South Caucasus has an important geostrategic significance in the system of international relations, and is a relevant connecting space between the Middle East and Russia, Europe and Central Asia. Geography, unlike ethnography, ethnopolitics and economics, has a more permanent characteristic and, naturally, determines policy.
Unfortunately, the modern geopolitical characteristics of the South Caucasus indicate that this region remains one of the most controversial and conflict-prone, and retains a high potential for destabilization due to the presence of acute territorial disputes.
Thus, the basis of the existing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict was laid by the well-known agreements between the Bolshevik and Kemalist governments in 1920–1921. We are primarily talking about:
– secret agreements of August 24, 1920, which initiated Turkey’s next aggression against independent Armenia in September – November 1920;
– Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921, according to which Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey carried out the division of Armenia;
– Kars Treaty of October 13, 1921, which confirmed the borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan imposed on Armenia.
The possibility of a secret agreement between the Bolsheviks and Kemalists in August 1920 is noted by a very competent, scientifically trained and politically informed source - the first President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan, as well as the course of subsequent events in September - November 1920, which led to the offensive of the Turkish army under the command of General Karabekir to Armenia.
After the Entente countries signed the Treaty of Sèvres on August 10, 1920, according to the provisions of which Armenia received its own ethnic territory of 170 thousand square meters. km and access to the Black Sea in the Trabzon region, the official delegation of independent Armenia led by Levon Shant urgently left for Moscow to negotiate with the head of the NKID of the RSFSR Georgy Chicherin and conclude a corresponding Armenian-Russian agreement. Yerevan, which was in allied relations with the countries that were victorious in the First World War (Entente), hoped that Russia would also recognize independent Armenia within the boundaries of the Treaty of Sèvres, which corresponded to the provisions of the secret Sykes-Picot-Sazonov agreement of 1916, which was signed by and Russian side. However, the Armenian side did not realize the fact that the government of V.I. Lenin refused obligations Tsarist Russia and the same Sykes-Picot-Sazonov agreement.
Following L. Shant, the Turkish delegation of the then unrecognized government of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, headed by Ali-Fuad Jebesoy, went to Moscow with the sole purpose of preventing recognition from the outside. Soviet Russia independent Armenia within the boundaries of the Treaty of Sèvres, and generally exclude the concept of “Armenia” from the political map of the region. The result of the mission of A.-F. Jebesoy became the Turkish-Russian treaty of August 24, 1920.
Russian-Armenian negotiations, as is known, were interrupted not without pressure from the Turks. Chicherin made the fact of recognition and signing of the treaty with Armenia dependent on Yerevan’s refusal to accept the decisions of Sèvres. Naturally, Armenia could not unilaterally renounce the Treaty of Sèvres, since it was about the original Armenian territories with access to the Black Sea. Wherein Armenian people survived genocide during the First World War and lost most of its people.
At the same time, Armenia guaranteed Russia the passage of the Red Army through its territory, but Moscow supported Turkey, suspended negotiations and promised to resume them, sending its representative Legrand to Baku. In reality, the Bolsheviks entered into secret agreements with the Kemalists to launch a new military campaign (or rather, another aggression) against independent Armenia, which was in allied relations with the Entente countries. The war, naturally, led to the defeat of Armenia (since the West - represented by the same USA and Great Britain - did not provide military assistance to Yerevan, and Menshevik Georgia remained neutral), the fall of the Dashnak government and the transfer of power to the Revolutionary Committee, that is, the Armenian Bolsheviks.
In other words, Moscow was not interested in the fate of Armenia and its tragedy; Lenin only hoped to stay in power and expand the Bolshevism movement to the periphery of the former Russian Empire.
The results of the autumn military campaign of 1920 led to the Sovietization of Armenia and the signing of the Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921, which determined the fate of the status of the ancient Armenian province of Nakhichevan as an autonomy within the then formally independent Azerbaijan.
IN Soviet period history, the Azerbaijani authorities have undertaken a deliberate policy to oust the indigenous Armenian population from Nakhichevan. The Armenian population of the region in 1917 was 41%, and this despite the massacre by the Turks. By the end of Soviet rule in this autonomy, the number of Armenians decreased to less than 1%, and with the beginning of the next stage of the Karabakh movement in 1988, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and the collapse of the USSR, there were no Armenians left at all in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. In this regard, the question arises: what then is the essence of autonomy, if there is no one in this region except the Azerbaijani population? Autonomy for whom and from whom?
Conflictual relations between Baku and Yerevan led to a transport blockade of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan and Turkey. And in this regard, the most important transport communication in the region - the Nakhichevan railway (linking Iran, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Russia, the Black Sea) ceased to function. At the same time, Nakhichevan, blockading Armenia, itself suffers from this economic absurdity.
Azerbaijan is stationing a large military group in Nakhichevan - the 5th brigade of the Armed Forces, and is trying to improve the economic life of this autonomy through Iran and Turkey. Armenia also keeps a significant part of its armed forces on the border with Nakhichevan to repel possible provocations from the neighboring side.
The issue of Nakhichevan in bilateral Armenian-Azerbaijani relations is of particular importance both from a political and legal point of view and from a transport and economic perspective. Unblocking the Nakhichevan railway is of serious regional and international importance, and this relevance is gaining momentum given the lifting of Western sanctions against Iran on January 16, 2016 and the April 4-day conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Tehran, building up trade and economic relations with the outside world (primarily with EU countries), is extremely interested in unblocking the Nakhchivan railway to connect Julfa and Yeraskh. China may also be interested in this communication, taking into account the implementation of the Silk Road megaproject, where Iran, the countries of the South Caucasus, and the Black Sea may become one of the routes to Europe. Accordingly, the parties interested in Nakhchivan in the new configuration after January 16, 2016 may be EU countries and, of course, the United States.
However, resolving this issue only within the framework of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations becomes unrealistic due to the unresolved Karabakh issue and the contradictory approaches of Yerevan and Baku to the topic of compromise. The Azerbaijani aggression on April 2–5, 2016 against Nagorno-Karabakh, counting on a blitzkrieg, failed again, which further distanced the parties from a political settlement of this territorial problem. Until recently, the political and economic format for solving the Nakhchivan problem in expert circles could only be considered in the format of a military confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the event of the resumption of a new large-scale conflict in Karabakh. Although on April 5, through the mediation of the Russian General Staff, the conflicting parties reached an oral truce, however, skirmishes along the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border (including Nakhichevan) regularly continue. The Baku authorities do not stop carrying out provocations, but they are not able to win a convincing military victory over Artsakh and force Stepanakert to capitulate.
Over the past years of Azerbaijan’s independence and the Karabakh conflict, the Baku authorities have taken additional destructive actions of an anti-Armenian nature in Nakhichevan, aimed at destroying material and ethnocultural monuments of the history of the Armenian people in this province (for example, the destruction by units of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces of the ancient Armenian cemetery in New Julfa and turning it into a military cemetery polygon). All this further aggravates the Nakhichevan issue.
The almost century-long period of such division of the territories of Armenia between Russia and Turkey is coming to an end. With the collapse of the USSR, Russia first recognized the independence of Azerbaijan, and then was forced in 1992 to withdraw its troops from this country, including the territory of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Region. The latter, in my opinion, was a wrong decision, however, as in the situation with determining the status of Crimea in the same 1992, and under the terms of the Budapest summit in 1994. But if Russia still retained its Black Sea naval base in Sevastopol and fleet, Moscow did not have any military presence in Nakhichevan and provided Turkey and Azerbaijan with every opportunity to Turkize this province, ending transport blockade and the creation of new geopolitical threats. And every time Russian authorities They hoped that, you see, the Azerbaijani government, in agreement with Turkey and the United States, refused to allow Russia to station military bases and Russian border guards on its territory. But for some reason, the Kremlin does not remember the terms of the Moscow Treaty of 1921, nor does it remind Baku how Nakhichevan became autonomous and ended up in Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan, in the hope of military-technical superiority, unleashed a new military aggression against Karabakh on April 2–5, but its plan for a rapid breakthrough of the layered Armenian defense failed miserably and led to significant losses in manpower and equipment, which forced the Baku authorities to request a truce through Moscow . Azerbaijan opposes the initiatives of the American side, supported by other mediators and the EU, to deploy technical sensor devices on the line of contact in the conflict zone to identify violators of the terms of the 1994 Bishkek truce. and conducting appropriate investigations into these facts.
What is Azerbaijan counting on? As the experience of the April 4-day war showed, Baku today is not in a position to wage a large-scale war, since it may get the opposite result to its expectations, which will inevitably lead to sad consequences for the country. In the current conditions in which Turkey finds itself, Azerbaijan also cannot count on military assistance and intervention in the conflict with Armenia from brotherly Turkey (despite the loud propaganda statements of its leaders and diplomats), since such freedom from Ankara is unlikely to please Russia, the United States and Europe. Turkey itself will most likely find itself on the verge of territorial collapse, taking into account the Kurdish and Armenian issues.
Relying on the Russian offensive military equipment(MLRS “Smerch”, TOS-1A “Solntsepek”, T-90S tanks, etc.) gives a certain advantage to the Azerbaijani army, but does not bring the expected result due to the skillful defense of the NKR Defense Army. And Russia, with its supplies of weapons and equipment to Azerbaijan, undermined its own political reputation as an ally of Armenia. The Russians cynically betrayed Once again interests of Armenia. Statements that if Russia does not sell weapons to Azerbaijan, then someone else will do it, sounds even more ridiculous and unrealistic, since, firstly, this “someone” (or rather Turkey, Israel, Pakistan) they sold and continue to supply these supplies to Azerbaijan, secondly, except for Russia, other countries do not have such deadly weapons as the Smerch MLRS, TOS-1A Solntsepek, T-90S tanks.
The oil-dependent economy of Azerbaijan is suffering heavy losses due to the fall in world oil prices, which will soon affect the military budget. The West will put pressure on the Ilham Aliyev administration over the expansion of purchases Russian weapons, and not so much because of the interests of Armenia, but because of the need to increase the degree of economic pressure on Russia.
Baku must understand that Armenia and its armed forces are capable of not only adequately responding to military provocations and aggression in the Karabakh direction, but also creating a certain tension in the Nakhichevan sector. This can happen in two cases: a) if Azerbaijan does not stop the escalation of tensions against Nagorno-Karabakh; b) if Iran, the USA, EU countries and Russia wish to change the situation around Nakhichevan and go to unblock it.
The defense doctrine of Armenia is forced to move from “ passive defense"to "contain and curb" the enemy. This strategy will be devoted to the strategy of rearmament of the Armenian army, military-technical cooperation of Armenia with Russia, China and, possibly, Iran. Yerevan and Stepanakert are quite tired of Baku’s provocations and intend, in the event of another military provocation from Azerbaijan, to launch a counter-offensive to change the NKR status quo towards expanding the bridgehead in the eastern direction to natural boundaries. The fact that the Armenian command agreed to a truce on April 5, 2016 and did not give the command for a counterattack caused great criticism in the military circles of Artsakh and Armenia. However, this war showed that the Armenian side will be categorically against the issue of territorial concessions, because Baku has once again shown its reluctance to a political settlement of the problem. Moreover, the Armenian side will have a negative attitude towards any attempts to deploy foreign (international) peacekeeping forces military formations due to the lack of trust in them and the corresponding lack of perception of them both on the part of Yerevan and Stepanakert, and Tehran.
Iran and six powers (USA, France, UK, Germany, China and Russia) reached a historic agreement on July 14, 2015 in Vienna to resolve the long-standing Iranian nuclear problem. As a result, the Vienna Agreements led to the fact that January 16, 2016 became a historic day for Iran, since some of the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, the EU and the United States were lifted.
As a result of the lifting of sanctions, Iran gained access to its frozen foreign assets, which, according to the US Treasury Department, amount to over $50 billion. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani called the nuclear deal “a golden page in the history of Iran” and a “turning point” in the development of the country’s economy.
The lifting of sanctions on Iran, undertaken by the West (or rather the United States), despite the persistent opposition of Israel and its Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, comes from a new configuration in the Middle East and South Caucasus region. The foreign policy departments of the leading countries of the world (Russia, USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, China) stated that agreements with Iran help strengthen security in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.
In this regard, the geopolitical situation in the Transcaucasian region has changed. The same Armenia now has the opportunity to build strategic relations with Iran. As a direct neighbor of Iran, Armenia should directly benefit from the situation.
Iranian gas and oil are important for Europe, which today opens its doors wide to Iran and provides large investments to the Iranian economy. As already noted, one of the routes of the Chinese Silk Road project may pass through Iran, followed by Indian goods.
After decisions to complete the first stage of creating new borders in the Middle East (that is, in Syria and Iraq), according to Igor Muradyan, “the United States and Europe will be forced to clearly choose Iran and the Shiite communities as their strategic ally in the region. This will be a difficult and difficult decision, but throughout the 21st century. “The Atlantic community will have no other strategic allies in the Middle East.”
In other words, Tehran views Armenia as liaison and a bridge for communication with the same Georgia, EU countries and Russia (EAEU). Armenia can become an important logistics entity in the South Caucasus, almost the same as Georgia in terms of connections between Western countries and Turkey with Azerbaijan and the republics Central Asia, as well as Azerbaijan in connection with Russia and Iran, Turkey and the EU countries with Central Asia.
The issue of opening a transport corridor between Iran and Armenia in recent months became one of the topics discussed in official and expert circles. The main joint Iranian-Armenian economic projects are the construction of a hydroelectric power station on the Araks River near the Armenian city of Meghri, a third high-voltage power line and a railway.
China is showing particular interest in the Iran-Armenia Southern High Speed Railway project. According to the Chinese Ambassador to Armenia, Mr. Tian Erlong, Beijing is considering the possibility of investing in the Iran-Armenia railway construction project. The railway project was developed International company construction and communications of China (CCCC International). Chinese banks are showing interest in the project and have expressed their willingness to finance 60% of the program. However, there is a time gap until 2022; during this period, important events in the region may occur. The high cost of constructing the Armenian section of the railway in high mountain conditions not only delays the process of its implementation, but also allows Tehran to look for bypass routes through Azerbaijan (Astara and Nakhichevan).
Thus, the February visit of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to Iran confirmed that by the end of 2016 Iran and Azerbaijan will unite railways and they will become part of the North-South corridor. It remains to build across the river. Araks railway bridge connecting Iranian Astara with Azerbaijani Astara. The implementation of this project may “devalue” the Armenian-Iranian railway. If Azerbaijan unites its railways with Iran, then after the Kars-Akhalkalak-Baku railway is put into operation, trains from Iran can reach the Black Sea. Then the Armenian-Iranian railway, valued at $3.5 billion, may lose its meaning for Tehran, if it had one.
True, in such a case, Iran will find itself dependent on the Turkish-Azerbaijani communication corridor and will be forced to take into account the interests of Ankara and Baku, which does not entirely correspond to Tehran’s intentions.
However, it is important for Iran to have alternative communications, given the unpredictability of regional relations and the presence of conflict potential. In addition, Armenia demonstrated in relation to Iran high degree political loyalty and under the conditions of the sanctions regime, which is not forgotten in the East. And the West, represented by the United States, will be interested in the Armenian corridor of investment relations with Iran.
It was no coincidence that the April 4-day war in the Karabakh zone was unleashed by Azerbaijan following the Washington Nuclear Security Summit and on the eve of a trilateral summit of the heads of foreign affairs of Azerbaijan, Iran and Russia on the fate of North-South transport communications. But Russia is deeply mistaken that Azerbaijan will be Moscow’s best friend in relations with Tehran, for which the interests of Armenia can be sacrificed. The war in Karabakh did not allow Azerbaijan to advance south towards Fuzuli, Jebrail, Zangelan and Kubatlu, that is, to restore Azerbaijani control over the lost areas and the 132-km border with Iran along the river. Araks. Conversely, the expected counter-offensive of the NKR Defense Army could plunge Azerbaijan and its allies (partners) into shock if Armenian control expands over the border with Iran. In other words, in the eastern direction, the construction of new communications across the river. Araks and Azerbaijan is an unsafe event, given the unresolved Karabakh conflict and the possibility of its resumption.
In this regard, the Nakhchivan issue is being updated. If Iran and its Western partners manage to “persuad” Azerbaijan to unblock Nakhichevan, then the corridor will become a reality.
Thus, Iran and the West (USA, leading EU countries) are faced with the need to unblock the Nakhichevan railway through Julfa in the direction of Armenia - Georgia - Black Sea - Europe. Given the fall in oil prices, Azerbaijan is suffering serious economic and financial losses, which leads to serious social costs. And from this point of view, Azerbaijan, like Armenia and Georgia, is objectively interested in Iranian traffic through Nakhichevan and Astara. The topic of the Nakhichevan railway (as, indeed, Nakhichevan itself) is becoming an urgent geo-economic and geopolitical problem in relations with Azerbaijan (and not only and not so much Armenia, but also Iran, the USA, the EU, Russia and China).
Azerbaijan still considers it unacceptable for itself to unblock Nakhichevan without resolving the Karabakh issue according to Baku’s conditions, since in otherwise this could lead to the freezing of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and economic growth Armenia, which will also change the military balance between the conflicting parties. However, in in this case, as they say, the stake is greater than the issue of Azerbaijani-Armenian relations. It is no coincidence that Lately Tehran reiterated its readiness to assist in the Karabakh settlement, and representatives of the Iranian Foreign Ministry held relevant negotiations in Moscow with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin.
Referring to the April military crisis in Karabakh, Iran, through the speaker of its parliament, Mr. Larijani, once again called on the parties for peaceful negotiations and a political settlement. At the same time, the Iranian politician noted that the resumption of a large-scale war in Nagorno-Karabakh is unacceptable due to turbulent processes in the region, which could lead to the growth and internationalization of the conflict itself, with devastating consequences for its participants. At the same time, Larijani emphasized that it is unknown who will emerge victorious in this new war. In other words, Iran made it clear to Azerbaijan that it should not count on success in the Karabakh war, because this could force Tehran to take appropriate military measures. It is known that during the days of the April War, the 7th Armored Brigade of the Iranian Armed Forces was put on full combat readiness and could cross the Araks River to the north.
What will the West do? The United States is very interested in opening a corridor to connect Iran through Armenia with Europe. Washington, using its positions in the IMF and the World Bank, actually refused to provide Azerbaijan with a loan in the amount of $4 billion. The West, of course, can force Azerbaijan to default if I. Aliyev continues his uncompromising position on Karabakh. However, Washington may take this step if Yerevan adjusts its foreign policy from the EAEU in favor of the EU, CSTO - NATO, Russia to the USA.
The Nakhichevan issue is acquiring special geo-economic attractiveness for outside world, and Azerbaijan should pursue a more cautious and pragmatic policy. The well-known loud propaganda campaign - the initiative of deputies of the State Duma of Russia from the Communist Party faction V. Rashkin and S. Obukhov to denounce the Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921, which determined, among other things, the status of the Nakhichevan autonomy - can also be considered as a kind of signal to Azerbaijan according to fate Nakhichevan railway.
Moscow does not yet unilaterally intend to revise the borders of the Transcaucasian republics, but it can, in agreement with Western countries (the same USA), start a new historical process and station its troops here as a guarantor of regional stability. In this regard, the fate of Azerbaijan itself will largely depend on the position of the leadership of Azerbaijan. Baku, while maintaining fraternal friendship with ethnically related Turkey, still does not lose reality and does not allow itself to be drawn into Turkish-Russian conflict relations. And on Syria, Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan Azimov noted Russia’s well-founded support.
The fact of the American-Russian regional partnership to establish a truce in Syria after the obvious successes of the Russian Aerospace Forces, positive assessment Russia’s role in the Syrian settlement, given in February 2016 by US Secretary of State John Kerry, and his warning about sanctions against violators of the agreements (that is, Turkey) speaks of the possibility of American-Russian success in the South Caucasus. Washington did not lift sanctions on Iran so that someone would block Tehran transport interchanges region.
In the Karabakh issue, Azerbaijan and Armenia are capable of achieving great success if Nakhichevan is unblocked, Azerbaijani-Armenian trade and economic cooperation is established, and ethnic communities in the region are reconciled. The issue of returning certain territories from the security zone around the NKR cannot be resolved without simultaneously determining the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, solving the problems of all refugees (both Azerbaijani and Armenian), returning the Shaumyan district to Stepanakert and unblocking the same Nakhichevan.
If Azerbaijan again relies on the military method of resolving the issue and continues to promote anti-Armenian hatred, then Baku has no chance of success. Military victory will be for Artsakh and Armenia.
Opinion Russian politicians and diplomats that no one has solved problems like Karabakh by military means, in our opinion, is extremely inadequate. I agree with everyone who advocates political methods for resolving this issue. But desire is one thing, reality is another. You might think it's capitulation fascist Germany in May 1945 became the result of 4 years of painstaking Soviet-German negotiations. Russia decided the fate of the same Crimea in the spring of 2014 not at all based on the results of political consultations with Kiev, but thanks to its naval base in Sevastopol and the so-called green men of Russian special forces, hastily transferred to Crimea to avoid provocations, holding a meeting of the then Supreme Council Crimean Autonomous Republic in order to make the necessary political decision in favor of secession from Ukraine and joining Russia. One might think that the independent status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was decided by a political settlement between Russia and Georgia, and not by the results of the 5-day war in August 2008.
At the same time, the 4-day war in Artsakh did not help Azerbaijan resolve the issue of Armenian surrender, even despite military-technical assistance from Russia. But who guaranteed Azerbaijan against another devastating defeat, loss of new territories and complete capitulation under the threat of statehood failure? No one will dare to give such a guarantee to Baku, since no one has a peaceful plan for solving this problem. The only way out that Azerbaijan and Armenia, through the mediation of Iran, the United States, the EU countries and Russia, begin to gradually, step by step, restore trade and economic ties through the transit of the Julfa railway in Nakhichevan. Over time, this policy can lead to a decrease in the degree of mutual intolerance and hatred of the two societies, restoring the degree of trust and traditions of good neighborliness. Accordingly, the democratization of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations will also stimulate the political resolution of the territorial issue in Karabakh.
Alexander Svarants, doctor political sciences, Professor
12:58 — REGNUM
In Armenia in the post-Soviet years, the question is very popular: did the Armenian people benefit or suffer because of Armenia’s accession to the USSR? Points of view on this matter are very different, and all have their own justifications. Many, mainly young people, have not thought about this issue at all. And the older generation perfectly remembers the episodes of Armenia’s entry into the USSR from the stories of their grandfathers and great-grandfathers. The letter published today is written in a form that is quite bold for its time, even taking into account the “thaw” that has already arrived. Honored Artist of the Armenian SSR, Honored Architect of the Armenian SSR, State Prize laureate Rafael Israelyan On July 20, 1962, he addressed the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev. The letter reached Khrushchev. At one of the receptions in the Kremlin, S. Israelyan reminded the first secretary of the issues raised, to which Khrushchev responded: “The time will come.” A copy of the letter is now kept in the National Archives of Armenia. publishes this letter without abbreviations.
Dear Nikita Sergeevich!
In No. 173 of the Pravda newspaper dated June 22, 1962, an article was published entitled “To the upcoming edition of the multi-volume history of the CPSU,” which also contains the following lines:
"The history of the CPSU will show the essence of the Leninist national policy of the party, as a party of consistent internationalists, its irreconcilable struggle against all manifestations of bourgeois nationalism (great-power chauvinism, local nationalism), for the implementation of complete political, economic and cultural equality of all nationalities of the Soviet Union, for the strengthening of friendship peoples of the USSR and their further unification in common struggle for building communism." I read this article - and a question arose before me, the answer to which I would like to receive from the editors: was Lenin’s national policy correctly implemented during the creation of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1920-21? As an old agitator, propagandist and political education worker, I would like to dispel the doubts that have arisen in me. Let me explain my thoughts with facts.
Taking advantage of the devastation caused by the anti-people adventurist policy of the Dashnaks and the Turkish invasion of Armenia, the Georgian Mensheviks and Azerbaijani Musavatists decided to grab for themselves part of the ancestral Armenian lands. But in the very first months, the theses of Lenin’s national policy were solemnly proclaimed responsible managers The Soviet state and the Bolshevik party: already on December 2, 1920, at the ceremonial meeting of the Baksovet on the establishment of Soviet power in Armenia, comrade. Sergo Ordzhonikidze quoted the declaration of the head of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic, Comrade. N. Narimanova regarding the Armenian regions of Zangezur, Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh, regions that the anti-people Musavatist government tried to tear away from Armenia. Comrade's speech is very characteristic. Narimanov. He read his declaration on Zangezur, Nakhichevan and Karabakh. Comrade Narimanov says: “Take them for yourself! Take these lands for Armenia!” Chapter Azerbaijan Republic comes out and says: “This terrible question no longer exists!” (see G.K. Ordzhonikidze. Selected speeches and articles, 1956, pp. 139-141). And here is the declaration itself by Comrade. N. Narimanov dated 2/XII 1920 on behalf of the Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan: “The territories of Zangezur and Nakhichevan districts are an indivisible part of Soviet Armenia. And the working peasantry of Nagorno-Karabakh is given full right to self-determination.” (Central State Archive of the Armenian SSR, f. 114, d. 80, l. 1. First published in the Kommunist newspaper on December 2, 1920).
And on December 4, 1920, the People's Commissariat of Nationalities of the Soviet state, headed by Lenin, solemnly confirmed on behalf of the Soviet government: “On December 1, Soviet Azerbaijan voluntarily renounces the disputed provinces and declares the transfer of Zangezur, Nakhichevan, and Nagorno-Karabakh to Soviet Armenia.” (see I.V. Stalin, Works, volume 4, p. 414).
But then something completely inexplicable happens: from these lands that form an indivisible part of the territory of Soviet Armenia, the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic is created. This is not enough - and the very administration of this “autonomous republic” is transferred not to the Armenian SSR, but to Azerbaijan! But the territory of this “autonomous republic” with its dense, compact Armenian population was still included in the Erivan province, and it was subordinate to the Erivan governor! By this, the territory of Armenia itself was torn into two parts: in order, for example, from Yerevan to get to the Armenian regions of Kafan, Meghri, Sisian, now you have to drive through lands that are wedged into the territory of the Armenian SSR, but for some reason assigned to Nakhichevan." autonomous republic." Just half a century ago, the territory of this “autonomous republic” of Nakhichevan was densely populated by a compact Armenian population. But in the years of artificially instilled interethnic hatred, this indigenous people was partially cut out, partially fled to the current territory of the Armenian SSR, where he lives to this day, not daring to return to his native places. The rest of the Armenian population is gradually leaving their native places, leaving their original, historically they have always belonging territory, on which it is unthinkable to live under the created conditions. But if the Armenian population left and is leaving their native places, then the Armenian monuments cannot move from their places material culture, the architecture with which the whole earth is dotted here. At every step here you come across monuments with Armenian inscriptions, with rare frescoes, which are threatened with oblivion and outright destruction. Thus, a few kilometers from the Kizil-vank station, there was an outstanding monument of Armenian culture - Karmravank, which was blown up in 1958. And there are so many similar examples of barbaric attitude towards the national culture of the original Armenian population that it is inconvenient to talk about it in our time. For some reason, Nagorno-Karabakh was also turned into an autonomous region, and again subordinated not to the Armenian, but to the Azerbaijani SSR, contrary to the declaration of the leaders Soviet Azerbaijan and the Soviet Union. But the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh is a direct continuation of the territory of Armenia, and 90% of its population are Armenians. Doesn’t such a division of both the territory and population of the Soviet socialist republic contradict Lenin’s national policy?
Being cut off from Armenia, neither the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic nor Nagorno-Karabakh is developing in such a way that the pace of their economic and cultural development met the requirements of building communism. Let’s take Shusha, for example, this thriving center of Nagorno-Karabakh in the past: the Musavatists burned this city, its population was slaughtered. Forty years ago, the sight of a city lying in charred ruins evoked feelings of shock and indignation, but these terrible ruins evoke exactly the same feelings now, because for more than 40 years they did not bother to build up and populate this Armenian Lidice (Czech: Lidice, German: Liditz) - a mining village in the Czech Republic, 20 km west of Prague and southeast of the city of Kladno, destroyed on June 10, 1942 at the request of the German government - REGNUM news agency).
Can such a situation contribute to “strengthening the friendship of peoples and their unity”?
In Nagorno-Karabakh, there is discrimination against the population; there are no achievements in the development of a culture that is national in form and socialist in content. Only the most insignificant part of the youth of Nagorno-Karabakh manages to overcome the applied discrimination and make their way to special and higher education. The Armenian youth of the territories separated from the Armenian SSR are deprived of the opportunity to get acquainted with the history of their people, with their centuries-old literature and art, and to study the monuments of the national culture of their native Karabakh. The population of the region is artificially kept away from its national culture, the attitude of the predominant Armenian population and the national minority - the Azerbaijanis - is far from dictated by Lenin's national policy.
It must be said frankly that all these questions would not have arisen if, during the creation Soviet republics Transcaucasia, the national and historical characteristics of the Armenian population were reasonably taken into account (at one time recognized by the Soviet leaders, but for some reason not taken into account by them, or, rather, consigned to oblivion by them). Then there would be no place for such a situation in which only 64% of the Armenian population of Transcaucasia is located within the Armenian SSR, and a whole THIRD of this compact population would not live on the Armenian lands, for some reason included and transferred to a foreign republic, which at one time declared its renunciation of claims to these territories, “constituting an indivisible part of the Armenian SSR.”
I would be very grateful for an answer that would clarify for me how right I am in my judgments and conclusions.
I remain with deep respect (signature) S. ISRAELYAN (Lenin Order Bearer)
My address: city. Yerevan-9, Tumanyan street, no. 73.
Prepared Ashot Poghosyan
The fact that recently in Nakhichevan there has been a serious concentration of not only Azerbaijani, but also Turkish troops, a lot was said. The reaction of the Azerbaijani mass media, which tries as much as possible not to react or respond to such information that appears from time to time in the publications of their colleagues in the region, once again proves that the situation there is really dirty.
Some experts cite specific figures and claim that today an entire army corps is stationed and entrenched in Nakhichevan. And that the number of Turkish soldiers in this area is three times greater than Azerbaijani ones.
Quite often this figure is mentioned by the leader of the Democratic Party of Armenia (DPA) Aram Gasparovich Sargsyan and the former Minister of Defense of Armenia Vagharshak Harutyunyan. They are sure that Turkey is now carrying out a kind of creeping, unspoken army expansion in Nakhichevan. Moreover, this is done not simply with the tacit consent of Baku, but due to specific agreements with it.
Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia Ruben Safrastyan believes that Ankara is purposefully strengthening its influence and increasing the number of its army contingent in the autonomous region, since Turkey’s plans in the medium term are to increase its influence and increase pressure on geopolitical processes in the South Caucasus region.
All this can really lead to anxious thoughts, especially in the sense that the border with Nakhichevan passes only some 80-100 kilometers from the capital of Armenia. That is, Yerevan is within the range of Turkish missile systems, of which the Azerbaijani army has a lot in service.
If we add to all of the above the factor that Baku has recently been quite often conducting military exercises (staff, tank, infantry) in Nakhichevan, then we can say with confidence that military strength is being pumped up in the autonomous region.
In the latest combined arms exercises alone, up to 25 thousand military personnel, up to 250 units of tanks and armored vehicles, and up to 50 units of army and front-line aviation took part there. Moreover, our army intelligence has data that not only Azerbaijani armored vehicles and infantry units participated in the exercises.
The latest information coming from Nakhichevan indicates that a new full-fledged military unit was opened there recently. Or rather, even a whole training and educational center. Soldiers' barracks, an army welfare complex, a headquarters building, and a hospital were built there. Created Observation deck, a sports town, a shooting range - in a word, the complete set.
Rumor has it that the main Teaching Staff in the training and education center there are specialists from Turkey who have undergone NATO training.
It is noteworthy that the commissioning ceremony of the entire complex was attended by President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, who these days came to Nakhichevan in connection with events dedicated to the 95th anniversary of the birth of his father Heydar Aliyev.
There, during his speech, Aliyev said that soon (in the next three years) that part of the railway that will connect the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic with “mainland” Azerbaijan through the territory of Iran will be put into operation.
The President of Azerbaijan called this a “breaking of the blockade” in which, it turns out, Nakhichevan had been under all these years.
17:02 — REGNUM
The change in the leadership of Armenia led to an unprecedented escalation of tension in the region and a sharp increase in the risks of a resumption of, if not war, then at least the same type of military action that unfolded in April 2016. It comes to the point that few politicians and experts do not is now engaged in “forecasting” military operations.
The only difference is when the prophets expect their resumption. Some expect the end of the World Cup in Russia, while others associate the likelihood of war with the completion of the elections in Turkey. At the same time, the outbreak of war in April 2016, as Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev admitted, was indeed seemingly not tied to reality and started “solely on his orders.” This is something many doubted even in 2016 itself, because everyone knows that Azerbaijan did not begin military operations even in the 90s without “external signals”. And then, and this is not difficult to verify, a day or two before the start of the Azerbaijani attacks, the presidents of Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan, on approximately the same days, visited the United States in unison and met with high-ranking American officials.
A little more about the events of 2016, which led to the tragedy on the fronts of Karabakh in April of that year. In February 2016, the second meeting of the advisory council of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) project was held in Baku. On March 1, 2016, Turkey, represented by the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Berat Albayrak, announced support American project. At the end of March, the presidents of Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan visited the United States. On the night of April 1-2, 2016, the Azerbaijanis began their attacks.
It was on April 2 that the shareholders of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) project gathered in Baku, and on their behalf, the head of SOCAR (State Oil Company of Azerbaijan, SOCAR) Rovnag Abdullayev said that they were planning until the end of the current (i.e. 2016) year to attract about $2 billion from international financial institutions. That negotiations are underway with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank, etc. “The funds will be raised for a period of 20 years at very low interest rates. This will allow us not to invest our own funds in the implementation of this project,” the head of SOCAR emphasized.
Isn't there a relationship between the listed events and the escalation of military violence in Artsakh unleashed by Baku? That is, the role of the United States in that “April War” is also visible, as is the role of the decades-long attempts of the West (and, we should add, Israel) to “gas” ignore the territories of Russia and Iran, as a logical continuation of the Baku-Tbilisi oil pipeline conceived in the late 90s. Ceyhan and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline.
Let us also note that after the April war of 2016, inflammatory statements and blackmail were repeatedly noted by both the US ex-co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group (MG) James Warlick and the US Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats (in February of this year). Thus, anyone who is going to predict the time when Azerbaijan will resume military operations against the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, or even the start of an outright war against Armenia, is simply obliged to reckon with the ambiguous role of the United States in the settlement and the meaning of “orders from Washington” regarding the April 2016 war , which were read to the presidents of Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan on March 29-31, 2016 in “direct contact” with Mr. Kerry...
In this context, all statements by Ilham Aliyev about “historical Iran” or the remarks of the Armenian leadership that Yerevan is not satisfied with this and that are secondary. If hostilities resume, and, of course, again on the part of Azerbaijan, then one should keep in mind not the threatening calls and ultimatum statements from Baku and Ankara, but the fact that the Western owners of the Southern Gas Complex “gave the go-ahead”, and precisely in June 2018 th. And it would not be a mistake if, following the example of 2016, we again recall: any military operations in the region, be it on the fronts in Artsakh or in some other part of Eastern Transcaucasia, are objectively not beneficial only to: 1) Artsakh; 2) Armenia; 3) Iran and 4) Russia. Why war is not beneficial and not necessary for the two Armenian republics, I think, is clear without additional explanation. Why war is not necessary and not beneficial for Russia is understandable if we keep in mind that, despite significant stabilization in the North Caucasus, the Russian Federation firmly remembers and knows that when Transcaucasia completely becomes “Turkish”, then “trips” of terrorists to the Russian parts of the Caucasus become “rotational workers”. Why all this is especially not beneficial for Iran - it is clearer than clear, its northern borders border with Armenia, the conflict zone, and Azerbaijan.
Finally, with Russia and Iran deeply engaged in suppressing terrorism in Iraq and Syria, Moscow and Tehran do not at all need a war in their “underbelly.” And it was Russia and Iran that made a lot of efforts to ensure that hostilities in April 2016 were stopped quite quickly. And Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, precisely after harsh statements from Tehran in April 2016, in particular statements by the Ayatollah’s chief military adviser, General Yehia Rahim Safavi, stopped inciting actions and began to seek dialogue with his Russian and Iranian colleagues.
But there are also differences between April 2016 and summer 2018. It is in Armenia that they often say that some kind of armed provocations threaten the country from the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (NAR) - we remind you that the territory of the NAR, in fact, was also recognized as a conflict zone by the OSCE quite a long time ago. At the same time, discussing certain scenarios, certain probable motives or parties that might need a war between Turkey and Azerbaijan with Armenia, and even from Nakhichevan, completely ignores the fact that in the event of an attack from Nakhichevan, any potential the military enemy of the Armenians will be forced to first undertake aggression against Armenia, and not against the Republic of Artsakh.
In the event of an attack on any part of the territory of Armenia, a whole range of preventive countermeasures will enter the battle:
1) the relevant points of the “grand agreement” between Armenia and Russia of 1997, according to which countries come to each other’s rescue in the event of aggression against one of them or the threat of aggression;
2) the status of the 102nd Gyumri military base of Russia provides for the base’s entry into the war if the threat comes specifically from Armenia;
3) Armenia, as a member of the CSTO CIS bloc, has the right to request assistance of any kind, including direct military assistance, from the entire bloc or from its individual member countries;
4) the Armenian-Russian Joint Group of Forces, represented by the 102nd base (more precisely, its strike special forces) and the 5th Army Corps of the Armenian Armed Forces, officially formed at the end of 2016, enters the battle, and, as reported, “in the event what" the situation can be entered into and Russian troops Southern Military District (SMD), in which operational management and the 102nd is located military base RF.
For example, it is widely known that the creation of an Armenian-Russian group of troops was sharply criticized from the very first days by Turkey and Azerbaijan, whose politicians agitated Moscow to abandon this idea and see Ankara and Baku exclusively as “loyal allies.” It seems that, given all the “knives in the back” that the Turks have jabbed at Russia (starting with the downed planes in Syria, the killing of pilots and ending with the brazen terrorist attack against Russian Ambassador Karlov in Ankara) since 2015–16, the hypocrisy of opponents of the creation and operation of the Armenian Russian group of troops is more than noticeable. It is also noticeable that Moscow has not and does not intend to listen to the pharisaical calls of Ankara and Baku.
Iran factor
However, much less is remembered and talked about the Iranian factor in the event that some forces intend to open a front from the territory of Nakhichevan. In the modern history of the Transcaucasian region, the Iranian factor affected the fate of Nakhichevan, oddly enough, much earlier than, for example, Turkey, which is ethnically close to the Azerbaijanis (Turks of Transcaucasia), came to grips with the affairs of this territory. Back in late autumn - early December 1989, there was a massive breakthrough of residents of the region towards Iran, accompanied by acts of violence and destruction of border structures between the then USSR and Iran. After several weeks of inaction and silence, the Iranian authorities officially turned to Moscow with a request to “calm down” its Nakhichevan citizens. However, after Gorbachev’s clique actually washed its hands of it, hiding behind its course of “restructuring and acceleration,” the Iranian authorities and military circles decided to independently stop the illegal actions of state border violators.
According to some information, however, not officially confirmed (neither by the authorities of the USSR, nor by the Iranian authorities), but which, however, is quite often referred to by radical pan-Turkic Azerbaijani circles when they propagate hatred of Iran and Iranians, then Iranian strong structure resorted to the use of military weapons against USSR citizens of Azerbaijani nationality who were breaking into Iran. A significant number of Azerbaijanis were arrested and handed over to the Soviet authorities. However, according to Iranian government officials, in subsequent years, some of the Nakhichevan residents managed to hide in Iran and later even change their citizenship. Now, as in 1989, it is still difficult to guess the true mechanisms of the then vandalism on the border of Nakhichevan and Iran.
It cannot be ruled out that this could have been a carefully planned operation, the goals of which are still unknown to us. However, even the events of 1989 clearly showed that the prerequisites for the geopolitical play of the Iranian card in Transcaucasia or the Azerbaijani card in Iran could begin to be created in the region. And for this purpose the territory and resource base of Nakhichevan can be used...
In subsequent years, Iran's interest in Nakhichevan clearly increased. But during the war to defend the independence of NKR-Artsakh, one day Iran (summer 1993) was seriously alarmed - when units of the NKR Defense Army reached the borders with Iran. Under the pretext of ensuring the safety of two reservoirs (border) on the Araks, Iranian military units then went beyond their state borders - including into the territory of Nakhichevan. Strange as it may seem, no one at the official level reacted to Tehran’s sharp move then, including the authorities of Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey. But it was the second the most important moment- both for the NAR and for the entire regional geopolitics, when the Iranian factor in full height demonstrated his certain lack of alternatives in matters relating to Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and, of course, Tehran’s reaction to the events taking place on its northern borders. In turn, these realities of 1993 also showed how vulnerable Nakhichevan was from the point of view of not only communication ties, but also purely military security issues. By the way, it was in connection with the described steps of Iran to take under protection two reservoirs on the Araks and the entry of Iranian troops into the NAR that neighboring Turkey intensified the construction of bridges connecting Nakhichevan with Turkish territory.
Already by 2002, the life of Nakhichevan was highly dependent on Iran, which was and is the main supplier of food and energy resources for the region. Unlike Turkey, whose firms are mainly engaged in the export of leather raw materials from the region, Iran was actively creating a region-forming infrastructure here, tying the region to the Iranian “greater economic space.” The most important element of this infrastructure will be energy supply. For example, the Tabriz-Nakhichevan main gas pipeline, built in 2002, with a throughput capacity of up to 1 billion cubic meters. m. and is more clearly designed not for the volume of consumption in Nakhichevan, but has transit significance.
In general, Nakhchivan is considered by all interested parties as a transit region. This economic link is reinforced by political links. It should be noted that, in contrast to Azerbaijan, where Iran’s position as a whole is not the most significant, in Nakhichevan already at that time an “Iranian party” was essentially taking shape, which, of course, had primarily economic interests. All political groups in Nakhichevan, including local branches of the “Baku parties,” have pro-Iranian sentiments.
However, at the same time, a significant role in the arrangement political forces Turkish agents, represented by two dozen “advisers” in various fields, play in Nakhichevan. Openly anti-Iranian elements in Nakhichevan include certain administrative and intellectual circles, as well as the commanders of the brigades of the Azerbaijani army stationed here. Individuals who are aware of their Iranian origin play a certain role in the formation of pro-Iranian sentiments. Carrying out preventive measures against Iranian influence in Nakhichevan is important task the Baku administration and, of course, the Turkish ruling circles assisting them. But, one way or another, if we evaluate the level of foreign investment in Nakhichevan, Iran is even ahead of Turkey.
Therefore, Iran’s intervention in any scenario of using the Nakhichevan territory for some anti-Armenian military purposes is, in essence, a “resolved issue.” Considering the tone of the authors of some statements from Yerevan, we also have to take into account the fact that the development of the situation may be influenced, for example, by the desire of the signatories of the Kars Peace Treaty of 1921 to achieve a complete revision of the status quo of the current NAR. I wrote about this several times in the 90s. famous Soviet and Russian international lawyer, diplomat Yu. Barsegov. The crux of the matter is that the Treaty of Kars was supposed to expire in 1946, according to the opinion of a well-informed diplomat, former employee Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia (now deceased) L. Eyramdzhyants - with all the ensuing state and legal consequences. As he noted in his article (“Golos Armenii”, 04/04/2001), “in the text of the Moscow Treaty, the third article on the ownership of Nakhichevan ends with the words “without the right of transfer to a third party,” which means Iran. However, this phrase is already absent from the text of the Kars Treaty.
By the fall of 1921, Iran no longer hid its irritation at the creation in Transcaucasia of a state called “Azerbaijan,” which claimed to be united with the Iranian Turkic-speaking province of the same name and its rejection in favor of the Soviet state.” The author also emphasized the following important circumstance: “It is no coincidence that on November 30, 1989, when even in the Baltic states they spoke almost in a whisper about state sovereignty, the Majlis of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic suddenly announced its secession from the USSR and the Azerbaijan SSR. That same night, the state border of the USSR with Iran was swept away by armed detachments of the Nakhichevan militia. Information about this “incomprehensible” episode by the Soviet press was traditionally crumpled, although the situation was completely clear.
In those years in Moscow the main source expert assessments for Iran was the Iranian Studies Department of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. It was completely in the hands of Azerbaijani scientists - representatives of the Nakhichevan clan of Heydar Aliyev. Only their “activities” can explain the fact that, in addition to the fundamental agreement, certain “secret protocols” were signed, which determined the main thing - the existence of temporary parameters for the operation of the agreement. These documents, the relevance of the search for which is obvious not only from the point of view of historical justice, but also corresponds national interests Armenia and strategic Moscow, can and should be preserved in the archives of the parties that signed the treaty, in particular Russia.
Diplomatic miscalculation of the USSR
At the end of the 70s. the author of these lines, under the guidance of Doctor of Historical Sciences, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Armenian SSR of that time, J. Kirakosyan, one of the largest specialists in the history of Armenia at the beginning of the century, professionally dealt with this problem... Then it was possible to process large tracts of not only information materials historical plan, but also very serious volumes of modern Turkish printed information. In connection with the wave of terrorist attacks and the growth in Europe of broad public discussions of the problem of the Armenian Genocide, the Turkish press, scientists, the relevant special commissions on the Armenian issue of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Defense published a large number of propaganda materials - books, booklets, newspaper articles. Of course, the purpose of such publications was to defend the well-known Turkish point of view, which is completely different from the Armenian one, “affirming” the alleged guilt of Russia in these events, the front-line conditions of the First World War, and so on.
However, these same Turkish materials contained a lot of indirect, “background” information regarding the problem of interest to us. Along with others, it was discovered whole line additional direct and indirect evidence that the contract was concluded for exactly 25 years. The particular value of this information - although the materials themselves were more in the nature of propaganda propaganda - lay in the fact that it was prepared by the most important - Turkish - opponent of Armenia in this matter. In particular, various historically reliable episodes were presented in detail, which, according to the authors of the propaganda, were supposed to show the aggressiveness of the young Soviet country. For example, the fact that in 1925, the Ambassador of the RSFSR in the High Porte Vinogradov in an official note demanded the denunciation of the Russian-Turkish Treaty of 1921, accompanying “behavior so unconventional in international practice” with statements about Russia’s readiness to implement it unilaterally.
At the same time, according to a Turkish (!) source, Ambassador Vinogradov explains in an oral conversation at the Foreign Ministry: “We cannot wait 25 years and signed the RTD because we were weak then.” And now “we are strong and demand the restoration of the borders of Armenia.” To which one of the most famous statesmen of Turkey of that time, Ismet Inenu, immediately reacts: “ new country“It is necessary to adhere to its international obligations, and “in 25 years, Turkey, of course, will return these territories.” There were a dozen or so such individual episodes, directly confirming the essence of the issue and having a very reliable character. There are indirect, specifically Turkish, confirmations of our thesis, and even more.”
The well-informed author also provides other arguments in favor of his thesis. So, in particular, he, among other things, refers to one well-known academic work, which also contains rather unequivocal statements on this matter: “Serious confirmation of our thesis can also be found in official historiography. The three-volume “History of International Relations after the Second World War,” edited by Academician Khvostov, clearly and clearly, although in a footnote to the main article, formulates: “due to the mistakes of the Soviet foreign policy“Türkiye did not return “significant territories” to the USSR.
It is also known for certain that in the spring of 1945, the Armenian SSR and the Georgian SSR presented Turkey with territorial claims and an ultimatum on the need to withdraw its “troops and population” to its known borders so that by March 1946, Soviet troops would enter this territory. There is no doubt about the historical authenticity of this fact. This coincided with the intentions of the Soviet Union to declare war on Turkey, and, regardless of Ankara’s diplomatically simple game and the declaration of war on Germany “at the end”, the Soviet troops were provided legal side actions, after which they were actually ready to enter Turkish territory.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, later the head of the Turkish government of that time, Saracioglu answered verbatim in the following way: “We know that this is the territory of Armenia, and we are ready to begin the demarcation process... However, we do not understand Georgia’s claims,” “It would be nice if you in the Soviet Union sorted it out among yourselves, and then shared the skin unkilled bear" Quotable historical fact described in both Soviet historical and Turkish relevant literature...
It is noteworthy that after 1921, the first official document at the level of a bilateral agreement between Russia (USSR) and Turkey, declaring that the parties do not have mutual territorial claims, is an interstate agreement signed only in August 1978 during the official visit of Turkish Prime Minister B. Ecevit to Moscow. The agreement was signed by A. Kosygin on August 22, 1978, it was published in Izvestia. The paragraph about the absence of mutual territorial claims is the second. Feedback from the Turkish press at the time openly joyfully pointed to RTD.
Nakhichevan in modern regional architecture
Moving on to the description of relatively recent events, L. Eyramdzhyants also points to the significant role of Iran in regional processes. Thus, in particular, he emphasizes: “Another fact of the recent history of the region, confirming the regulation of the most serious processes in Transcaucasia by the RTD, are the events of the late spring of 1992, when the Armenian armed forces retreated almost for the only time during the war in the north-eastern direction of the front in Karabakh . Then, as a result of the beginning intensification of political contacts of the Armenian leadership with the West and the subsequent rear betrayals immediately after this, we lost the Getashen subdistrict, Shaumyan and half of the Martakert region of Karabakh, which are still under the control of Azerbaijan.
Until now, however, it remains little known that the Azerbaijani offensive was then stopped by the decisive actions of Iran. Tehran sent an ultimatum note to Baku (and an official notification to Yerevan) demanding to immediately stop the offensive of the Azerbaijani army. Otherwise, the 7th armored division of the fanatical “pasdarans” (“guardians of the revolution”), which was already pulled up to the Iran-Nakhichevan border and, according to the Iranian side, was ready to cross the border and occupy Nakhichevan, violating the entire internal logic of the RTD. A few years later, in an informal conversation between the author of these lines and the Ambassador of Iran in Yerevan, confirmation was received not only of the seriousness of the intentions of the Iranian side, but also extreme surprise was expressed that in Yerevan, unlike Baku, few people are interested in the international rights of Iran in part of Nakhichevan, stipulated by the 1921 treaty."
Thus, if we proceed from the information of L. Eyramdzhyants, which is hardly subject to doubt, we can come to the conclusion that at the present stage, neither Turkey nor Russia, based on a number of factors, is yet profitable to push the topic of revising the Treaty of Kars, especially its secret part (protocols, the existence of which is claimed by L. Eyramdzhyants). It is all the more difficult to expect that this secret part could ever be made widely public in the foreseeable future.
As for Iran, the latter will probably clearly state its position only if there is a danger of a sharp decline in its influence in the NAR, as a result of which, for example, the international rights and interests of Iran in the modern NAR will be sharply and radically violated by someone. In this case, neither Moscow nor Ankara will be able to do anything if Tehran itself decides to scrap the system enshrined in Transcaucasia by the Treaty of Kars.
That is why, when, after Turkey put forward the notorious “Caucasian Platform” in 2008, the Turks initially categorically refused to take into account the Iranian factor in organizing security and stability in the Caucasus, Moscow indirectly (during international conference in Turkey in November 2008) made it clear to Ankara that if the Turkish authorities refuse to take into account Tehran’s interests in the region, it will be Russia that will demand a revision of the format of Turkish proposals.
Ankara then promoted the formula of 3 recognized states Transcaucasia+Russia+Türkiye+USA+EU. After consultations with the Russian leadership, the formula was changed to the so-called. The “Caucasian Five” was given wide publicity in this form. After the Turks refused to include Iran in the framework of the described initiative Russian side insisted that either Ankara begins negotiations with Tehran on Iran’s participation in the “Caucasus Platform”, or Turkey will have to reckon with the fact that:
a) at the request of Russia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and “more” will have to be included in the framework of the initiative unrecognized states region”, i.e. NKR-Artsakh;
b) in addition to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and NKR-Artsakh, consider the so-called “Caucasian Platform” as possible individual participants. " autonomous entities”, i.e. Nakhichevan and Adjara, in which, by the way, the Iranian consulate began to represent the interests of Tehran even then.
Nevertheless, we suggest not to exclude anything a priori. After all, if we follow the geopolitics around Nakhichevan, comparing this with Iran’s measures to integrate into the same SCO and EAEU, it is clear that military actions, to which Tehran will simply be forced to react or even intervene in them, may again be “frozen” for an indefinite future. plans of the Iranian leadership. However, this also applies to the Iranian program of combating Wahhabi terrorism and Zionism in the Middle East. In this context, the intensification of some military actions or staging in Nakhichevan is a reflection of the general strategic situation in the Caspian region, in the Middle East and in general around the Transcaucasus.
Capital of the Na-hi-che-van Av-to-nom-noy Res-pub-li-ki.
Population: about 86 thousand people (2012). Ras-po-lo-zhen on the right bank of the Na-hi-che-van-chai river (a tributary of the Araks river). Railroad station. Auto-road knot. International Airport.
Nakhichevan is one of the oldest cities on the territory of Azerbaijan (an ancient and medieval city located in the northern part of the modern city; according to According to J. Ha-li-lo-va and V. G. Aliyeva, medieval Nakhichevan was located 12 km from the modern city). The earliest references to the city are contained in the works of ancient scientists Josephus Flavius (1st century AD .; the name pe-re-da-but in the form “Apo-ba-te-ri-on”) and Claudius Pto-le-mea (2nd century AD; the name per-re-da- but in the form “Na-ksua-na”); some medieval is-ki-da-ti-ru-yut os-no-va-nie city of 1539 BC. e. Nakhichevan became part of the Man-ney kingdom (IX-VII centuries), then Midia. In the 6th-4th centuries in the 14th sat-ra-pii Akh-me-ni-dov of the state-sudar-st-va, then in the company of Atro-pa-te-na and others. From V -VI century AD e. Nakhichevan is an important trade and administrative and political center. In the 7th-9th centuries, under the control of Ha-li-fa-ta. At the end of the 10th - mid-11th centuries, the capital of the not-large-sho-sto-stable Na-hi-che-van-sk-go shah-st-va (Turkic “Na-khchy-van shah-lyg"), os-no-van-no-go Abu Du-la-fa-mi. In 1064, he was captured by the Sel-Juk sul-ta-n Alp-Ars-lan, who created his residence there. In the 12th century, the capital of the state of Il-de-gi-zi-dov, the significance of the city increased, about 150-200 thousand lived in it. people Nakhichevan was divided into sheh-ri-stan (inside the fortress walls) and ra-bat (ba-za-ry and kar-ra-van-sa-rai). You have developed a local school of architecture.
In 1221, Nakhichevan for-khva-che-na and raz-ru-she-na mon-go-la-mi. The city began to rise in the state of Khu-la-gui-dov during the reign of Ga-zan-khan (1295-1304). In 1386, for-nya-ta and raz-ru-she-na ha-nom Zo-lo-toy Or-dy Tokh-ta-my-sh, and in 1387 - Ti-mu-rum. In the 15th century, di-la became part of the states of Ak-Ko-yun-lu and Ka-ra-Ko-yun-lu. During the Turkish-Persian wars of the 16th-17th centuries, Nachevan was repeatedly transferred from hand to hand and destroyed; The pra-vi-te-lei of Nakhichevan at this time on-know-cha-li, as the pra-vi-lo, from among the ple-me-ni kyan-ger-li. In 1588-1603 (it was the center of Sand-ja-ka) and 1724-1735 it was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. From the 2nd half of the 17th century it became part of the Chu-khur-sa-ad-sko-go bey-ler-bey-st-va state of the Se-fe-vids.
In 1735, Nakhichevan was occupied by Na-dir-Ku-li-khan Af-shar (from 1736 Na-dir-Shah). After his death, Nakhichevan became the hundred-face of Na-hi-che-van-skogo khan-st-va (1747-1828). In 1808, they were followed by Russian troops during the Russian-Persian War of 1804-1813, and secondarily by them in June 1827 during Russian-Persian war of 1826-1828. According to the Turk-man-chay-world of 1828, Nakhichevan, together with the Na-khi-che-van-khan-st, became part of the Russian Empire. rii. Center of the Na-khi-che-van province of the Armenian las-ti region (until 1840), district town of the Gruz-i-no-Ime-re-tinskaya (1840-1846 years), Tiflis (1846-1849), Eri-van (1849-1920) provinces. In the 2nd third of the 19th century, there was a mass transfer of Armenian families from Persia and the Ottoman Empire to Nakhichevan. peri. According to the city government in 1870, city government was introduced in the city. In 1908, the Ulu-khan-lu (now Ma-sis, Ar-meniya) - Jul-fa railway line opened traffic along the route through Nakhichevan. .