Battle of Prokhorovka. Great Tank Battle

N. S. Khrushchev in his memoirs describes the situation when he, together with Georgy Zhukov and the commander of the 5th Tank Army Rotmistrov, were driving in the vicinity of Prokhorovka. “In the fields one could see many destroyed tanks, both enemy and ours. There was a discrepancy in the assessment of losses: Rotmistrov said that he saw more destroyed German tanks, but I saw more of ours. Both, however, are natural. There were significant losses on both sides,” Khrushchev noted.

The calculation of the results showed that there were significantly more losses on the part of the Soviet army. Given the impossibility of maneuvering in a field crowded with armored vehicles, light tanks were unable to take advantage of their advantage in speed and, one after another, perished under long-range shells from enemy artillery and heavy combat vehicles.

Reports from commanders of tank units indicate large losses of personnel and equipment.

The 29th Tank Corps lost 1,033 people killed and missing, and 958 people were wounded. Of the 199 tanks that took part in the attack, 153 tanks burned out or were knocked out. Of the 20 self-propelled artillery units, only one remained on the move: 16 were destroyed, 3 were sent for repair.

The 18th Tank Corps lost 127 people killed, 144 people missing, and 200 people wounded. Of the 149 tanks that took part in the attack, 84 burned out or were knocked out.

The 2nd Guards Tank Corps lost 162 people killed and missing, and 371 people were wounded. Of the 94 tanks that took part in the attack, 54 burned out or were knocked out.

The 2nd Tank Corps, out of 51 tanks that took part in the counterattack, irretrievably lost 22, that is, 43%.

Thus, summing up the reports of the corps commanders, Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Tank Army lost 313 combat vehicles, 19 self-propelled guns and at least 1,466 people killed and missing.

The official data of the Wehrmacht differs somewhat from the above. Thus, according to reports from German headquarters, 968 people were captured; 249 Soviet tanks were knocked out and destroyed. The discrepancy in numbers refers to those combat vehicles that were able to leave the battlefield under their own power, and only then completely lose their combat effectiveness.

The Nazis themselves did not suffer large losses, losing no more than 100 pieces of equipment, most of which were restored. The very next day, judging by the reports of the commanders of the Adolf Hitler, Death's Head and Reich divisions, 251 pieces of equipment were ready for battle - tanks and self-propelled assault guns.

The vulnerability of Soviet tanks, so clearly revealed in the Battle of Prokhorovka, made it possible to draw appropriate conclusions and gave impetus to the reorientation of military science and industry towards the development of heavy tanks with a cannon firing over long distances.

The battle continued. The Oryol-Kursk section of the Central Front successfully resisted the Wehrmacht soldiers. In the Belgorod sector, on the contrary, the initiative was in the hands of the Germans: their offensive continued in a south-eastern direction, which posed a threat to two fronts at once. The site of the main battle was to be a small field near the village of Prokhorovka.

The choice of area for combat operations was carried out based on geographical features - the terrain made it possible to stop the German breakthrough and deliver a powerful counterattack by the forces of the Steppe Front. On July 9, by order of the command, the 5th Combined Arms and 5th Tank Guards Armies moved to the Prokhorovka area. The Germans advanced here, changing their attack direction.

Tank battle near Prokhorovka. Central battle

Both armies concentrated large tank forces in the village area. It became clear that an oncoming battle simply could not be avoided. On the evening of July 11, the German divisions began an attempt to attack the flanks, and our troops had to use significant forces and even bring in reserves to stop the breakthrough. On the morning of July 12, at 8:15, she launched a counteroffensive. This time was not chosen by chance - the Germans' aimed shooting was made difficult as a result of being blinded by the rising sun. Within an hour, the Battle of Kursk near Prokhorovka acquired a colossal scale. At the center of the fierce battle were approximately 1,000-1,200 German and Soviet tanks and self-propelled artillery units.

For many kilometers the grinding of colliding combat vehicles and the roar of engines could be heard. The planes flew in a whole “swarm”, resembling clouds. The field was burning, more and more explosions shook the ground. The sun was obscured by clouds of smoke, ash, and sand. The smell of hot metal, burning, and gunpowder hung in the air. Choking smoke spread across the field, stinging the soldiers’ eyes and preventing them from breathing. The tanks could only be distinguished by their silhouettes.

Battle of Prokhorovka. Tank battles

On this day, battles were fought not only in the main direction. South of the village, a German tank group attempted to penetrate our forces’ left flank. The enemy's advance was stopped. At the same time, the enemy sent about a hundred tanks to capture the heights near Prokhorovka. They were opposed by soldiers of the 95th Guards Division. The battle lasted three hours and the German attack ultimately failed.

How the Battle of Prokhorovka ended

At approximately 13:00, the Germans once again tried to turn the tide of the battle in the central direction and launched an attack on the right flank with two divisions. However, this attack was also neutralized. Our tanks began to push the enemy back and by evening they were able to push him back 10-15 km. The Battle of Prokhorovka was won and the enemy advance was stopped. Hitler's troops suffered heavy losses, their attacking potential on the Belgorod sector of the front was exhausted. After this battle, right up to the Victory, our army did not let go of the strategic initiative.

On July 12, 1943, Soviet troops repelled an attack by Nazi troops. In a wide field, near the village of Prokhorovka, two huge tank armies met, the total number of tanks exceeding 1,200 units. The battle lasted from morning to evening, and the Soviet troops won a difficult but confident victory.

This is how this battle is usually described in Soviet textbooks, and from there the description migrated to many Russian textbooks. What is most interesting is that there is not a word of untruth in the description itself. And what’s even more interesting is that if we take the meaning and not the individual words, we won’t find even a word of truth. Yes, the Soviet troops won, yes, the battle took place in the field, yes, the number of tanks exceeded 1,200 units, yes, all this is true, but... The Kursk Bulge was a section of the front curved towards the fascist troops, essentially a springboard for the Soviet army. Now let's figure out what a bridgehead is from the point of view of military science. The enemy can attack from 3 sides; defending a bridgehead is always very difficult, often completely impossible. That is, statically, strategically, the side with the bridgehead is at a disadvantage. But dynamically, tactically, it has a great advantage. It lies in the fact that you can attack from the bridgehead several points of the enemy’s defense, some even from the rear. In addition, the enemy must rearrange his formations in order to seize a bridgehead, since he cannot be ignored.


So, we have come to the correct and logical conclusion: the side with the bridgehead must either attack or mine the bridgehead and leave. Soviet troops did neither one nor the other. They decided to defend the Kursk Bulge, and, having exhausted the advancing German troops, defeat the enemy armies with a powerful counterattack, liberating a large territory from occupation. The Wehrmacht attack plan, in general terms, was known to the Soviet troops: the partisans intercepted it and handed it over to the Soviet leadership.

The Soviet defense consisted of three lines of trenches, bunkers and bunkers (long-term camouflaged firing points). The Germans were supposed to attack from the south and north. However, on July 4, the day before the offensive, an order came from Berlin: immediately send two panzer divisions (tank divisions) to Italy, where Mussolini’s troops suffered defeat after defeat from local units of the Italian Resistance. A light tank division was recalled from the northern direction of the attack, reinforced by a repair brigade (the way to Italy is long, and after 3-4 days a repair brigade was supposed to approach the attacking troops from another front) and a tank division (mainly PZ-IV) from the southern direction attacks. On the night of the 5th, Soviet troops conducted artillery shelling of German positions. They shot mainly at the bushes, the losses of the fascist troops were minimal, but the German officers realized that the Soviet troops knew about the upcoming offensive. Taking this into account, as well as the sending of two panzer divisions to Italy, many were inclined to postpone the offensive. However, early in the morning an order was received: to begin the offensive according to a pre-approved (known to the Soviet troops) plan.

The Germans assembled a little more than a thousand tanks on the Kursk Bulge (PZ-III, PZ-IV, PZ-V “Panther” and PZ-VI “Tiger”). PZ-I and PZ-II, which the Germans themselves called “cardboard boxes,” can be ignored. There were cases when a bullet from a machine gun, fired at point-blank range, pierced the frontal armor of this tank, killed the tank driver, pierced the armor of the tank from behind and killed a German infantryman running behind the tank. After sending two divisions to Italy, the Germans were left with approximately 1,000 tanks. All “Panthers”, numbering 250 units, were assembled in the northern direction into a separate tank corps. "Tigers", numbering 150, stood in the southern direction. About 600 PZ-III and PZ-IV and 50 “Elephants”, or, as they were otherwise called, “Ferdinads” were concentrated in approximately equal numbers on both directions of the offensive. It was assumed that the medium tanks of the northern corps would attack first. Three hours later, the southern corps is attacked, also with the forces of medium tanks PZ-III and PZ-IV. At this time, the “Panthers” march around the positions of the Soviet troops and hit them in the flank. And when the Soviet command decides that the main offensive is coming from the north, and the southern direction is just a diversionary maneuver, the SS panzer divisions will appear on the scene. In total, Germany had 4 panzer-SS divisions, three of them were stationed in the southern direction of the Kursk Bulge.

As a result of two armored divisions leaving for Italy, the offensive was later than planned and the northern and southern corps struck simultaneously. Many of the Panthers assembled near Kursk had recently come off the production line and had certain flaws. Since the repair crew had left, and the majority of the tankers had not driven such vehicles before, about 40 “Panthers” were unable to take part in the battle for technical reasons. Light tanks were supposed to go in front of the Panther corps, they were supposed to reconnoiter the road for the main strike force in the northern direction. The light tank division was also sent to Italy; there was not enough strength for the initial strike, let alone for reconnaissance. As a result, the Panthers stumbled upon a minefield, from 50 to 70 vehicles were disabled. After about 150 of the 250 vehicles remained, the command decided to abandon the plan of outflanking and attacking the flank with the Panthers; they were forced to attack the Soviet positions head-on. As a result, in the northern direction the Germans did not even take the first line of defense out of three. What happened in the south?

Since the division, consisting of PZ-IV, was sent to Italy, the Panzer-SS divisions had to not wait for the decisive moment, but attack openly from the very first day of the operation. In the southern direction, the attack of German troops was extremely successful; two lines of Soviet defense were broken, albeit with fierce fighting, albeit with heavy losses, but they were broken. The third line was still defending. If it had fallen, the division's panzers would have literally crushed the northern lines of defense, attacking them from the rear. The troops of the neighboring Soviet fronts, in particular Steppe, were noticeably weaker than the armies defending the Kursk Bulge; in addition, if successful here, the Germans were ready to attack along the entire front; it can be argued that victory in the Battle of Kursk would have confronted the Soviet troops with a difficult task . The Germans could advance on Moscow, attack Stalingrad, or simply move straight to Voronezh and Saratov, in order to cut the Volga there and create a defensive position in the rear of the Soviet troops.

On July 10, the Germans reached the third line of defense of the Soviet troops. The units defending the third line of northern defense were removed and hastily thrown to the south. The Germans in the south initially attacked in the area of ​​​​the town of Oboyan, then transferred the main attack to the Soviet defense section passing through the Psel River. It was here on July 12 that two Soviet armies, the 5th Tank and the 5th Combined Arms Guards, attacked three German Panzer-SS divisions. The Soviet tank army, according to its staff, consisted of 4 divisions. Each division has 200 tanks. The combined arms army also had a tank division. In total, taking into account the forces defending the area near Prokhorovka, the USSR concentrated about 1,200 tanks on this section of the front. That is why all textbooks say that MORE than 1200 units of equipment took part in the battle - 1200 from the Soviet Union plus tanks from the Wehrmacht. Let's figure out how many tanks the Germans had.

The German panzer division consists of 10 companies, which are united into 3 battalions (three companies each) and a separate company. The first battalion consisted of light PZ-I and PZ-II and performed mainly reconnaissance functions. The second and third battalions formed the main striking force (PZ-III and PZ-IV). The 10th separate company was equipped with “panthers” and “tigers”. Each company had 10 units of equipment, for a total of 120 tanks per division. Panzer-SS divisions consisted of 150 tanks. According to reports from German officers, by July 12, on the eighth day of the offensive, between 30% and 50% of the personnel and equipment remained in the troops. In total, by the time the battle of Prokhorovka began, the Panzer-SS corps consisted of about 180 tanks. This is approximately 6.5 times less than the number of Soviet tanks.

If the Great Tank Battle had taken place in an open field, then the fully equipped Panzer-SS divisions would not have stood up to the number of Soviet tanks, but the fact is that the place of the battle, which took place between the village of Prokhorovka and the Udarnik collective farm, was limited, on the one hand, by a bend of the Psel River, and with another railway embankment. The width of the field was from 6 to 8 kilometers. According to military science, the distance between advancing tanks should be about 100 meters. When reduced by half, the effectiveness of the offensive increases by one and a half times, and losses by three. The battlefield was not only narrow, but also indented by ravines and streams. Therefore, we can safely say that no more than 150 units of equipment took part in the battle at the same time. Despite the enormous numerical superiority of the Soviet troops, the battle was fought almost one-on-one. The difference was that the reserves of the Wehrmacht, unlike the reserves of the Headquarters, were very limited.

On the German side, only three panzer-SS divisions took part in the battle (there were 4 such divisions in total): “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”, “Das Reich” and “Totencopf” (“Death’s Head”). The battle lasted from morning to evening, Soviet troops lost about 900 tanks, the Panzer-SS Corps about 150, 6 times less. In the evening, the 30 remaining German tanks, seeing the hopelessness of further battle, retreated. 300 Soviet tanks did not dare to pursue them.

Thus ended the Great Tank Battle.

Strengths of the parties Losses Audio, photo, video on Wikimedia Commons

Battle of Prokhorovka- a battle between units of the German and Soviet armies during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk. It happened on July 12, 1943 on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge (Belgorod direction) in the Voronezh Front, in the area of ​​Prokhorovka station on the territory of the Oktyabrsky state farm (Belgorod region of the RSFSR). Some representatives of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces consider it one of the largest battles in military history, with the use of armored forces.

Direct command of the tank formations during the battle was carried out by: Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov from the Soviet side and SS Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser from the German side.

Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of Soviet troops and gain operational space, and Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.

Encyclopedic YouTube

• 1 / 5

  Initially, the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the Yakovlevo-Oboyan operational line. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and Army Group Kempf went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, at position 6- On the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions to the 1st and 7th Guards armies. On July 6, two counterattacks were launched against the advancing Germans from the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki (northern) - Kalinin area by the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repelled by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

  Strengths of the parties

  Traditionally, Soviet sources indicate that about 1,500 tanks took part in the battle: about 800 from the Soviet side and 700 from the German side (eg TSB). In some cases, a slightly smaller number is indicated - 1200.

  Many modern researchers believe that the forces brought into the battle were probably significantly smaller. In particular, it is indicated that the battle took place in a narrow area (8-10 km wide), which was limited on one side by the Psel River and on the other by a railway embankment. It is difficult to introduce such significant masses of tanks into such an area.

  It must be said that the overestimation of enemy forces also took place at the preliminary stage. So Shtemenko S. M. points out in his work: “ By April 8, the enemy concentrated 15-16 tank divisions with 2,500 tanks against the Voronezh and Central Fronts. ... On April 21, N.F. Vatutin already counted up to 20 infantry and 11 tank divisions just in front of the Voronezh Front in the Belgorod region.“G.K. Zhukov assesses the situation more realistically. We read from him: " In the Battle of Kursk, the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, as I have already said, were somewhat superior to the enemy in strength and means. ... in people - 1.4 times, in guns and mortars - 1.9 times, in tanks - 1.2 times, in airplanes - 1.4 times. However, placing the main emphasis on tank and motorized troops, the German command grouped them in narrow areas..."There is a version that the command of the Voronezh Front also tried to group tank forces near Prokhorovka.

  Germany

  From the western direction, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (2 SS tanks) was advancing on Prokhorovka, while the SS division “Adolf Hitler” was operating in the zone between the Psel River and the railway, and from the southern direction - the 3rd Panzer Corps (3 tanks) . Known for the presence of tanks and assault guns without self-propelled guns: Grille, Wespe, Hummel and Marder, the data for which is being clarified, in the divisions of 2 SS Tank Tank as of the evening of July 11 and 3 Tank Tank as of the morning of July 12 is indicated in the table.

  The strength of units and formations of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps 4 TA and the 3rd Panzer Corps AG "Kempf" on July 11, 1943

  	Pz.II	Pz.III 50/L42	Pz.III 50/L60	Pz.III 75 mm	Pz.IV L24	Pz.IV L43 and L48	Pz.VI Tiger	T-34	StuG III	Bef.Pz. III	Total tanks and StuG
  2nd SS Panzer Corps
  Td Leibstandarte-SS “Adolf Hitler” (at 19.25 11.07)	4	-	5	-	-	47	4	-	10	7	77
  Td SS “Das Reich” (at 19.25 11.07)	-	-	34	-	-	18	1	8	27	7	95
  TD SS Totenkopf (at 19.25 11.07)	-	-	54	-	4	26	10	-	21	7	122
  2nd SS Panzer Corps, total	4	-	93	-	4	91	15	8	58	21	294
  3rd Tank Corps
  6th Tank Division (on the morning of July 11)	2	2	11	?	-	6	-	-	-	2	23 (?)
  7th Tank Division (on the morning of July 12)	-	-	24	2	1	9	-	-	-	3	39
  19th Tank Division (on the morning of July 12)	-	-	7	4	-	3	-	-	-	1	15
  503rd separate heavy tank battalion (on the morning of July 11)	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	-	-	-	23
  228th separate battalion of assault guns (on the morning of July 12)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	-	19
  3rd Tank Corps, total	2	2	42	6	1	18	23	-	19	6	119

  It should be noted that the Panther tanks did not take part in the Battle of Prokhorovka on July 12, continuing to operate as part of the Greater Germany division in the Oboyan direction. In the post-war press, instead of the company of captured T-34 tanks that actually participated in the battle near Prokhorovka (8 units as part of the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich"), Panther tanks were indicated. About the “Panthers” allegedly operating against his 5th Guards. TA, said P. A. Rotmistrov.

  USSR

  Commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army, Representative of the Supreme High Command Headquarters Vasilevsky A. M. - until 07/14/43. From July 14, Zhukov G.K. was already in charge of coordinating the actions of the front with Headquarters.

  The Soviet group included the following forces:

  • 2nd Air Army (2nd VA, Lieutenant General of Aviation Krasovsky S.A.);
  • 5th Guards Army (5th Guards A, Lieutenant General Zhadov A.S.);
  • 5th Guards Tank Army (5th Guards TA, Lieutenant General T/V Rotmistrov P.A.) consisting of:
    • 18th Tank Corps (18 Tank Corps, Major General T/V Bakharov B.S.), 148 tanks:

  Subdivision	T-34	T-70	Mk IV
  110th Tank Brigade (110th Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel M. G. Khlyupin)	24	21
  170th Tank Brigade (170 Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Tarasov V.D.)	22	17
  181st tank brigade (181st brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Puzyrev V.A.)	24	20
  36th Guards Separate Heavy Tank Breakthrough Regiment (36th Guards Separate TPP)	0	0	20

  32nd Motorized Rifle (32nd MSB Colonel I. A. Stukov).

  • • 29th Tank Corps (29 Tank Corps, Major General T/V Kirichenko I.F.), 192 tanks and 20 self-propelled guns:

  Subdivision	T-34	T-70	SU-122	SU-76
  Units of equipment combat-ready and temporarily under repair as of July 11
  25th Tank Brigade (25th Tank Brigade, Colonel Volodin N.K.)	26	32
  31st tank brigade (31st brigade, Colonel Moiseev S.F.)	32	38
  32nd Tank Brigade (32nd Tank Brigade, Colonel Linev A.A.)	64	0
  1446th self-propelled artillery regiment (1146 glanders)			12	8

  53rd Motorized Rifle (53rd MSB, Lieutenant Colonel Lipichev N.P.). 1529th heavy self-propelled artillery regiment SU-152 (1529 tsap. The regiment, consisting of 11 vehicles out of 12, arrived at the site only in the evening of July 12 without shells. Did not take part in the tank battle on July 12).

  • • 5th Guards Mechanized Corps (5th Guards Mk, Major General T/V Skvortsov B.M.)

  Subdivision	T-34	T-70	SU-122	SU-76
  10th Guards Mechanized Brigade (10th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel Mikhailov I.B.)	29	12
  11th Guards Mechanized Brigade (11th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel N.V. Grishchenko)	42	22
  12th Guards Mechanized Brigade (11th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel Borisenko G. Ya.)
  24th Guards Separate Tank Brigade (24th Guards Detachment Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Karpov V.P.)	51	0
  1447th self-propelled artillery regiment (1147 glanders)			12	8

  • 5th Guards The TA was reinforced by formations that became part of it from July 10:
    • 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps (2nd Guards Tank Corps, Colonel Burdeyny A.S.),

  Subdivision	T-34	T-70	Mk IV
  Units of equipment combat-ready and temporarily under repair as of July 11, units
  4th Guards Mechanized Brigade (4th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel Brazhnikov A.K.)	28	19
  25th Guards Mechanized Brigade (25th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Bulygin S.M.)	28	19
  26th Guards Mechanized Brigade (26th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Nesterov S.K.)	28	14
  47th Guards Separate Breakthrough Tank Regiment (47th Guards Separate Tank Division, Lieutenant Colonel M. T. Shevchenko)	0	0	21

  • • 2nd Tank Corps (2nd Tank Corps, Major General T/V Popov A.F.):
      • 26th Tank Brigade (26 Tank Brigade, Colonel Piskarev P.V.) (as of 07/11/43 T-34 1 1 unit + 7 under repair and T-70 33 units + 2 under repair)
      • 99th Tank Brigade (99 Tank Brigade, Colonel L. I. Malov),
      • 169th Tank Brigade (169 Tank Brigade, Colonel I. Ya. Stepanov).
  The state of the equipment and support of the 5th Guards Tank Army at 17:00 on July 11, 1943

  Combat vehicles	29 tk	18 tk	2 tk	2nd Guards Ttk	5th Guards mk	army units	Total
  T-34	120	68	35	84	120	36	463
  T-70	81	58	46	52	56	8	301
  Mk IV	-	18	4	3	-	-	25
  SU-122	12	-	-	-	10	-	22
  SU-76	8	-	-	-	7	-	15
  Total tanks and self-propelled guns	221	144	85	139	193	44	826
  On the way to the station Prokhorovka	13	33	-	-	51	4	101
  Under repair	2	6	9	-	1	6	24
  Total armored units	236	183	94	139	245	54	951

  G. A. Oleynikov, as of July 10, has 790 tanks in the 5th Guards Tank Army - 260 T-70, 501 T-34, 31 Mk IV Churchill (modifications Churchill IV). And 40 (two regiments) SU-122 self-propelled assault howitzers and light infantry support assault guns based on the T-70 SU-76.

  Rotmistrov himself assessed the amount of equipment as follows: “ The 5th Guards Tank Army was reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky and 2nd Tank Corps, 1529th Self-Propelled Artillery, 1522nd and 1148th Howitzer, 148th and 93rd Cannon Artillery Regiments, 16th and 80th guards mortar regiments. In general, in our army with attached tank formations there were about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns.»

  The assessment of the forces of the parties very much depends on the geographical scope of the battle. In the area of ​​the Oktyabrsky state farm, the 18th and 29th tank corps were advancing - a total of 348 tanks.

  Plans of the parties

  1. The enemy in the Belgorod direction, having brought large forces of tanks into battle, is trying to develop success in the north. direction - to Oboyan, Kursk (up to 400 tanks) and to the east. direction - to Aleksandrovsky, Skorodnoye, Stary Oskol (up to 300 tanks).

  To the commander of the 29th Tank Tank, Lieutenant General T. Kirichenko

  1. The task of the corps is the same...
  2. Start of the attack - 8.30 July 12, 1943. Artillery preparation begins at 8.00.
  3. I authorize the use of the radio from 7.00 on July 12, 1943. Commander of the 5th Guards. TA Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov

  2 SS tanks defeat the enemy in the south. Prokhorovka and thereby creates the preconditions for further advancement through Prokhorovka. Division assignments:

  Division "MG" go on the offensive from the bridgehead at dawn, capture the heights of the north-east. and first of all go to the road Prokhorovka, Kartashevka. Take control of the river valley Psel attacked from the southwest, securing the left flank of the AG division.

  The “AG” division, holding the occupied line on the left flank, occupied Storozhevoye and the forest to the north, the branch of the “Stalinskoe” state farm, etc. on the right flag. Pits, as well as heights of 2 km east. With the onset of a threat from the river valley. Psel, together with MG units, captured Prokhorovka and height 252.4.

  Division "R", holding the achieved lines on the right flank, occupy Vinogradovka and Ivanovka. After capturing the right-flank units of the AG division Storozhevoye and the forest to the north, using their success, move the main efforts in the direction of the heights of the southwest. Right-handed. Hold the new line of Ivanovka, the heights of the southwest. Right, height 2 km east. Sentry (lawsuit).

  Progress of the battle

  There are different versions of this battle.

  The first clash in the Prokhorovka area occurred on the evening of July 11. According to the recollections of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17 o’clock he, together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by two tank brigades.

  At 8 am the next day, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18th, 29th, 2nd and 2nd Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

  At the beginning of the battle, the Soviet tank crews gained some advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. Very soon the battle formations were mixed. The high density of the battle, during which tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tank crews were able to target the most vulnerable spots of heavily armored German vehicles.

  When Soviet tanks, during a counterattack, came within direct range of their guns and were met with heavy fire from German anti-tank guns, the tankers were simply stunned. Under hurricane fire, it was necessary not only to fight, but first of all to psychologically rebuild from a breakthrough deep into the enemy’s defense to positional combat with enemy anti-tank weapons.

  To the south of the main battle, the German tank group “Kempf” was advancing, which sought to enter the advancing Soviet group on the left flank. The threat of envelopment forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction.

  At about 13:00, the Germans withdrew the 11th Tank Division from reserve, which, together with the Death's Head division, struck the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to their aid and the attack was repulsed.

  By 2 p.m., Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy westward. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

  Version based on the memoirs of German generals

  Based on the memoirs of German generals, about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle (some probably fell behind on the march - “on paper” the army had more than a thousand vehicles), of which about 270 were knocked out (meaning only the morning battle on July 12) .

  From Rotmistrov’s memoirs it follows that his army had to break through the front and move to Kharkov (this is indirectly confirmed by the qualitative composition of the army, half consisting of light vehicles and almost no heavy ones), bypassing the German tank concentration, located, according to intelligence data, 70 km away from Prokhorovka and “successfully attacked” at that moment by attack aircraft. The collision of the tank masses was unexpected for both sides, since both tank groups were solving their offensive tasks and did not expect to meet a serious enemy.

  The groups moved towards each other not “head-on”, but at a noticeable angle. The Germans were the first to notice the Soviet tanks and managed to reorganize and prepare for battle. The light and most of the medium vehicles attacked from the flank and forced Rotmistrov’s tankers to pay full attention to themselves, who began to change the direction of the attack on the move. This caused inevitable confusion and allowed the Tiger company, supported by self-propelled guns and part of the medium tanks, to unexpectedly attack from the other side.

  Version of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, son of Joachim von Ribbentrop, commander of a tank company, a direct participant in the battle

  According to the published memoirs of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, Operation Citadel pursued not strategic, but purely operational goals: to cut off the Kursk ledge, destroy the Russian troops involved in it and straighten the front. Hitler hoped to achieve military success during the front-line operation in order to try to enter into negotiations with the Russians.

  Ribbentrop notes that the Russian side expected a German offensive. On top of everything, the German command showed the courtesy to the enemy by attacking exactly at the points where it was intended. The Russians had the advantage of an “inner line”: they could send reserves along a short route to each of the threatening sectors of the front. They stationed an operational reserve in Stary Oskol: the 5th Guards Tank Army. The German side did not have significant operational reserves at its disposal. German strategy called for front-line infantry divisions to punch holes in enemy lines through which armored divisions would strike into the enemy rear. However, the infantry divisions had no chance of overcoming the Russian defensive positions, which were completely reinforced by T-34s dug into the ground. Thus, the tank divisions had to make their own way with significant losses: so of the 22 T-IV vehicles of the tank company, with which Ribbentrop set out on July 5, by the morning of July 12, only 7 combat vehicles remained .

  In Ribbentrop's estimation, the long-barreled 75mm cannons mounted on the old, sluggish T-IVs were excellent weapons. T-34s were much faster, more powerful and more maneuverable than T-IVs. However, the T-34 did not have a commander's cupola and was controlled by a gunner who did not have all-round visibility. The gunner saw only a small area of ​​the battlefield, which he was precisely aiming at with his poor optics.

  In his memoirs, Ribbentrop gives a detailed description of the disposition of the battle, its course and result. By July 11, 1943, the SS Panzer Corps managed to advance far into the Russian positions. At the tip of the wedge on the evening of July 11, there was an “armored group” of the 1st SS Panzer Division “Leibstandarte”, which included Ribbentrop’s tank company. Units of the division overcame another long and deep anti-tank ditch, breaking through numerous enemy defensive lines. Early in the morning of July 12, the Germans needed to take Prokhorovka, an important point on the way to Kursk. However, suddenly units of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army intervened in the battle.

  The unexpected attack on the deeply advanced spearhead of the German offensive - by units of the 5th Guards Tank Army, deployed overnight - was undertaken by the Russian command in a completely incomprehensible manner. The Russians inevitably had to go into their own anti-tank ditch, which was clearly shown even on the maps we captured.

  The Russians drove, if they managed to get that far at all, into their own anti-tank ditch, where they naturally became easy prey for our defenses. Burning diesel fuel spread a thick black fume - Russian tanks were burning everywhere, some of them had run over each other, Russian infantrymen had jumped between them, desperately trying to get their bearings and easily turning into victims of our grenadiers and artillerymen, who were also standing on this battlefield.

  The attacking Russian tanks - there must have been more than a hundred of them - were completely destroyed.

  As a result of the counterattack, by noon on July 12, the Germans “with surprisingly small losses” occupied “almost completely” their previous positions.

  The Germans were stunned by the wastefulness of the Russian command, which abandoned hundreds of tanks with infantrymen on their armor to certain death. This circumstance forced the German command to think deeply about the power of the Russian offensive.

  Stalin allegedly wanted to put on trial the commander of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army, General Rotmistrov, who attacked us. In our opinion, he had good reasons for this. Russian descriptions of the battle - "the grave of German tank weapons" - have nothing to do with reality. We, however, felt unmistakably that the offensive had run out of steam. We did not see a chance for ourselves to continue the offensive against superior enemy forces, unless significant reinforcements were added. However, there were none.

  Versions of other historians

  Version by V. N. Zamulin

  According to his research, the German command planned the battle at Prokhorovka in advance: “4th TA was supposed to move from Belgorod not strictly north, but, breaking through two army lines and defeating 6th Guards. A and 1 TA, turn to the east in order to meet Soviet tank and mechanized corps on the fourth day of the operation in the most convenient place for using their tank divisions - the Prokhorovsk direction.” At the same time, the participation of the Soviet side in it was improvisation.

  According to the Soviet side, the counterattack on July 12, 1943 in the area of ​​Prokhorovka station was supposed to finally turn the tide of the defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk:

  the main reason for this was the decision to launch a frontal attack by the 5th Guards corps. TA and 5th Guards. And not along the flanks, but “head-on” to the strongest enemy formation at that time, which part of its forces went on the defensive. The plan for the counterattack at its start no longer corresponded to the changed operational situation, the deployment area of ​​the main counterattack group was inconvenient for the use of a large number of tanks, and the capabilities of the 2nd SS Tank Tank in holding the territory it occupied on July 11 at Prokhorovka were underestimated.

  According to V.N. Zamulin, July 12, 1943 in the 5th Guards. A and 5th Guards. At least 7,019 soldiers and commanders were out of action in the TA. Losses of four corps and the forward detachment of the 5th Guards. The tanks consisted of 340 tanks and 17 self-propelled guns, of which 194 were burned out, and 146 could be restored. But due to the fact that most of the damaged combat vehicles ended up in territory controlled by German troops, vehicles that were subject to restoration were also lost. Thus, a total of 53% of the army’s armored vehicles that took part in the counterattack were lost. According to V.N. Zamulin,

  the main reason for the high loss of tanks and the failure to complete the tasks of the 5th Guards. TA was the incorrect use of a tank army of a homogeneous composition, ignoring the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 325 of October 16, 1942, which accumulated the experience accumulated over the previous years of the war in the use of armored forces. The dispersion of strategic reserves in an unsuccessful counterattack had a significant negative impact on the results of the final stage of the Kursk defensive operation.

  Assessing the role of the tank battle at Prokhorovka station on July 12, 1943, V.N. Zamulin admits that it was “the culminating moment of the Kursk defensive operation on the southern front, after which the tension of the battles sharply decreased,” but the battle was only part of the battle that took place from 10 to July 16, and the failure of the offensive of the GA "South" was the result of the joint efforts of the troops of the Voronezh Front and the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters. The Red Army could only use about 8 thousand tanks in the Battle of Kursk.

  Results

  According to the research of A.V. Isaev:

  The counterattack of Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area was an expected move for the Germans. Back in the spring of 1943, more than a month before the offensive, the option of repelling a counterattack from the Prokhorovka area was being worked out, and units of the II SS Panzer Corps knew very well what to do. Instead of moving to Oboyan, the SS divisions “Leibstandarte” and “Totenkopf” exposed themselves to the counterattack of P. A. Rotmistrov’s army. As a result, the planned flank counterattack degenerated into a head-on collision with large German tank forces. The 18th and 29th tank corps lost up to 70% of their tanks and were actually taken out of the game...

  Despite this, the operation took place in a very tense situation, and only offensive, I emphasize, offensive actions of other fronts made it possible to avoid a catastrophic development of events.

  Information about a flank attack is nothing more than a myth. The Battle of Prokhorov was part of the (main) general offensive, which included 5 of the 7 armies of the Voronezh Front, namely: 5 Guards. TA, 5th Guards. A, 1 TA, 6 Guards. A and 69 A. The offensive of absolutely all armies was planned in the forehead of the advancing German troops:

  • 5th Guards TA against the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler".
  • 5th Guards And against the SS division “Totenkopf”.
  • 40 A (with attached units of 2 Tank and 2 Guards Ttk) against the SS division "Das Reich"
  • 1 TA and 6 Guards. A (with attached units of 40 A, 10 Tank Tank and 5 Guards Stk) against 3 Tank Division, 11 Tank Division and Md "Great Germany" (including the 100th Tank Brigade "Panthers").

  However, the idea of ​​a flank attack by the 5th Guards. TA in the direction of Shakhovo, Yakovlevo was indeed considered and, moreover, thoroughly. The fact is that in this sector the 48th Infantry Squadron of the 69th A was confronted by a relatively weak enemy - the German 167th Infantry Division. On July 11, by order of P. A. Rotmistrov, the commander of the 29th Tank Corps, I. F. Kirichenko, with a group of headquarters officers, began reconnaissance of the Leski, Shakhovo area. If the breakthrough of the 29th tank tank was successful, there would be a threat of encirclement of the main forces of the 4th tank tank. But this option was not accepted, probably due to the need to overcome difficult obstacles: the swampy floodplain of Lipovy Donets and the railway embankment mined by the Germans. The offensive plan of the 5th Guards was also considered. TA on x. Vesely, against the SS division “Totenkopf”, but due to the lack of means to force the river. Psel also abandoned this plan.

  The terrain in which the troops fought on July 11 was very rugged along the entire front: with deep ravines, ravines, floodplains and railway embankments. According to the situation on July 10, the offensive from the storage area. Komsomolets was the most preferred for a tank attack. However, by the evening of July 11, the 2nd Grenadier Regiment of the SS Leibstandarte Division had already reached the outskirts of Prokhorovka, depriving the 5th Guards. TA of all the advantages of the maneuver. The army was forced to advance in echelon in two possible very narrow places, bypassing a deep beam:
  - To the village of Vasilyevka, along the Psel River.
  - through the warehouse Oktyabrsky, along the railway embankment, crossing its own anti-tank ditch, passed by the Germans the day before.
  Thus, taking into account the terrain and the arrival of the 5th Guards. TA near Prokhorovka, there were simply no other opportunities for a concentrated attack by tank units on July 11. Especially on the flank of the advancing 2nd SS Tank.

  However, the German offensive ended in failure, and the Germans did not undertake any more such large-scale attacks near Kursk.

  The losses of Soviet tank crews amounted to at least 270 vehicles (of which only two tanks were heavy) in the morning battle and several dozen more during the day - according to the recollections of the Germans, small groups of Soviet tanks and even individual vehicles appeared on the battlefield until the evening. It was probably the stragglers on the march who were catching up. Anti-tank artillery was already fighting them, the armored vehicles were withdrawn and camouflaged.

  However, having disabled a quarter of the enemy’s tanks (and given the qualitative balance of forces of the parties and the surprise of the attack, this was extremely difficult), the Soviet tankers forced him to stop and, ultimately, abandon the offensive.

  Summary data on losses of the 5th Guards. TA for July 12 , no. 70 The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Tank Tank on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Death's Head division, which did not participate in the morning battle.

  Compound	Personnel, total	Irrevocable losses	Source of losses	Tanks and self-propelled guns in service	Participated in battle	Losses (burnt out / hit)	Source of tank and self-propelled gun losses	In service at 13.00 07/13/43

  Availability of combat-ready tanks and assault guns in the 2nd SS Tank Tank on the evening of July 13, 1943. (the day of celebration of these saints falls on July 12, the day of the battle). The names of 7 thousand soldiers who died here are carved on the marble slabs of its walls. Marduk has the Kursk tank mission, and the action takes place near Prokhorovka.

  Number, connection name	Pz.II	Pz.III 50/L42	Pz.III 50/L60	Pz.III 75 mm	Pz.IV L24	Pz.IV L43 and L48	Pz.VI "Tiger"	T-34	StuG	Bef.Pz. III	Total tanks and StuG
  Td Leibstandarte-SS "Adolf Hitler"	4	-	5	-	-	31	3	-	20	7	70
  TD SS "Das Reich"	-	-	43

  Battle of Prokhorovka- a battle between units of the German and Soviet armies during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk. It is considered one of the largest battles involving armored forces in military history. Happened on July 12, 1943 on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge in the area of ​​Prokhorovka station on the territory of the Oktyabrsky state farm (Belgorod region of the RSFSR).

  Direct command of the troops during the battle was carried out by Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Pavel Rotmistrov and SS Gruppenführer Paul Hausser.

  Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of Soviet troops and enter the operational space, and Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.

  Initially, the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the Yakovlevo - Oboyan operational line. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and Army Group Kempf went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, in position 6- On the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions to the 1st and 7th Guards armies. On July 6, two counterattacks were launched against the advancing Germans from the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki (northern) - Kalinin area by the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repelled by the German 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

  To provide assistance to Katukov’s 1st Tank Army, which was waging heavy fighting in the Oboyan direction, the Soviet command prepared a second counterattack. At 23:00 on July 7, front commander Nikolai Vatutin signed directive No. 0014/op on readiness to begin active operations from 10:30 on the 8th. However, the counterattack, delivered by the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, although it eased the pressure on the 1st TA brigades, did not bring tangible results.

  Having not achieved decisive success - by this time the depth of advance of the advancing troops in the well-prepared Soviet defense in the Oboyan direction was only about 35 kilometers - the German command on the evening of July 9 decided, without stopping the offensive on Oboyan, to shift the spearhead of the main attack in the direction of Prokhorovka and reach Kursk through the bend of the Psel River.

  By July 11, the Germans took their starting positions to capture Prokhorovka. By this time, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army was concentrated in positions northeast of the station, which, being in reserve, on July 6 received an order to make a 300-kilometer march and take up defense at the Prokhorovka-Vesely line. From this area it was planned to launch a counterattack with the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th and 7th Guards Armies. However, in reality, only the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms, as well as two separate tank corps (2nd and 2nd Guards), were able to go on the attack; the rest fought defensive battles against the advancing German units. Opposing the front of the Soviet offensive were the 1st Leibstandarte-SS Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".

  It should be noted that by this time the German offensive on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge had already begun to dry up - from July 10, the advancing units began to go on the defensive.

  When the battle for Ponyri was lost by the Germans, a radical turning point occurred in the entire Battle of Kursk. And in order to somehow turn the combat situation differently, in their favor, the Germans brought in tank troops near Prokhorovka.

  Strengths of the parties

  Traditionally, Soviet sources indicate that about 1,500 tanks took part in the battle: about 800 from the Soviet side and 700 from the German side (eg TSB). In some cases, a slightly lower figure is indicated - 1200.

  Many modern researchers believe that the forces brought into the battle were probably significantly smaller. In particular, it is indicated that the battle took place in a narrow area (8-10 km wide), which was limited on one side by the Psel River and on the other by a railway embankment. It is difficult to introduce such significant masses of tanks into such an area.

  PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE

  Official Soviet version

  The first clash in the Prokhorovka area occurred on the evening of July 11. According to the recollections of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17 o’clock he, together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by two tank brigades.

  At 8 am, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18, 29, 2 and 2 Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

  At the beginning of the battle, Soviet tankers gained a significant advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west.

  Very soon the battle formations were mixed. The high density of the battle, during which tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tank crews were able to target the most vulnerable spots of heavily armored German vehicles.

  The battle formations were mixed up. From a direct hit from shells, the tanks exploded at full speed. The towers were torn off, the caterpillars flew to the sides. No individual shots were heard. There was a continuous roar. There were moments when in the smoke we distinguished our own and German tanks only by silhouettes. Tankers jumped out of burning vehicles and rolled on the ground, trying to put out the flames.

  By 2 p.m., Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy westward. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

  Russian historian V.N. Zamulin notes the lack of a clear presentation of the course of hostilities, the lack of a serious analysis of the operational situation, the composition of the warring factions and the decisions made, subjectivity in assessing the significance of the Prokhorov battle in Soviet historiography and the use of this topic in propaganda work. Instead of an impartial study of the battle, Soviet historians until the early 1990s created the myth of “the largest tank battle in the history of war.” At the same time, there are other versions of this battle.

  Version based on the memoirs of German generals

  Based on the memoirs of German generals (Guderian, Mellenthin, etc.), about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle, of which about 270 were knocked out (meaning only the morning battle on July 12). Aviation did not take part in the battle; even reconnaissance aircraft did not fly from the German side. The collision of the tank masses was unexpected for both sides, since both tank groups were solving their offensive tasks and did not expect to meet a serious enemy.

  According to Rotmistrov’s recollections, the groups moved towards each other not “head-on”, but at a noticeable angle. The Germans were the first to notice the Soviet tanks and managed to reorganize and prepare for battle. The light and most of the medium vehicles attacked from the flank and forced Rotmistrov’s tankers to pay full attention to themselves, who began to change the direction of the attack on the move. This caused inevitable confusion and allowed the Tiger company, supported by self-propelled guns and part of the medium tanks, to unexpectedly attack from the other side. Soviet tanks found themselves under crossfire, and only a few saw where the second attack was coming from.

  The tank battle took place only in the direction of the first German attack; the “tigers” fired without interference, as if in a shooting range (some crews claimed up to 30 victories. It was not a battle, but a beating.

  Nevertheless, Soviet tank crews managed to disable a quarter of the German tanks. The corps was forced to stop for two days. By that time, counterattacks by Soviet troops had begun on the flanks of the German strike forces, and the further offensive of the corps was becoming futile. As at Borodino in 1812, tactical defeat ultimately became victory.

  According to the version of the famous Western historian, Professor of the Royal Department of Modern History at the University of Cambridge (UK) Richard J. Evans, the Battle of Kursk did not end with a Soviet victory, although for some reason the Germans retreated all the time after this battle (which Evans is still forced to admit). The quality of this scientist’s research can be assessed at least by the fact that the largest number of Soviet tanks (according to Western sources) that the Red Army could have used in the Battle of Kursk was about 8 thousand (Zetterling and Frankson), of which, according to Evans, 10 thousand were by the end the battle is lost. Evans writes about Prokhorovka:

  Rotmistrov's units (more than 800 tanks) moved out from the rear and covered up to 380 km in just three days. Leaving some of them in reserve, he threw 400 vehicles from the northeast and 200 from the east against the battle-weary German forces, which were taken completely by surprise. With only 186 armored vehicles, of which only 117 were tanks, the German forces faced the threat of complete destruction. But the Soviet tankers, tired after three days of continuous marching, did not notice the huge anti-tank trench four and a half meters deep, dug shortly before in preparation for the battle. The first rows of T-34s fell straight into the ditch, and when those behind finally saw the danger, they began to turn aside in panic, crash into each other and catch fire, as the Germans opened fire in the meantime. By mid-afternoon, the Germans reported that 190 Soviet tanks had been destroyed or disabled. The scale of the losses seemed so incredible that the commander personally arrived on the battlefield to make sure of this. The loss of so many tanks infuriated Stalin, who threatened to put Rotmistrov on trial. To save himself, the general agreed with his immediate superiors and member of the front’s military council, Nikita Khrushchev, to claim that the tanks were knocked out during a major battle in which heroic Soviet troops destroyed more than 400 German tanks. This report later became the source of a persistent legend, which noted Prokhorovka as the site of “the largest tank battle in history.” In fact, it was one of the biggest military fiascos in history. The Soviet army lost a total of 235 tanks, the Germans - three. Rotmistrov became a hero, and today a large monument has been erected on this site.

  The Battle of Kursk ended not with a Soviet victory, but with Hitler's order to end it. Ultimately, however, the Prokhorovka fiasco had no real significance for the overall balance of power in the Kursk region. Overall, German losses in this battle were relatively light: 252 tanks against almost 2,000 Soviet tanks, about 500 artillery pieces against almost 4,000 on the Soviet side, 159 aircraft against almost 2,000 Soviet fighters and bombers, 54,000 in manpower compared to almost 320,000 Soviet troops. And as the Soviet armies advanced along the front, instead of breaking through it, they suffered further huge losses. By the time the counteroffensive ended, on August 23, 1943, the Red Army as a whole had suffered approximately 1,677,000 killed, wounded, or missing, against 170,000 Germans; more than 6,000 tanks - compared to 760 for the Germans; 5,244 artillery pieces, compared to about 700 on the German side, and more than 4,200 aircraft, compared to 524 for the Germans. Overall, in July and August 1943, the Red Army lost almost 10,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, while the Germans lost just over 1,300. Yet the Germans were much less able to withstand their much smaller losses. “From here onwards” they were in continuous retreat.

  According to V.N. Zamulin, July 12, 1943 in the 5th Guards. A and 5th Guards. At least 7,019 soldiers and commanders were out of action in the TA. Losses of four corps and the forward detachment of the 5th Guards. The tanks consisted of 340 tanks and 17 self-propelled guns, of which 194 were burned out, and 146 could be restored. But due to the fact that most of the damaged combat vehicles ended up in territory controlled by German troops, vehicles that were subject to restoration were also lost. Thus, a total of 53% of the army’s armored vehicles that took part in the counterattack were lost. According to V.N. Zamulin,
  the main reason for the high loss of tanks and the failure to complete the tasks of the 5th Guards. TA was the incorrect use of a tank army of a homogeneous composition, ignoring the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 325 of October 16, 1942, which accumulated the experience accumulated over the previous years of the war in the use of armored forces. The dispersion of strategic reserves in an unsuccessful counterattack had a significant negative impact on the results of the final stage of the Kursk defensive operation.

  The counterattack of Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area was an expected move for the Germans. Back in the spring of 1943, more than a month before the offensive, the option of repelling a counterattack from the Prokhorovka area was being worked out, and units of the II SS Panzer Corps knew very well what to do. Instead of moving to Oboyan, the SS divisions “Leibstandarte” and “Totenkopf” exposed themselves to the counterattack of P. A. Rotmistrov’s army. As a result, the planned flank counterattack degenerated into a head-on collision with large German tank forces. The 18th and 29th tank corps lost up to 70% of their tanks and were actually taken out of the game...

  Despite this, the operation took place in a very tense situation, and only offensive, I emphasize, offensive actions of other fronts made it possible to avoid a catastrophic development of events.

  However, the German offensive ended in failure, and the Germans did not undertake any more such large-scale attacks near Kursk.

  According to German data, the battlefield remained behind them and they were able to evacuate most of the damaged tanks, some of which were subsequently restored and brought back into battle.

  In addition to their own vehicles, the Germans also “stole” several Soviet ones. After Prokhorovka, the corps already had 12 thirty-fours. The losses of Soviet tankers amounted to at least 270 vehicles (of which only two tanks were heavy) in the morning battle and a couple of dozen more during the day - according to the recollections of the Germans, small groups of Soviet tanks and even individual vehicles appeared on the battlefield until the evening. It was probably the stragglers on the march who were catching up.

  However, having disabled a quarter of the enemy’s tanks (and given the qualitative balance of forces of the parties and the surprise of the attack, this was extremely difficult), the Soviet tankers forced him to stop and, ultimately, abandon the offensive.

  Paul Hausser's 2nd Panzer Corps (actually only as part of the Leibstandarte division) was transferred to Italy.

  Losses

  Estimates of combat losses from different sources vary greatly. General Rotmistrov claims that about 700 tanks were disabled on both sides during the day. The official Soviet “History of the Great Patriotic War” provides information about 350 damaged German vehicles. G. Oleinikov criticizes this figure; according to his calculations, more than 300 German tanks could not have taken part in the battle. He estimates Soviet losses at 170-180 vehicles. According to the report presented to Stalin by Headquarters representative A.M. Vasilevsky following the battle, “within two days of fighting, Rotmistrov’s 29th Tank Corps lost 60% of its tanks, irretrievably and temporarily out of action, and the 18th Corps, up to 30% of its tanks.” To this must be added significant infantry losses. During the battles of July 11-12, the 95th and 9th Guards Divisions of the 5th Guards Army suffered the greatest losses. The first lost 3,334 people, including almost 1,000 killed and 526 missing. 9th Guards The airborne division lost 2525, killed - 387 and missing - 489. According to the military archive of Germany, the 2nd SS Tank Corps from July 10 to 16 lost 4178 people (approximately 16% of its combat strength), including 755 killed, 3351 wounded and missing - 68. In the battle on July 12, he lost: killed - 149 people, wounded - 660, missing - 33, in total - 842 soldiers and officers. 3 Tank Corps lost 8,489 people from July 5 to July 20, of which approximately 2,790 people were lost on the approaches to Prokhorovka from July 12 to July 16. Based on the data provided, both corps (six tank and two infantry divisions) lost about 7 thousand soldiers and officers from July 10 to 16 in the battles near Prokhorovka. The ratio of human losses is about 6:1 in favor of the enemy. Depressing numbers. Especially considering that our troops defended themselves with superiority in forces and means over the advancing enemy. Unfortunately, the facts indicate that by July 1943, our troops had not yet fully mastered the science of winning with little bloodshed.

  Based on materials from wikipedia.org