Memories
Prof. A.M. Nogaller,
Guard Major Med. services
The first months of the Great Patriotic War
(Memoirs of an eyewitness)
In 2015, Russia widely celebrated the most important event in world history - Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War on May 9. Much less attention in the press was paid to the tragic date of the start of the war - June 22, 1941. The beginning of the war and its first months have been preserved in my memory for almost three quarters of a century. As it is sung in famous song, “On June 22, at exactly four o’clock, Kyiv was bombed, they announced to us that the war had begun.” The radio announcer's announcement of the beginning of the war still rings in my ears to this day.
At the beginning of June 1941, together with a group of students of the 1st Moscow medical institute them. I.M. Sechenov I was at summer practice after completing the 4th year in the regional town of Zaraysk. The Second World War had been going on for almost two years, and the USSR was preparing for a possible military attack in the form of anti-aircraft defense classes (local air defense), which included, among other things, measures during an air raid warning. During our summer student internship, we worked a lot in the surgical department of a local hospital. On the night of June 20-21, an air raid warning was announced by radio. We quickly got dressed and ran to the operating room. Soon the all clear sounded and we returned to our dorm beds.
On the night of June 21-22, the air raid alarm sounded again, and my neighbor woke me up with the words: “Get up quickly, alarm!” In my sleep, I muttered that yesterday there was already an alarm, to which he replied: “No, this is not a training alarm, but a real alarm, the war has begun!” On the same day, June 22, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V.M. Molotov addressed the Soviet people on the radio, and on July 3, J.V. Stalin. Speaking about the insidious attack of the enemy and the forced temporary retreat of the Red Army, Stalin instilled hope for quick victory, saying that there were still a few months, maybe a year, and fascist Germany will collapse under the weight of the crimes she has committed. No one thought that the war would last four years and the price of Victory would be so high.
Soon we were called to Moscow to continue our studies at the institute. Our classes in the fifth and then last year lasted only three months. When the Nazi troops were on the outskirts of Moscow, we were given diplomas of graduation and the title of doctor ahead of schedule, without any state exams, by order of the People's Commissar of Health of the USSR.
In pre-war times, children entered the first grade of school at the age of eight. But my parents sent me to school at the age of seven. Perhaps this seemingly insignificant circumstance saved my life, because when the war began, I was already with the highest medical education. Many of my classmates did not have time to receive higher education and ended up in the war in junior positions command staff or privates.
Attending lectures and practical classes at the institute was strictly mandatory before the war. Since the beginning of the war, it was possible to miss classes, because many students were forced to work or be on duty during air raid raids. More often, enemy air raids were carried out at night. We had to stand guard on the roofs of houses, waiting for incendiary bombs to fall. They had to be grabbed in time with special metal tongs and extinguished in a box with sand, which usually also stood on the roof. Sometimes the bombing lasted all night, and in the morning we had to go to classes. This was the case in the first month of the war, and then the Nazis began to drop mainly high-explosive bombs, and then, when an air raid signal sounded, it was necessary to go not to the roof of the house, but to a bomb shelter, to the nearest metro station or an ordinary basement, more or less suitable for spending the night. People carried cots, blankets, baby strollers, and pillows. With the advent of darkness, the windows in the apartments were carefully curtained so that enemy pilots could not see residential buildings. A month later, Moscow's air defense strengthened, and fascist raids almost stopped.
On August 2, 1941, Mirra (Marianna) Medova and I formalized our marriage. I've been in love with her since freshman year, and we had a summer internship together. At this time, the country had already introduced card system for food and clothing, but we managed to celebrate the wedding by buying a portion of ice cream, which was still sold freely. One day, on one of the streets, a gypsy woman came up to us and offered to tell our fortunes by reading our hands. She told me something long life, and told my wife general phrases about the joys and difficulties in life. We didn't believe her, because... The war was already going on and I had to go to the front soon. But the gypsy’s prediction came true: I lived a long life, but my wife became seriously ill after retiring at 57 and died quite early.
I joined the active army west of Moscow at the beginning of October as a senior (and only) doctor in an artillery regiment.
Under the pressure of superior enemy forces, our troops were forced to retreat towards the capital. The retreat proceeded with stubborn fighting. The guns of our regiment fired directly at the tanks moving along the highway. There were not enough anti-tank guns and anti-tank rifles. Often, infantrymen set fire to advancing tanks by throwing Molotov cocktails at them. Not only in movies, but also in life there were many heroic deeds, when fighters, whose names often remained unknown to posterity, sacrificed their lives so as not to allow the enemy to reach the capital. They threw themselves under tanks with bundles of grenades in their hands or tied grenades around themselves and died along with the burning tank. We retreated together with infantry units from the city of Mozhaisk to the Kubinka station. This was probably the most hard time. I remember the words of the medical instructor of the regiment’s medical unit, Semyon Maznev, that “... whoever did not survive the retreat can be considered not to have been in the war...”. During one of the battles with the attackers German tanks our regiment lost half personnel and guns. As the former chief of staff of the regiment, Afanasy Stepanovich Antonenko, later told me, the regiment commander, Captain V.N. After this battle, they wanted to bring Ivanov to trial before a military tribunal, but they regretted it.
And Vasily Nikolaevich Ivanov ended the war with the rank of major general and with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Shortly before the start of the war, People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov said that we have something to protect, who to protect and how to protect it. I had to hear the soldier’s humor when the words “... and there is a place to retreat” were added to K.E. Voroshilov’s speech.
In one of the battles, the commander of the gun, A. Vinokurov, was wounded. He had multiple shrapnel wounds chest and limbs. After providing first aid, they quickly managed to send him to the nearest medical battalion. Then he was sent to an army field hospital and to the rear. I met him by chance in 1950, when I worked at the clinic of the Institute of Nutrition in Moscow. Alexander Vinokurov was admitted to it for treatment peptic ulcer. He told me that the soft tissue wounds healed relatively quickly, but one of the shrapnel damaged the spine and spinal cord, causing pelvic organ disorder and paralysis of both legs. Five for long years he was bedridden and could not walk. Despite seriously injured and a newly developed illness, he did not lose heart. Before the war, Alexander managed to complete a ten-year school and short-term artillery courses. Lying in bed, he began to study history and philosophy in depth, passed exams in absentia in all subjects for the university, then successfully defended candidate's thesis. By the time we met again, he was walking slowly on crutches, driving a car, and working as a philosophy teacher at Moscow University. Not only in healthy body - healthy mind", but also vice versa: when strong spirit the body becomes healthier.
The book by B. Polevoy “The Tale of a Real Man” about the legless pilot Alexei Maresyev is well known. I came across many similar cases of “real people”, when people overcame their disability after being wounded and achieved their intended goal, during the war years and shortly after it.
By this time, as I have already mentioned, the first truck-mounted jet guns appeared on our front - the famous Katyushas. The spectacle is really bright when 6-10 shells fly out as if on rails at once. "Katyushas" came to the front line, fired back and went to the rear so that this highly classified weapon would not fall into the hands of the enemy. The entire crew of the gun then consisted only of proven officers. The Germans did not have such weapons then. They only acquired Faust-type missiles towards the end of the war. With the current development of electronic and atomic weapons"Katyushas" seem like child's play, but at that time they made a strong impression on our soldiers, instilled in us hope for a quick victory, and instilled fear in our enemies.
On December 6, 1941, the Sovinformburo announced the start of a counteroffensive by our troops. Along the entire huge front line, but mainly from the flanks surrounding Moscow, artillery preparation began, our air raids on enemy positions intensified, and then infantry units moved forward. The Germans were forced to retreat, but this happened very slowly, after heavy fighting. The enemy tried to keep everyone strong point, village, river. Every advance of our troops cost great sacrifices. The flow of wounded increased. Our regimental medical center had to work very hard, treat wounds, apply bandages, administer anti-tetanus serum and painkillers (morphine, pantopon).
There were great difficulties in evacuating the wounded and delivering them to the nearest medical battalion. Often we had to stop passing cars traveling lightly to the rear. Here they no longer understood who was “us” and who was “stranger”, i.e. not from our regiment. By the end of December, there was a lull in our sector of the front.
In mid-October the German offensive fascist troops was suspended. I remember well how the regiment’s command staff lined up at the edge of the forest and read out the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin. It spoke of the forced retreat of the Red Army and emphasized that it was impossible to retreat further. The slogan “Not a step back!” then became the guiding motto of our army.
Dual command was eliminated, when the commander and commissar (regiment, division, corps) had equal rights. After the reorganization of the structure of the Red Army in October 1941, the commander was responsible for conducting combat operations, and the commissar was renamed political officer and was responsible only for ideological - educational work military personnel.
Barrier detachments and SMERSH (death to spies) were created, which prevented unjustified retreats and desertion. Modern rifles and PPSh (Shpagin submachine gun) appeared in the troops. Instead of cubes and sleepers, shoulder straps with different sizes and the number of stars depending on military rank. The Red Army introduced pre-revolutionary ranks: sergeant, lieutenant, major, colonel, general. The command staff began to be called officers, and this was not identified in the minds of people with the White Guard officers of the times Civil War. The rank of military technician and military doctor were replaced by uniform military ranks indicating only the type of troops.
Instead of the rank of military doctor of the 3rd rank and the sleepers on my buttonholes, I was given the rank of captain of the medical service with four stars on my shoulder straps.
In the battle of Moscow, the Germans - fascist army was defeated for the first time. Although the outcome of the war was finally determined after the battles at Stalingrad and Orlovsko - Kursk Bulge, this battle was decisive. The military parade on Red Square in Moscow on November 7, 1941 instilled hope for a quick victory in the hearts of the commanders and soldiers of the Red Army.
During the four years of war, I saw many people die from their wounds. After the war, working in a clinic, I thought it was strange and unacceptable that people died not from wounds, but from some kind of disease, that death could not be prevented. Here I would like to remember Petropavlovsky, pompotekh (assistant for the technical part of the regiment). I was friends with him, sometimes we visited batteries together front line front. I remember this incident. We approach artillery batteries with cannons. He tells me that this is not our part. I say that you can distinguish the battery commander or privates by the faces, and 76 mm. the guns are all the same. No, he says, each gun has its own characteristics, this is not our regiment yet. I will remember this remark for the rest of my life. For him, each weapon had its own personality, just as people's faces have their own characteristics.
In his memoirs G. K. Zhukov, former boss The General Staff in 1940-41 analyzed these reasons in detail from the point of view of the military-political leadership. It is this analysis, with some clarifications regarding Stalin's repressions 1937-38 against the command cadres of the Red Army, lies at the basis of the analysis of this issue by domestic historiography.
G.K. Zhukov pointed out that on the eve of the war strategic defense lines were moved to the western borders of the country to the newly annexed regions of the Baltic states, Ukraine and Belarus. At the same time, there was not enough time to recruit them; in peacetime, the required mobilizations could not be carried out. Therefore, their equipment was done at the expense of already existing fortifications, which were weakened as a result. He also notes that the old fortifications were partially dismantled. And the mobilization actions that the command insisted on were only partially carried out.
Modern researchers note repression against Soviet command 1937-38, provoked by German intelligence, as a result of which about 40 thousand high-ranking officers who had experience of the Civil War were killed. As a result, the level of training and equipment of the army personnel turned out to be significantly lower than required, which led to defeats in the initial period of the Finnish war.
An important psychological factor noted by Western researchers was stupor, the inability of many managers to make independent decisions, which was a direct consequence of the policy Stalin's terror. In addition, the fascists widely used ideological and psychological means of warfare, creating a fifth column. Fifth column- detachments of saboteurs and spies on enemy territory, which made it impossible, especially in the initial period, to use field reconnaissance.
In our opinion, it is necessary to note a number of contradictions in assessments of military-political issues. First of all, foreign policy doctrine of the USSR, just like pre-revolutionary Russia, it remained defensive. First world war, as a result, the defensive lines were moved inland, and in the very first months of the retreat civilians became a victim of total terror carried out by the invaders. This was one of the reasons for the political crisis and the collapse of the government, which lost the trust of the population. The reason for Russia's defeat was not so much military, but rather political and economic defeat, due to the occupation of a significant part of the country by the enemy.
During World War II, the Soviet government took these lessons into account. The defensive doctrine was based on the principles of defense and self-defense of the civilian population, to strengthen which significant efforts were directed, especially since 1932, when the inevitability of war with fascism became obvious. From the point of view of protecting the civilian population, preparing for the evacuation of a significant part of it, as well as industrial facilities, destroying archives and organizing underground and partisan movement in the occupied territories under the leadership of the communists, it was completely justified to transfer defensive lines to the borders and strengthen the border troops, whose task was not to stop, but to detain the enemy. In the eyes of the civilian population, such a policy confirmed the government's desire and readiness to protect it. An important psychological factor was the appointment of Stalin as chairman of the government at the beginning of the war, which meant the readiness of the country's leadership to lead its defense.
On the contrary, premature mobilization, unjustified by defense needs, could indeed become a reason for intervention, cause mass protest among the civilian population of the newly annexed regions, and deprive the country of human reserves in a protracted and deprived war.
It must be borne in mind that the tactics of retreat, the creation of partisan regions, the heroic resistance of cities blocked by the enemy, are an inevitable plan for the defense strategy in a blitzkrieg war. Similar strategic plans were worked out by the Russian General Staff during the Japanese War of 1904-1905. It became clear then that modern warfare the retreat lasts for several years, but the most important danger is financial, economic and political crisis, which could be followed by a military coup and defeat.
If we evaluate Stalin's political steps as aimed at preventing such a possibility, they turn out to be consistent and purposeful. It is no coincidence that the flexibility of his political mind and endurance in that difficult political situation, were and are, as a rule, assessed very highly by both his contemporaries and today's Western historians.
Preparing for an attack on the USSR, the Nazis at the end of 1940 developed the “Barbarossa” plan, according to which they hoped to defeat the main forces of the Red Army before the onset of winter and victoriously end the war. Germany gradually redeployed its troops to Polish territory, closer to the USSR border. On the border with Belarus, by the beginning of the war, the German military command concentrated the most powerful army grouping, “Center,” which consisted of 50 divisions, 1,800 tanks, 14,300 guns and mortars, 1,680 combat aircraft, 820 thousand soldiers and officers. On the Soviet side, these forces were opposed by the troops of the Western Special Military District, which from June 22, 1941 became known as the Western Front. It consisted of 44 divisions, 3 brigades, 8 fortified areas and the Pinsk military flotilla, 2202 tanks, 10087 guns and mortars, 1909 combat aircraft. Total number of troops Western Front amounted to 672 thousand soldiers and officers.
Hitler's intentions to attack the Soviet Union were warned by intelligence officers and defectors who named the exact date fascist attack. All the more surprising was the TASS statement on June 14, 1921 that rumors about an upcoming attack on the USSR were false and provocative. It was on this day that Hitler gathered all the army group commanders in Berlin to listen to their reports on the completion of preparations for war. At this meeting, G. Guderian stated that it would take him 5-6 days to reach Minsk.
At dawn on June 22, 1941 German troops crossed the border of the USSR. Taking advantage of the carelessness of the railway workers and the command of the Brest garrison, the Germans transferred a train with sealed cars, containing armed soldiers and officers, from across the Bug to the Brest-Zapadny station. They occupied the station and part of the city, leaving border guards and military personnel in the fortress behind.
The inability of the command to foresee the course of military operations was also manifested in the deployment of military formations of the Western Front in Bialystok salient. Of the 26 divisions of the first echelon, 19 were concentrated here, including all tank and motorized ones. The 10th Army was supposed to hold the defense in the center - the strongest. On the flanks stood the 3rd and 4th armies - weaker ones. The Germans knew this well and began their attack from the flanks. On the first day of the war, Hoppner's 4th group broke through the front of the 3rd Army and Manstein's corps broke into the breakthrough; by the evening of June 22, 3 divisions of the Red Army were scattered, and 5 others suffered losses of up to 70% of their personnel. The 14th mechanized corps in the Pruzhany-Kobrin area was almost completely destroyed on the same day. About 14 thousand Soviet soldiers died here.
On the night of June 22-23, front commander Pavlov tried to organize a counteroffensive, but this led to huge losses of manpower and equipment. On June 23 and 24, the 6th and 11th mechanized corps were killed. The front command made attempts to delay the German advance in the Polotsk-Vitebsk region. And this attempt was unsuccessful.
On June 25, northeast of Slonim, the tanks of Guderian and Hoth completed the encirclement of units that were retreating from Bialystok. On June 26, the Germans captured Baranovichi, and on June 27, most of the units of the Western Front fell into a new encirclement in the Novogrudok region. 11 divisions of the 3rd and 10th armies were destroyed.
On June 26, 1941, German mechanized units approached Minsk. The troops of the 13th Army held the lines until June 28. The troops of the 100th Infantry Division of Major General I.M. fought heroically. Rusiyanov in the Ostroshitsky town area. By the evening of June 28, German troops occupied Minsk. Retreating to the east, units of the Red Army fought heavy defensive battles. All the burdens of the country's defense were placed on the shoulders of ordinary soldiers. Only on June 29, a directive was given by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions, in accordance with which additional mobilization into the Red Army was carried out. In June - August, more than 500 thousand residents of Belarus were mobilized.
To combat enemy saboteurs and paratroopers, fighter squads were created. In mid-July, 78 fighter battalions were created. More than 200 militia units were created to help the army. More than 1.5 million people were evacuated to the eastern regions of the USSR, equipment from 124 enterprises, 5 thousand tractors, and 674 thousand heads of livestock were removed. Collectives from 60 research institutes and laboratories, 6 theaters, more than 20 higher and secondary specialized institutions, and 190 children's institutions were evacuated to the eastern regions of the country.
At the beginning of July 1941, the Soviet command attempted to create a defense line along the Western Dvina and Dnieper. There were three days of fighting in Borisov. On July 14, rocket mortars were used for the first time near Orsha. Fierce fighting broke out in the Bobruisk area. From July 3 to July 28, the defense of Mogilev continued. During the 14-hour battle on the Buynitsky field alone, 39 enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers were destroyed. Hard fights On August 12-19 we marched beyond Gomel. By the beginning of September 1941, the entire territory of Belarus was occupied by German troops.
During defensive battles Red Army troops lost 1.5 million people, 10 thousand guns and mortars, 5 thousand tanks and 2 thousand aircraft. Despite heavy losses, Soviet soldiers fought selflessly and committed unprecedented feats. In the Grodno area, a border guard outpost repelled fascist attacks for ten hours. Until the end of June 1941, the garrison fought staunchly Brest Fortress. In the first days of the war, the crew of captain N.D. Gastello directed his damaged aircraft towards a concentration of enemy equipment and manpower. Pilots P.S. rammed enemy planes in the first hours of the war. Ryabtsev over Brest, A.S. Danilov in the Grodno region, S.M. Gudimov in the Pruzhany area, D.V. Kokarev.
The catastrophe of the Red Army at the beginning of the war was a consequence of the existence of a harsh totalitarian regime in the country. One of the reasons for this disaster was the incompetence and self-confidence of the party and state apparatus in the center and locally. In the first days of the war, the leadership of the BSSR called on the population to remain calm and convinced people that the enemy would not pass through. Resolutions were adopted to combat “alarmists.” At the same time, trains were being prepared to evacuate employees of the Central Committee and government agencies. Three days before the occupation, during a tragic period for the people, the leaders of the republic, without announcing a general evacuation, secretly left the city on the night of June 24-25. The defense of the western military districts turned out to be unprepared. As a result of repression of military personnel in the second half of the 30s. About 40% of the most trained, experienced officers, generals, and marshals were destroyed. Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky subsequently stated that without the repressions of 1937, perhaps the 1941 war would not have happened at all.
8. The first months of the war
Early in the morning of June 22, I was awakened by an insistent phone call. Wondering who could need me so early, and on Sunday, I went to the phone and picked up the receiver. The manager of the NKID, M. S. Khristoforov, who lived in the same house, called. Without any greeting and in a tone of reproach, he said:
“You, of course, are still sleeping and that means you don’t know that the war has started.”
-Are you kidding? – I asked without any confidence in the affirmative answer.
- What kind of jokes can there be here! - Khristoforov flared up. - Listen! At twelve o'clock Vyacheslav Mikhailovich appears on the radio. We will listen to him at the People's Commissariat. He ordered all the heads to immediately report to the People's Commissariat and gather all their employees whom they could notify. The dispatcher has sent a car for us, we will wait for it near our house. You will go with me and other managers from Bolshaya Kaluga. Come out in ten minutes.
The news was stunning, despite the fact that psychologically, it seemed, everyone had been prepared for it for a long time. We waited for it day after day and at the same time passionately wanted to hear it as late as possible - not on this day, not this month and not this year. And suddenly it came, this early Sunday morning!..
And, oddly enough, it was reflected in my consciousness that the limit of alarming uncertainty had been set, that the time had come to measure my strength with an impudent, constantly threatening enemy. To correctly understand this complex sensation, we must remember that everything soviet people lived then with firm conviction in the invincibility of the Red Army, in the confidence that the war will be short-lived and will take place on enemy territory, that, therefore, the inevitable military adversities will soon be eliminated - if not forever, then, in any case, for a long time. True, the Finnish campaign made significant amendments to these ideas, but it was thought that since then, over the past 15 months, the necessary practical lessons were extracted and the level of the country's defense capability was certainly increased.
In an excited state, I called Burmistenko and Monastyrsky, so that they, in turn, called other department employees and told them to go to the People's Commissariat. I quickly got dressed, chewed a sandwich as I walked, and went down to the gate of the house. Khristoforov and the head of one of the departments, G.F. Rezanov, who lived in the same entrance, were already standing there. A few minutes later two more colleagues joined us. In the car we tried to find out additional news about the war from Khristoforov, but he himself still didn’t know anything.
We did not find out anything about the situation from Vyshinsky, who gathered all the heads of departments in his office. He only gave us a number of instructions about the work schedule in wartime, about the establishment of round-the-clock duty for managers and their deputies, and about other measures apparently provided for by the mobilization plan. Some of these measures were modified in the coming weeks - the war required fundamental adjustments.
First official message We heard about the war from Molotov’s speech on the radio at 12 noon. By this time, almost all of its employees were already in the department, and the speech was listened to collectively. It confirmed that general outline They knew before that: at four o’clock in the morning, German troops invaded Soviet territory without declaring war. Molotov further stated that the Soviet Union conscientiously observed the non-aggression pact, did not give any grounds for claims on the part of Germany, and that, thus, there was direct aggression that would meet a firm rebuff from the Red Army and all Soviet people. “Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours,” Molotov concluded his speech.
The first report of the Red Army High Command on the situation on the fronts as of ten o’clock in the evening on June 22 was also imbued with a spirit of optimism. “At dawn on June 22, 1941, regular troops of the German army attacked our border units on the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea and were held back by them during the first half of the day. In the afternoon, German troops met with the advanced units of the field troops of the Red Army. After fierce fighting, the enemy was repulsed with heavy losses."
The attacks were repulsed with heavy losses for the enemy, I thought. What could be better for the first day? And then, of course, our counter-offensive will unfold, as envisaged by the Soviet military doctrine, which we all knew about from official propaganda.
Approximately the same report was given for June 23, it noted the border towns of Kolno, Lomza and Brest captured by the Germans. In the editorial of Pravda for June 24, under the heading “We will give a crushing rebuff to the fascist barbarians,” there were sober notes that warned against underestimating the enemy and the difficulties ahead. However, such warnings have not yet taken away our hopes for the upcoming counter-offensive of the Red Army.
One day of this tragic week, I hardly found time to go to Vereya, 100 kilometers from Moscow, and brought my family who lived there in the summer. I didn’t bring her for long, because already in mid-July, as part of the mandatory evacuation of unemployed women with children, she had to go, along with the families of other NKID workers, to the evacuation site designated for them - the village of Verkhniy Uslon (a few kilometers from Kazan). With a heavy heart, I sent my wife on a long journey with two babies in her arms, with a small amount of luggage allowed by the rules and with a meager supply of food. Apparently, they had to live in very cramped conditions. At that moment it was nothing more than a guess, but, unfortunately, it was soon completely justified.
Terrible events on the fronts grew into a serious danger for the country. The initial bewilderment at our military failures began to turn into confusion among some. Everyone was waiting for an authoritative word from the country's leadership that would clarify the current situation and outline a way out of it. 11 days passed, and on July 3, J.V. Stalin spoke on the radio. The content of this speech is well known.
This speech also spoke about the creation of thousands of people's militia to support the Red Army. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs party organization perceived the words about the creation of a people's militia as a party directive, subject to immediate implementation. The next day, at the direction of the party committee, the party group of our department held a meeting, the agenda of which included only one question - about Stalin’s speech. The discussion was brief, serious and effective. Members of the party group unconditionally supported joining the people's militia. But when immediately, at the meeting, the registration of those wishing to join the militia opened, everyone signed up, except for one of the referents. I won’t give his last name, there’s no point. He refused to put his signature on the list, citing the fact that he was not physically strong enough and that military service in the militia he will not be able to do so.
His refusal shocked all of us, his fellow workers. After all, until now no one in the department had heard from him the slightest complaint about any ailments. We tried to reason with him, pointing out that at such a critical moment it was not becoming for a party member to hide behind his physical weakness. However, all our arguments were in vain: he never signed.
Then party group leader Burmistenko added a new issue to the agenda - the personal matter of our comrade. The matter was absolutely clear: among us there was a coward and a deserter, unworthy of the title of party member. And no matter how painful it was to make an extreme, but inevitable decision under these conditions, we unanimously expelled him from the party. Later, the party committee approved our decision, and a few days later the deserter was expelled from the People's Commissariat.
The list of militia members of our department was transferred to the leadership of the People's Commissariat, which reviewed it simultaneously with similar lists from all other parts of the apparatus and approved it with one exception. My deputy Burmistenko, assistant Monastyrsky, assistants Sergeev, Berulin, Paisov, Shendra went to the militia. Of all the men in the department, I was the only one left. I admit that, having learned about the exception made for me, I felt almost as much a deserter as an employee expelled from the party. It seemed to me that the three employees of the department—the secretary, the stenographer and the typist—looked at me with the same eyes, not to mention the employees of other departments who did not know that I had signed up for the militia along with everyone else.
Oppressed by such feelings, I called the People's Commissar and excitedly said that, in my deep conviction, I should be in the militia next to my comrades, otherwise this would be perceived by everyone as some kind of special indulgence. Without allowing me to speak to the end, Molotov angrily replied:
– I really didn’t expect such ridiculous reasoning from you, Comrade Novikov! So, do you think we are going to close the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs? And if not, then someone will need to work in it? It is necessary to reorganize the department, and who should organize it if not the head? Stop your nonsense, roll up your sleeves and get to work. For now - one for all. Then we will find someone to help you.
For some time I actually worked alone in the department, if we mean diplomatic workers. How did you work? He was torn to pieces, chronically sleep-deprived and malnourished, and yet still did not have time to cope with all the tasks that usually fell to the lot of seven department employees who went into the militia. He carried out only the most urgent work that could not be delayed. In many cases, unfortunately, I could not use the help of the department’s clerical employees. Only at the end of July and in August the diplomatic staff of the department began to be replenished mainly by NKID employees who had returned from abroad.
By that time the department Balkan countries, having existed for only about two months, underwent reorganization. Hungary and Romania were removed from its jurisdiction as countries fighting against the Soviet Union, and Poland and Czechoslovakia were again included. Among the former countries, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece remained in it.
After the reorganization, the department began to be called the Fourth European. If Greece were not in it, it could be called a department Slavic countries. Its second feature was that these countries, with the exception of Bulgaria, were captured by Germany, and their governments were in exile. In July, these governments were recognized by the Soviet government and diplomatic relations were established with them.
At the end of July, I got a deputy in the person of an experienced diplomatic worker, Georgy Maksimovich Pushkin, and two assistants. The work of the department gradually began to return to normal.
In the summer-autumn period of 1941, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs as a whole - and, naturally, our department - were given a lot of worries by the very aggravated relations between the USSR and Bulgaria. After the attack of the fascist aggressors on the Soviet Union, the forced position of Bulgaria as a satellite of Germany affected even more to a greater extent than before. Its territory, ports, airfields and railways became a springboard for hostile German actions against the USSR. For its part, the reactionary Bulgarian government used all means of fascist terror to suppress widespread anti-German and anti-war sentiments among the people, introducing on the basis of the “Law on the Defense of the State” state of emergency. In short, the officially proclaimed Bulgarian “neutrality” was in fact entirely placed at the service of the military interests of the Nazis. It is not surprising that in such conditions the Bulgarian government embarked on the slippery slope of supporting German provocations.
On July 15, the Bulgarian envoy Stamenov asked for an audience with Vyshinsky, during which he reported that on July 14, three Soviet paratroopers landed in Bulgaria near the city of Dobrich. On July 26, a new Bulgarian demarche followed in Sofia. Secretary General The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry Shishmanov protested to the Soviet envoy in Sofia Lavrishchev that on July 23 Soviet planes allegedly dropped bombs near the cities of Ruse, Plevna and Lovech.
A response to the Bulgarian representations in Moscow and Sofia was given to Stamenov on July 27 by Vyshinsky, who stated regarding the first of them that a thorough investigation did not confirm the fact of the landing of Soviet paratroopers. At the same time, he drew Stamenov’s attention to the fact that the Bulgarian authorities did not allow Lavrishchev to meet with them in order to establish their identity and the circumstances of this strange case. According to the information now available to the Soviet government, these paratroopers are not Soviet citizens and were transferred by the Germans from Romania for provocative purposes. In connection with the second presentation, Vyshinsky stated that at none of the points listed by Shishmanov and at any other point over the territory of Bulgaria did Soviet planes fly. The rumors being spread about this are provocative in nature and clearly come from German-fascist sources hostile to the Soviet Union. In conclusion, he added that the Soviet government could not help but express its bewilderment at the fact that the Bulgarian government attached importance to these rumors, despite their clearly implausible and slanderous nature towards the USSR.
On September 10, V. M. Molotov invited the Bulgarian envoy and made him a lengthy statement, replete with data on Bulgaria’s preparations for a joint attack with Germany on the Soviet Union from the Black Sea. Drawing a conclusion from these facts, the People's Commissar stated:
“Based on the above, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to make a real representation to the Bulgarian Government and draw its attention to the fact that the position and actions of the Bulgarian Government in relation to the USSR are disloyal and do not correspond to the position and actions of a state in normal relations with the USSR, which is , according to the deep conviction of the Soviet Government, in equally not in accordance with the interests of Bulgaria itself and the Bulgarian people.”
The demarches and counter-demarches I have cited do not exhaust all those ideas that took place in the summer and autumn months 1941, but sufficiently characterize the degree of tension in relations between the USSR and Bulgaria. The disastrous tendencies in the policy of the Bulgarian government, which appeared in the initial period of the war, did not weaken in the future.
As I noted above, in July diplomatic relations were restored with Czechoslovakia and Poland, new countries falling under the competence of the Fourth European Department. These relations were very active from the very beginning, and I will dwell on them in detail.
On July 18, as a result of negotiations taking place in London, Soviet Ambassador I.M. Maisky and Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk signed an agreement under which the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia committed themselves to providing each other with assistance and support in the war against Hitler's Germany. In accordance with this obligation, the Soviet government agreed to the creation of Czechoslovak military units on the territory of the USSR. military units who were supposed to act under the direction Supreme High Command THE USSR. On September 27, a military agreement was concluded in Moscow, signed by the Commissioner of the Supreme High Command of the USSR, Major General A. M. Vasilevsky and the Commissioner of the Supreme Command of Czechoslovakia, Colonel G. Pika. By virtue of this agreement, at the end of 1941, the formation of Czechoslovak military units began in Buzuluk.
Even more active form and the scope of diplomatic relations with the Polish government, established by the agreement of July 30, which was signed in London Soviet ambassador I. M. Maisky and the Polish Prime Minister General Sikorsky. Talking about scope diplomatic relations, I also mean the scope of the friction that accompanied them, for which there were many reasons.
The main one was the reluctance of the Polish émigré government to find a realistic approach to the issue of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. This unrealistic position was taken by the Sikorsky government during the negotiations on the establishment of diplomatic relations. Therefore, no agreement was reached on the issue of the Polish-Soviet border, and it remained open, latently poisoning relations between the two governments.
The main points in the agreement of July 30 were the points about mutual assistance and support in the war against Germany and the creation of a Polish army on Soviet territory under a command appointed by the Polish government with the consent of the Soviet government. Operationally, the Polish army was supposed to operate under the leadership of the Supreme High Command of the USSR, which included a representative of the Polish army. Attached to the agreement was a Protocol granting the Soviet government an amnesty to all Polish citizens interned in 1939 after the Red Army's invasion of the lands. Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.
On August 6, a Polish military mission led by General Szyszko-Bogush arrived in Moscow to negotiate with the Commissioner of the USSR Supreme High Command, Major General Vasilevsky. As a result of negotiations on August 14, an agreement was concluded on practical issues related to the creation of the Polish army. For the post of commander Polish army The commander-in-chief of the Polish armed forces, General Sikorski, appointed General Wladyslaw Anders, who began forming an army in Buzuluk in September.
Both of these agreements gave rise to many practical issues, which fell upon the understaffed Fourth European Division. Since the opening of the Polish embassy in Moscow, its representatives - Councilor Sokolnitsky and First Secretary Arlet - visited the department every day, bringing several memos or notes in their briefcases at once.
They were talking mainly about the resettlement and employment of amnestied Polish citizens, supplying them with fuel, food, etc. The issue of housing in eastern regions the country at that time was one of the most acute, but still one way or another amenable to solution. Difficulties arose mainly due to the fact that most of those amnestied did not want to live in areas with a harsh climate and sought through the embassy to move to warmer climes.
The flow of such documents especially intensified after the Polish embassy created the institution of “special representatives” in 20 cities, which was later supplemented by the institution of so-called “embassy trustees,” the number of which over time reached several hundred.
I must admit that I was very reserved about expanding the network of “representatives” and “trusted persons” of the embassy. The reason for my restraint was the anticipation of political complications from such hypertrophy of the foreign embassy apparatus. In the autumn of 1941, these possible complications appeared to me still in an abstract form, but the foresight suggested by experience was fully realized. In reality, there were much more political tensions, misunderstandings and conflicts than could have been foreseen.
I will now limit myself to these cursory remarks about the consequences of the excessive activity of the Polish embassy, intending to dwell on them again in the future.
As for relations with the other countries within the competence of the department - Greece and Yugoslavia, in the summer-autumn period of 1941 they did not stand out with any noticeable events, and the newly opened Yugoslav and Greek missions in Moscow barely started their activities, few went beyond the protocol.
In mid-July, the situation on the fronts, previously characterized by an almost continuous retreat of our troops, acquired some new features. Near Smolensk, our units fought stubborn defensive battles, which delayed the German advance for several days. Smolensk was abandoned by us, but at the line Yartsevo - Yelnya - the Desna River the Red Army stopped for a long time German offensive on the Western Front. At the end of July and throughout August, the fighting there did not subside, and in early September our counteroffensive launched, which made it possible to liberate part of the occupied areas. On September 10 it was suspended, and at the front again a temporary unstable equilibrium. Successful defensive and offensive operations The Red Army near Yelnya had great moral and political significance, since here for the first time the vaunted German blitzkrieg was first slowed down and then delayed for two months. The Red Army received the opportunity to regroup its forces.
But on other fronts things were different. On Northwestern Front The Germans continued to advance and in September blockaded Leningrad. Our troops left Kyiv on the Southwestern Front. During the retreat from Kyiv, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)U and a member of the Military Council of the front, M. A. Burmistenko, was killed. Some time after this news, I learned with bitterness that in one of the military operations of the militia near Moscow, his brother, my deputy in the department, I. A. Burmistenko, was killed. In passing, I note that he was not the only one among the NKID militia who gave his life for his homeland or was seriously injured. Among the latter was my former assistant E. A. Monastyrsky. In the fall, most of the NKID militia were recalled from the active army and returned to their jobs.
The first raid took place on the night of July 22 German aviation to Moscow. Massive raids were repeated on the nights of July 23 and 24. Later they turned into a rather ordinary phenomenon. The air raid signal caught us in a variety of places. If this happened during working hours (and they lasted well after midnight), then we spent half the night, or even the whole night long - often due to lack of transport - in the People's Commissariat bomb shelter. We slept on the cement floor, placing sheets of newspaper under us. Several times I had to wait for the all-clear signal in the Kremlin's service bomb shelter.
In September, men from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs began to be trained in military affairs. For me, a former Red Army soldier demobilized back in January 1921, this was nothing new. I also went through military training- according to the Universal Education program - during his student years in Leningrad, and then in the 30s at the Institute of Red Professors, where the level military training was much higher. But even now I did not shirk my general responsibility and took the course accelerated learning along with everyone. Twice or three times a week we went to the shooting range at one of the Yaroslavl railway stations and practiced target shooting. My severe myopia somewhat reduced my shooting achievements, but still I fired one or two out of three cartridges into the target depicting a fascist soldier.
Thus, the combat summer of 1941 passed through hard work, worries and anxieties for the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and autumn came, marking a new, even more dangerous stage of the war. It also brought major changes in the conditions of the NKID activities.
For me personally, it turned into months of semi-nomadic life - throughout almost the entire fourth quarter of this year.
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1. Latest news
2. Attack on Dorogobuzh
After the defeat of the main forces of the Soviet Western Front in the Battle of Bialystok-Minsk, the German mobile forces of Army Group Center reached the Western Dvina in the area of Vitebsk and Mogilev. Battle of Smolensk began on July 10-12 with the offensive of mobile formations of the 4th Army of the Wehrmacht in two wedges on Vitebsk and Mogilev. In a new offensive in the Moscow direction German command expected to achieve decisive success. The general plan provided for the division of the Soviet defense front into three parts, the encirclement and liquidation of the Polotsk-Nevel, Smolensk and Mogilev groupings of the Western Front and the creation favorable conditions for an unhindered attack on Moscow.
Since July 1941, 37-mm 61-K automatic anti-aircraft guns, along with 85-mm 52-K guns, were included in the anti-tank regiments of the Supreme High Command Reserve. These regiments were armed with eight 37 mm and eight 85 mm anti-aircraft guns. During the war, 37-mm automatic anti-aircraft guns were quite often used to fire at ground targets.
5. Children in a makeshift bunker
6. Military parade in honor of the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution
The military parade held during the Battle of Moscow, when the front line passed just a few tens of kilometers from the city, is equated to the most important in its impact on the course of events. military operation. He had great value to raise the morale of the army and the entire country, showing the whole world that Moscow is not giving up, and the fighting spirit of the army is not broken.
7. Line of fortifications
By the beginning of December 1941, the line of fortifications from the Moscow River in the area of the village of Krylatskoye through the western outskirts of Kuntsevo and to Tsaritsyno was completed.
8. Evacuation of livestock
It seems strange today. But historians are sure that they had their own reasons for this.