After the defeat of the Polish army fighting between Germany, Great Britain and France were suspended until the spring of 1940. This period in history was called the “Phantom War.” It was characterized by the inaction of the Anglo-French and German troops and lasted 8 months - until May 10, 1940.
Western European countries during this period carried out secret negotiations with the Nazi leadership. They sought to direct the German “war machine” against the Soviet Union.
On October 29, 1939, the German High Command issued a directive for the capture of France under code name"Gelb-plan" ("Yellow plan").
Before the invasion of France Nazi Germany occupied Denmark and Norway. Military events developed at lightning speed. During the day on April 9, 1940, Denmark was captured. The occupation of Norway required significantly more effort and time. However, the armed forces of Norway (about 16 thousand) could not resist the 100 thousand strong German group.
On May 10, 1940, the Wehrmacht unleashed its might on Belgium, Holland and France. On May 28, 1940, the surrender of the Belgian army was signed.
On May 19, the Germans captured the city of Amiens, reaching the coast near the port of Dunkirk. 40 English, French and Belgian divisions were cut off from the main forces. The German command considered that the fate of this group was decided. On May 24, A. Hitler gave the order to suspend the offensive of tank formations. The artificially created pause helped the Allies in the following days to escape from the German “pincers” and evacuate by sea from France.
On June 5, the German command began to implement a plan for an attack on the central regions of France, codenamed “Rot” (“Red”). Already on June 14, the German army virtually captured Paris without a fight, and on June 22, 1940, the pro-German government of A.F. Pétain (the so-called Vichy government) signed a surrender in Compiegne.
The terms of the armistice were harsher than those imposed on Germany in 1918. All Northern France with Paris became a zone of German occupation. Italy was given part of South-Eastern France.
According to the terms of the Compiegne Truce, the southern part of France remained under the rule of the government of A.F. Pétain, who took the path of cooperation with the invaders.
3.2 ."Battle of England". German aggression in the Balkans
The surrender of France meant that Great Britain would have to stand alone against Germany, which had conquered all of Central and Western Europe. During this period, the cabinet of N. Chamberlain was replaced on May 10, 1940 by a coalition government led by Conservative leader W. Churchill, who declared that Great Britain would wage the war to a victorious end.
According to Hitler's Directive No. 16, German troops planned to carry out Operation Sea Lion on July 17, 1940. Thirteen shock divisions with a total strength of about 260 thousand people were supposed to cross the English Channel.
Taking over Great Britain was no easy task for Germany. The start of the operation was postponed several times. Throughout the summer of 1940, German aircraft bombed Great Britain. However, it was impossible to achieve victory through bombing alone.
The issue of landing in Great Britain was finally decided on September 14, 1940. Due to the fact that the possibility of failure was too great, German generals suggested that A. Hitler refrain from seizing Great Britain. The decision was made to postpone Operation Sea Lion indefinitely.
During the “Battle of Britain” from July to the end of October, British aviation lost 915 fighters, German losses amounted to 1733 aircraft.
After the capture of France, the Nazi leadership began preparing for war with the USSR. Particular attention was paid to strengthening relations with Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Finland, which were to become important springboards for aggression against the Soviet Union.
On March 1, 1941, the tsarist government of Bulgaria announced its accession to the Tripartite Pact. On the same day, German troops were brought into the country.
On April 5, 1941, a treaty of friendship and non-aggression was concluded between the USSR and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
In response to the peace agreement between Yugoslavia and the USSR, German troops invaded Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, with the support of Italian and Hungarian divisions. Already on April 12, Yugoslavia was divided between Germany, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria, although the act of surrender of Yugoslavia was signed in Sarajevo only on April 17, 1941.
Simultaneously with the attack on Yugoslavia, German and Italian troops launched military operations against Greece. Greece was supported by the British expeditionary force, numbering 50 thousand people. Nevertheless, the balance of power was in Germany's favor. As a result of the betrayal of the commanders, on April 23, the Greek army surrendered to the Germans and Italians.
Resistance movement in European countries
From the first days of the loss of independence, a struggle against the Nazi occupation regime began in most European countries, called the Resistance movement.
Already in the autumn of 1939, pockets of anti-fascist resistance began to emerge in Poland. The Polish resistance was supported by the Polish government, which was in exile in Great Britain, headed by V. Sikorski. The Home Army played a major role in the resistance to the Nazi invaders.
The anti-fascist movement began in France. At the end of June 1940, the patriotic organization “Free France” was created in London, headed by Charles de Gaulle. At the beginning of July 1941, the forces of the French Resistance movement united into the National Front. In May 1943 it was formed National Council resistance, uniting all anti-fascist forces in France. In the spring of 1944, numerous organizations of French patriots united into the French army internal forces, whose number reached 500 thousand people.
Widest scope anti-fascist resistance purchased in Yugoslavia. Already in the fall of 1941, there were about 70 thousand people in the Yugoslav partisan detachments. They liberated entire regions of the country from the enemy. In November 1942, the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia was formed.
The Resistance movement also unfolded in those countries where pro-German governments operated. Thus, partisan Garibaldian brigades operated in the north and center of Italy.
Preparing Germany for war with the USSR
The occupation of Western European countries allowed Germany to significantly strengthen its military-economic potential. At her disposal were manufacturing enterprises France, which before the war produced 97% of the iron and 94% of the steel, produced 79% of the country's coal and 100% of its iron ore. The Reichswerke Hermann Goering concern included metallurgical plants in Alsace-Lorraine and Luxembourg in its system. The seizure of industry in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Poland increased the capacity of the Reich's metallurgical industry by 13–15 million tons. For example, Belgium supplied 2.3 million tons of steel by 1941. The number of foreign workers and prisoners of war employed in German industry exceeded 1 million people compared to 0.5 million in the fall of 1939. By the beginning of the war with the Soviet Union, Germany had accumulated significant reserves of non-ferrous metals: copper, zinc, lead, aluminum, etc. Oil production was of great importance for the preparation of the war against the USSR. In addition to its own oil resources, Germany used oil from Romania, Austria, Hungary, Poland and France. The country has increased production of synthetic fuel. In 1941, Germany had 8 million tons of petroleum products. In addition, it captured 8.8 million tons of fuel from France, Belgium and Holland.
In August 1940 it was adopted new program production of weapons and ammunition. It provided for the acceleration of the production of medium tanks, anti-tank guns and other weapons. The main focus was on achieving superiority over the USSR in the quality and efficiency of weapons.
Having information about the Soviet advantage in tanks, German command took care of providing its troops with anti-tank weapons.
IN Lately again and again the old, dilapidated version of preventive war is pulled out of its bins. Its primary source should be considered “Hitler’s Address to the German People and Soldiers of the Eastern Front” on the day of Nazi Germany’s attack on the USSR. It was then that the fascist dictator put forward the thesis that he was forced to begin military action in order to prevent the USSR from attacking Germany and eliminate the “Soviet threat” supposedly hanging over Europe. From the first day of the war, the fascist adventurers repeated this vile provocative slander countless times to the duped population of the “third empire” and the duped soldiers. German army, tormented and disgraced peoples of Europe. On this vile fabrication was built Hitler's plan organizing a “crusade against Bolshevism.”
We asked Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor of the Department of Russian History and Historiography G. A. Shirokov to tell us how Nazi Germany prepared aggression against the USSR.
The German fascists were preparing an attack on the Soviet Union long time. IN general form the Barbarossa plan was mentioned by Hitler in February 1933 at a meeting with the generals, where Hitler stated: “The main task future army will be the conquest of a new living space in the East and its ruthless Germanization.” Hitler clearly formulated the idea of conquering Russia after the Anschluss of Austria, i.e. in 1938. Hitler’s childhood friend, engineer Joseph Greiner, in “Memoirs” wrote about a conversation with SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich, who told him: “The war with the Soviet Union is a decided matter.” .
Having established themselves in Europe, the fascist rulers turned their gaze to the East. No Wehrmacht military plan was prepared as fundamentally as the Barbarossa plan. Two major periods can be distinguished in the preparation of the German General Staff for the war against the USSR. The first is from July to December 18, 1940, that is, before Hitler signed Directive No. 21; and the second - from December 18, 1940 until the start of the invasion. During the first period of preparation, the General Staff developed strategic principles for waging war, determined the forces and means necessary to attack the USSR, and carried out measures to increase the armed forces of Germany.
Participating in the development of the war plan against the USSR were: the operational department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces (chief - Colonel Greifenberg), the department of foreign armies of the East (chief - Lieutenant Colonel Kinzel), chief of staff of the 18th Army General E. Marx, deputy. Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces F. Paulus.
The first calculations for the war plan against the USSR, at the direction of Hitler, began to be made on July 3, 1940. On this day, General Halder ordered Colonel Greifenberg to determine the timing of the deployment of troops and the necessary forces in the event of war with the Soviet Union in the fall of 1940. A few days later, Halder was presented with the following considerations :
a) the deployment of troops will last 4-6 weeks;
b) it is necessary to defeat the Russian army. It is desirable to advance deep into the USSR so that German aircraft can destroy its most important centers;
c) 80-100 divisions are needed. The USSR has 70-75 good divisions.
These calculations are commander in chief ground forces Field Marshal V. Brauchitsch reported to Hitler. Having familiarized himself with the preliminary considerations of the General Staff, Hitler ordered a more energetic approach to the Russian problem.
To speed up the development of the plan for the “eastern campaign,” on July 23, Halder ordered the dispatch of General E. Marx from the 18th Army to the General Staff (this army was the first to deploy at the borders of the Soviet Union). E. Marx began developing the plan on July 29, 1940. On the same day, Hitler received the Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces, Field Marshal Keitel, and the Chief of Staff of the Operational Command, Colonel General Jodl, and informed them that he wanted to defeat the USSR in the fall of 1940. Generally approving This is an intention, Keitel expressed doubts about the timing of its implementation. The underdeveloped network of highways and railways in Poland, in his opinion, could not quickly ensure the concentration of forces necessary to defeat the Red Army. Keitel and Jodl, according to the latter, allegedly convincingly showed that 100 divisions were clearly not enough for this purpose. In this regard, Hitler decided to postpone the attack on the Soviet Union until the spring of 1941. He was afraid of the fate of Napoleon, who could not finish hostilities in Russia before the winter.
Armed with the instructions of Hitler and Halder, the “expert in Russian affairs” (as E. Marx was considered to be since the First World War) developed vigorous activity. At the beginning of August 1940, E. Marx reported to Halder the project for Operation OST. This was a detailed and complete development, which took into account all the data available to the General Staff about the armed forces and economy of the USSR, about the characteristics of the terrain, climate and the condition of the roads of the future theater of military operations. In accordance with the plan, it was planned to create two large strike groups north and south of the Pripyat marshes and the deployment of 147 divisions, including 24 tank and 12 motorized. The outcome of the entire campaign against the USSR, it was emphasized in the development, largely depends on how effective the attacks of tank and motorized formations will be.
To prevent Soviet troops from repeating the maneuver of the Russian army of 1812, that is, to avoid battle in the border zone and withdraw their troops into the depths, German tank divisions had to, according to E. Marx, rapidly move forward into the enemy’s location. The duration of the “eastern campaign” is 9-17 weeks. The development was approved by Halder.
E. Marx led the planning of the “eastern campaign” until the beginning of September, and then, on Halder’s instructions, he handed over all the materials to General F. Paulus, who had just been appointed deputy. Chief of the General Staff.
Under the leadership of F. Paulus, members of the General Staff continued to work on the plan. On October 29, 1940, F. Paulus presented Halder with a note in which he outlined the principles of waging war against the Soviet Union. It noted the advantages of German troops over Soviet troops (the presence of combat experience), and therefore the possibility successful actions German troops in conditions of maneuverable fast-moving war.
F. Paulus believed that in order to achieve decisive superiority in forces and means, it was necessary to ensure surprise in the attack.
Like E. Marx, F. Paulus focused on depriving the Red Army troops of the opportunity to retreat deep into the country and conduct a mobile defense. The German groups were faced with the task of creating gaps in decisive directions, encircling and destroying Soviet troops, not allowing them to retreat.
At the same time, another plan for war against the USSR was being developed. On September 19, 1940, the head of the country's defense department, Warlimont, reported to Jodl a draft plan drawn up by Lieutenant Colonel B. Lossberg. The plan emphasized the need to create three army groups instead of the two proposed by E. Marx based on previously given instructions from Hitler with a concentration of forces north of the Pripyat marshes in order to take the shortest route to Moscow through Smolensk. The third group was supposed to strike at Leningrad. As it turned out later, B. Lossberg borrowed these ideas from F. Paulus, being in contact with him in violation of Jodl’s orders.
For four months the General Staff developed a plan for war against the USSR. On November 12 (according to other sources, November 19), 1940, Halder reported the “Otto” program (as the plan for the war against the Soviet Union was originally called) to Brauchitsch, who on December 5 presented the plan to Hitler. The latter agreed with his main strategic provisions, indicated the approximate date for the start of the war - the end of May 1941, and ordered preparations for the war against the USSR to be launched at full speed in accordance with this plan.
So, the plan for the war against the USSR was developed, received Hitler’s approval, but they were in no hurry to approve it: they decided to check the reality of the plan’s implementation on war game leadership of the General Staff, which was entrusted to General Paulus. Participants in the development of the plan acted as commanders of army groups and tank groups. The game consisted of three stages.
The first began on November 29 with the invasion of German troops and battles in the border zone. On December 3, the second stage of the operation was lost - an offensive to capture the Minsk-Kyiv line. Finally, on December 7, the destruction of possible targets that could be beyond this border was carried out. Each stage of the game ended with a detailed analysis and summing up of the position and condition of the troops. The results of the game allowed us to make some clarifications to the plan.
But the High Command of the Ground Forces did not limit itself to these games. Halder summoned the chiefs of staff of the three army groups created by this time, informed them of the main data from the developed plan and demanded that they present their views on the main problems of conducting an armed struggle against the Soviet Union. All proposals that differed significantly from the General Staff plan were discussed under the leadership of Halder and Paulus at a meeting with the chiefs of staff of army groups and armies on December 13, 1940. The meeting participants came to the conclusion that the USSR would be defeated within 8-10 weeks.
After making the necessary clarifications, General Jodl ordered Warlimont to develop a directive based on the war plan against the USSR approved by Hitler. This directive, number 21, was prepared and reported to Hitler on December 17. Before approving the document, he demanded a number of changes.
On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21 of the Supreme High Command, which received the code name “Barbarossa Option” and is the main guiding document of the war against the USSR.
From Directive No. 21: “The German armed forces must be prepared to defeat Soviet Russia in a short-term campaign...”
After Hitler signed Directive No. 21, the second period of preparation by the General Staff for the war against the USSR began. If before Directive No. 21, preparation was limited mainly to the development of a plan in the General Staff of the Ground Forces and the training of reserves, now the plans of all types of armed forces were thought out in detail.
The war plan against the USSR is a whole complex of political, economic and strategic measures of the Hitlerite leadership. In addition to Directive No. 21, the plan included directives and orders from the Supreme High Command and the main commands of the armed forces on strategic concentration and deployment, logistics, theater preparation, camouflage, disinformation, and so on. Political goal the war is reflected in a group of documents codenamed “General Plan “Ost””; in Goering's Green Folder; directive “On special jurisdiction in the Barbarossa area and on special measures of troops” dated May 13, 1941; in the “Instruction on Special Areas” of March 13, 1941, which set out the system of the occupation regime in the conquered territory, and other documents.
The political essence of the war plan was the destruction of the Soviet Union, the transformation of our country into a colony of Nazi Germany, and the conquest of world domination.
The Ost General Plan is one of the most shameful documents in the history of mankind, which revealed the criminal plans of the Nazis for extermination and Germanization Slavic peoples. The plan was designed for 20-30 years and defined three lines:
- “biological” dismemberment of the Slavic peoples through mass extermination (46-51 million people) and forced Germanization of the elected part;
Transformation of Eastern Europe into an area of SS military settlements,
Eugenic weakening of the Slavic peoples.
The Nazis planned to evict 65% of the population of Western Ukraine, 75% of the population of Belarus, and a significant part of the population of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia within 30 years. They intended to settle 10 million Germans on this territory. The remaining indigenous people(according to their calculations, 14 million people) were supposed to be gradually Germanized and used as unskilled labor.
The drafters of the Ost plan intended to “defeat the Russians as a people, to divide them.”
The program for the mass extermination of Soviet people was the directive “On special jurisdiction in the Barbarossa region and special measures of troops.” Trampling on everything international law, she demanded to show ruthlessness towards Soviet citizens, carry out mass repressions and shoot on the spot without trial anyone who showed even the slightest resistance or sympathized with the partisans. From the directive: “...Crimes of hostile civilians until further notice are removed from the jurisdiction of the military and military courts.
Partisans must be mercilessly destroyed by troops in battle or during pursuit.
Any other attacks by hostile civilians on the armed forces, their members and personnel serving the troops must also be suppressed by troops on the spot using the most extreme measures ... "
Hitler's soldiers and officers were cleared of any responsibility for any crimes on Soviet soil. Moreover, they were targeted for this. On June 1, 1941, twelve commandments for the conduct of Germans in the East were drawn up. Here are excerpts from them.
“...No explanations or justifications, let the Russians see our workers as leaders.
...In view of the fact that the newly annexed territories must be permanently assigned to Germany and Europe, much will depend on how you position yourself there. You must understand that you have been representatives for centuries great Germany and standard bearers of the National Socialist Revolution and new Europe. Therefore, you must, with the consciousness of your dignity, carry out the most stringent and merciless measures that the state will require of you... Berlin June 1, 1941 G. Bakke.”
Commanders of armies and tank groups gave similar instructions to their troops. From the order of the Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal von Reichenau: “... In the event of the use of weapons in the rear of the army by individual partisans, take decisive and cruel measures against them.<…>Without going into political considerations for the future, the soldier must perform a twofold task:
1. Complete destruction of the Bolshevik heresy, Soviet state and his armed forces.
2. Ruthless eradication of enemy cunning and cruelty and thereby ensuring the security of the German armed forces in Russia.
Only in this way can we fulfill our historical mission to liberate the German people forever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger.”
Let the reader forgive us, but we decided to present another document testifying to the bloodthirstiness of the fascists.
From the “Memo to the German Soldier”: “Soldier of Great Germany, you will be invulnerable and invincible, strictly following the following instructions. If you don't complete at least one of them, you will die.
To save yourself, act according to this “Memo”.
Remember and do:
1) Morning, afternoon, night, always think about the Fuhrer, don’t let other thoughts bother you, know that he thinks and does for you. You just have to act, not be afraid of anything, you, a German soldier, are invulnerable. Not a single bullet, not a single bayonet will touch you. There are no nerves, no heart, no pity - you are made of German iron. After the war you will again find a new soul, a clear heart - for your children, for your wife, for great Germany. Now act decisively, without hesitation.
2) A German cannot be a coward. When things get hard for you, think about the Fuhrer. You will feel joy and relief. When the Russian barbarians attack you, think about the Fuhrer and act decisively. They will all die from your blows. Remember the greatness, the victory of Germany. For your personal glory you must kill exactly 100 Russians, this is the fairest ratio - one German is equal to 100 Russians. You have no heart and nerves; they are not needed in war. Destroy pity and compassion in yourself, kill every Russian, don’t stop if there’s an old man or a woman, a girl or a boy in front of you. Kill, thereby saving yourself from death, ensuring the future of the whole family and becoming famous forever.
3) Not a single world power can resist German pressure. We will bring the whole world to its knees. The German is the absolute master of the world. You will decide the fate of England, Russia, America. You are a German, as befits a German, destroy all living things that resist in your path, always think about the sublime, about the Fuhrer - you will win. Neither a bullet nor a bayonet will take you. Tomorrow the whole world will kneel before you.”
For Soviet people who were captured, it was prescribed to create a regime of inhumane conditions and terror: to set up camps in the open air, fencing them only with barbed wire; prisoners are used only for hard, exhausting work and kept on half-starved rations, and if they try to escape, they are shot without warning.
The face of fascism is especially revealed by the “Instructions on the treatment of political commissars” of June 6, 1941, which demanded the extermination of all political workers of the Red Army.
Hitler's strategists planned in every possible way to incite national hostility between the peoples of the Soviet Union. This idea runs like a red thread throughout the entire section of the Directives, entitled “Treatment of the population on territorial grounds.”
Regarding the Baltic Soviet republics it was indicated that there “it would be most expedient for the German authorities to rely on the remaining Germans, as well as on the Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians. The contradictions between the national groups and the remaining Russians should be used in the interests of Germany."
Finally, the same regarding the Caucasus: “The contradictions between the natives (Georgians, Armenians, Tatars, etc.) and the Russians should be used to our advantage.”
In the occupied territory, it was planned to destroy medium and higher schools. The Nazis believed that the education of enslaved peoples should be the most basic. Here is what Reichsführer SS Himmler wrote about this: “For not German population There should be no higher schools in the eastern regions. It is enough for him to have a four-grade public school. The aim of the training should be to teach only simple counting, up to 500 at the most, the ability to sign, and the instillation that the divine commandment is to obey the Germans, to be honest, diligent and obedient. I consider the ability to read unnecessary.” And the head of the party chancellery and the Fuhrer’s secretary, Martin Bormann, said: “The Slavs must work for us. When we no longer need them, they may die. Compulsory vaccinations and health services are not necessary for them. A high birth rate among the Slavs is undesirable. Their education is dangerous. It is enough if they can count to one hundred. The best and most acceptable education will be one that will form useful coolies for us. Any educated person“This is the future enemy.” The main goal of training is to instill to the Soviet population the need for unquestioning submission to the Germans.
The economic goals of the aggression included the robbery of the Soviet state, the depletion of its material resources, and the use of the public and personal property of the Soviet people for the needs of the Third Reich.
The program for the economic plunder of the Soviet Union was contained in instructions and directives compiled in the so-called “Goering Green Folder”. Its documents provided for the immediate export to Germany of reserves of valuable raw materials (platinum, magnesite, rubber, etc.) and equipment. “Getting as much food and oil as possible for Germany is the main economic goal of the campaign,” said one of the directives of Goering’s Green Folder.
Hitler’s invaders hoped to provide food for their armed forces by plundering the occupied regions of the USSR, which doomed local population to starvation.
The section of Goering's Green Folder entitled "Consumption Regulation" states: "All the raw materials, semi-finished products and finished products should be withdrawn from commerce by orders, requisitions and confiscations.”
In the order of the Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal von Reichenau, on the behavior of the troops we read: “... food supply local residents and prisoners of war is unnecessary humanity..."
Appointed head of economic policy in the occupied territory of the USSR (Oldenburg Plan), Goering declared: “I intend to rob, and effectively,” and taught his subordinates: “You must be like pointing dogs. Anything that could be useful to the Germans should be taken out of the warehouses and delivered here.”
Goering's Green File on economic policy in Russia said: "When we take out of the country everything we need, tens of millions of people will undoubtedly die of hunger."
It's hard to believe that people can come up with such fanaticism. So, the motto of the invaders: destroy, rob, exterminate! This is what they did in practice.
The Barbarossa plan also contained ways to achieve its goals. main idea it consisted of delivering a lightning strike on the Soviet Union (blitzkrieg), which was supposed to lead to surrender.
The plan, in particular, provided for the hidden concentration of large masses of troops and combat assets on the border with the USSR; launching surprise attacks on Soviet troops concentrated in border areas; reaching the Leningrad, Smolensk, Kyiv line by July 11; subsequent occupation of the territory of the Soviet Union for 1.5-2 months until the “AA” line (Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan).
From Directive No. 21 (Barbarossa Plan): “...The ultimate goal of the operation is to create a protective barrier against Asian Russia along the common Volga-Arkhangelsk line. Thus, if necessary, the latter industrial area, remaining with the Russians in the Urals, can be paralyzed with the help of aviation... Adolf Hitler.”
The war against the USSR was planned to begin at the end of May 1941. Subsequently, due to events in the Balkans, Hitler postponed the attack several times. In mid-May, he announced that June 22 was the start date for Operation Barbarossa. On May 30, Hitler finally confirmed this date.
What should have happened if Operation Barbarossa had been successful? Our country was supposed to disintegrate into 4 German Reichskommissariat.
3. Reichskommissariat Moscow. It includes the general commissariats: Moscow, Tula, Leningrad, Gorky, Vyatka, Kazan, Ufa, Perm.
4. Reichskommissariat Ostland. General Commissariats: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus.
5. Reichskommissariat Ukraine. General Commissariats: Voyno-Podolia, Zhitomir, Kiev, Chernigov, Kharkov, Nikolaev, Tavria, Dnepropetrovsk, Stalino, Rostov, Voronezh, Stalingrad, Saratov, Volga Germans.
6. Reichskommissariat Caucasus. General Commissariats: Kuban, Stavropol, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Mountain Commissariat and the Main Commissariat of Kalmykia. (It was also envisaged that the Reichskommissariat of Turkestan would be created later.)
By June 1941, all posts in Berlin were distributed, including the posts of 1050 regional commissars. Rosenberg's deputy Arno Schickedanz was appointed in Tbilisi, Gauleiter Siegfried Kasche in Moscow, Gauleiter Lohse in Riga, and Gauleiter Erich Koch in Rivne.
According to the Barbarossa plan, you need to pay attention to the following.
Firstly, the change in the date of the start of the war served as a reason for falsifiers of history to consider this change one of Hitler’s “fatal decisions”, which allegedly led to the defeat of Nazi Germany (Zeitler, Guderian, etc.). But not everything depended on Hitler: the peoples of Greece and Yugoslavia offered heroic resistance to the invaders, and the flood western rivers, which dragged on until June, also did not depend on him.
Secondly, no matter how much the Nazis rushed around with the “Sea Lion” plan, threatening England with terrible punishments, they failed to hide the “Barbarossa” plan in safes.
In Berlin, since 1934, the quiet American S. Wood served as trade attaché at the US Embassy. He managed to establish contacts with high-ranking Nazis. One of his informants already reported in August 1940 that the Nazi leadership was planning a war against the USSR. Washington initially reacted with some distrust to this information. But a thorough check convinced the president of their veracity. At the beginning of January 1941, S. Wood managed to obtain and send to Washington a document that dispelled all doubts - Directive No. 21 of December 18, 1940, the so-called “Barbarossa” plan. The document was soon presented to F. Roosevelt with an indication that the State Department and the FBI considered it identical to the original. In March 1941, the US government warned the Soviet government of an impending attack.
Thirdly, despite the careful development of the plan and German punctuality, it was fundamentally flawed.
The plan was based on a clear overestimation of the forces and capabilities of Nazi Germany and an underestimation of the forces of the Soviet Union.
The German command, relying on intelligence assessments, ignored the potential capabilities of the Soviet economy. In every possible way speeding up the timing of the attack on the Soviet Union, Hitler, in a conversation with Field Marshal Keitel in August 1940, said: “Russia is only at the stage of creating its military-industrial base, but is far from ready in this regard.”
In reality, contrary to the forecasts of Hitler’s intelligence, which believed that it would be able to disorganize our rear and disable a number of key defense enterprises, Soviet economy even in conditions of relocation of industry to eastern regions turned out to be capable, as a result of the intensive mobilization of all means, not only of maintaining its stable position, but also of supplying the front with everything necessary and in ever-increasing quantities.
Perhaps one of the most fatal miscalculations of the German leadership was an incorrect assessment of the Soviet mobilization ability. In August 1941, the German military intelligence estimated it at 370-390 divisions, i.e. approximately 7.5-8 million people, while the actual mobilization capacity of the USSR turned out to be 4 times higher. This miscalculation cannot in any way be explained by ignorance of the facts, since data on the population of the USSR in 1939-1940. were well known to the German side. Although the 1939 census data on the sex and age structure of the population of the USSR were never published, the materials of the previous 1926 census were known, as well as the fact that the losses of Germany and Russia during the First World War and the Civil War were close to each other in proportion to population size, as well as vital statistics during the interwar period. All this made it possible to fairly accurately assess the mobilization ability of the Soviet Union.
The plan was based on the possibility of isolating the Soviet Union in the international arena.
Finally, the depravity of the Nazi war plan lay in the fact that it focused on the complete mobilization of the army, the transfer of the German national economy to serve the needs of the war, the concentration of the required number of troops in strategically necessary directions for the offensive, the use of the experience of modern warfare gained by the German army in campaigns against the states of Western Europe, etc.
Life soon confirmed the unreality and adventurism of the fascist German plan.
Soviet intelligence knew everything
In Russian society, there is still a very widespread idea that the Wehrmacht invasion of the USSR on the night of June 22, 1941 came as a complete surprise to our entire country, including its leadership. IN Soviet time surprise thesis Hitler's attack in the USSR it was perceived as an axiom.
Facts indicate that Hitler's aggression was not a complete surprise for the Soviet leadership. Thanks to intelligence actions, information about Hitler’s preparations for war against the USSR arrived on time and in sufficient quantities. Our intelligence officers acted quite professionally, despite the fact that it was not easy to mobilize them for successful work: in 1940, intelligence had to be recreated virtually from scratch. After the purges of 1937-1938. Less than half of the personnel intelligence officers remained in service, which led to the severance of many intelligence connections and a decrease in the effectiveness of illegal work abroad.
The purge in the special services is partly explained by the fact that a number of high-ranking employees - Nathan Reiss, Samuel Ginzberg (known as Walter Krivitsky), Alexander Barmin, Lev Feldbin (Alexander Orlov), Genrikh Lyushkov, Alexander Uspensky - became defectors in the 30s and were extradited secret information. Some of them did not hide their sympathy for L. Trotsky, who was expelled from the USSR, a zealous opponent of Stalin’s encirclement, and Stalin wanted to neutralize everyone who, at least potentially, could have connections with the Trotskyist opposition. He was especially wary of professionals from the special services who were proficient in reconnaissance and sabotage technologies.
At the same time, Stalin realized the importance of intelligence as an indispensable tool in making foreign policy decisions. When the Wehrmacht occupied Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, the Soviet leadership could not help but wonder about future plans Hitler. Stalin ordered the replenishment of the special services with new personnel and the resumption of large-scale illegal activities abroad, primarily in Germany.
Sudoplatov and Korotkov carried out illegal work in the Reich, knew all its intricacies, and successfully controlled an agent network embedded in German government agencies and military units. The supplier of intelligence personnel was the Comintern, from whose structures came such illegal aces as Rudolf Abel, Arnold Deitch, Sandor Rado, Richard Sorge.
Soviet intelligence officers also found a common language with opponents of the Nazi doctrine from among high-ranking Germans and Japanese.
In Tokyo, Richard Sorge managed to recruit Ozaki Hotsumi, secretary to the head of the Japanese government, Prince Funimaro Konoe.
In Berlin, agent Breitenbach - Willy Lehmann, an employee of the central office of the Gestapo, became a very valuable source of information for our intelligence.
Since the spring of 1940, the Main Intelligence Directorate began to receive numerous information concerning German plans for preparations for war against the USSR, the creation of military groups in the Wehrmacht, the transfer of German troops and military equipment to the Soviet borders, and the likely timing of the outbreak of war. All this data clearly indicated that the Nazis were in full swing preparing Germany for aggression against the Soviet Union.
The information transmitted by the intelligence officers was not in vain: the leadership of the USSR responded to it with measures to strengthen the country’s defense capability. Intelligence data directly influenced the military-strategic planning carried out by the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army.
On December 18, 1940, Hitler issued Directive No. 21, Plan Barbarossa, which ordered the completion of Wehrmacht preparations for an attack on the USSR by May 15, 1941. Already on December 29, the Intelligence Directorate in Moscow had information about this directive.
By the beginning of 1941, it was completely clear to our intelligence officers that Hitler was preparing aggression against the USSR. As the pace increases military training the Wehrmacht and the flow of information about it increased. It came from military headquarters, from the police, from the German Foreign Ministry.
In the spring of 1941, reports from Germany to Moscow no longer left any doubts about Nazi plans regarding the USSR. On May 7, materials were transmitted to the Center that the concentration of the Wehrmacht had entered its final stage and the Germans intended to launch an offensive on a broad front from Finland to Romania. At the end of May, the GRU informed Stalin, Voroshilov and Timoshenko about the composition of the German troops concentrated against three military districts - Baltic, Western and Kyiv special.
Our intelligence officers accurately determined the scale of the deployment of Wehrmacht forces to Soviet border. In light of these facts, the thesis about the complete surprise of Hitler’s aggression against the USSR does not seem to correspond to historical realities.
The logic of the behavior of the USSR leadership on the eve of the German attack
The Soviet leadership was not mistaken about Hitler's true plans. Seeing the growing military danger from Germany, it strengthened the line of defense on western borders country, deployed military units from hinterland to border districts. After the Wehrmacht defeated the British and French troops near Dunkirk and a few days later took Paris without a fight, Stalin clearly realized that war was just around the corner for the Soviet Union. It is no coincidence that in September 1940 large-scale tactical exercises of the Red Army were held in all border military districts. However, the Kremlin was obliged to do everything to delay the start of the war for as long as possible. A different logic of behavior would be obviously adventurous.
To understand this, you need to give an exact answer to the question: was it realistic to complete the mobilization activities carried out at that time before June 22, 1941? It's obvious that organizational capabilities countries were determined by the objective state of the economy, and it was impossible to voluntarily step over this factor.
Back in the late 20s technical equipment The Red Army was almost nil: only 92 tanks were in service, there were not enough artillery pieces, all the planes were outdated. IN large-scale war If it had happened at that time, the Soviet Union would have had no chance of success.
The implementation of the modernization program began with the adoption of the first five-year plan, the main task of which was to repeatedly increase the country's defense capability. Thanks to the benefits of planning, industrial production doubled during the first five-year plan, and increased by another 2.2 times during the second. In the third five-year plan, there was a further expansion of the industrial potential of the USSR.
Industrial construction in the east of the country was of the greatest strategic importance. In addition to new production facilities, enterprises were built there that duplicated factories operating in the west of the USSR. As the first months of the war showed, duplication of production in the east turned out to be necessary and extremely timely.
In 1940, investment in military production was significantly increased, which made it possible to increase the volume of defense production by more than a third. The size of the army and navy has increased.
On June 25, 1940, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to strengthen production discipline by prohibiting workers from moving from one enterprise to another without permission. In addition, a seven-day working week. With this decision, the country's economy was essentially transferred to a military, mobilization track.
In September 1939, a law on universal conscription was adopted. From this time to January 1941, the size of the army and navy increased 2.8 times, reaching 4,200 thousand military personnel.
At the same time, the Kremlin understood that a numerical increase in the Armed Forces without improving their qualitative characteristics did not make much sense. The army needed new tanks, aircraft, artillery systems, and small arms.
On instructions from the government, our designers created such high-quality models of equipment as the famous T-34 tank, the Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3, Il-2, Pe-2 aircraft, advanced for that time.
Much attention was paid to the technical equipment of the navy, and military bases were created in the Black, Baltic and North Seas. The mobilization measures carried out by the government in the pre-war years yielded positive results. But by June 1941 they were not yet completely completed.
In mid-May 1941, People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov introduced the Chairman of the Government I.V. Stalin "Strategic Deployment Plan" armed forces Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies." A few days later, the commanders of the Western, Baltic, Kyiv Special and Odessa Military Districts received secret directives from the People's Commissariat of Defense ordering the deployment manpower and equipment in the fortified areas of these districts.
However, this deployment was not carried out quickly enough. It was slowed down by the inconsistency and ambiguity of instructions issued to the districts by the central military command.
Stalin sought by any means to postpone the start of the war in order to complete the modernization of the armed forces. He understood that the same information from the hundreds of intelligence reports arriving could not be the result of a simple coincidence, but, as a person accustomed to the role of a sophisticated theorist, it was difficult for him to abandon his ideas about the logic of deployment historical events. He hoped that the war between Germany and Britain would sooner or later emerge from its sluggish state and result in a fierce battle between them, and if so, Hitler would not dare to take such a risky step for him as an attack on the USSR.
Marshal G. Zhukov wrote: “I remember Stalin’s words when they reported to him about the suspicious actions of the German troops: “Hitler and his generals are not such fools as to fight simultaneously on two fronts, on which the Germans broke their necks in the First World War. Hitler doesn’t have enough strength to fight on two fronts at the same time, and he won’t go on an adventure.”
Stalin believed that he would be able to keep the Soviet Union out of the armed conflict. The situation was also influenced by the Secretary General’s confidence that the German invasion must certainly be preceded by an ultimatum on their part, which would make it possible to begin negotiations with them, and therefore would allow them to gain time to complete mobilization measures in the USSR. But no ultimatum came. Soviet leader, who regarded this fact as unheard of treachery on the part of the Germans, expressed his indignation at their actions: “They attacked us without making any claims, without demanding any negotiations.”
AGGRESSION AGAINST THE USSR
DIRECTIVE OF THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES OF DECEMBER 18, 1940 NO. 21 ON THE ATTACK ON THE USSR (PLAN “BARBAROSSA”)
[Document 446-PS, US-31]
Directive No. 21 Barbarossa Option
The German armed forces must be prepared to ensure that even before the end of the war with England defeat Soviet Russia through a quick military operation(variant "Barbarossa").
For this army will have to provide all the formations at its disposal with the only limitation that the occupied areas must be protected from all surprises.
Task air force will be to free up for the eastern front the forces necessary to support the army so that one can count on the rapid execution ground operation, and also to ensure that the destruction of the eastern regions of Germany by enemy aircraft would be least significant.
The main requirement is that the areas of combat operations and combat support under our authority be completely protected from enemy air attack and that offensive actions against England and especially against her supply routes should not weaken at all.
Application center of gravity navy During the eastern campaign it remained directed primarily against England.
Order about the offensive I will give to Soviet Russia, if necessary, eight weeks before the scheduled start of the operation.
Preparations that require more time should be started (if not already started) now and completed by 15-5-41.
Particular attention should be paid to ensure that the intention to carry out an attack is not revealed.
Preparations by the Supreme High Command should be based on the following basic principles:
common goal
The military masses of the Russian army located in the western part of Russia must be destroyed in bold operations with deep advance of tank units. The retreat of combat-ready units into the vastness of Russian territory should be prevented.
Then, by rapid pursuit, a line must be reached from which Russian aircraft will no longer be able to launch attacks on German areas. The ultimate goal of the operation is to fence off from Asian Russia along the common line Arkhangelsk - Volga. Thus, if necessary, the last remaining Russian industrial area in the Urals can be paralyzed with the help of aviation.
During these operations, the Russian Baltic Fleet will quickly lose its strongholds and thus cease to be combat-ready.
Already at the beginning of the operation it is necessary to powerful blows prevent the possibility of effective interference from Russian aviation.
Allies and their missions
1. On the flanks of our operation, we can count on the active participation of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia.
The High Command of the German Army will promptly coordinate and establish in what form the armed forces of both countries will be subordinated to the German command upon their entry into the war.
2. Romania's task will be to pin down the enemy forces opposing it, together with the group of armed forces advancing there, and otherwise to carry out auxiliary service in the rear area.
3. Finland will have to cover the advance of the German airborne northern group (part of the XXI group), which will arrive from Norway, and then operate together with it. In addition, Finland will have to liquidate (Russian forces) in Hanko.
4. It can be counted on that no later than the start of the operation, Swedish railways and highways will be made available for the advance of the German northern group.
Carrying out the operation
Army in accordance with the above goals:
In the area of military operations, divided by the swamps of the Pripyat River into northern and southern halves, the center of gravity of the operation should be outlined north of this area. Two army groups should be provided here.
The southern of these two groups, forming the center common front, the task ahead, with the help of especially reinforced tank and motorized units, is to advance from the Warsaw region and north of it and destroy the Russian armed forces in Belarus. Thus, the preconditions must be created for the penetration of large forces of mobile troops to the north in order to, in cooperation with the northern army group advancing from East Prussia in the direction of Leningrad, destroy the enemy troops fighting in the Baltic states. Only after achieving this urgent task, which should end with the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt, should offensive operations to capture the most important center communications and defense industry - Moscow.
Only the unexpectedly rapid destruction of the resistance of the Russian army could make it possible to strive for the simultaneous completion of both stages of the operation.
The main task of the XXI Group during the eastern operation remains the defense of Norway. The forces available in addition to this should be directed in the north (mountain corps) first of all to securing the Petsamo region and its ore mines, as well as the Arctic Ocean route, and then, together with the Finnish armed forces, advance to the Murmansk railway in order to interrupt the supply by land to the Murmansk areas.
Whether such an operation can be carried out with the help of more powerful German armed forces (2-3 divisions) from the Rovaniemi area and south of it depends on Sweden's willingness to provide its railways for this offensive.
Main forces Finnish army the task will be set, in accordance with the successes of the German northern flank, to pin down as many Russian forces as possible by attacking to the west or on both sides of Lake Ladoga, and also to capture Hanko.
The main task of the army group, located south of the Pripyat swamps, is to advance from the Lublin region in the general direction of Kyiv in order to quickly advance with powerful tank forces to the flank and rear of the Russian forces and then attack them as they retreat to the Dnieper.
The German-Romanian army group on the right flank has a task:
a) defend Romanian territory and thus the southern flank of the entire operation;
b) during an attack on the northern flank of the southern army group, pin down the enemy forces located against it, and in the event successful development events through persecution, in interaction with air force, to prevent the organized withdrawal of Russians across the Dniester.
In the north - quick access to Moscow. The capture of this city means a decisive success both politically and economically, not to mention the fact that the Russians will be deprived of their most important railway junction.
Air Forces:
Their task will be to paralyze and eliminate the impact of Russian aviation if possible, as well as to support the army's operations in its decisive directions, namely the central army group and, in the decisive flank direction, the southern army group. Russian railways should be cut depending on their importance for the operation, mainly at their most important nearby objectives (bridges over rivers) by capturing them by a bold landing of parachute and airborne units.
In order to concentrate all forces to fight against enemy aircraft and directly support the army, attacks should not be made on defense industry. Only after the end of the operation against means of communication will such attacks become the order of the day, primarily against the Ural region.
Navy:
In the war against Soviet Russia, the Navy will have the task of preventing enemy naval forces from leaving the Baltic Sea, while defending its own coast. In view of the fact that upon reaching Leningrad the Russian Baltic Fleet will lose its last stronghold and find itself in a hopeless situation, more significant naval operations should be avoided before this.
After the liquidation of the Russian fleet, the task will be to fully ensure the supply of the northern flank of the army by sea(clearing mines!).
All orders that will be given by the commanders-in-chief on the basis of this instruction must clearly proceed from the fact that we're talking about about precautions in case Russia changes its attitude towards us, which it has adhered to until now.
The number of officers involved in preliminary training should be as limited as possible, further employees should be brought in as late as possible and dedicated only to the extent necessary for the immediate activities of each individual. Otherwise, there is a danger that due to the publicity of our preparations, the implementation of which has not yet been decided at all, dire political and military consequences may arise.
I expect reports from the commanders-in-chief on their further intentions based on this instruction.
Report to me about the planned preparations and their progress in all military units through Supreme Command(OKW).
Endorsed: Yodel, Keitel.
Signed: Hitler .
Sent out:
Supreme Command of the Army Ground Forces (operations department)
-"- fleet (SKl)
copy No. 1 -"- №2 -"- №3
-"- №4 -"- №5-9
-"- Air Force OKV:
PC. hands armed forces Division L
FROM THE PROTOCOL OF THE INTERROGATION OF COLONEL GENERAL WALTER WARLIMONT OF THE GERMAN ARMY
[Document USSR-263]
On this day, Colonel General Jodl arrived on a special train at the Reichengalle station, where the “L” department of the operational leadership headquarters was located... This immediately caught my eye because General Jodl had probably not come to us before.
Besides me, he also ordered three other senior officers to appear... I cannot repeat his expressions verbatim, but the meaning was as follows: Jodl declared that the Fuhrer had decided to prepare a war against Russia. The Fuhrer justified this by the fact that the war had to happen one way or another, it would be better if this war was carried out in connection with the war already taking place and, in any case, to begin the necessary preparations for it... At the same time, or somewhat later, Jodl said that Hitler intended to start a war against the Soviet Union already in the fall of 1940. However, he later abandoned this plan. The reason for this was that the strategic concentration of the army could not be accomplished by this time. For this there were no necessary prerequisites in Poland: railways, military premises, bridges were not prepared..., communications, airfields were still not organized... Therefore, an order was issued that was supposed to provide all the prerequisites for to prepare such a campaign and for it to take place...
STATEMENT OF PAULUS TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
[Document USSR-156]
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR
Moscow
On August 8, 1944, I appealed to the German people to overthrow Hitler and end the war that had become senseless.
Today, when the crimes of Hitler and his accomplices are brought before the peoples, I consider it my duty to provide the Soviet Government with everything known to me from my activities, which can serve as material in the Nuremberg trials to prove the guilt of the war criminals.
From September 3, 1940 to January 18, 1942, I held the position of Oberquartermaster on the General Staff ground forces. My tasks included replacing the Chief of the General Staff and carrying out his special tasks. Only in the fall of 1941 did I begin to head departments of the General Staff. Of these, the training department and the organizational department were subordinate to me.
During the indicated period of time, Colonel General Halder was the chief of the general staff of the ground forces.
When I joined the OKH on September 3, 1940, I found, among other plans, the still unfinished preliminary operational plan for an attack on the Soviet Union, known under the symbol “Barbarossa.” Major General Marx was involved in developing the plan. Marx was the chief of staff of the 18th Army (Field Marshal von Küchler) and was temporarily seconded to the OKH to develop this plan.
This plan, the development of which was carried out by order of the OKW, was handed over to me by Colonel General Halder with the task of analyzing the possibilities of offensive operations, taking into account terrain conditions, the use of forces, required strength etc. with 130-140 divisions.
According to the OKW plan, the operational task was: first - the capture of Moscow, Leningrad and Ukraine, then - North Caucasus with its oil sources. The ultimate goal was to achieve approximately the Astrakhan - Arkhangelsk line.
The stated goal in itself characterizes this plan as a preparation for pure aggression; this is also clear from the fact that the plan did not provide for defensive measures at all...
This debunks the false claims about preventive war against the threatening danger, which, similar to the frenzied Goebbels propaganda, were disseminated by the OKW.
Preparations also begin in advance for the future partner in aggression - Romania, which in the preliminary Barbarossa plan was envisaged from the very beginning as a springboard for the offensive.
In September 1940, by order of the OKW, a military mission and the 13th Panzer Division were sent to Romania as a model unit.
The cavalry general Hansen was placed at the head of the military mission. Major General Gauffe was appointed his chief of staff, Major Merck was appointed chief quartermaster, and the 13th Panzer Division was commanded by Major General von Rothkirch.
The purpose of the military mission was to reorganize the Romanian army and prepare it for an attack on the Soviet Union in the spirit of Plan Barbarossa. General Hansen and his chief of staff received preliminary guidance on this task from me, and the assignment came from the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Field Marshal Brauchitsch.
General Hansen received directives from two places: through the military mission - from the OKW, on issues of ground forces - from the OKW, directives of a military-political nature only from the OKW. Communication between the German General Staff and the Romanian General Staff was carried out through the military mission.
While a secret alliance existed with Romania already in September 1940, ties with the other two satellites during this period of preparation for aggression against the Soviet Union were weaker, or rather, more cautious.
For example, establishing contact with the Finnish general staff to clarify offensive capabilities in the Murmansk direction was allowed to the chief of staff of the army group (Norway), Colonel Buschenhagen, only at the end of February 1941.
The question of cooperation with Hungary under the Barbarossa plan remained unclear for months. However, Finland always remained directly subordinate to the OKW theater of operations. It was significant that the Chief of the Finnish General Staff, Lieutenant General Heinrichs, came to the OKW and OKH in mid-December 1940. Taking advantage of this opportunity, he made a report to the General Staff officers from the OKH about Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 and about his war experience. The report clearly expressed the general interest in a military clash with the Red Army. Heinrichs assessed the Red Army as a serious adversary.
The visit of the head of the operational group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Laszlo, in the second half of December 1940 was limited to purely organizational issues.
Meanwhile, preparatory activities for the Barbarossa plan had advanced significantly by the end of 1940.
The development of the preliminary plan for Barbarossa, which began in August 1940, ended with the holding of two war games under my leadership at OKH headquarters in Zossen.
The games were attended by Colonel General Halder, the Chief of Operations of the General Staff, Colonel Heusinger, and senior specially invited staff officers from the OKH.
The result of the games, taken as a basis for the development of directives for the strategic deployment of the Barbarossa forces, showed that the envisaged disposition on the Astrakhan-Arkhangelsk line - the distant goal of the OKW - should have led to the complete defeat of the Soviet state, which, in fact, was achieved in its aggression OKW and what, finally, was the goal of this war: to turn Russia into a colonial country.
During the games, the head of the Vostok Department of Foreign Armies, Colonel Kintzel, gave an assessment of the Soviet Union.
The speaker's conclusions were based on the assumptions that the Red Army was a credible adversary, that there was no information about special military preparations, and that the military industry, including the newly created one east of the Volga, was highly developed.
Decisive in further preparatory work for the Barbarossa plan was that the OKW, by directive of December 18, 1940, set the start of the offensive at approximately mid-May 1941. The appointed period was explained by Russian climatic conditions.
At the same time, the circle of employees was expanded to include the commanders of the three intended army groups, who, at a meeting at the OKH in Zossen, were privy to all the details of this plan.
These commanders were: Infantry General von Sodenstern for the future army group "Süd"; Infantry General von Salmuth for Group Center; Lieutenant General Brenneke for the Nord group.
At the same time, Hitler, in the presence of Keitel and Jodl, approved the planned OKH operations reported to him by Brauchitsch and Halder and gave the order for the development of final directives for the strategic deployment of forces.
With this, the military command finally decided to violate the treaty, to attack and to wage a war of aggression against the Soviet Union.
Further development of the plan was taken over by the head of the operations department, Colonel Heusinger, who was directly subordinate to the chief of the general staff.
On February 3, 1941, in Berchtesgaden, following a report from Brauchitsch, Hitler, in the presence of Keitel and Jodl, approved the first directive for the strategic deployment of the Barbarossa forces.
Also present, accompanying Brauchitsch, were the chief of the operations department, Colonel Heusinger, Quartermaster General Wagner, the chief of transport, General Gerke, and I, as the deputy chief of the general staff who was on vacation.
Hitler gave permission to the OKW, regarding this as an important political decision, to negotiate with the Romanian and Finnish general staffs. He banned negotiations with Hungary until further notice.
In general, Hitler dealt with little things in military matters, such as, for example, putting into operation individual long-range guns.
In matters relating to the Soviet Union, he did not express his position either politically or militarily.
During the aforementioned conference with Hitler, Lieutenant Colonel von Lossberg of the OKW told me about the following expression by Jodl:
“Three weeks after our attack, this house of cards will fall apart.”
This statement, as arrogant as it is frivolous, characterizes the entire spiritual baseness of the Nazi leadership and its authoritative advisers Keitel and Jodl.
This remark also demonstrates the absence of any hesitation regarding the planned war of conquest and betrays their true opinion, covered with a deliberate lie, about the threat from Russia as the reason for the planned attack.
On the way to attacking the Soviet Union, these dangerous peacemakers had to remove one more obstacle - the threat to their flank from Yugoslavia.
For this purpose, in April 1941, an attack was carried out on this country.
On March 27, 1941, I met all three in the Imperial Chancellery - Hitler, Keitel and Jodl, who had gathered immediately after this decision was made and Brauchitsch and Halder had distributed tasks for its implementation.
Due to this plan, the OKW was forced to give an order to postpone the implementation of the Barbarossa plan to the second half of June.
Due to the close connection of the Yugoslav issue with the attack on Russia, on March 30, 1941, I was sent by Halder to Budapest, to the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, Infantry General Werth, in order to come to an agreement with the Hungarians, who also wanted to tear off a piece of this spoils for themselves, regarding the implementation of the Yugoslav operation both with regard to the participation of the Hungarians themselves, and on the issue of the deployment of German troops on Hungarian territory.
The attack on Yugoslavia led to a change in the directive on the strategic deployment of forces under the Barbarossa plan, since there were not enough troops for the attack from Romania, which were tied up in the Balkans.
All commanders-in-chief of the troops, navy and air force report to Hitler, Keitel and Jodl about the tasks ahead of them in carrying out the German invasion of Soviet Russia.
In Stalingrad on the Volga, this course reached its apogee with the concentration of all the phenomena that accompanied the Nazi war of conquest.
In view of the compelling fact that the 6th Army came to Stalingrad as a result of the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, all the sacrifices and sorrows suffered Soviet people in their just struggle, receive sublime significance in the light of guilt and responsibility.
1. The war criminals Keitel and Jodl are guilty of the fact that due to the refusal of my repeated urgent demands for a breakthrough from the closed ring - telegrams from November 22, 23, 25, 1942 onwards, almost daily in the period from December 8 to the end of December, - Stalingrad turned into an extermination zone for the Russian civilian population located there.
2. They are, in addition, responsible for the fundamental prohibition of the capitulation of troops in a hopeless situation and especially for the refusal of my urgent petition dated January 20, 1943 for permission to capitulate.
The consequence of the refusal was the death and severe suffering of Russian prisoners of war and the local population.
3. War criminals Keitel, Jodl and Goering are guilty of not fulfilling their solemn promises deliver supplies by air to the 6th Army surrounded in Stalingrad.
The accused Goering bears special guilt for the fact that he not only did not fulfill his promise to deliver by air the missing food, medicine and dressings, but even for his frivolous promise to take over the supply by air, which prompted Hitler and Keitel to provide the 6th army to your destiny.
The consequences were: starvation and death from exhaustion of many Russian prisoners of war and the Russian civilian population.
4. The accused Keitel, Jodl and Goering bear significant blame for the fact that they did not draw the necessary conclusions of political and military significance from the Stalingrad disaster.
Therefore, as well as for the further conduct of the war, they are especially guilty for all losses, mainly for the losses of the Soviet people.
I myself bear a heavy responsibility for the fact that then, at Stalingrad, I quite conscientiously carried out the orders of military leaders who acted deliberately criminally.
I am also responsible for the fact that I did not control the implementation of my order of January 14, 1943 on the transfer of all prisoners of war to the Russian side, which led to deaths among them, and for the fact that I did not take more care of them.
As a survivor of Stalingrad, I consider myself obligated to give satisfaction to the Russian people.
Paulus, Field Marshal General.
Prisoner of war camp 9.1.1946
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF FORMER FIELD MARSHAL GENERAL OF THE GERMAN ARMY FRIEDRICH PAULUS IN THE COURT SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL ON FEBRUARY 11, 1946
On September 3, 1940, I began working in the High Command of the Ground Forces as an Oberquartermaster on the General Staff. As such, I had to replace the Chief of the General Staff, and otherwise had to carry out individual operational tasks that they entrusted to me. During my assignment, I found in the area in which I was supposed to work there was also an operational plan that was not yet ready, which concerned an attack on the Soviet Union. This operational plan was then worked out by Major General Marx, Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, who for this purpose was temporarily at the disposal of the high command of the ground forces. The Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Halder, entrusted me with the further development of this plan, begun on the basis of an OKW directive, and, in particular, I was to do this on the following basis. It was necessary to analyze the possibilities of an offensive against Soviet Russia. This check had to be made in relation to the analysis of the terrain, in relation to the use of forces, capabilities and requirements of forces, etc., and it was indicated that I should proceed from 130 to 140 divisions that would be available for the execution of this operation .
Further, from the very beginning it was necessary to take into account the use of Romanian territory as a springboard for the southern group of German troops. Finland's participation in the war was envisaged on the northern flank, but this point was not taken into account during the development of preliminary operational plans.
The objectives of the operation were taken into account as the basis for the measures taken: firstly, the OKW’s intention to destroy the Russian troops located in Western Russia and stop the possibility of military units retreating into the interior of Russia; secondly, to reach a line that would make effective raids by the Russian air force on the territory of the German Empire impossible. The ultimate goal was to reach the Volga-Arkhangelsk line.
The development which I have now outlined was completed at the beginning of November and culminated in two war games which I directed on behalf of the Army General Staff. Senior officers of the General Staff took part in this. As a basis for these war games, the use of forces was envisaged in this way: in the southern region, an army group from the region of southern Poland and Romania, which was supposed to reach the Dnieper and Kyiv. From the northern direction - the army group in the Pripyat area, the strongest, was supposed to advance from the Warsaw area and further north, in the direction of the main attack on Minsk and Smolensk, with the final intention of subsequently hitting Moscow, then another group from the East Prussian space, which was advancing through the Baltic to Leningrad.
The results obtained from these games boiled down to reaching the Dnepr-Minsk-Leningrad line. Further operations had to develop in connection with the situation that would be established as a result of these actions. At the end of these games, a meeting was held with the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, which used the theoretical results of these war games with the involvement of the heads of individual headquarters of the army groups that were responsible for operations in the East. At the end of this meeting, a report was made by the head of the department of armies of the East, who made a report on the economy and geographical characteristics of the Soviet Union, as well as regarding the characteristics of the troops of the Soviet Union. It is noteworthy that at that time nothing was known about any preparations on the part of Russia. These war games and meetings that I just spoke about represented, so to speak, the theoretical part and planning for a future aggressive war, and were, so to speak, the completion of this planning.
Immediately after this, on December 18, 1940, the High Command of the Armed Forces issued Directive No. 21 (this directive was the basis for all military and economic preparations for war). Based on this directive, it was necessary to carry out all actions related to the war. In relation to the High Command of the Ground Forces, this was expressed in the fact that it was necessary to take care of the development of the strategic deployment of forces. These first directives concerning the deployment of forces were approved by Hitler on February 3, 1941, after the report at Obersalzberg. They were then released to the troops. Subsequently, various additions to them were compiled. The beginning of the war was timed to coincide with the time that would be most appropriate for the advancement of large military units on Russian territory. The possibility of such a promotion was expected in mid-May. And accordingly all preparations were made. This plan, however, was changed, since Hitler at the end of March decided, on the basis of the situation in Yugoslavia, to attack Yugoslavia.
As a result of his decision to attack Yugoslavia, Hitler changed the timing of his offensive. The offensive had to be delayed by approximately five weeks, i.e. The offensive was scheduled for the second half of June. And, indeed, this offensive took place in the second half, namely on June 22, 1941.
In conclusion, I want to establish that all preparations for this attack on the USSR, which took place on June 22, were already underway in the fall of 1940...
Around September 1940, just when I was busy operationally planning an attack on the Soviet Union, it was already envisaged to use Romanian territory as a springboard for attacks by the right, i.e. southern group of German troops. A military mission was sent under the leadership of the cavalry general Hansen to Romania. Next, a tank division was sent as a model division to Romania. It was clear to all those privy to these plans that this exercise could only serve to put future military partners on alert. Further, regarding Hungary. In December 1940, the head of the operational group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Laszlo, arrived at the main command of the ground forces in Zossen and asked for advice on organizational issues. At that time, the Hungarian troops were dealing with the reorganization of brigades and divisions and the deployment of motorized and tank units. The head of the organizational department of the general staff, Major General Bule, and I gave a number of advice to Colonel Laszlo on this issue. At the same time, a number of Hungarian military missions were sent to Berlin, including the Hungarian Minister of War, who entered into negotiations with the relevant military authorities in Germany regarding the supply of weapons for the war.
It was clear to all of us, privy to these plans, that all these measures regarding the transfer of weapons to other armies were conceivable only if and clearly boiled down to the fact that military operations were coming in the future and that these weapons would be used in these future military operations. actions in the interests of Germany.
The following could also be said regarding Hungary. Due to developments in Yugoslavia, Hitler decided to attack Yugoslavia at the end of March 1940. On March 27 or 28 I was called up to imperial chancellery in Berlin, where at that time a meeting took place between Hitler, Keitel and Jodl. The commander of the ground forces and the chief of the general staff of the ground forces also took part in this meeting. Upon my arrival, General Halder - Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces - informed me that Hitler had decided to attack Yugoslavia and thereby eliminate the flank threat to future operations in the Greek area, and in order to capture railway line from Belgrade to Nis, and in order to further ensure the implementation of the Barbarossa plan in the sense of freeing up its right flank. I was instructed to attract a number of relevant officers of the General Staff of the Ground Forces and go with them to Vienna in order to explain and transmit the relevant orders to the German commanders who took part in these operations. Then I had to go to Budapest, to General base Hungary in order to discuss and come to an agreement on the use of Austria as a springboard for German troops, as well as to agree on the participation of Hungarian troops in an attack on Yugoslavia.
On March 30, early in the morning, I arrived in Budapest and negotiated with the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, Infantry General Werther, then with the Chief of the Operations Group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Laszlo. The meeting proceeded without any friction and led to the desired result. This result was recorded on the map. The map that was given to me by the Hungarian General Staff showed not only the actions of the groups attacking Yugoslavia, but also the distribution of all the forces that were located on the border of Transcarpathian Ukraine. This arrangement was intended as cover from the Soviet Union.
The fact that such a group existed is proof that there was also a belief on the Hungarian side that a German attack on Yugoslavia would be considered an act of aggression by the Soviet Union. As for the fundamental position regarding Hungary’s position in the sense of participation in such preparations, I knew Hitler’s opinion that Hungary was striving, with the help of Germany, to return and expand the territories that were lost by Hungary in 1918. In addition, Hungary fears the strengthening of another German ally, Romania.
It was from this angle that Hitler viewed Hungary’s participation in his political course. Hitler, as far as I could see from a number of other examples, treated Hungary very reservedly. Firstly, he sought to conceal future offensive plans from Hungary, as he feared its connections with states hostile to Germany. Secondly, Hitler did not seek to make premature promises to Hungary in terms of territorial acquisitions.
I can give an example in relation to the area of oil sources - Drohobych. Subsequently, when the offensive against the Soviet Union began, the German 17th Army, which was fighting in this area, received strict instructions to occupy the Drohobych oil region under all conditions before the approach of Hungarian troops.
In relation to this future military partner, according to my observations, Hitler behaved as if, on the one hand, he definitely counted on Hungary’s participation and therefore supplied Hungary with weapons and helped her in training troops, but still had not yet set a deadline when he informs this partner of his final plans.
Next, a question concerning Finland. In December 1940, the first visit of Lieutenant General Heinrichs, the Chief of the General Staff of Finland, took place to the main headquarters of the High Command of the Ground Forces in Zossen. Lieutenant General Heinrichs conferred with the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces. I no longer remember the content of this conversation, but he made a report there regarding Russian-Finnish war 1939-1940 This report was made for OKH General Staff officers. This report was also addressed to those heads of headquarters of army groups who participated in war games. This report was very important for the General Staff officers at that time, since it was made when Directive No. 21 of December 18 was issued. This report was very important because it represented an exchange of experience from the war with the Soviet Union.
The second visit of the Chief of the Finnish General Staff to Zossen took place approximately in the second half of March 1941. The Finnish chief of the general staff then arrived from Salzburg, where he had a meeting with the high command of the German armed forces. The subject of discussion in Zossen was the coordination of the actions of the Finnish southern group for Operation Barbarossa, the coordination of the actions of this group with the German army group North, which was to advance from East Prussia in the direction of Leningrad. Then it was agreed that the performance of the Finnish southern group should have been coordinated with the performance of the German northern group. Coordinated actions against Leningrad by these groups were determined, and the actions of the Finnish group were to depend on the actions of the German group and were to develop depending on the situation...
The attack on the Soviet Union took place, as I have already said, after lengthy preparations and according to a strictly thought-out plan. The troops that were to carry out the attack were first placed on the appropriate bridgehead. Only by special order were they partially withdrawn to their original positions and then simultaneously set out along the entire front line - from Romania to East Prussia. The Finnish theater of operations should be excluded from this. Just as the operational plan was thought out and analyzed, the offensive was also carefully analyzed at the headquarters of army groups, corps and divisions in a number of war games. The results of this analysis were recorded long before the start of the war in the relevant orders, which concerned all the details of the offensive. A very complex deception was organized, which was carried out from Norway and also from the French coast. These operations were supposed to create the appearance of operations planned against England, and were thereby supposed to divert Russia's attention. However, not only operational surprises were provided for. All tactical opportunities to mislead the enemy were also provided. This meant that they went to the extent of prohibiting overt reconnaissance on the border, thereby allowing possible losses in the name of achieving surprise in the attack. But this also meant that there was no fear that the enemy would suddenly try to cross the border...
The ultimate goal of the attack, which was to advance to the Volga, exceeded the strength and capabilities of the German army. And this goal characterizes the aggressive policy of Hitler and the Nazi state that knew no limits.
From a strategic point of view, achieving this goal would mean the destruction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. Capturing this line would mean capturing and conquering the main regions of Soviet Russia, including the capital Moscow, and thereby the political and economic centers of Soviet Russia.
The economic capture of this Volga-Arkhangelsk line would mean possession of the most important sources of food, the most important mineral resources, including the oil sources of the Caucasus, as well as the most important industrial centers of Russia and then the central transport network of the European part of Russia. The extent to which this corresponded to Hitler’s aspirations and his economic interest in this war can be judged by the example that I personally know. On June 1, 1942, at a meeting of commanders of the southern army group in the Poltava region, Hitler stated that if he did not receive the oil of Maikop and Grozny, he would have to end this war. To exploit and administer the occupied territories, all economic and administrative organizations and institutions were created even before the start of the war. In conclusion, I would like to say: these goals meant the conquest for the purpose of colonization of Russian territories, the exploitation of which and the resources of which should have made it possible to end the war in the West with the aim of finally establishing German dominance in Europe...
FROM THE WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF THE FORMER HEAD OF THE FIRST DEPARTMENT OF GERMAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, LIEUTENANT GENERAL HANS PICKENBROOK DATED DECEMBER 12, 1945
[Document USSR-228]
I first learned about Germany’s impending war against the Soviet Union under the following circumstances.
At the end of December 1940 or at the beginning of January 1941, I don’t remember exactly, I, together with Admiral Canaris, attended a regular report with Field Marshal Keitel in Berchtesgaden. General Jodl was also present at this report. When we finished our report, General Jodl invited Canaris and me to his office, saying that he had something to tell us. The conversation lasted only a few minutes. Jodl told us that in our work we must count on the fact that in the summer of 1941 Germany would be at war with the Soviet Union.
Speaking about the upcoming war with Russia as a finally resolved issue, Jodl said that the German General Staff is no longer interested in individual information about the Red Army and, in connection with this, it sets only one task - to monitor what is happening with the Russians in Soviet-German border. Jodl also told us that Hitler was of the opinion that after the first successful battles with units of the Red Army on the border, the Soviet Union would burst like a soap bubble, and victory over Russia would be assured. This concluded Jodl's conversation with us.
Before Jodl's message, no one told us about preparations for war against Russia.
However, I must say that already from August - September 1940, reconnaissance missions for the Abwehr in the USSR began to significantly increase on the part of the Foreign Armies Department of the General Staff. These assignments were certainly related to the preparations for war against Russia.
I learned about the more precise timing of Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union in January 1941 from Canaris. I don’t know what sources Canaris used, but he told me that the attack on the Soviet Union was scheduled for May 15.
At the same time, Canaris told me that all the preparations for this attack would be called “Plan Barbarossa.”
In March 1941, I witnessed a conversation between Canaris and the head of the sabotage and sabotage department of Abwehr 2, Colonel Lahousen, about the activities under the “Barbarossa Plan”, while they all the time referred to Lahousen’s written order on this matter.
I personally, as the head of Abwehr-1, from February 1941 until June 22, 1941, repeatedly led business meeting with Oberquartermaster IV, Lieutenant General Tippelskirch, and the head of the “Foreign Armies - East” department, Colonel Kinzel. These conversations concerned clarification of various Abwehr assignments for the Soviet Union and, in particular, the re-checking of old intelligence data about the Red Army, as well as clarification of the deployment of Soviet troops during the preparation of an attack on the Soviet Union.
To carry out these tasks, I sent a significant number of agents to the areas of the demarcation line between Soviet and German troops. For reconnaissance purposes we also used some of the German citizens who traveled around various issues in the USSR, and also interviewed people who had previously visited the USSR.
In addition, all peripheral intelligence departments of the Abwehrstelle, which were working against Russia, were given the task of intensifying the sending of agents into the USSR. The same task - strengthening intelligence work against the USSR - was given to all intelligence agencies that existed in the armies and army groups. For more successful management of all these Abwehr bodies, a special intelligence headquarters was created in May 1941, codenamed “Walli-1”. This headquarters was located near Warsaw in the town of Suliewek.
The head of "Valli-1" was appointed as best specialist for work against Russia, Major Baun. Later, when, following our example, Abwehr-2 and Abwehr-1 also created the headquarters “Walli-2” and “Walli-3”, the body as a whole was called the headquarters “Walli” and directed all intelligence, counterintelligence and sabotage work against the USSR. At the head of the Valley headquarters was Lieutenant Colonel Schmalschläger.
From the repeated reports of Colonel Lahousen to Canaris, which I also attended, I know that through this department a lot of preparatory work was carried out for the war with the Soviet Union during the period February - May 1941, and there were repeated meetings of senior Abwehr 2 officials with Jodl’s deputy, General Warlimont. These meetings were held at the cavalry school in the town of Krampnitz. In particular, at these meetings, in accordance with the requirements of the war with Russia, the issue of increasing units was resolved special purpose"Brandenburg-800" and on the distribution of the contingent of these units to individual military formations.
The testimony was recorded by me in my own hand. Pickenbrock
FROM THE PROTOCOL OF THE INTERROGATION OF THE FORMER HEAD OF THE III DEPARTMENT OF GERMAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, LIEUTENANT GENERAL FRANZ VON BENTIVEGNY DATED DECEMBER 28, 1945
[Document USSR-230]
I first learned about Germany’s preparations for a military attack on the Soviet Union in August 1940 from the head of German intelligence and counterintelligence, Admiral Canaris. In an informal conversation that took place in Canaris's office, he told me that Hitler had begun to take measures for the campaign to the East, which he announced back in 1938 in his speech at the Berlin Gauleiter Conference.
Canaris further told me that now these plans of Hitler began to take real forms. This can be seen from the fact that divisions of the German army are being transferred in large numbers from the west to eastern borders and, according to a special order from Hitler, are placed at the starting positions of the upcoming invasion of Russia.
At the end of our conversation, Canaris warned me about the extreme secrecy of his message about plans to prepare an attack on the Soviet Union.
Further, around October 1940, Canaris also told me in one of his informal conversations that Field Marshal Brauchitsch and General Halder, on Hitler’s orders, had developed overall plan preparations for war against the Soviet Union.
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