The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.
Napoleon
Plan Barbarossa is a plan for a German attack on the USSR, based on the principle of lightning war, blitzkrieg. The plan began to be developed in the summer of 1940, and on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan according to which the war was to end in November 1941 at the latest.
Plan Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, the 12th century emperor who became famous for his campaigns of conquest. This contained elements of symbolism, to which Hitler himself and his entourage paid so much attention. The plan received its name on January 31, 1941.
Number of troops to implement the plan
Germany was preparing 190 divisions to fight the war and 24 divisions as reserves. 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions were allocated for the war. Total number The contingent that Germany sent to the USSR, according to various estimates, ranges from 5 to 5.5 million people.
The apparent superiority in USSR technology is not worth taking into account, since by the beginning of the wars, Germany's technical tanks and aircraft were superior to those of the Soviet Union, and the army itself was much more trained. Enough to remember Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940, where the Red Army demonstrated weakness in literally everything.
Direction of the main attack
Barbarossa's plan determined 3 main directions for attack:
- Army Group "South". A blow to Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea and access to the Caucasus. Further movement to the line Astrakhan - Stalingrad (Volgograd).
- Army Group "Center". Line "Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow". Promotion to Nizhny Novgorod, aligning the Volna - Northern Dvina line.
- Army Group "North". Attack on the Baltic states, Leningrad and further advance to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. At the same time, the “Norway” army was supposed to fight in the north together with the Finnish army.
| SOUTH | CENTER | NORTH | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target | Ukraine, Crimea, access to the Caucasus | Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow | Baltic states, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk |
| Number | 57 divisions and 13 brigades | 50 divisions and 2 brigades | 29th Division + Army "Norway" |
| Commanding | Field Marshal von Rundstedt | Field Marshal von Bock | Field Marshal von Leeb |
| common goal | Get on line: Arkhangelsk – Volga – Astrakhan (Northern Dvina) |
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Around the end of October 1941, the German command planned to reach the Volga - Northern Dvina line, thereby capturing the entire European part of the USSR. This was the plan for the lightning war. After the blitzkrieg, there should have been lands beyond the Urals, which, without the support of the center, would have quickly surrendered to the winner.
Until about mid-August 1941, the Germans believed that the war was going according to plan, but in September there were already entries in the diaries of officers that the Barbarossa plan had failed and the war would be lost. The best proof The fact that Germany in August 1941 believed that only a few weeks remained before the end of the war with the USSR was a speech by Goebbels. The Minister of Propaganda suggested that the Germans collect additional warm clothes for the needs of the army. The government decided that this step was not necessary, since there would be no war in the winter.
Implementation of the plan
The first three weeks of the war assured Hitler that everything was going according to plan. The army rapidly moved forward, winning victories, but the Soviet army suffered huge losses:
- 28 divisions out of 170 were put out of action.
- 70 divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.
- 72 divisions remained combat-ready (43% of those available at the start of the war).
Over the same 3 weeks, the average rate of advance of German troops deep into the country was 30 km per day.
By July 11, the Army Group “North” occupied almost the entire Baltic territory, providing access to Leningrad, the Army Group “Center” reached Smolensk, and the Army Group “South” reached Kiev. These were the latest achievements that were fully consistent with the plan of the German command. After this, failures began (still local, but already indicative). Nevertheless, the initiative in the war until the end of 1941 was on the side of Germany.
Germany's failures in the North
Army “North” occupied the Baltic states without any problems, especially since there was practically no partisan movement there. The next strategic point to be captured was Leningrad. Here it turned out that the Wehrmacht was beyond its strength. The city did not capitulate to the enemy and until the end of the war, despite all efforts, Germany was unable to capture it.
Army Failures Center
Army "Center" reached Smolensk without problems, but was stuck near the city until September 10. Smolensk resisted for almost a month. German command required a decisive victory and the advancement of troops, since such a delay near the city, which was planned to be taken without great losses, was unacceptable and called into question the implementation of Barbarossa’s plan. As a result, the Germans took Smolensk, but their troops were pretty battered.
Historians today assess the Battle of Smolensk as a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for Russia, since it was possible to stop the advance of troops towards Moscow, which allowed the capital to prepare for defense.
Complicated the advance of the German army deep into the country partisan movement Belarus.
Failures of the Army South
Army “South” reached Kyiv in 3.5 weeks and, like Army “Center” near Smolensk, was stuck in battle. Ultimately, the city was taken into account obvious superiority army, but Kyiv held out almost until the end of September, which also hampered the advance of the German army, and made a significant contribution to the disruption of the Barbarossa plan.
Map of the German advance plan
Above is a map showing the German command's offensive plan. The map shows: in green – the borders of the USSR, in red – the border to which Germany planned to reach, in blue – the deployment and plan for the advancement of German troops.
General state of affairs
- In the North, it was not possible to capture Leningrad and Murmansk. The advance of the troops stopped.
- It was with great difficulty that the Center managed to reach Moscow. At the time the German army reached the Soviet capital, it was already clear that no blitzkrieg had happened.
- In the South it was not possible to take Odessa and seize the Caucasus. By the end of September Hitler's troops They just captured Kyiv and launched an attack on Kharkov and Donbass.
Why Germany's blitzkrieg failed
Germany's blitzkrieg failed because the Wehrmacht prepared the Barbarossa plan, as it later turned out, based on false intelligence data. Hitler admitted this by the end of 1941, saying that if he had known the real state of affairs in the USSR, he would not have started the war on June 22.
The tactics of lightning war were based on the fact that the country has one line of defense on the western border, all large army units are located on the western border, and aviation is located on the border. Since Hitler was confident that all Soviet troops were located on the border, this formed the basis of the blitzkrieg - to destroy the enemy army in the first weeks of the war, and then quickly move deeper into the country without encountering serious resistance.
In fact, there were several lines of defense, the army was not located with all its forces on the western border, there were reserves. Germany did not expect this, and by August 1941 it became clear that the lightning war had failed and Germany could not win the war. The fact that the Second World War lasted right up to 1945 only proves that the Germans fought in a very organized and brave manner. Thanks to the fact that they had the economy of the whole of Europe behind them (speaking of the war between Germany and the USSR, many for some reason forget that the German army included units from almost all European countries) they were able to fight successfully.
Did Barbarossa's plan fail?
I propose to evaluate the Barbarossa plan according to 2 criteria: global and local. Global(reference point - the Great Patriotic War) - the plan was thwarted, since the lightning war did not work out, the German troops were bogged down in battles. Local(landmark – intelligence data) – the plan was carried out. The German command drew up the Barbarossa plan based on the assumption that the USSR had 170 divisions on the country’s border and there were no additional echelons of defense. There are no reserves or reinforcements. The army was preparing for this. In 3 weeks, 28 Soviet divisions were completely destroyed, and in 70, approximately 50% of the personnel and equipment were disabled. At this stage, the blitzkrieg worked and, in the absence of reinforcements from the USSR, gave the desired results. But it turned out that the Soviet command had reserves, not all troops were located on the border, mobilization brought high-quality soldiers into the army, there were additional lines of defense, the “charm” of which Germany felt near Smolensk and Kiev.
Therefore, the failure of the Barbarossa plan should be considered as a huge strategic mistake of German intelligence, led by Wilhelm Canaris. Today, some historians connect this man with English agents, but there is no evidence of this. But if we assume that this is really the case, then it becomes clear why Canaris palmed Hitler off with the absolute lie that the USSR was not ready for war and all the troops were located on the border.
Plan Barbarossa is a program developed by Hitler for the conquest of the USSR.
It is considered the Fuhrer’s most important miscalculation, which four years after the start of the plan led Germany to defeat.
Prerequisites
From the moment they came to power in 1933, the Nazis promoted a policy of occupation eastern territories. Such propaganda was very convenient: it allowed the Nazis to gain the support of the people, who were convinced that all of Germany's problems arose as a result of the loss in the First World War and the loss of territories.
Germany must regain its former power, the Nazis declared, and be reborn as great empire. In turn, the promise of imperial greatness allowed the oligarchs, whose henchmen were the Nazis, not to deal with the solution of social and economic problems in the country and keep your capital for yourself.
The plan to attack the USSR was given the code name "Barbarossa" in honor of Frederick I Barbarossa, the 12th-century German ruler who also tried to revive the empire of Charlemagne. The authors of the concept seemed to hint that what Friedrich could not do to the end, Adolf Hitler would do. At the same time, the inevitability of war with the Soviet Union was also promoted.
In 1939, Germany concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR in order to protect itself from the east, and in September of the same year, both countries almost simultaneously attacked Poland: the USSR appropriated the eastern regions (Western Ukraine and Western Belarus), and everything else went to the Germans, who established the Polish General Government.
Why was it necessary to attack the USSR?
In achieving world domination, Hitler's Germany had a serious rival - Great Britain. And she hoped for help from two other superpowers - the USSR and the USA. To overcome their main enemy, the Nazis developed a plan for a phased takeover of the world:
- The defeat of the USSR will lead to the strengthening of the Nazi ally - Japan;
- Japan, with German support, will defeat the United States.
- Having lost both allies, England will leave Europe and Germany will remain dominant in it.
Before arriving at this plan, the Nazi government held a series of negotiations with several countries, including the Soviet Union. In 1940, the Berlin Pact was initiated to rally new allies around Germany against England. The USSR responded that it was ready to join the treaty only under a number of certain conditions, which the German side could not accept.
Thus, the USSR was declared a serious enemy of Germany and “ the last frontier"on the Nazis' path to domination of Europe.
Hit from multiple sides
The German government was confident that “Russia” (as they called the Soviet Union) could be conquered with one lightning attack. To do this, the attack had to be carried out from several sides:
- North - from the Baltic side;
- South - from the Ukrainian side;
- Later, a separate operation was planned to attack Baku.
The Nazis set a tough task - to conquer the Soviet Union by the spring of 1941. An important point Moscow was considered the largest and most developed city in the country, its capital and most important railway junction. The Nazi government believed that the Red Army would throw all its forces into defending Moscow, weakening other strategically important areas.
Plans were also prepared for the division of the USSR. European part The country was planned to be decentralized and divided into several economic zones, which were to become an agricultural and raw materials appendage of the Reich. Modern industrial equipment had to be taken to the Reich. In the future, these zones were planned to be reorganized into separate states controlled by Germany.
Hitler's Miscalculations
Barbarossa's plan was only good on paper. The Nazis underestimated the capabilities of Soviet defense and clearly overestimated their own strength. Instead of a lightning strike, they received a multi-year protracted war which ended with the capture of Berlin by Soviet troops and the fall of fascist regime.
Meanwhile, at first this was not noticeable: Soviet troops suffered defeats in border battles, as well as at the first stage of the Great Patriotic War, when Germany quite quickly conquered the territories of Ukraine and Belarus.
The defeats of the Soviet army were due to several reasons, including:
- Massive Stalinist repressions, including against the high command;
- The new commanders who took their posts in place of those repressed were not distinguished by their professionalism and proper training;
- Insufficient interaction various genera troops, their poor preparation for a big war;
- The Soviet army leadership hoped for an offensive nature of the war and did not do enough defensive operations.
Hitler openly declared that his goal was world domination Germany. Everyone who took the hysterical Nazi leader seriously understood that his rise to power would inevitably lead to a new European and then world war.
From election to election, Hitler's National Socialist workers' party Germany was gaining more and more votes and was already one step away from power. All the resistance of the Comintern under pressure from Stalin and the Western Communist Parties, which threw all their strength into the fight against the Social Democrats, turned out to be split into the most decisive moment and the Nazi party, having received only a third of the votes in the parliamentary elections of 1933, took control state power in Germany. Hitler became chancellor, assumed unlimited powers, crushed the Social Democrats and Communists by force, and established a fascist dictatorship in the country. A state appeared in the center of Europe, striving to redistribute the world and ready to sweep away everything in its path with armed force.
Germany began implementing its program to equip the army with the latest weapons in 1936. The aggressiveness of Hitler's foreign policy was intensified by the growth of the country's military power. Its officially declared goal was the annexation of all neighboring territories of states in which the majority of the population was German. This could only be achieved by breaking the post-war boundaries by force or the threat of force. None of the large European countries, neither England nor France, were ready to fight for the interests of the small countries of Europe, to which Germany had territorial claims. The powers that were once part of the Entente for the sake of maintaining peace in Europe (especially in cases where this sacrifice had to be made by others).
That is why Hitler so brazenly and freely violated the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty: he created the largest Western Europe army and armed it with modern military equipment; sent troops into the border areas with France; annexed Austria to his Reich; obtained from the French and English governments the transfer of the Judicial Region and Czechoslovakia to Germany. (With the loss of this mountain range, which surrounded on three sides lowland areas country, Czechoslovakia became militarily defenseless - a strip of defensive fortifications built in the Sudeji Mountains fell into the hands of the aggressor without a fight).
The successes of the German aggressors attracted other countries to their side, whose leaders also dreamed of conquest; By the end of the 1930s, a military alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan (called Anti-Comintern Pact). Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria were inclined to cooperate with Hitler. At the beginning of 1939, it became clear that the world would not be able to get along with fascism - Germany occupied, dismembered and turned Czechoslovakia into its colony, seized the Memel region (Lithuania Minor - the region of modern Klaipeda) from Lithuania, and made claims against Poland; Italy subjugated Albania. Hitler was choosing a new victim in Europe, Mussolini was targeting North Africa, Japan occupied one province after another in China and developed plans to seize British and French possessions in Asia.
Plan "Barbarossa"
Preparing for the attack, Hitler and his leadership did not expect to tinker with the USSR for long. He expected to complete the entire campaign to enslave our Motherland within a few months. For these purposes, a plan was developed, which was called the “Barbarossa” plan, drawn up in the spirit of the “Lightning War,” which had already brought success more than once.
The strength of the Wehrmacht was the high professionalism of its officers, internal organization and good training of all branches of the military. Nevertheless, for Hitler, an attack on the USSR was an extremely risky business, both for objective reasons and, according to sound calculations, it promised very little chance of success. Even focusing on Soviet border¾ of its own armed forces with the addition of the army of its allies, Germany could not achieve equality of strength of the Red Army opposing it, especially in technology (in addition, German intelligence in its reports erroneously downplayed the deployment of Soviet troops and the economic capabilities of the USSR. So in the book “50 Years of the Armed Forces” forces of the USSR" it is said: In fact, in the western European districts alone there were 170 divisions and 2 brigades of the Soviet army. A particularly big miscalculation was made by the Nazis when determining the number of Soviet troops stationed in the internal districts).
Strategic reserves, materials and ammunition to conduct such great war There were clearly not enough, and there was nowhere to take them - except in the captured enemy territory. With such an unfavorable balance of forces, the Germans could only count on the stunning surprise of the attack and the absolute unpreparedness of the Soviet troops to defend their own territory from unexpected aggression.
The plan for Operation Barbarossa provided for just such a strike with all available forces - while creating superiority in narrow, decisive sectors of the front. The task was to encircle and destroy the main forces of the Red Army in fast-moving border battles; "The retreat of combat-ready enemy troops to wide open spaces Russian territory should have been prevented."
The essence of what Hitler conceived in the Barbarossa plan boiled down to the following: On the evening of December 18, 1940, Hitler signed a directive for the deployment of military operations against the USSR, which received serial number No. 21 and the symbol variant “Barbarossa” (Fall “Barbarossa”). It was made in only nine copies, three of which were presented to the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces (ground forces, air force and navy), and six were locked in OKW safes.
Directive No. 21 set out only the general plan and initial instructions for waging war against the USSR and did not represent a complete war plan. The war plan against the USSR is a whole complex of political, economic and strategic measures of the Hitlerite leadership. In addition to the directive, the plan also included orders from the Supreme High Command and the main commands of the armed forces on strategic concentration and deployment, logistics, preparation for the theater of military operations, camouflage, disinformation and other documents. Among these documents, the directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of ground forces of January 31, 1941 was especially important. It specified and clarified the tasks and methods of action of the armed forces set out in Directive No. 21.
Plan Barbarossa was intended to defeat the Soviet Union in one short campaign before the war against England was over. Leningrad, Moscow, the Central Industrial Region and the Donetsk Basin were recognized as the main strategic objects. Special place Moscow was allocated in the plan. It was assumed that its capture would be decisive for the victorious outcome of the war. According to the plan of the German General Staff, with success in western regions USSR german army could capture Moscow in the fall. " The ultimate goal operations - said in the directive, is access to the Volga-Arkhangelsk line by winter, and the creation protective barrier against Asian Russia. There was no intention of going any further. Thus, if necessary, the last industrial region and the last military-industrial base of the USSR remaining with the Russians in the Urals should be destroyed by massive bombing from the air, with the help of aviation. For destruction Soviet Union it was planned to use all German ground forces, excluding only the formations and units necessary to conduct occupation service in the enslaved countries.
The German Air Force was tasked with “releasing such forces to support the ground forces during the eastern campaign so that we could count on a quick completion ground operations and at the same time limit destruction to a minimum eastern regions Germany by enemy aircraft." For combat operations at sea against the three Soviet fleets - the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea - it was planned to allocate a significant part of the warships of the German Navy and the navies of Finland and Romania.
According to the Barbarossa plan, 152 divisions (including 19 tank and 14 motorized) and two brigades were allocated for the attack on the USSR. Germany's allies 29 infantry divisions and 16 brigades. Thus, a total of 190 divisions were allocated. In addition, two-thirds of the air force available in Germany and significant naval forces were involved in the war against the USSR. The ground forces intended to attack the Soviet Union were consolidated into three army groups: “South” - the 11th, 17th and 6th field armies and the 1st tank group; “Center” - 4th and 9th field armies, 2nd and 3rd tank groups; "North" - 16th and 18th and 4th tank groups. The 2nd Separate Field Army remained in the OKH reserve; Army Norway was given the task of operating independently in the Murmansk and Kandalash directions.
Plan Barbarossa contained a somewhat refined assessment of the Soviet Armed Forces. According to German data, by the beginning of the German invasion (on June 20, 1941), the Soviet Armed Forces had 170 rifle, 33.5 cavalry divisions and 46 mechanized and tank brigades. Of these, as stated by the fascist command, 118 rifle, 20 cavalry divisions and 40 brigades stationed in the western border districts, 27 rifle, 5.5 cavalry divisions and 1 brigade in the rest of the European part of the USSR, and 33 divisions and 5 brigades in the Far East. It was assumed that Soviet aviation consisted of 8 thousand combat aircraft (including about 1,100 modern ones), of which 6 thousand were in the European part of the USSR.
Hitler's command assumed that Soviet troops deployed in the west would use field fortifications on the new and old state borders for defense, as well as numerous water barriers, and would enter the battle in large formations west of the rivers Dnieper and Western Dvina. At the same time, the Soviet command will strive to maintain air and naval bases in the Baltic states, and rely on the Black Sea coast with the southern wing of the front. “If the operation develops unfavorably south and north of the Pripyat marshes,” it was noted in the Barbarossa plan, “the Russians will try to stop the German offensive along the line of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers. When attempting to liquidate German breakthroughs, as well as in possible attempts to withdraw threatened troops beyond the Dnieper and Western Dvina lines, one should take into account the possibility of offensive actions by large Russian formations using tanks.”
According to the Barbarossa plan, large tank and motorized forces, using aviation support, were supposed to launch a swift attack to great depths north and south of the Pripyat marshes, break through the defenses of the main forces of the Soviet Army, presumably concentrated in the western part of the USSR, and destroy disunited groups of Soviet troops. North of the Pripyat marshes, an offensive of two army groups was planned: “Center” (commander Field Marshal F. Bock) and “North” (commander Field Marshal V. Leeb). Army Group "Center" delivered the main blow and was supposed to concentrate the main efforts on the flanks where the 2nd and 3rd tank groups were deployed, carry out a deep breakthrough with these formations north and south of Minsk, and reach the Smolensk area planned for connecting tank groups . It was assumed that with the entry of tank formations into the Smolensk region, the preconditions would be created for the destruction by field armies of the Soviet troops remaining between Bialystok and Minsk. Subsequently, when the main forces reached the line of Roslavl, Smolensk, Vitebsk, Army Group Center had to act depending on the situation developing on its left wing. If the neighbor on the left failed to quickly defeat the troops defending in front of him, the army group was supposed to turn its tank formations to the north, and conduct an attack eastward towards Moscow with field armies. If Army Group “North” was able to defeat the Soviet Army in its offensive zone, Army Group “Center” was to immediately strike Moscow. Army Group North received the task, advancing from eastern Prussia, to deliver the main blow in the direction of Daugavpils, Leningrad, to destroy the troops of the Soviet Army defending in the Baltic States and, by capturing ports on the Baltic Sea, including Leningrad and Kronstadt, to deprive the Soviet Baltic Fleet of its bases. If this group of armies was unable to defeat the grouping of Soviet troops in the Baltic states, the mobile forces of Army Group Center, the Finnish Army and formations transferred from Norway were supposed to come to its aid. Army Group North, thus strengthened, was to achieve the destruction of the Soviet troops opposing it.
According to the German command, the operation of the reinforced Army Group North provided Army Group Center with freedom of maneuver to capture Moscow and solve operational-strategic tasks in cooperation with Army Group South. To the south of the Pripyat marshes, an offensive was planned by Army Group South (commanded by Field Marshal G. Rundschtedt). It delivered one strong blow from the Lublin area in the general direction of Kyiv and further south along the Dnieper bend. As a result of the strike, in which powerful tank formations were to play the main role, it was supposed to cut off Soviet troops located in western Ukraine from their communications on the Dnieper, and seize crossings across the Dnieper in the Kiev area and south of it. In this way, it provided freedom of maneuver to develop an offensive in the eastern direction in cooperation with troops advancing to the north, or to advance to the south of the Soviet Union in order to capture important economic regions.
The troops of the right wing of Army Group South (11th Army) were supposed to, by creating a false impression of the deployment of large forces on the territory of Romania, pin down the opposing Red Army troops, and later, as the offensive on the Soviet-German front developed, impede the organized withdrawal of Soviet formations beyond the Dnieper.
The Barbarossa plan was intended to use the principles of combat that had proven themselves in the Polish and Western European campaigns. However, it was emphasized that, unlike actions in the West, the offensive against the Red Army must be carried out simultaneously along the entire front: both in the direction of the main attacks and in secondary sectors. “Only in this way,” said the directive of January 31, 1941, “will it be possible to prevent the timely withdrawal of combat-ready enemy forces and destroy them west of the Dnieper-Dvina line.
The plan took into account the possibility of active counteraction Soviet aviation the advance of German ground forces. From the very beginning of hostilities, the German Air Force was tasked with suppressing the Soviet Air Force and supporting the offensive of ground forces in the directions of the main attacks. To solve these problems at the first stage of the war against the USSR. Attacks on the rear industrial centers The USSR was planned to begin only after the Red Army troops were defeated in Belarus, the Baltic states and Ukraine.
The offensive of Army Group Center was planned to be supported by the 2nd air fleet, “South” - by the 4th Air Fleet, “North” - by the 1st Air Fleet. The Navy of Nazi Germany had to defend its coast and prevent the Soviet ships from breaking through Navy from the Baltic Sea. At the same time, it was envisaged to avoid major naval operations until the ground forces captured Leningrad as the last naval base of the Soviet Union. Baltic Fleet. Subsequently, the naval forces of Nazi Germany were tasked with ensuring freedom of navigation in the Baltic Sea and supplying the troops of the northern wing of the ground forces.
The attack on the USSR was planned to be carried out on May 15, 1941. Thus, according to the plan, the immediate strategic goal of the Nazis in the war against the USSR was the defeat of the Red Army troops in the Baltic states, Belarus and Right Bank Ukraine. The subsequent goal was to capture Leningrad in the north, the Central Industrial Region and the capital of the Soviet Union in the center, and capture all of Ukraine and the Donetsk basin in the south as quickly as possible. The ultimate goal of the eastern campaign was the exit Nazi troops to the Volga and Northern Dvina.
On February 3, 1941, at a meeting in Berchtesgaden, Hitler, in the presence of Keitel and Jodl, heard a detailed report from Brauchitsch and Haider on the plan for war against the USSR. The Fuhrer approved the report and assured the generals that the plan would be successfully implemented: “When the implementation of Plan Barbarossa begins, the world will hold its breath and freeze.” The armed forces of Romania, Hungary and Finland - allies of Nazi Germany - were to receive specific tasks just before the start of the war. The use of Romanian troops was determined by the Munich plan, developed by the command German troops in Romania. In mid-June, this plan was brought to the attention of the Romanian leadership. On June 20, the Romanian dictator Antonescu issued an order based on it to the Romanian armed forces, which outlined the tasks of the Romanian troops.
Before the outbreak of hostilities, Romanian ground forces were supposed to cover the concentration and deployment of German troops in Romania, and with the outbreak of war, pin down the group of Soviet troops located on the border with Romania. With the withdrawal of the Red Army from the Prut River line, which was believed to follow the offensive of the German Army Group South, the Romanian troops had to move on to energetic pursuit of the Red Army units. If Soviet troops managed to hold their positions on the Prut River, the Romanian formations had to break through the Soviet defense in the Tsutsora, New Bedraz sector.
The tasks for the Finnish and German troops deployed in Northern and Central Finland were determined by the OKW directive of April 7, 1941 and announced by the operational directives of the Finnish General Staff, as well as the directive of the commander of the Army “Norway” of April 20. The OKW directive stipulated that the Finnish armed forces, before the advance of Hitler's troops, were to cover the deployment of German formations in Finland, and with the Wehrmacht going on the offensive, to pin down Soviet groups in the Karelian and Petrozavodsk directions. With Army Group North reaching the Luga River line, Finnish troops had to launch a decisive offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, as well as between Lakes Onega and Ladoga, in order to connect with the German armies on the Svir River and in the Leningrad region. The German troops deployed on the territory of Finland, according to the directive of the commander of the Army “Norway”, were given the task of attacking in two groups (each consisting of a reinforced corps): one on Murmansk, the other on Kandalaksha. The southern group, having broken through the defenses, was supposed to reach White Sea to the Kandalaksha area, then advance along the Murmansk railway to the north in order to, in cooperation with the northern group, destroy the Soviet troops located on the Kola Peninsula and capture Murmansk and Polyarnoye. Aviation support for Finnish and German troops, advancing from Finland, was assigned to the 5th Air Fleet of Germany and the Finnish Air Force.
At the end of April, the political and military leadership of Nazi Germany finally set the date of the attack on the USSR: Sunday, June 22, 1941. The postponement from May to June was caused by the need to redeploy forces that participated in the aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece to the borders of the USSR. Preparing the war against the USSR, Hitler's leadership outlined major measures to restructure its armed forces. They concerned primarily the ground forces. It was planned to increase the number of divisions of the active army to 180 and increase the reserve army. By the beginning of the war against the USSR, the Wehrmacht included a reserve army and SS troops, and should have had about 250 fully equipped divisions.
Particular attention was paid to strengthening mobile troops. It was planned to deploy 20 tank divisions instead of the existing 10 and increase the level of infantry motorization. For this purpose, it was planned to allocate an additional 130 thousand tons of steel for the production of military trucks, all-terrain vehicles and armored vehicles at the expense of the fleet and aviation. Big changes were planned in the production of weapons. According to the planned program, the most important task was the production of the latest models of tanks and anti-tank artillery. It was also planned to significantly increase the production of aircraft of those designs that had withstood testing during battles in the West.
Great importance was attached to the preparation of the theater of military operations. The directive of August 9, 1940, which received the code name “Aufbau Ost” (“Construction in the East”), outlined the transfer of supply bases from west to east, construction in eastern regions new railways and highways, training grounds, barracks, etc., expansion and improvement of airfields, communication networks. In preparations for aggression against the USSR, the Nazi leadership assigned the most important place to ensuring the surprise of the attack and the secrecy of every preparatory measure, whether it concerned economic restructuring, strategic planning, preparing a theater of military operations or the deployment of armed forces. All documents related to planning the war in the east were prepared in secrecy. An extremely narrow circle of people was allowed to develop them. The concentration and rapid deployment of troops was planned to be carried out in compliance with all camouflage measures. However, Hitler's leadership understood that it was impossible to completely hide the concentration of a multi-million army with a huge amount of military equipment near the Soviet borders. Therefore, it resorted to a broadly conceived political and operational-strategic camouflage of the impending aggression, recognizing the number one task of misleading the government of the USSR and the command of the Red Army about the plan, scale and time of the outbreak of aggression.
Both the operational-strategic leadership and the Abwehr (intelligence and counterintelligence) took part in the development of measures to disguise the concentration of Wehrmacht troops in the East. The Abwehr developed a directive, signed on September 6, 1940, which specifically outlined the goals and objectives of disinformation. Instructions for the secrecy of preparations for war were contained in the Barbarossa plan. But perhaps the treacherous tactics of the Nazis are most fully revealed by the directive on disinformation of the enemy, issued by the OKW on February 15, 1941. “The purpose of disinformation is,” the directive stated, “to hide the preparations for Operation Barbarossa.” This the main objective and should form the basis of all measures to disinformation the enemy.” The camouflage measures were planned to be carried out in two stages. The first stage - until approximately mid-April 1941 - included the camouflage of general military preparations not related to the massive regrouping of troops. The second stage - from April to June 1941 - camouflage the concentration and operational deployment of troops near the borders of the USSR.
The first stage was to create a false impression regarding the true intentions of the German command, using various kinds preparations for the invasion of England, as well as for Operation Marita (against Greece) and Sonnenblum (in North Africa).
The initial deployment of troops to attack the USSR was planned to be carried out under the guise of conventional armies of movement. At the same time, the goal was to create the impression that the center of concentration of armed forces was in the south of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria and that the concentration of troops in the north was relatively small.
At the second stage, when, as noted in the directive, it would no longer be possible to conceal preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union, the concentration and deployment of forces of the eastern campaign were planned to be presented in the form of false events, allegedly carried out with the aim of diverting attention from the planned invasion of England. Hitler’s command presented this diversionary maneuver as “the greatest in the history of war.” At the same time, work was carried out aimed at preserving the impression among the personnel of the German armed forces that preparations for the landing in England were continuing, but in a different form - the troops allocated for this purpose were being withdrawn to the rear until a certain point. “It was necessary to keep even those troops destined for action directly in the East in confusion about the plans for as long as possible.” Great importance was attached, in particular, to the dissemination of disinformation information about non-existent airborne corps, supposedly intended for the invasion of England. About the upcoming landing on British Isles should have been evidenced by such facts as the secondment of English translators to military units, the release of new English topographic maps, reference books, etc. Rumors spread among the officers of Army Group South that German troops would allegedly be transferred to Iran to fight a war for the British colonies.
The OKW directive on disinformation of the enemy indicated that the greater the concentration of forces in the east, the more efforts must be made to keep public opinion astray about German plans. In the instructions to the OKW chiefs of staff dated March 9, it was recommended that the Wehrmacht be deployed in the east and as defensive measures to ensure the rear of Germany during the landing in England and operations in the Balkans.
Hitler's leadership was so confident in the successful implementation of the plan that, around the spring of 1941, it began the detailed development of further plans for conquest of world domination. In the official diary of the Supreme High Command of the Nazi forces for February 17, 1941, Hitler’s demand was stated that “after the end of the eastern campaign, it is necessary to provide for the capture of Afghanistan and the organization of an attack on India.” Based on these instructions, OKW headquarters began planning Wehrmacht operations for the future. These operations were planned to be carried out in the late autumn of 1941 and winter of 1941/42. Their plan was set out in draft directive No. 32 “Preparation for the period after the implementation of the Barbarossa plan”, sent to the ground forces, air force and navy on June 11, 1941.
The project provided that after the defeat of the USSR, the Wehrmacht would seize British colonial possessions and some independent countries in the basin Mediterranean Sea, Africa, the Near and Middle East, the invasion of the British Isles, the deployment of military operations against America. Hitler's strategists planned to begin the conquest of Iran, Iraq, Egypt, the Suez Canal area, and then India, where they planned to unite with Japanese troops, already in the fall of 1941. The fascist German leadership hoped, by annexing Spain and Portugal to Germany, to quickly accept the siege of the islands. The development of Directive No. 32 and other documents indicates that after the defeat of the USSR and the solution of the “English problem,” the Nazis intended, in alliance with Japan, to “eliminate the influence of the Anglo-Saxons in North America.”
The capture of Canada and the United States was supposed to be carried out by landing large amphibious assault forces from bases in Greenland, Iceland, the Azores and Brazil - on the east coast of North America and from the Aleutian and Hawaiian Islands - on the west. In April - June 1941, these issues were repeatedly discussed at the highest German headquarters. Thus, the fascist German leadership, even before the aggression against the USSR, outlined far-reaching plans for conquest of world domination. The key positions for their implementation, as it seemed to the Nazi leadership, were provided by the campaign against the USSR.
In contrast to the preparation of campaigns against Poland, France and the Balkan states, the war against the USSR was prepared with special care and over a longer period of time. The aggression against the USSR according to the Barbarossa plan was planned as a short-lived campaign, the ultimate goal of which - the defeat of the Red Army and the destruction of the Soviet Union - was proposed to be achieved in the fall of 1941.
The fighting was supposed to be carried out in the form of a blitz - krieg. At the same time, the offensive of the main strategic groupings was presented in the form of a continuous offensive at a rapid pace. Short pauses were allowed only to regroup troops and bring up lagging rear forces. The possibility of stopping the offensive due to the resistance of the Crane Army was excluded. Excessive confidence in the infallibility of their plans and plans “hypnotized” the fascist generals. Hitler's machine was gaining momentum to win victory, which seemed so easy and close to the leaders of the “Third Reich”.
But even if the plan to defeat the Red Army had succeeded, it would hardly have been possible to consider the war over. Almost two hundred million people in the vast expanses of their country had the opportunity to resist foreign invasion for years, bleeding most of them German army. Therefore, Hitler constantly emphasized that the war in the East is fundamentally different from the war in the West - the final victory in Russia can only be achieved with incredible cruelty to the population, the “depopulation” of vast territories, the evictions and extermination of tens of millions of people. A terrible threat loomed over the peoples of the USSR.
The nature of the war.
It would be wrong to think that the Second World War arose by chance or as a result of the mistakes of some statesmen, although mistakes took place in the top leadership of the country, at the very beginning of the war, when Stalin hoped for friendship with Hitler. In fact, war arose as an inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces, that is, due to the uneven development of capitalist countries, which led to a sharp disruption within the world system. Moreover, those countries that were provided with raw materials and markets made attempts to change the situation and redistribute “spheres of influence” in their favor by using an armed attack. As a result of this, hostile camps arose, and a war began between them.
Thus, as a result of the first crisis of the capitalist system of the world economy, the First World War arose, from this we can conclude that the Second World War arose as a result of a second or other disagreement between states.
But the Second World War is not a copy of the first; on the contrary, the Second World War is significantly different from the first in nature. The main fascist states - Germany, Japan, Italy - before attacking the allied countries, destroyed the last remnants of bourgeois-democratic freedoms, established a brutal terrorist regime, trampled on the principle of sovereignty and free development of small countries, declared a policy of seizing foreign lands as their own politics and declared publicly that they were seeking global domination of the fascist regime throughout the world.
By capturing Czechoslovakia and the central regions of China, the Axis states showed that they were ready to carry out their threat to enslave all freedom-loving peoples. In view of this, the Second World War against the Axis states, unlike the First World War, from the very beginning took on the character of an anti-fascist war of liberation, one of the tasks of which was also the restoration of democratic freedoms.
The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against fascist Germany and its allies could only strengthen, and indeed strengthened, the anti-fascist and liberation character of the Second World War. On this basis, an anti-fascist coalition was formed between the Soviet Union, the USA, Great Britain and other freedom-loving states, which later played a decisive role in the defeat of the fascist army. The war was not and could not be an accident in the life of peoples, it turned into a war of peoples for their existence and that is why it could not be fleeting, lightning fast. This is the case regarding the origin and nature of the Second World War.
Causes of defeats in the summer and autumn of 1941
Many historians believe that before the war the USSR did everything possible to strengthen the country's defense capabilities, including the creation of powerful Armed Forces. However, the Red Army was not brought to full combat readiness on the eve of the war. The troops did not occupy defensive lines along the Western border of the USSR in a timely manner. There were serious shortcomings in the organization of border defense. The main blame for all the mistakes and miscalculations made in the pre-war period lies with Stalin and, to a much lesser extent, with the military.
In his first address to to the Soviet people On July 3, 1941, Stalin explained everything that happened by the “unexpectedness” of the attack, the complete readiness of German troops for an attack, and the war experience that they acquired in Western campaigns. Also, the cause of the disaster was that before the war, the Red Army troops were in camps, on training grounds, at the stage of reorganization, replenishment, redeployment and movement. However, upon deeper examination of the reasons for the defeat in the summer and autumn of 1941, it turns out that the matter is not only about miscalculations and the timing of Germany’s attack on the USSR.
One of the main reasons for the defeat was the border battle in the summer of 1941. Its result was the defeat of the Red Army in the Western districts, our losses in manpower and equipment, the loss of a significant part of the country's territory, which led to the distress of the people, great economic damage, and the protracted nature of the war. The unpreparedness of the troops to repel the first strike of the enemy due to Stalin’s stubborn (stubborn) reluctance to analyze intelligence data (some of the data is given), his manic, inexplicable in the light of intelligence data, demand not to succumb to provocations, not to give Hitler a reason to declare the USSR an aggressor.
According to commanders G.K. Zhukov and a number of other marshals, in order to win a border battle it was necessary to create groupings of forces, keep them in the required areas combat-ready and combat-ready and capable of carrying out an offensive. They did not carry out further forecasting of events.
An analysis of the diplomatic and other efforts of the Soviet leadership of that period allows us to identify the most important conditions, the achievement of which was considered necessary to repel enemy aggression: a) the exclusion of a war on two fronts - against Germany and Japan; b) the exclusion of a crusade by Western countries against the USSR; the presence of allies in the fight against Hitler, in the limit - formation anti-Hitler coalition; c) removal state border from vital facilities of the country, primarily from Leningrad; d) strengthening the combat capability of the Red Army, equipping it with modern weapons; e) creation of such a structure of the army and navy, such an initial formation of their groupings, in order to repel the first strike of the enemy (but taking into account conditions “a” and “c”), and then transfer them to enemy territory fighting for the final breakdown of aggression.
Among the most important reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 is “the cause of mass panic among the troops” at the beginning of the Patriotic War. These are flights from positions, and in hopeless situations - surrender or suicide. The realization of the fact that all the military propaganda that trumpeted the power of the Red Army and our readiness for war, that in the event of war we would fight “with little blood on foreign territory,” turned out to be a lie. The Soviet soldier felt the hard way that he was not an “atom” great army, having meaningful tactics and strategy, he is cannon fodder in the hands of incompetent and confused military commanders. And then the popular consciousness, of all the reasons for military failures, singled out one - treason, at the very top, in the leadership of the country and the army. Each new defeat revived this panic mood, which neither political agencies nor foreign detachments could cope with.
The situation was aggravated by the fact that the commanders of the defeated units and formations of the Red Army, who were surrounded and made their way to their own, were influenced by the same sentiments about treason and could not explain anything to the soldiers. Thus, in the author’s manuscript of the memoirs of Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, published in full only in recent years, many pages are devoted to a description of the “shock” that our troops experienced in the summer of 1941 and from which they could not recover “ long time" In November 1941, the commander of the defeated Soviet division, Kotlyarov, before shooting himself, left a note containing the following words: “General disorganization and loss of control. Guilty senior headquarters. Move behind the anti-tank obstacle. Save Moscow. There are no prospects ahead." Documents dedicated to the Battle of Moscow and many other documentary evidence about the events of 1941 tell about similar sentiments.
Consequently, the main conclusion, the real reasons that caused the events of 1941 to develop in such an incomprehensible and incomprehensible way, lies not in Stalin’s personal miscalculations, which many military leaders talk about in their memoirs, but in other circumstances. Historians, politicians, diplomats and military men who created in their works the image of Stalin - a cunning, calculating, insidious intriguer (which corresponds to historical literature image of an “outstanding politician”), contradict themselves by attributing to his personal initiative all those orders that led to the collapse of the army on the eve of the war. Having reached supreme authority Stalin would not have voluntarily committed acts that could not be explained logically - the very formulation of the question in this vein is anti-scientific.
Famous German plan"Barbarossa" can be briefly described as follows: it is almost unreal strategic plan Hitler to seize Russia as the main enemy on the path to world domination.
It is worth remembering that by the time of the attack on the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, had almost unhindered captured half of European countries. Only Britain and the USA resisted the aggressor.
The essence and goals of Operation Barbarossa
The Soviet-German non-aggression pact, signed shortly before the start of the Great Patriotic War, was nothing more than a head start for Hitler. Why? Because the Soviet Union, without assuming a possible betrayal, fulfilled the said agreement.
And the German leader thus gained time to carefully develop a strategy for capturing his main enemy.
Why did Hitler recognize Russia as the biggest obstacle to the implementation of the blitzkrieg? Because the resilience of the USSR did not allow England and the USA to lose heart and, perhaps, surrender, like many European countries.
In addition, the fall of the Soviet Union would serve as a powerful impetus to strengthen Japan's position on the world stage. And Japan and the United States had extremely tense relations. Also, the non-aggression pact allowed Germany not to launch an offensive in unfavorable conditions winter cold.
The preliminary strategy of the Barbarossa plan looked something like this:
- A powerful and well-trained Reich army invades Western Ukraine, instantly defeating the main forces of the disoriented enemy. After several decisive battles, German forces finish off the scattered detachments of surviving Soviet soldiers.
- From the territory of the captured Balkans, march victoriously to Moscow and Leningrad. Capture both cities that are extremely important to achieve the intended result. The task of capturing Moscow as the political and tactical center of the country stood out especially. Interesting: the Germans were sure that every single remnant of the USSR army would flock to Moscow to defend it - and it would be as easy as shelling pears to completely defeat them.
Why was Germany's attack plan on the USSR called Plan Barbarossa?
The strategic plan for the lightning capture and conquest of the Soviet Union was named after Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, who ruled the Holy Roman Empire in the 12th century.
The said leader went down in history thanks to his numerous and successful campaigns of conquest.
The name of the Barbarossa plan undoubtedly reflected the symbolism inherent in almost all actions and decisions of the leadership of the Third Reich. The name of the plan was approved on January 31, 1941.
Hitler's goals in World War II
Like any totalitarian dictator, Hitler did not pursue any special goals (at least those that could be explained using elementary logic sound mind).
The Third Reich unleashed the Second World War with the only goal: to take over the world, establish dominance, subjugate all countries and peoples with their perverted ideologists, impose their picture of the world on the entire population of the planet.
How long did it take for Hitler to take over the USSR?
In general, Nazi strategists allocated only five months—one single summer—to capture the vast territory of the Soviet Union.
Today, such arrogance may seem unfounded, unless we remember that at the time the plan was developed, the German army had captured almost all of Europe in just a few months without much effort or loss.
What does blitzkrieg mean and what are its tactics?
Blitzkrieg, or the tactic of lightning the capture of the enemy, is the brainchild of German military strategists of the early 20th century. The word Blitzkrieg comes from two German words: Blitz (lightning) and Krieg (war).
The blitzkrieg strategy was based on the ability to capture vast territories in record time (months or even weeks) before opposing army comes to his senses and mobilizes the main forces.
The tactics of a lightning attack were based on the close cooperation of infantry, aviation and tank formations of the German army. Tank crews, supported by infantry, must break through behind enemy lines and surround the main fortified positions important for establishing permanent control over the territory.
The enemy army, being cut off from all communication systems and all supplies, quickly begins to experience difficulties in solving the simplest issues (water, food, ammunition, clothing, etc.). The forces of the attacked country, thus weakened, are soon captured or destroyed.
When did Nazi Germany attack the USSR?
Based on the results of the development of the Barbarossa plan, the Reich's attack on the USSR was scheduled for May 15, 1941. The date of the invasion was shifted due to the Nazis carrying out the Greek and Yugoslav operations in the Balkans.
In fact, Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union without declaring war on June 22, 1941 at 4:00 am. This mournful date is considered the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.
Where did the Germans go during the war - map
Blitzkrieg tactics helped German troops in the first days and weeks of the Second World War to cover enormous distances across the territory of the USSR without any particular problems. In 1942, the Nazis captured a fairly impressive part of the country.
German forces reached almost Moscow. They advanced through the Caucasus to the Volga, but after the Battle of Stalingrad they were driven back to Kursk. At this stage, the retreat of the German army began. By northern lands The invaders advanced to Arkhangelsk.
Reasons for the failure of Plan Barbarossa
If we consider the situation globally, the plan failed due to the inaccuracy of German intelligence data. Wilhelm Canaris, who led it, could well have been British double agent, as some historians claim today.
If we take these unconfirmed data on faith, it becomes clear why he “fed” Hitler the misinformation that the USSR had practically no secondary lines of defense, but there were huge supply problems, and, moreover, almost all the troops were stationed on the border.
Conclusion
Many historians, poets, writers, as well as eyewitnesses of the events described, admit that fighting spirit played a huge, almost decisive role in the victory of the USSR over Nazi Germany Soviet people, the love of freedom of the Slavic and other peoples who did not want to drag out a miserable existence under the yoke of world tyranny.
Barbarossa Fall"), the code name for Germany's war plan against the USSR (named after the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa).
1940 after the defeat French army the moment had come that Hitler and his associates considered convenient for the implementation of their aggressive plans in the East. July 22, 1940, the day of the surrender of France, chief General Staff Ground Forces General Franz Halder received instructions from Hitler and the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Walter von Brauchitsch, to develop a plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union. The command of the ground forces (OKH) in July-December simultaneously developed several options, each independently. One of the options was developed in the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) under the leadership of Alfred Jodl and his deputy, General Walter Warlimont, and was carried out under code name"Study of Lossberg". It was completed by September 15 and differed from the other option - General Marx - in that the main blow in it was determined on the northern sector of the front. When making the final decision, Hitler agreed with Jodl's considerations. By the time work on the plan options was completed, General Friedrich Paulus was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff, who was tasked with bringing all the plans together and taking into account the comments made by the Fuhrer. Under the leadership of General Paulus, in mid-December 1940, staff games and meetings of the military and Nazi leadership took place, where the final version of the Barbarossa plan was worked out. Paulus wrote in his memoirs: " Preparatory game for Operation Barbarossa was carried out under my leadership in mid-December 1940 for two days at the headquarters of the ground forces command in Zossen.
The main goal was Moscow. To achieve this goal and eliminate the threat from the north, Russian troops in the Baltic republics had to be destroyed. Then it was planned to take Leningrad and Kronstadt, and deprive the Russian Baltic Fleet of its base. In the south, the first target was Ukraine with the Donbass, and later the Caucasus with its oil sources. Particular importance was attached to the capture of Moscow in the OKW plans. However, the capture of Moscow had to be preceded by the capture of Leningrad. The capture of Leningrad pursued several military goals: the liquidation of the main bases of the Russian Baltic Fleet, the disabling military industry this city and the liquidation of Leningrad as a concentration point for a counteroffensive against German troops advancing on Moscow. When I say that a decision was made, I do not mean that there was complete unity in the opinions of the responsible commanders and staff officers.
On the other hand, although little was said about this, the opinion was expressed that a rapid collapse of the Soviet resistance should be expected as a consequence of internal political difficulties, organizational and material weaknesses of the so-called “colossus with feet of clay...
“The entire territory on which operations will take place is divided by the Pripyat swamps into northern and southern halves. In the latter bad network expensive The best road and railways located on the Warsaw-Moscow line. Therefore, in the northern half there seem to be more favorable conditions to use a larger number of troops than in the south. In addition, a significant concentration of troops is planned in the Russian grouping in the direction of the Russian-German demarcation line. It must be assumed that immediately beyond the former Russian-Polish border there is a Russian supply base, covered by field fortifications. The Dnieper and Western Dvina represent the easternmost line on which the Russians will be forced to give battle.
If they retreat further, they will no longer be able to protect their industrial areas. As a result, our plan should be to prevent the Russians from creating a continuous defensive front west of these two rivers with the help of tank wedges. Especially large strike force must advance from the Warsaw region to Moscow. Of the three army groups envisaged, the northern one will need to be sent to Leningrad, and the southern forces will need to deliver the main blow in the direction of Kyiv. The final goal of the operation is the Volga and the Arkhangelsk region. A total of 105 infantry, 32 tank and motorized divisions should be used, of which large forces (two armies) will initially follow in the second echelon."
"We moved through frozen swamps, often the ice cracked, and ice water got into boots. My gloves were soaked through and I had to take them off and wrap my numb hands in a towel. I wanted to howl in pain." From a letter German soldier, participant in the Russian campaign of 1941-42.
“The most important goal is to prevent the Russians from retreating while maintaining the integrity of the front. The offensive should be carried out so far to the east that Russian aircraft cannot carry out raids on the territory of the German Reich and so that, on the other hand, German aircraft can launch air strikes against the Russians military industrial areas. To do this, it is necessary to achieve the defeat of the Russian armed forces and prevent their re-creation. The very first strikes must be delivered in such units that large enemy forces can be destroyed. Therefore, mobile troops should be used on the adjacent flanks of both northern army groups, where the main blow will be delivered.
In the north it is necessary to achieve encirclement enemy forces located in the Baltic countries. To do this, the army group that will advance on Moscow must have enough troops to be able to turn a significant part of its forces to the north. The army group advancing south of the Pripyat marshes must move out later and achieve encirclement of large enemy forces in Ukraine by performing an enveloping maneuver from the north... The number of troops of 130-140 divisions provided for the entire operation is sufficient."
The final version of the plan is set out in the directive Supreme High Command Armed Forces (OKW) ´21 of December 18, 1940 (see.
Directive 21) and the "Directive for the Strategic Concentration and Deployment of Troops" of the OKH of January 31, 1941. The Barbarossa plan provided for "defeating Soviet Russia in a fleeting campaign even before the war against England was over." The idea was "to split the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of Russia, with quick and deep strikes of powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, to destroy disunited groups of enemy troops." At the same time, the main forces of the Soviet army were supposed to be destroyed west of the Dnieper, Western Dvina line, preventing them from retreating into the interior of the country. In the future, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass and reach the Astrakhan, Volga line, Arkhangelsk (see "A-A"). The Barbarossa plan set out in detail the tasks of army groups and armies, the order of interaction between them, the tasks of the Air Force and Navy, issues of cooperation with allied states and etc.
It was planned to begin its implementation in May 1941, but due to operations against Yugoslavia and Greece, this date was postponed. In April 1941, the final order was given for the day of the attack - June 22.
In addition to the OKW and OKH directives, a number of additional documents, incl.
part of the disinformation directive, which required that “the strategic deployment of forces for Operation Barbarossa be presented as the greatest disinformation maneuver in the history of war, aimed at diverting attention from the final preparations for the invasion of England.”
In accordance with the Barbarossa plan, by June 22, 1941, 190 divisions (including 19 tank and 14 motorized) of Germany and its allies were concentrated near the borders of the USSR. They were supported by 4 air fleets, as well as Finnish and Romanian aviation. The troops concentrated for the offensive numbered 5.5 million.
people, about 4,300 tanks, over 47 thousand field guns and mortars, about 5,000 combat aircraft. Army groups were deployed: "North" consisting of 29 divisions (all German) - in the zone from Memel (Klaipeda) to Gołdap; "Center" consisting of 50 divisions and 2 brigades (all German) - in the zone from Goldap to the Pripyat marshes; "South" consisting of 57 divisions and 13 brigades (including 13 Romanian divisions, 9 Romanian and 4 Hungarian brigades) - in the strip from the Pripyat swamps to the Black Sea. Army groups had the task of attacking respectively general directions to Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv. The German Army Norway and 2 Finnish armies were concentrated in Finland and Norway - a total of 21 divisions and 3 brigades, supported by the 5th Air Fleet and Finnish aviation.
They were given the task of reaching Murmansk and Leningrad. There were 24 divisions left in the OKH reserve.
Despite the initial significant successes of the German troops, the Barbarossa plan turned out to be untenable, since it was based on the false premise of the weakness of the Soviet Union and its armed forces.
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