." West German historian W. Goerlitz writes that the attack on Kursk was basically carried out “in in accordance with the scheme of previous battles - tank wedges acted to cover from two directions».

Reactionary bourgeois researchers of the Second World War made great efforts to distort events near Kursk . They are trying to rehabilitate the Wehrmacht command, gloss over its mistakes and all the blame for failure of Operation Citadel blamed on Hitler and his closest associates. This position was put forward immediately after the end of the war and has been stubbornly defended to this day. Thus, the former chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Colonel General Halder, was still at work in 1949 "Hitler as a commander", deliberately distorting the facts, claimed that in the spring of 1943, when developing a war plan on the Soviet-German front, “ The commanders of army groups and armies and Hitler's military advisers from the main command of the ground forces tried unsuccessfully to overcome the great operational threat created in the East, to direct him to the only path that promised success - the path of flexible operational leadership, which, like the art of fencing, lies in rapid alternation of cover and strike and compensates for the lack of strength with skillful operational leadership and high fighting qualities of the troops...».

Documents show that miscalculations in planning the armed struggle on the Soviet-German front were made by both the political and military leadership of Germany. The Wehrmacht intelligence service also failed to cope with its tasks. Statements about the non-involvement of the German generals in the development of the most important political and military decisions contradict the facts.

The thesis that the offensive of Hitler’s troops near Kursk had limited goals and that failure of Operation Citadel cannot be considered as a phenomenon of strategic importance.

In recent years, works have appeared that give a fairly close to objective assessment of a number of events of the Battle of Kursk. American historian M. Caidin in the book "Tigers" are burning" characterizes the Battle of Kursk as " greatest land battle ever fought in history”, and does not agree with the opinion of many researchers in the West that it pursued limited, auxiliary” goals. " History deeply doubts, - writes the author, - in German statements that they did not believe in the future. Everything was decided at Kursk. What happened there determined the future course of events" The same idea is reflected in the annotation to the book, where it is noted that the battle of Kursk “ broke the back of the German army in 1943 and changed the entire course of the Second World War... Few outside Russia understand the enormity of this stunning clash. In fact, even today the Soviets feel bitterness as they see Western historians downplaying the Russian triumph at Kursk».

Why did the last attempt of the fascist German command to carry out a major victorious offensive in the East and regain the lost strategic initiative fail? The main reasons for failure Operation Citadel the increasingly stronger economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union, the superiority of Soviet military art, and the boundless heroism and courage of Soviet soldiers appeared. In 1943, the Soviet war economy produced more military equipment and weapons than the industry of Nazi Germany, which used the resources of the enslaved countries of Europe.

But the growth of the military power of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces was ignored by Nazi political and military leaders. Underestimating the capabilities of the Soviet Union and overestimating its own strengths were an expression of the adventurism of the fascist strategy.

From a purely military point of view, complete failure of Operation Citadel to a certain extent was due to the fact that the Wehrmacht failed to achieve surprise in the attack. Thanks to the efficient work of all types of reconnaissance, including airborne, the Soviet command knew about the impending offensive and took the necessary measures. The military leadership of the Wehrmacht believed that no defense could resist powerful tank rams, supported by massive air operations. But these predictions turned out to be unfounded; at the cost of huge losses, the tanks only slightly wedged themselves into the Soviet defenses north and south of Kursk and got stuck on the defensive.

An important reason collapse of Operation Citadel The secretiveness of the preparation of Soviet troops for both a defensive battle and a counteroffensive was revealed. The fascist leadership did not have a complete understanding of the plans of the Soviet command. In preparation for July 3, that is, the day before German offensive near Kursk, department for the study of the armies of the East “Assessment of enemy actions during Operation Citadel there is not even a mention of the possibility of a counteroffensive by Soviet troops against Wehrmacht strike forces.

The major miscalculations of fascist German intelligence in assessing the forces of the Soviet Army concentrated in the area of ​​the Kursk salient are convincingly evidenced by the report card of the operational department of the General Staff of the German Army Ground Forces, prepared on July 4, 1943. It even contains information about the Soviet troops deployed in the first operational echelon are reflected inaccurately. German intelligence had very sketchy information about the reserves located in the Kursk direction.

At the beginning of July, the situation on the Soviet-German front and possible decisions of the Soviet command were assessed by the political and military leaders of Germany, essentially, from their previous positions. They firmly believed in the possibility of a major victory.

Soviet soldiers in the battles of Kursk showed courage, resilience and mass heroism. The Communist Party and the Soviet government highly appreciated the greatness of their feat. Military orders sparkled on the banners of many formations and units, 132 formations and units received the guards rank, 26 formations and units were awarded the honorary names of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachev. More than 100 thousand soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals were awarded orders and medals, over 180 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, including private V.E. Breusov, division commander Major General L.N. Gurtiev, platoon commander Lieutenant V.V. Zhenchenko, battalion Komsomol organizer Lieutenant N.M. Zverintsev, battery commander Captain G.I. Igishev, private A.M. Lomakin, platoon deputy commander, senior sergeant Kh.M. Mukhamadiev, squad commander Sergeant V.P. Petrishchev, gun commander Junior Sergeant A.I. Petrov, Senior Sergeant G.P. Pelikanov, Sergeant V.F. Chernenko and others.

Victory of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased role of party political work. Commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol organizations helped the personnel understand the significance of the upcoming battles, their role in defeating the enemy. By personal example, the communists attracted the fighters with them. Political agencies took measures to maintain and replenish party organizations in their divisions. This ensured continuous party influence over all personnel.

An important means of mobilizing soldiers for military exploits was the promotion of advanced experience and the popularization of units and subunits that distinguished themselves in battle. The orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, declaring gratitude to the personnel of the distinguished troops, had great inspiring power - they were widely promoted in units and formations, read out at rallies, and distributed through leaflets. Extracts from the orders were given to each soldier.

The increase in the morale of Soviet soldiers and confidence in victory was facilitated by timely information from personnel about events in the world and in the country, about the successes of the Soviet troops and the defeats of the enemy. Political agencies and party organizations, carrying out active work to educate personnel, played an important role in achieving victories in defensive and offensive battles. Together with their commanders, they held high the banner of the party and were bearers of its spirit, discipline, steadfastness and courage. They mobilized and inspired soldiers to defeat the enemy.

« The giant battle on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge in the summer of 1943, noted L. I. Brezhnev , – broke the back of Nazi Germany and incinerated its armored shock troops. The superiority of our army in combat skills, weapons, and strategic leadership has become clear to the whole world.».

The victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk opened up new opportunities for the fight against German fascism and the liberation of Soviet lands temporarily captured by the enemy. Firmly holding the strategic initiative. The Soviet Armed Forces increasingly launched a general offensive.

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion up to 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide, facing west (the so-called “Kursk Bulge”), formed in the center of the Soviet-German front. Throughout April - June, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties prepared for the summer campaign.

Plans and strengths of the parties

The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk salient in the summer of 1943. It was planned to launch converging attacks from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The strike groups were supposed to unite in the Kursk area, encircling the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name “Citadel”. At a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted according to Gott’s proposal: the 2nd SS Corps turns from the Oboyan direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with the armored reserves of the Soviet troops. And, based on losses, continue the offensive or go on the defensive. (from the interrogation of the chief of staff of the 4th Tank Army, General Fangor)

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 o'clock in the morning (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow time as 5 o'clock in the morning), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time the forces of two fronts carried out counter-artillery preparation with an amount of ammunition 0.25 ammo. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. There was also an unsuccessful air raid by the 2nd and 17th Air Armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the enemy’s Kharkov and Belgorod air hubs.

Battle of Prokhorovka

On July 12, the largest oncoming tank battle in history took place in the Prokhorovka area. On the German side, according to V. Zamulin, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 494 tanks and self-propelled guns, took part in it, including 15 Tigers and not a single Panther. According to Soviet sources, about 700 tanks and assault guns took part in the battle on the German side. On the Soviet side, the 5th Tank Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, took part in the battle. After a massive air strike [source not specified 237 days], the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day. By the end of July 12, the battle ended with unclear results, only to resume on the afternoon of July 13 and 14. After the battle, German troops were unable to advance any significantly, despite the fact that the losses of the Soviet tank army, caused by tactical errors of its command, were much greater. Having advanced 35 kilometers between July 5 and 12, Manstein’s troops were forced, after trampling on the achieved lines for three days in vain attempts to break into the Soviet defenses, to begin withdrawing troops from the captured “bridgehead.” During the battle, a turning point occurred. Soviet troops, which went on the offensive on July 23, pushed back the German armies in the south of the Kursk Bulge to their original positions.

Losses

According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, and over 3,500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield of the Battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers have been called into question. For example, according to G. A. Oleinikov’s calculations, more than 300 German tanks could not have taken part in the battle. According to research by A. Tomzov, citing data from the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles of July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irretrievably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs , in the short term - 15 Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III tanks. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Tank Tank on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf division.

- At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks

The central front, involved in the battle in the north of the arc, suffered losses of 33,897 people from July 5-11, 1943, of which 15,336 were irrevocable, its enemy - Model’s 9th Army - lost 20,720 people during the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which took part in the battle on the southern front of the arc, lost from July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including the Voronezh Front alone - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed that the losses of their front were 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irrevocable. If, contrary to Soviet documents from the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account the German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides here is 4.95: 1.

- During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front consumed 1079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh Front used 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was due to the smaller massing of forces and assets in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov). On July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel-General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by Colonel-General Markian Popov) fronts launched an offensive against the enemy’s 2nd Tank and 9th armies in the Orel region. By the end of the day on July 13, Soviet troops broke through the enemy’s defenses. On July 26, the Germans left the Oryol bridgehead and began to retreat to the Hagen defensive line (east of Bryansk). On August 5 at 05-45, Soviet troops completely liberated Oryol.

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev). On the southern front, the counter-offensive by forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at approximately 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway on August 11, and captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were unsuccessful.

- On August 5, the first fireworks display of the entire war was given in Moscow - in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

- The victory at Kursk marked the transition of the strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for the attack on the Dnieper.

- After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as the Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945), were also unsuccessful.

- Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, subsequently wrote:

- It was the last attempt to maintain our initiative in the East. With its failure, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. Therefore, Operation Citadel is a decisive turning point in the war on the Eastern Front.

- - Manstein E. Lost victories. Per. with him. - M., 1957. - P. 423

- According to Guderian,

- As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to large losses in men and equipment.

- - Guderian G. Memoirs of a Soldier. - Smolensk: Rusich, 1999

Discrepancies in loss estimates

- The losses of the parties in the battle remain unclear. Thus, Soviet historians, including Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. M. Samsonov, talk about more than 500,000 killed, wounded and prisoners, 1,500 tanks and over 3,700 aircraft.

However, German archival data indicate that the Wehrmacht lost 537,533 people on the entire Eastern Front in July-August 1943. These figures include the killed, wounded, sick, and missing (the number of German prisoners in this operation was insignificant). And even despite the fact that the main fighting at that time took place in the Kursk region, the Soviet figures for German losses of 500 thousand look somewhat exaggerated.

- In addition, according to German documents, on the entire Eastern Front the Luftwaffe lost 1,696 aircraft in July-August 1943.

On the other hand, even Soviet commanders during the war did not consider Soviet military reports about German losses to be accurate. Thus, General Malinin (chief of staff of the front) wrote to lower headquarters: “Looking at the daily results of the day about the amount of manpower and equipment destroyed and captured trophies, I came to the conclusion that these data are significantly inflated and, therefore, do not correspond to reality.”

A people who forgets their past has no future. This is what the ancient Greek philosopher Plato once said. In the middle of the last century, “fifteen sister republics” united by “Great Russia” inflicted a crushing defeat on the plague of humanity - fascism. The fierce battle was marked by a number of victories of the Red Army, which can be called key. The topic of this article is one of the decisive battles of the Second World War - the Kursk Bulge, one of the fateful battles that marked the final mastery of the strategic initiative by our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. From that time on, the German occupiers began to be crushed on all fronts. The purposeful movement of fronts to the West began. From that time on, the fascists forgot what “forward to the East” meant.

Historical parallels

The Kursk confrontation took place 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943 on the original Russian Land, over which the great noble prince Alexander Nevsky once held his shield. His prophetic warning to the Western conquerors (who came to us with a sword) about imminent death from the onslaught of the Russian sword that met them once again took effect. It is characteristic that the Kursk Bulge was somewhat similar to the battle given by Prince Alexander to the Teutonic Knights on 04/05/1242. Of course, the armament of the armies, the scale and time of these two battles are incommensurable. But the scenario of both battles is somewhat similar: the Germans with their main forces tried to break through the Russian battle formation in the center, but were crushed by the offensive actions of the flanks.

If we pragmatically try to say what is unique about the Kursk Bulge, a brief summary will be as follows: unprecedented in history (before and after) operational-tactical density on 1 km of front.

Battle disposition

The offensive of the Red Army after the Battle of Stalingrad from November 1942 to March 1943 was marked by the defeat of about 100 enemy divisions, driven back from the North Caucasus, Don, and Volga. But due to the losses suffered by our side, by the beginning of spring 1943 the front had stabilized. On the map of the fighting in the center of the front line with the Germans, towards the Nazi army, a protrusion stood out, to which the military gave the name Kursk Bulge. The spring of 1943 brought calm to the front: no one was attacking, both sides were rapidly accumulating forces in order to again seize the strategic initiative.

Preparation for Nazi Germany

After the defeat of Stalingrad, Hitler announced mobilization, as a result of which the Wehrmacht grew, more than covering the losses incurred. There were 9.5 million people “under arms” (including 2.3 million reservists). 75% of the most combat-ready active troops (5.3 million people) were on the Soviet-German front.

The Fuhrer longed to seize the strategic initiative in the war. The turning point, in his opinion, should have occurred precisely on that section of the front where the Kursk Bulge was located. To implement the plan, the Wehrmacht headquarters developed the strategic operation “Citadel”. The plan involved delivering attacks converging on Kursk (from the north - from the Orel region; from the south - from the Belgorod region). In this way, the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts fell into the “cauldron”.

For this operation, 50 divisions were concentrated in this section of the front, including. 16 tank and motorized troops, totaling 0.9 million selected, fully equipped troops; 2.7 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft; 10 thousand mortars and guns.

In this group, the transition to new weapons was mainly carried out: Panther and Tiger tanks, Ferdinand assault guns.

In preparing the Soviet troops for battle, one should pay tribute to the leadership talent of Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov. He, together with the Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky, reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief J.V. Stalin the assumption that the Kursk Bulge would become the main future site of the battle, and also predicted the approximate strength of the advancing enemy group.

Along the front line, the fascists were opposed by the Voronezh Front (commander - General N. F. Vatutin) and the Central Front (commander - General K. K. Rokossovsky) with a total number of 1.34 million people. They were armed with 19 thousand mortars and guns; 3.4 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft. (As we can see, the advantage was on their side). Secretly from the enemy, the reserve Steppe Front (commander I.S. Konev) was located behind the listed fronts. It consisted of a tank, aviation and five combined arms armies, supplemented by separate corps.

Control and coordination of the actions of this group were carried out personally by G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

Tactical battle plan

Marshal Zhukov's plan assumed that the battle on the Kursk Bulge would have two phases. The first is defensive, the second is offensive.

A deeply echeloned bridgehead (300 km deep) was equipped. The total length of its trenches was approximately equal to the Moscow-Vladivostok distance. It had 8 powerful lines of defense. The purpose of such defense was to weaken the enemy as much as possible, deprive him of the initiative, making the task as easy as possible for the attackers. In the second, offensive phase of the battle, two offensive operations were planned. First: Operation Kutuzov with the aim of eliminating the fascist group and liberating the city of Orel. Second: “Commander Rumyantsev” to destroy the Belgorod-Kharkov group of invaders.

Thus, with the actual advantage of the Red Army, the battle on the Kursk Bulge took place on the Soviet side “from defense.” For offensive actions, as tactics teach, two to three times the number of troops was required.

Shelling

It turned out that the time of the offensive of the fascist troops became known in advance. The day before, German sappers began making passages in the minefields. Soviet front-line intelligence began a battle with them and took prisoners. The time of the offensive became known from the “tongues”: 03:00 07/05/1943.

The reaction was prompt and adequate: At 2-20 07/05/1943, Marshal Rokossovsky K.K. (commander of the Central Front), with the approval of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov, carried out a preventive powerful artillery shelling by frontal artillery forces. This was an innovation in combat tactics. The invaders were fired upon by hundreds of Katyusha rockets, 600 guns, and 460 mortars. For the Nazis this was a complete surprise; they suffered losses.

Only at 4:30, having regrouped, they were able to carry out their artillery preparation, and at 5:30 go on the offensive. The Battle of Kursk has begun.

Start of the battle

Of course, our commanders could not predict everything. In particular, both the General Staff and Headquarters expected the main blow from the Nazis in the southern direction, towards the city of Orel (which was defended by the Central Front, commander - General Vatutin N.F.). In reality, the battle on the Kursk Bulge from the German troops was focused on the Voronezh Front, from the north. Two battalions of heavy tanks, eight tank divisions, a division of assault guns, and one motorized division moved against Nikolai Fedorovich’s troops. In the first phase of the battle, the first hot spot was the village of Cherkasskoe (virtually wiped off the face of the earth), where two Soviet rifle divisions held back the advance of five enemy divisions for 24 hours.

German offensive tactics

This Great War is famous for its martial art. The Kursk Bulge fully demonstrated the confrontation between two strategies. What did the German offensive look like? Heavy equipment was moving ahead along the front of the attack: 15-20 Tiger tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns. Following them were from fifty to a hundred medium Panther tanks, accompanied by infantry. Thrown back, they regrouped and repeated the attack. The attacks resembled the ebb and flow of the sea, following each other.

We will follow the advice of the famous military historian, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Professor Matvey Vasilyevich Zakharov, we will not idealize our defense of the 1943 model, we will present it objectively.

We have to talk about German tank battle tactics. The Kursk Bulge (this should be admitted) demonstrated the art of Colonel General Hermann Hoth; he “jewelfully,” if one can say so about tanks, brought his 4th Army into battle. At the same time, our 40th Army with 237 tanks, the most equipped with artillery (35.4 units per 1 km), under the command of General Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, turned out to be much to the left, i.e. out of work The opposing 6th Guards Army (commander I.M. Chistyakov) had a gun density per 1 km of 24.4 with 135 tanks. Mainly the 6th Army, far from the most powerful, was hit by Army Group South, whose commander was the most gifted Wehrmacht strategist, Erich von Manstein. (By the way, this man was one of the few who constantly argued on issues of strategy and tactics with Adolf Hitler, for which, in fact, he was dismissed in 1944).

Tank battle near Prokhorovka

In the current difficult situation, in order to eliminate the breakthrough, the Red Army brought into battle strategic reserves: the 5th Guards Tank Army (commander P. A. Rotmistrov) and the 5th Guards Army (commander A. S. Zhadov)

The possibility of a flank attack by the Soviet tank army in the area of ​​the village of Prokhorovka was previously considered by the German General Staff. Therefore, the divisions “Totenkopf” and “Leibstandarte” changed the direction of attack to 90 0 - for a head-on collision with the army of General Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov.

Tanks on the Kursk Bulge: 700 combat vehicles went into battle on the German side, 850 on our side. An impressive and terrible picture. As eyewitnesses recall, the roar was so loud that blood flowed from the ears. They had to shoot point-blank, which caused the towers to collapse. When approaching the enemy from the rear, they tried to fire at the tanks, causing the tanks to burst into flames. The tankers seemed to be in prostration - while they were alive, they had to fight. It was impossible to retreat or hide.

Of course, it was unwise to attack the enemy in the first phase of the operation (if during the defense we suffered losses of one in five, what would they have been like during the offensive?!). At the same time, Soviet soldiers showed real heroism on this battlefield. 100,000 people were awarded orders and medals, and 180 of them were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Nowadays, the day of its end - August 23 - is celebrated annually by residents of the country like Russia.