German defense

The fighting during the Berlin operation took place in Western Pomerania, Mecklenburg, Brandenburg provinces and part of Saxony. The terrain in the offensive zone of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian, 1st Ukrainian fronts for the most part was convenient for the operation of all types of troops. On the other hand, natural and anthropogenic factors made it possible to create a strong defense. There were a large number of rivers, lakes, canals, large forests, large cities and settlements with strong stone structures, which provided ample opportunities for organizing defense in a short time. For the advancing fronts, this created additional difficulties for the deployment of troops and their maneuver.

The Soviet command had to take into account the factor of the need to force a significant number of water barriers. The main part of the rivers in central Germany flows in a meridional direction from south to north. This gave the Germans additional opportunities to organize defensive positions on the western banks of the rivers. The most serious water obstacles were the rivers Oder and its branches (Eastern and Western Oder), Neisse, Spree, Havel and Elbe, as well as the Finow, Hohenzollern, Ruppiner, Oder-Spree and Teltow canals.

Back in January 1945, when the Red Army broke through the Vistula defensive line, the German command hastily began equipping defensive positions on the territory of the Reich. Fortification work especially began in February, when our troops reached the line of the Oder and Neisse rivers. The central regions of Germany and the imperial capital were under threat. Engineering work was carried out not only by troops and paramilitary organizations, they mobilized the German population, attracted a large number of prisoners of war and foreign workers, a significant number of whom worked in Germany throughout the war.

Particular attention was paid to creating a strong defense on the western bank of the Oder and Neisse. The Germans here created a strong and deeply layered defense. The Oder-Neissen defensive line had three lines: the first (main), second and third (rear). In important directions between these strips, intermediate and cut-off strips were built. The depth of German defense at the Oder-Neissen line reached 20-40 kilometers. The total depth of German defense in the Berlin direction, including the Berlin fortified area, reached 100 kilometers.

The main line of enemy defense mainly ran along the western bank of the Oder and Neisse rivers. In addition, in the areas of Frankfurt an der Oder, Guben, Forst and Muskau, the Germans had small bridgeheads on the eastern bank. The first strip consisted of 2-3 positions, the total depth of which reached 5-10 km. The front edge was covered with barbed wire and minefields. All settlements in this zone were turned into strongholds. The dense network of defensive structures was a serious obstacle for our troops. The Germans, using the Oder lock system and numerous canals, prepared a number of areas for flooding, which was supposed to delay the advance of our troops.

The Germans created a particularly powerful defense in the possible directions of attack of the strike groups of the Soviet fronts: sections from Stettin to Schwedt (2nd Belorussian Front), from the mouth of the river. Alter Oder to Frankfurt (1st BF), from Guben (Gubin) to Priebus. The section from Stettin to Schwedt was especially difficult from a natural standpoint for the advancing troops. Here the Oder (Odra) River had two branches, which created two independent rivers: the Ost (Eastern) Oder and the West (Western) Oder. The main line of defense of the German troops ran along the western bank of the Western Oder. The river's floodplain and the interfluve were flooded and were under enemy fire. To attack the enemy, it was necessary to cross the Eastern and Western Oder under German fire.

The Germans created the most powerful defense in terms of engineering in the Küstrin-Berlin direction, on the front section from the river. Alter Oder to Frankfurt an der Oder. Here the enemy had 3-4 lines of full profile trenches. In the Frankfurt an der Oder - Priebus sector, nature also did not support the actions of large forces. The German defense passed through a forested lake area, so the enemy built 1-3 lines of intermittent trenches, covering the most accessible areas. On the offensive sector of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Guben - Priebus, the Germans had a dense defense with 2-3 lines of full-profile trenches.

German cities were prepared for all-round defense and street fighting. As a result, populated areas became strong defense centers. The approaches to them were covered by several lines of trenches. Particular attention was paid to the eastern and southern sectors of defense. The most powerful defense centers were Stettin, Schwedt, Frankfurt, Guben, Forst and Muskau. These cities, in connection with other strongholds, were the basis of the main defense line. A particularly powerful defense was created in Frankfurt an der Oder. The roads that passed through the forests were blocked by rubble and mined. Much attention was paid to anti-tank defense. To do this, they tried to use natural boundaries (rivers, canals), created rubble, and installed many minefields. In the most important directions, 1 km of front accounted for up to 2 thousand minutes. Ahead of the first trench, at road junctions, rifle cells were set up for soldiers armed with anti-tank grenade launchers (faustpatrons).

The front edge of the second defense line ran 10-20 km from the front edge of the main line. The second line of defense ran along the western bank of the river. Rand, the towns of Angermünde, Wriezen, Seelow, Katlow, Debern, Weiswasser and Görlitz. The most powerful defense was in the Berlin direction. There were 2-3 lines of trenches, all settlements and even individual estates, estates (farms) were prepared for all-round defense, turned into strong points. The most famous position in the second line of defense was the Seelow Heights in the Küstrin-Berlin direction. The city of Seelow and the Seelow Heights were one of the most important obstacles on the way of our troops to Berlin.

The Seelow Heights are the high bank of the old riverbed of the Oder and rise 40-50 meters above the area. The steepness of the coast reaches 30-40 degrees. From these heights it was good to adjust mortar and artillery fire. Fire weapons were located on the slopes of the heights. There are trenches and trenches on the slopes. There are anti-tank ditches in front of them. Tanks and self-propelled guns could only overcome the steep slopes of the Seelow Heights on roads. However, all the roads were mined and were under fire from all types. For our troops, the location of the German troops was difficult to identify due to the groves and gardens east of Seelow. The Germans called the Seelow Heights “the castle of Berlin.” Indeed, after the heights, a direct path to the German capital opened up. The Germans were preparing to fight to the death in this position.

Soviet attack on the Seelow Heights

The section of the second German defense line from Katlov to Weiswasser in front of the 1st Ukrainian Front (“Matilda Line”) consisted of one trench and settlements prepared for defense. The area was wooded, so the Germans made extensive use of tree debris here. The section from Müllrose to Katlov passed through wooded-lake terrain and consisted of an intermittent trench and individual strongholds. Positions for artillery and anti-tank grenade launchers were equipped along the roads.

The rear defense line was located 20-40 km from the front edge of the main line. It went from Torgelow, along the Uecker River, through Pasewalk, Prenzlau, Eberswalde, Batzlow, Müncheberg, Fürstenwalde, along the western bank of the Spree River to the lake in the Beskow area, through Ferow, again along the western bank of the Spree, Cottbus and Spremberg. The basis of the rear line of defense were cities, transformed into powerful strongholds and centers of resistance. They were surrounded by trenches. The most important strongholds were Torgelow, Prenzlau, Eberswalde, Batslow, Müncheberg, Fürstenwalde, Beskow, Cottbus and Spremberg.

The third line of defense was prepared most densely in the central (Berlin) direction, in the Eberswalde - Fürstenwalde section and in the Cottbus-Berlin direction, in the Cottbus - Spremberg section. For example, Cottbus had two defensive contours; strong artillery and armored caps were located in the most important directions. The trenches were covered with wire and anti-tank barriers. Sturdy stone buildings were turned into permanent defensive structures, and the streets were blocked off with barricades. Other cities were prepared for defense in approximately the same way. All the main forces of the field army defended the first and second defense lines, so sapper units, militias and the Hitler Youth were located on the rear line.

Simultaneously with the equipment of the Oder-Neissen defensive line, the Germans hastily prepared the Berlin region for defense. The Berlin defensive area consisted of three defensive rings (external, internal and urban). It was an entire fortified area, prepared for long battles. The German capital was surrounded on all sides by rivers, canals, lakes and forests, which helped in the creation of a defensive region. Rivers and canals divided Berlin into several parts, which also strengthened the defensive capabilities of the German garrison. The entire Berlin defensive region was divided into nine sectors. Sector No. 9 was located in the center, from which the other eight defense sectors diverged radially. Each sector in turn was divided into several subsectors.

The outer defensive contour of the Berlin region was located 25-40 km from the center of the capital along the Biesenthal line, Lake Stinitz See, Lake Seddin See, Mittenwalde, Rangsdorf, Tirow, Lake Schwilow See, Briselang, Velten and Lanke. Numerous rivers, lakes and canals strengthened the defense. Populated areas were turned into defense centers. On the outer defensive perimeter, the Wehrmacht planned to weaken the enemy as much as possible, to bleed him dry, in order to finally stop him on the inner defensive ring.

The internal defensive line (“green line”) was considered the main defensive line on which the enemy was going to be stopped. The Green Line ran along the outskirts of the Berlin suburbs - Malchow, Marzahn, Dahlwitz, Köpenick, Rudow, Lichtenrade, the Teltow Canal, Kladow, Falkenhagen, Tegel and Rosenthal. The internal defensive contour was based on strong buildings, converted into long-term structures. The internal circuit had 3-5 lines of trenches with a total depth of up to 6 kilometers. True, engineering work at this line was not completed before the start of the Soviet offensive. On this line, the German command planned to throw the main forces of the Berlin garrison into battle, and the troops received orders to hold this line at any cost. Even if Russian troops broke through the “green line” in some directions, all troops had to remain in their places, unless the reserve forces would restore the situation with counterattacks.

The city defensive contour ran along the ring railway. Barricades were set up on all the streets that led to the center of Berlin. Firing positions were prepared in squares and street intersections. The German command ordered to fight for every street, every house and every meter of the capital. The defense planned to use well-developed underground communications, including the metro and sewer system. Underground communications allowed German units to move from one place to another without being subjected to air and artillery strikes and to deliver unexpected attacks on Soviet troops, including in the rear.

Volksturm militia parade in Berlin

Volkssturm soldiers erect anti-tank barriers, Berlin

Particular attention was paid to the central defense sector (sector No. 9). Various central state, party and military institutions were located here. Among them were the Reichstag and the Imperial Chancellery. This was the “heart” of the Third Reich. Therefore, during the Battle of Berlin, the central sector became the site of especially fierce and furious fighting. It was here that the remnants of the Berlin garrison and selected SS units defended until the last. The leaders of the Reich settled here. Here the Victory Banner soared above the Reichstag dome.

Afterwards, Berlin itself was a huge city with about 600 thousand buildings. Taking such a city was extremely difficult, although Soviet troops had already gained extensive experience in urban battles during the assault on Budapest, Vienna, and Königsberg. Here every block, street and house had to be taken by storm, and a bloody price had to be paid for victory. For our soldiers, on the one hand, this was the last and main battle; they stormed the “lair of the beast.” On the other hand, everyone knew that Victory was near; dying and losing comrades was especially difficult.

The defense of Berlin was organized with the expectation of conducting brutal street fighting. Hitler and his entourage were going to fight to the last, they were not going to give up. The troops were given the order to defend the capital to the last man and last cartridge. The military-political leadership of the Third Reich, even in conditions of complete senselessness of resistance, refused to capitulate and made the final sacrifice - tens and hundreds of thousands of people still had to die for peace to finally come to Europe.

Thus, our troops at the end of the war needed to solve a difficult problem. Break through the Oder-Neissen defensive line (of three stripes) with a total depth of 20-40 kilometers, which ran along serious natural boundaries, had a well-prepared defense system and many cities and towns turned into centers of resistance. It was necessary to break the resistance of the million-strong Berlin group (the armies of Army Group Vistula and Center), in which the best divisions of the Third Reich were concentrated. It was necessary to crush such a tough nut as the Berlin fortified area.

Soviet soldiers during the storming of Berlin

To be continued…

The Germans also knew how to hold the defense well and fight courageously on their territory, as evidenced by the defense of the fortified city of Breslau (now Wroclaw). The garrison and residents of this city did not give up for almost 3 months from February 13 to May 6, 1945 and continued to fight even when the fate of all of Germany was already sealed and Adolf Hitler himself was no longer alive.

Soldiers of the 309th "Piryatinskaya" rifle division of the unit of sergeant major Andrei Semenovich Provoznyuk in street battles for Breslau.
For his courage, in April 1945, the sergeant major was awarded the Order of Glory, 3rd degree.

It is known that during the Second World War, Breslau was an important industrial center for the German military machine. On its territory there were several factories and a concentration camp.

It is also interesting that until the last months of the war, Breslau, like Dresden, was not destroyed at all, since the city was beyond the reach of Allied bombers and even due to this received the nickname “Bomb Shelter of the Reich.” In connection with this, many German government institutions were then moved to Breslau. This city experienced its first air raid only in the fall of 1944, when Soviet troops had already reached the banks of the Vistula in central Poland. However, work on creating city fortifications and, in general, preparing Breslau for defense began in June 1944. It was then that two defensive belts were erected around the city and warehouses for provisions and ammunition were built. The work was mainly carried out using labor from labor camps, volunteers, women, the elderly and children.

Nature itself allowed the Germans to create an impregnable fortress from Breslau, since the entire southeastern, eastern and northern sides of the city had natural barriers inaccessible to tanks: the Weide River, the canals of the Oder River, the Ole River with wide floodplains. And the northern side was generally a swampy area or viscous soil, which prevented Soviet tanks from massively attacking the suburbs of Breslau from this direction.

These advantages were used by the Germans to create a strong defense, especially in anti-tank terms. Stone buildings, gardens and parks made it possible to secretly deploy fire weapons and provide good camouflage from ground and air surveillance. The enemy blocked the roads in advance with ditches and barricades, mined possible passages, created rubble and kept them under targeted artillery fire.

But the most important thing that contributed to the fierce and long-term defense of Breslau was not its well-thought-out and powerful fortifications, but the German troops themselves who defended the city, their high fighting spirit. Yes, it was known that there was active Nazi propaganda among the German soldiers and volunteers defending the city, but it did not play the main role in the defensive battles; the Germans in Breslau simply had nothing to lose, they were truly driven into a corner, since for many soldiers of the Wehrmacht, SS troops and Volkssturm detachments, this was their hometown, and as we know, everyone will fight for their home to the end.

From German sources it is known that the “fortress garrison” that held Breslau for three months consisted of 35,000 Wehrmacht employees and 10 thousand conscripted into the Volkssturm. In total it included the newly formed 609th Infantry Division, elements of the 269th Infantry Division, training and reserve units, a temporary SS regiment, 38 Volkssturm battalions (each with 400 people), Hitler Youth units, police, Luftwaffe ground units and remnants units defeated in battle. The defenders had 32 artillery batteries, allegedly composed of obsolete German, as well as captured Soviet, Polish, Yugoslav and Italian guns. There were supposedly no tank units in the garrison, with the exception of a company of 15 self-propelled guns of various types.

Soviet sources give a slightly different, but more detailed composition of the enemy group, so in the city of Breslau, according to Soviet military intelligence, the following enemy group was surrounded: units of the 20th Panzer Division. 236th brigade of assault guns, combined tank special company "Breslau". artillery and anti-aircraft units, as well as 38 Volkssturm battalions. According to the testimony of prisoners in the first line of defense, the enemy had: 25,710 people. 1443 machine guns, 1885 faust cartridges, 101 mortars. 68 guns of various calibers, about 20 tanks and self-propelled guns. In total, 30,980 people defended the city with the support of 1,645 machine guns, 2,335 faust cartridges, and 174 mortars. 124 guns of various calibers, 50 tanks and self-propelled guns.

At first, the garrison was supplied by air and even received reinforcements in the form of two battalions of paratroopers. The Wehrmacht High Command even tried twice to relieve Breslau, however, realizing the futility of these actions, they gave up on the besieged and they were thus left to defend themselves in splendid isolation, they simply did not know that everything was already over, that the Third Reich. actually lived out his last weeks, or even days

The 6th and 5th Guards Armies, with the support of the 7th and 4th Guards Tank Corps, were tasked with taking this fortress city.

It was these formations that began preparations for the systematic assault on the city, and on February 16 the assault itself began. However, the fighting proceeded unevenly, sometimes it was active, sometimes it died down, this is when our troops regrouped, were replenished with manpower and ammunition, and again struck, this time in a new direction.

At the beginning, Breslau was stormed from all sides, then, after blocking and complete encirclement, battles in the city unfolded in separate directions, directly in city blocks, for every house and floor.

The Germans built their defenses in such a way that on the side from which our troops were advancing, the streets and alleys of Breslau allowed the Soviet command to use their numerous tanks and self-propelled guns in a very limited manner, only in small groups of 2-3 vehicles and no more, and even those with a large they could hardly maneuver in narrow quarters. In addition to this, the German “Faustniks” staged a real hunt for our armored vehicles from all sides. During the first two weeks of fighting alone, the Red Army troops lost over 160 tanks and self-propelled guns on the streets of Breslau.

On the other side of Breslau, where German troops were directly defending, its suburbs had a good network of excellent roads, which allowed the city’s defense command to transfer the few German tanks and self-propelled guns from one “problem” area to another. The enemy's armored vehicles were in the personal reserve of the garrison commandant and in small groups (1-2 tanks, 1-3 self-propelled guns) operated in more active sectors of the defense, supporting the infantry with fire and repelling attacks by Soviet tanks.

During the first street battles that unfolded, it became clear to the Soviet command that Breslau could not be taken straight away, that it was urgently necessary to change the assault tactics itself, to bring more powerful self-propelled guns, special sapper units and flamethrower units into the battles.

Soon, special assault battalions of engineer brigades were used for fighting in the city (in Breslau - the 62nd separate engineer brigade), whose fighters and commanders (1st and 2nd battalions of each brigade) were specially trained for fighting in city ​​and capturing powerful long-term enemy fortifications.

The personnel of these units had protective metal armor, ROKS flamethrowers, portable machines for launching PC shells and captured Faust cartridges, and most importantly, they were well acquainted with demolition skills. These were real war pros who had gone through more than one assault. Additionally, the troops involved in the assault were reinforced with ISU-152 from the heavy self-propelled artillery regiments.

Now, in order to avoid unnecessary losses, tanks and self-propelled guns changed their firing positions only when all buildings, floors, basements and attics were “cleared” by our infantry from the enemy’s “faustniks”. These sweeps were carried out by assault groups using all forces and means, the basements and buildings where the enemy’s operational bases were located were blown up with explosives, thrown with grenades, burned out with flamethrowers, the majority of the Germans showed themselves to be courageous opponents, even in the most hopeless situations they preferred to die in battle than to surrender.

The use of tanks and self-propelled guns by Soviet troops during battles on the streets of Breslau is interesting. Where they often played the role of a battering ram, which makes passages in fences and barricades. With the fire of their cannons, our armored vehicles destroyed the strong brick walls of houses and fences, allowing infantrymen and artillerymen to infiltrate the attacked objects and conduct close combat with the enemy.

But what surprised our tankers the most was that they invented an original way of removing rubble and barricades using river anchors. The tank and self-propelled guns, complete with a requisitioned cable with an anchor, approached the rubble under the cover of another combat vehicle or artillery gun. The sappers hooked the anchor to the logs or beams of the blockage, the tank backed up and pulled away the barricade. The anchor returned to its place, on board the combat vehicle.

It is known from combat reports that as a result of just one month of fighting during the assault on Breslau, the armored and self-propelled artillery units of the 6th Army inflicted the following losses on the enemy: 2 tanks destroyed, 36 guns of various calibers, 22 mortars, heavy machine guns - 82, light machine guns - 210, bunkers and bunkers - 7, enemy soldiers and officers - 3,750 people. Captured: 3 guns, 6 mortars, 5 heavy machine guns, 3 motorcycles, 52 bicycles. 123 people were captured.

During the same month of fighting, ONLY the tank and self-propelled units that were part of the 6th Army suffered the following losses. The enemy burned 5 IS-2, 6 T-34, 3 SU-122, and one ISU-152 tanks. 3 ISU-152s and 7 IS-2s were shot down. Mines hit: 4 T-34s and 2 SU-122s. The total loss of materiel was: 3 ISU-152. 13 IS-2.6 T-34. 3 SU-122. as well as 154 killed and wounded personnel.

Active hostilities in Breslau took place almost continuously from February 18 to May 1, 1945, and only on April 30, waiting for the end of the war, did Soviet troops go on the defensive mainly in the southern and western parts of the city of Breslau. The rest of the city continued to remain in German hands.

On May 4, the mastermind of the defense of Breslau, Gauleiter Hanke, was evacuated from the city by plane, he was probably in a hurry to take the post of Reichsführer SS, instead of the removed Himmler. However, he was clearly unlucky; a week later he went missing in the Prague area. On May 6, the commandant of Breslau, General Neuhoff, signed the act of surrender. According to one data, the losses in the battles for Breslau in the Wehrmacht's manpower amounted to 7,000 people, the losses of the Red Army - 9,000 people. The losses of Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns amounted to about 200 units, of which 70%, in the first 2 weeks of fighting. More than 2/3 of the city's buildings were destroyed. Civilian casualties amounted to about 80,000 people, including Volkssturm and Hitler Youth units.

According to other sources, about 6,000 soldiers and officers and 170,000 civilians died on the German side. 45,000 German soldiers were captured. German losses were actually even higher, as many supply and evacuation planes were shot down and many wounded never made it over the front lines. The Soviet side lost more than 8,000 people killed (including about 800 officers).
From modern Polish sources it is known that 7 thousand Soviet soldiers are buried in the military cemetery of the city of Wroclaw.

The commandant of the fortress, General Niehof himself, cited slightly different figures in his memoirs. In his opinion, about 50 thousand Wehrmacht soldiers and Volkssturmists took part in the defense of Breslau, of whom 6 thousand were killed and another 29 thousand were wounded. That is, the total losses of the German garrison amounted to 35 thousand people, which leaves about 58% of the total number of the German group. If this figure is correct, then this is a very large proportion of military casualties. He estimated civilian casualties at 80 thousand people. When Niehof talks about Soviet losses, he bases himself on the figure of 30-40 thousand killed, citing Soviet sources that he does not name.

It is interesting that the Germans themselves still consider the feasibility of defending Breslau controversial.

For example, the famous historian and researcher of the Second World War, General Kurt von Tippelskirch, in his “History of the Second World War” expressed the idea that the defense of Breslau made strategic sense only in the first phase of the winter offensive of the Red Army in 1945, that is, in January and February. At this point, the fighting for Breslau could pin down the advancing Soviet divisions, which, in turn, could allow the German command to create a new front line that would stretch from Lower Silesia to the Sudeten foothills.

In any case, with the defense of Breslau, the Germans managed to pin down the actions of about 12 Soviet divisions, 7 of which were on the front line, and another 5 were used as an operational reserve. However, this did not generally affect the general situation on the Eastern Front, as, for example, the actions of the Soviet troops in the summer and autumn of 1942 could influence the same situation. in the battle for Voronezh, when these actions generally contributed to changing the situation in the battle for Stalingrad in favor of the Red Army.

The composition of the Red Army units that took part in the siege and storming of the fortress

22nd Rifle Corps (22 sk), consisting of:

112 “Rylsko-Korosten” Rifle Division (112 Infantry Division)
135 "Krakow" Rifle Division (135 Infantry Division)
181 "Stalingrad" Rifle Division (181st Infantry Division)
273 "Bezhitskaya" Infantry Division (273 Infantry Division)

74th Rifle Corps (74 sk), consisting of:

218 "Romodano-Kyiv" Rifle Division (218 Infantry Division)
294 "Cherkasy" Rifle Division (294 Infantry Division)
309 "Piryatinskaya" Rifle Division (309 Infantry Division)
359 "Yartsevskaya" Rifle Division (359 Infantry Division)

Flamethrower parts:

322 Separate flamethrower battalion (22 special units)
325 Separate flamethrower battalion (25 general units)
337 Separate battalion of backpack flamethrowers (37 units)
346 Separate battalion of backpack flamethrowers (46 units)
347 “Keletsky” Separate battalion of backpack flamethrowers (47 units)

Engineering units:

362 “Nikopolskaya” Separate engineer-sapper brigade (62nd brigade)
3240 "Kievsko-Keletsky" Engineer Battalion (240 ISB (53 ISB))
334 Separate battalion of electric barriers (34 obez)

Tank units, consisting of:

387 “Bobruisk” Separate Guards Heavy Tank Regiment (87 Guards Tank Regiment)
3222 "Ropshinsky" Separate tank regiment (222 detachment)
3349 "Lvov" Guards heavy self-propelled artillery regiment (349 Guards TsAP)
3374 "Ostropolsky" Guards heavy self-propelled artillery regiment (374 Guards TsAP)

The list does not include artillery, air defense and artillery units of the RGK

PS Notes from the memoirs of Colonel Alexei Pavlovich Chichin

02/17/45 – Zabschau, castle. Breslau is surrounded. We are on the southwestern outskirts. Everyone in the city from 15 to 60 years old is armed. They resist to the death. When will the allies budge?

02/18/45 – Kletendorf, suburb of Breslau. Breslau is protected from young to old. Our soldiers take revenge mercilessly. An order was given: not to shoot prisoners and civilians, but it doesn’t help. We need to take urgent action, we must not become barbarians.

02/27/45 – Krittern, suburb of Breslau. We gnaw around the block like toothless nuts. Big losses, especially among the command staff. There are not enough shells. The resistance is fierce.

03/11/45 – Breslau, southern part, quarter. 665. Things are bad. The losses were heavy, and only 1/4 of the city was taken. Time plays into the pr-ka's hands. And he snaps. So he knocked and chopped off Striegau. What the hell, it will hit Breslau - help out. The city is destroyed to smithereens.

03/15/45 – Breslau, block 665, Kleinburg street. Depression with great losses in people. In my fourth year I learned what war is like in big cities. Budapest and Breslau are shining examples for our statutes, which will still be written after the war. The destruction is staggering. In the West, the Allies are still “expanding” bridgeheads and outlying fortifications. Obviously, the operational pause will last at least a month. But Hitler foreshadows a “decisive turning point,” and he still has many fools who listen and believe... I received a postcard from my daughter.

03.27.45 – Breslau, Hohenzollern street. No success. Reasons: there is little infantry, there is no interaction with aviation, no artillery can take basements, and there is no way to use it in street battles. The Germans are strong with faustpatrons and cellars. They stand to death. It seems that the allies have begun to move. Went 2 and 3 Ukrainian. fronts. In the regions of Königsberg and Danzig there are hopes to finish the matter soon (2 fronts would be freed at once). Almost 2 months have passed since 01/31/45—my crossing of the German border in the region of the village of Elgut-Rippin. There was an unbearable desire to end the war as quickly as possible. I want it because I saw the end of all this.

04/10/45 – Brokkau, suburb of Breslau. I’ll tell posterity how we took Breslau, how we fought with the Volkssturm: until you blow up a basement, an apartment, an entrance or an entire house, these Volkssturm fight to the death. And behind them, behind them, “es-es.” But hurray! Koenigsberg fell.

04/19/45 – Breslau. The 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian began the offensive. Between these fronts and the Allied fronts there remained a gap of no more than 100 km. They will connect soon. How will this affect the overall situation? Will Berlin seriously resist? Will the war end soon? I can't believe it. What then? Japanese? If only I could take a break for a year or two, see my family, live with my little wife... And we got along with Breslava. And God knows how difficult it was that brought us here! We do not have sufficient forces for a decisive assault. Stalwart infantry with Faustpatrons in such a large city is irresistible...

04/23/45 – Critern, 22:15. The radio has just announced something that has long been the property of us, the bosses: a) a breakthrough of the front of the avenue on the river. Neisse, exit to the Elbe north-west. Dresden; b) our troops broke into Berlin from the south. Until now, nothing has been heard about Zhukov, but he is also in Berlin. The denouement is approaching. The radio announced that an important message would be broadcast at 23:15. Perhaps a repetition of the breakthrough of the 1st Ukrainian Army. front. Or maybe about Zhukov? (I hear our anti-aircraft guns barking: German transport workers are throwing ammunition to the surrounded garrison, and our little ones are “spitting” at them.) No... This is about the 4th Ukrainian. front: his troops captured the territory. Czechosl. mountains Opava. And that's money. "The indestructible union of free republics!.."

From Colonel Chichin’s letter home: “My dear, dear daughters! The war with Nazi Germany ended in our complete victory. And the first people I want to greet these days are you, my family. I warmly congratulate you on Victory Day, now we are happier than ever! Fate has preserved me, I am destined to continue to live - for my family and my Motherland, to whom my humble life belongs. Be healthy, dear ones, and see you soon! Your dad, son and husband. Breslau, 05/09/45."
- “A warrior and a dreamer,” “a philosopher in uniform” (as he calls himself in his notes), he wrote surprisingly tender letters to his family. But even the most touching of them were written by a professional soldier.

Soviet soldiers handing out bread

The Tannenberg line is a complex of German defensive structures in Estonia on the Narva Isthmus between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipsi. The name of the line, according to the propagandists of the Third Reich, was supposed to support the weakened morale of the German troops: in the Battle of Tannenberg during the East Prussian operation of 1914, two corps of the 2nd Army of Russia under the command of General Samsonov were surrounded and defeated.

Back in the summer of 1943, the Germans began to strengthen the defensive line along the Narova River, giving it the code name “Panther”. Retreating from Leningrad, the Germans occupied the Panther defense line, but rather quickly losing ground, on June 26, 1944 they occupied the Tannenberg line, the defense line of which included the Vaivara Blue Mountains. The wooded, swampy Narva Isthmus, in itself, was a serious obstacle to the advancement of troops and military equipment. Reinforced with military engineering structures and firepower, it became almost impregnable.

The line consisted of three defensive line stripes with a total length of 55 km and a depth of 25-30 km. The first line of this line ran from the village of Mummasaare, located on the shores of the Gulf of Finland, along the three heights of the Blue Mountains through the strongholds of Sirgala, Putki, Gorodenka and further along the Narova River to Lake Peipsi. The basis of the defense was the Blue Mountains, 3.4 km long, which consisted of three heights: Tower Mountain, 70 m high, Grenadier Mountain, 83 m high, and Park Mountain, 85 m high. All three mountains had a dominant position in the surrounding their localities.

The first military structures were built on three, then unnamed, heights under Peter I, during the Northern War with the Swedes. They were built to protect the rear of the army during the assault on Narva. At the beginning of the 20th century, the heights with the battery located there were included in the coastal defense system of the Russian Empire. Moves were cut inside the mountains to deliver ammunition and reserves. Firing points and strong points were connected by underground communications. German troops used a system of ready-made underground structures, adapting and rebuilding everything to suit their needs. Himmler personally checked the reliability of the Tannenberg line.

Taking into account the fact that on one side there were impenetrable swamp forests with Lake Peipus, and on the other, the Gulf of Finland, the Germans considered the defense line an insurmountable natural barrier for the Red Army units advancing from the east.

Along the defense line in populated areas, several parallel full-profile trenches were dug, lined with logs and poles. The trenches were reinforced with dugouts and bunkers, as well as open and semi-open firing points. In wetlands, instead of trenches, fortifications were built from logs on wooden decks. In front of the first line of trenches there were several rows of barbed wire, Bruno spirals and minefields. Behind the trenches in the depths of the defense, reinforced concrete and wood-earth shelters were placed to shelter troops. The defenses in the Blue Mountains were reinforced with artillery positions, armored Crab machine gun nests, and buried tanks. The deep caves on the heights that had existed since Peter the Great's time were turned by the Germans into bomb shelters and shelters for guns. The trenches climbed the slopes in winding labyrinths, connecting at the top with casemates that hid long-range artillery. The stone buildings of the children's colony that once existed here have been rebuilt into nests for firing points. The foundations of the buildings have been converted into massive pillboxes. Headquarters and reserves were located on the slopes of the heights, in bunkers. To the north and south of the heights were the main communications - the railway and the highway, which led deep into Estonia and allowed the Germans to maneuver their troops.

The second defensive line of the Tannenberg Line ran along the Sytka River from Sillamäe in the direction of Van - Sytke through Sirgala to the south. The third strip was located 25 kilometers from the main one and ran from the Gulf of Finland through the settlements of Kukkvhvrja, Suur-Konya, Moonaküla, Oru Yaam and further along the shore of Lake Peenjare.

On July 24, 1945, the troops of the left flank of the Leningrad Front, having launched the Narva offensive operation, liberating the city of Narva, ran into the Tannenberg defensive line and were forced from July 27 to begin a fierce assault on the fortifications until August 10, after which they went on the defensive. The 3rd German SS Armored Corps, with a total number of 50 thousand people, fought against units of the 2nd and 8th Soviet armies, with a total number of 57 thousand people. Estonians, Danes, Norwegians, Swedes, Dutch, Belgians, Flemings, Finns and representatives of other nations who volunteered to join the SS fought on the side of the Germans. Having failed to penetrate the defenses head-on for two weeks, the Soviet command, according to the plan of the Tallinn offensive operation, abandoned the assault on the Tannenberg line and, from September 3, secretly began transferring troops of the 2nd Shock Army to the southwestern coast of Lake Peipus, to the river line Emajõgi, to attack the line from the rear. The transfer of troops was promptly discovered by the enemy and on September 16, Hitler signed an order to withdraw troops from Estonia to Latvia. On the same day, the Germans, without announcing the order, began to evacuate their units. The Estonian units were informed of Hitler's order almost two days late. They were supposed to cover the general withdrawal of German units and leave the Blue Mountains on the morning of September 19, 1944. However, the Estonians were “ahead of schedule” and already left their positions on September 18th.

During the fighting, the losses of the German side amounted to about 10 thousand people, incl. 2.5 thousand Estonians. The Red Army lost a little less than 5 thousand people. The discrepancy between the losses of attackers and defenders in the current proportion is explained by the significant superiority of the Red Army in aviation and artillery. On average, per day of the offensive, from 1 to 3 thousand shells and mines of various calibers fell on the German positions. In two weeks, attack aircraft and bombers carried out about a thousand combat missions. According to eyewitnesses, the Blue Mountains were turned into a complete conflagration, plowed by heavy shells to a depth of 2-3 meters. Only 10-15 years after the war the first sprouts of trees began to appear there. Therefore, German losses would have been many times greater if they had not been saved by countless caste caves, adapted for shelters and shelters.

The Tannenberg line was one of the smallest German defensive structures in terms of length in the entire history of World War II and the only one that the Red Army could not take, although it suffered very serious material and human losses. Thus, the Tannenberg defensive line is one of the few fortifications in Germany that has fully completed its task, and even with minimal capital investment.

Machine gun nests are built directly from the main trench and in some cases are pushed forward 2-3 meters; each machine gun nest is designed for two people. Closed machine gun nests are rarely constructed, in this case having an overlap of 1-2 rolls of logs and a layer of earth, with a total height of up to 80 centimeters. Niches are dug in the nest for storing ammunition. In the presence of camouflage nets or improvised materials, the trenches are camouflaged from aerial surveillance. To the side of the enemy, dugouts are set up for soldiers to rest, to which communication passages 1-2 meters deep lead.
Dugouts are dug into the ground, having a hard layer of up to 60-80 centimeters. The walls and ceiling have wooden formwork. 1-2 rows of logs are laid on top and covered with open soil. The bunks in the dugouts are arranged in two floors for 5 people each, niches are also created there for the personal belongings of soldiers, and, if possible, a table and benches are equipped.
During a long-term defense from communication passages leading to the dugouts, more adits, 3-4 meters deep, are torn to the side, serving as shelters during heavy shelling and air raids, each designed for separation.
Platoon commanders usually have separate dugouts, sometimes located 20-60 meters behind the main trench. The company command post is usually located 100 meters deep from the trench line, consisting of 4 dugouts. One accommodates the company commander, his clerk - a non-commissioned officer or sergeant major, a radio operator and a messenger. In the second dugout there are medical non-commissioned officers, a gunsmith, a radio operator and a messenger. Then, two dugouts for the reserve squad and the squad armed with anti-tank weapons - offenror and faustpatrons.

Anti-tank ops are located 200-400 meters from the trench line; they are a round depression 60 cm deep, with a diameter of 2 meters. On the right and left in the ground there are shelters for 4 servants with niches for storing ammunition.
Mortar OPs are most often set up on the reverse slopes of hills or in gullies. Square or round holes are dug for them, measuring 1.5x1.5-1.5. Near the strong points, 10-12 meters away, dugouts for servants are erected. Ammunition is stored in pits 2-3 meters from the OP, connected by communication passages.
Strongholds of field 7.5 cm guns are located at a distance of up to 1000 meters from the trench line, depending on the terrain; they are also equipped, if possible, on the reverse slope of the hills. According to the state, a 7.5 cm field gun is served by a crew of 7 people, but since 1943, usually, the servants have been reduced to 4-5 people.

The battalion command post is located on average at a distance of 200-500 meters from the front line of the trenches. The battalion commander's dugout is covered with a row of boards, three rows of logs and a layer of earth with a total height of 1.6-1.8 meters. Near the battalion commander's dugout there are another 4-5 dugouts for telephone operators and a switchboard, one for 5-8 people. Radio operators and walkie-talkies - one for 5-7 people. For a doctor and orderlies - one dugout for 5-6 people. and for the reserve platoon - 2 dugouts. Communication passages leading from the trench line to company and battalion command posts have a depth of 1.2-1.6 meters. The company command post has direct communication with the platoon and battalion command posts and, through a switchboard, with other companies.

Radio communication is maintained between companies and battalions, between battalions and regiments. The battalions are connected to each other only by telephone; they have no radio communications. The distance between the battalion CP and the company is on average 300-600 meters; if the ground is soft, then the communication passages from the battalion CP are torn off by each of the companies, otherwise a general communication passage with a depth of up to 1.5 meters opens. In front of the trench line, at a distance of 20-40 meters, there are wire barriers: a Bruno spiral in one row and, in some cases, a Flemish fence. Close to the wire in the direction of the trenches, holes were dug for listening posts for two people each; duty began at nightfall and continued until dawn. As the enemy approaches, the platoon commanders or one of the duty officers are warned personally, or sometimes using a cord connected to some kind of sound signal, for example, tin cans; after the signal, both duty officers retreat to the trenches. In the trenches during the day, one observer with binoculars is on duty from each squad. Anti-personnel mines are laid in front of the wire fences, and anti-tank mines in 2-3 rows in tank-hazardous directions.

Excavated German dugout

The SECOND option for constructing a forward defense line - instead of trenches, strong points in the form of dugouts, designed for one squad each. There are only two platoons in the company’s defense sector, from which all-round defense can be carried out. Behind them, 60 meters away, there is a general communication passage 0.8 meters wide, 1.8 meters deep, to which connecting passages from the dugouts approach. Whenever possible, communication passages are camouflaged from aerial surveillance. The dugouts are surrounded by wire fences, in addition, in front of them at a distance of 10-15 meters there is also a Flanders fence, and between them a minefield with anti-tank mines. The company's third platoon is a reserve for a counterattack and is located near the company command post. Behind the front line, 600 meters from the general communication route, there is a PT ditch. Cut-off positions are located approximately 1 km behind the strong points. This is the initial area for the reserve in case of a counterattack, and a refuge for the battalion commander's reserve is also located there.

The battalion command post is being supplied with ammunition for the reserve approach, 1.8 meters deep and 1.5 meters wide. At a distance of 150-200 meters from the general route of communication, heavy machine gun bases are located, firing in the gap between strong points and over the heads of their troops. The servants of heavy machine guns have dugouts also surrounded by barbed wire, in which they take shelter from artillery shelling and air raids. Connecting passages extend from these dugouts to a communication passage leading into the depths. Mortar positions are located 400-600 meters from the general communication route, designed for 4 81.4mm mortars, the servants of which also have appropriate shelter.

German dugout flooded with water

The Wehrmacht “invincible and legendary” [Military art of the Reich] Runov Valentin Aleksandrovich

DEFENSE OF THE WEHRMACHT

DEFENSE OF THE WEHRMACHT

In preparation for waging lightning wars, the Wehrmacht command first of all assumed that the German armed forces would have to at least temporarily go on the defensive in certain areas. Therefore, this type of combat operations was spelled out quite fully in the pre-war charters and manuals. However, the offensive campaigns of 1939 and 1940 did not provide practical experience of defense, as a result of which most German military leaders began to treat it superficially.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, cases of German troops switching to tactical defense became more frequent. Thus, already in border battles, the German command preferred to repulse frequent counterattacks and counterattacks of Soviet troops in a number of cases with attacks from the spot, for which their troops temporarily took up defensive positions. The peculiarities of this defense were that it was based on random lines and nodes of resistance that were not prepared in advance in engineering terms. The earlier advancing troops hastily occupied these lines, forming their battle formation in one echelon, and tried to inflict maximum defeat on the enemy on the approaches to the defense. Most of the artillery, as a rule, was deployed for direct fire. Often, defensive actions by ground forces were linked to air strikes or offensive actions in other directions. In the overwhelming majority, such defense was short-lived and was an integral part of a larger offensive operation.

In the summer of 1941, German troops also used defense to block encircled Soviet troops (internal encirclement front) and prevent their breakthrough or attack from the outside for the purpose of releasing the blockade (external encirclement front). And in this case, too, the main forces of the German troops were concentrated in the first echelon, which included tanks and artillery for direct fire. As a rule, engineering equipment for defensive lines was not carried out; defensive actions of ground troops were closely linked with air strikes. Such defense was considered temporary, and after solving a particular task, the troops undertaking it immediately went on the offensive and were used, after regrouping and replenishment, as reserves of armies or army groups.

For the first time, the German command began to think seriously about the problem of defense with the start of the counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Moscow in early December 1941. By that time, the German troops operating in this direction had practically lost their offensive capabilities and ran into Soviet defenses. For some time, the parties stood in front of each other: Soviet troops did not dare to launch a counteroffensive until the reserves arrived, and German troops did not plan to defend themselves. But the fate of the latter was already predetermined by the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army.

At the beginning of December 1941, the Soviet command managed to gather significant forces of its troops in the Moscow direction, which were distributed across three fronts: Kalinin, Western and Southwestern. It was planned to use simultaneous powerful strikes by the troops of the Western, left wing of the Kalinin and right wing of the Southwestern fronts to defeat the strike groups of German troops operating north and south of Moscow, and then with a rapid attack to the west to complete the encirclement and defeat of the main forces of Army Group Center.

The main forces went to the Western Front. By the beginning of the offensive, he outnumbered the enemy by approximately 1.5 times in personnel, by 1.3 times in guns and mortars, and by 1.5 times in tanks. One rifle or cavalry division accounted for more than 8 kilometers of front. On every kilometer of the front, from 10 to 12 guns and mortars and about 5 tanks could be used. It was difficult to advance with such superiority, but quite possible.

The German military command understood well that their troops would not be able to hold out in this position near Moscow for long, but Hitler’s Headquarters did not allow this to happen. Thus, General G. Guderian in his book “Memoirs of a Soldier” wrote: “The attack on Moscow failed... The main command of the ground forces, being in East Prussia, far from the front, had no idea about the actual position of its troops...

A timely withdrawal of troops and taking up defense at an advantageous and previously prepared line would be the best and most effective means of restoring the situation and gaining a foothold before the onset of spring. In the zone of action of the 2nd Tank Army, such a line could be the line of defense it occupied in October along the Zusha and Oka rivers. However, this is precisely what Hitler did not agree with.”

South of Moscow, at the 350-kilometer line along the line of Tula, Serebryanye Prudy, Mikhailov, Chernava, the troops of the 2nd Tank Army of General G. Guderian were stopped. The front line of the tank army's defense was occupied by the 24th Tank, 53rd Army and 47th Tank Corps, having divisions in one line with very insignificant reserves. All divisions were stretched along the front from 25 to 50 kilometers and had regiments, also lined up in one line, and regiments - one line of battalions. Thus, due to the single-echelon formation of the formations, the depth of the main defensive line of the German troops did not exceed 3–4 kilometers. Only two divisions were left in the reserve of the tank army - the 25th motorized and 112th infantry, which were located, respectively, in the areas of Venev and Stalinogorsk.

There was no continuous front line on the main line of German defense. The troops were garrisoned in populated areas, which were turned into strongholds and adapted for all-round defense. There were significant gaps between the strongholds that were not occupied by troops and were not equipped in engineering terms, but according to the command plan they should have been covered with artillery and rifle-machine-gun fire. Minefields were laid on the approaches to strongholds.

Schematic diagram of the Wehrmacht defense in December 1941

Typically, resistance nodes in large populated areas were defended by forces up to an infantry battalion, reinforced with tanks. Smaller villages housed infantry or tank companies. There were larger forces in the cities. Thus, a motorized infantry regiment was located in Serebryanye Prudy, and two motorized infantry and one artillery regiments were located in Mikhailov. In the operational depth of defense, defensive lines along the western banks of the Pronya and Don rivers were prepared from an engineering standpoint by the local population, but were not occupied by troops.

To attack Mikhailov, formations of the 10th Army were advanced (commanded by Lieutenant General I.F. Golikov), which, by decision of Headquarters, was transferred to the Western Front only on December 2. It consisted of eight rifle, three cavalry and one mixed air divisions. The army was armed with 254 field guns, 81 anti-tank guns, and 270 mortars of 82 and 120 mm caliber. In front of the army's offensive front there was one motorized division, reinforced with tanks.

The neighbor of the 10th Army on the right was the group of General P. A. Belov, consisting of a cavalry corps, one rifle division, a tank brigade and a separate tank battalion. Even further, in the Tula region, the 50th Army was located. To the south, the 61st Army was advancing from the Ryazhi area and preparing for the attack by the 3rd Army of the Southwestern Front.

Thus, in the area east of Tula, the troops of General G. Guderian’s 2nd Tank Army were practically in a deep “cauldron”, the neck of which could be slammed shut by Soviet troops with counter attacks from Tula to the south and from Efremov to the north.

Under these conditions, General G. Guderian decides to withdraw his subordinate troops, covering the retreat with defense. In his memoirs, he writes: “In the face of a threat to my flanks and rear and given the onset of incredibly cold weather, as a result of which the troops lost mobility, on the night of December 6, for the first time since the beginning of this war, I decided to stop this isolated offensive and withdraw far forward parts on the line of the upper reaches of the river. Don, b. Shat, b. UPA, where to take up defense.”

Thus, the defense of German troops east of Tula should be considered not as a well-prepared defensive operation of the 2nd Tank Army, but as a tactical defense conducted with the aim of ensuring the exit from the battle and withdrawal of the main group of troops.

The offensive of the Soviet troops of the 10th Army began on December 6, and during the day, slowly, through deep snow, its formations approached the city of Mikhailov. At 24 hours on December 6, after a 10-minute artillery preparation, the Soviet regiments again went on the attack. At 2 o'clock on December 7, they burst into the city and by 7 o'clock they completely liberated it. The Germans systematically withdrew their troops from Mikhailov to the west.

Information on how the battles for Mikhailov were conducted is contained in the textbook of the Department of History of Military Art of the Military Academy named after M. V. Frunze, “Preparation and conduct of an offensive with the advance of formations of the 10th Army from the depths in a counteroffensive near Moscow.” It says, in part: “By 2 o’clock on December 7, troops of the 330th Infantry Division broke into the city. Regimental artillery, being in infantry combat formations, destroyed enemy firing points with direct fire. Panic began among the enemy troops. To cut off the Germans' escape routes, the division commander ordered the commander of the 1111th Infantry Regiment to send one battalion to the road southwest of Mikhailov and block the enemy's retreat routes. But due to deep snow, the battalion did not complete its task. The remnants of the defeated enemy units managed to escape unhindered in a southwestern direction under cover of darkness.

In the battles for Mikhailov, the 330th Infantry Division captured about 50 people, captured 16 guns, 6 vehicles, one tank, 16 motorcycles, a large amount of ammunition, as well as documents of the 32nd, 63rd motorized infantry and 422nd motorized artillery regiments of the 10th th motorized division.

The tank battalion assigned to the 330th Infantry Division did not participate in the battle due to equipment failure. On the first day of the operation, the 28th Aviation Division carried out (in total. – Auth.) 11 sorties. Other army units acted less successfully on December 6.”

From this academic textbook, one can draw reasoned conclusions that the offensive of the 10th Army in the counteroffensive near Moscow was extremely poorly organized. Soviet troops attacked on a broad front after moving from the depths over a long distance. No preliminary reconnaissance of the enemy was carried out. There was no artillery or air preparation for the offensive. Tanks did not participate in the offensive. Nevertheless, the liberation of the city of Mikhailov by the morning of the next day of the offensive was presented as a great victory.

Thus, on time, none of the divisions operating in the first echelon of the 10th Army, despite the virtual absence of resistance from the enemy, was able to fully complete the task of the first day of the operation, which was to move from the concentration area to the front line of the enemy’s defense on 25–30 kilometers and mastering its tactical defense zone at a depth of 4–6 kilometers.

Subsequently, the offensive of the 10th Army troops continued at a slow pace. Not knowing the situation at the front and not having a specific task, the division commanders acted slowly, cautiously and without initiative. When intelligence reported to the commander of the 323rd Infantry Division that a column of German vehicles with troops was moving along the Mikhailovo highway towards Stalinogorsk, he did not take any measures to cut the highway and destroy the enemy. In general, the advance of the army troops on the second day of the operation, despite the lack of resistance from the enemy in front of all divisions, with the exception of one 322nd, was insignificant.

The 322nd Rifle Division was advancing on the city of Serebryanye Prudy, which also represented a center of resistance. On December 7, at 15:00, having covered 8 kilometers off-road, the division regiments reached the city. But it was not possible to take it on the move. The Soviet infantry attack was repelled by machine gun and artillery fire. The troops lay down and were forced to spend several hours in this position.

As darkness fell, units of the 322nd Rifle Division again launched an attack on Serebryannye Prudy. Its parts covered the city from the north and south. German troops not only repelled attacks from the spot, but also tried to launch a counterattack. By 20 o'clock the city was captured by Soviet units, which took 50 prisoners, 6 artillery pieces and about 30 motorcycles.

In another direction, the 326th Rifle Division at 7 o'clock in the morning, without much resistance from the enemy, captured the village of Gryaznoye, after which its commander, Colonel V.S. Andreev, decided to temporarily stop the offensive and take a day's rest. The commander of the 41st Cavalry Division, which was advancing on the left flank of the 10th Army, brigade commander P. M. Davydov, on the second day of the operation, made no attempts at all to continue the offensive. The 28th Air Division flew only 24 sorties on the second day of the operation.

The offensive on the left flank of the army developed even more slowly. The 10th Army did not have an elbow connection with its neighbor on the left, which the German troops defending there immediately took advantage of. On December 8, Guderian ordered the forces of the 40th Signal Regiment to counterattack the flank of the 41st Cavalry Division, which was forced to stop the offensive and begin to retreat eastward. Only after the commander of the 10th Army sent the 41st and 57th Cavalry Division to reinforce it on December 9, the offensive was resumed and Soviet troops were able to occupy the village of Tabola by the end of December 10.

Thus, during the first four days of the operation, the German troops were practically pushed out of the Stalinogorsk pocket. By the end of December 10, the 330th Infantry Division reached the approaches to the Don in the area of ​​​​the village of Krutoye. The 328th Infantry Division captured Dubovo. And only the 324th Infantry Division completed the task of the first day of the operation and reached the Don. During the four days of the offensive, they covered 35–40 kilometers, advancing at an average pace of 8–10 kilometers per day. By that time, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, in cooperation with the 322nd Rifle Division of the 110th Army, had captured the city of Venev.

On December 10, General G. Guderian reported the situation to A. Hitler's chief adjutant, General Schmundt, and the chief of personnel of the main command of the ground forces, warning that if effective measures were not taken in this direction, then they should not have any illusions about those successful there actions of German troops.

On December 12, Soviet troops occupied Efremov, and on December 13, after a long battle, they captured the city of Epifan. The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps advanced several kilometers south of Venev.

Thus, by the end of December 13, the 10th Army had only partially reached the milestone determined for it as part of the first offensive operation. The average rate of advance of its formations dropped to 4–5 kilometers per day. The opposing formations of the 2nd Tank Army were able to avoid encirclement, use rearguard defense to delay the advance of the Soviet troops and systematically retreat to a new rear line of defense.

In general, the counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Moscow in December 1941 achieved its goal. Having thrown the enemy strike force to the west and inflicted serious losses on it, the Red Army eliminated the danger looming over Moscow. The counteroffensive lasted 34 days. The total width of the combat front was 1000 kilometers, and the depth of advance of Soviet troops was 100–250 kilometers. The average daily rate of advance of rifle formations was 3–6 kilometers.

During this operation, the enemy’s plan to capture Moscow was thwarted, the troops of Army Group Center were defeated and the myth of the invincibility of German troops was dispelled.

The German command does not publish the exact number of losses during the Soviet offensive near Moscow. But, referring to the “War Diary” of F. Halder, it can be calculated that from December 10, 1941 to February 10, 1942, German ground forces lost 191 thousand people on the Eastern Front. A significant part of these forces was located near Moscow. It is known that during the operation, Soviet troops irretrievably lost 139.6 thousand people, 231.4 thousand were wounded and frostbitten.

Schematic diagram of the Wehrmacht defense in the fall of 1942

Almost a year has passed. Having exhausted offensive capabilities and not achieving the goals of the summer offensive of 1942, German troops were forced to go on the defensive along the entire Soviet-German front, the total length of which reached 2,300 kilometers. The order of the High Command of the German Ground Forces dated October 14, 1942 stated: “We have to conduct a winter campaign. The task of the Eastern Front is... to hold the achieved lines at all costs, to repel any enemy attempts to break through them and thereby create the preconditions for our offensive in 1943.”

To carry out this order, the German command began to create a defense that ran along previously occupied lines. The main area of ​​this defense was Stalingrad, where troops of the 6th field and 4th tank armies of the Germans, as well as the 3rd Army of Romania, defended. Moreover, German troops operated directly in the Stalingrad area, and their flanks were covered by Romanian troops.

On the northern face of the Stalingrad salient, where Romanian troops were defending, the defense consisted of one main zone 5–8 kilometers deep, on which infantry divisions defended. In the operational depth of defense along the Krivaya and Chir rivers, separate resistance centers were created at the main directions and road junctions, which were not engaged by troops in advance. Even deeper in areas not equipped for defense were located units of the 1st Romanian Panzer Division, the 22nd and 14th Panzer Divisions of the Wehrmacht, which by that time had already lost more than half of their tanks and were in a state of reformation.

Consequently, almost all hope of defense rested on the main zone, defended by Romanian infantry divisions. It consisted of two positions, each of which was equipped with one or two trenches. In certain directions, mainly in the area of ​​roads, minefields and wire barriers were installed in front of the first trench. The second position was located at a depth of 5–8 kilometers from the front line of the defense, was equipped with one trench and was defended by regimental reserves with a strength of up to a battalion. But due to winter conditions, a significant part of the reserves were drawn to populated areas, which were officially called “foci of resistance,” but in fact were a collection of headquarters, rear services, non-combat units and served as the location of hospitals.

The troops of the Southwestern and right wing of the Don Fronts, consisting of the 65th, 21st Field and 5th Tank Armies, were entrusted with breaking through the defenses of the Romanian troops and enveloping the main group of German troops located near Stalingrad from the north. From the southeast they were attacked by troops of the Stalingrad Front with the forces of the 57th and 51st field armies of the 4th mechanized and 4th cavalry corps. By that time, significant Red Army forces had been accumulated in the Stalingrad area as part of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts using reserves. In total, the fronts had ten combined arms, one tank and four air armies. These troops included 66 rifle divisions, 15 rifle brigades, three motorized rifle brigades, 4 tank corps, 14 separate tank brigades, 4 separate tank regiments, 3 cavalry corps. This group consisted of more than one million personnel, 900 tanks, 13.5 thousand guns and mortars, including about 2.5 thousand of 76 mm caliber and above, and more than a thousand combat aircraft.

The law of military art states that in order to achieve a quick breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses, the attacking side must resort to a decisive massing of forces and means in the direction of the main attack, even at the cost of weakening other directions. By the end of autumn 1942, the Soviet command had already mastered this rule. Thus, in the zone of the 5th Tank Army, where Soviet troops outnumbered the Romanians in men and artillery by more than 2 times, in tanks by 2.5 times, in aviation by 1.5 times, the army commander concentrated on the direction of the main attack four rifle divisions out of six, two tank and one cavalry corps, a tank brigade, a tank battalion, sixteen artillery and mortar regiments of the RGK. This made it possible to achieve superiority in people by 2.7 times, in artillery - by 5 times, in tanks - absolute. The overwhelming majority of Soviet aviation also carried out strikes in the same direction. The ratio of forces and means in the zone of Romanian troops defending south of Stalingrad was approximately the same.

It is quite clear that the German command was unable to hold back the attacks of Soviet troops in the Stalingrad area with a defense that had such weak flanks. On November 19, 1942, shock groups of troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, going on the offensive, broke through the main lines of Romanian defense, brought tank corps into battle, which united on November 23 near the city of Kalach. The enemy's defenses were broken through in a 300-kilometer area; the depth of advance of Soviet troops in the first 12 days of the operation reached from 40 to 120 kilometers.

After Stalingrad, the German command still tried to attack (Kursk in the summer of 1943, Balaton in the spring of 1945, etc.), but from then on the main type of military action of the Wehrmacht became defense. On February 1, 1943, A. Hitler told the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General K. Zeitzler: “I must say that the possibility of ending the war in the East by an offensive no longer exists. We must understand this clearly."

So, the first place among the two main types of military operations is taken to defense, the art of preparation and conduct of which has been constantly improved in subsequent years.

The goals pursued by the Wehrmacht in this type of combat operations also changed. The defense in the winter of 1941/42 and 1942–1943 was carried out, as a rule, with the goal of disrupting the offensive of Soviet troops, holding captured lines (regions), and gaining time to prepare a new offensive (counteroffensive). In subsequent years, in strategic terms, it pursued a different goal: to exhaust and bleed the Soviet Armed Forces, prolong the war and thereby gain time in the hope of splitting the anti-Hitler coalition.

Given the enormous length of the Soviet-German front and the limited number of forces and means, the German command tried to solve the problem of the stability of strategic defense by concentrating its main efforts on holding the most important areas in military, economic and political terms (city boundaries as road junctions); the location of the overwhelming majority of forces and assets in the first strategic echelon and the direction of the main efforts of army groups to maintain the tactical defense zone of fortified cities.

A characteristic feature of the organization of enemy defense in 1941 was the creation of strongholds (“hedgehogs”) adapted for all-round defense. They were in fire interaction with each other and blocked the path of the advancing troops in the main directions. In connection with this reception of the enemy in the tactics of the offensive battle of the Soviet troops, a desire arose to bypass enemy strongholds at intervals and to act against them from the flanks.

In 1942, Wehrmacht troops in some sectors of the front began to gradually create a deeper and more advanced defense in engineering terms. Individual strong points began to be connected with each other by trenches, resulting in a continuous position. Strongholds and defense areas appeared in the depths. This immediately increased the requirements for the methods of organizing offensive combat by Soviet troops. Already in the spring and summer of 1942, they began to use strike groups to a much greater extent than before, massing equipment in the directions of the main attacks.

Beginning in the spring of 1943, the Wehrmacht began to pay great attention to the use of lines, strips, and natural defensive lines prepared in the depths, such as large rivers - the Dnieper, Danube, Vistula, and Oder, to stabilize defense. It is noted that they are used to strengthen the defense of large settlements, such as Mozhaisk, Velikiye Luki, Orel, Belgorod, Vyazma, Smolensk, Odessa, Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Vilnius, Brest, Kaunas, Riga and others. It is noted that the lack of reserves was the weakest link in the strategic defense of the Wehrmacht. They were created mainly at the expense of formations and units withdrawn to the rear for replenishment after losses suffered, and were intended mainly to restore the damaged defense front by launching counterattacks and occupying important defensive lines in depth. In some cases they were used to launch a counteroffensive.

Significant changes occurred in the structure of the Wehrmacht's defense in the summer of 1943, after the failure of the offensive near Kursk. Its tactical zone, up to 8–15 kilometers deep, included the main defense line (“main battlefield”) and the second defense line (“corps reserve positions”). The defense of the tactical zone was entrusted to the army corps of the first echelon of the field army.

The main line of defense consisted of three positions. It was occupied by first echelon divisions. The basis of the first position were company strongholds, forming battalion defense areas. They were equipped with two or three lines of continuous trenches. The first position was usually occupied by battalions of the first echelons of regiments. The second position was also equipped with trenches, sometimes with separate strongholds. Regimental reserves and artillery firing positions were located within its boundaries. The third position was a system of strong points in which divisional reserves were located.

At a distance of 10–15 kilometers from the front edge of the main defense line, a second line was built. It could house the army corps commander's reserve. The depth of the position of the corps reserves reached 2–5 kilometers.

The improvement of the construction of defense zones of the German troops proceeded through the development of engineering structures, the creation of intermediate and cut-off positions, a system of pillboxes, bunkers, anti-tank ditches, and reinforced concrete caps. Within the main line of defense, all three positions began to be equipped with lines of continuous trenches.

Thus, the main line of defense of the German troops in the Korsun-Shevchenko salient (January 1944) had a depth of 6–8 kilometers and was built on holding individual strong points and resistance centers, which were covered by minefields and barbed wire barriers. Many of the strong points were interconnected by fire, and only a few of them were connected by trenches, which were more suitable for maneuvering forces and means in battle than for conducting the battle itself.

In the summer of 1944, German troops, during the transition to defense in Belarus, concentrated a group there consisting of 63 infantry divisions and 3 infantry brigades. But, being confident that the Soviet command was preparing the main blow in Ukraine, the main formations of tank and motorized forces were sent in this direction.

It must be remembered that at that time the territory of Belarus, which was characterized by the presence of large forests, rivers, swamps with a poorly developed road network, did little to facilitate large-scale military operations. In addition, numerous partisan detachments and groups operated in Belarus, which controlled a significant part of its territory. Therefore, the forces at the disposal of the German command in Belarus were concentrated in the areas of the cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk and Kovel, which were considered the most important operationally.

In order to maintain a wide front of defense in the absence of sufficient forces and means, the command of Army Group Center was forced to deploy its troops in one echelon, concentrating the main efforts on holding a well-prepared tactical defense zone with a depth of 8 to 12 kilometers, which was occupied by infantry divisions. In addition, in the depths along the western banks of numerous rivers with wide swampy floodplains, the forces of the local population also prepared defensive lines that could be occupied by troops in the event of a retreat. The total depth of defense, according to Soviet sources, reached 250–270 kilometers.

But the defense built by the German command in this way did not fulfill its task. There were several reasons for this. The main thing is that by that time the Soviet command already had experience in preparing and conducting large offensive operations with decisive goals. Secondly, at the beginning of the operation, the superiority of Soviet troops in Belarus was 2 times in personnel, 3.6 times in artillery, 3.9 times in aviation, 5.8 times in tanks and self-propelled guns. Thirdly, the operational and even tactical rear of the German troops were pinned down by Soviet partisans, whose total number reached 143 thousand people.

Under these conditions, the Soviet command decided to carry out an operation to encircle several enemy groups dispersed along the front and in depth with the goal of dismembering and defeating the main forces of Army Group Center. The encirclement and defeat of the Vitebsk group was planned by the forces of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts. The encirclement and defeat of the Bobruisk group was entrusted to the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front and the Dnieper River Flotilla. Taking into account the concentration of efforts on narrow sections of the front, the superiority of Soviet troops in the directions of the main attacks increased several times more.

To prevent German troops from maneuvering along the front between the indicated fronts, troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were to advance, which, together with other fronts, were to encircle and defeat the retreating enemy troops in the Minsk region.

The defeat of German troops as a result of the Belarusian operation was very significant. According to Soviet sources, in the Vitebsk region during the first five days, as a result of the breakthrough and encirclement, they lost 20 thousand people killed and 10 thousand prisoners. In the Bobruisk region, their losses in killed and captured reached 74 thousand people. In the Minsk region - 105 thousand people.

In total, during the Belarusian operation, German troops lost about 400 thousand people. Hitler's entourage regarded this defeat as a catastrophe equal to that which the Wehrmacht suffered at Stalingrad.

At the same time, it must be recognized that the victory in the Belarusian operation came at a high cost to the Red Army. The irretrievable losses of the front troops alone amounted to 178 thousand people, to which more than half a million wounded must be added.

Schematic diagram of the defense of the Wehrmacht in 1943-1945.

Failures in the Belarusian region forced the German command to pay even more serious attention to defense. But the strength of the Wehrmacht was dwindling every day, and it became increasingly difficult to replenish them. There were very little hope for the allies.

The Iasi-Kishinev operation, carried out by the Soviet command in August 1944 against the Army Group “Southern Ukraine”, which consisted of German and Romanian formations, put a big end to German-Romanian relations.

In the Iasi-Chisinau direction, by August 1944, the defense of German and Romanian troops had been prepared for four months, was echeloned in depth and well developed in engineering terms. In front of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, where the 6th German and 4th Romanian armies were defending, it consisted of three stripes 25–25 kilometers deep. Several lines and cut-off positions were established in the operational depth, and fortified areas were erected at Tirgu-Frumos and Iasi. In front of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, the enemy also prepared three defense lines with a total depth of 40–50 kilometers.

However, this defense also did not fulfill the tasks assigned to it. The main reasons are the significant numerical superiority of the Soviet troops and the extremely low combat effectiveness of the Romanian troops, in the zones of which the Soviet command delivered its main attacks. In addition, we must remember that the Iasi-Kishinev operation was launched on August 20, and on August 23, forces opposing Berlin rose up in Bucharest. The pro-fascist government of Antonescu was overthrown on the same day, and the new government immediately declared war on Germany. What kind of staunch defense of the Romanian troops, mainly consisting of peasants and industrial workers, at the front in such conditions could we talk about?

Then the Bulgarians did the same, starting a “popular uprising” in Sofia when Soviet troops approached. On September 8, Soviet troops crossed the Romanian-Bulgarian border without firing a shot, and on September 9, the new Bulgarian “government” declared war on Germany.

In such conditions, the German leadership had no choice but to defend the territories of the remaining allied Hungary and the territory of its own state. Nevertheless, in 1944 and 1945, the defense of the German troops received its further development, primarily due to the development of its operational depth. The operational defense zone at this time included the third army defense zone (“army reserve positions”) and the rear defensive zone (“army group reserve positions”). Its total depth reached 50–60 kilometers or more. It was characterized by the careful selection of terrain for the construction of defensive lines and their skillful engineering equipment.

With the transfer of hostilities to the territory of Poland and Germany, the army group’s defense system began to include pre-equipped intermediate lines and fortified areas, its depth increased to 120–150 kilometers. The system of “fortress cities” became very rich. Operational densities in the main directions ranged from 3 to 12 kilometers per division. Artillery density ranged from 15–20 to 50 guns and mortars per kilometer.

Defense activity on an operational scale was manifested in counterattacks, which were carried out primarily by mobile formations. The operational density during the counterattack was one division per 3.5–4 kilometers of front. Counterstrikes were most often delivered under the base of the wedged enemy group from one or more directions. This is how counterattacks were launched when Soviet troops penetrated the German defenses north of Orel in July and south of Belgorod in August 1943, in Eastern Pomerania in 1945 and in a number of other operations. Sometimes counterattacks were carried out in the form of a frontal strike. To create counterattack groups, the German command, in a limited time, carried out regroupings of large forces from various directions, and primarily from unattacked sectors of the front.

The constantly improving tactics of the enemy's defensive battle underwent significant changes. At the beginning, there were usually only a small number of forces and assets on duty at the forefront. The rest of the personnel were located in shelters at a depth of up to 1500 meters, in such a way as to occupy their areas within 15–20 minutes. But then, as the defense front was reduced, continuous trenches and a second position were created, the units no longer left their areas for rest, but were located here, in dugouts and shelters. The activity of the defense increased as a result of the participation in counterattacks of not only divisional but also regimental reserves, as well as due to the maneuver of forces and means on the scale of strong points of the first echelon companies. As a result, the struggle for every defensive line and stronghold became more fierce. When the defense was penetrated, the battle was transferred to the communication passages. It was combined with decisive and daring counterattacks even with small forces (before separation).

During the war, the Headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command sought to make maximum use of the experience gained. She developed special “Instructions for combat training of infantry based on the experience of battles on the Eastern Front,” which were essential for the further development of defensive battle tactics. Exceptional attention was paid to the role of fire in combat, especially against attacking tanks and self-propelled guns. It was necessary to quickly concentrate the fire of various types of weapons using flat and mounted fire. “By concentrating the fire of all available types of weapons in place and time,” this document emphasized, “the fastest and most effective impact is achieved; all types of weapons must be able to maneuver and operate simultaneously in the zones indicated by them.” Short-range fire, especially against attacking tanks, was considered more effective than long-range fire. It should be emphasized that in the third period of the war, during the Soviet troops’ artillery preparation for the attack, the enemy began to practice withdrawing the main forces from the forward platoon strongholds to the second and even third trenches. He also used other elements of military cunning.

The art of building defenses and the tactics of defensive combat of the Wehrmacht were also constantly improved. The strengths of the enemy’s defense include a developed network of engineering barriers, long-term and wood-earth structures. A major step aimed at increasing the stability and activity of the defense was the creation of cut-off trenches and positions adapted for occupation by reserves and equipped taking into account the formation of flank fire lines and fire “bags”, as well as the presence of mobile reserves in the depths of the defense. Various engineering barriers, as well as protective and other terrain conditions, were skillfully used. It should be noted that the enemy’s defense also had weaknesses. This is a relatively low density of anti-tank weapons, a significant distance from the front edge of firing positions, and a low degree of massing of artillery fire. The attempt to counterattack within the first position with relatively weak reserves (the strength of an infantry platoon) often did not give positive results. Therefore, starting from 1943, a completely new phenomenon came to the fore in the actions of German troops, associated with the art of timely withdrawal from battle and a systematic retreat to the rear defensive lines.

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