The Battle of Kursk. Battle of Kursk

Artist: I.M. Toidze

On August 23, all television channels will begin praising the “glory” of the victory over communism in 1991. But there are historical events of global significance that occurred on this day. Exactly 70 years ago, units of the Red Army liberated Kharkov, ending the Battle of Kursk with victory. A radical change occurred in the Great Patriotic War. Never after Kursk, Orel and Kharkov was the enemy able to go on the offensive with decisive goals. The Nazis were now only defending themselves. I present to our users a fragment of my work about the Great Patriotic War, dedicated to the Orel-Kursk Battle.

The Germans were forced to postpone the start of their general offensive in 1943 several times (from May 15 to June 25, and finally to July 5) due to the unavailability of troops, primarily tank formations. There were not enough tanks to staff the tank divisions. Replenishment of units with tanks and self-propelled guns occurred until the very last moment. So the 51st and 52nd tank battalions (200 Panthers)* were transferred to the front line only on July 3.

The German troops consisted of 900,000 people, 3,926 tanks and self-propelled guns, 10,500 guns and mortars, and 2,050 aircraft. 223 “tigers”, 198 “panthers”, 89 “Ferdinands”, 66 “grizzlies” were preparing to take part in the offensive.

They were opposed by the forces of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, numbering 1,336,000 people, 3,491 tanks and self-propelled guns (including 806 light ones (703 T-70, 103 T-60), 19,795 guns and mortars, 2,172 aircraft.

The German strike group (at a front of 40 km) aimed against the troops of the Central Front consisted of 5 corps of the 9th Field Army (41st, 46th, 47th Tank, 20th and 23rd Army). They consisted of 15 divisions - 6 tank (2nd, 4th, 9th, 12th, 18th, 20th), 8 infantry (6th, 7th, 31st, 78th, 86th, 216th, 258th, 383rd), 1 motorized (36th). In addition, it included the 656th separate regiment of heavy tank destroyers, the 505th (and presumably the 502nd) heavy tank battalion, the 216th heavy, 177th, 185th, 189th, 244th , 245th, 904th, 909th assault gun divisions, 202nd, 559th, 616th tank destroyer battalions, 312th radio-controlled tank company. It consisted of 270,000 soldiers and officers, 1,370 tanks and self-propelled guns (905 tanks (87 Pz.Kpfw.VI(H)E “Tiger”, 268 Pz.Kpfw.IV G/H, 70 Pz.Kpfw.IV D, 80 Pz.Kpfw.III L, 71 Pz.Kpfw.III N, 76 Pz.Kpfw.III J, 38 Pz.Bf.Wg.III, 124 Pz.Kpfw.38(t), 27 Pz.Kpfw.II F , 7 Pz.Kpfw.II J, 7 Pz.Kpfw.I F (VK.1801), 2 Pz.Kpfw.KV.Ia 753(r), 22 Pz.Kpfw.T-34 747(r), 4 Pz. Kpfw.T-70 743(r), 15 Pz.Kpfw.735 38H (f), 2 Pz.Kpfw.739 35S (f), 5 Art.Beob.Pz. III (Sd.Kfz.143)), and also 466 self-propelled guns (66 Sturmpanzer.IV “Brummbar” (Sd.Kfz.166), 207 StuG.40G, 51 StuH.42, 89 “Ferdinand” (Sd.Kfz.184), 16 Pz.SfL.I Fur 7 .5 cm Pak.40/1 auf Sl.(f) “Marder.”I (Sd.Kfz.135), 55 Pz.SfL.I Fur 7.62 cm Pak.36 (r) auf Pz.38 (t ) “Marder.”III (Sd.Kfz.139), 33 Pz.SfL.I Fur 7.5 cm Pak.40 auf Pz.38 (t) “Marder.”III (Sd.Kfz.138)), 3.500 guns and mortars. Air cover was provided by the 6th Air Fleet. Army Group Center's reserve included the 5th Tank, 10th Motorized and 707th Infantry Divisions and an assault gun division (131 tanks and self-propelled guns (102 tanks ( 76 Pz.Kpfw.IV H/G, 17 Pz.Kpfw.III L, 9 Pz.Bf.Wg.III), 29 assault guns (29 StuG.40G).

In addition, the 2nd Tank Army included the 561st (25 Pz.SfL.I Fur 7.5 cm Pak.40 auf Pz.38 (t) “Marder.III (Sd.Kfz.138)) and 655th (45 8.8-cm Pak.43/I auf. GsWg.III/IV (Sd.Kfz.164) “Hornisse”) separate tank destroyer battalions.

Later, the 8th and 13th tank divisions and the 25th motorized division were additionally transferred here.

The central front (the length of the section is 306 km) consisted of 5 combined arms armies (48th, 13th, 70th, 65th, 60th), a tank army (2nd), 2 tank corps (9th and 19th), 16th Air Army. They included 41 rifle divisions, 4 tank corps, 5 separate rifle brigades, 3 separate tank brigades, 3 fortified areas, 1 fighter air division, 15 separate tank battalions, 6 self-propelled artillery regiments, a total of 738,000 personnel. The front was armed with 1,749 tanks and self-propelled guns (99 KV-1/KV-1S, 967 T-34, 359 T-70, 67 T-60, 151 Mk.II “Matilda”, Mk.III “Valentine”, M -3 “General Lee”, M.5 “General Stuart”, 96 self-propelled guns), 11,098 guns and mortars, 1,100 combat aircraft. The main forces of the front, primarily artillery and tanks, were concentrated in a 95-kilometer zone where an enemy offensive was expected. The average artillery density was 36.3 barrels per kilometer of front.

The strike group of the Army Group "South", aimed against the troops of the Voronezh Front, consisted of the 4th Tank Army consisting of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, the 48th Tank Corps, the 52nd Army Corps, the Kepf operational group consisting of the 3rd 1st Tank Corps, 11th Army Corps "Rouse", 42nd Army Corps. Army Group South's reserve included the 24th Tank Corps and the 16th Motorized Division. A total of 23 divisions, including 12 tank divisions (3rd, 6th, 7th, 11th, 17th, 19th, 23rd, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th SS, "Gross Germany"), 1 motorized (16th), 10 infantry (39th, 57th, 106th, 161st, 167th, 168th, 255th, 282nd, 320th, 332nd). In addition: headquarters of the 10th tank brigade, 39th tank regiment, 503rd separate heavy tank battalion, 228th, 393rd, 905th assault gun brigades, 209th, 243rd, 277th , 911th Assault Gun Battalion, 560th Anti-Tank Fighter Battalion. Air cover was provided by the 6th Air Fleet. It consisted of 280,000 soldiers and officers, 2,355 tanks and self-propelled guns (including 1,854 tanks (136 Pz.Kpfw.VI(H)E “Tiger”, 198 Pz.Kpfw.VG “Panther”, 476 Pz.Kpfw. IV G/H, 148 Pz.Kpfw.IV D, 421 Pz.Kpfw.III L, 92 Pz.Kpfw.III N, 47 Pz.Kpfw.III J/E, 42 Pz.Kpfw.III M(flamm), 65 Pz.Bf.Wg.III, 103 Pz.Kpfw.38(t), 56 Pz.Kpfw.II F, 8 Pz.Kpfw.II L “Luchs”, 8 Pz.Kpfw.I B, 54 Pz.Kpfw. T-34 747(r)), 501 self-propelled guns (219 StuG.40G, 17 StuH.42, 45 Pak.43/I auf. GsWg.III/IV (Sd.Kfz.164) “Hornisse”, 21 Pz. SfL.I Fur 7.62 cm Pak.36 (r) auf Pz.II “Marder.”II (Sd.Kfz.132), 58 Pz.SfL.I Fur 7.62 cm Pak.36 (r) auf Pz .38 (t) “Marder.”III (Sd.Kfz.139), 33 Pz.SfL.I Fur 7.5 cm Pak.40 auf Pz.38 (t) “Marder.”III (Sd.Kfz.138 ), 54 Sd.Kfz.124 “Vespe”, 38 Sd.Kfz.138/1 “Bison”, 16 Sd.Kfz.165 “Hummel”, 4,014 guns and mortars (821 heavy (211-104.9 mm ), 287 infantry, 744 anti-tank missiles, 1,674 mortars, 340 rocket launchers (of which 148 are self-propelled***).

The Voronezh Front (244 km.) consisted of 5 combined arms armies (38th, 40th, 69th, 6th Guards, 7th Guards), 1st Tank Army, 2 tank corps (2nd , 5th Guards), 35th Rifle Corps, 2nd Air Army. They included 35 rifle divisions, 4 tank divisions, 1 mechanized corps, 6 separate tank brigades, a total of 535,000 personnel. There were 1,742 tanks and self-propelled guns in service (10 KV-2, 24 KV-1, 48 Mk.IV “Churchill”, 1,052 T-34, 18 Mk.II “Matilda”, 31 Mk.III “Valentine”, 133 M .3 “General Lee”, 344 T-70, 36 T-60, 10 Su-152, 36 Su-122), 8,697 guns and mortars (108-152.4 mm D-1, 72-122 mm A -19, 344 - 122 mm M-30, 3.588 PTO (36-85 mm KS-12, 1.820-76.2 mm ZiS-3, 20-57 mm ZiS-2, 1.712-45 mm M -42), 5,910 (120-82 mm) mortars, 267 rocket launchers), 1,100 combat aircraft. The threatened zone, compared to the Central Front, was larger - 164 km. As a result, the density of troops and equipment was lower.

In the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, the Steppe Front, which had 5 combined arms armies, 1 tank army and 1 air army, occupied the defense. A total of 580,000 personnel, 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, 7,400 guns and mortars, 470 aircraft. The steppe front excluded the possibility of the enemy breaking through into the depths of our territory in the event of failure of the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts, it was a powerful reserve for them (which happened during the battles on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge), and was intended for an attack on Belgorod and Kharkov, after repelling the enemy strike, which also happened when the enemy offensive was repulsed.

The basis of the defense of the Soviet troops in the Kursk ledge were anti-tank defensive areas in which anti-tank artillery was concentrated. Minefields, which were part of a unified defense system, were very widely used. To combat enemy aircraft, in addition to numerous fighters, 1,026 military air defense anti-aircraft guns and 760 anti-aircraft guns from the air defense forces were deployed. This density of anti-aircraft artillery made it possible to largely neutralize enemy aircraft and reliably cover troops from the air.

On July 5, 1943, the Germans launched their last strategic offensive of the war, Operation Citadel. From the areas of Orel and Belgorod, strike forces of the German army groups “Center” and “South” began an attack on Kursk.

The Soviet command correctly predicted the direction of the main German attack in the summer of 1943 and spent three months preparing to repel the German offensive precisely in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. The Soviet command was able to establish the exact time of the start of the German offensive, and two hours before it, the artillery of the Central and Voronezh fronts inflicted a 40-minute counter-artillery bombardment on the German units that had prepared for the attack, as a result of which they suffered heavy losses before even entering the battle. The troops of the 13th Army, 6th and 7th Guards Armies of the Central and Voronezh Fronts involved 2,460 guns and mortars. At the same time, 132 attack aircraft and 285 fighters of the 2nd and 17th air armies attacked eight enemy airfields and destroyed 60 enemy aircraft on them. But, despite the loss of surprise, the Germans were forced to launch an offensive on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk Bulge.

On the northern front, in the Oryol-Kursk direction, the German command brought into battle: the 2nd, 9th, 12th, 18th, 20th tank divisions, 36th motorized division, 6th, 7th, 78th, 86th, 216th, 258th and 383rd Infantry Divisions.

At 5:30 a.m., after artillery preparation and air strikes, fascist German troops attacked the entire defense line of the 13th Army of General N.P. on a 40-kilometer front. Pukhov, and the adjacent flanks of the 48th and 70th armies of generals P.L. Romanenko and I.V. Galanina. The 9th Field Army of Army Group Center delivered the main attack on Olkhovatka, with auxiliary attacks on Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets. Already on the first day, the enemy brought 9 divisions into the battle, including 2 tank divisions, as well as 7 assault gun divisions and a separate battalion of heavy tanks.

More than 500 tanks and assault guns operated in the Olkhovat direction. The enemy brought the main forces against the 13th Army. Fierce fighting broke out along the entire battle front. Enemy tank formations faced powerful defenses. Our units relied on anti-tank defense areas. In the most tank-dangerous directions in the infantry combat formations, separate tank brigades, tank and self-propelled artillery regiments attached to rifle formations occupied the defense.

Four fierce attacks repulsed Soviet units on the first day of the offensive. Only as a result of the fifth attack did the enemy manage to break into the front line of the 13th Army’s defense and push back its units on a narrow section of the front at 6-8 km.

The same intense battles took place in the air. On July 5, the Luftwaffe carried out 2,300 sorties on the Central Front. There were times when up to 300 enemy bombers and 100 enemy fighters were simultaneously over the battlefield.

Air battles continued continuously, developing into air battles in which hundreds of aircraft took part. On July 5, pilots of the 16th Air Army under General S.I. Rudenko carried out 1,232 sorties, conducted 76 air battles and shot down 106 enemy aircraft. But periodically, German aircraft broke through the screens of our fighters and launched bombing attacks on our troops. However, the enemy was not able to protect his troops from our air strikes. The Germans suffered great damage from the attacks of our aircraft.

The first day of the battle ended unsuccessfully for the Germans. The Wehrmacht command was forced to rush the commander of Army Group Center Kluge to bring second echelons and reserves into battle.

The command of the Central Front reinforced the 13th Army with the 1st and 13th anti-tank brigades and the 21st mortar brigade. The commander of the Central Front, having determined the direction of the main attack, ordered on the morning of July 6 a counterattack against the main enemy group with the forces of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps of the 13th Army, the 16th Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army and the 19th Tank Corps from the front reserve.

Since the morning of July 6, stubborn battles took place along the entire front, in the Olkhovatsky, Maloarkhangelsk and Gniltsovsky directions. The enemy threw hundreds of tanks and assault guns into the attack. Under these conditions, it was not possible to establish the necessary interaction between the branches of the military. The counterattack did not achieve the goals set by our command. But the enemy was pushed back by 1.5 - 2 km. His strength was constrained. The front command gained time to concentrate new forces in the threatened direction.

On July 6, German aviation carried out 1,162 sorties in the Central Front. The pilots of the 16th Air Army flew 1,326 combat sorties, conducted 92 air battles and shot down 113 aircraft, losing 91 aircraft.

Over two days of fighting, the enemy advanced only 6-10 km deep into the defense, suffering significant losses - more than 25 thousand people and a significant amount of equipment. The command of the 9th Army was forced to abandon the continuation of the offensive on a wide front, stopping attacks on Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets.

On July 7, General Model transferred the main attack to Ponyri - in the defense zone of the 3rd Tank Corps, continuing the offensive west of the railway to Olkhovatka - in the defense zone of the 16th Tank Corps and on Teploye - at the junction of the 16th and 19th Tank Corps . Having replenished the battered divisions of the 41st Tank Corps with reserve tanks and additionally introducing the fresh 9th Tank Division into the battle, the Nazis sought to break through the defenses of the 13th and 2nd Tank Armies. Fierce battles broke out for the second line of defense. In the Ponyri area, after strong artillery preparation and with the support of 150 aircraft, the enemy attacked the defenses of the 307th Rifle Division with two infantry divisions and part of the forces of the 18th Tank Division. He threw up to 150 tanks here. The enemy's onslaught was repelled by soldiers of the 307th Infantry Division of General M.A. Enshin, 129th separate tank brigade, 27th separate guards tank regiment. They were supported by massive fire from units of the 3rd Tank Corps. Enemy tanks, together with infantry, supported by strong artillery fire and massive air strikes, attacked eight times, but each time their attack was repulsed.

The front command reinforced the units fighting here with anti-tank and rocket artillery and mobile obstacle detachments. The miners of the 1st Guards Special Purpose Brigade especially distinguished themselves in these battles. Under the fiercest enemy fire, they crawled out of the trenches into the no-man's land, to meet the approaching enemy tanks and self-propelled guns they laid mines directly in the path of their movement (IVMV, T/7, p. 145-148).

At Ponyry, the enemy for the first time massively brought into battle the Ferdinands of the 653rd tank destroyer battalion from the 656th separate regiment of heavy tank destroyers. The attack involved the 3rd Austrian tank regiment of the 2nd tank division, 44 Sd.Kfz.184 “Ferdinand”, as well as the 505th separate heavy tank battalion (40 Pz.VI “Tiger”), 216th assault gun division ( 45 Sd.Kfz.166 “Brummbar”), a division of assault guns (20 Stug.40G, StuH.42), and at least 22 medium tanks (17 Pz.III, 3 Pz.IVN, 2 Pz.BfWg.III). New, well-armored enemy vehicles broke through the barrage of artillery fire into Soviet positions, but our soldiers managed to cut off the enemy’s infantry from the enemy’s tanks and self-propelled guns, and here it turned out that the “Ferdinands” were helpless in front of the enemy infantry. These tank destroyers had neither frontal nor coaxial machine guns. Our fighters approached enemy vehicles with almost impunity. They threw mines under their tracks and threw bottles of fuel at them. It got to the point that some crews, in desperation, fired at our infantry from light machine guns through the bore of the gun. At the same time, he failed. During the entire battle, “Ferdinand” was mercilessly bombed by our aircraft, fired at tanks, anti-tank guns and anti-tank guns. Under such powerful fire, these monsters demonstrated high survivability and inflicted considerable losses on our units in equipment, but they were unable to break through our defenses. However, no matter how well the Ferdinands were armored, they were gradually destroyed and failed one after another. As a result, having lost 21 out of 44 vehicles, the German self-propelled guns retreated. Of the 21 tank destroyers, 17 were destroyed and 4 were captured with little damage. Having lost a track or gotten stuck, the enemy’s vehicle became helpless. Its crew, under heavy fire, could not repair the damage and abandoned the vehicle. In addition, in this battle near Ponyry, at least 13 more enemy tanks and assault guns (3 “Brummbar”, 3 Pz.IV N, 5 Pz.III L, 2 Pz.BfWg.III) were destroyed, not counting the “Tigers” , StuG.40G and StuH.42.

In total, 37 Ferdinands were destroyed and 5 Ferdinands were captured on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge.

Thanks to the heroic actions of the troops of the 13th and 2nd Tank Armies, the enemy’s strike forces in all directions were stopped. By the evening of July 7, the Germans had advanced only 2-3 km.

But the Nazis were still strong and capable of delivering new blows. On July 8, the enemy brought fresh forces into the battle and tried to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops in the Olkhovat direction. In the morning, northwest of Olkhovatka, up to 300 German tanks and infantry attacked the positions of the 3rd Anti-Tank Destroyer Brigade, commanded by Colonel V.N. Rukosuev. In a fierce battle, the artillerymen of the 3rd brigade destroyed several dozen enemy tanks and survived. The enemy was forced to stop the offensive. German aviation activity decreased significantly. On July 9, the Germans flew only 350 combat sorties.

By July 9, the command of Army Group Center brought almost the entire strike group of the 9th Army into battle - seven infantry and five tank divisions. The commander of the 9th Army had only the 10th Motorized Division left in reserve. The Army Group's reserve included the 12th Tank and 36th Motorized Divisions.

The heroic resistance of the troops of the Central Front undermined the offensive capabilities of the Germans. They were forced to regroup to organize a strike on Fatezh - at the junction of the 13th and 70th armies. It became obvious that the Wehrmacht was losing the initiative.

The offensive resumed on July 10. To build up attacks, Hitler ordered the transfer of almost a third of the aviation of Army Group South to Army Group Center. However, despite powerful artillery and air support, the 9th Field Army was unable to advance deep into the defense of the Soviet troops on either July 10 or 11. The losses of Soviet troops were also significant. Thus, the 2nd Army lost 134 tanks (85 T-34, 49 T-70) in battles from July 5 to 15, and another 138 tanks were damaged (93 T-34, 45 T-70).

During the seven days of the offensive, the 9th Field Army was able to advance only 10-12 km deep into the Soviet defense. By July 12, the offensive had stalled. On this day, the troops of the Bryansk and western wings of the central front went on the offensive, creating a threat of encirclement of the German 9th Army. Soviet troops launched Operation Kutuzov. After this, the Germans went on the defensive, and then began a retreat, first from the occupied territory, and then generally, to Orel.

By July 15, north of Orel, Bryansk troops broke through the enemy’s heavily fortified defensive line on a 40-kilometer front and, in three days of intense fighting, advanced 45 kilometers. Numerous resistance centers and strongholds were destroyed. More than 50 settlements have been liberated, including the regional center of Ulyanovo.

East of Orel, units of the Central Front, having broken through the heavily fortified enemy defenses on a front of 30 kilometers, moved forward 25-30 kilometers with stubborn battles. In this direction, 60 settlements were liberated.

During the offensive of our troops, the 56th, 262nd, 293rd infantry divisions, 5th and 18th tank divisions were defeated. The 112th, 208th, 211th infantry divisions, 25th and 36th motorized divisions were severely defeated.

During three days of fighting, 2,000 soldiers and officers were captured.

During the same time, our troops, according to incomplete data, captured 40 tanks, 210 guns, 187 mortars, 99 machine guns, 26 warehouses.

294 aircraft, 109 tanks, 47 guns were destroyed. The enemy lost only 12,000 soldiers and officers killed.

(Messages of the Sovinformburo, T/5, pp. 26-27)

During July 22, our troops in the Oryol direction, encountering stubborn resistance and enemy counterattacks, continued the offensive and, moving forward 6-8 kilometers, liberated the city of Bolkhov and a number of other settlements. With the liberation of Bolkhov, our troops completed the liquidation of the enemy fortified area north of Orel. The path to Orel from the north was open.

During the ten days of the offensive in the Oryol direction, our troops took the following trophies: 372 tanks, 720 guns, 800 mortars, 1,400 machine guns, 128 warehouses.

More than 6,000 German soldiers and officers were captured.

During the same time, 776 tanks were shot down and destroyed, 900 aircraft, and 882 guns were destroyed. In ten days of fighting, the enemy lost over 50,000 soldiers and officers killed.

(Messages of the Sovinformburo, T/5, p. 37)

The counteroffensive north of Orel continued successfully. Soviet troops crushed enemy divisions one after another. The enemy suffered heavy losses. This is how the command of the Western Front reported in combat report No. 259 of July 29, 1943. During the battles from July 11 to July 28, front troops defeated the 20th Tank, 293rd Infantry Division, 637th Infantry Regiment of the 350th Division, and 350th Security Battalion. They defeated the 5th, 9th, 18th tank divisions, the 25th motorized division, the 134th, 183rd infantry divisions, and the 50th separate regiment.

During this period, the enemy lost 54,000 killed and wounded soldiers and officers. 2,167 soldiers and officers were captured. 607 tanks, 5 self-propelled guns, 70 armored vehicles, 426 guns, 267 mortars, 22 tractors, 700 cars, 217 motorcycles, 1,288 machine guns, 30 warehouses were destroyed. 95 tanks, 249 guns, 250 mortars, 1,019 machine guns, 3,125 rifles were captured (zhurnal.lib.ru/.. ./panzer_vermaxt_03.shtml)

By July 17, the Soviet troops operating in the Oryol-Kursk direction had completely restored the position they occupied before the start of the German offensive, i.e. until July 5, 1943

The increasingly complicated situation on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, the powerful onslaught of the Red Army and the general crisis on the eastern front forced the Germans to retreat. On July 26, at a meeting at Hitler’s headquarters, it was decided to leave the Oryol bridgehead as quickly as possible and withdraw the troops of Army Group Center to the Hagen position, systematically retreating from line to line to a depth of 100 km.

Retreating, the Germans devastated the territories they left behind, drove away people, destroyed crops, and urgently removed warehouses and looted property. But they were not allowed to leave quietly. By order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin's aviation of the Bryansk and Central Fronts carried out continuous bombing attacks on the railways against the retreating enemy columns. Over the course of five days, the 15th and 16th Air Armies carried out 9,800 sorties against enemy communications. The roads along which the Germans retreated from the Oryol region were strewn with the corpses of enemy soldiers and officers, wrecked cars, tanks and other military equipment.

On the ground, Oryol partisans struck at the retreating Nazis. From July 22 to August 1 alone, they blew up 7,500 rails. The actions of the partisans, coordinated by the Soviet command and the central headquarters of the partisan movement, disorganized the enemy’s transportation in the midst of the Oryol-Kursk Battle. In the area of ​​Army Group Center on August 3, 75 major accidents occurred (1,800 explosions). Train traffic stopped for 48 hours on August 4.

In the Oryol direction, on the night of August 4, the advanced units of the 3rd and 63rd armies approached Oryol. The first to rush into the city were the soldiers of the 5th Infantry Division, Colonel P.T. Mikhalitsin, 129th Infantry Division, Colonel I.V. Panchuk, 380th Infantry Division, Colonel A.F. Kustova and tank crews of the 17th Guards Tank Brigade, Colonel B.V. Shulgina. In the outbreak of street battles, the residents of Orel helped our troops, providing important information about the enemy, and helped organize the crossing of the Oka River. Having broken the resistance in the eastern part of the city, Soviet troops reached the Oka River and crossed it on the shoulders of the retreating enemy. At dawn on August 5, 1943, our troops, after fierce street fighting, liberated the city and the Oryol railway junction. The 5th, 129th, 380th rifle divisions and the 17th Guards Tank Brigade that most distinguished themselves during the liberation of the city were given the honorary name Orlovsky (IVMV, T/7, pp. 166-168).

By August 15, the troops of the Bryansk Front, after stubborn battles, liberated Karachev. The fighting on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge ended.

The 4th Tank Army, advancing on Oryol from July 26, in cooperation with the 11th Guards Army, 3rd and 63rd Armies of the Bryansk Front, defeated the 20th Tank, 10th and 25th Motorized and 253rd in battles infantry division. Inflicted heavy losses on the 9th and 18th tank divisions and the 208th infantry division. During the battles from July 26 to August 21, 1943, 23,767 enemy soldiers and officers were killed and 486 captured. 310 tanks and assault guns, 55 armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 530 guns and 367 mortars, 624 machine guns were destroyed. 51 enemy aircraft were shot down.

(TsAMO, f. 324, op. 4756, d.12, l.11)

During the battles of our troops in the Oryol direction from July 24 to August 6 and in the Belgorod direction from August 4 to 6, our troops destroyed: 50,000 enemy soldiers and officers, 1,100 aircraft, 1,705 tanks, 584 guns, 6,000 vehicles.

(Messages of the Sovinformburo, T/5, p. 62)

The blow to the southern front turned out to be much more powerful. The 3rd, 6th, 7th, 11th and 19th tank divisions, as well as SS tank divisions: “Adolf Hitler”, “Greater Germany”, “Reich”, “Totenkopf” were advancing in the Belgorod direction. , "Viking"*, 106th, 167th, 168th, 255th, 320th, 162nd and 332nd Infantry Divisions.

In the Voronezh Front zone, on July 4, in the afternoon, the forward detachments of the 4th German Tank Army, after a 10-minute artillery fire raid and air strikes, went on the offensive and began fighting with the outposts of the 6th Guards Army. It became obvious that at night or at dawn on July 5 a general offensive would begin. Therefore, the front commander decided to conduct artillery counter-training in the zone of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, using guns and mortars of the 40th Army. As on the northern front, the counter-preparation inflicted significant damage on the enemy.

On July 5 at 6 o'clock, after artillery preparation and massive air raids, Hitler's troops went on the offensive. The main blow was delivered in the direction of Oboyan, against the 6th Guards Army of General I.M. Chistyakov 5 tank, 1 motorized, 2 infantry divisions, 2 separate battalions and a division of assault guns. The second blow in the direction of Korocha is against the 7th Guards Army of General M.S. Shumilov was launched by 3 tank and 3 infantry divisions. Thus, the command of Army Group South already on the first day of the offensive brought 8 tank, 1 motorized and 5 infantry divisions into battle.

On the first day, the Germans brought up to 700 tanks into the battle, supported by a large number of artillery and aircraft. The fighting in the Cherkasskoe and Bykovka areas became especially fierce. To break the resistance of units of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps, the enemy several times threw a large number of tanks into the attack. With a steel armada, he hoped to immediately ram the defenses of the Soviet troops. However, the battle began to unfold differently than the Germans had planned. The Red Army put up extremely stubborn resistance, the enemy suffered huge losses, breaking through the powerful defense. The 245th Tank Regiment alone destroyed 42 tanks. The soldiers and commanders of the 214th Guards Regiment of the 73rd Guards Rifle Division fought heroically that day. They repelled the attack of 120 enemy tanks, including 35 Tigers, operating together with infantry. In a twelve-hour battle, the guards destroyed 35 enemy tanks and up to 1,000 Nazis. The soldiers of the 3rd battalion of the 214th regiment especially distinguished themselves in battle. Of the 450 soldiers and officers, 300 were killed and wounded, only 150 remained in the ranks, but the enemy tanks did not get through. For this battle, the entire battalion personnel were awarded orders and medals, and captains A.A. Belgin, I.V. Ilyasov and Sergeant S.P. Zorin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. (IVMV, T/7, p. 150)

In the Bykovka area, from 100 to 300 tanks and assault guns took part in the attacks simultaneously. The enemy's attacks were steadfastly repelled by units of the 52nd Guards and 375th Rifle Divisions, as well as the 230th Tank Regiment and the 96th Tank Brigade. Using local fire and counterattacks, they inflicted great damage on the enemy in manpower and military equipment. The 96th Tank Brigade alone destroyed 17 tanks, 9 guns, up to two infantry battalions and 6 vehicles.

At the cost of huge losses, German troops managed to break through the main defense line of the 6th Guards Army in some areas. In order to completely exhaust the enemy’s main tank group and stop its advance within the tactical zone, the commander of the Voronezh Front, General N.F. Vatutin ordered the commander of the 1st Tank Army to advance two corps to the second defensive line of the 6th Guards Army and firmly gain a foothold on the Melovoe-Yakovlevo line. The 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps advanced to the Teterevino and Gostishchevo areas in readiness to launch a counterattack in the direction of Belgorod at dawn on July 6th.

1st Tank Army - Commander General M.E. Katukov, member of the Military Council General N.K. Popel, Chief of Staff General M.A. Shalin - made a night march and on the morning of July 6 went on the defensive at the indicated line. The first echelon was defended by the 6th Tank and 3rd Mechanized Corps. The 31st Tank Corps was in the second echelon of the army. On the morning of July 6, the enemy resumed the offensive, delivering two strikes: one from the Cherkassk region to the northeast in the direction of Lukhanino; the second is from the Bykovki area along the highway to Oboyan. Up to 160 enemy tanks in four columns entered the Chapaev, Shepelevka area and tried to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops on the move. But here they met powerful fire from rifle units, the 6th Tank Corps of General L.L. Hetman, as well as individual tank and artillery formations and units. The enemy, in groups of 40-50 tanks, repeated attacks four times, but all of them were repulsed. Up to 400 tanks advanced along the Oboyanskoye Highway. Here the enemy was met by soldiers of the 3rd Mechanized Corps, commanded by General S.M. Krivoshein. During the day, the corps repelled 8 attacks.

The fiercest battles took place in the Yakovlevo area. The first to receive the attack of German tanks on the approaches to Yakovlevo was the 2nd battalion of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, commanded by the communist Major S.I. Vovchenko. The battalion units boldly entered into single combat with 70 German tanks and opened powerful fire on them. The enemy retreated and decided to flank the tankers' positions. But on his way there was a tank platoon of Lieutenant V.S. Shalandina. The guardsmen allowed enemy tanks to come within 1000 meters and then opened heavy fire. For ten hours, the platoon fought a long, fierce battle under continuous air bombing and enemy artillery fire. Shalandin's crew alone destroyed 2 Tigers, 1 medium tank, 3 anti-tank guns and up to 40 German infantry. Shalandin's car caught fire from an enemy shell, but the heroic crew did not abandon it. The battle continued, the enemy's outflanking maneuver was disrupted. For high combat skill, courage and courage to Lieutenant V.S. Shalandin was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The platoon of Lieutenant G.I. also skillfully fought as part of this battalion. Bessarabov, whose crews skillfully chose positions and fired mainly at the sides of enemy tanks. This technique only allowed Bessarabov’s crew to destroy three Tigers. Three tanks, including 1 Tiger tank, were destroyed by battalion commander Major Vovchenko.

Unable to break through the battle formations of the 6th Tank and 3rd Mechanized Corps, the German command regrouped its forces and attacked the 5th Guards Tank Corps of General A.G. Kravchenko, who at that time, together with the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, launched a counterattack on the right flank of the enemy tank group, which was rushing to Oboyan. The main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Corps were concentrated on its right flank, in the Luchka area. The enemy, encountering strong fire resistance in this area, began to bypass its formations from the east and west. Half-encircled, the tank guards continued to wage fierce battles with enemy tanks and motorized infantry, grinding down their manpower and military equipment. By the morning of July 7, the 5th Guards Tank Corps, under pressure from superior forces, was forced to retreat to the new defensive line of Belenikhino and Teterevino. German troops, having captured Luchki, advanced to Yasnaya Polyana. 2nd Guards Tank Corps, commanded by Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, with part of his forces, managed to cross the Lipovy Donets north of Shopino, but was unable to break the enemy’s resistance. By order of the front commander, his formations retreated to their previous line of defense. The 31st Tank Corps, reinforced by an anti-tank destroyer brigade, advanced to the line Luchki (northern), Yasnaya Polyana and provided a junction between the tank army and the 5th Guards Tank Corps.

By the end of the second day of the battle, the enemy in the main direction had wedged 10-18 km into our defenses, but had not achieved freedom of maneuver anywhere. However, the situation was acute. The Germans could capture the village of Greznoye and the eastern outskirts of the village of Malye Mayachki. But the main enemy in a narrow area reached the rear army defense line, which is along the left bank of the Psel River. (Tankmaster No. 5/99, V. Zamulin)

On July 7 and 8, German troops made desperate attempts to expand the breakthrough towards the flanks and deepen in the direction of Prokhorovka. At the cost of heavy losses, the enemy in a narrow wedge approached the third defensive line in the Yasnaya Polyana, Greznoye sector and pushed the 3rd mechanized and 31st tank corps west to 6 km, but attempts to expand the wedge in the northeast direction were thwarted. The enemy's tank divisions stumbled upon the well-equipped defensive zone of the 69th Army, which formed the second echelon of the front. In this situation, the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps launched a counterattack on the right flank of the enemy tank wedge, in the general direction of Yakovlevo and, although they could not defeat the enemy, thwarted the Nazis’ intentions to break through to Prokhorovka.

The German command continued to increase its efforts in the Oboyan direction. During the night of July 9, the divisions of the strike force that had suffered heavy losses were replenished with marching teams. Ammunition was delivered and control, partially lost in grueling and bloody battles, was restored by the evening of July 8th. (IVMV, T/7, p. 152)

Field Marshal E. Manstein decided, without stopping the attack on Oboyan, to shift the spearhead of the attack to the Prokhorovsk direction and try to reach it through the Psel River. Since here the deepest penetration into our defense was achieved in the area between the Ilyinsky farm and the Komsomolets state farm, 12-13 km wide. Divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps reached the rear army defense line of the Voronezh Front. However, they failed to create a continuous breakthrough area. Instead, each of them, having made its own breach, tried to go north, bypassing the defenses of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies, suffering serious losses from the flanking fire of our artillery.

On the morning of July 9, after massive air strikes, large forces of infantry and tanks attacked the left flank of the 6th Tank Corps and tried to capture Syrtsevo and Verkhopenye. Up to 60 tanks repeatedly broke into Verkhopenye, but they were driven back by fire and counterattacks from Soviet tank brigades. Having failed to achieve success in this sector, the enemy, with two tank groups of up to 200 tanks, rushed to Kochetovka and Kalinovka and broke through the battle formations of the 3rd Mechanized and 31st Tank Corps.

By the evening of July 9, the 4th Panzer Army condensed the battle formations of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, reducing its offensive zone by half. From the Shopino-Wistloe region, the 3rd Division “Dead Head” is drawn up to the Prokhorovka direction, and the 2nd Division “Das Reich” surrenders its section up to and including the village of Luchki and concentrates in the Teterevino-Kalininskaya-Kalinin-Yasnaya Polyana region. Thus, by the end of the day, the entire 2nd SS Panzer Corps was concentrated in this direction.

Preparations were also made in the Melekhovo area for an attack on Prokhorovka from the south through Rzhavets-Vyvolzovka. Here, behind the 6th 19th Panzer Division, the 7th Panzer Division of Task Group Kempf was concentrated.

On the evening of July 9, the commander of the 4th Panzer Army, Colonel General G. Goth, signed order No. 5, which determined the army’s task for July 10. For the 2nd SS TC, it stated the following: “The 2nd TC defeats the enemy southwest of Prokhorovka and pushes him east, recaptures the heights on both sides of the Psl northeast of Prokhorovka.”

It was July 10 that became the day the Prokhorov battle began, and not July 12, as was previously believed.

Over five days of fierce fighting, the enemy managed to penetrate the defenses of the Soviet troops to a depth of about 35 km. Due to the tense situation created in the Belgorod-Kursk direction, the Voronezh Front was reinforced with two tank corps. One of them (10th) took up defense southwest of Prokhorovka, and the other (2nd) advanced to the Belenikhin area. On the night of July 9, the 10th Tank Corps was transferred to the Oboyan direction in the zone of action of the 1st Tank Army. To secure the right flank of the tank army, the 5th Guards Tank Corps was castled from near Belenikino to the Melovoe area. By the end of the day, the 5th Guards Tank Army had concentrated in the Prokhorovka area, and the 5th Guards Army had deployed on the army line of defense, in the Oboyan-Prokhorovka sector.

These formations were transferred by Headquarters to the Voronezh Front from the Steppe Front on July 7 at the request of Vatutin and Vasilevsky. Over the course of several days, they made a 250-300 kilometer march and on the morning of July 11 began to reach the specified areas. At the same time, due to the lack of vehicles, most of the rifle and airborne formations marched on foot. Moreover, having barely occupied their lines and begun to dig in, the 9th Guards Airborne and 95th Guards Rifle Divisions of the 5th Guards Army came under attack from tanks and motorized infantry of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which broke through the defenses of the bloodless units of the 183rd rifle division in the Vesely, Vasilievka, Storozhevoye sector.

After unsuccessful attempts to break through to Kursk along the highway to Oboyan, the Germans decided to do it further east, through Prokhorovka. The troops advancing in the Korochan direction also received the task of striking Prokhorovka. We can conclude that the plan of Colonel General G. Hoth on July 12 was as follows: after breaking through the defense and the divisions “Totenkopf” and “Adolf Hitler” reaching the line Kartashevka-Beregovoe-Prokhorovka-Storozhevoye, they turn around and strike north in the direction Oboyan, covering the flanks. At the same time, the Reich division captures the village of Pravorot and strikes towards the 3rd TC of the Kemph operational group advancing from the area of ​​the village of Rzhavets. The task was set not only to break through to Oboyan through Prokhorovka, but also to encircle the troops of the Voronezh Front in the Prokhorovka-Pravorot-Shakhovo area with counter strikes from the 2nd SS Tank and 3rd Tank. As a result, a gap should have formed in our defense, into which the reserve 24th Tank Corps of the Wehrmacht, which at that time was concentrating near Belgorod, could be introduced.

The Germans began implementing the plan on the night of July 12. At 2.00, up to 70 tanks broke through the 69th Army zone and captured the villages of Rzhavets, Ryndinka and Vypolzovka (28 km southeast of Prokhorovka). There was a threat of the enemy reaching the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army. Lieutenant General P.A. At 6.00, Rotmistrov gave the order to advance the 11th and 12th Guards Mechanized Brigades of the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps to the breakthrough area. The advance detachment of General K.G. advanced from near Oboyan. Trufanov as part of the 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment, a motorcycle battalion and several artillery units. The 26th Guards Tank Brigade of the 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps was sent to the area of ​​the village of Shakhovo, with the task of preventing the Germans from further crossing the Lipovy Donets River and advancing deep into our rear areas.

The Soviet command, having determined in time that a crisis was brewing in the enemy’s offensive, decided to defeat the enemy groups that had wedged themselves into our defenses in the Oboyan direction, and on the morning of July 12, launch a powerful counterattack from the Prokhorovka area with the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies, and from the Melovoe line , Orlovka - 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies in the general direction of Yakovlevo. Part of the forces of the 40th, 69th and 7th Guards armies were also supposed to participate in the counterattack. Ensuring the actions of Soviet troops from the air was entrusted to the main forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies.

The decisive role in the counterattack was assigned to the 5th Guards Tank Army - commander General P.A. Rotmistrov, member of the Military Council, General P.G. Grishin, Chief of Staff General V.N. Baskakov, - which included the 18th and 29th Tank and 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, as well as the attached 2nd and 2nd Guards Tank Corps. The army was supposed to strike in the direction of Prokhorovka, Yakovlevo.

At 8 o'clock on July 12, after aviation and artillery preparation, the formations of the first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army went on the offensive: the 18th was advancing on the right flank, the 29th in the center and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps on the left flank. A total of 539 tanks and self-propelled guns. The army had 170 T-70 light tanks. Initially, she was targeting Kharkov, but developments forced her to be brought into battle during the repulsion of the German offensive. The spearhead of the main attack of the 5th Guards Tank Army fell on a 10-kilometer section of the front between the Storozhevoye farm and the Psel River, 2 km southwest of Prokhorovka. The 42nd Guards Rifle and 9th Airborne Divisions of the 5th Guards Army operated together with the 18th and 29th Tank Corps. At the same time, the enemy’s strike force, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of SS-Obergruppenführer P. Hausser, began its offensive. It consisted of no less than 531 tanks and self-propelled guns.** The largest counter tank battle in history began, in which about 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part on both sides. In a relatively small area of ​​terrain, two avalanches of tanks collided. The brigades of the first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army, firing immediately, crashed head-on into the battle formations of the German troops, with a swift through attack, literally piercing the advancing enemy. Control in the forward units and units of both sides was disrupted. The field was covered by a continuous veil of smoke and dust, raised by explosions and the tracks of more than a thousand tanks from the ground. It was this battle that was later called an oncoming tank battle, and the field on which it took place a “tank field.” However, on this day, the German 48th and 3rd Tank Corps and the 1st Tank Army of Katukov and the tank and mechanized corps of the Voronezh Front, attached to the 6th, 7th Guards Armies and the 69th, were drawn into oncoming tank battles. army. The Prokhorov battle reached its climax on this day.

This turn of events was unexpected for both sides, but as a result, a tank battle “in a heap”, when the battle formations of the units were mixed, turned out to be more profitable for the Soviet tankers. The battle took place at minimal distances. The German advantage in communications and firing range disappeared. Moreover. It turned out that the turret rotation mechanism on the Tigers did not work well. The Germans did not have time to target our fast and maneuverable T-34s in time. The same ones, hiding in the clouds of smoke and dust, and the folds of the hilly terrain, approached the enemy tanks at minimum distances and shot the Tigers from pistol range at the sides and stern. Both sides fought with utmost ferocity. On this day, on the “tank field” near Prokhorovka alone, our tankers carried out 20 tank rams.

The powerful and sudden attack of the Soviet tank crews turned out to be a big surprise for the enemy. The battle was characterized by frequent and abrupt changes in the situation, activity, determination and a wide variety of forms and methods of combat operations. In some directions, oncoming battles unfolded, in others - defensive actions combined with counterattacks, in others - an offensive with repelling counterattacks.

The 18th Tank Corps, commanded by General B.S. Bakharov, advanced most successfully. Having broken the fierce resistance of the enemy, his formations advanced 3 km by the evening of July 12. The 29th Tank Corps, under the command of General I.F. Kirichenko, also overcame the Nazi resistance and advanced 1.5 km by the end of the day. The enemy was forced to retreat to the Greznoye area. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps went on the attack at 10 a.m., knocked out the Nazi cover and began to slowly advance in the direction of Yasnaya Polyana. However, the enemy, having created superiority in forces and means, stopped our troops, and in some areas pushed them back.

The 5th Guards Army, with right-flank formations, overcame the resistance of enemy troops and reached the northern outskirts of Kochetovka, and on the left flank it fought defensive battles on the Psel River.

At the same time, fierce fighting continued south of Prokhorovka. The enemy's 3rd Tank Corps continued the offensive that had begun at night from the Melekhovo area to Prokhorovka. However, the combined detachment of General Trufanov, in cooperation with formations of the 69th Army, not only stopped the enemy’s advance north to Prokhorovka, but also almost completely threw him back to his original position. About 300 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battles near the village of Rzhavets on both sides.

On July 12, 1943, about 3,000 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the oncoming battles west and south of Prokhorovka. The 6th Guards and 1st Tank armies, although they took part in the counterattack, advanced to an insignificant depth. This is explained mainly by the lack of time available to the troops to prepare for a counterattack, and by insufficient artillery and engineering support.

In the battle of Prokhorovka, Soviet soldiers showed courage, bravery, and high combat skill. The huge losses suffered by the Nazi army in this battle completely exhausted its strength. On the “Tank Field” near Prokhorovka alone, on July 12, the enemy lost about 320 tanks, up to 100 guns and mortars, 350 vehicles and more than 10,000 soldiers and officers killed.

The losses of the 5th Guards Tank Army that day were also significant and amounted to 1,366 killed and missing, and 2,383 wounded soldiers and officers, 164 tanks and self-propelled guns were burned (94 T-34, 50 T-70, 9 Mk.IV “ Churchill”, 8 Su-122, 3 Su-76), 180 vehicles destroyed (125 T-34, 39 T-70, 8 Mk.IV “Churchill”, 5 Su-122, 3 Su-76)

In total, from July 12 to July 16, 1943, the losses of the 5th Guards Tank Army that day amounted to 2,240 killed, 1,157 missing, and 3,510 wounded. 334 tanks and self-propelled guns were burned (222 T-34, 89 T-70, 12 Mk.IV “Churchill”, 8 Su-122, 3 Su-76), 212 damaged vehicles were under repair (143 T-34, 56 T -70, 7 Mk.IV “Churchill”, 3 Su-122, 3 Su-76). 240 vehicles, 15 guns, 53 anti-tank guns, 12 anti-aircraft guns, 51 mortars were destroyed.

However, the 5th Guards Tank Army itself inflicted even greater losses on the enemy. During the same time, 15,620 enemy soldiers and officers were killed. 552 tanks and self-propelled guns were destroyed, including 93 Pz.Kpfw.VI(H)E “Tiger”, 769 vehicles, 55 aircraft, 45 artillery batteries, 29 mortar batteries, 7 warehouses.

(TsAMO, f. 203, op. 2851, d. 24, l. 451-455)

The blow of Soviet troops near Prokhorovka and in other parts of the Kursk Bulge was so powerful that already on July 13, the German command was forced to abandon the plan of encircling Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge and take urgent measures to organize defense. True, in the next three days the enemy made several attempts to improve their positions, but they ended in vain. Moreover, under the pressure of the Red Army, the Germans were unable to hold their captured positions and were forced to begin a retreat on July 16. The enemy also had to make such a decision due to the difficult situation created in the Orel region, where at that time the troops of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts were successfully advancing.

On July 19, the command of the German troops came to the final conclusion that the continuation of Operation Citadel was impossible. Army Group South was defeated both in the Battle of Prokhorovka and in the offensive near Kursk. Operation Citadel ended in failure. The Germans went on the defensive, but were unable to hold back the onslaught of Soviet troops and on July 19 began to retreat to their original positions. However, this was only the beginning of the disaster on the Kursk Bulge.

In the Belgorod direction, our troops, developing a counteroffensive, by July 23 reached the lines they occupied before the start of the German offensive, i.e. until July 5, 1943

After a short regrouping, the troops of the 69th Army of the Steppe Front began the offensive operation “Commander Rumyantsev”, going on the offensive in the direction of Belgorod on August 4, broke through the enemy’s defenses and, on the morning of August 5, reached its northern outskirts. The enemy created a powerful defensive line around the city and stubbornly defended. The heights of the Cretaceous Mountains were in their hands. However, the enemy failed to hold the city. The 7th Guards Army, having crossed the Northern Donets, created a threat to the enemy garrison from the east. Units of the 1st Mechanized Corps, advancing west of the city, cut the Belgorod-Kharkov railway and highway. The fascist garrison, fearing encirclement, began a hasty retreat. By the evening of August 5, Belgorod was liberated by our troops. The first to enter the city were the 89th Guards Rifle Division of Colonel M.P. Seryugin and the 305th Infantry Division of Colonel A.F. Vasilyeva. These formations received the honorary name Belgorod (IVMV, T/7, p. 173).

The scale of the struggle was increasing. On the morning of August 5, the 27th Army and the strike force of the 40th Army of Generals S.G. went on the offensive. Trofimenko and K.S. Moskalenko. Having broken through the enemy’s defenses on a 26-kilometer section of the front, during the day they advanced into the depths of the German defense from 8 to 20 km. The success of the rapidly developing offensive forced the Wehrmacht command to make a decision on the urgent transfer of troops from the 1st Tank and 6th Field Armies located in the Donbass to the Kharkov region. Units of the SS panzergrenadier divisions “Das Reich”, “Totenkopf”, “Viking” arrived here, and units of the 3rd Panzer Division arrived. The panzergrenadier division “Greater Germany” was returned from near Orel to the Kharkov region. The fascist German command made every effort to stop the advance of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts.

Our aerial reconnaissance discovered the movement of enemy reserves. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered aviation to prevent the enemy from regrouping. As a result, the enemy, during the regrouping, was subjected to powerful bombing attacks by the 8th, 5th, 2nd and 17th air armies. On average, 400-500 sorties were carried out per day. In addition, the position of the Germans was significantly complicated by the actions of Soviet partisans who carried out operations on enemy communications - the “rail war”. As a result, the capacity of many railway lines has decreased significantly.

After the liberation of Belgorod, the offensive of the Soviet troops continued to develop successfully. Particularly stubborn battles took place on the flanks of the breakthrough. The enemy concentrated his main efforts against the 27th, 40th Armies, 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies. However, attempts to stop the Soviet advance failed.

The 1st Tank Army and the advanced units of the 6th Guards Army advanced more than 100 km in five days and by the end of August 7 captured an important stronghold of the enemy defense, the city of Bogodukhov. Units of the 27th Army liberated Grayvoron on the same day. A 55-kilometer gap opened up between the 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf. The defeat of the group west of Grayvoron further weakened the defense front of the 4th Tank Army. At the same time, the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies covered 80 km with stubborn battles. along the interfluve of the Uda and Lopan rivers and by the end of August 7, they captured strong enemy strongholds - Cossack Lopan and Zolochev. Soviet aviation confidently maintained air supremacy From August 3 to 8, the 2nd, 5th and 17th air armies carried out more than 13,000 sorties, took part in 300 air battles and shot down more than 400 German aircraft (IVMV, T/7 , pp.174-175).

The Germans made desperate attempts to hold the front, often counterattacked, tried to launch counterattacks, but were forced to retreat. By August 9, 1943, in the Kharkov direction, our troops continued to successfully develop the offensive, advanced 15–25 kilometers, liberated over 100 settlements, including the city and the Trostyanets railway station. In the Kharkov direction, our troops captured 212 tanks, 139 guns, 96 mortars, 618 vehicles, 323 machine guns, 30 radio stations, 500 horses, 500 carts, 315 wagons, 11 warehouses in the battles of August 7 and 8.

(Messages of the Sovinformburo, T/5, pp. 66-67)

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the isolation of Kharkov, intercepting the main railway and highway routes in the directions to Poltava, Krasnograd and Lozovaya as soon as possible. To do this, the 1st Tank Army cut the main routes in the area of ​​Kovyaga, Valka, the 5th Guards Tank Army, bypassing Kharkov from the southwest to cut the routes in the Merefa area.

By August 11, the Voronezh Front had significantly expanded the breakthrough in the western and southwestern directions and reached the Kharkov-Poltava railway. The troops of the Steppe Front successfully continued their offensive south of Belgorod.

The German command attached particular importance to the defense of Kharkov and the Kharkov industrial region. In addition, it wanted to cover the grouping of its troops in the Donbass from the north and hoped, by stabilizing the front on the approaches to the city, to transfer the fight on the eastern front into a positional war. Overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, by August 11, the 53rd, 69th and 7th Guards Armies of the Steppe Front came close to the outer Kharkov defensive perimeter, and the 57th Army of General N.A. Hagena, having crossed the Northern Donets, captured Chuguev and reached the approaches to Kharkov from the east and southeast.

At this time, the troops of the Voronezh Front advanced even further to the south and southwest. The possibility of deep coverage of the German group in the Kharkov region was created. To prevent such coverage, on August 11, the command of Army Group South, having concentrated three tank divisions south of Bogodukhov, launched a counterattack on the 1st Tank Army and the left flank of the 6th Guards Army. From August 11 to August 17, fierce fighting took place in this area. The enemy sought to cut off and defeat the 1st Tank Army and return the Poltava-Kharkov railway. On August 12, the Germans brought up to 400 tanks into the battle. The formations carrying out the counterattack were supported by German aviation, breaking through the screens of our fighters.

The fighting in the Bogodukhov direction was extremely fierce and intense. Both sides suffered huge losses, achieving little progress on certain sectors of the front. During August 13-14, the 6th Guards Army penetrated 10-12 km into enemy defenses and created an even greater threat of encirclement of enemy troops in the Kharkov region from the west.

The Germans were able to recapture the Poltava-Kharkov railway, but their advance to the rear of the main grouping of the Voronezh Front was only 20 km to the north. The counterattack was thwarted.

But the Wehrmacht command was preparing another counterattack from the west, from Akhtyrka to Bogodukhov, intending to cut off and defeat the advancing troops of the 27th Army and two tank corps. The enemy's strike force included the Panzergrenadier Division "Greater Germany", the 10th Motorized Division, the 7th, 11th, 19th Tank Divisions, the 51st and 52nd Tank Battalions. The SS panzergrenadier division “Totenkopf” was assigned to attack south of Akhtyrka.

On the morning of August 18, the Germans went on the offensive in the Akhtyrka direction and advanced in a narrow area in a day to a depth of 24 km. On the same day, in the direction of Kolontaev from the area south of Akhtyrka, the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division “Totenkopf” went on the offensive. However, the enemy failed to develop a counterattack. By the end of August 20, the 38th, 40th, 47th armies and the 4th Guards Army of the right wing of the Voronezh Front approached Akhtyrka from the north and northwest, deeply enveloping the left flank of the enemy group that was delivering a counterattack. The German advance was stopped. The enemy was forced to go on the defensive. In the period from August 22 to 25, the troops of the right wing of the Voronezh Front defeated the Akhtyrka group of Germans and liberated the city (IVMV, T/7, pp. 175-176).

During the battles on the Kursk Bulge from July 5 to August 20, 1943, our troops destroyed 4,600 aircraft, 6,400 tanks, 3,800 guns, and more than 20,000 vehicles.

The enemy's losses in killed amounted to 300,000 soldiers and officers, in total 1,000,000 soldiers and officers were killed and wounded.

During the same time, our troops captured: 857 tanks, 1,274 guns, including self-propelled ones, 3,429 machine guns, 4,230 vehicles. 25,600 German soldiers and officers were captured.

(Messages of the Sovinformburo, T/5, p. 89)

However, fierce and large-scale battles on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge continued for another three days. Things were also unfavorable for the enemy south of Kharkov. On August 13, the troops of the Steppe Front, overcoming stubborn resistance from the Nazis, broke through the outer defensive perimeter, located 8-14 km from Kharkov, and by the end of August 17, fighting began on the northern outskirts of the city.

Every day the position of the Kharkov enemy group became more and more complicated and, fearing encirclement, the Germans began to withdraw from the city on August 22. Commander of the Steppe Front, Marshal I.S. Konev gave the order to begin the assault on the city at night. Throughout the night of August 23, there were street battles in the city. Step by step, the soldiers of the 53rd, 57th, 69th, 7th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies cleared Kharkov of the fascists.

By noon on August 23, Kharkov was liberated for the second and last time after fierce fighting. With his release, the Battle of Kursk ended. In the battles for the city, the 89th Guards Belgorod, 15th, 28th, 93rd Guards, 84th, 116th, 183rd, 252nd, 299th and 375th Rifle Divisions distinguished themselves. These formations were given the honorary name of Kharkov (IVMV, T/7, p. 177).

The Battle of Oryol-Kursk is the greatest battle in history. The Red Army won it. The result was the final turning point in the war. Never again was Nazi Germany able to launch offensives with decisive goals, and was forced to switch to strategic defense.

The scale of this battle is amazing. Never, neither before nor after the Battle of Oryol-Kursk, has any battle reached such intensity of battles, such a concentration of troops and equipment. More than 4 million people took part in it.

The losses of the Red Army amounted to 254,470 killed, 608,833 wounded, 18,000 prisoners. A total of 881,303 people, 6,064 tanks and self-propelled guns, 5,244 guns and mortars, 1,606 combat aircraft. (The classification has been removed, pp. 187-191, 370).

However, the losses of Nazi Germany were even greater and amounted to 1,046,475 people from July 5 to August 23, 1943, of which 305,900 were killed, 714,750 wounded, 25,775 prisoners. 4,787 combat aircraft, 6,841 tanks and self-propelled guns, 110 armored cars, 117 armored personnel carriers, 3,857 guns, 1,221 mortars, 5 six-barreled mortars, 48 ​​tractors, 64 tank trucks, 20,200 cars, 246 motorcycles, 1 armored train, 4,781 bullets destroyed yeah. 37 aircraft, 863 tanks, 78 assault guns, 4 armored vehicles, 1,274 guns, 1,341 mortars, 36 six-barreled mortars, 36 tractors and tractors, 4,430 cars, 3,646 machine guns, 1,019 machine guns, 9,625 rifles were captured.

The total losses in equipment and weapons were: 4,824 aircraft, 7,784 tanks and assault guns, 227 armored vehicles, 5,131 guns, 2,562 mortars, 41 six-barreled mortars (7,734 artillery systems), 84 tractors and tractors, 64 tank trucks, 24,630 cars, 246 motorcycles, 7. 139 machine guns .

(Messages of the Sovinformburo, T/5, p. 11-92)

* German sources report that 1 Ferdinand and 2 Panthers were lost in "accidents" before 5 July. The self-propelled gun crashed in a train accident, and the tanks burned down. The partisans, naturally, have nothing to do with these “accidents”...

*** Self-propelled howitzers “Hummel”, “Bison”, “Vespe” are counted along with other self-propelled guns and at the same time taken into account in the general balance of artillery of the strike group on the southern front. At the same time, in the table presented by N. Pavlov there are no 149.1-mm SiG.33 infantry howitzers from 10 infantry divisions (up to 120 tables) and the artillery of the 24th Tank Corps is not taken into account.

* - according to Sovinformburo reports.

* the motorized grenadier division “Greater Germany” of the Wehrmacht, not the SS, was the only one (until 1944) that did not have a number and was its elite unit. By 07/05/1943, it consisted of more than 240 tanks - more than in any Wehrmacht and SS tank division. Renamed to tank only in October 1943. All SS divisions 1st “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”, 2nd “Das Reich”, 3rd “Toten Kopf”, 5th “Viking” were officially called motorized grenadiers until October 1943 ., but in fact they were tank in composition. The Tiger battalion was deployed as part of “Great Germany”, and the “Tiger” company was deployed as part of the SS motorized grenadier divisions.

Situation and strengths of the parties

In the early spring of 1943, after the end of the winter-spring battles, a huge protrusion formed on the Soviet-German front line between the cities of Orel and Belgorod, directed to the west. This bend was unofficially called the Kursk Bulge. At the bend of the arc were located the troops of the Soviet Central and Voronezh fronts and the German army groups “Center” and “South”.

Some representatives of the highest command circles in Germany proposed that the Wehrmacht switch to defensive actions, exhausting the Soviet troops, restoring its own strength and strengthening the occupied territories. However, Hitler was categorically against it: he believed that the German army was still strong enough to inflict a major defeat on the Soviet Union and again seize the elusive strategic initiative. An objective analysis of the situation showed that the German army was no longer capable of attacking on all fronts at once. Therefore, it was decided to limit offensive actions to only one segment of the front. Quite logically, the German command chose the Kursk Bulge to strike. According to the plan, German troops were to strike in converging directions from Orel and Belgorod in the direction of Kursk. With a successful outcome, this ensured the encirclement and defeat of the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The final plans for the operation, codenamed "Citadel", were approved on May 10-11, 1943.

It was not difficult to unravel the plans of the German command regarding exactly where the Wehrmacht would advance in the summer of 1943. The Kursk salient, extending many kilometers into the territory controlled by the Nazis, was a tempting and obvious target. Already on April 12, 1943, at a meeting at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the USSR, it was decided to move to a deliberate, planned and powerful defense in the Kursk region. The Red Army troops had to hold back the onslaught of Nazi troops, wear down the enemy, and then launch a counteroffensive and defeat the enemy. After this, it was planned to launch a general offensive in the western and southwestern directions.

In case the Germans decided not to attack in the Kursk Bulge area, a plan of offensive actions was also created with forces concentrated on this section of the front. However, the defensive plan remained a priority, and it was its implementation that the Red Army began in April 1943.

The defense on the Kursk Bulge was built thoroughly. In total, 8 defensive lines with a total depth of about 300 kilometers were created. Great attention was paid to mining the approaches to the defense line: according to various sources, the density of minefields was up to 1500-1700 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines per kilometer of front. Anti-tank artillery was not distributed evenly along the front, but was collected in so-called “anti-tank areas” - localized concentrations of anti-tank guns that covered several directions at once and partially overlapped each other’s sectors of fire. In this way, the maximum concentration of fire was achieved and shelling of one advancing enemy unit was ensured from several sides at once.

Before the start of the operation, the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts totaled about 1.2 million people, about 3.5 thousand tanks, 20,000 guns and mortars, as well as 2,800 aircraft. The Steppe Front, numbering about 580,000 people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 7.4 thousand guns and mortars, and about 700 aircraft, acted as a reserve.

On the German side, 50 divisions took part in the battle, numbering, according to various sources, from 780 to 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 10,000 guns and approximately 2.5 thousand aircraft.

Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army had a numerical advantage. However, we should not forget that these troops were located on the defensive, and therefore, the German command had the opportunity to effectively concentrate forces and achieve the required concentration of troops in breakthrough areas. In addition, in 1943, the German army received in fairly large quantities new heavy tanks "Tiger" and medium "Panther", as well as heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", of which there were only 89 in the army (out of 90 built) and which, however, , themselves posed a considerable threat, provided they were used correctly in the right place.

The first stage of the battle. Defense

Both commands of the Voronezh and Central Fronts predicted the date of the German troops' transition to the offensive quite accurately: according to their data, the attack should have been expected in the period from July 3 to July 6. The day before the start of the battle, Soviet intelligence officers managed to capture “tongue,” who reported that the Germans would begin the assault on July 5.

The northern front of the Kursk Bulge was held by the Central Front of Army General K. Rokossovsky. Knowing the time of the start of the German offensive, at 2:30 a.m. the front commander gave the order to conduct a half-hour artillery counter-training. Then, at 4:30, the artillery strike was repeated. The effectiveness of this measure was quite controversial. According to reports from Soviet artillerymen, the Germans suffered significant damage. However, apparently, this was still not true. We know for sure about small losses in manpower and equipment, as well as about the disruption of enemy wire lines. In addition, the Germans now knew for sure that a surprise attack would not work - the Red Army was ready for defense.

At 5:00 am the German artillery preparation began. It had not yet ended when the first echelons of Nazi troops went on the offensive following the barrage of fire. German infantry, supported by tanks, launched an offensive along the entire defensive line of the 13th Soviet Army. The main blow fell on the village of Olkhovatka. The most powerful attack was experienced by the right flank of the army near the village of Maloarkhangelskoye.

The battle lasted approximately two and a half hours, and the attack was repulsed. After this, the Germans shifted their pressure to the left flank of the army. The strength of their onslaught is evidenced by the fact that by the end of July 5, the troops of the 15th and 81st Soviet divisions were partially surrounded. However, the Nazis had not yet succeeded in breaking through the front. In just the first day of the battle, German troops advanced 6-8 kilometers.

On July 6, Soviet troops attempted a counterattack with two tank, three rifle divisions and a rifle corps, supported by two regiments of guards mortars and two regiments of self-propelled guns. The impact front was 34 kilometers. At first, the Red Army managed to push the Germans back 1-2 kilometers, but then the Soviet tanks came under heavy fire from German tanks and self-propelled guns and, after 40 vehicles were lost, were forced to stop. By the end of the day, the corps went on the defensive. The counterattack attempted on July 6 did not have serious success. The front managed to be “pushed back” by only 1-2 kilometers.

After the failure of the attack on Olkhovatka, the Germans shifted their efforts in the direction of the Ponyri station. This station was of serious strategic importance, covering the Orel-Kursk railway. Ponyri were well protected by minefields, artillery and tanks buried in the ground.

On July 6, Ponyri was attacked by about 170 German tanks and self-propelled guns, including 40 Tigers of the 505th heavy tank battalion. The Germans managed to break through the first line of defense and advance to the second. Three attacks that followed before the end of the day were repulsed by the second line. The next day, after persistent attacks, German troops managed to get even closer to the station. By 15:00 on July 7, the enemy captured the “1 May” state farm and came close to the station. The day of July 7, 1943 became a crisis for the defense of Ponyri, although the Nazis still failed to capture the station.

At the Ponyri station, German troops used the Ferdinand self-propelled guns, which turned out to be a serious problem for the Soviet troops. Soviet guns were practically unable to penetrate the 200 mm frontal armor of these vehicles. Therefore, the Ferdinanda suffered the greatest losses from mines and air raids. The last day when the Germans stormed the Ponyri station was July 12.

From July 5 to July 12, heavy fighting took place in the 70th Army's zone of action. Here the Nazis launched an attack with tanks and infantry, with German air superiority in the air. On July 8, German troops managed to break through the defense, occupying several settlements. The breakthrough was localized only by introducing reserves. By July 11, Soviet troops received reinforcements as well as air support. The dive bomber strikes caused quite significant damage to German units. On July 15, after the Germans had already been completely driven back, in the field between the villages of Samodurovka, Kutyrki and Tyoploye, military correspondents filmed damaged German equipment. After the war, this chronicle began to be mistakenly called “footage from near Prokhorovka,” although not a single “Ferdinand” was near Prokhorovka, and the Germans failed to evacuate two damaged self-propelled guns of this type from near Tyoply.

In the zone of action of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Vatutin), combat operations began in the afternoon of July 4 with attacks by German units on the positions of the front's military outposts and lasted until late at night.

On July 5, the main phase of the battle began. On the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, the battles were much more intense and were accompanied by more serious losses of Soviet troops than on the northern one. The reason for this was the terrain, which was more suitable for the use of tanks, and a number of organizational miscalculations at the level of the Soviet front-line command.

The main blow of the German troops was delivered along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. This section of the front was held by the 6th Guards Army. The first attack took place at 6 a.m. on July 5 in the direction of the village of Cherkasskoye. Two attacks followed, supported by tanks and aircraft. Both were repulsed, after which the Germans shifted the direction of the attack towards the village of Butovo. In the battles near Cherkassy, ​​the enemy almost managed to achieve a breakthrough, but at the cost of heavy losses, Soviet troops prevented it, often losing up to 50-70% of the units' personnel.

During July 7-8, the Germans managed, while suffering losses, to advance another 6-8 kilometers, but then the attack on Oboyan stopped. The enemy was looking for a weak point in the Soviet defense and seemed to have found it. This place was the direction to the still unknown Prokhorovka station.

The Battle of Prokhorovka, considered one of the largest tank battles in history, began on July 11, 1943. On the German side, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the 3rd Wehrmacht Panzer Corps took part in it - a total of about 450 tanks and self-propelled guns. The 5th Guards Tank Army under Lieutenant General P. Rotmistrov and the 5th Guards Army under Lieutenant General A. Zhadov fought against them. There were about 800 Soviet tanks in the Battle of Prokhorovka.

The battle at Prokhorovka can be called the most discussed and controversial episode of the Battle of Kursk. The scope of this article does not allow us to analyze it in detail, so we will limit ourselves to only reporting approximate loss figures. The Germans irretrievably lost about 80 tanks and self-propelled guns, the Soviet troops lost about 270 vehicles.

Second phase. Offensive

On July 12, 1943, Operation Kutuzov, also known as the Oryol offensive operation, began on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge with the participation of troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts. On July 15, troops of the Central Front joined it.

On the German side, a group of troops consisting of 37 divisions was involved in the battles. According to modern estimates, the number of German tanks and self-propelled guns that took part in the battles near Orel was about 560 vehicles. Soviet troops had a serious numerical advantage over the enemy: in the main directions, the Red Army outnumbered German troops by six times in the number of infantry, five times in the number of artillery and 2.5-3 times in tanks.

German infantry divisions defended themselves on well-fortified terrain, equipped with wire fences, minefields, machine gun nests and armored caps. Enemy sappers built anti-tank obstacles along the river banks. It should be noted, however, that work on the German defensive lines had not yet been completed when the counteroffensive began.

On July 12 at 5:10 am, Soviet troops began artillery preparation and launched an air strike on the enemy. Half an hour later the assault began. By the evening of the first day, the Red Army, waging heavy fighting, advanced to a distance of 7.5 to 15 kilometers, breaking through the main defensive line of German formations in three places. Offensive battles continued until July 14. During this time, the advance of Soviet troops was up to 25 kilometers. However, by July 14, the Germans managed to regroup their troops, as a result of which the Red Army offensive was stopped for some time. The Central Front offensive, which began on July 15, developed slowly from the very beginning.

Despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy, by July 25 the Red Army managed to force the Germans to begin withdrawing troops from the Oryol bridgehead. In early August, battles began for the city of Oryol. By August 6, the city was completely liberated from the Nazis. After this, the Oryol operation entered its final phase. On August 12, fighting began for the city of Karachev, which lasted until August 15 and ended with the defeat of the group of German troops defending this settlement. By August 17-18, Soviet troops reached the Hagen defensive line, built by the Germans east of Bryansk.

The official date for the start of the offensive on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge is considered to be August 3. However, the Germans began a gradual withdrawal of troops from their positions as early as July 16, and from July 17, units of the Red Army began pursuing the enemy, which by July 22 turned into a general offensive, which stopped at approximately the same positions that Soviet troops occupied at the start of the Battle of Kursk . The command demanded the immediate continuation of hostilities, but due to the exhaustion and fatigue of the units, the date was postponed by 8 days.

By August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts had 50 rifle divisions, about 2,400 tanks and self-propelled guns, and more than 12,000 guns. At 8 o'clock in the morning, after artillery preparation, Soviet troops began their offensive. On the first day of the operation, the advance of units of the Voronezh Front ranged from 12 to 26 km. The troops of the Steppe Front advanced only 7-8 kilometers during the day.

On August 4-5, battles took place to eliminate the enemy group in Belgorod and liberate the city from German troops. By evening, Belgorod was taken by units of the 69th Army and the 1st Mechanized Corps.

By August 10, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway. There were about 10 kilometers left to the outskirts of Kharkov. On August 11, the Germans struck in the Bogodukhov area, significantly weakening the pace of the offensive of both fronts of the Red Army. Fierce fighting continued until August 14.

The steppe front reached the near approaches to Kharkov on August 11. On the first day, the attacking units were not successful. Fighting on the outskirts of the city continued until July 17. Both sides suffered heavy losses. In both Soviet and German units, it was not uncommon to have companies numbering 40-50 people, or even less.

The Germans launched their last counterattack at Akhtyrka. Here they even managed to make a local breakthrough, but this did not change the situation globally. On August 23, a massive assault on Kharkov began; This day is considered the date of the liberation of the city and the end of the Battle of Kursk. In fact, the fighting in the city stopped completely only on August 30, when the remnants of German resistance were suppressed.

Dates of the Battle of Kursk: 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943. The Great Patriotic War had 3 significant events:

• Liberation of Stalingrad;
• Battle of Kursk;
• Capture of Berlin.

Here we will talk about the greatest tank battle in modern history.

Battle for Kursk. The situation before the battle

Before the Battle of Kursk, Germany celebrated a small success, managing to recapture the cities of Belgorod and Kharkov. Hitler, seeing short-term success, decided to develop it. The offensive was planned on the Kursk Bulge. The salient, cut deep into German territory, could be surrounded and captured. The operation, approved on May 10-11, was called “Citadel”.

Strengths of the parties

The advantage was on the side of the Red Army. The number of Soviet troops was 1,200,000 people (against 900 thousand for the enemy), the number of tanks was 3,500 (2,700 for the Germans), guns were 20,000 (10,000), and aircraft were 2,800 (2,500).

The German army was replenished with heavy (medium) Tiger (Panther) tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled guns (self-propelled guns), and Foke-Wulf 190 aircraft. Innovations on the Soviet side were the St. John's wort cannon (57 mm), capable of penetrating the armor of the Tiger, and anti-tank mines, which caused significant damage to them.

Plans of the parties

The Germans decided to launch a lightning strike, quickly capture the Kursk ledge, and then continue a large-scale offensive. The Soviet side decided to first defend itself, launching counterattacks, and when the enemy was weakened and exhausted, go on the offensive.

Defense

We managed to find out that Battle of Kursk will begin on 05/06/1943. Therefore, at 2:30 and 4:30, the Central Front carried out two half-hour artillery counterattacks. At 5:00 the enemy’s guns responded, and then the enemy went on the offensive, exerting intense pressure (2.5 hours) on the right flank in the direction of the village of Olkhovatka.

When the attack was repulsed, the Germans intensified their attack on the left flank. They even managed to partially encircle two (15, 81) Soviet divisions, but failed to break through the front (advance 6-8 km). Then the Germans attempted to capture the Ponyri station in order to control the Orel-Kursk railway.

170 tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns broke through the first line of defense on July 6, but the second one held out. On July 7, the enemy came close to the station. The 200mm frontal armor became impenetrable to Soviet guns. Ponyri station was held due to anti-tank mines and powerful raids by Soviet aviation.

The tank battle near the village of Prokhorovka (Voronezh Front) lasted 6 days (10-16). Almost 800 Soviet tanks faced 450 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns. The overall victory was for the Red Army, but more than 300 tanks were lost versus 80 for the enemy. Average tanks The T-34 had difficulty resisting the heavy Tigers, and the light T-70 was generally unsuitable in open areas. This is where the losses come from.

Offensive

While the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts were repelling enemy attacks, units of the Western and Bryansk Fronts (July 12) went on the attack. Within three days (12-14), fighting heavy battles, the Soviet army was able to advance up to 25 kilometers.

August 23 is the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the defeat of the Wehrmacht forces by Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge. The Red Army was led to this important victory by almost two months of intense and bloody battles, the outcome of which was by no means a foregone conclusion. The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest battles in world history. Let's remember about it in a little more detail.

Fact 1

The salient in the center of the Soviet-German front to the west of Kursk was formed during the stubborn battles of February–March 1943 for Kharkov. The Kursk Bulge was up to 150 km deep and 200 km wide. This ledge is called the Kursk Bulge.

Battle of Kursk

Fact 2

The Battle of Kursk is one of the key battles of the Second World War, not only because of the scale of the fighting that took place on the fields between Orel and Belgorod in the summer of 1943. Victory in this battle meant the final turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet troops, which began after the Battle of Stalingrad. With this victory, the Red Army, having exhausted the enemy, finally seized the strategic initiative. This means that from now on we are advancing. The defense was over.

Another consequence - political - was the final confidence of the Allies in victory over Germany. At a conference held in November–December 1943 in Tehran on the initiative of F. Roosevelt, the post-war plan for the dismemberment of Germany was already discussed.

Scheme of the Battle of Kursk

Fact 3

1943 was a year of difficult choices for the command of both sides. Defend or attack? And if we attack, how large-scale tasks should we set ourselves? Both the Germans and the Russians had to answer these questions one way or another.

Back in April, G.K. Zhukov sent his report to Headquarters on possible military actions in the coming months. According to Zhukov, the best solution for the Soviet troops in the current situation would be to wear down the enemy on their defense by destroying as many tanks as possible, and then bring in reserves and go on a general offensive. Zhukov's considerations formed the basis of the campaign plan for the summer of 1943, after it was discovered that Hitler's army was preparing for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge.

As a result, the decision of the Soviet command was to create a deeply echeloned (8 lines) defense on the most likely areas of the German offensive - on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge.

In a situation with a similar choice, the German command decided to attack in order to maintain the initiative in their hands. Nevertheless, even then, Hitler outlined the objectives of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge not to seize territory, but to exhaust the Soviet troops and improve the balance of forces. Thus, the advancing German army was preparing for a strategic defense, while the defending Soviet troops intended to attack decisively.

Construction of defensive lines

Fact 4

Although the Soviet command correctly identified the main directions of German attacks, mistakes were inevitable with such a scale of planning.

Thus, the Headquarters believed that a stronger group would attack in the Orel area against the Central Front. In reality, the southern group operating against the Voronezh Front turned out to be stronger.

In addition, the direction of the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was not accurately determined.

Fact 5

Operation Citadel was the name of the German command’s plan to encircle and destroy the Soviet armies in the Kursk salient. It was planned to deliver converging attacks from the north from the Orel area and from the south from the Belgorod area. The impact wedges were supposed to connect near Kursk. The maneuver with the turn of Hoth's tank corps towards Prokhorovka, where the steppe terrain favors the action of large tank formations, was planned in advance by the German command. It was here that the Germans, reinforced with new tanks, hoped to crush the Soviet tank forces.

Soviet tank crews inspect a damaged Tiger

Fact 6

The battle of Prokhorovka is often called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not so. It is believed that the multi-day battle that took place in the first week of the war (June 23–30) 1941 was larger in terms of the number of tanks participating. It occurred in Western Ukraine between the cities of Brody, Lutsk and Dubno. While about 1,500 tanks from both sides fought at Prokhorovka, more than 3,200 tanks took part in the battle of 1941.

Fact 7

In the Battle of Kursk, and in particular in the battle of Prokhorovka, the Germans especially relied on the strength of their new armored vehicles - Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But perhaps the most unusual new product was the “Goliath” wedges. This tracked self-propelled mine without a crew was controlled remotely via wire. It was intended to destroy tanks, infantry and buildings. However, these wedges were expensive, slow-moving and vulnerable, and therefore did not provide much help to the Germans.

Memorial in honor of the heroes of the Battle of Kursk

On July 5, 1943, the Battle of Kursk, also known as Battle of Kursk. This is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War, which finally consolidated the radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War, which began at Stalingrad. The offensive was launched by both sides: both the Soviet and the German. The Wehrmacht's summer strategic offensive on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk bridgehead was called Operation Citadel.

According to Soviet and Russian historiography, the battle lasted 49 days, it included: Kursk strategic defensive operation (July 5 - 23), Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3 - 23) strategic offensive operations.

What about the Oryol-Kursk arc? Is that also more correct?

In various sources you can find references to the events of July 5 - August 23, 1943 as the “Battle of Oryol-Kursk” and the “Oryol-Kursk Bulge”. For example, in his report at a ceremonial meeting in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War on May 8, 1965, L. I. Brezhnev says:

"Giant Battle" on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge in the summer of 1943 I broke my back...".

How often did this spelling occur? We'll find out a little later.

The arc was located between the Oryol and Kursk regions, which means it should be called that - Oryol-Kursk

An arc is a section of a curve between two of its points. The southern point of the bulge that formed at the front by July 5, 1943 is Belgorod, now the Belgorod region, the northern point is the Maloarkhangelsk station, now the Oryol region. Based on the names of the extreme points, we will give the name: Belgorod-Oryol arc. So?

• On June 13, 1934, Belgorod was included in the newly formed Kursk region.
• On June 13, 1934, after the liquidation of the Central Black Earth Region, Maloarkhangelsk District became part of the newly formed Kursk Region.

For a contemporary of the Battle of Kursk, it would be completely natural to call the arc the Kursk-Kursk Bulge. That is... just the Kursk Bulge. That's what they called her.

Where did they call her that?

See the titles of some materials from different years:

• Markin I. I. On the Kursk Bulge. - M.: Voenizdat, 1961. - 124 p.
• Antipenko, N. A. On the main direction (Memoirs of the deputy front commander). - M.: Nauka, 1967. Chapter “ On the Kursk Bulge»
• O. A. Losik - Head of the Military Academy of Armored Forces, professor, colonel general. From a speech on July 20, 1973 at the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense at a scientific session dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the defeat of the Nazi troops on the Kursk Bulge
• Even Brezhnev, in his speech at the ceremonial meeting dedicated to the presentation of the Order of Lenin to Georgia, at the Sports Palace in Tbilisi on November 1, 1966, noted, as if he had not said anything about Orel in 1965:
  

  ... stood to the death at the walls of the legendary Stalingrad and on Kursk Bulge…

• Etc.

There will be some interesting statistics below.

In 1944, the Maloarkhangelsk region returned to the Oryol region, and Belgorod became the administrative center of the newly formed Belgorod region only in 1954. The Belgorod arc never became, and the Oryol part was sometimes added - without any visible system.

The arc is fine. Well, is it really the Oryol-Kursk battle? Okay, Kursko-Orlovskaya?

J.V. Stalin, who read a report on November 6, 1943 at a ceremonial meeting of the Moscow Council of Workers' Deputies with party and public organizations of the city of Moscow, says:

From a purely military point of view, the defeat of the German troops on our front by the end of this year was predetermined by two most important events: the battle of Stalingrad and battle of Kursk.

Textbooks from different years also keep up:

History of the USSR. Part 3. 10th grade. (A. M. Penkratova. 1952), p. 378.

The Germans hoped to strike from two sides - from the Oryol bridgehead in the north and from the Belgorod region in the south - to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops concentrated in the bend Kursk Bulge, and then launch an attack on Moscow.

§10. Battle of Kursk. Completion of a radical turning point in the war

Methodological manual on modern history. Bogolyubov, Izrailovich, Popov, Rakhmanova. - 1978, p. 165. 2nd question for the lesson:

What was the historical significance of the largest battles of the Second World War - Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursky?

No matter what, everything they have is Kursk.

Maybe the Battle of Oryol never happened?

According to Soviet and Russian historiography, there was an Oryol strategic offensive operation as part of the Battle of Kursk.

It’s still correct - Battle of Oryol-Kursk

If you compare the frequency of mentions on the Internet, the difference is striking:

• “Oryol-Kursk battle”- 2 thousand results;
• “Battle of Kursk” - Oryol- 461 thousand results;

• “Oryol-Kursk arc”- 6 thousand results;
• “Kursk Bulge” - Orlovsko- 379 thousand results;

• “Oryol arc”- 946 results. Indeed, why not.

So not all documents are uploaded to the Internet

There are no “underloaded” documents in quantities that can compensate for a two-hundred-fold difference.

So, the Battle of Kursk and the Kursk Bulge?

Yes, the Battle of Kursk and the Kursk Bulge. But if for some reason you want to name events, adding the Oryol component, no one minds. Formally, a small piece of the Oryol region was part of the ledge even in 1943.