Dear comrades! Friends!
In world history there is a lot important dates. Excited exact time or turning back an entire era. More often behind these dates and events there are certain personalities. That is why their birthdays also become large, important historical dates celebrated by their descendants. Stalin's birthday, December 18, 1878, is one of these.
The contribution of Joseph Vissarionovich to the history of our socialist Motherland is invaluable. For almost 30 years he headed the Bolshevik Party, was the head of the Soviet government, and during the Great Patriotic War Patriotic War he was entrusted to lead the state. Under the leadership of Comrade Stalin Soviet people was able to achieve unprecedented results: the country's population and its prosperity grew, thousands of new factories were put into operation, scientific laboratories, educational establishments, kindergartens, museums, theaters, the most democratic constitution in history was adopted and much more. Led by Stalin, the Soviet people were the first in the world to build socialism, carry out the most powerful industrialization and collectivization in world history, complete the cultural revolution, defeat Nazism and open the way for the peoples of the planet to peace and the struggle for justice.
Stalin was a faithful student and closest ally of V.I. Lenin. He brilliantly continued the work and strengthened the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin. His works are still an important source of knowledge that feeds us on the path of difficult struggle. Stalin's theoretical legacy cannot be pushed aside, as was done by the Soviet leadership in the 60s. Having lost it, our forces will be weakened, and the struggle will become futile. For the Stalinist legacy is not only a revolutionary theory, but also colossal practical experience revolutionary changes in the country of victorious socialism. That is why, on the day of his 138th birthday, we can safely say: Stalin’s cause is our business!
In memory of Stalin, grateful descendants erect monuments to him to this day. In just two years (2015-2016), about 15 monuments depicting the leader appeared in Russia.
Today, the struggle against the desecration of Stalin is the work of every communist. Only by joining the struggle everywhere can we achieve victory in this matter. Someone will say - why? This is not something that communists should do in modern conditions. "No!" – we declare! The desecration of Stalin is a work begun by the enemies of socialism, taken up by the revisionists within the USSR and continued by their descendants today. Stopping the anti-Stalinism campaign, washing away the dirt and perpetuating the memory of Stalin is a matter today. A task that must not be postponed!
So let's study Stalin's legacy, learn from Stalin and fight for Stalin! His cause is the cause of today’s generations, his memory is the struggle to cleanse socialism of myths and dirty lies!
Long live the Generalissimo Soviet Union, great leader and teacher Comrade Stalin!
Happy 138th birthday of Joseph Vissarionovich, comrades!
“Why did my mother keep a portrait of Stalin? She was a peasant woman. Before collectivization, our family lived well. But at what cost did this come about? Hard work from dawn to dusk. And what prospects did her children have (she gave birth to eleven children!)? Become peasants best case scenario- artisans. Collectivization began. Ruin of the village. Flight of people to cities. And the result of this? In our family, one person became a professor, another became a plant director, a third became a colonel, and three became engineers. I don’t want to use evaluative expressions “good” and “bad.” I just want to say that in that era there was an unprecedented rise in the history of mankind for many millions of people from the very bottom of society to become craftsmen, engineers, teachers, doctors, artists, officers, writers, directors, etc.”
Alexander Zinoviev,
satirist, formal logician,
social philosopher, WWII veteran
Supreme Commander
138 years ago, on December 18, 1878, Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili was born. Comrade Stalin is a prominent revolutionary, ally of V.I. Lenin, one of the creators Soviet state, who led it from the 1920s until his death in 1953. The milestones of his biography are the stages of formation and development of the USSR: forced industrialization, collectivization Agriculture, cultural revolution, building a socialist society. Under the leadership of Stalin, our country won Great Victory over Nazi Germany and turned into a world superpower, opening the way to space for humanity.
Even before I.V. On July 19, 1941, Stalin became the head of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, and three weeks later (August 8) he became the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, he actually took over the leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Since at the same time I.V. Stalin headed the State Defense Committee, the Council People's Commissars USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), he was able to subordinate all links of state and political life to the decision main task, facing the country - to defeat Hitler's Germany and her allies. During the war years, Stalin's characteristic leadership style emerged, which played a significant role in the implementation of this task.
Collection of information
First of all, from the very first day of the war, Stalin tried to get the most reliable information about the situation on the Soviet-German border, which has turned into a huge front from Black to Barents Sea. For this purpose, Stalin maintained telephone contact with the commanders of military districts and party leaders of the border republics. At the same time, he sent the most important battles representatives of the highest military command.
Soon a steady rhythm of providing Stalin with operational information about the progress of hostilities developed. Three times a day, Stalin listened carefully to the detailed reports of his employees General Staff. As the then chief of the operations department of the General Staff, S.M., recalled. Shtemenko, “the first of them took place at 10–11 o’clock in the afternoon, usually by telephone. This fell to my lot... Between 10 and 11 o'clock, rarely a little later, the Supreme Commander himself called us. Sometimes he said hello, but more often he asked directly: “What’s new?” Boss Operational management reported the situation, moving from table to table with the telephone receiver to his ear. In all cases, the report began from the front, where fighting were of the most intense nature, and, as a rule, from the most acute area. The situation was presented sequentially, for each front separately, in any form.”
“If our troops were successful, the report was usually not interrupted. All that could be heard on the phone was the occasional cough and smacking of lips, characteristic of a smoker sucking on a pipe. Stalin did not allow any army to be omitted from the report, even if nothing important happened in its zone during the night. He immediately interrupted the speaker with a question: “What does Kazakov have?” Sometimes during the report the Supreme Commander-in-Chief gave some instructions to be transmitted to the front. It was repeated out loud, and one of the deputy heads of the department immediately wrote everything down verbatim, and then formalized it in the form of an order or directive.”
In the evening, at 16-17 hours, according to Shtemenko, Stalin “was reported to by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff. And at night we went to Headquarters with the final report for the day. Before that, the situation was prepared on maps at a scale of 1:200000 separately for each front, showing the position of the troops up to the division, and in other cases up to the regiment. Even knowing thoroughly where, what happened during the day, we still spent 2-3 hours before each trip carefully understanding the situation, contacting front commanders and chiefs of staff, clarifying with them individual details of ongoing or just planned operations, consulting and through them they checked the correctness of their assumptions, considered the requests and applications of the fronts, and last hour edited draft directives and orders of Headquarters prepared for signature.”
As Shtemenko emphasized, “the reports of the General Staff at Headquarters had their own strict order... Our report began with a description of the actions of our troops over the past 24 hours. No preliminary recordings were used. The situation was known from memory, and it was reflected on the map. At the end of the table, in the corner, stood a large globe. I must note, however, that in hundreds of times I have visited this office, I have never seen it used when considering operational issues. Talk about directing the actions of the fronts around the globe is completely groundless.”
According to Shtemenko, during daily reports on the situation at the front by speakers from the General Staff, “fronts, armies, tank and paramilitary corps were called by the names of commanders and commanders, divisions by numbers.” This order was established because Stalin knew exactly from memory the names of all the commanders of the fronts, armies, and corps. He knew the names of many division commanders.
Recognizing the importance of accurate and timely information for adoption right decisions, Stalin reacted sharply to the slightest delays in reports from the field. In his memoirs, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky talked about how he once hesitated in submitting a report to Stalin on the results of the operation and received a sharp reprimand in writing for this. Stalin wrote: “ Last time I warn you that if you ever allow yourself to forget about your duty to Headquarters, you will be removed from the post of Chief of the General Staff and recalled from the front.”
It seemed that Stalin's reproaches were excessively harsh, but Vasilevsky justified him. The marshal wrote: “Stalin was so categorical not only in relation to me. He demanded similar discipline from every representative of the Headquarters... I believe that the absence of any leniency towards the representative of the Headquarters was justified by the interests of the operational management of the armed struggle. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief very closely followed the course of front-line events, quickly responded to all changes in them and firmly kept control of the troops in his hands.”
Stalin was no less demanding regarding the quality of information received. According to Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, “to go to a report to Headquarters, to Stalin, say, with maps on which there were at least some “white spots”, to provide him with indicative data, and even more so exaggerated data, was impossible. I.V. Stalin did not tolerate answers at random; he demanded exhaustive completeness and clarity. He had some special instinct for weak points in reports and documents, he immediately discovered them and strictly punished those responsible for unclear information. Possessing a tenacious memory, he remembered well what was said, and did not miss an opportunity to sharply reprimand for what was forgotten. Therefore, we tried to prepare staff documents with all the care that we were capable of in those days.”
Stalin was harsh on those who were careless in presenting facts that needed to be verified. Marshal of Artillery N.D. Yakovlev recalled: “Stalin did not tolerate it when the true state of affairs was hidden from him.”
Meanwhile, as noted by S.M. Shtemenko, the real scourge in the work of the General Staff was the desire of the commanders of active formations to distort the real state of affairs at the front, either downplaying the size of defeats or exaggerating their successes. He wrote how “the chief of staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front was removed from his post for not reporting to the General Staff about the enemy’s seizure of one important settlement in the hope that he can be returned."
Development of solutions
Only after receiving reliable information did Stalin begin to develop solutions to further progress military operations. In a conversation with writer K. Simonov G.K. Zhukov recalled that Stalin “had his own method of mastering the specific material of the upcoming operation... Before starting preparations for this or that operation, before calling front commanders, he met in advance with General Staff officers - majors, lieutenant colonels, who were overseeing the relevant operational areas. He called them one by one to report, worked with them for one and a half, two hours, clarified the situation with each, understood it, and by the time of his meeting with the front commanders, by the time they set new tasks, he turned out to be so prepared that he sometimes surprised them his awareness... His awareness was not ostentatious, but real, and his preliminary work with the officers of the General Staff to clarify the situation before making future decisions was work in highest degree reasonable."
A.M. Vasilevsky recalled: “As a rule, a preliminary outline of a strategic decision and a plan for its implementation was developed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in narrow circle persons Usually these were some of the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the State Defense Committee, and from the military - the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of the General Staff and his first deputy. Often this work required several days. During its course, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, as a rule, conducted conversations, receiving necessary certificates and councils on issues under development, with commanders and members of military councils of the relevant fronts, with senior officials of the People’s Commissariat of Defense, with people’s commissars and especially with those in charge of one or another branch of the military industry.”
Stalin’s desire for collegiality in preparing decisions was confirmed by S.M. Shtemenko: “I must say that Stalin did not decide and generally did not like to decide important questions wars alone. He well understood the need for collective work in this complex area, recognized authorities on this or that military problem, took into account their opinions and gave each their due.” Placing the search for truth at the forefront, rather than the desire to prove that he was right, Stalin always gave in if his ideas were refuted by weighty arguments. Marshal of the Soviet Union I.Kh. Baghramyan wrote:
“Subsequently, I myself often had to talk with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, already in the role of front commander, and I became convinced that he knew how to listen to the opinions of his subordinates. If the performer firmly stood his ground and put forward compelling arguments to substantiate his position, Stalin almost always conceded.”
This opinion was confirmed by G.K. Zhukov: “By the way, as I became convinced over the long years of war, I.V. Stalin was not at all the kind of person to whom one could not pose pressing questions and with whom one could not argue or even firmly defend one’s point of view.” Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky witnessed a similar conversation with I.V. Stalin with G.K. Zhukov: “Stalin instructed Zhukov to carry out a small operation, it seems, in the area of the Mga station, in order to somehow alleviate the situation of the Leningraders. Zhukov argued that it was necessary major operation, only then the goal will be achieved. Stalin replied: “This is all good, Comrade Zhukov, but we do not have the means, we must take this into account.” Zhukov stood his ground: “Otherwise nothing will come of it. Desire alone is not enough.” Stalin did not hide his irritation, but Zhukov firmly stood his ground. Finally, Stalin said: “Go, Comrade Zhukov, think, you are free for now.” I liked the directness of Georgy Konstantinovich. But when we left, I said that, in my opinion, I shouldn’t have spoken so harshly to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Zhukov replied: “This doesn’t happen here yet.” He was right then: desire alone is not enough for military success.” Refuting the opinion of Stalin’s self-will, Zhukov wrote: “After Stalin’s death, a version appeared that he single-handedly made military-political decisions. We cannot agree with this. I already said above that if questions were reported to the Supreme Commander with knowledge of the matter, he took them into account. And I know of cases where he refused his own opinion before decisions made. This was the case, in particular, with the start of many operations.”
Stalin created the maximum favorable conditions for people to participate in collective intellectual creativity. By directing the movement of collective thought and giving the meeting participants the opportunity to speak out or express their attitude to the issue under discussion, Stalin contributed to the birth of the most balanced and profound decision. Marshal of Artillery N.D. Yakovlev recalled: “Work at Headquarters was characterized by simplicity and great intelligence. No ostentatious speeches, no raised tone, all conversations are in a low voice.”
People's Commissar of Armaments during the war D.F. Ustinov recalled how Stalin’s discussions took place: “For all his authority, severity, I would say, rigidity, he eagerly responded to the manifestation of reasonable initiative, independence, and valued independence of judgment. In any case, as far as I remember, he did not preempt those present with his remark, assessment, or decision. Knowing the weight of his words, Stalin tried for the time being not to reveal his attitude to the problem under discussion; more often than not, he either sat as if aloof, or walked almost silently around the office, so that it seemed that he was very far from the subject of the conversation, thinking about something of his own. And suddenly a short remark would be heard, sometimes turning the conversation into a new and, as it often turned out later, the only right direction.”
Stalin's analytical mind in action
Noting Stalin’s “great erudition” and “rare memory,” Zhukov drew attention to his “natural analytical mind.” Stalin's analytical skills amazed W. Churchill during negotiations in the Kremlin in August 1942. Then, in order to smooth out the painful impression of the Allies’ blatant violation of their promises to open a second front, the British Prime Minister informed Stalin about the secret plan for the Allied landing in North Africa called “Torch”. After Churchill and the US Ambassador to the USSR A. Harriman answered a number of questions, Stalin assessed this operation. According to Churchill, he gave “four reasons in favor of its implementation: firstly, in this way a blow would be struck in the rear of Rommel’s troops; secondly, it will intimidate Franco; thirdly, it will cause clashes between the Germans and the French in France; fourthly, it will bring war to Italy's doorstep. I was deeply impressed by this momentous statement. It indicated that the Russian dictator quickly and comprehensively realized the essence of the problem, which was previously completely unknown to him. Very few people alive could understand in a few minutes the goals of this operation, over which we have been poring over for several months. He appreciated all this with lightning speed.” According to Zhukov, Stalin “knew how to find the main link in strategic situation and, grasping it, counteract the enemy, carry out one or another major offensive operation... I.V. Stalin mastered the organization of front-line operations and operations of groups of fronts and directed them with full knowledge affairs, having a good understanding of large strategic issues. These abilities of I.V. Stalin as Commander-in-Chief was especially evident, starting from Stalingrad... Undoubtedly, he was a worthy Supreme Commander-in-Chief.”
In his memoirs, Vasilevsky cited the full directive for the commander of the Transcaucasian Front I.V. Tyulenev, which Stalin dictated on January 4, 1943, since the marshal found “it useful in the sense of assessing Stalin as a military figure, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who led the grandiose struggle of the Soviet Armed Forces.” Commenting on the content of the Stalinist directive, A.M. Vasilevsky explained the meaning of Stalin’s detailed directive this way: “Block the Germans’ exit from the Caucasus and cut off their formations, which only yesterday were brazenly climbing to the south, to Elbrus, to Georgia and Azerbaijan.” Vasilevsky emphasized: “There were many similar documents that came directly from Stalin and related to the solution of the most important operational-strategic issues during the war.”
Stalin more than once proposed solutions aimed at the most efficient use various genera troops. On July 10, 1944, he prepared a letter to the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front I.S. Konev, which said: “1. Tank armies and cavalry-mechanized groups should not be used for a breakthrough, but to develop success after the breakthrough. In the event of a successful breakthrough, tank armies should be introduced one day after the start of the operation, and cavalry-mechanized groups two days after the start of the operation, following the tank armies. 2. On the first day of the operation, assign feasible tasks to the infantry, since the tasks you have set are certainly too high.” According to Shtemenko, during the preparation of the so-called seventh strike of the Red Army (Yasso-Kishinev operation), the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front R.Ya. Malinovsky “reported that he could concentrate on each of the 22 km of the breakthrough front 220 guns of at least 76 mm caliber, that is, create a very high artillery density.
I.V. Stalin noticed that this was not enough, more was needed. Since it turned out that there were not enough resources to create a higher density in such a section at the front, it was proposed to reduce the breakthrough section to 16 km and thus achieve a density of 240 or even slightly more guns per kilometer. So high densities artillery was one of the guarantees of a reliable defeat of the enemy, quickly breaking his defenses and developing success in depth to the crossings on the Prut River in the direction of Focsani. Powerful blows on the defense of the Nazi ally should, as I.V. believed. Stalin, influence the policy of royal Romania and facilitate its exit from the war." Shtemenko noted that Stalin was “still initial stage developing an operation plan... pointed to political side affairs".
When preparing military operations, Stalin attached great importance psychological factor, and therefore developed large-scale operations to disinformation the enemy. A month and a half before the start of Operation Bagration, which was to become the main one in the summer campaign of 1944, Stalin took measures to mislead the German military command about the direction of the main attack. On May 3, Stalin signed an order to the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front: “In order to disinform the enemy, you are entrusted with carrying out operational camouflage measures. It is necessary to show a concentration of eight or nine people behind the right flank of the front rifle divisions, reinforced with tanks and artillery... The false staging area should be brought to life by showing the movement and location separate groups people, vehicles, tanks, guns and equipment of the area; place ZA guns in the locations where mock-ups of tanks and artillery are located, simultaneously marking the air defense of the entire area with the installation of ZA weapons and fighter patrols. By observing and photographing from the air, check the visibility and credibility of false objects.” A similar directive went to the 3rd Baltic Front.
Shtemenko noted: “The enemy immediately took these two baits. The German command showed great concern, especially in the southern direction. With the help of enhanced aerial reconnaissance, it persistently tried to establish what we were up to north of Chisinau, what our intentions were. The abandonment of tank armies in the southwestern direction was also a kind of disinformation. Enemy intelligence kept an eye on us and, since these armies did not move, concluded that, most likely, we would launch an offensive here. In fact, we were gradually preparing a tank attack in a completely different place.”
Grand defeat Nazi troops In Belarus, during the implementation of Operation Bagration, Stalin decided to use it to carry out an operation to disinformation the enemy on an unprecedented scale. According to former leader NKVD Department for the fight against Nazi saboteurs P.A. Sudoplatov, based on Stalin’s proposal, an order was issued, according to which intelligence officers “had to introduce German command misleadingly creating the impression active actions in the rear of the Red Army remnants German troops who were surrounded during our offensive. Stalin's plan was to trick the Germans into using their resources to support these units and "help" them make a serious attempt to break through the encirclement. The scope and boldness of the proposed operation made a great impression on us. I felt elation and at the same time anxiety: the new task went beyond the scope of previous radio games with the goal of misleading the enemy.” The captured German officers of the defeated Schernhorn group, converted by Soviet intelligence, sent to the German command false information about actions in the rear of the Red Army. According to Sudoplatov, “from August 19, 1944 to May 5, 1945, we conducted perhaps the most successful radio game with the German high command.”
Monitoring the implementation of decisions made
As Marshal of Artillery N.D. recalled. Yakovlev, Stalin “had enviable patience and agreed with reasonable arguments. But this is at the stage of discussing this or that issue. And when a decision had already been made on it, no changes were allowed.” Zhukov wrote: “Everything that was done through the Headquarters or the State Defense Committee was done in such a way that the decisions made by these high bodies began to be implemented immediately, and the progress of their implementation was strictly and steadily controlled personally by the Supreme Commander or, on his instructions, by other leading persons or organizations.” .
Many defense industry executives remember phone calls from Stalin during the war. Leading designer of artillery weapons, Colonel General V.G. Grabin recalled how in the fall of 1941, when the Germans stood near Moscow, Stalin called him and demanded a report on the execution production tasks. Then he said: “You are well aware that the situation at the front is very difficult. The Nazis are rushing to Moscow.
Under pressure from superior enemy forces, our troops are retreating with heavy fighting. Nazi Germany has a quantitative superiority in weapons. Regardless of this, we will defeat Nazi Germany. But in order to win with less bloodshed, you need to have more weapons in the near future. I beg you, do everything necessary and give as many guns as possible as soon as possible.”
During the second German offensive on Moscow in November 1941, Stalin sometimes communicated directly with the commanders of the armies defending Moscow. Rokossovsky, then commander of the 16th Army, was summoned to telephone conversation with Stalin soon after the Germans Once again pushed back our troops on the Istra sector of the front, and on this occasion the general had a “stormy conversation” with the front commander Zhukov. Rokossovsky recalled: “Walking to the apparatus, I imagined, under the impression of a conversation with Zhukov, what thunder awaited me now. In any case, I prepared for the worst. He picked up the phone and announced himself. In response I heard the calm, even voice of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. He asked what the current situation was at the Istra border. When reporting this, I immediately tried to talk about the planned countermeasures. But Stalin gently stopped me, saying that there was no need to talk about my events. This emphasized trust in the commander. At the end of the conversation, Stalin asked if it was hard for us. Having received an affirmative answer, he said that he understood this: “Please hold on for a while longer, we will help you...” Need I add that such attention from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief meant a lot to those to whom it was paid. And the warm, fatherly tone encouraged and strengthened confidence. Not to mention that by morning the promised help arrived in the army - a Katyusha regiment, two anti-tank regiments, four companies with anti-tank rifles and three battalions of tanks. Moreover, Stalin sent over 2 thousand Muscovites for replenishment.”
At the end of November, Stalin called Rokossovsky again. “He asked if I knew that enemy units had appeared in the Krasnaya Polyana area, and what measures were being taken to prevent them from reaching this point. Stalin especially emphasized that from Krasnaya Polyana the Nazis could begin shelling the capital with large-caliber artillery.” Rokossovsky informed Stalin about the measures he was taking, and Stalin, in turn, told the general that “Headquarters ordered the reinforcement of this sector with troops from the Moscow defense zone.”
At times, Stalin intervened in military operations when he saw that front commanders did not notice emerging threats from the enemy. Shtemenko reproduced in his memoirs Stalin’s directive of August 22, 1943 to the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin, which, in particular, said: “I am once again forced to point out to you the unacceptable mistakes that you repeatedly repeated during operations, and I demand that the task of eliminating the enemy’s Akhtyr group, as the most important task, was completed in the coming days. You can do this because you have enough funds. I ask you not to get carried away with the task of covering the Kharkov bridgehead from Poltava, but to focus all your attention on the real and specific task - the liquidation of the Akhtyrka enemy group, because without the liquidation of this enemy group, serious successes of the Voronezh Front became impossible.”
Stalin also restrained the “offensive” moods of Zhukov and Vasilevsky in early July 1944. During a meeting with Stalin on July 8, Zhukov spoke in favor of strengthening the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front in order to capture East Prussia and cut off the German Group North. Stalin objected. Zhukov recalled: “Are you in agreement with Vasilevsky? – asked the Supreme. “He also asks to strengthen it.” “No, we didn’t agree. But if he thinks so, then he thinks correctly,” Zhukov noted. Knowing full well the history and significance East Prussia for the Hitlerite leadership, Stalin replied: “The Germans will fight to the last for East Prussia. We might get stuck there. We must first liberate the Lviv region and eastern part Poland". Move offensive operation Soviet troops in October 1944 in East Prussia showed that Stalin was right.
"War is a severe test"
Stalin was acutely worried about the failures, and even more so the defeat of the Red Army. One of the serious defeats of 1942 was the defeat of the troops Crimean Front. A day after the start of the offensive in May 1942, the Germans broke through the front defenses. Sent to the front as a representative of Headquarters, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army and at the same time People's Commissar State control L.Z. Mehlis, in his report to Stalin, blamed the incident on front commander D.T. Kozlova. In his response to Mehlis, Stalin wrote: “You hold the strange position of an outside observer, not responsible for the affairs of the Crimean Front. This position is convenient, but it is completely rotten... You have not yet understood that you were sent to the Crimean Front not as State Control, but as a responsible representative of Headquarters. You demand that we replace Kozlov with someone like Hindenburg. But you cannot help but know that we do not have Hindenburgs in reserve. Your affairs in Crimea are not complicated, and you could handle them yourself. If you used attack aircraft not for side affairs, but against the enemy’s tanks and manpower, the enemy would not have broken through the front and the tanks would not have gotten through. You don't have to be the Hindenburg to understand this simple thing, sitting on the Crimean Front for two months.”
Meanwhile, the situation on the Kerch Peninsula was deteriorating. From May 17, rearguard battles began to allow our troops to evacuate from Crimea, but it was not possible to carry out the evacuation in an organized manner. The enemy captured almost all military equipment and heavy weapons of the Soviet troops. According to German general Butlar, in the battles on the Kerch Peninsula the Germans “captured 150 thousand prisoners, 1133 guns, 255 tanks and 323 aircraft.”
On June 3, the manager of the affairs of the Council of People's Commissars, Ya.E. Chadayev met Mehlis, who had flown to Moscow, in Stalin’s reception room. While Mehlis was arguing with Chadayev about the reasons for the defeat of our troops on the Kerch Peninsula, “Stalin appeared at the door. Mehlis jumped out of his seat. “Hello, Comrade Stalin! Allow me to report to you...” Stalin paused slightly, looked down at Mehlis for a moment and said with excitement in his voice: “Damn you!” And he immediately entered the office, slamming the door behind him. Mehlis slowly lowered his hands to his sides and turned to the window.”
The next day, June 4, Headquarters adopted a directive that was unmistakably Stalinist in style. It examined in detail the mistakes of the leadership of the Crimean Front. Front commander D.T. Kozlov, member of the Military Council, divisional commissar F.A. Shamanin, chief of staff of the front P.P. Eternal and a number of other commanders were removed from their positions, and Kozlov and Shamanin were demoted in rank. L.Z. Mehlis was removed from the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army and demoted to the rank of Corps Commissar.
General Kozlov tried to protest the decision made regarding him. Rokossovsky became a witness to his conversation with Stalin. Justifying himself, Kozlov said that “he did everything he could to take control of the situation, he made every effort...” Stalin calmly listened to him without interrupting. I listened for a long time. Then he asked: “Are you all?” - "Yes". “You see, you wanted to do everything you could, but you couldn’t do what you were supposed to do.” In response to these words, spoken very calmly, Kozlov began to talk about Mehlis, that Mehlis did not allow him to do what he considered necessary, interfered, put pressure on him, and he did not have the opportunity to command because of Mehlis as he considered necessary .
Stalin calmly stopped him and asked: “Wait, Comrade Kozlov! Tell me, who was your front commander, you or Mehlis?” - "I". - “So you commanded the front?” - "Yes". “Was everyone at the front required to carry out your orders?” – “Yes, but...” – “Wait. Mehlis was not the front commander? - “I wasn’t...” - “So you are the front commander, and Mehlis is not the front commander? So you should have been in command, not Mehlis, right?” – “Yes, but...” – “Wait. Are you the front commander? - “I did, but he didn’t let me command.” - “Why didn’t you call and inform?” “I wanted to call, but I didn’t have the opportunity.” - "Why?" “Mehlis was with me all the time, and I couldn’t call without him. I would have to make the call in his presence.” - "Fine. Why couldn’t you call in his presence?” Silent. “Why, if you believed that you were right and not him, why couldn’t you call in his presence? Obviously, you, Comrade Kozlov, were more afraid of Mehlis than the Germans?” “You don’t know Mehlis, Comrade Stalin,” exclaimed Kozlov. “Well, let’s say this is not true, Comrade Kozlov. I know Comrade Mehlis. (In 1924 - 30 Mehlis was Stalin’s assistant in the apparatus Secretary General Central Committee. – Approx. ed.). Now I want to ask you: why are you complaining? You commanded the front, you were responsible for the actions of the front, and you are being held accountable for this. It’s because you didn’t dare to pick up the phone and call, and as a result you failed the operation, that we punished you... I believe that everything was done correctly with you, Comrade Kozlov.”
When Kozlov left, Stalin turned to Rokossovsky and, saying goodbye to him, said: “That’s what interesting conversation, Comrade Rokossovsky." The marshal later recalled: “I left the office of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with the thought that I, a man who had recently taken over the front, had been given an objective lesson. Believe me, I tried to internalize it.”
In addition to Kozlov, during the war, many other military leaders were removed from their command posts for failures in troop leadership. As the war progressed, new commanders replaced them.
Before they took up their high positions, I.V. carefully looked at them. Stalin.
As S.M. recalled Shtemenko, in the summer of 1949, when he was at Stalin’s dacha, its owner began to talk about the reasons for the victory Soviet country over Hitler's Germany. Stalin said: “War is a severe test. She puts forward strong, brave, talented people. A gifted person will prove himself in a war in a few months, which takes years in peacetime. In the very first months of the war, we had remarkable military leaders who gained experience in the crucible of war and became real commanders.” According to Shtemenko, Stalin “began to list from memory the names of the commanders of fronts, armies, fleets, as well as partisan leaders.”
“And in the rear? - Stalin continued. – Could other leaders have done what the Bolsheviks did? To tear out entire factories and factories from under the enemy’s nose, transport them to bare places in the Volga region, beyond the Urals, to Siberia and to incredible harsh conditions set up production in a short time and give everything the front needs! We have our own generals and marshals from oil, metallurgy and transport, mechanical engineering and agriculture. Finally, there are the commanders of science."
Shtemenko wrote: “Slowly, without hesitation, he began to name the names of scientists, industrial and agricultural workers.” All these people, who fought on the war fronts or worked for the front in the rear, were, as a rule, personally acquainted with Stalin and participated in the meetings at which the Victory strategy was developed.
But Stalin also remembered those who did not sit in the Kremlin offices. According to Shtemenko, Stalin said: “Hundreds of thousands of people worked for Hitler, taken to Germany and turned, essentially, into slaves. And yet he was unable to sufficiently provide for his army. And our people did the impossible, accomplished a great feat. This was the result of the work of the communists to build the Soviet state and educate a new man... Here is another reason for our victory!”
Stalin knew that Victory would have been impossible without the heroic efforts of millions Soviet people. Stalin’s personal success as Supreme Commander-in-Chief was ensured by the selfless support of the Soviet people for Stalin’s course towards Victory over a cruel enemy.
Yuri Emelyanov,
historian, publicist
One of Stalin's most important decisions
The reform of 1947 was necessary, but the leadership decided not only to replace banknotes, but also to modernize the financial system itself, because the reform was carried out after the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944, at which agreements were adopted on the principles of the formation of exchange rates and on the creation of the IMF and the World Bank. jar. These agreements were not ratified by the USSR in December 1945, although our delegation actively participated, as far as it could, in the development of the final documents of the conference.
Why didn't Stalin sign the Bretton Woods agreements? Maybe even then he decided to create his own financial system, which began with the reform of 1947?
Stalin served as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Armed Forces from August 8, 1941 to September 4, 1945. From June 30, 1941, he was also chairman State Committee Defense, which concentrated in its hands the entirety of military and civil authority in USSR. In addition, Stalin served as Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.
Stalin showed the highest and manifestation of quality as a statist commander. It was none other than Stalin who gave our military leaders all the means of struggle: the most advanced weapons in the world, an abundance of ammunition, a stable rear, a healthy moral climate in society, national unity. Stalin was a commander, a military leader, the leader of the two hundred million army of our people. No commander in history has led such an army with such brilliant success.
During the war, Stalin could set the people a variety of ideological tasks - defense of the Fatherland, proletarian internationalism, democratic liberation mission, peaceful coexistence with Western countries. It would have been impossible to mobilize the country's forces to repel the invasion of 1941 without a powerful economy for such an army as the Armed Forces of the USSR. Only in the socialist period of our history, for example, was it possible to carry out such a set of measures as the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal, the development of the Northern sea route and the creation of the Northern Fleet. In the history of Russia, only Stalin and Peter the Great were able to transform Russia so dramatically. Neither the strategic nuclear fleet, nor the nuclear icebreaker fleet, nor the prospects for developing the riches of the North, nor Norilsk Nickel - nothing would have happened without the feat of our people during the Stalinist period. Same as without suppression Streltsy riot, Demidov's convicts, the hellish labor of the builders of St. Petersburg, there would not have been a Russian Empire - just like in the days Stalin's USSR Without the suppression of the Trotskyist conspiracy, without the Gulag, where “enemies of the people” were kept, who sought to throw our country back several decades (if not centuries), but who had gone through a “re-education school,” the existence of the USSR would not have been possible.
Of course, Stalin’s mistakes included the laying down of a series of heavy ships before the war, which were supposed to form the core of the USSR’s ocean-going fleet. However, the whole world suffered from confusion about the role of heavy artillery ships during that period, increasing the displacement, armament and armor of battleships. When the first clashes between the German and British fleets occurred in 1940, the Bismarck and the Hood were lost, the Soviet leadership realized that the era of dreadnoughts was becoming a thing of the past, and work on their construction was stopped.
However, speaking about the fleet, I would like to once again emphasize the efficiency Soviet power both the Russian state system of that era and Stalin’s personnel policy.
During the Great Patriotic War, outstanding military commanders-sailors worked in all USSR fleets: N.G. Kuznetsov, F.S. Oktyabrsky, V.F. Tributs, I.S. Isakov, A.G. Golovko. At the same time, the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov was 39 years old in 1941, the commander Northern Fleet Golovko is 36 years old, the commander of the Baltic Fleet Tributs is 40 years old.
Stalin's influence on the course of the war is revealed, first of all, by the history of military operations, the quality of the rear work, and the provision of military materials, weapons and ammunition to the army. They often say that Stalin, Zhukov, and Russians in general don’t know how to fight, the Germans were overwhelmed with corpses, their army is Asian, etc. Always judge by the result. For example, at the beginning of 1942, against 6.2 million German soldiers, we had 5.5 million in the Red Army, and 1942 ended with the Stalingrad Massacre of the Nazis.
Details of the Supreme's work help understand memories Soviet military leaders, party and economic leaders, designers of military equipment, as well as foreign politicians, scientists and cultural figures. They worked on their memoirs in different circumstances, which often dictated certain emphases to the authors. And yet, I would like to emphasize one detail common to them: everyone who personally came across Stalin in one way or another, and these are hundreds, thousands of the most different people from K.I. Chukovsky to A.A. Gromyko, did not doubt the greatness of Stalin and his enormous human charm. Even Chief Marshal Aviation Golovanov, who was one of Stalin’s closest collaborators during the war, and who was dismissed from service after the war, worked odd jobs and had difficulty feeding his family, left not just kind, but enthusiastic memories of Stalin. Our military leaders brought to us the truth, every word of which came no easier than a fortified enemy line - the truth about what kind of Supreme Commander Stalin was in the Great Patriotic War.
G. K. Zhukov, four times Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief: “Intelligence and talent allowed Stalin to master operational art so much during the war that, calling front commanders to him and talking with them on topics related to the conduct operations, he showed himself as a person who understood this no worse, and sometimes better, than his subordinates. At the same time, in a number of cases he found and suggested interesting operational solutions.”
K.K. Rokossovsky, Marshal of the Soviet Union and Marshal of Poland, twice Hero of the Soviet Union: “For me, Stalin is great and unattainable. He is a giant to me."
A.M. Vasilevsky, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Chief of the General Staff: “In my deep conviction, Stalin is the most powerful and colorful figure strategic command. He successfully led the fronts and was able to exert significant influence on the leading political and military leaders of the allied countries. Stalin possessed not only an enormous natural intelligence, but also surprisingly great knowledge.”
M. E. Katukov, Marshal armored forces, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, commander of the 1st Guards tank army: “For us, front-line soldiers, the name of Stalin was surrounded by boundless respect. All the most sacred things were associated with this name - the Motherland, faith in victory, faith in the wisdom and fortitude of our people, in the party.”
L.I. Pokryshkin, three times Hero of the Soviet Union, air marshal: “I was raised by Stalin and I believe that if we had been led by weak people during the war, we would have lost the war. Only Stalin’s strength and intelligence helped him survive in such a situation.”
Of course, Stalin had human shortcomings: hot temper, suspicion, intolerance to other people's opinions. Sometimes these qualities helped him in his work, sometimes vice versa. And is it possible to maintain complete impartiality, objectivity, and avoid irritation, when faced every day with dozens of very different people, with their opinions, ambitions, temperament, pressure? One might think that Stalin was surrounded throughout his life only by holy dean fathers, sinless, innocent and defenseless.
Stalin won the Great Patriotic War. Under his wise leadership—it was he who was responsible for the final option in making one or another strategic decision—our Soviet people were able to defeat the hated enemy.
Stalin served as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Armed Forces from August 8, 1941 to September 4, 1945. From June 30, 1941, he was also the chairman of the State Defense Committee, which concentrated in his hands all the military and civil power in the USSR. In addition, Stalin served as Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. All these positions were not a formality, a flowery pathetic title, but solely reflected the essence of the work Stalin performed.
In the battles of Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Modern Age, to be a military leader meant to be a military leader, to literally lead regiments, to have not only, and not so much, a strategic, tactical outlook, but personal qualities: courage, physical strength. Such commanders were Alexander the Great, Caesar, Svyatoslav, Suvorov. However, at the turn of the 18th-19th centuries, a new type of commanders came to the fore - organizational commanders, statesman commanders. Such were Frederick the Great and Napoleon. They both had a lot talented generals: Seydlitz, Murat, Ney, Davout. However, all these generals acted based on the conditions created by Frederick and Napoleon: the moral uplift of the nation, economic development countries, diplomatic successes.
Stalin represented the highest and, apparently, unattainable manifestation of such a statist commander. How would Zhukov, Konev or Rokossovsky have performed under a Supreme Commander like Nicholas II? It was none other than Stalin who gave our military leaders all the means of struggle: the most advanced weapons in the world, an abundance of ammunition, a stable rear, a healthy moral climate in society, national unity, foreign policy cover. It was these factors that ultimately turned out to be decisive, since the Germans had no shortage of capable generals. However, the Nazi state and Hitler were unable to create the conditions for victory for the army, and without them, all German tactics remained, in Napoleon’s words, “fortification on the sand.” During the war, the USSR was a single military camp, which was pierced through and through by the will of Stalin. Stalin was a commander, a military leader, the leader of the two hundred million army of our people. No commander in history has led such an army with such brilliant success.
They also often say: “our people won the war.” However, the First World War Russian people couldn't win. One might also think that we are talking about the superiority of the Russians over the Germans. This is wrong! The Germans are warriors no worse than us, and, let’s be fair, workers too. What's the matter then?
Our ideology, which must be viewed not as a self-sufficient communist, but as a complex social-patriotic one, turned out to be much stronger and more flexible than German bourgeois nationalism. As a result, Stalin during the war could set the people a variety of ideological tasks - defense of the Fatherland, proletarian internationalism, a democratic liberation mission, peaceful coexistence with Western countries. Nazism, having driven the German people into a state of hysterical trance, failed to raise them even to defend the Fatherland, since it brought robbery and murder to the level of national idea, incompatible with the defense of the homeland. The German soldiers continued to be told about the Slavic subhumans, even when they began to be brutally beaten, and the superiority of Soviet military equipment and spirit became obvious to every corporal.
Exactly at moral superiority and consists of the expression “our people won the war,” however, if we take into account the source of this superiority, the phrase looks castrated without the addition of “under the leadership of Stalin.”
When we talk about the level of mobilization of the country, we, of course, also mean the opportunities that the socialist form of economy provided in this regard. Of course, life itself has proven this, socialist economy is not perfect and is not able to fully satisfy the needs of society. However, in relation to the Great Patriotic War, it should be said that a different form of economy would have been disastrous for the country. As is known, in Tsarist Russia, even during the war period, purchases of weapons and quartermaster equipment for the army were carried out by bidding. Moreover, even under the tsar, orders were carefully fulfilled only by state-owned enterprises. There has not been a single case where weapons or property ordered abroad or from private enterprises in Russia were completed in full and on time. Thus, during the First World War, rifles ordered in the USA to Remington and a number of others were only delivered at 15%, despite an advance payment in gold. A similar situation arose with the purchase of howitzers in Germany during the Russo-Japanese War.
Auctions held in Russia even during wartime were repeatedly postponed “due to the absence of those willing to bargain,” as a result of which the supply of the army turned into a real farce. You can't find another word.
General Kuropatkin, commander of the Manchurian Army in 1904-1905, reported to the General Staff that due to the shortage and disgraceful quality of uniforms, soldiers were forced to wear Chinese cotton jackets instead of overcoats, and Chinese conical ones instead of caps. straw hats, instead of boots - Chinese uls. Count A.A. Ignatiev bitterly called the Russian army “a crowd of ragamuffins.”
Of course, it would be impossible to mobilize the country’s forces to repel the invasion of 1941 on the basis of such an economy, such an army and such supplies. Only in the socialist period of our history, for example, was it possible to carry out such a set of measures as the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal, the development of the Northern Sea ways and creation of the Northern Fleet. In the history of Russia, only Stalin and Peter the Great were able to transform Russia so dramatically. Neither the strategic nuclear fleet, nor the nuclear icebreaker fleet, nor the prospects for developing the riches of the North, nor Norilsk Nickel - nothing would have happened without the feat of our people during the Stalinist period. Just as without the suppression of the Streltsy revolt, Demidov’s concentration camps, and the hellish labor of the builders of St. Petersburg, there would have been no Russian Empire. What right do we, who enjoy all this wealth today, have to condemn the generations that have passed this time for us? way of the cross?
Of course, Stalin’s mistakes included the laying down of a series of heavy ships before the war, which were supposed to form the core of the USSR’s ocean-going fleet. However, the whole world suffered from confusion about the role of heavy artillery ships during that period, increasing the displacement, armament and armor of battleships. When the first clashes between the German and British fleets occurred in 1940, the Bismarck and the Hood were lost, the Soviet leadership realized that the era of dreadnoughts was becoming a thing of the past, and work on their construction was stopped.
Speaking about the fleet, I would like to once again emphasize the effectiveness of Soviet power as the state system of Russia of that era, Stalin’s personnel policy. In the Russian fleet under the tsar, the promotion of officers was not determined by personal success or the education of commanders, but was carried out exclusively in turn. Studying foreign innovations and self-education were considered dangerous foolishness, bordering on freethinking. As a result, in the Russian fleet in the 19th and 20th centuries, command posts were occupied by elderly and ignorant admirals. The exceptions can easily be counted on the fingers of one hand.
During the Great Patriotic War, outstanding military commanders-sailors worked in all USSR fleets: N.G. Kuznetsov, F.S. Oktyabrsky, V.F. Tributs, I.S. Isakov, A.G. Golovko. At the same time, the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov in 1941 was 39 years old, the commander of the Northern Fleet Golovko was 36 years old, the commander of the Baltic Fleet Tributs was 40 years old.
During the war, military and government decisions were accepted without fanfare or fanfare. Many important meetings highest authorities, especially in initial period wars were not even recorded; a number of problems were resolved in a narrow circle of people, one on one, or in a telephone conversation.
Letters, directives, and other documents dictated or written by Stalin were immediately, without retyping, transferred to the adjacent room - the equipment room of a special communications center. Stalin dictated, as a rule, to leaders invited by specific issue. This joint creativity with marshals and people's commissars, who wrote under Stalin's dictation, helped to avoid further coordination with them and unnecessary bureaucracy. No typists, stenographers, or assistants were present; Stalin even brewed and poured tea for himself.
Today there are practically no photographs of Stalin during the war. “Stalin over the map”, “Stalin with the military”. All we have are a few pictures from conferences Anti-Hitler coalition, photo on the podium of the Mausoleum during the November 7, 1941 Parade and the Victory Parade.
Churchill, for example, has hundreds of war photographs: on an airplane, in his office, in the Kremlin, on the ruins of London, with officers, with ladies, with the king. The explanation is simple - Stalin had no time for that, and also emphasizes it once again genuine attitude to the external, formal side of the matter.
Stalin's influence on the course of the war is revealed, first of all, by the history of military operations, the quality of the rear work, and the provision of military materials, weapons and ammunition to the army. They often say that Stalin, Zhukov, and Russians in general don’t know how to fight, the Germans were overwhelmed with corpses, their army is Asian, etc. Always judge by the result. For example, at the beginning of 1942, against 6.2 million German soldiers, we had 5.5 million in the Red Army, and 1942 ended with the Stalingrad Massacre of the Nazis. The conclusion, in my opinion, is obvious.
Details of the work of the Supreme Commander help to understand the memories of Soviet military leaders, party and economic leaders, designers of military equipment, as well as foreign politicians, scientists and cultural figures. They worked on their memoirs in different circumstances, which often dictated certain emphases to the authors. And yet, I would like to emphasize one detail common to them: everyone who personally encountered Stalin in one way or another, and these are hundreds, thousands of very different people from K.I. Chukovsky to A.A. Gromyko, did not doubt the greatness of Stalin and his enormous human charm. Even Chief Marshal of Aviation Golovanov, who was one of Stalin’s closest collaborators during the war, and who was dismissed from service after the war, worked odd jobs and had difficulty feeding his family, left not just kind, but enthusiastic memories of Stalin.
And on the contrary, those who find themselves on the sidelines of the great achievements of our people do not know the real deal, whose worldview was formed not in the army or labor collectives, but in a sterile, decadent atmosphere high school, readily attack Stalin and his time.
Marshals and generals took up their pens when the Generalissimo was taken out of the Mausoleum, and Khrushchev gave the command to debunk him. As a result, scolding Stalin became not just good manners, but an indispensable condition for passing a book through the filters of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army.
The competent authorities interfered in the work of the authors even at the manuscript stage, not stopping at attempts to secretly check the texts of famous marshals and generals for loyalty to the new government.
The craze of military leaders for memoirs was dictated by an important circumstance - the power’s passion for rewriting history could erase from it not only Stalin, but also any of the marshals, so they naturally sought to “stake out” their place in history and secure their share of glory.
Of course, the most important source about Stalin’s work should have been the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov, who in 1941-1942 resolved most strategic and operational issues with Stalin one-on-one. However, Zhukov, being in disgrace, was forced to practically not cover Stalin’s role in the war, limiting his huge work to two or three pages dedicated to the Supreme. The enumeration of well-known figures and facts takes up hundreds of times in “Memories and Reflections.” more space, how true story about joint work with Stalin, which determined the fate of the war. This shortcoming was partially eliminated in individual interviews with Zhukov.
It is difficult to blame the marshal for his desire to publish his book, since there were those who wanted to completely erase Zhukov from the history of the Patriotic War. Stalin's political heirs, who mocked the Marshal of Victory, should be held accountable for this.
And even despite such conditions, our military leaders conveyed to us the truth, every word of which was given no easier than a fortified enemy line - the truth about what kind of Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin was in the Great Patriotic War.
G. K. Zhukov, four times Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief:“Intelligence and talent allowed Stalin to master the operational art so much during the war that, calling the front commanders to him and talking with them on topics related to the conduct of operations, he showed himself as a person who understood this no worse, and sometimes better than his own.” subordinates. At the same time, in a number of cases he found and suggested interesting operational solutions.”
K.K. Rokossovsky, Marshal of the Soviet Union and Marshal of Poland, twice Hero of the Soviet Union:“For me, Stalin is great and unattainable. He is a giant to me."
A.M. Vasilevsky, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Chief of the General Staff:“In my deep conviction, Stalin is the most powerful and colorful figure in the strategic command. He successfully led the fronts and was able to exert significant influence on the leading political and military leaders of the allied countries. Stalin possessed not only an enormous natural intelligence, but also surprisingly great knowledge.”
M. E. Katukov, Marshal of Armored Forces, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army:“For us, front-line soldiers, the name of Stalin was surrounded by boundless respect. All the most sacred things were associated with this name - the Motherland, faith in victory, faith in the wisdom and fortitude of our people, in the party.”
L.I. Pokryshkin, three times Hero of the Soviet Union, air marshal:“I was raised by Stalin and I believe that if during the war we were led by weak people, we would have lost the war. Only Stalin’s strength and intelligence helped him survive in such a situation.”
As for the numerous conversations about Stalin’s personality, about his habits, inclinations, character, the disclosure of this issue will remain outside the scope of the book. There are too many legends surrounding
Stalin. They say, for example, that Stalin was actually the son of the famous traveler Przhevalsky, and he, in turn, was the offspring of one of the great princes or the emperor himself. They say that Stalin killed Lenin, Krupskaya, his wife Nadezhda Alliluyeva, his friend Kirov, his friend Gorky, Frunze, that Stalin was an agent Tsarist secret police that had fused toes. Now, with the passage of time, when Stalin’s actions have long since turned into accomplishments, all this no longer plays a role.
Of course, Stalin had human shortcomings: hot temper, suspicion, intolerance to other people's opinions. Sometimes these qualities helped him in his work, sometimes vice versa. And is it possible to maintain complete impartiality, objectivity, and avoid irritation, when faced every day with dozens of very different people, with their opinions, ambitions, temperament, pressure? One might think that Stalin was surrounded throughout his life only by holy dean fathers, sinless, innocent and defenseless.
We must always remember that everything historical figures have human qualities. History is made by people. Sometimes they are hot-tempered, unfair, cruel, drunk, funny, but in the end, we judge them by their deeds. And ours historical figures We not only judge our military commanders, our leaders by their deeds, but we must also love them as our strict, sometimes unbearable, but fair fathers.
These names are closely connected by their great contribution to the Victory. Both were not Russian by birth, but, as is not uncommon in Russia, they became great Russian figures. Pole and Georgian.
And they respected each other. At the end of his life, when asked to denigrate the already deceased Stalin, Rokossovsky replied: “Stalin is a saint for me.” Khrushchev immediately removed him from his post as Deputy Minister of Defense.
Stalin addressed Rokossovsky by name and patronymic: “Konstantin Konstantinovich,” as a sign of deep respect for him. Almost no one from the leader’s entourage received such an honor.
According to legend, during a feast at a dacha in Crimea after the war, Stalin called Rokossovsky into the garden and quietly said to him: “I know that you served several years without guilt.” It hurts me to look into your eyes. You have all possible rewards. Please accept this award from me personally. He went to the rose bush and picked a large bouquet. He wiped the blood from the thorns of the roses from his palms with a handkerchief, handed the bouquet to Rokossovsky and returned to the hall. He stood on the veranda for a long time with a large bouquet...
Divisional Commander Rokossovsky was arrested in June 1937. He alerted the cavalry division and brought it into the field, despite the unfavorable weather forecast. Rain and frost led to the death of some horses and people. The investigation was also based on the testimony of a number of arrested colleagues. The court reviewed his case in 1939 and shortly before the war, Rokossovsky was released, reinstated in rank and appointed commander of a tank corps.
Rokossovsky's corps fought well near Moscow, and Stalin appointed Rokossovsky to the post of Commander of the army, which he himself formed.
Rokossovsky obeyed G.K. in the battles near Moscow. Zhukov. Despite their previous joint service, and Zhukov was previously a subordinate of Rokossovsky, Zhukov was sometimes rude to him. Rokossovsky suggested talking in a calm tone. Representatives of Glavpur, who were in the next room, reported to Stalin about this conflict. Stalin reprimanded Zhukov for his rudeness and he apologized to Rokossovsky.
And subsequently, smooth relations were established between Zhukov and Rokossovsky.
Stalin once, in the presence of Rokossovsky, scolded one army commander for unsuccessful army operations. He, justifying himself, blamed the representative of the Headquarters, who was preventing him from leading the army. Stalin asked the general if he had contact with Headquarters. He replied that there was a connection. Stalin: - We are punishing you for your indecisiveness; you should have called Headquarters and reported the situation.
Rokossovsky understood this as a lesson to him and repeatedly showed decisiveness when reporting to Stalin about different opinions when planning operations.
Rokossovsky was a master at deceiving the enemy. When advancing on Sukhinichi, Rokossovsky's 16th Army clearly did not have enough strength to capture the city. And Rokossovsky decided to deceive the Germans. The broadcast constantly reported on the advance of clearly superior forces of Rokossovsky's army, and reported on non-existent divisions. And the enemy believed and left Sukhinichi without a fight. In further battles, Rokossovsky was seriously wounded by a shell fragment.
Only in May 1942 did Konstantin Konstantinovich return to the army.
In July 1942, Rokossovsky was appointed commander of Bryansk, then Stalingrad fronts. The operation to encircle the Germans “Ring” was supposed to begin according to the plans of the Headquarters, approved by Stalin. But Rokossovsky asked Stalin to delay the start for four and a half days due to the unpreparedness of the front. And Stalin approved the postponement, completely trusting Rokossovsky.
Operation “Ring” was a complete success, Stalin called Rokossovsky and, firmly shaking his hand, thanked him: “You did great!”
IN Battle of Kursk Due to the skillful deployment of troops, the Germans were almost unable to break through the defenses of the Rokossovsky front, although neighboring fronts were broken through for tens of kilometers. And Rokossovsky was even able to help his neighbor Vatutin.
In May 1944, the plan for Operation Bagration in Belarus was discussed at Headquarters. And the opinion of Headquarters did not coincide with the opinion of Rokossovsky. He proposed launching two main strikes from the south and northeast, which contradicted the military doctrine of one main strike. Stalin insisted on one strike so as not to disperse the forces of the front. - Think for two hours, and then report your thoughts to Headquarters.
Two hours later, Rokossovsky repeated his plan again. Stalin noted the commander’s persistence and the thoughtfulness of the plan and approved it.
And the plan was carried out brilliantly. Rokossovsky was awarded the title of Marshal and Hero of the Soviet Union.
The front was uncontrollably rushing towards Berlin. But Stalin unexpectedly appointed Zhukov Commander of the First Belorussian Front, and Rokossovsky by the Second Belorussian Front. Stalin, apparently, was guided by geopolitics, the desire to take Berlin as early as possible, before the allies. And the cautious strategist Rokossovsky could not cope with the deadlines. Zhukov probably could. AND post-war development Europe largely depended on new borders. Now it is no longer possible to recognize Stalin’s plans at that time.
Rokossovsky's merits in the capture of Berlin are undeniable.
Have you forgotten how to ride a horse? Stalin asked Rokossovsky after the Victory.
You will have to command the Victory Parade.
The handsome Marshal on a magnificent horse was the decoration of the Parade.
Alexey Puzitsky