Battle of Prokhorovka. Battle of Prokhorovka: the greatest tank battle in history

There is no clear date for the start of the battle, but they say that the tank battle near Prokhorovka began on July 10, 1943.

The largest tank battle in world history, which, as we were taught at school, we heroically won, defeated the enemy, and celebrated the victory.
A beautiful story for instilling heroism in children, but it does not stand up to the criticism of historians. After the battle, the great commander Rotmistrov was personally greeted by Stalin with the words “Tell me, asshole, how did you burn a tank army in 5 minutes?”, and Rotmistrov himself went to him, confident that he would be shot, but then it was recognized that this massacre was a victory, and the general a Hero .
Such information has survived to this day, but the terrible details of the incompetence of our leadership are now open to prying eyes.

The balance of forces before the start of the Soviet counterattack at Prokhorovka station at 08.00 on the morning of July 12, 1943.

In the condition and strength of the 5th Guards Army A.S. Zhadova, since she began occupying forward positions on the morning of July 11, little has changed, although she suffered some losses. There were no tanks or self-propelled artillery units in the army at all. 5th Guards Tank Army of P.A. Rotmistrov consisting of the 18th, 29th, 2nd Tank Corps, 2nd Guards Tank Corps, 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment and attached army units formally had 909 tanks (28 heavy infantry tanks Mk.IV "Churchill", 563 medium tanks T-34, 318 light tanks T-70) and 42 self-propelled artillery units (24 caliber 122mm, 18 caliber 76mm), but at the moment the counterattack began on the Prokhorovsky field, there were 699 tanks in service (that is, in serviceable and combat-ready condition, arriving at their initial positions on time and not included in K.G. Trufanov’s detachment) (of which approximately 4 percent were heavy, 56 percent were medium, 40 percent light) and 21 self-propelled artillery units. (According to some reports, an additional 15 KV-1S heavy tanks arrived.)

By the morning of July 12, in the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of Paul Hausser (divisions "Totenkopf", "Adolf Hitler", "Reich") the total number of tanks and self-propelled assault guns was 294 units, but only 273 of them were in serviceable and combat-ready condition them (including 22 T-VIE "Tiger"). There were no "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" at all.

There was no oncoming tank battle, so widely advertised in Soviet military-historical literature and feature films, for example, in the epic film “Liberation”. Shortly before the battle, at night and in the morning, heavy rain fell in places, the day of July 12 was gloomy and cloudy, the Kursk black soil in some places became completely impassable for German tanks (which greatly delayed the advance of the Death's Head division beyond the Psel River, where Soviet tanks there was none at all).

Having the ability to conduct effective lethal fire from a distance of 2 km, the German tankers had no need to get closer to make the battle conditions easier for their enemy (especially since fire from a standing position is an order of magnitude more accurate than on the move). They did not get closer, shooting at attacking Soviet tanks, as at a training ground, from closed positions. The thoughtfulness of the location and equipment of the German positions were such as if the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps had arrived here a month ago, and not on July 11.

There was no through attack by Soviet tanks, allegedly cutting the ranks of the advancing German tank mass in two. The tank brigades of the Soviet 29th Tank Corps covered only 1.5 - 2 km during the two hours of the offensive. These 2 km north of the line “Oktyabrsky State Farm - height 252.2 located from it to the southeast” became a real cemetery for the 31st and 32nd tank brigades. Only 15 T-34 tanks of the 1st battalion of the 32nd tank brigade under the command of Major P.S. Ivanov, hiding behind forest plantations and the smoke of burning Soviet tanks, managed to slip through the strongholds of German assault guns - heights 242.5 and 241.6 - and break into the Komsomolets state farm , going deepest into the enemy’s defenses - 5 km.

By 11:00 the leading tanks of the rest of the 32nd Tank Brigade had managed to cover only 3 km from the positions from which they launched the attack. P.A. Rotmistrov decided to throw his reserve - the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps - in the direction of the Komsomolets state farm, but the Germans blocked the state farm and launched a powerful artillery and air strike on it. Ultimately, the units of the 32nd Tank Brigade and the 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps that broke through were almost completely destroyed, Major P.S. Ivanov burned in the tank. By 10.00 am, only one tank battalion remained from the 25th Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps, which withdrew and took up defense half a kilometer southeast of the Storozhevoye farm.

The blow of the Soviet 18th Panzer Corps fell on the left flank of the Adolf Hitler division, affecting the right flank of the Death's Head division (here, in the area of ​​​​the villages of Bogoroditskoye and Kozlovka, on the banks of the Psel River, there were 30-40 tanks and a battery of self-propelled assault guns of this divisions). The 170th tank brigade of the 18th tank corps tried to break through at high speed, leaving the Oktyabrsky state farm on the left, but the German assault and anti-tank guns of the Adolf Hitler division, dug into the ground, literally exterminated it at a direct shot distance. From 8.30 am to 12.00 pm, the brigade covered 2.5 km from its starting positions to the first buildings of the Oktyabrsky state farm, but was never able to overcome them, losing 60 percent of its tanks. The 181st Tank Brigade of the 18th Tank Corps managed to reach the first line of German defense at heights 231.3 and 241.6, but got stuck in front of them. The Soviet offensive with far-reaching plans to defeat the enemy along the entire southern front of the Kursk Bulge actually failed.

P.A. Rotmistrov (left) and A.S. Zhadov, Prokhorovka district, July 1943

If we exclude from consideration the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, two brigades of which did not participate at all in the battles on July 12, and the losses of the remaining units remained unknown, then according to far from complete data for July 12, the 5th Guards Tank Army lost: 17 heavy infantry tanks Mk.IV "Churchill" (9 - burned, 8 - knocked out), 221 T-34 medium tanks (130 - burned, 91 - knocked out), 91 T-70 light tanks (50 - burned, 41 - knocked out), 19 self-propelled tanks artillery installations of all types (14 were burned out, 5 were knocked out), that is, a total of 329 tanks and 19 self-propelled guns.

In fact, these are all irretrievable losses, since the damaged equipment, with the exception of a few units, remained on the territory occupied by the enemy. If on the morning of July 12 in service (serviceable and combat-ready, including the combined detachment of Major General K.G. Trufanov) the army had 818 tanks and 42 self-propelled artillery units, then at 13.00 the next day, July 13, there were 399 tanks and 11 self-propelled artillery installations. At the same time, the 18th, 29th, 2nd Tank Corps and the 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment almost completely lost their combat effectiveness.

(The Russian Institute of Military History claims that the 5th Guards Tank Army irretrievably lost about 500 tanks and self-propelled guns on July 12, 1943.)

The enemy's total losses were an order of magnitude lower, that is, the Germans lost ten times less, as directly indicated by the events of the next three days on the Voronezh Front. All these days, the enemy continued not only to intensively attack Soviet troops, but also to carry out offensive actions. (German military historian Karl-Heinz Friser, based on reports and reports of units and subunits of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, claims that the corps' losses on July 12 and 13, 1943 amounted to 43 tanks and 12 self-propelled assault guns, of which they were irretrievably lost , that is, they were not subject to restoration, only 5 tanks.)

But Rotmistrov was considered one of the best tank commanders in the Red Army. It is not without reason that even before the Battle of Kursk, “Red Star” published an article about him with the eloquent title “Master of Driving Tank Troops.” Who then was Hausser, Hoth or Manstein? Probably supermasters. In any case, near Prokhorovka, Hausser cut the “master” to pieces.

Tank counterattack. Still from the film “Liberation: Arc of Fire.” 1968

There is silence over the Prokhorovsky field. Only from time to time you can hear the bell ringing, calling parishioners to worship in the Church of Peter and Paul, which was built with public donations in memory of the soldiers who died on the Kursk Bulge.
Gertsovka, Cherkasskoe, Lukhanino, Luchki, Yakovlevo, Belenikhino, Mikhailovka, Melekhovo... These names now hardly say anything to the younger generation. And 70 years ago, a terrible battle was raging here; the largest oncoming tank battle took place in the Prokhorovka area. Everything that could burn was burning; everything was covered in dust, fumes and smoke from burning tanks, villages, forests and grain fields. The earth was scorched to such an extent that not a single blade of grass remained on it. Soviet guards and the elite of the Wehrmacht - the SS tank divisions - met head-on here.
Before the Prokhorovsky tank battle, there were fierce clashes between the tank forces of both sides in the 13th Army of the Central Front, in which up to 1000 tanks took part in the most critical moments.
But tank battles took on the largest scale in the Voronezh Front. Here, in the first days of the battle, the forces of the 4th Tank Army and the 3rd Tank Corps of the Germans collided with three corps of the 1st Tank Army, the 2nd and 5th Guards Separate Tank Corps.
“LET'S HAVE DINNER IN KURSK!”
The fighting on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge actually began on July 4, when German units attempted to knock down military outposts in the zone of the 6th Guards Army.
But the main events unfolded early in the morning of July 5, when the Germans launched the first massive attack with their tank formations in the direction of Oboyan.
On the morning of July 5, the commander of the Adolf Hitler division, Obergruppenführer Joseph Dietrich, drove up to his Tigers, and an officer shouted to him: “Let's have lunch in Kursk!”
But the SS men did not have to have lunch or dinner in Kursk. Only by the end of the day on July 5 did they manage to break through the defensive line of the 6th Army. Exhausted soldiers of the German assault battalions took refuge in the captured trenches to eat dry rations and get some sleep.
On the right flank of Army Group South, Task Force Kempf crossed the river. Seversky Donets and attacked the 7th Guards Army.
Tiger gunner of the 503rd heavy tank battalion of the 3rd Panzer Corps Gerhard Niemann: “Another anti-tank gun about 40 meters ahead of us. The gun crew flees in panic, with the exception of one man. He leans towards the sight and shoots. A terrible blow to the fighting compartment. The driver maneuvers, maneuver - and another gun is crushed by our tracks. And again a terrible blow, this time to the rear of the tank. Our engine sneezes, but nevertheless continues to work.”
On July 6 and 7, the 1st Tank Army took the main attack. In a few hours of battle, all that was left of its 538th and 1008th anti-tank fighter regiments, as they say, were only numbers. On July 7, the Germans launched a concentric attack in the direction of Oboyan. Only in the area between Syrtsev and Yakovlev on a front stretching five to six kilometers, the commander of the 4th German Tank Army, Hoth, deployed up to 400 tanks, supporting their offensive with a massive air and artillery strike.
Commander of the 1st Tank Army, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Mikhail Katukov: “We got out of the gap and climbed a small hill where a command post was equipped. It was half past four in the afternoon. But it seemed that a solar eclipse had arrived. The sun disappeared behind clouds of dust. And ahead in the twilight bursts of shots could be seen, the earth took off and crumbled, engines roared and tracks clanged. As soon as enemy tanks approached our positions, they were met by dense artillery and tank fire. Leaving damaged and burning vehicles on the battlefield, the enemy rolled back and went on the attack again.”
By the end of July 8, Soviet troops, after heavy defensive battles, retreated to the second army line of defense.
300 KILOMETER MARCH
The decision to strengthen the Voronezh Front was made on July 6, despite violent protests from the commander of the Steppe Front, I.S. Koneva. Stalin gave the order to move the 5th Guards Tank Army to the rear of the troops of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, as well as to strengthen the Voronezh Front with the 2nd Tank Corps.
The 5th Guards Tank Army had about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns, including T-34-501 medium tanks and T-70-261 light tanks. On the night of July 6-7, the army moved to the front line. The march took place around the clock under the cover of aviation from the 2nd Air Army.
Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Pavel Rotmistrov: “Already at 8 o’clock in the morning it became hot, and clouds of dust rose into the sky. By noon, dust covered roadside bushes, wheat fields, tanks and trucks in a thick layer, the dark red disk of the sun was barely visible through the gray dust curtain. Tanks, self-propelled guns and tractors (pulling guns), armored infantry vehicles and trucks moved forward in an endless stream. The soldiers' faces were covered with dust and soot from the exhaust pipes. It was unbearably hot. The soldiers were thirsty, and their tunics, soaked with sweat, stuck to their bodies. It was especially difficult for the driver mechanics during the march. The tank crews tried to make their task as easy as possible. Every now and then someone would replace the drivers, and during short rest stops they would be allowed to sleep.”
The aviation of the 2nd Air Army so reliably covered the 5th Guards Tank Army on the march that German intelligence was never able to detect its arrival. Having traveled 200 km, the army arrived in the area southwest of Stary Oskol on the morning of July 8. Then, having put the material part in order, the army corps again made a 100-kilometer throw and, by the end of July 9, concentrated in the area of ​​Bobryshev, Vesely, Aleksandrovsky, strictly at the appointed time.
MAN MAIN CHANGES THE DIRECTION OF THE MAIN IMPACT
On the morning of July 8, an even more fierce struggle broke out in the Oboyan and Korochan directions. The main feature of the struggle that day was that the Soviet troops, repelling massive enemy attacks, themselves began to launch strong counterattacks on the flanks of the 4th German Tank Army.
As in previous days, the most fierce fighting broke out in the area of ​​the Simferopol-Moscow highway, where units of the SS Panzer Division "Gross Germany", the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions, reinforced by individual companies and battalions of the Tigers and Ferdinands, were advancing. Units of the 1st Tank Army again bore the brunt of enemy attacks. In this direction, the enemy simultaneously deployed up to 400 tanks, and fierce fighting continued here all day.
Intense fighting also continued in the Korochan direction, where by the end of the day the Kempf army group broke through in a narrow wedge in the Melekhov area.
The commander of the 19th German Panzer Division, Lieutenant General Gustav Schmidt: “Despite the heavy losses suffered by the enemy, and the fact that entire sections of trenches and trenches were burned out by flamethrower tanks, we were unable to dislodge the group entrenched there from the northern part of the defensive line enemy force up to a battalion. The Russians settled in the trench system, knocked out our flamethrower tanks with anti-tank rifle fire and put up fanatical resistance.”
On the morning of July 9, a German strike force of several hundred tanks, with massive air support, resumed the offensive in a 10-kilometer area. By the end of the day, she broke through to the third line of defense. And in the Korochan direction, the enemy broke into the second line of defense.
Nevertheless, the stubborn resistance of the troops of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards armies in the Oboyan direction forced the command of Army Group South to change the direction of the main attack, moving it from the Simferopol-Moscow highway to the east to the Prokhorovka area. This movement of the main attack, in addition to the fact that several days of fierce fighting on the highway did not give the Germans the desired results, was also determined by the nature of the terrain. From the Prokhorovka area, a wide strip of heights stretches in a northwestern direction, which dominate the surrounding area and are convenient for the operations of large tank masses.
The general plan of the command of Army Group South was to launch three strong strikes in a comprehensive manner, which should have led to the encirclement and destruction of two groups of Soviet troops and to the opening of offensive routes to Kursk.
To develop the success, it was planned to introduce fresh forces into the battle - the 24th Panzer Corps as part of the SS Viking division and the 17th Panzer Division, which on July 10 were urgently transferred from Donbass to Kharkov. The German command scheduled the start of the attack on Kursk from the north and south for the morning of July 11.
In turn, the command of the Voronezh Front, having received the approval of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, decided to prepare and conduct a counter-offensive with the aim of encircling and defeating enemy groups advancing in the Oboyan and Prokhorovsky directions. Formations of the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Army were concentrated against the main group of SS tank divisions in the Prokhorovsk direction. The start of the general counteroffensive was scheduled for the morning of July 12.
On July 11, all three German groups of E. Manstein went on the offensive, and later than everyone else, clearly expecting the attention of the Soviet command to be diverted to other directions, the main group launched an offensive in the Prokhorovsk direction - the tank divisions of the 2nd SS Corps under the command of Obergruppenführer Paul Hauser, awarded the highest award of the Third Reich "Oak leaves to the Knight's Cross".
By the end of the day, a large group of tanks from the SS Reich Division managed to break through to the village of Storozhevoye, posing a threat to the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army. To eliminate this threat, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was sent in. Fierce oncoming tank battles continued throughout the night. As a result, the main strike group of the 4th German Tank Army, having launched an offensive on a front of only about 8 km, reached the approaches to Prokhorovka in a narrow strip and was forced to suspend the offensive, occupying the line from which the 5th Guards Tank Army planned to launch its counteroffensive.
The second strike group - the SS Panzer Division "Gross Germany", the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions - achieved even less success. Our troops successfully repulsed their attacks.
However, northeast of Belgorod, where the Kempf army group was advancing, a threatening situation had arisen. The enemy's 6th and 7th tank divisions broke through to the north in a narrow wedge. Their forward units were only 18 km from the main group of SS tank divisions, which were advancing southwest of Prokhorovka.
To eliminate the breakthrough of German tanks against the Kempf army group, part of the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army was sent: two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and one brigade of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.
In addition, the Soviet command decided to begin the planned counter-offensive two hours earlier, although preparations for the counter-offensive were not yet completed. However, the situation forced us to act immediately and decisively. Any delay was beneficial only to the enemy.
PROKHOROVKA
At 8.30 on July 12, Soviet strike groups launched a counteroffensive against the troops of the 4th German Tank Army. However, due to the German breakthrough to Prokhorovka, the diversion of significant forces of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards armies to eliminate the threat to their rear and the postponement of the start of the counteroffensive, Soviet troops launched an attack without artillery and air support. As the English historian Robin Cross writes: “Artillery preparation schedules were torn to shreds and rewritten again.”
Manstein threw all his available forces into repelling the attacks of the Soviet troops, because he clearly understood that the success of the offensive of the Soviet troops could lead to the complete defeat of the entire strike force of the German Army Group South. A fierce struggle broke out on a huge front with a total length of more than 200 km.
The most fierce fighting during July 12 broke out on the so-called Prokhorov bridgehead. From the north it was limited by the river. Psel, and from the south - a railway embankment near the village of Belenikino. This strip of terrain measuring up to 7 km along the front and up to 8 km in depth was captured by the enemy as a result of intense fighting during July 11. The main enemy group deployed and operated on the bridgehead as part of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 320 tanks and assault guns, including several dozen Tiger, Panther and Ferdinand vehicles. It was against this grouping that the Soviet command delivered its main blow with the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army and part of the forces of the 5th Guards Army.
The battlefield was clearly visible from Rotmistrov's observation post.
Pavel Rotmistrov: “A few minutes later, the tanks of the first echelon of our 29th and 18th corps, firing on the move, crashed head-on into the battle formations of the Nazi troops, literally piercing the enemy’s battle formation with a swift through attack. The Nazis, obviously, did not expect to encounter such a large mass of our combat vehicles and such a decisive attack. Control in the enemy's advanced units was clearly disrupted. His "Tigers" and "Panthers", deprived of their fire advantage in close combat, which they enjoyed at the beginning of the offensive in a clash with our other tank formations, were now successfully hit by Soviet T-34 and even T-70 tanks from short distances. The battlefield swirled with smoke and dust, and the ground shook from powerful explosions. The tanks ran at each other and, having grappled, could no longer disperse, they fought to the death until one of them burst into flames or stopped with broken tracks. But even damaged tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire.”
West of Prokhorovka along the left bank of the Psel River, units of the 18th Tank Corps went on the offensive. His tank brigades disrupted the battle formations of the advancing enemy tank units, stopped them and began to move forward themselves.
Deputy commander of the tank battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps, Evgeniy Shkurdalov: “I only saw what was, so to speak, within the boundaries of my tank battalion. The 170th Tank Brigade was ahead of us. With tremendous speed, it wedged itself into the location of the heavy German tanks that were in the first wave, and the German tanks penetrated our tanks. The tanks were very close to each other, and therefore they literally shot at point-blank range, simply shooting at each other. This brigade burned down in just five minutes—sixty-five vehicles.”
Radio operator of the command tank of the Adolf Hitler tank division, Wilhelm Res: “Russian tanks were rushing at full throttle. In our area they were prevented by an anti-tank ditch. At full speed they flew into this ditch, due to their speed they covered three or four meters in it, but then seemed to freeze in a slightly inclined position with the gun raised up. Literally for a moment! Taking advantage of this, many of our tank commanders fired directly at point-blank range.”
Evgeniy Shkurdalov: “I knocked out the first tank when I was moving along the landing along the railway, and literally at a distance of a hundred meters I saw a Tiger tank, which stood sideways to me and fired at our tanks. Apparently he knocked out quite a few of our vehicles, since the vehicles were moving sideways towards him, and he fired at the sides of our vehicles. I took aim with a sub-caliber projectile and fired. The tank caught fire. I fired again and the tank caught fire even more. The crew jumped out, but somehow I had no time for them. I bypassed this tank, then knocked out the T-III tank and the Panther. When I knocked out the Panther, you know, there was a feeling of delight that you see, I did such a heroic deed.”
The 29th Tank Corps, with the support of units of the 9th Guards Airborne Division, launched a counteroffensive along the railway and highway southwest of Prokhorovka. As noted in the corps' combat log, the attack began without artillery bombardment of the line occupied by the enemy and without air cover. This enabled the enemy to open concentrated fire on the corps’ combat formations and bomb its tank and infantry units with impunity, which led to large losses and a decrease in the tempo of the attack, and this, in turn, enabled the enemy to conduct effective artillery and tank fire from the spot.
Wilhelm Res: “Suddenly one T-34 broke through and moved straight towards us. Our first radio operator began handing shells to me one at a time so that I could put them in the cannon. At this time, our commander above kept shouting: “Shot! Shot!" - because the tank was moving closer and closer. And only after the fourth – “Shot” – did I hear: “Thank God!”
Then, after some time, we determined that the T-34 had stopped just eight meters from us! At the top of the tower he had, as if stamped, 5-centimeter holes located at the same distance from each other, as if they had been measured with a compass. The battle formations of the parties were mixed up. Our tankers successfully hit the enemy from close ranges, but they themselves suffered heavy losses.”
From the documents of the Central Administration of the Russian Ministry of Defense: “The T-34 tank of the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps, Captain Skripkin, crashed into the Tiger formation and knocked out two enemy tanks before an 88-mm shell hit his T turret -34, and the other penetrated the side armor. The Soviet tank caught fire, and the wounded Skripkin was pulled out of the wrecked car by his driver, Sergeant Nikolaev, and radio operator Zyryanov. They took cover in a crater, but still one of the Tigers noticed them and moved towards them. Then Nikolaev and his loader Chernov again jumped into the burning car, started it and aimed it straight at the Tiger. Both tanks exploded upon collision.”
The impact of Soviet armor and new tanks with a full set of ammunition thoroughly shook Hauser's battle-weary divisions, and the German offensive stopped.
From the report of the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the Kursk Bulge region, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Vasilevsky, to Stalin: “Yesterday I personally observed a tank battle of our 18th and 29th corps with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack southwest of Prokhorovka. At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the PCs we had took part in the battle. As a result, the entire battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks within an hour.”
As a result of the counteroffensive of the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army southwest of Prokhorovka, the offensive of the SS tank divisions “Totenkopf” and “Adolf Hitler” to the northeast was thwarted; these divisions suffered such losses that they could no longer launch a serious offensive.
Units of the SS tank division "Reich" also suffered heavy losses from attacks by units of the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, which launched a counteroffensive south of Prokhorovka.
In the breakthrough area of ​​the Army Group "Kempf" south and southeast of Prokhorovka, fierce fighting also continued throughout the day on July 12, as a result of which the attack of the Army Group "Kempf" to the north was stopped by tankers of the 5th Guards Tank and units of the 69th Army .
LOSSES AND RESULTS
On the night of July 13, Rotmistrov took the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal Georgy Zhukov, to the headquarters of the 29th Tank Corps. On the way, Zhukov stopped the car several times to personally inspect the sites of recent battles. At one point, he got out of the car and looked for a long time at the burnt-out Panther, rammed by a T-70 tank. A few tens of meters away stood a Tiger and a T-34 locked in a deadly embrace. “This is what a through tank attack means,” Zhukov said quietly, as if to himself, taking off his cap.
Data on the losses of the parties, in particular tanks, vary dramatically in different sources. Manstein, in his book “Lost Victories,” writes that in total, during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, Soviet troops lost 1,800 tanks. The collection “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Wars, Combat Actions and Military Conflicts” talks about 1,600 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns disabled during the defensive battle on the Kursk Bulge.
A very remarkable attempt to calculate German tank losses was made by the English historian Robin Cross in his book “The Citadel. Battle of Kursk". If we put his diagram into a table, we get the following picture: (see the table for the number and losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the 4th German Tank Army in the period July 4–17, 1943).
Cross's data differs from Soviet sources, which may be understandable to a certain extent. Thus, it is known that on the evening of July 6, Vatutin reported to Stalin that during the fierce battles that lasted all day, 322 enemy tanks were destroyed (Kross had 244).
But there are also completely incomprehensible discrepancies in the numbers. For example, aerial photography taken on July 7 at 13.15, only in the area of ​​Syrtsev, Krasnaya Polyana along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway, where the SS Panzer Division “Great Germany” from the 48th Panzer Corps was advancing, recorded 200 burning enemy tanks. According to Cross, on July 7, 48 Tank lost only three tanks (?!).
Or another fact. According to Soviet sources, as a result of bombing attacks on concentrated enemy troops (SS Great Germany and 11th TD) on the morning of July 9, many fires broke out throughout the area of ​​the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. It was German tanks, self-propelled guns, cars, motorcycles, tanks, fuel and ammunition depots that were burning. According to Cross, on July 9 there were no losses at all in the German 4th Tank Army, although, as he himself writes, on July 9 it fought stubbornly, overcoming fierce resistance from Soviet troops. But it was precisely by the evening of July 9 that Manstein decided to abandon the attack on Oboyan and began to look for other ways to break through to Kursk from the south.
The same can be said about Cross's data for July 10 and 11, according to which there were no losses in the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This is also surprising, since it was on these days that the divisions of this corps delivered the main blow and, after fierce fighting, were able to break through to Prokhorovka. And it was on July 11 that Hero of the Soviet Union Guard Sergeant M.F. accomplished his feat. Borisov, who destroyed seven German tanks.
After archival documents were opened, it became possible to more accurately assess Soviet losses in the tank battle of Prokhorovka. According to the combat log of the 29th Tank Corps for July 12, of the 212 tanks and self-propelled guns that entered the battle, 150 vehicles (more than 70%) were lost by the end of the day, of which 117 (55%) were irretrievably lost. According to combat report No. 38 of the commander of the 18th Tank Corps dated July 13, 1943, corps losses amounted to 55 tanks, or 30% of their original strength. Thus, it is possible to obtain a more or less accurate figure for the losses suffered by the 5th Guards Tank Army in the battle of Prokhorovka against the SS divisions “Adolf Hitler” and “Totenkopf” - over 200 tanks and self-propelled guns.
As for the German losses at Prokhorovka, there is an absolutely fantastic discrepancy in the numbers.
According to Soviet sources, when the battles near Kursk died down and broken military equipment began to be removed from the battlefields, more than 400 broken and burned German tanks were counted in a small area southwest of Prokhorovka, where an oncoming tank battle unfolded on July 12. Rotmistrov claimed in his memoirs that on July 12, in battles with the 5th Guards Tank Army, the enemy lost over 350 tanks and more than 10 thousand people killed.
But in the late 1990s, German military historian Karl-Heinz Friser published sensational data he obtained after studying German archives. According to these data, the Germans lost four tanks in the battle of Prokhorovka. After additional research, he came to the conclusion that in fact the losses were even less - three tanks.
Documentary evidence refutes these absurd conclusions. Thus, the combat log of the 29th Tank Corps states that enemy losses included 68 tanks (it is interesting to note that this coincides with Cross’s data). A combat report from the headquarters of the 33rd Guards Corps to the commander of the 5th Guards Army dated July 13, 1943 states that the 97th Guards Rifle Division destroyed 47 tanks over the past 24 hours. It is further reported that during the night of July 12, the enemy removed his damaged tanks, the number of which exceeded 200 vehicles. The 18th Tank Corps chalked up several dozen destroyed enemy tanks.
One can agree with Cross’s statement that tank losses are generally difficult to calculate, since disabled vehicles were repaired and went into battle again. In addition, enemy losses are usually always exaggerated. Nevertheless, it can be assumed with a high degree of probability that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps lost at least over 100 tanks in the battle of Prokhorovka (excluding the losses of the SS Reich Panzer Division, which operated south of Prokhorovka). In total, according to Cross, the losses of the 4th German Tank Army from July 4 to July 14 amounted to about 600 tanks and self-propelled guns out of 916 at the start of Operation Citadel. This almost coincides with the data of the German historian Engelmann, who, citing Manstein’s report, claims that in the period from July 5 to July 13, the German 4th Tank Army lost 612 armored vehicles. The losses of the 3rd German Tank Corps by July 15 amounted to 240 tanks out of 310 available.
The total losses of the parties in the oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka, taking into account the actions of Soviet troops against the 4th German Tank Army and the Kempf Army Group, are estimated as follows. On the Soviet side, 500 were lost, on the German side - 300 tanks and self-propelled guns. Cross claims that after the Battle of Prokhorov, Hauser's sappers blew up damaged German equipment that was beyond repair and standing in no man's land. After August 1, German repair shops in Kharkov and Bogodukhov accumulated such a quantity of faulty equipment that they had to be sent even to Kyiv for repairs.
Of course, the German Army Group South suffered its greatest losses in the first seven days of fighting, even before the battle of Prokhorovka. But the main significance of the Prokhorovsky battle lies not even in the damage caused to the German tank formations, but in the fact that the Soviet soldiers dealt a powerful blow and managed to stop the SS tank divisions rushing to Kursk. This undermined the morale of the elite of the German tank forces, after which they finally lost faith in the victory of German weapons.

Number and losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the 4th German Tank Army July 4–17, 1943
date The number of tanks in the 2nd SS Tank Tank Number of tanks in the 48th Tank Tank Total Tank losses in the 2nd SS Tank Tank Tank losses in the 48th Tank Tank Total Notes
04.07 470 446 916 39 – 39 48th TK – ?
05.07 431 453 884 21 – 21 48th TK – ?
06.07 410 455 865 110 134 244
07.07 300 321 621 2 3 5
08.07 308 318 626 30 95 125
09.07 278 223 501 – – – ?
10.07 292 227 519 – 6 6 2nd SS Tank - ?
11.07 309 221 530 – 33 33 2nd SS Tank - ?
12.07 320 188 508 68 – 68 48th TK – ?
13.07 252 253 505 – 36 36 2nd SS Tank - ?
14.07 271 217 488 11 9 20
15.07 260 206 466 – – – ?
16.07 298 232 530 – – ?
17.07 312 279 591 no data no data –
Total tanks lost in the 4th Tank Army

280 316 596

The tank battle near Prokhorovka (took place on July 12, 1943), as an episode of the Battle of Kursk during the execution of Operation Citadel by German troops. Considered one of the largest battles in military history using armored vehicles (?). On July 10, faced with stubborn resistance in their movement towards Oboyan, the Germans changed the direction of the main attack on the Prokhorovka railway station, 36 km southeast of Oboyan.

The results of this battle still cause heated debate today. The amount of equipment and the scale of the operation are called into question, which, according to some historians, were exaggerated by Soviet propaganda.

Strengths of the parties

The main participants in the Tank Battle of Prokhorovka were the 5th Panzer Army, under the command of Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov, and the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, commanded by SS Gruppenführer Paul Hausser.


According to one version, the 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Tank Army, which attacked the German positions, included 190 T-34 medium tanks, 120 T-70 light tanks, 18 British heavy Mk-4 Churchill tanks and 20 self-propelled artillery units (self-propelled guns) - a total of 348 combat vehicles.

On the German side, historians cite a figure of 311 tanks, although official Soviet historiography cites a figure of 350 enemy armored vehicles destroyed alone. But modern historians speak of a clear overestimation of this figure; in their opinion, only about 300 tanks could have taken part on the German side. It was here that the Germans first used teletankettes.

Approximate data in numbers: the II SS Panzer Corps had three motorized divisions. As of July 11, 1943, the motorized division “Leibstandarte CC Adolf Hitler” had 77 tanks and self-propelled guns in service. The SS motorized division "Totenkopf" had 122 and the SS motorized division "Das Reich" had 95 tanks and self-propelled guns of all types. Total: 294 cars.

From documents that were declassified at the end of the 20th century, it can be assumed that about 1,000 armored vehicles took part in the battle on both sides. This is approximately 670 Soviet and 330 German vehicles.

Not only tanks took part in this battle. Historians insist on the term armored forces, which also includes wheeled or tracked vehicles and motorcycles.

Progress of the battle near Prokhorovka

July 10 - the attack on Prokhorovka began. Thanks to the very effective support of their attack aircraft, by the end of the day the Germans managed to capture an important defensive point - the Komsomolets state farm - and gain a foothold in the area of ​​​​the village of Krasny Oktyabr. The next day, German troops continued to push back the Russians in the area of ​​the Storozhevoye farmstead and surrounded the units that defended the villages of Andreevka, Vasilyevka and Mikhailovka.

There are only 2 km left to Prokhorovka without any serious fortifications. Realizing that on July 12 Prokhorovka would be taken and the Nazis would turn to Oboyan, at the same time reaching the rear of the 1st Tank Army, front commander Nikolai Vatutin hoped only for a counterattack by the 5th Tank Army, which could turn the tide. There was practically no time left to prepare a counterattack. The troops had only a few hours of daylight and a short summer night to carry out the necessary regrouping and placement of artillery. Moreover, both artillerymen and Rotmistrov’s tanks experienced a shortage of ammunition.

Vatutin, at the last moment, decided to move the time of the offensive from 10.00 to 8.30. As he believed, this should have allowed him to forestall the Germans. In fact, this decision led to fatal consequences. German troops were also preparing for the attack, scheduled for 9.00. By the morning of July 12, their tanks were in their original positions awaiting orders. Anti-tank artillery was deployed to repel a possible counterattack.

When the tanks of Rotmistrov's army moved into battle, they came under devastating fire from artillery and tanks of the SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, which was preparing for battle. Already after the first minutes of the battle, dozens of medium Soviet T-34 and light T-70 tanks were blazing on the field.

Only at 12.00 our tanks managed to approach the German positions, but they were subjected to a powerful air raid by attack aircraft armed with 37-mm cannons. Soviet tank crews, among whom there were many untrained crews who had almost entered into battle for the first time, fought heroically literally until the last shell. They were forced to fight under deadly accurate German fire and air attacks, without, for their part, proper support from aviation and artillery. They tried to shorten the distance; the tanks that had broken through, having shot all their ammunition, went to ram, but no miracle happened.

In the afternoon, German troops launched a counterattack, concentrating their main efforts north of Prokhorovka, in the zone of the Totenkopf division. There they were opposed by about 150 tanks from Rotmistrov's army and the 1st Tank Army. The Germans were stopped mainly due to excellent anti-tank artillery.

Losses

As for losses, the greatest damage to our troops was caused by German artillery. The number of equipment destroyed in the battle of Prokhorovka varies greatly in different sources. It is likely that the most plausible and documented figures are about 160 German vehicles; 360 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns.

And yet, Soviet troops were able to slow down the German advance.

The day of celebration of the holy apostles Peter and Paul, in whose honor the church in Prokhorovka is named, falls on July 12 - the day of the legendary battle.

The Soviet T-34 tanks that took part in the battle had an advantage over all German tanks in speed and maneuverability. This is why the Germans regularly used captured T-34s. In the battle of Prokhorovka, eight such tanks took part in the SS Panzer Division Das Reich.

The Soviet T-34 tank commanded by Pyotr Skripnik was shot down. The crew, having pulled out their commander, tried to take cover in the crater. The tank was on fire. The Germans took notice of him. A German tank moved towards our tankers to crush them under its tracks. Then the mechanic, saving his comrades, rushed out of the safety shelter. He ran to his burning tank and pointed it at the German Tiger. Both tanks exploded.

In Soviet times, there was a popular version that Soviet tanks were attacked by German Panthers. But according to recent research, there were no Panthers at all in the Battle of Prokhorovka. And there were “Tigers” and…. "T-34", captured vehicles.

"I want everything..."




So, by the beginning of the battle, the USSR tank forces available near Prokhorovka had an overwhelming numerical superiority: 368 tanks and self-propelled guns against 150 German ones. However, this numerical superiority of the Red Army was somewhat offset by the higher combat characteristics of some Wehrmacht tanks: the heavy Tigers simply did not have an equal enemy on the field near Prokhorovka. Even our heavy KVs were penetrated by the Tiger at maximum firing ranges, and they themselves could hit the German “cat” only when firing almost point-blank. Thank God that the entire Tiger company, and not a battalion, was operating in this sector... In Russian literature, it is customary to sing the praises of the power of our main medium tank T-34; this is indeed true in relation to 1941, however, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Germans were able to improve their Pz.IV medium tanks so much that they were equal in their combat qualities to the "thirty-four" and in nothing except speed on the highway (and only on the highway!) they were not inferior to her. The 1943 “Tigers”, armed with a 76-mm cannon, simply could not resist the Tigers. But the weakest point of the 5th Guards Tank Army was the huge number (139 pieces!) of light T-70 tanks, protected by thin armor and armed with a weak 45-mm cannon. These tanks were quite suitable for reconnaissance or fighting enemy infantry, but to resist medium, and even more so heavy tanks...
Based on the figures given in the table, we can say that in the battle of Prokhorovka, Soviet tank forces suffered not just huge, but horrific losses - 70% of all tanks. The Germans, having more than two times less strength, lost only about half of their armored vehicles - 47%. There are several reasons for this. In particular, simple luck, an accident that is often decisive in war. After all, the Germans were the first (perhaps thanks to their excellent optics) to notice the enemy and managed to reorganize for battle; the Soviet tank crews had to do this under fire, suffering losses. The communication system also played a role: at that time, not every Soviet tank had a transceiver, and even when the enemy was detected, many tankers simply could not inform their comrades about it. It was also important what I already said above: that the basis of the Soviet armored forces near Prokhorovka were “thirty-fours”, which did not have any advantages over the enemy, and light T-70s, which could not compete in battle even with the medium Pz.IV and Pz.III. In addition, the self-propelled artillery available to the warring sides was unequal: all self-propelled guns of the Soviet armored forces were “anti-personnel” and could hardly withstand tanks. At the same time, most of the self-propelled guns the Germans had were anti-tank, and from closed second-line positions they were capable of inflicting very serious damage on the enemy.
And yet, despite the superiority of the enemy in the quality of armored vehicles, despite his better organization and simple luck, despite the huge, in fact catastrophic losses, it was the Soviet tankers who won this battle. Yes, at the cost of his own life. But they stopped the advance of enemy tanks, bleeding the Germans, knocking out almost half of their vehicles. And they fled, making a turning point in the grandiose battle. And they drove the enemy away - those who survived and those who came to the rescue from the reserves. The day of the battle of Prokhorovka became a turning point for the Battle of Kursk: until that day, Soviet troops were only on the defensive, but from that day on they went on the offensive! And the Germans were no longer able to seize the initiative and attack again - never!
This is how hard and bloody, and not a mass beating of “numerous, but weak and cowardly fools-Germans,” as Soviet propaganda imagined during my childhood, that war was. The war in which my 17-year-old uncle remained forever, and my father, then still a boy, literally miraculously survived (otherwise I would not have existed). And after studying the loss figures hidden from us by our government for many years, I began to respect the people who fought in that war even more - the “dry numbers” told me personally about the heroism of our ancestors, who despised death, much more than the tales of official Soviet propagandists...

USSR

Germany Germany

Commanders Losses Audio, photo, video on Wikimedia Commons

Direct command of the tank formations during the battle was carried out by: Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov from the Soviet side and SS Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser from the German side.

Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: German troops failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of Soviet troops and gain operational space, and Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.

The situation on the eve of the battle

Initially, the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the Yakovlevo-Oboyan operational line. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and Army Group Kempf went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, in position 6- On the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions to the 1st and 7th Guards armies. On July 6, two counterattacks were launched against the advancing Germans from the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki (northern) - Kalinin area by the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repelled by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

Strengths of the parties

Traditionally, Soviet sources indicate that about 1,500 tanks took part in the battle: about 800 from the Soviet side and 700 from the German side (eg TSB). In some cases, a slightly smaller number is indicated - 1200.

Many modern researchers believe that the forces brought into the battle were probably significantly smaller. In particular, it is indicated that the battle took place in a narrow area (8-10 km wide), which was limited on one side by the Psel River and on the other by a railway embankment. It is difficult to introduce such significant masses of tanks into such an area.

It must be said that the overestimation of enemy forces also took place at the preliminary stage. So Shtemenko S.M. in his work points out: “ By April 8, the enemy concentrated 15-16 tank divisions with 2,500 tanks against the Voronezh and Central Fronts. ... On April 21, N.F. Vatutin already counted up to 20 infantry and 11 tank divisions just in front of the Voronezh Front in the Belgorod region.“G.K. Zhukov assesses the situation more realistically. We read from him: " In the Battle of Kursk, the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, as I have already said, were somewhat superior to the enemy in strength and means. ... in people - 1.4 times, in guns and mortars - 1.9 times, in tanks - 1.2 times, in airplanes - 1.4 times. However, placing the main emphasis on tank and motorized troops, the German command grouped them in narrow areas..."There is a version that the command of the Voronezh Front also tried to group tank forces near Prokhorovka.

Germany

From the western direction, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (2 SS Tank Corps) was advancing on Prokhorovka, while the SS Division “Adolf Hitler” was operating in the zone between the Psel River and the railway, and from the southern direction - the 3rd Panzer Corps (3 Tank Corps) . Known for the presence of tanks and assault guns without self-propelled guns: Grille, Vespe, Hummel and Marder 2, the data for which is being clarified, in the divisions of the 2nd SS Tank as of the evening of July 11 and 3rd Tank as of the morning of July 12 is indicated in the table.

The strength of units and formations of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps 4 TA and the 3rd Panzer Corps AG "Kempf" on July 11, 1943
Pz.II Pz.III
50/L42		 Pz.III
50/L60		 Pz.III
75 mm		 Pz.IV
L24		 Pz.IV
L43 and L48		 Pz.VI "Tiger" T-34 StuG III Bef.Pz. III Total tanks and StuG
2nd SS Panzer Corps
TD Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler" (at 19.25 11.07) 4 - 5 - - 47 4 - 10 7 77
TD SS "Das Reich" (at 19.25 11.07) - - 34 - - 18 1 8 27 7 95
TD SS "Totenkopf" (at 19.25 11.07) - - 54 - 4 26 10 - 21 7 122
2nd SS Panzer Corps, total 4 - 93 - 4 91 15 8 58 21 294
3rd Tank Corps
6th Panzer Division (on the morning of July 11) 2 2 11 ? - 6 - - - 2 23 (?)
7th Panzer Division (on the morning of July 12) - - 24 2 1 9 - - - 3 39
19th Panzer Division (on the morning of July 12) - - 7 4 - 3 - - - 1 15
503rd separate heavy tank battalion (on the morning of July 11) - - - - - - 23 - - - 23
228th separate battalion of assault guns (on the morning of July 12) - - - - - - - - 19 - 19
3rd Tank Corps, total 2 2 42 6 1 18 23 - 19 6 119
Total armored units 6 2 135 6 5 109 38 8 77 27 413

It should be noted that “Panther” tanks did not take part in the Battle of Prokhorovka on July 12, continuing to operate as part of the “Great Germany” division in the Oboyan direction. In the post-war press, instead of the company of captured T-34 tanks that actually participated in the battle near Prokhorovka (8 units as part of the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich"), Panther tanks were indicated. About the “Panthers” allegedly operating against his 5th Guards. TA, said P. A. Rotmistrov.

USSR

Commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army, Representative of the Supreme High Command Headquarters A. M. Vasilevsky - until 07/14/43. From July 14, Zhukov G.K. was already involved in coordinating the actions of the front with Headquarters.

The Soviet group included the following forces:

  • 2nd Air Army (2nd VA, Aviation Lieutenant General Krasovsky S.A.);
  • 5th Guards Army (5th Guards A, Lieutenant General Zhadov A.S.);
  • 5th Guards Tank Army (5th Guards TA, Lieutenant General t/v Rotmistrov P.A.) consisting of:
    • 18th Tank Corps (18 Tank Corps, Major General T/V Bakharov B.S.), 148 tanks:
Part T-34 T-70 "Churchill"
110th Tank Brigade (110th Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel M. G. Khlyupin) 24 21
170th Tank Brigade (170 Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Tarasov V.D.) 22 17
181st Tank Brigade (181st brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Puzyrev V.A.) 24 20
36th Separate Guards Heavy Tank Breakthrough Regiment (36 Separate Guards TPP) 0 0 20

32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, Colonel I. A. Stukov).

    • 29th Tank Corps (29 Tank Corps, Major General T/V Kirichenko I.F.), 192 tanks and 20 self-propelled guns:
Part T-34 T-70 SU-122 SU-76
Units of equipment combat-ready and temporarily under repair as of July 11
25th Tank Brigade (25th Tank Brigade, Colonel Volodin N.K.) 26 32
31st Tank Brigade (31st Tank Brigade, Colonel Moiseev S.F.) 32 38
32nd Tank Brigade (32nd Tank Brigade, Colonel Linev A.A.) 64 0
1446th self-propelled artillery regiment (1146 glanders) 12 8

53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Lipichev N.P.). 1529th heavy self-propelled artillery regiment SU-152 (1529 tsap. The regiment, consisting of 11 vehicles out of 12, arrived at the site only in the evening of July 12 without shells. Did not take part in the tank battle on July 12).

    • 5th Guards Mechanized Corps (5th Guards Mk, Major General t/v Skvortsov B.M.)
Part T-34 T-70 SU-122 SU-76
10th Guards Mechanized Brigade (10th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel Mikhailov I.B.) 29 12
11th Guards Mechanized Brigade (11th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel N.V. Grishchenko) 42 22
12th Guards Mechanized Brigade (11th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel Borisenko G. Ya.)
24th Guards Separate Tank Brigade (24th Guards Separate Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Karpov V.P.) 51 0
1447th self-propelled artillery regiment (1147 glanders) 12 8
  • 5th Guards The TA was reinforced by formations that became part of it from July 10:
    • 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps (2nd Guards Tank Corps, Colonel Burdeyny A.S.),
Part T-34 T-70 "Churchill"
Units of equipment combat-ready and temporarily under repair as of July 11, units
4th Guards Mechanized Brigade (4th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel A.K. Brazhnikov) 28 19
25th Guards Mechanized Brigade (25th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Bulygin S.M.) 28 19
26th Guards Mechanized Brigade (26th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Nesterov S.K.) 28 14
47th Guards Separate Breakthrough Tank Regiment (47 Guards Separate TPP, Lieutenant Colonel Shevchenko M. T.) 0 0 21
    • 2nd Tank Corps (2nd Tank Corps, Major General T/V Popov A.F.):
      • 26th Tank Brigade (26 Tank Brigade, Colonel Piskarev P.V.) (as of 07/11/43 T-34 1 1 unit + 7 under repair and T-70 33 units + 2 under repair)
      • 99th Tank Brigade (99 Tank Brigade, Colonel L. I. Malov),
      • 169th Tank Brigade (169 Tank Brigade, Colonel I. Ya. Stepanov).
The state of the equipment and support of the 5th Guards Tank Army at 17:00 on July 11, 1943
Combat vehicles 29 tk 18 tk 2 tk 2nd Guards tk 5th Guards mk army units Total
T-34 120 68 35 84 120 36 463
T-70 81 58 46 52 56 8 301
"Churchill" - 18 4 3 - - 25
SU-122 12 - - - 10 - 22
SU-76 8 - - - 7 - 15
Total tanks and self-propelled guns 221 144 85 139 193 44 826
On the way to the station Prokhorovka 13 33 - - 51 4 101
Under repair 2 6 9 - 1 6 24
Total armored units 236 183 94 139 245 54 951

G. A. Oleynikov, as of July 10, has 790 tanks in the 5th Guards Tank Army - 260 T-70, 501 T-34, 31 Mk IV "Churchill" (modifications of Churchill IV). And 40 (two regiments) SU-122 self-propelled assault howitzers and light infantry support assault guns based on the T-70 SU-76.

Rotmistrov himself assessed the amount of equipment as follows: “ The 5th Guards Tank Army was reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky and 2nd Tank Corps, 1529th Self-Propelled Artillery, 1522nd and 1148th Howitzer, 148th and 93rd Cannon Artillery Regiments, 16th and 80th guards mortar regiments. In general, in our army with attached tank formations there were about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns.»

The assessment of the forces of the parties is highly dependent on the assessment of the geographical scope of the battle. In the area of ​​the Oktyabrsky state farm, the 18th and 29th tank corps were advancing - a total of 348 tanks.

Plans of the parties

1. The enemy in the Belgorod direction, having brought large forces of tanks into battle, is trying to develop success in the north. direction - to Oboyan, Kursk (up to 400 tanks) and to the east. direction - to Aleksandrovsky, Skorodnoye, Stary Oskol (up to 300 tanks).

To the commander of the 29th Tank Tank, Lieutenant General T. Kirichenko

1. The task of the corps is the same...
2. Start of the attack - 8.30 July 12, 1943. Artillery preparation begins at 8.00.
3. I authorize the use of the radio from 7.00 on July 12, 1943. Commander of the 5th Guards. TA Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov

2 SS tanks defeat the enemy in the south. Prokhorovka and thereby creates the preconditions for further advancement through Prokhorovka. Division assignments:

Division "MG" go on the offensive from the bridgehead at dawn, capture the heights of the north-east. and first of all go to the road Prokhorovka, Kartashevka. Take possession of the river valley. Psel attacked from the southwest, securing the left flank of the AG division.

The “AG” division, holding the occupied line on the left flank, occupied Storozhevoye and the forest to the north, the branch of the “Stalinskoe” state farm, etc. on the right flag. Pits, as well as heights of 2 km east. With the onset of a threat from the river valley. Psel, together with MG units, captured Prokhorovka and height 252.4.

Division "R", holding the achieved lines on the right flank, occupy Vinogradovka and Ivanovka. After capturing the right-flank units of the AG division Storozhevoye and the forest to the north, using their success, move the main efforts in the direction of the heights of the southwest. Right-handed. Hold the new line of Ivanovka, the heights of the southwest. Right, height 2 km east. Sentry (lawsuit).

Progress of the battle

There are different versions of this battle.

The first clash in the Prokhorovka area occurred on the evening of July 11. According to the memoirs of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17:00, he and Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by two tank brigades.

At 8 am the next day, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18th, 29th, 2nd and 2nd Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the battle, the Soviet tank crews gained some advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. Very soon the battle formations were mixed. The high density of the battle, during which tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tank crews were able to target the most vulnerable spots of heavily armored German vehicles.

When Soviet tanks, during a counterattack, came within direct range of their guns and were met with heavy fire from German anti-tank guns, the tankers were simply stunned. Under hurricane fire, it was necessary not only to fight, but first of all to psychologically rebuild from a breakthrough deep into the enemy’s defense to positional combat with enemy anti-tank weapons.

To the east of the battle area, the German tank group Kempf was advancing, which sought to enter the advancing Soviet group on the left flank. The threat of envelopment forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction.

At about 1 p.m., the Germans withdrew the 11th Tank Division from reserve, which, together with the Death's Head division, struck the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to their aid and the attack was repulsed.

By 2 p.m., Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy south. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

According to the memoirs of German generals



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