The war between the USSR and the Finns. Real losses of the USSR in the Soviet-Finnish war

A New Look

Triumphant defeat.

Why is the victory of the Red Army hidden?
in the "winter war"?
Version by Viktor Suvorov.


The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, called the "winter war", is known as one of the most shameful pages of the Soviet military history. The huge Red Army was unable to break through the defenses of the Finnish militias for three and a half months, and as a result, the Soviet leadership was forced to agree to a peace treaty with Finland.

Is the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Armed Forces, Marshal Mannerheim, the winner of the “Winter War”?


Defeat Soviet Union in the "Winter War" is the most striking evidence of the weakness of the Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. It serves as one of the main arguments for those historians and publicists who argue that the USSR was not preparing for war with Germany and that Stalin sought by any means to delay the entry of the Soviet Union into the world conflict.
Indeed, it is unlikely that Stalin could have planned an attack on a strong and well-armed Germany at a time when the Red Army suffered such a shameful defeat in battles with such a small and weak enemy. However, is the “shameful defeat” of the Red Army in the “Winter War” an obvious axiom that does not require proof? To understand this issue, let's first look at the facts.

Preparing for war: Stalin's plans

The Soviet-Finnish war began on the initiative of Moscow. On October 12, 1939, the Soviet government demanded that Finland cede the Karelian Isthmus and the Rybachy Peninsula, hand over all the islands in the Gulf of Finland, and lease the port of Hanko for a long term as a naval base. In exchange, Moscow offered Finland territory twice the size, but not suitable for economic activity and strategically useless.

A delegation of the Finnish government arrived in Moscow to discuss territorial disputes...


The Finnish government did not reject the claims of its “great neighbor”. Even Marshal Mannerheim, who was considered a supporter of a pro-German orientation, spoke in favor of a compromise with Moscow. Started in mid-October Soviet-Finnish negotiations, lasting less than a month. On November 9, the negotiations broke down, but the Finns were ready for a new bargain. By mid-November, tensions in Soviet-Finnish relations seemed to have eased somewhat. The Finnish government even called on residents of border areas who moved inland during the conflict to return to their homes. However, at the end of the same month, on November 30, 1939, Soviet troops attacked the Finnish border.
Naming the reasons that prompted Stalin to start a war against Finland, Soviet (now Russian!) researchers and a significant part of Western scientists indicate that the main goal of Soviet aggression was the desire to secure Leningrad. They say that when the Finns refused to exchange lands, Stalin wanted to seize part of the Finnish territory near Leningrad in order to better protect the city from attack.
This is an obvious lie! The true purpose of the attack on Finland is obvious - the Soviet leadership intended to seize this country and include it in the "Indestructible Alliance..." Back in August 1939, during secret Soviet-German negotiations on the division of spheres of influence, Stalin and Molotov insisted on the inclusion of Finland (along with the three Baltic states) into the "Soviet sphere of influence". Finland was to become the first country in a series of states that Stalin planned to annex to his power.
The aggression was planned long before the attack. The Soviet and Finnish delegations were still discussing possible conditions for a territorial exchange, and in Moscow the future communist government of Finland was already being formed - the so-called “People's Government of the Finnish Democratic Republic”. It was headed by one of the founders of the Communist Party of Finland, Otto Kuusinen, who lived permanently in Moscow and worked in the apparatus of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

Otto Kuusinen - Stalin's candidate for Finnish leader.


Group of leaders of the Comintern. Standing first on the left is O. Kuusinen


Later, O. Kuusinen became a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was appointed deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and in 1957-1964 was secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Kuusinen was matched by other “ministers” of the “people’s government”, which was supposed to arrive in Helsinki in the convoy of Soviet troops and announce “ voluntary accession“Finland to the USSR. At the same time, under the leadership of NKVD officers, units of the so-called “Red Army of Finland” were created, which were assigned the role of “extras” in the planned performance.

Chronicle of the "Winter War"

However, the performance did not work out. The Soviet military planned to quickly capture Finland, which did not have a strong army. People's Commissar of Defense "Stalin's eagle" Voroshilov boasted that in six days the Red Army would be in Helsinki.
But already in the first days of the offensive, Soviet troops encountered stubborn resistance from the Finns.

Finnish rangers are the mainstay of Mannerheim's army.



Having advanced 25-60 km deep into Finnish territory, the Red Army was stopped on the narrow Karelian Isthmus. Finnish defensive troops dug into the ground along the Mannerheim Line and repelled all Soviet attacks. The 7th Army, commanded by General Meretskov, suffered heavy losses. Additional troops sent by the Soviet command to Finland were surrounded by mobile Finnish detachments of skier warriors, who made sudden raids from the forests, exhausting and bleeding the aggressors.
For a month and a half, a huge Soviet army trampled on the Karelian Isthmus. At the end of December, the Finns even tried to launch a counteroffensive, but they clearly did not have enough strength.
The failures of the Soviet troops forced Stalin to take emergency measures. On his orders, several high-ranking commanders were publicly shot in the army; General Semyon Timoshenko (future People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR), close to the leader, became the new commander of the main North-Western Front. To break through the Mannerheim Line, additional reinforcements were sent to Finland, as well as NKVD barrier detachments.

Semyon Timoshenko - leader of the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line"


January 15, 1940 soviet artillery began a massive shelling of Finnish defense positions, which lasted 16 days. At the beginning of February, the offensive against Karelian section 140 thousand soldiers and more than a thousand tanks were abandoned. Fierce fighting raged on the narrow isthmus for two weeks. Only February 17 Soviet troops managed to break through the Finnish defenses, and on February 22, Marshal Mannerheim ordered the army to be withdrawn to a new defensive line.
Although the Red Army managed to break through the Mannerheim Line and capture the city of Vyborg, the Finnish troops were not defeated. The Finns managed to once again gain a foothold on new frontiers. Mobile units of Finnish partisans operated in the rear of the occupying army and carried out daring attacks on enemy units. The Soviet troops were exhausted and battered; their losses were enormous. One of Stalin's generals bitterly admitted:
- We conquered exactly enough Finnish territory to bury our dead.
Under these conditions, Stalin chose to again propose to the Finnish government to resolve territorial issue through negotiations. About plans for Finland to join the Soviet Union general secretary I chose not to remember. By that time, Kuusinen's puppet "people's government" and his "Red Army" had already been slowly disbanded. As compensation, the failed "leader" Soviet Finland“received the post of Chairman of the Supreme Council of the newly created Karelo-Finnish SSR. And some of his colleagues in the “Cabinet of Ministers” were simply shot - apparently so as not to get in the way...
The Finnish government immediately agreed to negotiations. Although the Red Army suffered heavy losses, it was clear that the small Finnish defense would not be able to stop the Soviet offensive for long.
Negotiations began at the end of February. On the night of March 12, 1940, a peace treaty was concluded between the USSR and Finland.

The head of the Finnish delegation announces the signing of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union.


The Finnish delegation accepted all Soviet demands: Helsinki ceded to Moscow the Karelian Isthmus with the city of Viipuri, the northeastern shore of Lake Ladoga, the port of Hanko and the Rybachy Peninsula - about 34 thousand in total square kilometers territory of the country.

Results of the war: victory or defeat.

So these are the basic facts. Having remembered them, we can now try to analyze the results of the “winter war”.
Obviously, as a result of the war, Finland found itself in a worse situation: in March 1940 Finnish government was forced to make much larger territorial concessions than those demanded by Moscow in October 1939. Thus, at first glance, Finland was defeated.

Marshal Mannerheim managed to defend the independence of Finland.


However, the Finns managed to defend their independence. The Soviet Union, which started the war, did not achieve main goal- Finland's accession to the USSR. Moreover, the failures of the Red Army's offensive in December 1939 - the first half of January 1940 caused enormous damage to the prestige of the Soviet Union and, first of all, its armed forces. The whole world made fun of the huge army that trampled on a narrow isthmus for a month and a half, unable to break the resistance of a tiny Finnish army.
Politicians and military men rushed to the conclusion about the weakness of the Red Army. They especially closely followed developments on the Soviet-Finnish front in Berlin. German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary back in November 1939:
"The Russian army is worth little. It is poorly led and even worse armed..."
A few days later, Hitler repeated the same thought:
"The Fuhrer once again identifies the catastrophic state of the Russian army. It is barely capable of fighting... It is possible that the average level of intelligence of the Russians does not allow them to produce modern weapons."
It seemed that the course of the Soviet-Finnish war completely confirmed the opinion of the Nazi leaders. On January 5, 1940, Goebbels wrote in his diary:
"In Finland the Russians are not making any progress at all. It looks like the Red Army isn't really worth much."
The theme of the weakness of the Red Army was constantly discussed at the Fuhrer's headquarters. Hitler himself stated on January 13:
“You still can’t get more out of the Russians... This is very good for us. A weak partner in our neighbors is better than an equally good comrade in the alliance.”
On January 22, Hitler and his associates again discussed the course of military operations in Finland and came to the conclusion:
"Moscow is very weak militarily..."

Adolf Hitler was sure that the "winter war" revealed the weakness of the Red Army.


And in March, the representative of the Nazi press at the Fuhrer’s headquarters, Heinz Lorenz, already openly mocked the Soviet army:
"...Russian soldiers are just fun. Not a trace of discipline..."
Not only Nazi leaders, but also serious military analysts considered the failures of the Red Army to be evidence of its weakness. Analyzing the course of the Soviet-Finnish war, the German General base made a report to Hitler next output:
"The Soviet masses cannot resist a professional army with skillful command."
Thus, the “winter war” dealt a strong blow to the authority of the Red Army. And although the Soviet Union made very significant territorial concessions in this conflict, strategic plan he suffered a most ignominious defeat. In any case, this is what almost all historians who studied the Soviet-Finnish war believe.
But Viktor Suvorov, not trusting the opinion of the most authoritative researchers, decided to check for himself: did the Red Army really show weakness and inability to fight during the “Winter War”?
The results of his analysis were amazing.

A historian is at war with... a computer

First of all, Viktor Suvorov decided to simulate on a powerful analytical computer the conditions in which the Red Army fought fighting. He entered the necessary parameters into a special program:

Temperature - up to minus 40 degrees Celsius;
snow cover depth - one and a half meters;
relief - sharply rugged terrain, forests, swamps, lakes
and so on.
And every time the smart computer answered:


IMPOSSIBLE

IMPOSSIBLE
at this temperature;
with such a depth of snow cover;
with such terrain
and so on...

The computer refused to simulate the course of the Red Army's offensive within the given parameters, recognizing them as unacceptable for conducting offensive operations.
Then Suvorov decided to abandon the modeling of natural conditions and suggested that the computer plan a breakthrough of the “Mannerheim Line” without taking into account climate and terrain.
Here it is necessary to explain what the Finnish “Mannerheim Line” was.

Marshal Mannerheim personally supervised the construction of fortifications on the Soviet-Finnish border.


The “Mannerheim Line” was a system of defensive fortifications on the Soviet-Finnish border, 135 kilometers long and up to 90 kilometers deep. The first line strip included: extensive minefields, anti-tank ditches and granite boulders, reinforced concrete tetrahedrons, wire barriers in 10-30 rows. Behind the first line was the second: reinforced concrete fortifications 3-5 floors underground - real underground fortresses made of fortification concrete, covered with armor plates and multi-ton granite boulders. Each fortress has an ammunition and fuel warehouse, a water supply system, a power plant, rest rooms, and operating rooms. And then again - forest rubble, new minefields, scarps, barriers...
Having received detailed information about the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line, the computer clearly answered:

Main attack direction: Lintura - Viipuri
before the attack - fire preparation
first explosion: airborne, epicenter - Kanneljärvi, equivalent - 50 kilotons,
height - 300
second explosion: airborne, epicenter - Lounatjoki, equivalent...
third explosion...

But the Red Army in 1939 did not have nuclear weapons!
Therefore, Suvorov introduced a new condition into the program: to attack the “Mannerheim Line” without the use of nuclear weapons.
And again the computer answered categorically:

Conducting offensive operations
IMPOSSIBLE

A powerful analytical computer declared a breakthrough of the “Mannerheim Line” in winter conditions without the use of nuclear weapons IMPOSSIBLE four times, five times, many times...
But the Red Army made this breakthrough! Even if after long battles, even at the cost of enormous human casualties, but still in February 1940, the “Russian soldiers”, about whom they mockingly gossiped at the Fuhrer’s headquarters, accomplished the impossible - they broke through the “Mannerheim Line”.
Another thing is that this heroic feat did not make sense, that in general this whole war was a rash adventure generated by the ambitions of Stalin and his parquet “eagles”.
But militarily, the “winter war” demonstrated not the weakness, but the power of the Red Army, its ability to carry out even an IMPOSSIBLE order Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Hitler and company did not understand this, many military experts did not understand, and after them, modern historians did not understand either.

Who lost the "winter war"?

However, not all contemporaries agreed with Hitler’s assessment of the results of the “Winter War”. Thus, the Finns who fought with the Red Army did not laugh at the “Russian soldiers” and did not talk about the “weakness” of the Soviet troops. When Stalin invited them to end the war, they very quickly agreed. And not only did they agree, but without much debate they ceded strategically important territories to the Soviet Union - much larger than Moscow demanded before the war. And the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, spoke of the Red Army with great respect. He considered the Soviet troops modern and effective and had a high opinion of their fighting qualities:
“Russian soldiers learn quickly, grasp everything on the fly, act without delay, easily obey discipline, are distinguished by courage and sacrifice and are ready to fight to the last bullet, despite the hopelessness of the situation,” the marshal believed.

Mannerheim had the opportunity to verify the courage of the Red Army soldiers. Marshal on the front line.


And the Finns’ neighbors, the Swedes, also commented with respect and admiration on the breakthrough of the “Mannerheim Line” by the Red Army. And in the Baltic countries they also did not make fun of the Soviet troops: in Tallinn, Kaunas and Riga they watched in horror the actions of the Red Army in Finland.
Viktor Suvorov noted:
“The fighting in Finland ended on March 13, 1940, and already in the summer three Baltic states: Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia surrendered to Stalin without a fight and turned into “republics” of the Soviet Union.”
Indeed, the Baltic countries drew a completely clear conclusion from the results of the “winter war”: the USSR has a powerful and modern army, ready to carry out any order, without stopping at any sacrifice. And in June 1940, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia surrendered without resistance, and in early August “the family Soviet republics replenished with three new members."

Soon after the Winter War, the three Baltic states disappeared from the world map.


At the same time, Stalin demanded from the Romanian government the “return” of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which before the revolution were part of Russian Empire. Taking into account the experience of the “winter war”, the Romanian government did not even bargain: on June 26, 1940, Stalin’s ultimatum was sent, and on June 28, units of the Red Army “in accordance with the agreement” crossed the Dniester and entered Bessarabia. On June 30, a new Soviet-Romanian border was established.
Consequently, it can be considered that as a result of the “winter war” the Soviet Union not only annexed the Finnish border lands, but also had the opportunity to capture three entire countries and a considerable part of a fourth country without fighting. So, in strategic terms, Stalin still won this massacre.
So, Finland did not lose the war - the Finns managed to defend the independence of their state.
The Soviet Union did not lose the war either - as a result, the Baltics and Romania submitted to the dictates of Moscow.
Who then lost the “winter war”?
Viktor Suvorov answered this question, as always, paradoxically:
"Hitler lost the war in Finland."
Yes, Nazi leader, who closely followed the course of the Soviet-Finnish war, made the biggest mistake he can make statesman: He underestimated the enemy. “Not understanding this war, not appreciating its difficulties, Hitler made catastrophically wrong conclusions. For some reason he suddenly decided that the Red Army was not ready for war, that the Red Army was not capable of anything.”
Hitler miscalculated. And in April 1945 he paid with his life for this miscalculation...

Soviet historiography
- in the footsteps of Hitler

However, Hitler very soon realized his mistake. Already on August 17, 1941, just a month and a half after the start of the war with the USSR, he told Goebbels:
- We seriously underestimated Soviet combat readiness and, mainly, weapons Soviet army. We had no idea what the Bolsheviks had at their disposal. Therefore the assessment was given incorrectly...
- Perhaps it is very good that we did not have such an accurate idea of ​​​​the potential of the Bolsheviks. Otherwise, perhaps we would be horrified by the urgent question of the East and the proposed attack on the Bolsheviks...
And on September 5, 1941, Goebbels admitted - but only to himself, in his diary:
"...We incorrectly assessed the Bolshevik resistance force, we had incorrect digital data and based all our policies on them."

Hitler and Mannerheim in 1942. The Fuhrer had already realized his mistake.


True, Hitler and Goebbels did not admit that the cause of the disaster was their self-confidence and incompetence. They tried to shift all the blame onto “Moscow’s treachery.” Speaking to his comrades at the Wolfschanze headquarters on April 12, 1942, the Fuhrer said:
- The Russians... carefully hid everything that was in any way connected with their military power. The entire war with Finland in 1940... is nothing more than a grandiose campaign of disinformation, since Russia at one time had weapons that made it, along with Germany and Japan, a world power.
But, one way or another, Hitler and Goebbels admitted that, analyzing the results of the “winter war,” they were mistaken in assessing the potential and strength of the Red Army.
However, to this day, 57 years after this recognition, most historians and publicists continue to harp on about " shameful defeat"The Red Army.
Why do communist and other “progressive” historians so persistently repeat the theses of Nazi propaganda about the “weakness” of the Soviet armed forces, about their “unpreparedness for war”, why, following Hitler and Goebbels, do they describe the “inferiority” and “lack of training” of Russian soldiers and officers?
Viktor Suvorov believes that behind all these rantings lies the desire of official Soviet (now Russian!) historiography to conceal the truth about the pre-war state of the Red Army. Soviet falsifiers and their Western “progressive” allies, despite all the facts, are trying to convince the public that on the eve of Germany’s attack on the USSR, Stalin did not even think about aggression (as if there was no seizure of the Baltic countries and part of Romania), but was only concerned with “ensuring border security” .
In fact (and the “winter war” confirms this!) The Soviet Union already at the end of the 30s had one of the most powerful armies, armed with modern military equipment and staffed by well-trained and disciplined soldiers. This powerful military machine was created by Stalin for the Great Victories of Communism in Europe, and perhaps throughout the world.
On June 22, 1941, preparations for the World Revolution were interrupted by a sudden attack on the Soviet Union by Hitler's Germany.

References.

  • Bullock A. Hitler and Stalin: Life and Power. Per. from English Smolensk, 1994
  • Mary V. Mannerheim - Marshal of Finland. Per. with Swedish M., 1997
  • Picker G. Hitler's Table Talks. Per. with him. Smolensk, 1993
  • Rzhevskaya E. Goebbels: Portrait against the background of a diary. M., 1994
  • Suvorov V. The Last Republic: Why the Soviet Union Lost the Second World War. M., 1998

Read the material in the following issues
ACADEMIC BULLYING
about the controversy surrounding the research of Viktor Suvorov

Finland was included in the Soviet sphere of influence by secret protocols to the 1939 Soviet-German non-aggression pact. But, unlike other Baltic countries, it refused to make serious concessions to the USSR. The Soviet leadership demanded that the border be moved away from Leningrad, since it ran 32 km from " northern capital" In exchange, the USSR offered larger and less valuable territories of Karelia. Referring to the threat to Leningrad in the event of aggression from a potential enemy through the territory of Finland during the Second World War, the USSR also demanded the rights to lease the islands (primarily Hanko) to create a military base.

The Finnish leadership, led by Prime Minister A. Kajander and the head of the Defense Council K. Mannerheim (in his honor Finnish line fortifications began to be called the “Mannerheim Line”), in response to Soviet demands, decided to play for time. Finland was ready to slightly adjust the border so as not to affect the Mannerheim Line. From October 12 to November 13, negotiations were held in Moscow with Finnish ministers V. Tanner and J. Paasikivi, but they reached a dead end.

On November 26, 1939, on the Soviet-Finnish border, in the area of ​​the Soviet border point Mainila, a provocative shelling was carried out from the Soviet side Soviet positions, which was used by the USSR as a pretext for the attack. On November 30, Soviet troops invaded Finland in five main directions. In the north, the Soviet 104th Division occupied the Petsamo area. South of the Kandalaksha area, the 177th division moved to Kemi. Even further south, the 9th Army was advancing on Oulu (Uleaborg). By occupying these two ports in the Gulf of Bothnia, the Soviet army would have cut Finland in two. North of Ladoga, the 8th army advanced to the rear of the Mannerheim line. And finally, on the main direction 7, the army was supposed to break through the Mannerheim Line and enter Helsinki. Finland was to be defeated in two weeks.

On December 6-12, troops of the 7th Army under the command of K. Meretskov reached the Mannerheim Line, but were unable to take it. On December 17-21, Soviet troops stormed the line, but unsuccessfully.

An attempt to bypass the line north of Lake Ladoga and through Karelia failed. The Finns knew this territory better, moved faster and were better camouflaged among the hills and lakes. Soviet divisions moved in columns along the few roads suitable for the passage of equipment. The Finns, bypassing the Soviet columns from the flanks, cut them in several places. This is how several Soviet divisions were defeated. As a result of the battles between December and January, the forces of several divisions were surrounded. The most severe defeat was the 9th Army near Suomussalmi on December 27 - January 7, when two divisions were defeated at once.

Frosts hit, snow covered the Karelian Isthmus. Soviet soldiers died from cold and frostbite, since the units arriving in Karelia were not sufficiently provided with warm uniforms - they did not prepare for the winter war, counting on a quick victory.

Volunteers from the most different views- from social democrats to right-wing anti-communists. Great Britain and France supported Finland with weapons and food.

On December 14, 1939, the League of Nations declared the USSR an aggressor and expelled it from its membership. In January 1940, Stalin decided to return to modest tasks - not to take all of Finland, but to move the border away from Leningrad and establish control over the Gulf of Finland.

The Northwestern Front under the command of S. Timoshenko broke through the Mannerheim Line on February 13-19. On March 12, Soviet troops broke into Vyborg. This meant that Helsinki could fall in a few days. The number of Soviet troops was increased to 760 thousand people. Finland was forced to accept the conditions of the USSR, and they became stricter. Now the USSR demanded that the border be drawn near the line determined by the Treaty of Nystad in 1721, including the transfer of Vyborg and the Ladoga coast to the USSR. The USSR did not withdraw its demand for the lease of Hanko. A peace agreement on these terms was concluded in Moscow on the night of March 13, 1940.

The irretrievable losses of the Soviet army in the war amounted to more than 126 thousand people, and the Finns - more than 22 thousand (not counting those who died from wounds and diseases). Finland retained its independence.

Sources:

On both sides of the Karelian Front, 1941-1944: Documents and materials. Petrozavodsk, 1995;

Secrets and lessons Winter War, 1939-1940: According to documents from declassified archives. St. Petersburg, 2000.

After the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Germany went to war with Poland, and relations between the USSR and Finland began to strain. One of the reasons - secret document between the USSR and Germany on delimiting spheres of influence. According to it, the influence of the USSR extended to Finland, the Baltic states, western Ukraine and Belarus and Bessarabia.

Realizing that big war inevitable, Stalin sought to protect Leningrad, which could be shelled by artillery from Finnish territory. Therefore, the task was to move the border further north. For a peaceful resolution of the issue Soviet side offered Finland the lands of Karelia in exchange for moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus, but any attempts at dialogue by the Finns were suppressed. They didn't want to come to an agreement.

Reason for war

The reason for the Soviet- Finnish war 1939-1940 was an incident near the village of Maynila on November 25, 1939 at 15:45. This village is located on the Karelian Isthmus, 800 meters from Finnish border. Mainila was subjected to artillery shelling, as a result of which 4 representatives of the Red Army were killed and 8 were wounded.

On November 26, Molotov called Finnish Ambassador in Moscow (Irie Koskinen) and presented a note of protest, stating that the shelling was carried out from the territory of Finland, and that the only thing that saved from the outbreak of war was that the Soviet army had an order not to succumb to provocations.

On November 27, the Finnish government responded to the Soviet note of protest. Briefly, the main provisions of the answer were as follows:

  • The shelling actually took place and lasted approximately 20 minutes.
  • The shelling came from the Soviet side, approximately 1.5-2 km southeast of the village of Maynila.
  • It was proposed to create a commission that would jointly study this episode and give it an adequate assessment.

What really happened near the village of Maynila? This important question, since it was as a result of these events that the Winter (Soviet-Finnish) War was unleashed. The only thing that can be stated unequivocally is that there really was shelling of the village of Maynila, but who carried it out is impossible to establish through documentation. Ultimately, there are 2 versions (Soviet and Finnish), and each needs to be evaluated. The first version is that Finland shelled the territory of the USSR. The second version is that it was a provocation prepared by the NKVD.

Why did Finland need this provocation? Historians talk about two reasons:

  1. The Finns were a political tool in the hands of the British, who needed war. This assumption would be reasonable if we consider the winter war in isolation. But if you remember the realities of those times, then at the time of the incident it was already underway World War, and England has already declared war on Germany. England's attack on the USSR automatically created an alliance between Stalin and Hitler, and this alliance would sooner or later hit England itself with all its might. Therefore, to assume this is tantamount to assuming that England decided to commit suicide, which, of course, was not the case.
  2. They wanted to expand their territories and influence. This is an absolutely stupid hypothesis. This is from the category - Liechtenstein wants to attack Germany. It's nonsense. Finland had neither the strength nor the means for war, and everyone in the Finnish command understood that their only chance of success in the war with the USSR was a long defense that would exhaust the enemy. With such situations, no one will disturb the den with the bear.

The most adequate answer to the question posed is that the shelling of the village of Mainila is a provocation of the Soviet government itself, which was looking for any excuse to justify the war with Finland. And it was this incident that was subsequently presented to Soviet society as an example of the treachery of the Finnish people, who needed help to carry out the socialist revolution.

Balance of forces and means

It is indicative how the forces were correlated during the Soviet-Finnish war. Below is summary table, which describes how the opposing countries approached the Winter War.

In all aspects except infantry, the USSR had a clear advantage. But conducting an offensive, superior to the enemy by only 1.3 times, is an extremely risky undertaking. In this case, discipline, training and organization come to the fore. The Soviet army had problems with all three aspects. These numbers once again emphasize that the Soviet leadership did not perceive Finland as an enemy, expecting to destroy it in the shortest possible time.

Progress of the war

The Soviet-Finnish or Winter War can be divided into 2 stages: the first (December 39th - January 7th 40th) and the second (January 7th 40th - March 12th 40th). What happened on January 7, 1940? Timoshenko was appointed commander of the army, who immediately set about reorganizing the army and establishing order in it.

First stage

The Soviet-Finnish war began on November 30, 1939, and the Soviet army failed to carry it out briefly. The USSR army actually crossed the state border of Finland without declaring war. For its citizens, the justification was the following - to help the people of Finland in overthrowing the bourgeois government of the warmonger.

The Soviet leadership did not take Finland seriously, believing that the war would be over in a few weeks. They even mentioned a figure of 3 weeks as a deadline. More specifically, there should be no war. The Soviet command's plan was approximately as follows:

  • Send in troops. We did this on November 30th.
  • Creation of a working government controlled by the USSR. On December 1, the Kuusinen government was created (more on this later).
  • Lightning-fast attack on all fronts. It was planned to reach Helsinki in 1.5-2 weeks.
  • Declining the real government of Finland towards peace and complete surrender in favor of the Kuusinen government.

The first two points were implemented in the first days of the war, but then problems began. The blitzkrieg did not work out, and the army was stuck in the Finnish defense. Although in initial days war, until about December 4, it seemed that everything was going according to plan - Soviet troops were moving forward. However, very soon they stumbled upon the Mannerheim line. On December 4, armies entered it eastern front(near Lake Suvantojärvi), December 6 – central front (Summa direction), December 10 – western front(The Gulf of Finland). And it was a shock. A huge number of documents indicate that the troops did not expect to encounter a well-fortified defense line. And this is a huge question for the Red Army intelligence.

In any case, December was a disastrous month that thwarted almost all the plans of the Soviet Headquarters. The troops advanced inland slowly. Every day the pace of movement only decreased. Reasons for the slow advance of Soviet troops:

  1. Terrain. Almost the entire territory of Finland is forests and swamps. It is difficult to use equipment in such conditions.
  2. Application of aviation. Aviation was practically not used in terms of bombing. There was no point in bombing villages adjacent to the front line, since the Finns were retreating, leaving behind scorched earth. It was difficult to bomb the retreating troops, since they were retreating with civilians.
  3. Roads. While retreating, the Finns destroyed roads, caused landslides, and mined everything they could.

Formation of the Kuusinen government

On December 1, 1939, the People's Government of Finland was formed in the city of Terijoki. It was formed on territory already captured by the USSR, and with the direct participation of the Soviet leadership. The Finnish people's government included:

  • Chairman and Minister of Foreign Affairs – Otto Kuusinen
  • Minister of Finance – Mauri Rosenberg
  • Minister of Defense - Axel Antila
  • Minister of the Interior – Tuure Lehen
  • Minister of Agriculture – Armas Eikia
  • Minister of Education – Inkeri Lehtinen
  • Minister for Karelia Affairs – Paavo Prokkonen

Outwardly it looks like a full-fledged government. The only problem is that the Finnish population did not recognize him. But already on December 1 (that is, on the day of formation) this government concluded an agreement with the USSR on the establishment diplomatic relations between the USSR and the FDR (Finnish Democratic Republic). On December 2, a new agreement is signed - about mutual assistance. From this moment on, Molotov says that the war continues because a revolution took place in Finland, and now it is necessary to support it and help the workers. In fact, it was a clever trick to justify the war in the eyes of the Soviet population.

Mannerheim Line

The Mannerheim Line is one of the few things that almost everyone knows about the Soviet-Finnish war. Soviet propaganda They said about this system of fortifications that all the world generals recognized its impregnability. This was an exaggeration. The line of defense was, of course, strong, but not impregnable.


The Mannerheim Line (as it received this name already during the war) consisted of 101 concrete fortifications. For comparison, the Maginot Line, which Germany crossed in France, was approximately the same length. The Maginot Line consisted of 5,800 concrete structures. In fairness it should be noted difficult conditions area of ​​the Mannerheim line. There were swamps and numerous lakes, which made movement extremely difficult and therefore a defense line did not require large number fortifications

The largest attempt to break through the Mannerheim Line at the first stage was made on December 17-21 in the central section. It was here that it was possible to occupy the roads leading to Vyborg, gaining a significant advantage. But the offensive, in which 3 divisions took part, failed. This was the first major success in the Soviet-Finnish war for the Finnish army. This success came to be called the “Miracle of Summa.” Subsequently, the line was broken on February 11, which actually predetermined the outcome of the war.

Expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations

On December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. This decision was promoted by England and France, who spoke of Soviet aggression against Finland. Representatives of the League of Nations condemned the actions of the USSR in terms of aggressive actions and the outbreak of war.

Today, the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations is cited as an example of restriction Soviet power and as a loss in image. In fact, everything is a little different. In 1939, the League of Nations no longer played the role it had been assigned following the First World War. The fact is that back in 1933, Germany left it, refusing to comply with the demands of the League of Nations for disarmament and simply left the organization. It turns out that at the time of December 14, the League of Nations de facto ceased to exist. After all, about what European system security can be discussed when Germany and the USSR left the organization?

Second stage of the war

On January 7, 1940, the Headquarters of the Northwestern Front was headed by Marshal Timoshenko. He had to solve all the problems and organize a successful offensive of the Red Army. At this point, the Soviet-Finnish war took a break, and until February active actions was not carried out. Started from February 1st to 9th powerful blows along the Mannerheim line. It was assumed that the 7th and 13th armies were to break through the defense line with decisive flank attacks and occupy the Vuoksy-Karkhul sector. After this, it was planned to move to Vyborg, occupy the city and block the railways and highways leading to the West.

On February 11, 1940, a general offensive of Soviet troops began on the Karelian Isthmus. This was a turning point in the Winter War, as units of the Red Army managed to break through the Mannerheim Line and begin advancing deeper into the country. We advanced slowly due to the specifics of the terrain, the resistance of the Finnish army and severe frosts, but the main thing was that we advanced. At the beginning of March, the Soviet army was already at west coast Vyborg Bay.


This actually ended the war, since it was obvious that Finland did not have great strength and means to contain the Red Army. From that time on, peace negotiations began, in which the USSR dictated its terms, and Molotov constantly emphasized that the conditions would be harsh, because the Finns forced the war to start, during which the blood of Soviet soldiers was shed.

Why did the war last so long

According to the Bolsheviks, the Soviet-Finnish war was supposed to end in 2-3 weeks, and the decisive advantage was to be given by the troops of the Leningrad district alone. In practice, the war dragged on for almost 4 months, and divisions were assembled throughout the country to suppress the Finns. There are several reasons for this:

  • Poor organization troops. This concerns bad work command staff, But a big problem- coherence between military branches. She was practically absent. If you study archival documents, there are a lot of reports according to which some troops fired at others.
  • Poor security. The army was in need of almost everything. The war was fought in winter and in the north, where the air temperature dropped below -30 by the end of December. And at the same time, the army was not provided with winter clothing.
  • Underestimating the enemy. The USSR did not prepare for war. The plan was to quickly suppress the Finns and solve the problem without war, attributing everything to the border incident of November 24, 1939.
  • Support for Finland by other countries. England, Italy, Hungary, Sweden (primarily) - provided assistance to Finland in everything: weapons, supplies, food, airplanes, and so on. The greatest efforts were made by Sweden, which itself actively helped and facilitated the transfer of assistance from other countries. In general, during the Winter War of 1939-1940, only Germany supported the Soviet side.

Stalin was very nervous because the war was dragging on. He repeated - The whole world is watching us. And he was right. Therefore, Stalin demanded a solution to all problems, restoration of order in the army and a speedy resolution of the conflict. To some extent this was achieved. And quite quickly. The Soviet offensive in February-March 1940 forced Finland to peace.

The Red Army fought extremely undisciplinedly, and its management does not stand up to criticism. Almost all reports and memos about the situation at the front were accompanied by a postscript - “an explanation of the reasons for the failures.” I will give some quotes from Beria’s memo to Stalin No. 5518/B dated December 14, 1939:

  • During the landing on the island of Sayskari, a Soviet plane dropped 5 bombs, which landed on the destroyer "Lenin".
  • On December 1, the Ladoga flotilla was fired upon twice by its own aircraft.
  • When occupying the island of Gogland, during the advance of the landing forces, 6 Soviet aircraft appeared, one of which fired several shots in bursts. As a result, 10 people were injured.

And there are hundreds of such examples. But if the situations above are examples of the exposure of soldiers and troops, then next I want to give examples of how the equipment of the Soviet army took place. To do this, let us turn to Beria’s memo to Stalin No. 5516/B dated December 14, 1939:

  • In the Tulivara area, 529th rifle corps 200 pairs of skis were needed to bypass the enemy fortifications. This could not be done, since the Headquarters received 3,000 pairs of skis with broken points.
  • The new arrivals from the 363rd Signal Battalion include 30 vehicles in need of repair, and 500 people are wearing summer uniforms.
  • The 51st Corps arrived to replenish the 9th Army artillery regiment. Missing: 72 tractors, 65 trailers. Of the 37 tractors that arrived, only 9 are in good condition, out of 150 machines - 90. 80% personnel are not provided with winter uniforms.

It is not surprising that against the backdrop of such events there was desertion in the Red Army. For example, December 14 from the 64th rifle division 430 people deserted.

Help for Finland from other countries

In the Soviet-Finnish war, many countries provided assistance to Finland. To demonstrate, I will cite Beria’s report to Stalin and Molotov No. 5455/B.

Finland is helped by:

  • Sweden – 8 thousand people. Mainly reserve personnel. They are commanded by career officers who are on “vacation.”
  • Italy - number unknown.
  • Hungary – 150 people. Italy demands an increase in numbers.
  • England - 20 fighter aircraft are known, although the actual number is higher.

The best proof that the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 took place with the support of the Western countries of Finland was the speech of Finnish Minister Greensberg on December 27, 1939 at 07:15 to the English agency Havas. Below I quote the literal translation from English.

The Finnish people thank the English, French and other nations for the assistance they provide.

Greensberg, Minister of Finland

It is obvious that Western countries opposed the USSR aggression against Finland. This was expressed, among other things, by the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations.

I would also like to show a photo of Beria’s report on the intervention of France and England in the Soviet-Finnish war.


Conclusion of peace

On February 28, the USSR handed over to Finland its terms for concluding peace. The negotiations themselves took place in Moscow on March 8-12. After these negotiations, the Soviet-Finnish war ended on March 12, 1940. The peace terms were as follows:

  1. The USSR received the Karelian Isthmus along with Vyborg (Viipuri), the bay and islands.
  2. The western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, together with the cities of Kexgolm, Suoyarvi and Sortavala.
  3. Islands in the Gulf of Finland.
  4. Hanko Island with its maritime territory and base was leased to the USSR for 50 years. The USSR paid 8 million German marks for rent annually.
  5. The agreement between Finland and the USSR of 1920 has lost its force.
  6. On March 13, 1940, hostilities ceased.

Below is a map showing the territories ceded to the USSR as a result of the signing of the peace treaty.


USSR losses

Question of quantity dead soldiers The USSR is still open during the Soviet-Finnish war. Official story does not answer the question by speaking veiledly about “minimal” losses and focusing on the fact that the objectives have been achieved. There was no talk about the scale of the Red Army's losses in those days. The figure was deliberately underestimated, demonstrating the success of the army. In fact, the losses were huge. To do this, just look at report No. 174 of December 21, which provides figures on the losses of the 139th Infantry Division over 2 weeks of fighting (November 30 - December 13). The losses are as follows:

  • Commanders – 240.
  • Privates - 3536.
  • Rifles - 3575.
  • Light machine guns – 160.
  • Heavy machine guns – 150.
  • Tanks – 5.
  • Armored vehicles – 2.
  • Tractors – 10.
  • Trucks – 14.
  • Horse composition - 357.

Belyanov's memo No. 2170 dated December 27 talks about the losses of the 75th Infantry Division. Total losses: senior commanders - 141, junior commanders - 293, rank and file - 3668, tanks - 20, machine guns - 150, rifles - 1326, armored vehicles - 3.

This is data for 2 divisions (much more fought) for 2 weeks of fighting, when the first week was a “warm-up” - the Soviet army advanced relatively without losses until it reached the Mannerheim Line. And during these 2 weeks, of which only the last was actually combative, the OFFICIAL figures are losses of more than 8 thousand people! A huge number of people suffered frostbite.

On March 26, 1940, at the 6th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, data on USSR losses in the war with Finland were announced - 48,745 people killed and 158,863 people wounded and frostbitten. These are official figures and therefore greatly underestimated. Today historians call different numbers losses of the Soviet army. It is said that between 150 and 500 thousand people died. For example, the Book of Combat Losses of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army states that in the war with the White Finns, 131,476 people died, went missing, or died from wounds. At the same time, the data of that time did not take into account the losses of the Navy, and for a long time people who died in hospitals after wounds and frostbite were not taken into account as losses. Today, most historians agree that about 150 thousand Red Army soldiers died during the war, excluding the losses of the Navy and border troops.

Finnish losses are listed as follows: 23 thousand dead and missing, 45 thousand wounded, 62 aircraft, 50 tanks, 500 guns.

Results and consequences of the war

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, even with a brief study, points to both absolutely negative and absolutely positive aspects. The negative is the nightmare of the first months of the war and the huge number of victims. By and large, it was December 1939 and early January 1940 that demonstrated to the whole world that the Soviet army was weak. That's how it really was. But there was also a positive aspect: the Soviet leadership saw real strength of his army. We have been told since childhood that the Red Army has been the strongest in the world almost since 1917, but this is extremely far from reality. The only major test of this army was the Civil War. We will not now analyze the reasons for the victory of the Reds over the Whites (after all, we are now talking about the Winter War), but the reasons for the victory of the Bolsheviks do not lie in the army. To demonstrate this, it is enough to just quote one quote from Frunze, which he voiced at the end of the Civil War.

All this army rabble needs to be disbanded as soon as possible.

Frunze

Before the war with Finland, the leadership of the USSR had its head in the clouds, believing that it had a strong army. But December 1939 showed that this was not the case. The army was extremely weak. But starting in January 1940, changes were made (personnel and organizational) that changed the course of the war, and which largely prepared a combat-ready army for the Patriotic War. This is very easy to prove. Almost the entire December of the 39th Red Army stormed the Mannerheim line - there was no result. On February 11, 1940, the Mannerheim line was broken through in 1 day. This breakthrough was possible because it was carried out by another army, more disciplined, organized, and trained. And the Finns did not have a single chance against such an army, so Mannerheim, who served as Minister of Defense, even then began to talk about the need for peace.


Prisoners of war and their fate

The number of prisoners of war during the Soviet-Finnish war was impressive. At the time of the war, there were 5,393 captured Red Army soldiers and 806 captured White Finns. Captured Red Army soldiers were divided into the following groups:

  • Political leadership. It was political affiliation that was important, without singling out rank.
  • Officers. This group included persons equated to officers.
  • Junior officers.
  • Privates.
  • National minorities
  • Defectors.

Particular attention was paid to national minorities. To them in Finnish captivity the attitude was more loyal than towards representatives of the Russian people. The privileges were minor, but they were there. At the end of the war, a mutual exchange of all prisoners was carried out, regardless of their belonging to one group or another.

On April 19, 1940, Stalin orders everyone who was in Finnish captivity to be sent to the Southern Camp of the NKVD. Below is a quote from the Politburo resolution.

All those returned by the Finnish authorities should be sent to the Southern camp. Within three months, ensure all the necessary measures are taken to identify persons processed by foreign intelligence services. Pay attention to dubious and alien elements, as well as those who voluntarily surrendered. In all cases, refer cases to court.

Stalin

Southern camp, located in Ivanovo region, started work on April 25. Already on May 3, Beria sent a letter to Stalin, Molotov and Timoschenko, informing that 5277 people had arrived at the Camp. On June 28, Beria sends a new report. According to it, the Southern camp “receives” 5,157 Red Army soldiers and 293 officers. Of these, 414 people were convicted of treason and treason.

The myth of war - Finnish “cuckoos”

“Cuckoos” is what Soviet soldiers called snipers who continuously fired at the Red Army. It was said that these are professional Finnish snipers who sit in trees and shoot almost without missing. The reason for such attention to snipers is their high efficiency and the inability to determine the point of the shot. But the problem in determining the point of the shot was not that the shooter was in a tree, but that the terrain created an echo. It disoriented the soldiers.

Stories about “cuckoos” are one of the myths that the Soviet-Finnish war gave rise to in large numbers. It’s hard to imagine in 1939 a sniper who, at air temperatures below -30 degrees, was able to sit on a tree for days, while firing accurate shots.

The topic of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 has now become a fairly popular topic of discussion in Russia. Many call it a disgrace to the Soviet army - in 105 days, from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940, the sides lost more than 150 thousand people in killed alone. The Russians won the war, and 430 thousand Finns were forced to leave their homes and return to their historical homeland.

In Soviet textbooks we were assured that the armed conflict was started by the “Finnish military.” On November 26, near the town of Mainila, there was an artillery attack on Soviet troops stationed near the Finnish border, as a result of which 4 soldiers were killed and 10 were wounded.

The Finns proposed creating a joint commission to investigate the incident, which the Soviet side refused and stated that it no longer considered itself bound by the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact. Was the shooting staged?

“I got acquainted with documents that had recently been classified,” says military historian Miroslav Morozov. — In the divisional combat log, the pages with entries about artillery shelling have a noticeably later origin.

There are no reports to the division headquarters, the names of the victims are not indicated, it is unknown to which hospital the wounded were sent... Apparently, at that time the Soviet leadership did not really care about the credibility of the reason for starting the war.”

Since Finland declared independence in December 1917, there have been constant disputes between it and the USSR. territorial claims. But they more often became the subject of negotiations. The situation changed at the end of the 30s, when it became clear that the Second World War would soon begin. The USSR demanded that Finland not participate in the war against the USSR and allow the construction of Soviet military bases on Finnish territory. Finland hesitated and played for time.

The situation worsened with the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, according to which Finland belonged to the sphere of interests of the USSR. The Soviet Union began to insist on its terms, although it offered certain territorial concessions in Karelia. But the Finnish government rejected all proposals. Then, on November 30, 1939, the invasion of Soviet troops into Finnish territory began.

In January frosts hit -30 degrees. Soldiers surrounded by Finns were forbidden to leave heavy weapons and equipment to the enemy. However, seeing the inevitability of the death of the division, Vinogradov gave the order to leave the encirclement.

Of almost 7,500 people, 1,500 returned to their own. The division commander, regimental commissar and chief of staff were shot. And the 18th Rifle Division, which found itself in the same conditions, remained in place and was completely destroyed north of Lake Ladoga.

But the most heavy losses Soviet troops suffered in battles on the main direction - the Karelian Isthmus. Covering it was the 140-kilometer defensive line Mannerheim on the main defensive line consisted of 210 long-term and 546 wood-earth firing points. It was possible to break through it and capture the city of Vyborg only during the third assault, which began on February 11, 1940.

The Finnish government, seeing that there was no hope left, entered into negotiations and on March 12 a peace treaty was concluded. The fighting is over. Having won a dubious victory over Finland, the Red Army began to prepare for war with a much larger predator - Nazi Germany. The story allowed 1 year, 3 months and 10 days to prepare.

According to the results of the war: 26 thousand military personnel died on the Finnish side, 126 thousand on the Soviet side. The USSR received new territories and moved the border away from Leningrad. Finland subsequently sided with Germany. And the USSR was excluded from the League of Nations.

A few facts from the history of the Soviet-Finnish war

1. The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939/1940 was not the first armed conflict between the two states. In 1918-1920, and then in 1921-1922, the so-called first and second Soviet-Finnish wars were fought, during which the Finnish authorities, dreaming of “ Greater Finland"tried to seize the territory of Eastern Karelia.

The wars themselves became a continuation of the bloody Civil War that raged in Finland in 1918-1919, which ended with the victory of the Finnish “whites” over the Finnish “reds”. As a result of the wars, the RSFSR retained control over Eastern Karelia, but transferred the polar Pechenga region to Finland, as well as western part Rybachy Peninsula and most of the Sredny Peninsula.

2. At the end of the wars of the 1920s, relations between the USSR and Finland were not friendly, but did not reach the point of outright confrontation. In 1932, the Soviet Union and Finland entered into a non-aggression pact, which was later extended until 1945, but was unilaterally broken by the USSR in the fall of 1939.

3. In 1938-1939, the Soviet government conducted secret negotiations with the Finnish side on the exchange of territories. In the context of the impending world war, the Soviet Union intended to move the state border away from Leningrad, since it was only 18 kilometers from the city. In exchange, Finland was offered territories in Eastern Karelia, significantly larger in area. The negotiations, however, were unsuccessful.

4. The immediate cause of the war was the so-called “Maynila Incident”: on November 26, 1939, on a section of the border near the village of Maynila, a group of Soviet military personnel was fired upon by artillery. Seven gun shots were fired, as a result of which three privates and one junior commander were killed, seven privates and two command personnel were wounded.

Modern historians still debate whether the Maynila shelling was a provocation by the Soviet Union or not. One way or another, two days later the USSR denounced the non-aggression pact, and on November 30 began military operations against Finland.

5. On December 1, 1939, the Soviet Union announced the creation of an alternative “ People's Government» Finland, led by the communist Otto Kuusinen. The next day, the USSR concluded a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship with the Kuusinen government, which was recognized as the only legitimate government in Finland.

At the same time, the process of forming the Finnish People's Army from Finns and Karelians was underway. However, by the end of January 1940, the position of the USSR was revised - the Kuusinen government was no longer mentioned, and all negotiations were conducted with the official authorities in Helsinki.

6. The main obstacle to the advance of the Soviet troops was the “Mannerheim Line” - named after the Finnish military leader and politician, the defense line between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga, consisting of multi-level concrete fortifications equipped with heavy weapons.

Initially, the Soviet troops, who did not have the means to destroy such a line of defense, suffered heavy losses during numerous frontal attacks on the fortifications.

7. Finland was simultaneously provided military assistance How fascist Germany, and its opponents - England and France. But if Germany was limited to unofficial military supplies, then the Anglo-French forces were considering plans military intervention against the Soviet Union. However, these plans were never implemented due to fears that the USSR in such a case might take part in the Second World War on the side of Nazi Germany.

8. By the beginning of March 1940, Soviet troops managed to break through the Mannerheim Line, which created a threat complete defeat Finland. Under these conditions, without waiting for the Anglo-French intervention against the USSR, the Finnish government went to peace talks with the Soviet Union. A peace treaty was concluded in Moscow on March 12, 1940, and the fighting ended on March 13 with the capture of Vyborg by the Red Army.

9. In accordance with the Moscow Treaty, the Soviet-Finnish border was moved away from Leningrad from 18 to 150 km. According to many historians, it was this fact that largely helped to avoid the capture of the city by the Nazis during the Great Patriotic War.

In total, the territorial acquisitions of the USSR following the results of the Soviet-Finnish war amounted to 40 thousand sq. km. Data about human losses The parties to the conflict remain contradictory to this day: the Red Army lost from 125 to 170 thousand people killed and missing, the Finnish army - from 26 to 95 thousand people.

10. The famous Soviet poet Alexander Tvardovsky wrote the poem “Two Lines” in 1943, which became perhaps the most vivid artistic reminder of the Soviet-Finnish war:

From a shabby notebook

Two lines about a boy fighter,

What happened in the forties

Killed on ice in Finland.

It lay somehow awkwardly

Childishly small body.

The frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,

The hat flew far away.

It seemed that the boy was not lying down,

And he was still running

Yes, he held the ice behind the floor...

Among the great cruel war,

I can’t imagine why,

I feel sorry for that distant fate

Like dead, alone,

It's like I'm lying there

Frozen, small, killed

In that unknown war,

Forgotten, small, lying.

Photos of the “unfamous” war

Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant M.I. Sipovich and captain Korovin at a captured Finnish bunker.

Soviet soldiers inspect the observation cap of a captured Finnish bunker.

Soviet soldiers are preparing a Maxim machine gun for anti-aircraft fire.

A house burning after a bombing in the Finnish city of Turku.

A Soviet sentry next to a Soviet quad anti-aircraft machine gun mount based on the Maxim machine gun.

Soviet soldiers dig up a Finnish border post near the Mainila border post.

Soviet military dog ​​breeders separate battalion connections with bonded dogs.

Soviet border guards inspect captured Finnish weapons.

Finnish soldier next to the downed man Soviet fighter I-15 bis.

Formation of soldiers and commanders of the 123rd Infantry Division on the march after the fighting on the Karelian Isthmus.

Finnish soldiers in the trenches near Suomussalmi during the Winter War.

Prisoners of the Red Army captured by the Finns in the winter of 1940.

Finnish soldiers in the forest try to disperse after noticing the approach of Soviet aircraft.

A frozen Red Army soldier of the 44th Infantry Division.

Red Army soldiers of the 44th Infantry Division frozen in a trench.

A Soviet wounded man lies on a plastering table made from improvised materials.

Three Corners Park in Helsinki with open gaps dug to provide shelter for the population in the event of an air raid.

Blood transfusion before surgery in a Soviet military hospital.

Finnish women sew winter camouflage coats at a factory/

A Finnish soldier walks past a broken Soviet tank column/

A Finnish soldier fires from a Lahti-Saloranta M-26 light machine gun/

Residents of Leningrad welcome tankers of the 20th Tank Brigade on T-28 tanks returning from the Karelian Isthmus/

Finnish soldier with a Lahti-Saloranta M-26 machine gun/

Finnish soldiers with a Maxim M/32-33 machine gun in the forest.

Finnish crew of the Maxim anti-aircraft machine gun.

Finnish Vickers tanks knocked out near Pero station.

Finnish soldiers at the 152-mm Kane gun.

Finnish civilians who fled their homes during the Winter War.

A broken column of the Soviet 44th Division.

Soviet SB-2 bombers over Helsinki.

Three Finnish skiers on the march.

Two Soviet soldiers with a Maxim machine gun in the forest on the Mannerheim Line.

A burning house in the Finnish city of Vaasa after a Soviet air raid.

View of a Helsinki street after a Soviet air raid.

A house in the center of Helsinki, damaged after a Soviet air raid.

Finnish soldiers raise the frozen body of a Soviet officer.

A Finnish soldier looks at the captured Red Army soldiers changing clothes.

A Soviet prisoner captured by the Finns sits on a box.

Captured Red Army soldiers enter the house under the escort of Finnish soldiers.

Finnish soldiers carry a wounded comrade on a dog sled.

Finnish orderlies carry a stretcher with a wounded man near a field hospital tent.

Finnish doctors load a stretcher with a wounded person into an ambulance bus manufactured by AUTOKORI OY.

Finnish skiers with reindeer and drags at a rest during the retreat.

Finnish soldiers dismantle captured Soviet military equipment.

Sandbags cover the windows of a house on Sofiankatu Street in Helsinki.

T-28 tanks of the 20th heavy tank brigade before entering a combat operation.

Soviet T-28 tank, destroyed on the Karelian Isthmus near height 65.5.

Finnish tanker next to a captured tank Soviet tank T-28.

Residents of Leningrad greet the tankers of the 20th heavy tank brigade.

Soviet officers against the backdrop of Vyborg Castle.

A Finnish air defense soldier looks at the sky through a rangefinder.

Finnish ski battalion with deer and drags.

A Swedish volunteer in position during the Soviet-Finnish War.

Crew of a Soviet 122 mm howitzer in position during the Winter War.

A messenger on a motorcycle conveys a message to the crew of a Soviet armored car BA-10.

Pilots Heroes of the Soviet Union - Ivan Pyatykhin, Alexander Letuchy and Alexander Kostylev.

Finnish propaganda from the Soviet-Finnish War

Finnish propaganda promised a carefree life to the surrendered Red Army soldiers: bread and butter, cigars, vodka and dancing to the accordion. They paid generously for the weapons they brought with them, they made a reservation, they promised to pay: for a revolver - 100 rubles, for a machine gun - 1,500 rubles, and for a cannon - as much as 10,000 rubles.

The official reasons for the outbreak of the war were the so-called Maynila Incident. On November 26, 1939, the USSR government sent a note of protest to the Finnish government regarding the artillery shelling that was carried out from Finnish territory. Responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities was placed entirely on Finland.

Start Soviet-Finnish War occurred at 8 o'clock in the morning on November 30, 1939. On the part of the Soviet Union, the goal was to ensure the security of Leningrad. The city was only 30 km from the border. Previously, the Soviet government approached Finland with a request to push back its borders in the Leningrad region, offering territorial compensation in Karelia. But Finland categorically refused.

Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940 caused real hysteria among the world community. On December 14, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations with serious violations of procedure (minority votes).

By the time hostilities began, the troops of the Finnish army numbered 130 aircraft, 30 tanks, and 250 thousand soldiers. However, the Western powers promised their support. In many ways, it was this promise that led to the refusal to change the border line. At the start of the war, the Red Army consisted of 3,900 aircraft, 6,500 tanks and 1 million soldiers.

The Russian-Finnish War of 1939 is divided by historians into two stages. Initially, it was planned by the Soviet command as a short operation that was supposed to last about three weeks. But the situation turned out differently.

First period of the war

Lasted from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940 (until the Mannerheim Line was broken). The fortifications of the Mannerheim Line were able to stop the Russian army for a long time. The better equipment of Finnish soldiers and harsher winter conditions than in Russia also played an important role.

The Finnish command was able to make excellent use of the terrain features. Pine forests, lakes, swamps slowed down the movement of Russian troops. The supply of ammunition was difficult. Serious problems Finnish snipers also delivered.

Second period of the war

Lasted from February 11 to March 12, 1940. By the end of 1939, the General Staff developed new plan actions. Under the leadership of Marshal Timoshenko, the Mannerheim Line was broken on February 11. A serious superiority in manpower, aircraft, and tanks allowed the Soviet troops to move forward, but at the same time suffering heavy losses.

The Finnish army experienced a severe shortage of ammunition and people. The Finnish government, which never received Western help, was forced to conclude a peace treaty on March 12, 1940. Despite the disappointing results of the military campaign for the USSR, a new border was established.

Afterwards, Finland will enter the war on the side of the Nazis.