Surprisingly, the general reader learned about the “tank duel” only 10 years after the battle itself, in 1953, when I. Markin’s book “The Battle of Kursk” was published. Battle of Prokhorovka was integral part this battle and perhaps the most important, because after Prokhorovka the Germans were forced to retreat to starting positions. So why was the Soviet command so keen not to advertise the Prokhorov battle? Yes, because it was better to remain silent about such massive losses, both human and armored vehicles used, especially since the reasons for the losses lay in fatal errors manuals.
WHEN DID IT HAPPEN?
Until 1943, the Germans advanced quite confidently in almost all directions. Germany has decided to hold a major strategic operation on the Kursk salient in the summer of 1943: it was planned to strike from Orel and Belgorod, and then the strike groups, uniting in the Kursk area, were supposed to encircle the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. This operation was called "Citadel". Then the Germans adjusted along the way original plan, deciding that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps would turn to Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions made it possible to stage a global battle with the armored reserves of the Soviet troops.
Soviet command knew about the Citadel plan and planned to conduct defensive battles(for this purpose, a defense in depth was created) to wear down the Germans and then defeat them with advancing counterattacks.
Official historiography speaks of a clear date for the battle at Prokhorovka - July 12, 1943, when our army launched a counteroffensive. However, as sources show, fighting in the Prokhorovsk direction began already on the third day of the German offensive on Kursk Bulge, and it would be more correct to consider the beginning of the Prokhorovka battle to be July 10, when the Germans began to break through the rear army line of the Soviet defense and capture Prokhorovka.
July 12 is the culmination, the “tank duel,” which, however, ended with unclear results and continued on July 13 and 14. The end of the fighting on Prokhorovka should be considered the day of July 16, 1943, or more precisely, the night of July 17, when the Germans began to withdraw their troops.
EFFECT OF SURPRISE
The start of the battle at Prokhorovka station came as a surprise to our troops. And then the versions differ. Some say that the battle was also unexpected for the Germans. It was just that two tank armies were solving their offensive tasks and did not expect to meet a serious enemy. The tank groups moved at a noticeable “angle,” but the Germans were the first to notice the Soviet tanks, managed to reorganize and prepare for battle. They quickly attacked the Russians, which caused inevitable confusion among the Soviet tank crews.
Other historians claim that the Germans tested the option of a counterattack by the Red Army from the Prokhorovka area, and the SS divisions specifically “exposed themselves” to a counterattack by the Soviet tank army. The result was a head-on collision Soviet tanks with large tank forces of the Germans, and this maneuver forced Russian tanks to fight in extremely unfavorable strategic conditions.
There is great reason in the second version, because when the Soviet tanks came within direct range of their guns, the enemy met them with dense fire, so powerful that they were stunned. Under this hurricane fire it was necessary not only to fight, but also to psychologically rebuild from a breakthrough deep into the enemy’s defense in trench warfare. And only the high density of the battle later deprived the Germans of all these advantages.
AGAINST "TIGERS" - EASY
It is believed that the main participants in the “duel” on July 12, 1943 near Prokhorovka were the 5th Panzer Army under the command of Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov and the 2nd SS Panzer Corps under the command of SS Gruppenführer Paul Hausser. According to German generals, about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle. According to other sources, ours had 850 cars. WITH German side researchers “count” about 311 tanks, although official Soviet historiography put forward the figure of 350 destroyed German tanks alone. However, now historians believe that this figure is clearly overestimated, and on the German side, more than 300 vehicles could not have participated. One way or another, about a thousand tanks collided near Prokhorovka in July 1943. The Germans, by the way, were the first to use teletankettes here.
IN Soviet times it was alleged that German Panthers were attacking our tanks. Now it turns out that the Panthers did not take part in the Battle of Prokhorovka. Instead of "Panthers", the Germans "set" not only "Tigers" against Soviet tankers, but also... Soviet T-34 tanks - as many as 8 captured vehicles.
But the worst thing is that our army at Prokhorovka consisted of one third even weaker than the T-34 (and the T-34s were clearly losing in a battle in open terrain to the German medium tank with its new long-barreled gun, not to mention powerful "Tiger"), T-70 tanks designed for reconnaissance and communications. They could not be used in open battle against heavy and medium enemy tanks, any shell from which would destroy the light Seventies. Our historians preferred to remain silent about this.
LAND OF LOSS
Losses in the Battle of Prokhorovka on our side turned out to be absurdly huge. Now historians talk about a ratio of 5:1 or even 6:1, which is not in our favor. For every German killed, there were five or six Soviet soldiers killed. Modern historians the following figures are given: from July 10 to July 16, the Soviet participants in the Prokhorovsky battle lost various reasons about 36 thousand people, of which 6.5 thousand were killed and 13.5 thousand were missing (this is 24 percent of the total losses of the Voronezh Front during the entire Battle of Kursk). The total German losses in the same period amounted to about 7 thousand soldiers, of which 2,795 were killed, 2,046 were missing. However, it is almost impossible to establish the exact number of human losses: search groups are still finding dozens of nameless Soviet soldiers who fell near Prokhorovka.
Total losses of two Soviet fronts on southern front of the Kursk salient amounted to 143,950 people! Both fronts lost a particularly large number of missing persons - about 35 thousand people. Most of them were captured: according to German data, 24 thousand of our soldiers and officers were captured by July 13, that is, during the Battle of Prokhorov.
The losses in equipment were also enormous: Rotmistrov's 5th Tank Army lost up to 70% of its tanks (this amounted to 53% of the entire armored vehicles of the army that took part in the counterattack), while the Germans lost only... 80 vehicles. And according to German data, they lost only 59 tanks in the “duel”, of which they managed to evacuate 54 from the battlefield, and even managed to “drag” several Soviet ones. After the Battle of Prokhorov, they already had 11 T-34s in their corps.
The main reasons for this huge casualties- mistakes and miscalculations of the headquarters of the Voronezh Front, which was headed by General N.F. Vatutin. The counterattack on July 12 was, to put it mildly, unsuccessful. Later, based on an analysis of events, it was recognized as “an example of an unsuccessful operation”: the moment for the counterattack was chosen extremely poorly, people were thrown into battle in the absence of real data about the enemy, without reconnaissance and with poor knowledge of the situation.
The front command underestimated the character and possible development conditions in the next 2-3 days. The interaction between our advancing units was organized so poorly that in some cases it led to battles between our units and the bombing of our own positions by our aircraft.
After the end of the Battle of Kursk, Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Georgy Zhukov tried to initiate the process of analyzing the events of July 12, 1943 near Prokhorovka, targeting the main culprits of the gigantic losses - N.F. Vatutin and the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army P. A. Rotmistrov. The latter was actually going to be put on trial. However, the culprits were saved by the successful completion of hostilities in this area, and later they even received... orders for the Battle of Kursk. P.A. Rotmistrov, by the way, even became Chief Marshal after the war armor tank troops.
QUESTION ABOUT VICTORY
Who won the battle of Prokhorovka and the Battle of Kursk in general? We argued that victory, of course, remained with
By the Red Army: the Germans were unable to “hack” the defenses of the Red Army, their strike force was defeated, and the enemy retreated.
Now they say that such a “victorious” view is just a myth. In fact, the German retreat was caused not by the defeat of their strike force, but by the impossibility of holding the wedge area stretching along the front up to 160 km. English historian Richard J. Evans is generally confident that the Battle of Kursk ended on “Hitler’s orders.” As for our troops, they were unable to immediately overthrow enemy covering units and immediately go on the offensive to defeat the retreating forces due to colossal losses.
And against such a rather bleak background, the feat of Soviet soldiers and tank crews, forced to act in terrible conditions, is enormous. It was ordinary soldiers who held the lines, it was they who paid for the miscalculations of their command with their own blood.
This feat will be best told by those who survived that hellish cauldron. This is what Hero of the Soviet Union Grigory Penezhko recalled about the events of July 12, 1943: “... There was such a roar that the eardrums were pressed, blood flowed from the ears. The continuous roar of engines, the clanging of metal, the roar, the explosions of shells, the wild rattle of torn iron... From point-blank shots, turrets collapsed, armor burst, tanks exploded... Hatches opened, and tank crews tried to get out... we lost the sense of time , did not feel thirst, heat, or even blows in the cramped cabin of the tank. One thought, one desire - while you are alive, beat the enemy. Our tank crews, having got out of their wrecked vehicles, searched the field for enemy crews, who were also left without equipment, and fired pistols and fought hand-to-hand...”
The documents preserve the Germans’ memories of that “duel.” This is what Untersturmführer Gürs, commander of the motorized rifle grenadier regiment, said: “The Russians launched an attack in the morning. They were around us, above us, among us. Hand-to-hand combat ensued... It was hell.”
Our tank crews, having got out of their wrecked vehicles, searched the field for enemy crews, who were also left without equipment, and fired pistols and fought hand-to-hand.
And here is more evidence of those terrible events: “... at that moment the ether turned into a cauldron human emotions, something unimaginable began to happen on the radio waves. Against the background of the usual crackling noise, dozens of commands and orders were heard in the headphones, as well as everything that hundreds of Russian men from different parts thought about the “Hans”, “Kruts”, fascists, Hitler and other bastards. The airwaves were so filled with vigorous Russian obscenities that it seemed that all this hatred at some point could materialize and hit the enemy along with the shells. Under hot hand The tankers also remembered their own superiors, who led them into this hell..."
Only in 1995, on the 50th anniversary of the victory, the Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul was opened in Prokhorovka - the day of these saints falls on July 12 - the date main battle near Prokhorovka. The earth, stained with blood, awaited the gratitude of its descendants.
July, 12 -memorable date military history Fatherland. On this day in 1943, the largest tank battle in World War II between the Soviet and German armies took place near Prokhorovka.
Direct command of the tank formations during the battle was carried out by Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov with Soviet side and SS Gruppenführer Paul Hausser - from the German. Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of Soviet troops and gain operational space, and Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.
“Of course, we won at Prokhorovka, not allowing the enemy to break into operational space, forced him to abandon his far-reaching plans and forced him to retreat to his original position. Our troops survived a four-day fierce battle, and the enemy lost its offensive capabilities. But the Voronezh Front had exhausted its strength, which did not allow it to immediately launch a counteroffensive. It has developed, figuratively speaking, stalemate situation, when the command of both sides still wants to, but the troops can’t!”
PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE
If in the zone of the Soviet Central Front, after the start of their offensive on July 5, 1943, the Germans were unable to penetrate deeply into the defense of our troops, then a critical situation developed on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Here, on the first day, the enemy brought into the battle up to 700 tanks and assault guns, supported by aviation. Having met resistance in the Oboyan direction, the enemy shifted his main efforts to the Prokhorovsk direction, trying to capture Kursk with a blow from the southeast. The Soviet command decided to launch a counterattack against the wedged enemy group. The Voronezh front was reinforced by the reserves of the Headquarters (5th Guards Tank and 45th Guards armies and two tank corps). On July 12, in the Prokhorovka area, the largest tank battle of World War 2 took place, in which up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part on both sides. Soviet tank units sought to conduct close combat (“armor to armor”), since the range of destruction of the 76 mm T-34 gun was no more than 800 m, and the rest of the tanks were even less, while the 88 mm guns of the Tigers and Ferdinands hit our armored vehicles from a distance of 2000 m. When approaching, our tankers suffered heavy losses.
Both sides suffered huge losses at Prokhorovka. In this battle Soviet troops lost 500 tanks out of 800 (60%). The Germans lost 300 tanks out of 400 (75%). For them it was a disaster. Now the most powerful German strike group was drained of blood. General G. Guderian, at that time the inspector general of the Wehrmacht tank forces, wrote: “The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, due to large losses in people and equipment, were out of action for a long time... and already more Eastern Front there were no quiet days." On this day, a turning point occurred in the development of the defensive battle on the southern front of the Kursk ledge. The main enemy forces went on the defensive. On July 13-15, German troops continued attacks only against units of the 5th Guards Tank and 69th Armies south of Prokhorovka. Maximum promotion German troops on the southern face it reached 35 km. On July 16, they began to retreat to their original positions.
ROTMISTROV: AMAZING COURAGE
I would like to emphasize that in all areas of the events that unfolded on July 12 grand battle The soldiers of the 5th Guards Tank Army showed amazing courage, unshakable fortitude, high combat skill and mass heroism, even to the point of self-sacrifice.
To the 2nd battalion of the 181st brigade on the 18th tank corps collapsed large group fascist "tigers". The battalion commander, Captain P. A. Skripkin, bravely accepted the enemy’s blow. He personally knocked out two enemy vehicles one after another. Having caught the third tank in the crosshairs, the officer pulled the trigger... But at the same instant his combat vehicle shook violently, the turret filled with smoke, and the tank caught fire. Driver-mechanic foreman A. Nikolaev and radio operator A. Zyryanov, saving a seriously wounded battalion commander, pulled him out of the tank and then saw that a “tiger” was moving right at them. Zyryanov hid the captain in a shell crater, and Nikolaev and loader Chernov jumped into their flaming tank and went to ram, immediately crashing into the steel fascist hulk. They died having fulfilled their duty to the end.
The tankmen of the 29th Tank Corps fought bravely. The battalion of the 25th brigade, led by the communist Major G.A. Myasnikov, destroyed 3 "tigers", 8 medium tanks, 6 self-propelled guns, 15 anti-tank guns and more than 300 fascist machine gunners.
The decisive actions of the battalion commander and company commanders, senior lieutenants A. E. Palchikov and N. A. Mishchenko, served as an example for the soldiers. In a heavy battle for the village of Storozhevoye, the car in which A.E. Palchikov was located was hit - a caterpillar was torn off by a shell explosion. The crew members jumped out of the car, trying to repair the damage, but were immediately fired upon by enemy machine gunners from the bushes. The soldiers took up defensive positions and repelled several attacks by the Nazis. In this unequal battle, Alexei Yegorovich Palchikov died the death of a hero, and his comrades were seriously injured. Only the mechanic-driver, candidate member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, foreman I.E. Safronov, although he was also wounded, could still fire. Hiding under a tank, overcoming the pain, he fought off the advancing fascists until help arrived.
REPORT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE Supreme High Command Headquarters MARSHAL A. VASILEVSKY TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER IN CHIEF ON COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE PROKHOROVKA AREA, July 14, 1943.
According to your personal instructions, since the evening of July 9, 1943, I have been continuously in the troops of Rotmistrov and Zhadov in the Prokhorovsky and southern directions. Until today, inclusively, the enemy continues on the Zhadov and Rotmistrov front massive tank attacks and counterattacks against our advancing tank units... Based on observations of the ongoing battles and the testimony of prisoners, I conclude that the enemy, despite huge losses, both in manpower and especially in tanks and aircraft, still does not give up the idea of breaking through to Oboyan and further to Kursk, achieving this at any cost. Yesterday I personally observed a tank battle of our 18th and 29th corps with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack southwest of Prokhorovka. At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the PCs we had took part in the battle. As a result, the entire battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks within an hour.
Over the course of two days of fighting, Rotmistrov's 29th Tank Corps lost 60% of its tanks irretrievably and temporarily out of action, and the 18th Corps lost up to 30% of its tanks. Losses in the 5th Guards. mechanized corps are insignificant. The next day, the threat of enemy tanks breaking through from the south into the Shakhovo, Avdeevka, Aleksandrovka areas continues to remain real. During the night I am taking all measures to bring the entire 5th Guards here. mechanized corps, the 32nd motorized brigade and four iptap regiments... The possibility of an oncoming tank battle here and tomorrow cannot be ruled out. In total, at least eleven tank divisions continue to operate against the Voronezh Front, systematically replenished with tanks. The prisoners interviewed today showed that the 19th Panzer Division currently has about 70 tanks in service, the Reich Division has up to 100 tanks, although the latter has already been replenished twice since July 5, 1943. The report was delayed due to late arrival from the front.
The Great Patriotic War. Military historical essays. Book 2. Fracture. M., 1998.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CITADEL
On July 12, 1943, a new stage of the Battle of Kursk began. On this day, part of the forces of the Soviet Western Front and Bryansk Front went on the offensive, and on July 15, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front attacked the enemy. On August 5, troops of the Bryansk Front liberated Oryol. On the same day, troops of the Steppe Front liberated Belgorod. On the evening of August 5, an artillery salute was fired for the first time in Moscow in honor of the troops who liberated these cities. During fierce battles, troops of the Steppe Front, with the assistance of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts, liberated Kharkov on August 23.
The Battle of Kursk was cruel and merciless. Victory in it came at great cost to the Soviet troops. In this battle they lost 863,303 people, including 254,470 permanently. Losses in equipment amounted to: 6064 tanks and self-propelled guns, 5244 guns and mortars, 1626 combat aircraft. As for Wehrmacht losses, information about them is fragmentary and incomplete. IN Soviet works Calculated data were presented according to which during the Battle of Kursk German troops lost 500 thousand people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3 thousand guns and mortars. Regarding losses in aircraft, there is information that during the defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk alone, the German side irretrievably lost about 400 combat vehicles, while the Soviet side lost about 1000. However, in fierce battles in the air, many experienced German aces, who have fought for more than one year on the Eastern Front, among them 9 holders of the Knight's Cross.
It is undeniable that the collapse of the German Operation Citadel had far-reaching consequences and had a decisive influence on the entire further move war. After Kursk, the German armed forces were forced to switch to strategic defense not only on the Soviet-German front, but also in all theaters of military operations of the Second World War. Their attempt to regain what was lost during Battle of Stalingrad the strategic initiative was a disastrous failure.
EAGLE AFTER LIBERATION FROM THE GERMAN OCCUPATION
(from the book “Russia at War” by A. Werth), August 1943
(...) The liberation of the ancient Russian city of Oryol and the complete liquidation of the Oryol wedge, which threatened Moscow for two years, was a direct result of the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk.
In the second week of August I was able to travel by car from Moscow to Tula, and then to Orel...
In these thickets, through which the dusty road from Tula now ran, death awaits a person at every step. “Minen” (in German), “mines” (in Russian) - I read on old and new tablets stuck in the ground. In the distance, on a hill, under the blue summer sky, the ruins of churches, the remains of houses and lonely chimneys could be seen. These miles of weeds were no man's land for almost two years. The ruins on the hill were the ruins of Mtsensk. Two old women and four cats were all the living creatures that Soviet soldiers found there when the Germans withdrew on July 20. Before leaving, the Nazis blew up or burned everything—churches and buildings, peasant huts and everything else. In the middle of the last century, Leskov and Shostakovich’s “Lady Macbeth” lived in this city... The “desert zone” created by the Germans now stretches from Rzhev and Vyazma to Orel.
How did Orel live during the almost two-year German occupation?
Of the 114 thousand population in the city, only 30 thousand now remain. The occupiers killed many residents. Many were hanged in the city square - the same one where the crew of the Soviet tank that was the first to break into Oryol is now buried, as well as General Gurtiev, the famous participant in the Battle of Stalingrad, killed on the morning when Soviet troops took the city in battle. They said that the Germans killed 12 thousand people and sent twice as many to Germany. Many thousands of Oryol residents went to the partisans in the Oryol and Bryansk forests, because here (especially in the Bryansk region) there was an area of active partisan operations (...)
Wert A. Russia in the war of 1941-1945. M., 1967.
*Rotmistrov P.A. (1901-1982), Ch. Marshal of Armored Forces (1962). During the war, from February 1943 - commander of the 5th Guards. tank army. Since Aug. 1944 - Commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army.
**Zhadov A.S. (1901-1977). Army General (1955). From October 1942 to May 1945, commander of the 66th Army (from April 1943 - 5th Guards) Army.
Official Soviet historiography called the battle of Prokhorovka legendary. A battle broke out on the battlefield, which was recognized as the greatest counter battle in history. tank battle, without, however, specifying the number of armored vehicles participating in it.
For a long time, the main story about this episode of the war was I. Markin’s book “The Battle of Kursk,” published in 1953. Then, already in the seventies, the epic film “Liberation” was shot, one of the episodes of which was dedicated to the Battle of Kursk. And its main part was. Without exaggeration, it can be said that the Soviet people studied the history of the war based on these works of art. For the first ten years there was no information at all about the world's greatest tank battle.
Legendary means mythical. These words are synonyms. Historians are forced to turn to myths when other sources are unavailable. The battle of Prokhorovka took place not in Old Testament times, but in 1943. The reluctance of honored military leaders to tell details about events so distant in time indicates that they made tactical, strategic or other miscalculations.
At the beginning of the summer of 1943, in the area of the city of Kursk, the front line was formed in such a way that an arc-shaped protrusion was formed deep into the German defense. The German General Staff reacted to this situation in a rather stereotypical manner. Their task was to cut off, encircle, and subsequently defeat the Soviet group, consisting of the Central and Voronezh fronts. According to the Citadel plan, the Germans were going to launch counter strikes in the direction from Orel and Belgorod.
The enemy's intentions were guessed. The Soviet command took measures to prevent a breakthrough of the defense and was preparing a retaliatory strike, which was supposed to follow after exhausting the advancing German troops. Both warring sides made movements of armored forces to implement their plans.
It is reliably known that on July 10, the Second SS under the command of Gruppenführer Paul Hausser collided with units of the Fifth Panzer of Pavel Rotmistrov, who was preparing for an offensive. The resulting confrontation lasted almost a week. It culminated on July 12th.
What is true in this information and what is fiction?
Apparently, the battle of Prokhorovka came as a surprise, both to the Soviet and German commands. Tanks are used for the offensive, they main function- infantry support and overcoming defense lines. The number of Soviet armored vehicles outnumbered the enemy, so at first glance, a counter battle was unprofitable for the Germans. However, the enemy skillfully took advantage of the favorable terrain, which made it possible to fire from long distances. Soviet T-34-75 tanks, which had an advantage in maneuver, were inferior to the Tigers in turret armament. In addition, every third person in this battle was a light reconnaissance T-70.
The factor of surprise was also important; the Germans discovered the enemy earlier and were the first to attack. Their best coordination of actions was due to well-organized radio communications.
Such difficult conditions The battle of Prokhorovka began. The losses were huge, and their ratio was not in favor of the Soviet troops.
According to the plan of the commander of the Voronezh Front Vatutin and member of the military council Khrushchev, the result of the counterattack should have been defeat German group trying to make a breakthrough. This did not happen, and the operation was declared a failure. However, it later turned out that there was still a benefit from it, and a huge one. The Wehrmacht suffered catastrophic losses German command lost the initiative, and the offensive plan was thwarted, albeit at the cost of great blood. Then a fictitious plan for the battle of Prokhorovka appeared in hindsight, and the operation was declared a major military success.
So, the official description of these events near Kursk is based on three myths:
Myth one: a premeditated operation. Although this was not the case. The battle occurred due to lack of awareness of the enemy's plans.
Myth two: main reason The loss of tanks by both sides was a counter battle. That wasn't true either. Most of the armored vehicles, both German and Soviet, were hit by anti-tank artillery.
Myth three: the battle took place continuously and on one field - Prokhorovsky. And that was not the case. The battle consisted of many separate combat episodes, from July 10 to July 17, 1943.
The State Military Historical Museum-Reserve "Prokhorovskoe Field" was opened on the site of the legendary tank battle of the Great Patriotic War, which became the greatest battle of armor and shells in the entire history of mankind. About a thousand tanks and self-propelled guns converged here on a relatively small area of flat Central Russian land. And today, traces of those battles are found here every day: the ground is filled with burnt metal.
TANKS ROOMED ACROSS THE FIELD...
The Battle of Prokhorovka is considered one of the largest battles in military history using armored forces.
Prokhorovka would have remained an ordinary village in Russian outback, if an event had not occurred here, which some historians consider decisive in the entire Second World War.
On July 12, 1943, during the Battle of Kursk near Prokhorovka, the largest tank battle in World War II - and in all of world history - took place. Up to 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns took part on both sides.
In the history of the country, Prokhorovskoye Field is called the Third Military Field of Russia, along with Kulikov and Borodino.
The Prokhorov battle unfolded in the southern section of the Kursk Bulge, where German command decided to direct the main blow. The Germans launched an offensive best forces: 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which included the elite divisions "Totenkopf", "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and "Reich". An armored wedge consisting of up to 300 tanks and assault guns broke through two lines of fortifications of the Soviet troops and reached the third, which was created 10 km southwest of the Prokhorovka station (in parallel, the offensive on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was developed by other German units: to the west and east of the Prokhorovka direction , which created a threat of encirclement - it was necessary to hurry).
On July 11, the enemy managed to break the defenses of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 183rd Rifle Division of the Red Army and approached the outskirts
Prokhorovka. At the cost of heavy losses, Soviet troops stopped the Germans. A situation has arisen where the outcome grand battle It was no longer hours that decided, but minutes. The Soviet command decided to carry out a powerful counterattack and destroy the enemy troops wedged into the defense. It was decided to strike on the morning of July 12 by the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov (1901-1982). The army was reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps. In total - more than 700 tanks and self-propelled artillery self-propelled guns.
At 08:30 on July 12, after a 15-minute artillery preparation, a counterattack was launched, after which the tank formations moved towards each other. The battle took place on a small - for such an incredible number of tanks and self-propelled guns - area, 3 to 8 km wide, between the railway and the bend of the Psel River.
The armor of Soviet tanks was not as powerful as that of the German ones, but they wedged themselves into battle formations German troops, gaining an advantage due to speed and maneuverability, shot the enemy at close range into the side armor. The short-range battle deprived the Germans of the opportunity to take advantage of powerful guns. As a result, the battle formations were mixed, and tank duels began.
Towards evening, the Death's Head division, having received the support of aviation and artillery, managed to break through the Soviet defenses rifle units. The Germans paid for it huge losses, which weakened their combat capabilities. The offensive ran out of steam.
On July 16, the German army stopped the attack and began to retreat towards Belgorod, while Soviet troops pursued the retreaters.
The result of the tank battle near Prokhorovka was failure German plan on the Kursk Bulge "Citadel" and significant losses of tank forces German army. The tank battle near Prokhorovka was the prologue to the defeat of Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk (July 5 - August 23, 1943), which became a turning point in the entire Second World War.
The State Military Historical Museum-Reserve "Prokhorovskoe Field" is located in the north Belgorod region, not far from the sources of the Psel River, and is an area with memorial buildings and monuments, the main one being the Victory Monument “Belfry”.
QUIET FIELD
There is silence over the Prokhorovsky field, as befits a place where thousands of soldiers fell. And it’s hard to believe that relatively recently tank armies fought here in mortal combat.
On April 26, 1995, on the eve of the 50th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War, President Russian Federation signed the Decree “On the creation of the State Military Historical Museum-Reserve “Prokhorovskoye Field”” “in order to perpetuate the memory of those who died defending the Fatherland in the Battle of Kursk and in connection with the completion of the creation of the museum-memorial complex “Prokhorovskoye Field”.
In 2010, a museum complex with a cultural and historical center “The Third Military Field of Russia “Prokhorovskoe Field”” was opened.
In the center of the square in front of the museum there is a sculptural and artistic composition “Tank Battle of Prokhorovka. Ram". The composition is very emotional, as the veterans said, fully conveying the intensity of the battle.
There is a Memory Candle on the square in front of the museum. At the entrance to the museum there are six steles - a kind of stone book about the Battle of Kursk.
In the museum itself, in the center of the hall dedicated directly to the battle of Prokhorova, an authentic T-34 tank froze.
Behind the museum building, fragments of Soviet and German defensive fortifications have been recreated: dugouts, trenches, trenches, communication passages, observation posts, artillery platforms and tank shelters. The museum constitutes a single architectural ensemble with the Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, built with public donations. The temple was opened in 1995 in memory of those killed at Prokhorovka and on the 50th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. The names of 7,382 soldiers who died on this land are inscribed on the walls of the temple.
On the Day of the Battle of Prokhorovka, celebrated annually, services are held in the Church of Peter and Paul in memory of the fallen soldiers.
The center of the museum complex is the Victory Monument “Belfry”. It is a stylized old Russian belfry, which was placed two kilometers from the outskirts of Prokhorovka, at an altitude of 252.2, where the epicenter of the Prokhorovka tank battle was located. It was also opened for the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War in 1995.
The walls of the "Belfry" represent separated friend from a friend there are four white marble pylons, symbolizing four years of war. At the top of the Belfry, words from the Bible are fixed on a copper plate. Church Slavonic language: “Greater love has no one to sow, but whoever lays down his life for his friends” (There is no greater love than to lay down one’s life for one’s friends). The alarm bell of the Belfry sounds every 20 minutes - three times an hour: the first time - about the heroes of the Kulikovo Field, the second - about the soldiers of Borodin, the third - in memory of the Battle of Prokhorov.
Next to the Belfry, episodes of the beginning of the attack of the tank company of the 5th Guards Tank Army are recreated. Every year on July 12, the day of the tank battle near Prokhorovka, a rally of many thousands takes place at the Belfry. The urban village of Prokhorovka, located next to the museum, has been known since the 17th century, although under different names. Currently - administrative center Prokhorovsky district, Belgorod region of Russia. This is a fairly large settlement with a population of about 10 thousand people. and several industrial enterprises.
FUN FACTS
■ In the old days, the village was called Sloboda Ilyinskaya after its founder - Polish nobleman Kirill Ilinsky (Korchak). In the 1860s. was renamed in honor of the reigning Emperor Alexander II into the village of Aleksandrovskoye. In the 1880s near the village the Kursk-Kharkov-Azov line was laid railway and the Prokhorovka station was built, named after the track engineer V.I. Prokhorov, who supervised the construction. Later, the village itself began to be called by the name of the station.
■ From the outside German troops The battle was fought by medium tanks T-IV modifications G and H (hull armor thickness - 80 mm, turret - 50 mm), as well as heavy tanks T-VIE "Tiger" (hull armor thickness - 100 mm, turret - 110 mm). Both tanks were armed with long-barreled cannons of 75 and 88 mm caliber, which penetrated the armor of Soviet tanks almost anywhere at a distance of over 500 m. The only exception was the IS-2 heavy tank.
■ The Soviet T-34 tanks that took part in the battle had an advantage over all German tanks in speed and maneuverability. And because of this, the Germans regularly used captured T-34s. In the battle of Prokhorovka, 8 such vehicles took part in the SS Panzer Division “Das Reich”.
■ In the battles near Prokhorovka on July 11, senior sergeant of the 2nd Tank Corps M.F. Borisov distinguished himself, knocking out seven enemy tanks with his gun and being awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for this feat.
■ Externally, the building of the museum “The Third Military Field of Russia” resembles a semicircle (symbolizing the Kursk Bulge), the main facade of the building is made in the form of tank tracks, and the ends are in the form of tank armor.
■ The celebration of the holy apostles Peter and Paul, in whose honor the church in Prokhorovka was named, falls on July 12 - the day of the famous battle.
■ Belfry - in Old Russian architecture - a building for hanging bells, usually located near the church. Can also denote a particularly memorable place.
■ At the foot of the Belfry there is a monument to the sculptor Vyacheslav Klykov (1939-2006), its main author. According to the creators of the monument, the sculptor examines the result of his work.
ATTRACTIONS
■ Museum complex “The Third Military Field of Russia” (2010).
■ Victory Monument “Belfry” (1995).
■ Temple of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul (1995).
■ Monument “Candle of Memory”.
■ Sculptural composition “Great commanders of the three military fields of Russia - Dmitry Donskoy, Mikhail Kutuzov, Georgy Zhukov” (2008).
■ Exhibition of armored vehicles from the Great Patriotic War.
■Unity Bell Slavic peoples(2000).
■ Monument to sculptor Vyacheslav Klykov, the main author of the Belfry.
NUMBERS
Forces of participants in the battle of Prokhorovka: USSR (5th Guards Tank Army of Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov) - 699 (according to other data 714) tanks and 21 self-propelled guns, Germany (2nd Tank Corps of SS Oberstgruppen-Führer Paul Hausser) - 232 tanks and 70 self-propelled guns .
Losses of the parties: USSR - about 300 tanks and self-propelled guns, Germany - about 100 tanks and assault guns.
Strengths of the parties in the Battle of Kursk: USSR - about 2 million people, about 5,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 3,500 aircraft, up to 30 thousand guns and mortars, Germany - about 850 thousand people, more than 2,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 2,000 aircraft and up to 8,000 guns.
Museum complex “Third Military Field of Russia”: total area- 5000 m2.
Total number of museum exhibits: about 20,000.
Victory Monument "Belfry": height - 59 m, weight of the alarm bell - 3.5 tons, height of the dome figure of the Virgin Mary at the top of the Belfry - 7 m.
Distance: 56 km from Belgorod.
Atlas. The whole world is in your hands #282
It is difficult to find a person who has never heard of Prokhorovka. Fights at this railway station, which lasted from July 10 to July 16, 1943, became one of the most dramatic episodes of the Great Patriotic War. For the next anniversary of the battle of Prokhorovka, Warspot is publishing a special project that will tell about the background and main participants of the battle, as well as with the help interactive map will introduce you to the little-studied battles that took place on July 12 to the west of the station.
West of Prokhorovka. Interactive map
Fighting in the area of the Oktyabrsky state farm and height 252.2
On July 12, 1943, the main attack west of Prokhorovka station was carried out by the 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army under Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov. Their actions were supported by units of the 9th Guards Airborne and 42nd Guards Rifle Divisions from the 5th Guards Army Lieutenant General A. S. Zhadov.
It was assumed that the forces of the Soviet troops would cover the area of the Oktyabrsky state farm with simultaneous attacks from the north and south. After this, with quick and decisive actions in this place, our tanks, together with the infantry, were supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses and continue the offensive. But the events that followed looked somewhat different.
The two tank corps of the Red Army consisted of 368 tanks and 20 self-propelled guns. But it was not possible to use them simultaneously, bringing down an avalanche of steel machines on the enemy. Expand a large number of Armored vehicles in this area were hampered by the terrain. Blocking the path of the tanks, in front of the Oktyabrsky state farm, a deep ravine, supplemented by several spurs, stretched from the river towards Prokhorovka. As a result, the 31st and 32nd tank brigades of the 29th Corps advanced in an area up to 900 meters wide between the railway and the girder. A 25th tank brigade attacked the enemy to the south, separated from the corps by a railway line.
The 181st Panzer became the forward brigade of the 18th Panzer Corps, advancing along the river. The beam prevented the 170th brigade from deploying, and it had to be sent to the railway area, placing it behind the 32nd brigade. All this led to the fact that the tanks of the brigades were brought into battle in parts, in groups of 35–40 vehicles, and not simultaneously, but at intervals of 30 minutes to an hour.
Who resisted the advancing tanks of the Red Army on this important section of the front near the Oktyabrsky state farm and height 252.2?
In the area between the Psel River and the railway, units of the German Leibstandarte division were located. At an altitude of 252.2, an infantry battalion was entrenched in armored personnel carriers from the 2nd Panzergrenadier Regiment. At the same time, German infantrymen were located in trenches, and armored personnel carriers were concentrated behind the heights. A division of self-propelled howitzers - 12 Vespes and 5 Hummels - took positions nearby. Anti-tank guns were installed at the height itself and on its reverse slopes.
Two other battalions of the 2nd Panzergrenadier Regiment, reinforced with assault and anti-tank guns, took up defense in the area of the Oktyabrsky state farm. Behind the height of 252.2 and the state farm are located most of the combat-ready tanks from the composition tank regiment divisions: about 50 Pz IV with a long-barreled 75-mm cannon and several more tanks of other types. Some of the tanks were allocated to reserve.
The division's flank between the river and the state farm was covered by a reconnaissance battalion with ten Marders. In the depths of the defense in the area of \u200b\u200bheight 241.6 there were positions of howitzer artillery and six-barreled rocket mortars.
At 8:30 a.m. on July 12, after a Katyusha salvo, our tankers went on the offensive. The first to reach height 252.2, which was on their way, were 26 “thirty-fours” and 8 SU-76 of the 29th Tank Corps. They were immediately met by fire from German anti-tank guns. Several tanks were hit and caught fire. The tankers, having opened fire, began to actively maneuver and move towards the state farm. The crews of damaged tanks, without leaving their combat vehicles, fired at the enemy - until a new hit forced them to get out of the burning tank or die in it.
24 T-34 tanks and 20 T-70 tanks from the 181st brigade were advancing from the north in the direction of Oktyabrsky. Just like at height 252.2, our tanks were met with heavy fire and began to suffer losses.
Soon the remaining tanks of the 32nd brigade appeared in the area of \u200b\u200bheight 252.2. The commander of the 1st tank battalion, Major P.S. Ivanov, seeing the burning tanks of the brigade, decided to bypass the dangerous area. With a group of 15 tanks, he crossed the railroad and, moving south of it, rushed to the Komsomolets state farm. As a group of our tanks appeared, the main forces entered the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm, and part of the forces tried to knock down the Germans from a height of 252.2.
By 10 o'clock in the morning, tanks from four of our tank brigades and 12 self-propelled guns were already participating in the battle in the area of the state farm. But it was not possible to quickly take Oktyabrsky - the Germans resisted stubbornly. The enemy's assault, self-propelled and anti-tank guns fired strong fire against numerous targets on the battlefield. Our tanks maneuvered, moving away from the state farm and approaching it, and from time to time stopping briefly to fire. At the same time, the number of destroyed Soviet tanks in the area of the state farm and height 252.2 increased. The Germans also suffered losses. At 11:35, tanks of the 181st brigade were able to break into the Oktyabrsky state farm for the first time, but since the German defense was not suppressed, the battle continued.
By 10 o'clock German tanks began to pull up to the front line and engage in battle with our tanks. While repelling our first attacks at height 252.2, several German “fours” were shot down and burned. German tank crews, having suffered losses, were forced to retreat to the reverse slopes of the heights.
By 13:30, through the joint actions of our tankers and motorized riflemen from the brigades of the 18th and 29th corps, the Oktyabrsky state farm was completely liberated from the enemy. However, there was no further development of the offensive of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the Oktyabrsky sector - height 252.2. To delay our tank corps, the Germans sent large air forces against them. The raids were carried out over several hours by groups of 8 to 40 aircraft.
In addition, the Germans carried out counterattacks with the participation of their tanks. Units of our troops that took up defensive positions in the area of the state farm repelled several enemy counterattacks in the afternoon.
Both sides suffered heavy losses during the battle in this area, especially in equipment. About 120 tanks and self-propelled guns of the 18th and 29th tank corps were shot down and burned in the area of the Oktyabrsky state farm and height 252.2. The Germans lost 50% of the tanks that took part in this battle, as well as two Grille self-propelled guns, five Vespes, one Hummel, more than 10 armored personnel carriers, and about 10 anti-tank guns. There were also losses among other types of weapons and equipment.
No less fierce battles took place near Prokhorovka and in other sectors of the front.
Fighting near the village of Storozhevoye
Fierce fighting in the area of the Storozhevoye farmstead continued throughout the previous day (July 11). Stubbornly defending, units of the 169th Tank and 58th Motorized Rifle Brigades of the 2nd Tank Corps, together with the infantrymen of the 285th rifle regiment repelled all enemy attacks. The Germans were unable to take Storozhevoye on July 11th. However, the infantry of the 1st Panzergrenadier Regiment, reinforced by approximately 12 Marders, managed to capture the forest and the heights north of Storozhevoy.
At 8:30 a.m., the 25th Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps of the Red Army went on the offensive. In addition to the existing 67 tanks, it received eight self-propelled guns as reinforcement, including 4 SU-122 and 4 SU-76. The brigade's actions were supported by the infantry of the 9th Guards Division. According to the assigned task, the brigade was supposed to advance in the direction of the villages of Storozhevoye and Ivanovsky Vyselok, reach the depths of the enemy’s defense, and then be ready for further development of the offensive.
The first to go on the attack were about 30 "thirty-fours" with an infantry landing on board. Already at the very beginning of the movement, our tanks came under targeted and dense fire from the Marders and anti-tank guns of the 1st Panzergrenadier Regiment.
The infantry was covered with mortar salvos and lay down. Having lost several tanks damaged and burned out, the “thirty-fours” returned to their original positions.
At 10 a.m. the attack resumed, this time with the entire brigade. The battalion was advancing ahead with T-34s and 4 SU-122s. Following them were 36 T-70s and 4 SU-76s. When approaching Storozhevoye, the tanks and self-propelled guns of the brigade were again met by heavy fire from the eastern edge of the forest. The crews of German anti-tank guns and the crews of the Marders, hiding among the vegetation, fired destructive fire from ambushes. Behind a short time many of our tanks and self-propelled guns were hit and burned.
Some of the combat vehicles still managed to break into the depths of the enemy’s defenses, but failure awaited them here too. Having reached the area of the Ivanovsky Vyselok farm, units of Volodin’s brigade were met by fire from tanks of the Reich division. Having suffered significant losses and lacking the support of their neighbors, the tankers were forced to retreat.
By noon, the remaining 6 T-34s and 15 T-70s were concentrated southeast of Storozhevoy. All self-propelled guns supporting the brigade had been knocked out or burned by this time. In this unsuccessful battle, the crews of our tanks and self-propelled guns acted courageously and desperately, as the episodes of the battle eloquently demonstrate.
One of the self-propelled guns under the command of Lieutenant V.M. Kubaevsky was hit and caught fire. Its crew continued to fire at the enemy until the shells ran out, after which the self-propelled gun, engulfed in flames, went to ram a German tank. At the moment of the collision, the self-propelled gun exploded.
Another self-propelled gun under the command of Lieutenant D. A. Erin had its track broken and its sloth broken as a result of being hit by German shells. Despite the fierce fire on the self-propelled gun, Erin got out and repaired the track, after which he took the damaged vehicle out of the battle and sent it to the repairmen's location. After 4 hours, the sloth was replaced with a new one, and Erin immediately went back into battle.
Lieutenants Vostrikov, Pichugin, Slautin and junior lieutenant Shaposhnikov, who fought on the T-70, died in battle while continuing to shoot at the enemy from burning tanks.
Having repelled all the attacks of the 25th Brigade, the Germans themselves went on the offensive on Storozhevoye, gradually increasing the strength of their attacks. Around one o'clock in the afternoon, from the southwestern direction, the farm was attacked by a battalion of the 3rd Panzergrenadier Regiment of the Reich Division with the support of ten assault guns. Later, 14 tanks and infantry from the Leibschatandarte division struck from the north in the direction of the farmstead. Despite the stubborn resistance of our troops, by 18 o'clock the Germans captured Storozhevoye. However, further advance of the enemy was stopped.
A small area in the Storozhevoye area turned out to be the only one where, during the day on July 12, parts of two German divisions“Leibstandarte” and “Reich” managed to move forward during the attacks.
Fighting near the villages of Yasnaya Polyana and Kalinin
On July 12, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps advanced in the auxiliary direction south of Storozhevoy. His commander, Colonel A.S. Burdein, was assigned difficult task. Offensive actions the brigades of his corps were supposed to pin down the forces of the Reich division in the Yasnaya Polyana - Kalinin sector and deprive the enemy of the opportunity to transfer troops to the direction of the main attack of the 5th Guards Tank Army.
The rapidly changing situation made changes in the preparation of the corps for the offensive. At night, divisions of the German 3rd Tank Corps south of Prokhorovka managed to break through the defenses of the 69th Army and reach the area of the village of Rzhavets. To block the German breakthrough, formations and units of the 5th Guards Tank Army that were in reserve or preparing to attack west of Prokhorovka began to be used.
At 7 am from the 2nd guards corps One of the three tank brigades was withdrawn and transferred to counter the German 3rd Tank Corps. Of the 141 tanks, only about a hundred remained at Burdeyny's disposal. This weakened the corps' combat capabilities and deprived it of a reserve commander.
The Reich division opposing the guards had more than a hundred tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as 47 anti-tank guns. And in terms of the number of personnel, the Reich division was twice as large as the tank corps that was about to attack it.
Part of the forces of the Reich Division took up defensive positions, while the other part was in a state of anticipation. The division's armored group, consisting of tanks, self-propelled guns and infantry in armored personnel carriers, was withdrawn from the front line and was ready to act depending on the situation.
Understanding the complexity of the situation, Burdeyny asked to postpone the start of the corps' transition to the offensive and received permission to do so. Only at 11:15 am the two corps tank brigades, numbering 94 tanks, began to attack the Reich division.
The 25th Guards Tank Brigade struck in the direction of Yasnaya Polyana. Having encountered strong enemy resistance, our tankers were able to capture only the forest south of the village. Further advance of the brigade was stopped by fire from anti-tank guns.
Having attacked from the Belenikino area through the infantry positions of the 4th Panzergrenadier Regiment, 28 T-34s and 19 T-70s from the 4th Guards Tank Brigade entered the battle for Kalinin. Here our tankers encountered approximately 30 tanks of the 3rd battalion of the 2nd SS Panzer Regiment. Among the enemy tanks were eight captured "thirty-fours" used in the "Reich" division. After the loss of several tanks, the commander of the Red Army brigade stopped the attack and ordered his tankers to take up defensive positions 600 meters southeast of Kalinin.
To the south of Kalinin, at the border of the Ozerovsky and Sobachevsky farms, battalions of the 4th Guards broke through motorized rifle brigade Burdeyny's building. Further advance of our infantrymen was stopped by mortar fire.
The transition of the Reich units to the attack on the right flank of the division and their capture of Storozhevoy seriously affected the position of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. The 25th Brigade was the first to receive the order to retreat back and cover the exposed right flank of the corps. And after the report that the Germans had captured Storozhevoy at 18:00, Burdeyny ordered the Guards 4th Tank and 4th Motorized Rifle Brigades to retreat to their original positions. By the end of the day on July 12, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was forced to go on the defensive at the Belenikhin-Vinogradovka line it had previously occupied.
By their actions during the day, the brigades of Burdeyny’s corps pinned down and diverted the attention of a number of units of the Reich division. Thus, they did not allow the use of the larger forces of the Reich division to carry out an offensive and help its neighbor, the Leibstandarte division, which was repelling attacks from two of our tank corps.
Battle for the Komsomolets state farm
At approximately 9 a.m., the 1st battalion of the 32nd tank brigade reached the area of height 252.2. Its commander, Major P.S. Ivanov, saw in front of him the damaged and burning “thirty-fours” of the 2nd battalion of the brigade advancing in front of him. Wanting to preserve the tanks and trying to complete the task assigned to him, Ivanov decided to make a maneuver and go around the height on the left. Ordering the crews of 15 tanks to follow him, the major crossed the railway and continued his advance along the railway embankment. The Germans, who did not expect such a maneuver from our tank crews, did not have time to do anything. The tanks of the first battalion, led by the commander's "thirty-four", continued to advance at high speed into the depths of the enemy's defense.
By 9 o'clock our tanks reached the Komsomolets state farm and captured it. Following the tankers, infantrymen of the first battalion of the 53rd motorized rifle brigade broke through to the state farm. Having quickly defeated the few German forces located on the state farm, our tank crews and motorized riflemen took up defensive positions in Komsomolets and its environs.
This was the first success and the deepest breakthrough of the defense of the Leibstandarte division over a distance of 5 kilometers, achieved by our tankers on the morning of July 12.
In an effort to eliminate the emerging threat, the Germans, using nearby units of their troops, cut off a group of our tankers and motorized riflemen from the main forces of the 29th Tank Corps with a strike from the north.
Soon the area of the state farm was covered with artillery and mortar fire. The enemy infantry went on the attack, trying to recapture the Komsomolets state farm. Gradually, the strength of the German attacks increased, and armored vehicles were introduced into the battle. Having competently organized the defense at the occupied line in the fortifications and dug in the tanks, our soldiers were able to repel the first enemy attacks.
Finding himself surrounded, Major Ivanov reported this by radio to the brigade commander. A group of tanks immediately went to help the defenders of the state farm. They also crossed the railway and moved towards the state farm, bypassing height 252.2. But they failed to get to Komsomolets. All tanks were knocked out by enemy fire on the approach to the state farm.
Left without support, units of the 29th Corps were able to hold out in Komsomolets for several hours. The Germans constantly attacked, and our tankers and motorized riflemen fought off one attack after another. The state farm changed hands five times.
Gradually, the inequality in power began to make itself felt. After all the tanks were knocked out, including the battalion commander’s tank, the motorized riflemen were forced to leave the state farm and fight back to the Yamka area, breaking out of the encirclement.
The forces of the 29th Tank Corps failed to build on the success achieved by capturing the Komsomolets state farm at the very beginning of the offensive. However, while the battle for the state farm continued, it diverted attention and part of the forces of the Leibstandarte division from the fighting on the front line.
After two o'clock in the afternoon the main hopes for further development The commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army associated the offensive with the actions of the 18th Tank Corps...
Fight near the village of Andreevka
Around one o'clock in the afternoon, the brigade commanders of the 18th Tank Corps received the task from General B.S. Bakharov to continue developing the offensive along the southern bank of the Psel River. The 110th Tank Brigade, previously in reserve, was targeting Mikhailovka. The 181st and 170th Brigades, in joint action with the Churchill Regiment and with the support of the 9th and 42nd infantry guards divisions and the 32nd motorized rifle brigade of the corps were supposed to capture Andreevka. Then the two tank brigades had to turn south and strike deep into the defense of the Leibstandarte division.
The 181st Tank Brigade advanced to Mikhailovka. Here she joined up with a group of Churchill tanks from the 36th Separate Guards Regiment and the infantry of the 127th Regiment of the 42nd Guards Rifle Division.
At the same time, tanks of the 170th Tank Brigade along with the infantry of the 23rd Guards Regiment of the 9th Guards Airborne Division advanced towards Andreevka from the Oktyabrsky state farm area.
On the German side, resistance to our troops was provided by units of the reconnaissance battalion of the Leibstandarte division and the 6th Panzergrenadier Regiment of the Death's Head division.
MK tanks. IV "Churchill" 36th Guards Separate Tank Regiment
The advance of a group of our troops along the river proceeded at a slow pace. The enemy was covering Soviet infantry salvos from howitzers and mortars, forcing it to lie down. The crews of the Churchill tanks, the number of which by this time numbered from 10 to 15 units, had to act independently.
To turn the situation in his favor, Major General Bakharov brought the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade into battle. By joint action formations and units of the 18th Tank Corps and the rifle regiment of the 42nd Guards Division by three o'clock in the afternoon, Avdeevka was liberated.
The 170th and 181st brigades turned south and began to advance in the direction of height 241.6. With this strike, the brigades sought to cut through the defenses of the Leibstandarte division in the area between the Psel River and the railway.
The remaining forces of the 18th Tank Corps, with the support of the infantrymen of the 42nd Guards Division, continued to advance along the river. By six o'clock in the evening they managed to capture Vasilyevka.
At this point, the offensive of our troops was stopped. The Death's Head commander, Hermann Pris, sent some of the division's tanks and assault guns to reinforce the infantry of the 6th Panzergrenadier Regiment. Having received reinforcements, the Germans began to launch counterattacks and tried to recapture the villages they had abandoned. However, units of the 18th Tank Corps and the 42nd Guards Division firmly held the achieved lines in the Vasilievka area.
Battle near height 241.6
The 181st and 170th brigades, deployed in the area between two ravines, began to advance in a southerly direction. Having overcome the curtain put up by units of the reconnaissance battalion of the Leibstandarte division, our tanks, together with the infantrymen, began to move deeper into the enemy’s defenses. The commander of the Leibstandarte division, Wisch, who was at that moment at an altitude of 241.6, clearly saw what was happening. He ordered a group of reserve tanks led by four Tigers to move towards the approaching Soviet tanks and counterattack to stop their advance. A firefight began between German and Soviet tanks. Several tanks of two of our brigades were knocked out.
Skillfully maneuvering on the battlefield and using the folds of the terrain, most of our tanks still managed to break through to the area of height 241.6. Here the crews of the T-34 and T-70 saw the positions of howitzer batteries artillery regiment"Leibstandarte". Taking advantage of the opportunity, the tankers began to destroy the German guns located nearby. The German artillerymen were shocked sudden appearance our tanks and began to hide in shelters.
The picture of the events that took place is well conveyed by the memories of one of the participants in those events - Muterlose, a soldier from the 3rd division, equipped with 150-mm howitzers:
“The T-34 turret appeared again. This tank moved relatively slowly. Against the background of the horizon, the silhouettes of the Red Army soldiers riding on it were clearly visible. At a distance of 20 or 30 meters from him followed the second, then the third and fourth. Perhaps their crews did not believe that our two 150 mm guns could open fire on them. Two separated artillery pieces were facing these nimble tanks. But the soldiers on these tanks also did not fire for some time. The T-34 reached the edge of the forest. It seemed to me that I simultaneously heard the clear commanding voice of the officer of our battery, UnterSturmführer Protz, and the dull roar of our guns. Who could believe this? Russian tanks continued to move. Not one of them took off into the air, or was even shot down. Not a single shot! Not even a single scratch! Even the soldiers were still sitting on top. Then they attacked and jumped down. This meant that the battle was now practically lost for our two guns. This time luck was not on our side. And before our gunners could reload their guns and fire again, all the tanks turned their turrets and opened fire on our positions with their fragmentation shells without pause or compassion. It was as if they were combing every trench with a hail of their shells. The fragments simply swarmed over our shelter. The sand covered us. What protection was the trench in the ground! We felt safe, hidden in this Russian land. The earth hid everyone: both its own and its enemies. The fire stopped suddenly. No commander's shouts and orders, no screams and groans were heard. Silence… "
Soviet tanks managed to destroy several German heavy howitzers along with part of their crews. This was one of the deepest and most effective breakthroughs of tanks of the 5th Guards Tank Army into the depths of enemy defenses on July 12. However, this time it was not possible to build on the success.
By bringing up reserves, including from the neighboring Reich division, the Germans were able to stop the advance of Soviet tanks and inflict losses on them. The tanks of our two brigades were forced to return to the Andreevka area.
Fighting near the village of Klyuchi
On July 12, fierce battles between formations of the 5th Guards Army and units of the Death's Head division took place in the area north of the Psel River.
The fighting began at dawn. Already at 4 in the morning, moving out from the area of the Vesely farm in the direction of the south, a combined battalion from units of the 51st and 52nd Guards attacked the enemy rifle divisions. Our infantrymen, supported by mortar and Katyusha fire, quickly reached German positions in the barracks area, north of the Klyuchi village. The guardsmen entered into close combat with German infantrymen from the 1st battalion of the 5th Panzergrenadier Regiment. The commander of the Death's Head division, Hermann Pris, urgently ordered tanks to be brought into battle to eliminate the threat to the crossings and secure the area for the upcoming offensive. By that time, the Germans had managed to transfer the 1st tank battalion 3rd SS Panzer Regiment (about 40 tanks).
The Germans divided their forces. The first group of 18 tanks, together with the grenadiers, counterattacked our combined battalion. The second group of 15 tanks, accompanied by infantry, headed to the area of height 226.6.
Having broken through the battle formations of the combined battalion, the Germans tried to capture Vesely, but met stubborn resistance. In this area, two of our rifle regiments from the 52nd and 95th Guards Rifle Divisions defended themselves with the support of artillery and Katyusha rockets.
Having come under rifle, machine-gun and mortar fire, the German infantry lay down. Our guns opened fire on the tanks that were left without infantry. Several German tanks were knocked out and two were burned. The impact of fire on the Death's Head units participating in the attack intensified - they were soon covered by several volleys of Katyusha rockets. After this, the Germans had to stop the attack and retreat to their original positions.
At the same time, a battle raged for several hours in the vicinity of Klyuchi. The combined battalion, having let tanks pass through its positions, did not retreat, but defended itself in the area of the barracks. The resistance of the guards was so fierce and stubborn that even the crews of destroyed, burned-out German tanks were thrown in to fight them as ordinary infantry. Only by 9 am the Germans were able to knock out our riflemen and capture the barracks.
On this fighting directly in the Klyuchi area ended.
The Germans continued to transfer armored vehicles to the bridgehead and concentrated their striking forces south of Hill 226.6. The primary goal of the upcoming offensive of the “Totenkopf” division, bypassing Prokhorovka from the flank, was to capture command heights 226.6 and 236.7 and settlements who were next to them.
Battle for height 226.6
Hill 226.6 was closest to the bridgehead and was important for both sides. Maintaining the heights allowed our troops to observe the crossings of the Psyol and the movement of enemy forces in the area. For the Germans, capturing the heights was a decisive condition for developing the offensive.
The first battles for the heights began early in the morning.
At 5:25 a.m., a group of 15 German tanks (1st battalion of the 3rd tank regiment), with the support of infantry, moved east from the Klyuchi village area to height 226.6. Having broken through the front line of defense of the 155th Guards Rifle Regiment, tanks and grenadiers rushed to the heights. Our guardsmen entered into close combat, which in some places turned into hand-to-hand combat in the trenches. After a fierce two-hour battle, the Germans were forced to retreat. At the same time, the German tanks did not retreat far, but positioned themselves on the southwestern slopes and began firing from the spot at the defenders of the height.
While the battle was going on, the main German forces accumulated south of the heights, ready to go on the offensive as they concentrated. Tanks of the 2nd battalion of the 3rd tank regiment and armored personnel carriers with grenadiers and sappers were pulled into this area. They were also in a hurry to be joined by the tanks of the 1st battalion that remained on the move after the morning battle at Vesely.
The concentration of German troops was carried out in full view of our soldiers and did not go unpunished. While the German tanks stood waiting to attack, many of their crews left their combat vehicles to rest. Suddenly, the area south of the height was covered with salvoes of Katyusha rockets. The tankers were lucky: they managed to hide from the fragments flying around under the tanks. The German sappers, who were in their armored personnel carriers at that moment, had nowhere to hide, and they suffered heavy losses. The start of the attack was delayed.
Only at 10:30 am an attack on the heights began with 42 tanks supported by infantry. The battle immediately became fierce. Units of the 155th Guards Rifle Regiment and the 11th Motorized Rifle Brigade opened fire on the German infantry and forced them to lie down. However, not having a sufficient number of anti-tank weapons, our riflemen found it difficult to fight German tanks. An hour later, by 11:30, most of the German tanks broke through to the crest of the height. German tank crews began firing point blank from cannons and machine guns at the positions of our troops at a height. Finding themselves under pressure from superior enemy forces, the infantry of the 155th Guards Regiment began to fight back from the heights. The Germans began to pull up additional forces to the heights.
During three hours, being surrounded and semi-encircled, the battalions of the 11th motorized rifle brigade fought tough fight at an altitude of 226.6. By three o'clock in the afternoon, under enemy pressure and having used up ammunition, motorized rifles in small groups, under the cover of gun and mortar fire, began to emerge from the heights in the northern and eastern directions.
Having lost several tanks destroyed and suffered casualties in the infantry, the Germans captured the heights. At the same time, having captured only the height closest to the river in the afternoon, the Germans were losing precious time, missing the chance to break through the defense of the 5th Guards Army in the bend of the Psel River.
Having pulled up additional forces of infantry and tanks to the area of height 226.6, units of the Death's Head division continued the offensive. In this case, the main blow was delivered to the north at height 236.7 and bypassing the height in the north-east direction. The target of the auxiliary attack was the Vesely village.
Fighting near the village of Vesely
A few hours after repelling the morning attack by German tanks and infantry, fierce fighting resumed in the area of the Vesely village.
At 15:15, thirteen German tanks, breaking through the defenses of the 155th Guards Rifle Regiment at height 226.6, attacked the positions of the 151st Regiment on the outskirts of Vesyoly. Having encountered intense fire from our artillery, the crews of the German tanks stopped the attack and, turning around, retreated back to the height area.
At 16:10 there was another attack by German tanks. This time, six German tanks, supported by infantry, managed to break through into the regiment's battle formations. A battle ensued between the infantry of both sides in the trenches, sometimes turning into hand-to-hand combat. The crews of German tanks fired at point-blank range with cannons and machine guns and ironed the positions of the guardsmen with their tracks. Under enemy pressure, units of the 155th Guards Regiment began to retreat. At this moment the Germans were close to capturing Vesely.
However, this did not happen. The enemy attack was repulsed by the joint efforts of the infantrymen of the 290th Guards Rifle Regiment and the fire of the guns of the 95th Guards Rifle Division supporting them.
Having never taken the village of Vesely, the Germans were forced to stop attacks in its direction and retreated to height 226.6.
Battle near height 236.6
Height 236.6 was the most high point, from which the entire area of combat operations that unfolded in the bend of the Psel River was perfectly visible. Already from early morning, the commander of the 5th Guards Army, Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov, was at the observation post equipped at a height. He personally followed the events taking place on the battlefield. After the Germans captured height 226.6 and accumulated forces in this area, the situation here became increasingly dangerous. There was a threat of a breakthrough in the defense of the 5th Guards Army.
Zhadov made every effort to prevent the Death's Head division from escaping from the bridgehead. He understood perfectly well that enemy tanks could be stopped only by creating a strong anti-tank barrier in their path. In the area of height 237.6 and to the west of it, all the guns of the artillery regiment and anti-tank battalion of the 95th Guards Rifle Division deployed. Additional forces were pulled up to the breakthrough site. North of height 237.6, the 6th Guards, which was in the army reserve, occupied the defense airborne division. All its guns were placed in open positions in readiness to fight German tanks. Already at 13:00, eight 45-mm guns of the 6th Guards Airborne Division deployed at an altitude of 237.6. Over the next four hours they took part in a battle with German tanks. At the same time, 122-mm howitzers of the 6th Guards Division fired at the enemy infantry advancing behind the tanks.
The commander of the Death's Head division, Hermann Pris, decided in the afternoon to still try to complete the task assigned to his division: to capture command heights and break through to the road approaching Prokhorovka from the north-west. By 16:00, in the area of \u200b\u200bheight 226.6, the Germans concentrated more than 70 tanks and assault guns, several dozen armored personnel carriers and up to an infantry regiment. German aviation was preparing to actively support the actions of tanks and infantry.
Soon, about 30 tanks and assault guns, supported by infantry, attacked height 236.7. About 30 more tanks, accompanied by armored personnel carriers with infantry, struck in a north-eastern direction, trying to reach the Prokhorovka-Kartashovka road. Our artillerymen entered into a fierce battle with German tanks.
At the beginning of the battle, the artillery of the 95th Guards Rifle Division took the brunt of the German tanks. The picture of the events that took place is well conveyed by the memoirs of the artillery commander of the 95th Guards Division, Colonel N. D. Sebezhko:
“Understanding the current situation, the division commander threw all his available resources and reserves into battle: a penal company, a company of machine gunners and other units, and most importantly, he brought in all the artillery to fight the tanks. The entire 233rd Guards was withdrawn for direct fire. ap under the command of Guards. Lieutenant Colonel A.P. Revin. The regiment commander managed to quickly withdraw and open fire with all cannon batteries, leaving only howitzer batteries in closed firing positions. The entire 103rd Guards was also thrown into battle. oiptad under the command of Major P. D. Boyko. ...Major Boyko was always in the thick of battle, skillfully leading his units and his personal example inspired fighters and commanders."
In addition to tanks, the positions of our artillery batteries were attacked by German bombers.
By the joint actions of the artillery of the 95th Guards Division and other units, by eight o'clock in the evening all attacks by German tanks had been repulsed. Despite the use of significant forces of tanks, operating with the support of infantry and aviation, the Death's Head division was unable to completely break through the defenses of the 5th Guards Army and break out of the bridgehead. Thus, the implementation of the German plan to break through to Prokhorovka was completely disrupted. At the same time, the “Dead Head” division suffered serious losses in tanks during the battle in the bend of the Psel River.
The artillery fire of the 95th Guards Rifle Division alone knocked out 24 German tank and three were burned.
Background and participants in the battle
On July 5, 1943, the Battle of Kursk began. The troops of Army Group South of the Wehrmacht dealt a powerful blow to the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Initially, the Germans, with the forces of the 4th Tank Army, sought to advance in a northern direction along the Belgorod-Kursk highway. The troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin met the enemy with stubborn defense and were able to stop his advance. On July 10, the German command, trying to achieve success, changed the direction of the main attack to Prokhorovka.
Three panzergrenadier divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps advanced here: “Totenkopf”, “Leibstandarte” and “Reich”. They were opposed by the troops of the Voronezh Front, to strengthen which the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Armies were transferred from the Headquarters reserve.
To stop the enemy’s advance and defeat his formations, on July 12 N.F. Vatutin decided to launch a powerful counterattack on German positions. The main role was assigned to two new armies. The main blow in the area west of Prokhorovka was to be delivered by the 5th Guards Tank Army.
However, on July 10 and 11, events occurred that complicated preparations for the counterattack. In particular, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps was able to approach Prokhorovka, and one of its divisions, the “Dead Head”, managed to create a bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psel River. Because of this, part of the forces intended to participate in the counterattack had to be brought into battle prematurely by Vatutin. On July 11, two divisions (95th Guards and 9th Guards Airborne) from the 5th Army entered into battle with the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, blocking its path to Prokhorovka and blocking the German forces on the bridgehead. Due to the advance of the Germans, the initial areas of army formations for participation in the counterattack had to be moved to the east. This had the greatest impact on the troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army - the tanks of its two tank corps (18th and 29th) had to deploy in a close area between the Psel River and the railway. In addition, the action of the tanks at the very beginning of the upcoming offensive was hampered by a deep ravine stretching from the river to Prokhorovka.
By the evening of July 11, the 5th Guards Tank Army, taking into account the two tank corps assigned to it (2nd Guards and 2nd Tank), had more than 900 tanks and self-propelled guns. However, not all of them could be used in the battles west of Prokhorovka - the Second Tank Corps was putting itself in order after participating in intense battles on July 11 and could not take an active part in the upcoming counterattack.
The changing situation at the front also left its mark on preparations for the counterattack. On the night of July 11-12, divisions of the German 3rd Tank Corps managed to break through the defenses of the 69th Army and reach the Prokhorovka direction from the south. If success developed, German tank divisions could reach the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army.
To eliminate the threat created, already on the morning of July 12, it was necessary to allocate and send a considerable part of the forces to the breakthrough site, including 172 tanks and self-propelled guns of the 5th Guards Tank Army. This scattered the army's forces and left its commander, General Pavel Rotmistrov, with an insignificant reserve of 100 tanks and self-propelled guns.
On July 12, by 8:30 am - the time the counterattack began - only about 450 tanks and self-propelled guns were ready to go on the offensive west of Prokhorovka, of which about 280 were in the area between the Psel River and the railway.
From the side of the 5th Guards Army on July 12, two divisions were to support the actions of the tankers. Two other divisions of A.S. Zhadov’s army were going to attack units of the “Dead Head” division on the northern bank of the Psel River.
The 2nd SS Panzer Corps, despite the losses suffered in previous battles, still remained quite strong and was ready for active action, both defensive and offensive. As of morning, the two divisions of the corps each had 18,500 personnel, and the Leibstandarte had 20,000 personnel.
For a whole week, the 2nd Tank Corps had been continuously engaged in fierce battles, and many of its tanks had been damaged and were being repaired. However, the corps still had a significant amount of combat-ready armored vehicles and was ready for active operations, both defensive and offensive. On July 12, the corps divisions could use about 270 tanks, 68 assault guns and 43 Marders in battle.
The corps was preparing to deliver the main blow from the bridgehead on the Psel River. Death's Head Division, used as a ram most from its 122 combat-ready tanks and assault guns, with the support of aviation, it was supposed to capture the bend of the Psel River and reach Prokhorovka from the north-west. Located in the area between the Psel River and the Storozhevoye village, the Leibstandarte division was to hold its positions on the left flank and in the center, capture Storozhevoye with an attack on the right flank, and then be ready to support the actions of the Dead Head division to capture Prokhorovka with a blow from the south -west. The Reich Division, located south of the Leibstandarte, was given the task of holding its positions in the center and on the right flank and attacking on the left flank.
On July 12, troops of the Voronezh Front carried out a counterattack. This event became the culmination of the Prokhorov battle.
The main battles west of Prokhorovka took place in the following areas:
- on the section between the Psel River and the railway on our side, the main forces of the 18th, 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army, as well as the 9th and 42nd Guards Divisions of the 5th Guards Army took part in them, and from the German part of the Lebstandarte and Death's Head divisions;
- in the area south of the railway in the Storozhevoy area, on our side, they involved the 25th Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps, units and units of the 9th Guards and 183rd Rifle Divisions, as well as the 2nd Tank Corps, and from the German part of the Leibstandarte and Death's Head divisions;
- in the area of Yasnaya Polyana and Kalinin, Sobachevsky and Ozerovsky, brigades of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps participated on our side, and the Reich division on the German part;
- To the north of the Psel River, formations and units of the 5th Guards Army took part on our side, and units of the Death’s Head division participated on the German side.
The constant change in the situation and the difficulties that arose in preparing the counterattack led to the fact that it did not proceed according to a pre-planned scenario. On July 12, fierce battles broke out west of Prokhorovka, in which in some areas Soviet troops attacked and the Germans defended, while in others everything happened exactly the opposite. In addition, attacks were often accompanied by counterattacks from both sides - this continued throughout the day.
The counterattack that day did not achieve its main goal - the enemy strike forces were not defeated. At the same time, the advance of the troops of the German 4th Tank Army in the direction of Prokhorovka was finally stopped. Soon the Germans stopped carrying out Operation Citadel, began to withdraw their troops to their original positions and transfer part of their forces to other sectors of the front. For the troops of the Voronezh Front, this meant victory in the Battle of Prokhorov and the defensive operation they carried out.
A detailed picture of the fighting west of Prokhorovka on July 12 is reflected on the interactive map.
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