The American strategic research center RAND (an abbreviation for Research and Development) analyzed Russia’s readiness for future wars. According to overseas experts, the modern Russian army relies not on the number of soldiers, but on tactics and high technology, and in this it is similar to the armies of the United States and Germany.
— Russia does not strive for a full-scale armed conflict, therefore the main task of the Russian army is to protect its country, large settlements and industrial centers;
- reforms of recent years have made it possible to maintain high combat readiness of a large part of the ground units of the Russian army, while reducing its strength - as a result, Russia can quickly transfer units by rail in the right directions;
- in the event of an armed conflict, Russian troops will strive to avoid a decisive battle with equal enemy forces, and for this, the Russian Federation will use the entire range of long-range land, air and sea-based missile weapons, with the main targets being enemy aircraft carriers, military bases and aircraft;
— given Russia’s traditional weaknesses in a protracted war with an equal or nearly equal enemy, Moscow will try to use indirect strategies of action and asymmetric responses to reduce existing inconsistencies;
— Moscow’s main “insurance” remains its nuclear arsenal, which the Russian Federation can use in response to an attack or threaten to use it.
“At the operational and tactical levels, Russia will likely focus on disrupting the enemy’s plans, destroying his command, control systems and manpower, including through cyber/electronic warfare and extensive use of the maneuver of his units,” RAND analysts assure.
Experts note that traditional methods of warfare will be combined with unconventional approaches, including assistance from the civilian population and the use of special forces, which have proven themselves well in Syria.
“Several Russian and Soviet military operations are examples of a rapid, coordinated coup d'état, attempting to achieve the main objectives of the campaign in the shortest possible time. Similar operations may be carried out in the future. Moreover, Russia has succeeded in using camouflage in preparation for such campaigns,” RAND analysts write.
RAND believes that the Russian army has units that have proven themselves in previous conflicts. At the same time, some formations use outdated weapons and are staffed by conscripts. Therefore, experts conclude, the question of the real potential of the Russian army remains open.
What is behind the RAND assessment, how serious an adversary does the Russian Federation look from the US point of view?
“RAND quite adequately assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the Russian Armed Forces,” says reserve colonel, member of the Expert Council of the Collegium of the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation Viktor Murakhovsky. — American experts consider the rapid development in Russia of high-tech weapons systems to be a strength. They especially note electronic warfare systems, as well as the emergence of ground- and air-launched cruise missiles as a means of strategic non-nuclear deterrence.
And the disadvantages are considered to be the lack of a fifth-generation fighter in the Russian Aerospace Forces, the weakness of the general-purpose forces of the fleet, as well as the fact that a third (according to their estimates) of the size of the Russian army is a conscript contingent. They note that conscripts are practically not involved in military conflicts and can only be used in a full-scale war.
The RAND report, in addition, indicates that Russian permanent readiness formations - ground forces, airborne forces and marines - cannot be used entirely in a large-scale conflict, but only partially: battalions and tactical groups that are entirely staffed by contract soldiers.
Finally, it is noted that Russia has practically no militarily strong allies.
In general, I repeat, the report is objective - if we exclude some assessments of our weapons systems, with which I personally, for example, do not agree.
"SP": - What are these estimates?
— I will not expand on this topic, on specific systems, so that the Americans do not get cards in their hands.
“SP”: — Do you agree with RAND’s assessments of our strategy and tactics?
— The Americans write that Russia does not want to directly confront the United States and NATO, and therefore uses the so-called strategy of hybrid wars. But at the same time, they believe that Russia’s military aspirations are largely ideologized—for example, they seriously consider the scenario of Russian military aggression against the Baltic countries.
RAND notes that Moscow is establishing strategic military cooperation with Beijing. Moreover, they consider Russia and China to be revisionist powers—those who challenge the influence and military superiority of the United States.
As for tactics, the joint work of aviation and special operations forces is noted for high-precision destruction of targets. At the same time, it is noted that the Russian Federation used conventional aviation weapons in Syria, and not high-precision ones.
"SP": - Can we learn something for ourselves from the RAND report - from the fact that Americans see us like this?
- No. The Russian command makes decisions not on the basis of RAND Corporation reports, but on the basis of documents at a different level.
“SP”: — If you look 10 years into the future, will our army, from the US point of view, be a more serious adversary than it is today?
- Certainly. The state armaments program for the next 10 years - until 2027 - is already signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Yes, its financial component has decreased significantly - 19 trillion. The rubles that are planned to be spent on it are, due to inflation, significantly less than 19 trillion. for the state program, which began in 2011. However, key funding goes specifically to high-tech weapons and system-wide means, such as space communications systems, missile attack warning systems, and robotics control systems.
In my opinion, all this will significantly increase the effectiveness of our Armed Forces and their combat capabilities.
Archive photo
Gorenburg analyzed the Russian state weapons program, designed until 2027. In his opinion, Russia will be ahead of its competitors in some types of weapons - in particular, we are talking about anti-ship missiles, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and air defense.
In other areas, the Russian army will be able to reduce the gap during this period - for example, with regard to unmanned aerial vehicles and precision-guided munitions. And in some, the lag will be significant and will remain - we are talking primarily about surface ships and automated control systems. When we talk about “lag,” we mean the West (primarily the United States) and China.
Actually, the most important problem is the issue of financing. Of course, this is by no means a peculiarity of our country; almost all states face similar problems. With the possible exception of the USA and China. And then, in the United States, current generals constantly talk about how difficult it is for them to curb the “Russian threat” without taking the necessary measures, which first of all imply stable and abundant funding.
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In particular, Dmitry Gorenburg believes, the nuclear triad will actively develop. We are talking about both new intercontinental ballistic missiles and other projects - for example, the Barguzin and Sarmatakh combat railway missile systems. In addition, the modernization of the Tu-160 and Tu-95 strategic bombers will continue - according to the expert, this is a more rational option for the foreseeable future than relying on the development of the PAK DA.
Photos on the topic
Russia showed what it will “slap” Europe
As for the Navy, the report calls it the “big loser.” Firstly, due to the high cost of development, for which reason, the American expert believes, the emphasis will be on the development of the submarine fleet and corvettes. The construction of larger surface ships, Gorenburg believes, is influenced by Western and Ukrainian sanctions. Apparently, this implies the story with the Mistrals and the cessation of supplies of Ukrainian engines for the needs of the Russian Navy (although active work is currently underway to replace them, serial production is expected to begin in 2018).
Secondly, another problem identified in the report is the inability of the shipbuilding industry to utilize the funds already allocated.
At the same time, the report praises the Caliber missiles, which, as Gorenburg notes, pose a great threat to a potential enemy, including NATO.
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Regarding the air force, the report notes that the emphasis will be on the Su-30SM, Su-24 and Su-35S. Perhaps the VKS will acquire some MiG-35s. As for the fifth-generation Su-57 fighters, Gorenburg believes that they will appear in significant quantities by 2027, that is, after the completion of the development of the new generation engine. Until then, these aircraft will be purchased in small quantities for testing.
Due to the high cost, the American analyst believes, the number of T-14 Armata tanks and combat vehicles created on this platform in the Russian troops will be small. However, here the author of the report does not demonstrate complete confidence that this will be the case.
Generally speaking, the report deals mainly with already known developments. And even then, not about everyone - as has already been said, there is an advantage in electronic warfare and air defense systems, but there is nothing about the prospects of these types of weapons. However, the report itself is not too voluminous and the analysis is quite general.
As a result, the author comes to the conclusion that Russian developments are updated versions of late Soviet designs. And the Russian industry is faced with the task of mastering the mass production of new types of weapons in order to ensure their uninterrupted supply.
Photo: reuters.com
At the Army 2015 forum, during a discussion about the future appearance of the army, a State Duma deputy Vyacheslav Tetyokin stated that Russia “acutely lacks” discussions “in parliamentary and military circles for the development of the army,” at which it would be necessary to identify the problems of the Russian army, and cited the Pentagon as an example, where this is customary. Yes, what the military lacks for complete happiness is a qualified (after all, experts in the military field!) opinion of State Duma deputies with a discussion of the latest (and, accordingly, not really for the public) data on military issues in an environment where many are not shy have dual citizenship.
But the Russian service of the BBC liked the idea, and it “turned to military experts with a request to name those weak points of the Russian army that, in their opinion, should be corrected first.” “Political Russia” recently talked about “five vulnerabilities of the US Army”: what is their significance and for what purpose was the corresponding material published (most likely, the Pentagon just wants budget money). Let's look at these five points from the BBC too.
1. The production and development of modern weapons suffers from a lack of personnel and imperfect material resources.
Quote from the speech at the round table by Vyacheslav Tetyokin:
“I outlined the problem of vocational education. But you [the military] must pose the problem of applied science to politicians, to us. All these wonderful systems, who will make them? I'm talking about hands. Where are these minds? [...] Who will generate all these things? For example, my brother worked at the Institute of Radio Engineering and Electronics of the Academy of Sciences, which does not exist now. He is 70 years old. He says that now the level of those who come to research institutes is an order of magnitude lower than ours.”
Nobody argues with the fact that education needs to be reformed, freeing from liberal reforms and sweeping out reformers with a ban on working in the field of education and in government positions; but this is a general problem, and not at all an army problem. By the way, the effectiveness of the proposal to introduce discussions in the State Duma on military issues is immediately visible: let them first at least learn to walk in formation, and then, perhaps, it will be clear that they need to answer the question posed, and not argue in an intellectual way “based on motives.”
And, by the way, the state weapons program implies achieving the share of modern weapons and military equipment from 70 to 100% by 2021.
2. The strength of the armed forces is insufficient, and recruitment is fraught with difficulties due to the lack of people.
Konstantin Sivkov, Chairman of the “Union of Geopoliticians” (this is my first time encountering this):
“The main problem of the Russian armed forces is that they are small in number. In order to ensure a normal, full-fledged solution to the country's defense problems, their number must be increased by about one and a half times. Secondly, Russian troops now need to purchase as much modern equipment as possible. Modern Russian military equipment meets all the most modern requirements in terms of the level of capabilities and the technologies contained therein. But purchases, in my opinion, are carried out in insufficient quantities.”
No argument was found other than the words “in my opinion.” I, too, am more of a “geopolitician” than a military expert - but at least I don’t give advice to the military on what to do. Yes, now 40% of Russian residents are in favor of increasing the size of the army, but quantity and quality are paradigmatically different categories, and the first does not transform into the second by simple extensive increase. In December, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Army General Valery Gerasimov(I think that he should know the needs of the troops better than various “geopoliticians”), stated:
“With a constant number of combat personnel, increasing the equipment with new equipment plus solving issues of supporting the armed forces leads to an increase in the combat effectiveness of individual units, groupings of armed forces in all strategic directions, as well as the Armed Forces as a whole. Thus, we can say that the combat capabilities of our armed forces have increased by 1.3 times.”
Wherein Sergei Shoigu back in September last year, he said that the army had fulfilled the annual plan for recruiting contract soldiers and was even “forced to take measures to restrain those who wanted it” - so maybe the military still knows better how many military personnel the country needs?
3. Inconsistency of reforms, voluntarism in decision making.
Igor Korotchenko, editor-in-chief of the National Defense magazine, noted:
“It’s a sad tradition in Russia - a new commander-in-chief comes and priorities change. We need an institution of permanent deputy ministers of defense, commanders-in-chief of all types of armed forces.”
“The first and main problem is the incompleteness of the military reform, launched in the late 2000s, and repeatedly changed in particulars. Moreover, both under Serdyukov and under Shoigu.”
One cannot but agree with the first: constant rotation of superiors does not lead to anything good, be it a platoon commander or the president of the country. Removal from a position should depend on the results of work, and not simply “it’s time for someone else to give orders here.” So I would reformulate the thesis less delicately: let’s play politics separately, and let the army work at the deputy level. However, the current commander in chief, unlike the previous one, in my opinion, sets priorities quite normally.
But the second is standard journalistic incompetent whining. Was it really necessary to accept the reform plan and stick to it to the end - regardless of everything that was happening? Oh well.
4. Lack of modern weapons, including unmanned systems, low rate of army rearmament
Again Igor Korotchenko:
“In the previous period, insufficient attention was paid to drones. Here we need to resolutely catch up. Russia needs drones of all main classes - from the tactical level to strategic aerial reconnaissance aircraft. Attack drones are needed because they are the future. The second problem is that it is necessary to eliminate voluntarism in decision-making related to arms purchases.”
Regarding voluntarism in procurement, I can’t say anything without specifics, although the topic is important, and at the same time not exclusive to Russia: for example, in Germany the Bundeswehr has a problem of the form “defective fighters and overheating rifles,” and the US Accounts Chamber found that all 33 deployed The missiles of the American missile defense system have defects. And I wasn’t even looking for anything, just links from the browser open. So they also have voluntarism in terms of “what to buy.”
About drones - I agree that this issue is significant, but “a weak point that needs to be corrected first”? Somehow I have a suspicion that the Russian BBC service “on its knees” compiled the list, simply compiling opinions on various occasions. Tetyokin’s quote is designated as taken from a round table - it is unlikely that he was asked the specific question stated. “The state stops investing in social capital and invests in defense and security forces. In the first quarter of 2015, defense spending amounted to a record 9% of quarterly GDP. This means that there will be fewer schools, fewer hospitals..."
So a puzzle has arisen: I, of course, do not pretend to be telepathic, but here there are not “five main problems”, but a pulled-from-the-finger news feed “the deputy proposed to discuss”, then from the pine forest the opinions of people, of whom only Igor Korotchenko understands the topic , and, apparently, he was not asked the question in the stated wording. And at the end the main idea is conveyed: “This is very expensive!” It is for the sake of promoting this idea, I think, that the BBC tried. And it doesn’t matter that the topic is presented with the remark “ it would be wrong to freeze in this place"- the article (and there are many reposts and retellings of it!) is not intended to convince that already there is no need to feed your army, namely to introduce the idea of “feeding your army expensive" - will be very useful in case of any difficulties when the idea is pushed: “Russia does not need a powerful modern army, it is very expensive, sausage is better than missiles!”
However, there is a feeling that the State Department has run out of professionals, and those who exist do not understand that Russia always unites from external influences, and Russians have not been intimidated by difficulties for many centuries.
The famous German newspaper Die Welt published an article “Russians cannot fight at night,” which, based on data from the Wikileaks resource, talks about the weaknesses of the Russian army. The main emphasis was placed on conducting large-scale military exercises “Zapad-2009” and “Ladoga-2009”, which took place in August-September 2009 on the western borders of Russia in close proximity to the borders of a number of countries of the North Atlantic Alliance. More than 33 thousand military personnel took part in the exercises.
The official objective of the exercise was to practice the interaction of military units in neutralizing military conflicts, as well as the destruction of terrorist groups. Along with these goals, the task was set to identify the weak points of the Russian armed forces, which appeared during the 5-day war with Georgia. The results of the exercises were discouraging; this is precisely the assessment given in secret NATO documents published by the Wikileaks website.
In order to circumvent the obligation to invite observers from the NATO bloc to the exercises, Russia conducted these exercises as a series of small, unrelated maneuvers, but NATO, with the help of spy satellites and intelligence services, monitored all stages of these exercises. On November 23, 2009, members of the NATO Council summed up the results of the exercises held in Russia. According to the intelligence received and the analytical work carried out, conclusions were drawn that during the exercises the Russian army fought primarily with itself.
The exercise showed that Russia currently has limited capabilities in conducting joint operations with the air force (this observation was also true during the war in South Ossetia, when the Russian air force operated in isolation from its ground forces) and remains heavily dependent on outdated weapons systems. Our army is not capable of fighting effectively in all weathers and is experiencing a shortage of strategic vehicles. Particularly noted was the Russian army's inability to coordinate joint offensive operations, a lack of camaraderie, and an aging officer corps that is losing tactical flexibility in thinking. Against the general background, insufficient training of personnel involved in the military exercises was noted. This problem, unlike all others, risks persisting in the Russian army longer than others, since no significant reform is expected in terms of transferring troops to a contract basis. Meanwhile, the training of conscript personnel has remained quite low for many years and apparently does not concern the Ministry of Defense to an insufficient extent.
Exercises "Zapad-2009"
Based on the results of the exercises, it was concluded that Russia is not able to simultaneously respond to two different, even relatively small, conflicts occurring in different places.
Despite this assessment of the past exercises, there was no relaxation at NATO headquarters. Quite the contrary, Western strategists are seriously concerned about the state of the Russian army, since its weakness increases its dependence on the use of tactical nuclear weapons even in relatively small regional conflicts. The greatest fear among the alliance countries is caused by the modern Iskander tactical systems, which have a range of hitting targets of up to 500 km. The missiles of the complex can be equipped with both conventional and nuclear warheads. Having placed the complexes on the territory of the Kaliningrad region, almost all of Poland, all of Lithuania, most of Latvia, and small parts of Germany and Denmark will be in their affected area. Which cannot but cause concern among members of the alliance.
In addition to the direct tasks of assessing the combat effectiveness of the Russian army, it was possible to solve another problem, to create a split in the NATO bloc from the inside. Many of the alliance's Eastern European members were outraged by the bloc's rather passive response to the exercise. In their opinion, the maneuvers in western Russia near St. Petersburg had the goal of working out a possible option for countering an attack from Poland and Lithuania. At the same time, Russia has been practicing the use of operational-tactical systems, the missiles of which can be equipped with nuclear warheads. The very fact of conducting such exercises was already a kind of “provocation” for the entire bloc. To a large extent, such an assessment of the exercises was facilitated by the fact that Russia did not make them transparent by not inviting observers.
OTRK Iskander-M
Be that as it may, the maneuvers were beneficial for Russia. And they brought confusion into the North Atlantic Alliance, and examined the shortcomings of their army in practice. Work to eliminate all identified shortcomings is already underway, and last year’s exercises “Vostok-2010” were held at a higher level. What is important for Russia is that the issue of equipping troops with new equipment and equipment has finally been positively resolved - primarily communications equipment. According to plans, in the near future, every soldier will have to receive personal communications equipment and GLONASS receivers, which should facilitate the conduct of modern combat.
Finally, the troops have received modern equipment that can be used in all weather conditions and at night. Procurement of all-weather attack helicopters capable of confident operation at night - Mi-28N and Ka-52 - is underway. The purchase of new T-90A tanks, equipped with modern 2nd generation thermal imagers, is underway. The only thing that confuses us is that the thermal imagers installed on the tanks are French; a strange situation is emerging where the country can produce more complex helicopter and aircraft equipment, but is not able to produce its own thermal imagers that are not inferior to their foreign counterparts. The purchase of Mistral helicopter carriers from France can be considered in terms of increasing the strategic maneuverability of force groups.
Our generals were able to learn lessons from the conflict in South Ossetia and the series of subsequent exercises without reading the foreign press. In general, the entire military reform taking place in the country can be considered a plus. Its component is especially strong in the field of rearmament of the army with new equipment, although even here it is not without pitfalls; modern Russia is not shy about buying weapons abroad. The average person just has to keep an eye on what the Western press will write about the exercises of the renewed Russian army in the next 3 years and draw their own conclusions based on this.
Russia is strong enough to defeat the army of any neighboring state except China. In addition, the Russian army has capabilities in some types of weapons that others do not, says analyst Dmitry Gorenburg of the Center for Naval Analysis and Harvard University. At the same time, there are areas where the Russian Federation is noticeably lagging behind, the expert believes.
Archive photo
Gorenburg analyzed the Russian state weapons program, designed until 2027. In his opinion, Russia will be ahead of its competitors in some types of weapons - in particular, we are talking about anti-ship missiles, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and air defense.
In other areas, the Russian army will be able to reduce the gap during this period - for example, with regard to unmanned aerial vehicles and precision-guided munitions. And in some, the lag will be significant and will remain - we are talking primarily about surface ships and automated control systems. When we talk about “lag,” we mean the West (primarily the United States) and China.
Actually, the most important problem is the issue of financing. Of course, this is by no means a peculiarity of our country; almost all states face similar problems. With the possible exception of the USA and China. And then, in the United States, current generals constantly talk about how difficult it is for them to curb the “Russian threat” without taking the necessary measures, which first of all imply stable and abundant funding.
In particular, Dmitry Gorenburg believes, the nuclear triad will actively develop. We are talking about both new intercontinental ballistic missiles and other projects - for example, the Sarmatians. In addition, the modernization of the Tu-160 and Tu-95 strategic bombers will continue - according to the expert, this is a more rational option for the foreseeable future than relying on the development of the PAK DA.
As for the Navy, the report calls it the “big loser.” Firstly, due to the high cost of development, for which reason, the American expert believes, the emphasis will be on the development of the submarine fleet and corvettes. The construction of larger surface ships, Gorenburg believes, is influenced by Western and Ukrainian sanctions. Apparently, this implies the story with the Mistrals and the cessation of supplies of Ukrainian engines for the needs of the Russian Navy (although active work is currently underway to replace them, serial production is expected to begin in 2018).
Secondly, another problem identified in the report is the inability of the shipbuilding industry to utilize the funds already allocated.
At the same time, the report praises the Caliber missiles, which, as Gorenburg notes, pose a great threat to a potential enemy, including NATO.
Regarding the air force, the report notes that the emphasis will be on the Su-30SM, Su-24 and Su-35S. Perhaps the VKS will acquire some MiG-35s. As for the fifth-generation Su-57 fighters, Gorenburg believes that they will appear in significant quantities by 2027, that is, after the completion of the development of the new generation engine. Until then, these aircraft will be purchased in small quantities for testing.
Due to the high cost, the American analyst believes, the number of T-14 Armata tanks and combat vehicles created on this platform in the Russian troops will be small. However, here the author of the report does not demonstrate complete confidence that this will be the case.
Generally speaking, the report deals mainly with already known developments. And even then, not about everyone - as has already been said, there is an advantage in electronic warfare and air defense systems, but there is nothing about the prospects of these types of weapons. However, the report itself is not too voluminous and the analysis is quite general.
As a result, the author comes to the conclusion that Russian developments are updated versions of late Soviet designs. And the Russian industry is faced with the task of mastering the mass production of new types of weapons in order to ensure their uninterrupted supply.
At the moment, Gorenburg believes, the Russian army is able to cope with the army of any neighboring state in a conventional war - with the exception of China.
However, this is already an achievement. Earlier, Pravda.Ru reported that they considered the Russian army so backward compared to the armies of Western states that, in their opinion, talking about any threat would be a great exaggeration.