USSR: Ukrainian SSR, Belorussian SSR, Moldavian SSR, Lithuanian SSR, Latvian SSR, Estonian SSR; regions: Pskov, Smolensk, Kursk, Oryol, Leningrad, Belgorod. |
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Aggression of Nazi Germany |
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Tactical - defeat of Soviet troops in border battles and retreat into the interior of the country with relatively small losses of the Wehrmacht and Germany's allies. The strategic result is the failure of the blitzkrieg of the Third Reich. |
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Opponents |
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Commanders |
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Joseph Stalin |
Adolf Gitler |
Semyon Timoshenko |
Walter von Brauchitsch |
Georgy Zhukov |
Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb |
Fedor Kuznetsov |
Fedor von Bock |
Dmitry Pavlov |
Gerd von Rundstedt |
Mikhail Kirponos † |
Ion Antonescu |
Ivan Tyulenev |
Carl Gustav Mannerheim |
Giovanni Messe |
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Italo Gariboldi |
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Miklos Horthy |
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Josef Tiso |
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Strengths of the parties |
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2.74 million people + 619 thousand Reserve of the Civil Code (VSE) |
4.05 million people |
Military losses |
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2,630,067 killed and captured 1,145,000 wounded and sick |
About 431,000 dead and dead 1,699,000 missing |
(Directive No. 21. Plan "Barbarossa"; German. Weisung Nr. 21. Fall Barbarossa, in honor of Frederick I) - a plan for Germany's invasion of the USSR in the Eastern European theater of World War II and the military operation carried out in accordance with this plan at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War.
Development of the Barbarossa plan began on July 21, 1940. The plan, finally developed under the leadership of General F. Paulus, was approved on December 18, 1940 by the directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht No. 21. It provided for the lightning defeat of the main forces of the Red Army west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers, in the future it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass with a subsequent exit on the line Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan.
The expected duration of the main hostilities, designed for 2-3 months, is the so-called “Blitzkrieg” strategy (German. Blitzkrieg).
Prerequisites
After Hitler came to power in Germany, revanchist sentiments sharply increased in the country. Nazi propaganda convinced the Germans of the need for conquest in the East. Back in the mid-1930s, the German government announced the inevitability of war with the USSR in the near future. Planning an attack on Poland with the possible entry of Great Britain and France into the war, the German government decided to protect itself from the east - in August 1939, a Non-Aggression Treaty was concluded between Germany and the USSR, dividing the spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe. On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland, as a result of which Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3. During the Polish campaign of the Red Army, the Soviet Union sent troops and annexed the former possessions of the Russian Empire from Poland: Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. A common border appeared between Germany and the USSR.
In 1940, Germany captured Denmark and Norway (Danish-Norwegian operation); Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France during the French Campaign. Thus, by June 1940, Germany managed to radically change the strategic situation in Europe, remove France from the war and expel the British army from the continent. The victories of the Wehrmacht gave rise to hopes in Berlin for a quick end to the war with England, which would allow Germany to devote all its strength to the defeat of the USSR, and this, in turn, would free its hands to fight the United States.
However, Germany failed to either force Great Britain to make peace or defeat it. The war continued, with fighting taking place at sea, in North Africa and the Balkans. In October 1940, Germany made attempts to attract Spain and Vichy France to an alliance against England, and also initiated negotiations with the USSR.
Soviet-German negotiations in November 1940 showed that the USSR was considering the possibility of joining the Tripartite Pact, but the conditions it set out were unacceptable to Germany, since they required it to renounce intervention in Finland and closed its possibility of advancing to the Middle East through the Balkans.
However, despite these events of the autumn, based on Hitler’s demands put forward by him in early June 1940, the OKH drew up rough outlines of a campaign plan against the USSR, and on July 22, the development of an attack plan began, codenamed “Plan Barbarossa.” The decision to war with the USSR and the general plan for the future campaign were announced by Hitler soon after the victory over France - on July 31, 1940.
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England's Hope - Russia and America. If hopes for Russia collapse, America will also fall away from England, since the defeat of Russia will result in the incredible strengthening of Japan in East Asia. […] If Russia is defeated, England will lose its last hope. Then Germany will dominate Europe and the Balkans. Conclusion: According to this reasoning, Russia must be liquidated. Deadline: spring 1941. The sooner we defeat Russia, the better. The operation will only make sense if we defeat the entire state with one swift blow. Just capturing some part of the territory is not enough. Stopping action in winter is dangerous. Therefore, it is better to wait, but make a firm decision to destroy Russia. […] Beginning [of the military campaign] - May 1941. The duration of the operation is five months. It would be better to start this year, but this is not suitable, since the operation must be carried out in one blow. The goal is to destroy the life force of Russia. The operation breaks down into: 1st hit: Kyiv, exit to the Dnieper; aviation destroys crossings. Odessa. 2nd hit: Through the Baltic states to Moscow; in the future, a two-pronged attack - from the north and south; later - a private operation to capture the Baku region. |
The Axis powers are informed of Barbarossa's plan.
Plans of the parties
Germany
The overall strategic objective of the Barbarossa plan is “ defeat Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the war against England was over" The concept was based on the idea “ split the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of the country, with quick and deep strikes from powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, destroy disunited groups of enemy troops" The plan provided for the destruction of the bulk of Soviet troops west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers, preventing them from withdrawing inland.
In development of the Barbarossa plan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces signed a directive on the concentration of troops on January 31, 1941.
On the eighth day, German troops were supposed to reach the line Kaunas, Baranovichi, Lvov, Mogilev-Podolsky. On the twentieth day of the war, they were supposed to capture territory and reach the line: Dnieper (to the area south of Kyiv), Mozyr, Rogachev, Orsha, Vitebsk, Velikie Luki, south of Pskov, south of Pärnu. This was followed by a pause of twenty days, during which it was planned to concentrate and regroup formations, give rest to the troops and prepare a new supply base. On the fortieth day of the war, the second phase of the offensive was to begin. During it, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass.
Particular importance was attached to the capture of Moscow: “ The capture of this city means a decisive success both politically and economically, not to mention the fact that the Russians will lose their most important railway junction" The Wehrmacht command believed that the Red Army would throw its last remaining forces into defense of the capital, which would make it possible to defeat them in one operation.
The line Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan was indicated as the final line, but the German General Staff did not plan the operation that far.
The Barbarossa plan set out in detail the tasks of army groups and armies, the order of interaction between them and with the Allied forces, as well as with the Air Force and Navy, and the tasks of the latter. In addition to the OKH directive, a number of documents were developed, including an assessment of the Soviet Armed Forces, a disinformation directive, calculation of time for preparing an operation, special instructions, etc.
Directive No. 21, signed by Hitler, named May 15, 1941 as the earliest date for an attack on the USSR. Later, due to the diversion of part of the Wehrmacht forces to the Balkan campaign, June 22, 1941 was named as the next date for the attack on the USSR. The final order was given on June 17.
USSR
Soviet intelligence managed to obtain information that Hitler had made some kind of decision related to Soviet-German relations, but its exact content remained unknown, like the code word “Barbarossa.” And the information received about the possible outbreak of war in March 1941 after withdrawal from the war in England were absolutely misinformation, since Directive No. 21 indicated an approximate date for the completion of military preparations - May 15, 1941 and emphasized that the USSR must be defeated " more before that how the war against England will end».
Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership did not take any action to prepare defense in the event of a German attack. In the operational-strategic headquarters game that took place in January 1941, the issue of repelling aggression from Germany was not even considered.
The configuration of the Red Army troops on the Soviet-German border was very vulnerable. In particular, the former Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov recalled: “ On the eve of the war, the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies of the Western District were located in the Bialystok ledge, concave towards the enemy, the 10th Army occupied the most unfavorable location. This operational configuration of troops created the threat of deep envelopment and encirclement from Grodno and Brest by attacking the flanks. Meanwhile, the deployment of front troops in the Grodno-Suwalki and Brest directions was not deep and powerful enough to prevent a breakthrough and envelopment of the Bialystok group. This erroneous deployment of troops, committed in 1940, was not corrected until the war itself...»
Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership took certain actions, the meaning and purpose of which continue to be discussed. At the end of May and beginning of June 1941, a partial mobilization of troops was carried out under the guise of reserve training, which made it possible to call up over 800 thousand people who were used to replenish divisions located mainly in the West; from mid-May, four armies (16th, 19th, 21st and 22nd) and one rifle corps began moving from the internal military districts to the border of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers. From mid-June, a hidden regrouping of the formations of the western border districts themselves began: under the guise of entering the camps, more than half of the divisions constituting the reserve of these districts were set in motion. From June 14 to 19, the commands of the western border districts received instructions to withdraw front-line commands to field command posts. From mid-June, vacations for personnel were cancelled.
At the same time, the General Staff of the Red Army Army categorically suppressed any attempts by the commanders of the western border districts to strengthen the defense by occupying the forefield. Only on the night of June 22 did the Soviet military districts receive a directive to switch to combat readiness, but it reached many headquarters only after the attack. Although, according to other sources, orders to withdraw troops from the border were given to the commanders of the western districts from June 14 to 18.
In addition, most of the territories located on the western border were incorporated into the USSR relatively recently. The Soviet army did not have powerful defensive lines on the border. The local population was quite hostile to Soviet power, and after the German invasion, many Baltic, Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalists actively helped the Germans.
Balance of power
Germany and allies
Three army groups were created to attack the USSR.
- Army Group North (Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb) was deployed in East Prussia, on the front from Klaipeda to Gołdap. It included the 16th Army, the 18th Army and the 4th Tank Group - a total of 29 divisions (including 6 tank and motorized). The offensive was supported by the 1st Air Fleet, which had 1,070 combat aircraft. The task of Army Group North was to defeat Soviet troops in the Baltic states, capture Leningrad and ports on the Baltic Sea, including Tallinn and Kronstadt.
- Army Group Center (Field Marshal Feodor von Bock) occupied the front from Gołdap to Wlodawa. It included the 4th Army, 9th Army, 2nd Tank Group and 3rd Tank Group - a total of 50 divisions (including 15 tank and motorized) and 2 brigades. The offensive was supported by the 2nd Air Fleet, which had 1,680 combat aircraft. Army Group Center was tasked with dissecting the strategic front of the Soviet defense, encircling and destroying the Red Army troops in Belarus and developing an offensive in the Moscow direction.
- Army Group South (Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt) occupied the front from Lublin to the mouth of the Danube. It included the 6th Army, 11th Army, 17th Army, 3rd Romanian Army, 4th Romanian Army, 1st Tank Group and the Hungarian Mobile Corps - a total of 57 divisions (including 9 tank and motorized) and 13 brigades (including 2 tank and motorized). The offensive was supported by the 4th Air Fleet, which had 800 combat aircraft, and the Romanian Air Force, which had 500 aircraft. Army Group South had the task of destroying Soviet troops in Right Bank Ukraine, reaching the Dnieper and subsequently developing an offensive east of the Dnieper.
USSR
In the USSR, on the basis of the military districts located on the western border, according to the decision of the Politburo of June 21, 1941, 4 fronts were created.
- The North-Western Front (commander F.I. Kuznetsov) was created in the Baltic states. It included the 8th Army, the 11th Army and the 27th Army - a total of 34 divisions (of which 6 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the Northwestern Front.
- The Western Front (commander D. G. Pavlov) was created in Belarus. It included the 3rd Army, 4th Army, 10th Army and 13th Army - a total of 45 divisions (of which 20 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Western Front Air Force.
- The Southwestern Front (commander M.P. Kirponos) was created in Western Ukraine. It included the 5th Army, 6th Army, 12th Army and 26th Army - a total of 45 divisions (of which 18 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the Southwestern Front.
- The Southern Front (commander I.V. Tyulenev) was created in Moldova and Southern Ukraine. It included the 9th Army and the 18th Army - a total of 26 divisions (of which 9 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the Southern Front.
- The Baltic Fleet (commander V.F. Tributs) was located in the Baltic Sea. It consisted of 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, 2 destroyer leaders, 19 destroyers, 65 submarines, 48 torpedo boats and other ships, 656 aircraft.
- The Black Sea Fleet (commander F.S. Oktyabrsky) was located in the Black Sea. It consisted of 1 battleship, 5 light cruisers, 16 leaders and destroyers, 47 submarines, 2 brigades of torpedo boats, several divisions of minesweepers, patrol and anti-submarine boats, and over 600 aircraft.
Development of the USSR Armed Forces since the signing of the non-aggression pact
By the beginning of the forties, the Soviet Union, as a result of the industrialization program, came to third place after the United States and Germany in terms of the level of development of heavy industry. Also, by the beginning of the Second World War, the Soviet economy was largely focused on the production of military equipment.
First phase. Invasion. Border battles (22 June - 10 July 1941)
Beginning of the invasion
In the early morning at 4 o'clock on June 22, 1941, the German invasion of the USSR began. On the same day, Italy (Italian troops began fighting on July 20, 1941) and Romania declared war on the USSR, Slovakia declared war on June 23, and Hungary declared war on June 27. The German invasion took the Soviet troops by surprise; on the very first day, a significant part of the ammunition, fuel and military equipment was destroyed; The Germans managed to ensure complete air supremacy (about 1,200 aircraft were disabled). German aircraft attacked naval bases: Kronstadt, Libau, Vindava, Sevastopol. Submarines were deployed on the sea lanes of the Baltic and Black Seas and minefields were laid. On land, after strong artillery preparation, the advanced units, and then the main forces of the Wehrmacht, went on the offensive. However, the Soviet command was unable to soberly assess the position of its troops. On the evening of June 22, the Main Military Council sent directives to the Military Councils of the fronts, demanding that decisive counterattacks be launched against the enemy groups that had broken through in the morning of June 23. As a result of failed counterattacks, the already difficult situation of the Soviet troops worsened even further. Finnish troops did not cross the front line, waiting for events to develop, but giving German aviation the opportunity to refuel.
The Soviet command launched bombing attacks on Finnish territory on June 25. Finland declared war on the USSR and German and Finnish troops invaded Karelia and the Arctic, increasing the front line and threatening Leningrad and the Murmansk railway. The fighting soon turned into positional warfare and had no impact on the general state of affairs on the Soviet-German front. In historiography they are usually separated into separate campaigns: the Soviet-Finnish War (1941-1944) and the Defense of the Arctic.
Northern direction
At first, not one, but two tank groups operated against the Soviet North-Western Front:
- Army Group North operated in the Leningrad direction, and its main striking force, the 4th Tank Group, was advancing on Daugavpils.
- The 3rd Tank Group of Army Group Center was advancing in the Vilnius direction.
An attempt by the command of the North-Western Front to launch a counterattack with the forces of two mechanized corps (almost 1000 tanks) near the city of Raseiniai ended in complete failure, and on June 25 a decision was made to withdraw troops to the Western Dvina line.
But already on June 26, the German 4th Tank Group crossed the Western Dvina near Daugavpils (56th motorized corps of E. von Manstein), on July 2 - at Jekabpils (41st motorized corps of G. Reinhard). Following the motorized corps, infantry divisions advanced. On June 27, Red Army units left Liepaja. On July 1, the German 18th Army occupied Riga and entered southern Estonia.
Meanwhile, the 3rd Tank Group of Army Group Center, having overcome the resistance of Soviet troops near Alytus, took Vilnius on June 24, turned southeast and went behind the rear of the Soviet Western Front.
Central direction
A difficult situation developed on the Western Front. On the very first day, the flank armies of the Western Front (3rd Army in the Grodno area and 4th Army in the Brest area) suffered heavy losses. The counterattacks of the mechanized corps of the Western Front on June 23–25 ended in failure. The German 3rd Panzer Group, having overcome the resistance of Soviet troops in Lithuania and developing an offensive in the Vilnius direction, bypassed the 3rd and 10th Armies from the north, and the 2nd Panzer Group, leaving the Brest Fortress in the rear, broke through to Baranovichi and bypassed them from the south. On June 28, the Germans took the capital of Belarus and closed the encirclement ring, which contained the main forces of the Western Front.
On June 30, 1941, the commander of the Soviet Western Front, Army General D. G. Pavlov, was removed from command; Later, by decision of the military tribunal, he, along with other generals and officers of the Western Front headquarters, was shot. The troops of the Western Front were led first by Lieutenant General A. I. Eremenko (June 30), then People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S. K. Timoshenko (appointed on July 2, took office on July 4). Due to the fact that the main forces of the Western Front were defeated in the Battle of Bialystok-Minsk, on July 2, the troops of the Second Strategic Echelon were transferred to the Western Front.
At the beginning of July, the Wehrmacht motorized corps overcame the Soviet defense line on the Berezina River and rushed to the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, but unexpectedly encountered troops of the restored Western Front (in the first echelon of the 22nd, 20th and 21st Armies). On July 6, 1941, the Soviet command launched an offensive in the Lepel direction (see Lepel counterattack). During the heated tank battle on July 6-9 between Orsha and Vitebsk, in which more than 1,600 tanks took part on the Soviet side, and up to 700 units on the German side, German troops defeated the Soviet troops and took Vitebsk on July 9. The surviving Soviet units retreated to the area between Vitebsk and Orsha. German troops took up their starting positions for the subsequent offensive in the area of Polotsk, Vitebsk, south of Orsha, as well as north and south of Mogilev.
South direction
The military operations of the Wehrmacht in the south, where the most powerful group of the Red Army was located, were not so successful. On June 23-25, Black Sea Fleet aircraft bombed the Romanian cities of Sulina and Constanta; On June 26, Constanta was attacked by ships of the Black Sea Fleet together with aviation. In an effort to stop the advance of the 1st Panzer Group, the command of the Southwestern Front launched a counterattack with six mechanized corps (about 2,500 tanks). During a major tank battle in the Dubno-Lutsk-Brody area, Soviet troops were unable to defeat the enemy and suffered heavy losses, but they prevented the Germans from making a strategic breakthrough and cutting off the Lviv group (6th and 26th Armies) from the rest of the forces. By July 1, the troops of the Southwestern Front retreated to the fortified line Korosten-Novograd-Volynsky-Proskurov. At the beginning of July, the Germans broke through the right wing of the front near Novograd-Volynsky and captured Berdichev and Zhitomir, but thanks to counterattacks by Soviet troops, their further advance was stopped.
At the junction of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts, on July 2, German-Romanian troops crossed the Prut and rushed to Mogilev-Podolsky. By July 10 they reached the Dniester.
Results of border battles
As a result of border battles, the Wehrmacht inflicted a heavy defeat on the Red Army.
Summing up the results of the first phase of Operation Barbarossa, on July 3, 1941, the Chief of the German General Staff F. Halder wrote in his diary:
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« In general, we can already say that the task of defeating the main forces of the Russian ground army in front of the Western Dvina and Dnieper has been completed... Therefore, it will not be an exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia was won within 14 days. Of course, it's not finished yet. The enormous extent of the territory and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, using all means, will fetter our forces for many more weeks. ...When we cross the Western Dvina and the Dnieper, it will be not so much about defeating the enemy’s armed forces, but rather about taking away the enemy’s industrial areas and not giving him the opportunity, using the gigantic power of his industry and inexhaustible human resources, to create new armed forces strength. As soon as the war in the east moves from the phase of defeating the enemy’s armed forces to the phase of economic suppression of the enemy, further tasks of the war against England will again come to the fore...» |
Second phase. The offensive of German troops along the entire front (July 10 - August 1941)
Northern direction
On July 2, Army Group North continued its offensive, its German 4th Panzer Group advancing in the direction of Rezekne, Ostrov, Pskov. On July 4, the 41st Motorized Corps occupied Ostrov, and on July 9, Pskov.
On July 10, Army Group North continued its offensive in the Leningrad (4th Tank Group) and Tallinn (18th Army) directions. However, the German 56th Motorized Corps was stopped by a counterattack by the Soviet 11th Army near Soltsy. Under these conditions, the German command on July 19 suspended the offensive of the 4th Panzer Group for almost three weeks until the formations of the 18th and 16th armies arrived. Only at the end of July did the Germans reach the border of the Narva, Luga and Mshaga rivers.
On August 7, German troops broke through the defenses of the 8th Army and reached the coast of the Gulf of Finland in the Kunda area. The 8th Army was split into two parts: the 11th Rifle Corps went to Narva, and the 10th Rifle Corps to Tallinn, where, together with the sailors of the Baltic Fleet, they defended the city until August 28.
On August 8, Army Group North resumed its offensive against Leningrad in the direction of Krasnogvardeisk, and on August 10 - in the Luga area and in the Novgorod-Chudov direction. On August 12, the Soviet command launched a counterattack near Staraya Russa, but on August 19 the enemy struck back and defeated the Soviet troops.
On August 19, German troops occupied Novgorod, and on August 20, Chudovo. On August 23, fighting began for Oranienbaum; The Germans were stopped southeast of Koporye (Voronka River).
Offensive on Leningrad
To strengthen Army Group North, the 3rd Panzer Group of G. Hoth (39th and 57th Motorized Corps) and the 8th Air Corps of V. von Richthofen were transferred to it.
At the end of August, German troops launched a new offensive against Leningrad. On August 25, the 39th motorized corps took Lyuban, on August 30 it reached the Neva and cut off the railway connection with the city, on September 8 it took Shlisselburg and closed the blockade ring around Leningrad.
However, having decided to carry out Operation Typhoon, A. Hitler ordered the release no later than September 15, 1941 of most of the mobile formations and the 8th Air Corps, which were called upon to participate in the final offensive on Moscow.
On September 9, the decisive assault on Leningrad began. However, the Germans failed to break the resistance of the Soviet troops within the specified time frame. On September 12, 1941, Hitler gave the order to stop the assault on the city. (For further military operations in the Leningrad direction, see Siege of Leningrad.)
On November 7, the Germans continue their offensive in a northern direction. The railways carrying food through Lake Ladoga to Leningrad were cut. German troops occupied Tikhvin. There was a threat of German troops breaking through to the rear and encircling the 7th Separate Army, which was defending the lines on the Svir River. However, already on November 11, the 52nd Army launched a counterattack on the fascist troops who occupied Malaya Vishera. During the ensuing battles, the Malovishera group of German troops suffered a serious defeat. Her troops were thrown back from the city across the Bolshaya Vishera River.
Central direction
On July 10-12, 1941, Army Group Center launched a new offensive in the Moscow direction. The 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Dnieper south of Orsha, and the 3rd Panzer Group attacked from Vitebsk. On July 16, German troops entered Smolensk, and three Soviet armies (19th, 20th and 16th) were surrounded. By August 5, the fighting in the Smolensk “cauldron” ended, the remnants of the troops of the 16th and 20th armies crossed the Dnieper; 310 thousand people were captured.
On the northern flank of the Soviet Western Front, German troops captured Nevel (July 16), but then fought for a whole month for Velikiye Luki. Big problems for the enemy also arose on the southern flank of the central section of the Soviet-German front: here the Soviet troops of the 21st Army launched an offensive in the Bobruisk direction. Despite the fact that Soviet troops failed to capture Bobruisk, they pinned down a significant number of divisions of the German 2nd Field Army and a third of the 2nd Panzer Group.
Thus, taking into account two large groupings of Soviet troops on the flanks and incessant attacks along the front, the German Army Group Center could not resume the attack on Moscow. On July 30, the main forces went over to the defensive and focused on solving problems on the flanks. At the end of August 1941, German troops managed to defeat Soviet troops in the Velikie Luki area and capture Toropets on August 29.
On August 8-12, the 2nd Tank Group and the 2nd Field Army began advancing southward. As a result of the operations, the Soviet Central Front was defeated, and Gomel fell on August 19. The large-scale offensive of the Soviet fronts of the Western direction (Western, Reserve and Bryansk), launched on August 30 - September 1, was unsuccessful, Soviet troops suffered heavy losses and went on the defensive on September 10. The only success was the liberation of Yelnya on September 6.
South direction
In Moldova, an attempt by the command of the Southern Front to stop the Romanian offensive with a counterattack of two mechanized corps (770 tanks) was unsuccessful. On July 16, the 4th Romanian Army took Chisinau, and in early August pushed the Separate Coastal Army to Odessa. The defense of Odessa pinned down the forces of the Romanian troops for almost two and a half months. Soviet troops left the city only in the first half of October.
Meanwhile, at the end of July, German troops launched an offensive in the Belaya Tserkov direction. On August 2, they cut off the 6th and 12th Soviet armies from the Dnieper and surrounded them near Uman; 103 thousand people were captured, including both army commanders. But although German troops, as a result of a new offensive, broke through to the Dnieper and created several bridgeheads on the eastern bank, they failed to take Kyiv on the move.
Thus, Army Group South was unable to independently solve the tasks set for it by the Barbarossa plan. From early August to early October, the Red Army carried out a series of attacks near Voronezh.
Battle of Kyiv
In pursuance of Hitler's orders, the southern flank of Army Group Center launched an offensive in support of Army Group South.
After the occupation of Gomel, the German 2nd Army of Army Group Center advanced to join the 6th Army of Army Group South; On September 9, both German armies united in eastern Polesie. By September 13, the front of the Soviet 5th Army of the Southwestern Front and the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front was completely broken, both armies switched to mobile defense.
At the same time, the German 2nd Tank Group, having repelled the attack of the Soviet Bryansk Front near Trubchevsk, entered operational space. On September 9, the 3rd Panzer Division of V. Model broke through to the south and captured Romny on September 10.
Meanwhile, the 1st Tank Group launched an offensive on September 12 from the Kremenchug bridgehead in a northern direction. On September 15, the 1st and 2nd tank groups linked up at Lokhvitsa. The main forces of the Soviet Southwestern Front found themselves in the gigantic Kiev “cauldron”; the number of prisoners was 665 thousand people. The administration of the Southwestern Front turned out to be destroyed; Front commander Colonel General M.P. Kirponos died.
As a result, Left Bank Ukraine was in the hands of the enemy, the path to Donbass was open, and Soviet troops in Crimea were cut off from the main forces. (For further military operations in the Donbass direction, see Donbass operation). In mid-September, the Germans reached the approaches to Crimea.
Crimea was of strategic importance as one of the routes to the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus (through the Kerch Strait and Taman). In addition, Crimea was important as an aviation base. With the loss of Crimea, Soviet aviation would have lost the ability to raid Romanian oil fields, and the Germans would have been able to strike targets in the Caucasus. The Soviet command understood the importance of holding the peninsula and focused its efforts on this, abandoning the defense of Odessa. On October 16, Odessa fell.
On October 17, Donbass was occupied (Taganrog fell). On October 25, Kharkov was captured. November 2 - Crimea is occupied and Sevastopol is blocked. November 30 - the forces of Army Group South gained a foothold on the Mius Front line.
Turn from Moscow
At the end of July 1941, the German command was still full of optimism and believed that the goals set by the Barbarossa plan would be achieved in the near future. The following dates were indicated for achieving these goals: Moscow and Leningrad - August 25; Volga line - early October; Baku and Batumi - early November.
On July 25, at a meeting of the chiefs of staff of the Wehrmacht's Eastern Front, the implementation of Operation Barbarossa was discussed in time:
- Army Group North: Operations developed almost entirely according to plans.
- Army Group Center: Until the start of the Battle of Smolensk, operations developed in accordance with plans, then development slowed down.
- Army Group South: Operations progressed more slowly than expected.
However, Hitler became increasingly inclined to postpone the attack on Moscow. At a meeting at the headquarters of Army Group South on August 4, he stated: “ First, Leningrad must be captured, for this purpose the troops of the Gotha group are used. Secondly, the eastern part of Ukraine will be captured... And only as a last resort will an offensive be launched to capture Moscow».
The next day, F. Halder clarified the Fuhrer’s opinion with A. Jodl: What are our main goals: do we want to defeat the enemy or are we pursuing economic goals (the seizure of Ukraine and the Caucasus)? Jodl replied that the Fuehrer believed that both goals could be achieved simultaneously. To the question: Moscow or Ukraine or Moscow and Ukraine, you should answer - both Moscow and Ukraine. We must do this, because otherwise we will not be able to defeat the enemy before the onset of autumn.
On August 21, 1941, Hitler issued a new directive which stated: " The most important task before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of Crimea, industrial and coal areas on the Donets River and blocking the Russian oil supply routes from the Caucasus. In the north, such a task is to encircle Leningrad and connect with Finnish troops».
Evaluation of Hitler's decision
Hitler's decision to abandon an immediate attack on Moscow and to turn the 2nd Army and 2nd Panzer Group to help Army Group South caused mixed opinions among the German command.
The commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, G. Goth, wrote in his memoirs: “ There was one compelling argument of operational significance against continuing the offensive on Moscow at that time. If in the center the defeat of the enemy troops located in Belarus was unexpectedly quick and complete, then in other directions the successes were not so great. For example, it was not possible to push back the enemy operating south of Pripyat and west of the Dnieper to the south. An attempt to throw the Baltic group into the sea was also unsuccessful. Thus, both flanks of Army Group Center, when advancing to Moscow, were in danger of being attacked; in the south, this danger was already making itself felt...»
The commander of the German 2nd Panzer Group, G. Guderian, wrote: “ The battle for Kyiv undoubtedly meant a major tactical success. However, whether this tactical success also had major strategic significance remains in doubt. Now everything depended on whether the Germans would be able to achieve decisive results before the onset of winter, perhaps even before the onset of the autumn thaw.».
Only on September 30, German troops, having brought up reserves, went on the offensive against Moscow. However, after the start of the offensive, stubborn resistance from Soviet troops and difficult weather conditions in late autumn led to a halt in the offensive against Moscow and the failure of Operation Barbarossa as a whole. (For further military operations in the Moscow direction, see Battle of Moscow)
Results of Operation Barbarossa
The ultimate goal of Operation Barbarossa remained unachieved. Despite the impressive successes of the Wehrmacht, the attempt to defeat the USSR in one campaign failed.
The main reasons can be associated with a general underestimation of the Red Army. Despite the fact that before the war the total number and composition of Soviet troops was determined quite correctly by the German command, the major miscalculations of the Abwehr included an incorrect assessment of the Soviet armored forces.
Another serious miscalculation was the underestimation of the mobilization capabilities of the USSR. By the third month of the war, it was expected to meet no more than 40 new divisions of the Red Army. In fact, the Soviet leadership sent 324 divisions to the front in the summer alone (taking into account the previously deployed 222 divisions), that is, German intelligence made a very significant mistake in this matter. Already during the staff games conducted by the German General Staff, it became clear that the available forces were not enough. The situation was especially difficult with reserves. In fact, the “Eastern Campaign” had to be won with one echelon of troops. Thus, it was established that with the successful development of operations in the theater of operations, “which is expanding to the east like a funnel,” German forces “will prove insufficient unless it is possible to inflict a decisive defeat on the Russians up to the Kyiv-Minsk-Lake Peipsi line.”
Meanwhile, on the line of the Dnieper-Western Dvina rivers, the Wehrmacht was waiting for the Second Strategic Echelon of Soviet troops. The Third Strategic Echelon was concentrating behind him. An important stage in the disruption of the Barbarossa plan was the Battle of Smolensk, in which Soviet troops, despite heavy losses, stopped the enemy’s advance to the east.
In addition, due to the fact that the army groups launched attacks on divergent directions towards Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv, it was difficult to maintain cooperation between them. The German command had to carry out private operations to protect the flanks of the central attacking group. These operations, although successful, resulted in wasted time and resources for the motorized troops.
In addition, already in August the question of the priority of targets arose: Leningrad, Moscow or Rostov-on-Don. When these goals came into conflict, a crisis of command arose.
Army Group North failed to capture Leningrad.
Army Group "South" was unable to carry out deep envelopment with its left flank (6.17 A and 1 Tgr.) and destroy the main enemy troops in right-bank Ukraine on time and, as a result, the troops of the South-Western and Southern Fronts were able to retreat to the Dnieper and gain a foothold .
Subsequently, the turn of the main forces of Army Group Center away from Moscow led to a loss of time and strategic initiative.
In the fall of 1941, the German command tried to find a way out of the crisis in Operation Typhoon (Battle of Moscow).
The 1941 campaign ended with the defeat of German troops in the central sector of the Soviet-German front near Moscow, near Tikhvin on the northern flank and under
The Great Patriotic War
German attack plan on the USSR
Adolf Hitler studying a map of Russia
The Soviet-Finnish war served as a harsh lesson for the country's leadership, showing that our army, weakened by mass repressions, was not ready for a modern war. Stalin made the necessary conclusions and began to take measures to reorganize and re-equip the army. In the upper echelons of power there was complete confidence in the inevitability of war, and the task was to have time to prepare for it.
Hitler also understood our unpreparedness. In his inner circle, he said shortly before the attack that Germany had made a revolution in military affairs, ahead of other countries by three to four years; but all countries are catching up, and Germany may soon lose this advantage, and therefore it is necessary to solve the military problems on the continent in a year or two. Despite the fact that Germany and the USSR made peace in 1939, Hitler still decided to attack the Soviet Union, as it was a necessary step towards world domination by Germany and the “Third Reich”. German intelligence officers came to the conclusion that the Soviet army was in many ways inferior to the German one - it was less organized, less prepared and, most importantly, the technical equipment of Russian soldiers left much to be desired. It should be emphasized that the British intelligence service MI6 also played a role in inciting Hitler against the USSR. Before the war, the British managed to acquire the German Enigma encryption machine and thanks to this they read all the encrypted correspondence of the Germans. From Wehrmacht encryption they knew the exact timing of the attack on the USSR. But before Churchill sent a warning to Stalin, British intelligence tried to use the information they received to spark a German-Soviet conflict. She also owns a fake that was distributed in the United States - supposedly the Soviet Union, having received information about Hitler's impending attack, decided to get ahead of him and was itself preparing a preemptive strike on Germany. This disinformation was intercepted by Soviet intelligence and reported to Stalin. The widespread practice of fakes caused him to distrust all information about the imminent Nazi attack.
Plan Barbarossa
In June 1940, Hitler instructed Generals Marx and Paulus to develop a plan for an attack on the USSR. On December 18, 1940, the plan, codenamed Plan Barbarossa, was ready. The document was produced in only nine copies, of which three were presented to the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces, air force and navy, and six were hidden in the safes of the Wehrmacht command. Directive No. 21 contained only a general plan and initial instructions on waging war against the USSR.
The essence of the Barbarossa plan was to attack the USSR, taking advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness, defeat the Red Army and occupy the Soviet Union. Hitler placed the main emphasis on modern military equipment that belonged to Germany and the effect of surprise. The attack on the USSR was planned in the spring-summer of 1941, the final date of the attack was made dependent on the success of the German army in the Balkans. Setting a deadline for aggression, Hitler said: “I will not make the same mistake as Napoleon; when I go to Moscow, I will set out early enough to reach it before winter.” The generals convinced him that a victorious war would last no more than 4-6 weeks.
At the same time, Germany used the memorandum of November 25, 1940 to put pressure on those countries whose interests were affected by it, and above all on Bulgaria, which in March 1941 joined the fascist coalition. Soviet-German relations continued to deteriorate throughout the spring of 1941, especially with the invasion of Yugoslavia by German troops hours after the signing of the Soviet-Yugoslav Friendship Treaty. The USSR did not react to this aggression, as well as to the attack on Greece. At the same time, Soviet diplomacy managed to achieve a major success by signing a non-aggression pact with Japan on April 13, which significantly reduced tension on the Far Eastern borders of the USSR.
Tank group
Despite the alarming course of events, the USSR, until the very beginning of the war with Germany, could not believe in the inevitability of a German attack. Soviet supplies to Germany increased significantly due to the renewal of the 1940 economic agreements on January 11, 1941. In order to demonstrate its “trust” to Germany, the Soviet government refused to take into account the numerous reports received since the beginning of 1941 about an attack on the USSR being prepared and did not take the necessary measures on its western borders. Germany was still viewed by the Soviet Union "as a great friendly power."
According to the “Barbarossa Plan,” 153 German divisions were involved in aggression against the USSR. In addition, Finland, Italy, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary intended to participate in the upcoming war. Together they fielded another 37 divisions. The invasion force consisted of about 5 million soldiers, 4,275 aircraft, 3,700 tanks. The troops of Germany and its allies were united into 3 army groups: “North”, “Center”, “South”. Each group included 2-4 armies, 1-2 tank groups, and from the air German troops were supposed to cover 4 air fleets.
The most numerous was the army group "South" (Field Marshal von Rundstedt), consisting of German and Romanian soldiers. This group was tasked with defeating Soviet troops in Ukraine and Crimea and occupying these territories. Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Bock) was supposed to defeat Soviet troops in Belarus and advance to Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow. Army Group North (Field Marshal von Leeb), with the support of Finnish troops, was to capture the Baltic states, Leningrad, and the Russian North.
Discussion of the OST plan
The final goal of the “Barbaros plan” was the destruction of the Red Army, access to the Ural ridge and the occupation of the European part of the Soviet Union. The basis of German tactics was tank breakthroughs and encirclements. The Russian company was supposed to become a blitzkrieg - a lightning war. Only 2-3 weeks were allotted to defeat the Soviet troops located in the western regions of the USSR. General Jodl told Hitler: “In three weeks this house of cards will fall apart.” The entire campaign was planned to be completed in 2 months.
German troops received instructions to carry out a policy of genocide towards the Slavic and Jewish populations. According to the OST plan, the Nazis intended to destroy 30 million Slavs, and the rest were to be converted into slaves. The Crimean Tatars and the peoples of the Caucasus were considered as possible allies. The enemy army was an almost perfect military mechanism. The German soldier was rightfully considered the best in the world, the officers and generals were excellently trained, the troops had a wealth of experience in combat operations. The most significant drawback of the German army was the underestimation of the enemy’s forces - German generals considered it possible to wage war in several theaters at once: in Western Europe, in Eastern Europe, in Africa. Later, already during the Great Patriotic War, such miscalculations as lack of fuel and unpreparedness for combat operations in winter conditions would take their toll.
Gabriel Tsobekhia
Plan "Ost" About the Nazi program of extermination of entire nationsAbout the Nazi program of extermination of entire nations
Alexander Pronin
A truly cannibalistic document of Nazi Germany was the Ost general plan - a plan for the enslavement and destruction of the peoples of the USSR, the Jewish and Slavic population of the conquered territories.
An idea of how the Nazi elite saw the waging of a war of destruction can be gained from Hitler’s speeches to the highest command of the Wehrmacht on January 9, March 17 and March 30, 1941. The Fuhrer stated that a war against the USSR would be “the complete opposite of normal war in the West and Northern Europe,” it provides for “total destruction,” “the destruction of Russia as a state.” Trying to provide an ideological basis for these criminal plans, Hitler announced that the upcoming war against the USSR would be a “struggle of two ideologies” with “the use of brutal violence”, that in this war it would be necessary to defeat not only the Red Army, but also the “control mechanism” of the USSR, “ destroy the commissars and communist intelligentsia,” functionaries and in this way destroy the “worldview bonds” of the Russian people.
On April 28, 1941, Brauchitsch issued a special order “Procedure for the use of security police and SD in ground forces formations.” According to it, Wehrmacht soldiers and officers were relieved of responsibility for future crimes in the occupied territory of the USSR. They were ordered to be ruthless, to shoot on the spot without trial or investigation anyone who offered even the slightest resistance or showed sympathy for the partisans.
The citizens were destined for either exile to Siberia without means of subsistence, or the fate of slaves of the Aryan masters. The justification for these goals was the racist views of the Nazi leadership, contempt for the Slavs and other “subhuman” peoples who interfere with ensuring the “existence and reproduction of the superior race” allegedly due to its catastrophic lack of “living space”.
“Racial theory” and “theory of living space” originated in Germany long before the Nazis came to power, but only under them acquired the status of a state ideology that covered large sections of the population.
The war against the USSR was considered by the Nazi elite primarily as a war against the Slavic peoples. In a conversation with the President of the Danzig Senate, H. Rauschning, Hitler explained: “One of the main tasks of German government is to forever prevent by all possible means the development of the Slavic races. The natural instincts of all living beings tell us not only the need to defeat our enemies, but also to destroy them.” Other leaders of Nazi Germany adhered to a similar attitude, primarily one of Hitler’s closest accomplices, Reichsführer SS G. Himmler, who on October 7, 1939 simultaneously took the post of “Reich Commissioner for Strengthening the German Race.” Hitler instructed him to deal with the issues of “returning” Imperial Germans and Volksdeutsche from other countries and creating new settlements as the German “living space in the East” expanded during the war. Himmler played a leading role in deciding the future that the population in Soviet territory up to the Urals should expect after the German victory.
Hitler, who throughout his political career advocated the dismemberment of the USSR, on July 16, at a meeting at his headquarters with the participation of Goering, Rosenberg, Lammers, Bormann and Keitel, defined the tasks of National Socialist policy in Russia: “The main principle is that so that this pie can be divided in the most convenient way, so that we can: firstly, own it, secondly, manage it and, thirdly, exploit it.” At the same meeting, Hitler announced that after the defeat of the USSR, the territory of the Third Reich should be expanded in the east at least to the Urals. He stated: “The entire Baltic region should become a region of the empire, Crimea with the adjacent regions, the Volga regions should become a region of the empire in the same way as the Baku region.”
At a meeting of the Wehrmacht high command held on July 31, 1940, dedicated to preparing an attack on the USSR, Hitler again stated: “Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states are for us.” He then intended to transfer the northwestern regions of Russia up to Arkhangelsk to Finland.
On May 25, 1940, Himmler prepared and presented to Hitler his “Some Considerations on the Treatment of the Local Population of the Eastern Regions.” He wrote: “We are extremely interested in under no circumstances uniting the peoples of the eastern regions, but, on the contrary, splitting them into the smallest possible branches and groups.”
A secret document initiated by Himmler called General Plan Ost was presented to him on July 15. The plan provided for the destruction and deportation of 80-85% of the population from Poland, 85% from Lithuania, 65% from Western Ukraine, 75% from Belarus and 50% of residents from Latvia, Estonia and the Czech Republic within 25-30 years.
45 million people lived in the area subject to German colonization. At least 31 million of them who would be declared “undesirable by racial indicators” were supposed to be evicted to Siberia, and immediately after the defeat of the USSR, up to 840 thousand Germans were to be resettled in the liberated territories. Over the next two to three decades, two more waves of settlers were planned, numbering 1.1 and 2.6 million people. In September 1941, Hitler stated that in the Soviet lands, which should become “provinces of the Reich,” it is necessary to carry out a “planned racial policy,” sending there and allocating lands not only to the Germans, but also to “Norwegians related to them by language and blood.” , Swedes, Danes and Dutch." “When settling the Russian space,” he said, “we must provide the imperial peasants with unusually luxurious housing. German institutions should be housed in magnificent buildings - governor's palaces. Around them they will grow everything necessary for the life of the Germans. Around the cities, within a radius of 30-40 km, there will be German villages that are striking in their beauty, connected by the best roads. There will be another world in which Russians will be allowed to live as they please. But on one condition: we will be masters. In the event of a rebellion, all we have to do is drop a couple of bombs on their cities, and the job is done. And once a year we will take a group of Kyrgyz people through the capital of the Reich, so that they become aware of the power and grandeur of its architectural monuments. The eastern spaces will become for us what India was for England.” After the defeat near Moscow, Hitler consoled his interlocutors: “Losses will be restored to a volume many times greater than theirs in the settlements for purebred Germans that I will create in the East... The right to land, according to the eternal law of nature, belongs to the one who conquered it, based on the fact that the old borders are holding back the growth of the population. And the fact that we have children who want to live justifies our claims to the newly conquered eastern territories.” Continuing this thought, Hitler said: “In the East there is iron, coal, wheat, wood. We will build luxurious houses and roads, and those who grow up there will love their homeland and one day, like the Volga Germans, will forever link their destiny with it.”
The Nazis had special plans for the Russian people. One of the developers of the Ost master plan, Dr. E. Vetzel, a referent on racial issues in the Eastern Ministry of Rosenberg, prepared a document for Himmler in which it was stated that “without complete destruction” or weakening by any means “the biological strength of the Russian people” to establish “German domination in Europe” will not succeed.
“This is not only about the defeat of a state centered in Moscow,” he wrote. - Achieving this historical goal would never mean a complete solution to the problem. The point, most likely, is to defeat the Russians as a people, to divide them.”
Hitler's deep hostility towards the Slavs is evidenced by the recordings of his table conversations, which from June 21, 1941 to July 1942 were conducted first by ministerial adviser G. Geim, and then by Dr. G. Picker; as well as notes on the goals and methods of occupation policy on the territory of the USSR, made by the representative of the Eastern Ministry at Hitler’s headquarters, W. Keppen, from September 6 to November 7, 1941. After Hitler’s trip to Ukraine in September 1941, Keppen records conversations at Headquarters: “At An entire block of Kiev burned down, but quite a large number of people still live in the city. They make a very bad impression, outwardly they resemble proletarians, and therefore their numbers should be reduced by 80-90%. The Fuhrer immediately supported the proposal of the Reichsfuehrer (H. Himmler) to confiscate the ancient Russian monastery located near Kyiv, so that it would not turn into a center for the revival of the Orthodox faith and national spirit.” Both Russians, Ukrainians, and Slavs in general, according to Hitler, belonged to a race unworthy of humane treatment and the expense of education.
After a conversation with Hitler on July 8, 1941, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General F. Halder, writes in his diary: “The Fuhrer’s decision to raze Moscow and Leningrad to the ground is unshakable in order to completely get rid of the population of these cities, which otherwise we will then forced to feed during the winter. The task of destroying these cities must be carried out by aviation. Tanks should not be used for this. This will be a national disaster that will deprive not only Bolshevism of centers, but also Muscovites (Russians) in general.” Köppen specifies Halder’s conversation with Hitler, dedicated to the destruction of the population of Leningrad, as follows: “The city will only need to be encircled, subjected to artillery fire and starved to death...”.
Assessing the situation at the front, on October 9, Koeppen writes: “The Fuhrer gave an order to prohibit German soldiers from entering the territory of Moscow. The city will be surrounded and wiped off the face of the earth.” The corresponding order was signed on October 7 and confirmed by the main command of the ground forces in the “Instruction on the procedure for the capture of Moscow and the treatment of its population” dated October 12, 1941.
The instructions emphasized that “it would be completely irresponsible to risk the lives of German soldiers to save Russian cities from fires or to feed their population at the expense of Germany.” German troops were ordered to apply similar tactics to all Soviet cities, while it was explained that “the more the population of Soviet cities rushes into internal Russia, the more chaos in Russia will increase and the easier it will be to control and use the occupied eastern regions.” In an entry dated October 17, Koeppen also notes that Hitler made it clear to the generals that after the victory he intended to save only a few Russian cities.
Trying to divide the population of the occupied territories in areas where Soviet power was established only in 1939-1940. (Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Baltic states), the fascists established close contacts with the nationalists.
To stimulate them, it was decided to allow “local self-government”. However, the restoration of their own statehood to the peoples of the Baltic states and Belarus was denied. When, following the entry of German troops into Lithuania, nationalists, without the sanction of Berlin, created a government headed by Colonel K. Skirpa, the German leadership refused to recognize it, saying that the issue of forming a government in Vilna would be decided only after victory in the war. Berlin did not allow the idea of restoring statehood in the Baltic republics and Belarus, resolutely rejecting requests from “racially inferior” collaborators to create their own armed forces and other attributes of power. At the same time, the Wehrmacht leadership willingly used them to form volunteer foreign units, which, under the command of German officers, participated in combat operations against partisans and at the front. They also served as burgomasters, village elders, in auxiliary police units, etc.
In the Reichskommissariat “Ukraine”, from which a significant part of the territory was torn away, included in Transnistria and the General Government in Poland, any attempts by nationalists not only to revive statehood, but also to create “Ukrainian self-government in a politically expedient form” were suppressed "
When preparing an attack on the USSR, the Nazi leadership attached paramount importance to the development of plans for using the Soviet economic potential in the interests of ensuring the conquest of world domination. At a meeting with the Wehrmacht command on January 9, 1941, Hitler said that if Germany “gets into its hands the incalculable riches of the vast Russian territories,” then “in the future it will be able to fight against any continents.”
In March 1941, for the exploitation of the occupied territory of the USSR, a paramilitary state-monopoly organization was created in Berlin - the Headquarters of the Economic Management “Vostok”. It was headed by two old associates of Hitler: Deputy G. Goering, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Hermann Goering concern, Secretary of State P. Kerner and Head of the Department of War Industry and Armament of the OKW, Lieutenant General G. Thomas. In addition to the “leadership group”, which also dealt with the workforce, the headquarters included groups of industry, agriculture, organization of enterprises and forestry. From the very beginning, it was dominated by representatives of German concerns: Mansfeld, Krupp, Zeiss, Flick, I. G. Farben." On October 15, 1941, excluding the economic commands in the Baltic states and the corresponding specialists in the army, the headquarters numbered about 10, and by the end of the year - 11 thousand people.
The plans of the German leadership for the exploitation of Soviet industry were set out in the “Directives for Management in the Newly Occupied Areas,” which received the name Goering’s “Green Folder” based on the color of the binding.
The directives provided for organizing on the territory of the USSR the extraction and export to Germany of those types of raw materials that were important for the functioning of the German military economy, and for restoring a number of factories for the purpose of repairing Wehrmacht equipment and producing certain types of weapons.
Most of the Soviet enterprises producing civilian products were planned to be destroyed. Goering and representatives of military-industrial concerns showed particular interest in the seizure of Soviet oil-bearing regions. In March 1941, an oil company was founded under the name Continental A.G., the chairmen of which were E. Fischer from the IG Farben concern and K. Blessing, a former director of the Reichsbank.
The general instructions of the organization “East” dated May 23, 1941 on economic policy in the field of agriculture stated that the goal of the military campaign against the USSR was “supplying the German armed forces, as well as providing food for the German civilian population for many years.” It was planned to realize this goal by “reducing Russia’s own consumption” by cutting off the supply of products from the southern black earth regions to the northern non-black earth zone, including to such industrial centers as Moscow and Leningrad. Those who prepared these instructions were well aware that this would lead to the starvation of millions of Soviet citizens. At one of the meetings of the Vostok headquarters it was said: “If we manage to pump everything we need out of the country, then tens of millions of people will be doomed to starvation.”
Economic inspectorates operating in the operational rear of German troops on the Eastern Front, economic departments in the rear of armies, including technical battalions of specialists in the mining and oil industries, units engaged in the seizure of raw materials, agricultural products and tools of production. Economic teams were created in divisions, economic groups - in field commandant's offices. In the units that exported raw materials and controlled the work of captured enterprises, specialists from German concerns were advisors. To the Commissioner for Scrap Metal, Captain B.-G. Shu and the inspector general for the seizure of raw materials, V. Witting, were ordered to hand over the trophies to the military concerns of Flick and I. G. Farben."
Germany's satellites also counted on rich booty for complicity in aggression.
The ruling elite of Romania, led by dictator I. Antonescu, intended not only to return Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which it had to cede to the USSR in the summer of 1940, but also to obtain a significant part of the territory of Ukraine.
In Budapest, for participation in the attack on the USSR, they dreamed of getting the former Eastern Galicia, including the oil-bearing areas in Drohobych, as well as all of Transylvania.
In a keynote speech at a meeting of SS leaders on October 2, 1941, the head of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security, R. Heydrich, stated that after the war, Europe would be divided into a “German great space”, where the German population would live - Germans, Dutch, Flemings, Norwegians, Danes both the Swedes and the “eastern space”, which will become a raw material base for the German state and where the “German upper class” will use the conquered local population as “helots”, that is, slaves. G. Himmler had a different opinion on this matter. He was not satisfied with the policy of Germanization of the population of the occupied territories pursued by Kaiser Germany. He considered it erroneous that the old authorities were trying to force the conquered peoples to renounce only their native language, national culture, lead a German way of life and obey German laws.
In the SS newspaper “Das Schwarze Kor” dated August 20, 1942, in the article “Should we Germanize?”, Himmler wrote: “Our task is not to Germanize the East in the old sense of the word, that is, to instill in the population the German language and German laws , but to ensure that only people of truly German, Germanic blood live in the East.”
The achievement of this goal was served by the mass extermination of civilians and prisoners of war, which occurred from the very beginning of the invasion of German troops into the territory of the USSR. Simultaneously with the Barbarossa plan, the OKH order of April 28, 1941 “Procedure for the use of security police and SD in ground forces formations” came into force. In accordance with this order, the main role in the mass extermination of communists, Komsomol members, deputies of regional, city, district and village councils, Soviet intelligentsia and Jews in the occupied territory was played by four punitive units, the so-called Einsatzgruppen, designated by letters of the Latin alphabet A, B, C, D. Einsatzgruppe A was assigned to Army Group North and operated in the Baltic republics (led by SS Brigade-Denführer W. Stahlecker). Einsatzgruppe B in Belarus (headed by the head of the 5th Directorate of the RSHA, SS Gruppenführer A. Nebe) was assigned to Army Group Center. Einsatzgruppe C (Ukraine, chief - SS Brigadeführer O. Rasch, inspector of the Security Police and SD in Königsberg) “served” Army Group South. Einsatzgruppe D, attached to the 2nd Army, operated in the southern part of Ukraine and Crimea. It was commanded by O. Ohlendorf, head of the 3rd Directorate of the RSHA (domestic security service) and at the same time the chief manager of the Imperial Trade Group. In addition, in the operational rear of the German formations advancing on Moscow, the punitive team “Moscow”, led by SS Brigadefuehrer F.-A., operated. Zix, head of the 7th Directorate of the RSHA (worldview research and its use). Each Einsatzgruppen consisted of 800 to 1,200 personnel (SS, SD, criminal police, Gestapo and order police) under the jurisdiction of the SS. Following on the heels of the advancing German troops, by mid-November 1941, the Einsatzgroups of armies “North”, “Center” and “South” exterminated more than 300 thousand civilians in the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine. They were engaged in mass murders and robbery until the end of 1942. According to the most conservative estimates, they accounted for over a million victims. Then the Einsatzgruppen were formally liquidated, becoming part of the rear forces.
In development of the “Order on Commissars”, the Wehrmacht High Command entered into an agreement on July 16, 1941 with the Main Directorate of Reich Security, according to which special teams of the Security Police and SD under the auspices of the head of the 4th Main Directorate of the Secret State Police (Gestapo) G Müller were obliged to identify politically and racially “unacceptable” “elements” among the Soviet prisoners of war delivered from the front to stationary camps.
Not only party workers of all ranks, but also “all representatives of the intelligentsia, all fanatical communists and all Jews” were considered “unacceptable.”
It was emphasized that the use of weapons against Soviet prisoners of war is considered “as a rule, legal.” Such a phrase meant official permission to kill. In May 1942, the OKW was forced to cancel this order at the request of some high-ranking front-line soldiers, who reported that the publication of the facts of the execution of the lieutenants led to a sharp increase in the strength of resistance from the Red Army. From now on, political instructors began to be destroyed not immediately after captivity, but in the Mauthausen concentration camp.
After the defeat of the USSR, it was planned “within the shortest possible time” to create and populate three imperial districts: the Ingria district (Leningrad, Pskov and Novgorod regions), the Gothic district (Crimea and Kherson region) and the Memel-Narev district (Bialystok region and Western Lithuania). To ensure connections between Germany and the Ingermanland and Gotha districts, it was planned to build two highways, each with a length of up to 2 thousand km. One would reach Leningrad, the other would reach the Crimean Peninsula. To secure the highways, it was planned to create 36 paramilitary German settlements (strong points) along them: 14 in Poland, 8 in Ukraine and 14 in the Baltic states. It was proposed to declare the entire territory in the East that would be captured by the Wehrmach as state property, transferring power over it to the SS administrative apparatus headed by Himmler, who would personally resolve issues related to granting German settlers the rights to own land. According to Nazi scientists, it would have taken 25 years and up to 66.6 billion Reichsmarks to build highways, accommodate 4.85 million Germans in three districts and settle them down.
Having approved this project in principle, Himmler demanded that it provide for the “total Germanization of Estonia, Latvia and the General Government”: their settlement by Germans within about 20 years. In September 1942, when German troops reached Stalingrad and the foothills of the Caucasus, at a meeting with SS commanders in Zhitomir, Himmler announced that the network of German strongholds (military settlements) would be expanded to the Don and Volga.
The second “General Plan of Settlement”, taking into account Himmler’s wishes to finalize the April version, was ready on December 23, 1942. The main directions of colonization in it were named northern (East Prussia - Baltic countries) and southern (Krakow - Lviv - Black Sea region). It was assumed that the territory of German settlements would be 700 thousand square meters. km, of which 350 thousand are arable lands (the entire territory of the Reich in 1938 was less than 600 thousand sq. km).
The “General Plan Ost” provided for the physical extermination of the entire Jewish population of Europe, the mass murder of Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Hungarians, and the physical extermination of 25-30 million Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians.
L. Bezymensky, calling the Ost plan a “cannibal document”, “a plan for the liquidation of the Slavs in Russia,” argued: “One should not be deceived by the term “eviction”: this was a familiar designation for the Nazis for killing people.”
“The General Plan Ost” belongs to history - the history of the forced relocation of individuals and entire nations,” said the report of the modern German researcher Dietrich Achholz at a joint meeting of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and the Christian Peace Conference “Munich Agreements - General Plan Ost - Benes Decrees. Causes of flight and forced relocation in Eastern Europe” in Berlin on May 15, 2004 - This story is as old as the history of humanity itself. But Plan Ost opened up a new dimension of fear. It represented a carefully planned genocide of races and peoples, and this in the industrialized era of the mid-20th century!” We are not talking here about the struggle for pastures and hunting grounds, for livestock and women, as in ancient times. The Ost master plan, under the guise of a misanthropic, atavistic racial ideology, was about profits for big capital, fertile lands for large landowners, wealthy peasants and generals, and profits for countless petty Nazi criminals and hangers-on. “The murderers themselves, who, as part of the SS task forces, in countless units of the Wehrmacht and in key positions of the occupation bureaucracy, brought death and fires to the occupied territories, only a small part of them were punished for their actions,” stated D. Achholz. “Tens of thousands of them “dissolved” and could some time later, after the war, lead a “normal” life in West Germany or somewhere else, for the most part avoiding persecution or at least censure.”
As an example, the researcher cited the fate of the leading SS scientist and expert Himmler, who developed the most important versions of the Ost master plan.” He stood out among those dozens, even hundreds of scientists - Earth researchers of various specializations, specialists in territorial and demographic planners, racial ideologists and eugenics specialists, ethnologists and anthropologists, biologists and doctors, economists and historians - who supplied data to the killers of entire nations for their bloody work. “It was this “master plan Ost” of May 28, 1942 that was one of the high-quality products of such killers at their desks,” the speaker notes. It was indeed, as the Czech historian Miroslav Karni wrote, a plan “in which the scholarship, advanced technical methods of scientific work, ingenuity and vanity of the leading scientists of Nazi Germany were invested,” a plan “that turned the criminal phantasmagoria of Hitler and Himmler into a fully developed system, thought out down to the smallest detail, calculated down to the last mark.”
The author responsible for this plan, full professor and head of the Institute of Agronomy and Agricultural Policy at the University of Berlin, Konrad Meyer, called Meyer-Hetling, was an exemplary example of such a scientist. Himmler made him head of the "main staff service for planning and land holdings" in his "Imperial Commissariat for the Strengthening of the Spirit of the German Nation" and first as a Standarten and later as an SS Oberführer (corresponding to the rank of colonel). In addition, as a leading land planner in the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture, who was recognized by the Reichsfuehrer of Agriculture and the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Regions, in 1942 Meyer was promoted to the position of chief planner for the development of all areas subject to Germany.
From the beginning of the war, Meyer knew in every detail about all the planned abominations; Moreover, he himself drew up decisive conclusions and plans for this. In the annexed Polish regions, as he officially announced already in 1940, it was assumed “that the entire Jewish population of this region, numbering 560 thousand people, had already been evacuated and, accordingly, would leave the region during this winter” (that is, they would be imprisoned in concentration camps, where will undergo systematic destruction).
In order to populate the annexed areas with at least 4.5 million Germans (until now 1.1 million people had permanently lived there), it was necessary to “expel 3.4 million Poles train by train.”
Meyer died peacefully in 1973 at the age of 72 as a retired West German professor. The scandal surrounding this Nazi killer began after the war with his participation in the Nuremberg war crimes trials. He was indicted along with other SS ranks in the case of the so-called General Office for Race and Resettlement, sentenced by a United States court to a minor punishment only for membership in the SS and released in 1948. Although in the verdict the American judges agreed that he, as a senior SS officer and a person who worked closely with Himmler, should have “known” about the criminal activities of the SS, they confirmed that there was “nothing aggravating” for him under the “Ost General Plan” it cannot be argued that he “knew nothing about evacuations and other radical measures”, and that this plan “was never put into practice” anyway. “The prosecution representative really could not present undeniable evidence at that time, since the sources, especially the “master plan” of 1942, had not yet been discovered,” D. Achholz notes bitterly.
And the court even then made decisions in the spirit of the Cold War, which meant the release of “honest” Nazi criminals and potential future allies, and did not think at all about attracting Polish and Soviet experts as witnesses.”
As for the extent to which the Ost master plan was implemented or not, the example of Belarus clearly demonstrates. The Extraordinary State Commission to reveal the crimes of the invaders determined that only the direct losses of this republic during the war years amounted to 75 billion rubles. in 1941 prices. The most painful and severe loss for Belarus was the extermination of over 2.2 million people. Hundreds of villages and hamlets were deserted, and the urban population sharply decreased. In Minsk at the time of liberation, less than 40% of the population remained, in the Mogilev region - only 35% of the urban population, Polesie - 29, Vitebsk - 27, Gomel - 18%. The occupiers burned and destroyed 209 of 270 cities and regional centers, 9,200 villages and hamlets. 100,465 enterprises were destroyed, more than 6 thousand km of railway, 10 thousand collective farms, 92 state farms and MTS were plundered, 420,996 collective farmers' houses, almost all power plants were destroyed. 90% of machine tools and technical equipment, about 96% of energy capacity, about 18.5 thousand vehicles, more than 9 thousand tractors and tractors, thousands of cubic meters of wood, lumber were exported to Germany, hundreds of hectares of forests, gardens, etc. were cut down. By the summer of 1944, only 39% of the pre-war number of horses, 31% of cattle, 11% of pigs, 22% of sheep and goats remained in Belarus. The enemy destroyed thousands of educational, health, scientific and cultural institutions, including 8825 schools, the Academy of Sciences of the BSSR, 219 libraries, 5425 museums, theaters and clubs, 2187 hospitals and outpatient clinics, 2651 children's institutions.
Thus, the cannibalistic plan for the extermination of millions of people, the destruction of the entire material and spiritual potential of the conquered Slavic states, which in fact was the Ost master plan, was carried out by the Nazis consistently and persistently. And all the more majestic, grandiose is the immortal feat of the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, partisans and underground fighters, who did not spare their lives to rid Europe and the world of the brown plague.
Contrary to German expectations, Britain was not prepared to enter into peace negotiations even after the defeat of France in June 1940. Since German air raids did not bring the expected result, and an attack on an island state seemed too risky, the German strategic concept had to be changed. Preference was given to the final goal of the war - the destruction of the Soviet Union and the achievement of colonial rule over all of Eastern Europe, thereby achieving victory over Great Britain.
After various preliminary studies, on December 18, 1940, Hitler gave instructions to prepare an attack on the Soviet Union (“Plan Barbarossa”). Only a small part of the German military and diplomats warned Hitler against this war, while the majority agreed with his goals and hoped for a quick victory. The optimistic authors of the plan intended to use a “lightning war” to achieve the intended goal, the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line within eight, and the more cautious ones - within sixteen weeks. The military formations intended to attack the Soviet Union numbered 3.3 million soldiers, which was approximately the same as their number in the war against France. True, they were better equipped and more experienced militarily. These included Allied troops (Romania, Finland) numbering about 600,000 people. After speaking with Hitler about a week before the attack, Goebbels expressed everyone's anticipation of victory: "We are facing an unprecedented victorious campaign."
When preparing the “war of worldviews” against the Soviet Union, something more than military-technical planning was in mind. At a meeting of the command staff on March 30, 1941, Hitler left no doubt that we were talking about a “struggle of annihilation.” “The fight will be very different from the fight in the West. Cruelty in the East is soft for the future.” Accordingly, military directives (General Hoepner's Fourth Panzer Group) stated that the war against Russia must be waged "with unheard-of cruelty." Already in March 1941, the Wehrmacht High Command announced its agreement that the Reichsführer SS would “independently and under personal responsibility” carry out “special tasks of the Fuhrer” in the area of combat operations of the ground forces. For actions against “enemy civilians,” the decree on the conduct of military proceedings of May 13, 1941 stated, “there will be no mandatory prosecution, even if the act constitutes a war crime or misdemeanor.” The “Order on Commissars” dated June 6, 1941 authorized the extermination of political workers of the Soviet Army. The plans for economic activity and food supply in the occupied areas foresaw starvation for many millions of people: “In this case, tens of millions of people will undoubtedly starve” (meeting of secretaries of state on May 2, 1941). “Several tens of millions of people in this territory will become redundant and will die or be forced to move to Siberia.” (“Economic Headquarters Ost” dated May 23, 1941).
The Soviet leadership had reliable information about the German attack at the latest in May 1941. But the Red Army was not ready for war: neither its personnel nor organizationally. Apparently, the Soviet leadership was unable to make a clear decision: although the troops were pulled up to the borders, they were not able to launch a counterattack and did not have a realistic defensive concept.
Text 25
Entries from the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Halder, dated March 30, 1941, regarding the goals of the war against the Soviet Union and its conduct.
War of two worldviews. A devastating verdict on Bolshevism as an antisocial collection of criminals. Communism is a terrible danger for the future. We must abandon the idea of soldier camaraderie. The communist was not and never will be a comrade. We are talking about a fight of destruction. If we do not accept this, then although we defeat the enemy, in 30 years we will again be confronted by the communist enemy. We are not waging war to mothball the enemy. Future picture of the state: Northern Russia belongs to Finland. Protectorates - the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Belarus. The fight against Russia: the destruction of the Bolshevik commissars and the Bolshevik intelligentsia. [...] The struggle must be waged in order to destroy the poison of decay. This is not a question of military courts. Troop leaders must know what we are talking about. They must lead the fight. Troops must defend themselves with the same means with which they are attacked. Commissars and GPU officers are criminals, and they must be dealt with accordingly.
Therefore, troops should not leave the authority of their leaders. The leader must take his orders in accordance with the mood in the troops. The fight will be very different from the fight in the West. In the East, cruelty is soft for the future. Leaders must demand self-sacrifice from themselves and overcome their doubts.
Text 26
Directives of the Wehrmacht High Command of March 13, 1941 regarding the administration of the occupied areas and cooperation with the SS.
2) [...]
B) in the area of operations of the ground forces, the Reichsfuehrer SS receives special assignments from the Fuhrer for the preparation of political control, which arise from the struggle of two opposing political systems, waged to a victorious end. Within the framework of these tasks, the Reichsführer SS acts independently and on his own responsibility. Otherwise, the administrative power transferred to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and the services authorized by him does not require intervention. The Reichsführer SS ensures that the execution of his tasks does not interfere with military operations. This is regulated in more detail directly by the High Command of the troops and the Reichsfuehrer SS. [...]
Chief of the Supreme
Wehrmacht command
Keitel
31 Hitler in the Reich Chancellery with representatives of the generals after being awarded the rank of Field Marshal for the victory over France, September 1940. From left to right: Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht Keitel, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group A von Rundt-Stadt, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group B von Bock, Reichsmarshal Goering , Hitler, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Z Ritter von Leeb, Commander of the 12th Army General List, Commander of the 4th Army von Kluge, Commander of the 1st Army General Witzleben, Commander of the 6th Army General von Reichenau.
32 General Staff Meeting (1940). Participants in the meeting at the table with a map (from left to right): Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal Keitel, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel General von Brauchitsch, Hitler, Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Halder.
Text 27
Information about the meeting of secretaries of state on May 2, 1941 on the economic goals of the war against the Soviet Union.
The location of the meeting is unknown, there is no list of participants. It is precisely known that those present were: Reichsmarshal Goering, head of the “Staff for Economic Management Ost”; General Thomas, head of the military-economic and military-industrial department of the Wehrmacht; Lieutenant General Schubert, chief of the “Economic Staff of the East”; Secretaries of State Körner (Four Year Plan Office), Bake (Ministry of Food), von Hanneken (Ministry of Economics), Alpers (Ministry of Forestry). Presumably present were Rosenberg, the future Minister of the Occupied Eastern Territories, and General Jodl from the Wehrmacht High Command.
An internal memo on the results of today's meeting with secretaries of state about the “Barbarossa Plan”.
1) The war should be continued only if the entire Wehrmacht in the third year of the war is supplied with food from Russia.
2) At the same time, tens of millions of people will undoubtedly starve if we take everything we need out of the country.
3) The most important thing is the preservation and transportation of oilseeds, oilseed cakes and only then grain. Available fats and meat are intended to supply troops.
4) The functioning of industry should be restored only in some areas, in particular: enterprises producing vehicles, enterprises producing general-purpose products (iron, etc.), textile enterprises, and from enterprises producing weapons only such profiles as in Germany is not enough. Opening repair shops for troops in large numbers.
5) To provide deep areas far from highways, special troops must be prepared; the RAD (Reich Workers' Service) or auxiliary army formations can be used. It is necessary to identify particularly important areas that require protection.
33 Reichsmarshal Goering in conversation with Secretary of State Herbert Backe (undated).
Text 28
Excerpt from the directive of the economic headquarters of the Ost, agricultural group, dated May 23, 1941 regarding the separation of Russian industrial centers from grain zones.
It follows from this: the allocation of black earth areas should ensure for us, under any circumstances, the presence of more or less significant surpluses in these areas. As a consequence, the supply of the entire forest zone, including large industrial centers - Moscow and St. Petersburg, will be cut off. [...] From all this it follows that the German administration in this area must devote all its efforts to mitigating the consequences of the undoubtedly likely famine and speeding up the process of naturalization. It is necessary to strive for more intensive economic development of these areas in the sense of expanding the acreage under potatoes and other high-yield crops that are important for consumption. But this will not eliminate hunger. Several tens of millions of people in this territory will become redundant and will die or be forced to move to Siberia. Attempts to save this population from starvation by sending there surpluses from the black earth zone can only be carried out at the expense of deteriorating supplies to Europe. They could undermine Germany's ability to hold out in the war and weaken the blockade strength of Germany and Europe. There must be absolute clarity on this issue.
Text 29
Decree of Hitler as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht of May 13, 1941 on military proceedings in the war with the Soviet Union.
In the original text, the words “plan Barbarossa”, the previous designation during development, are crossed out.
Fuhrer and Supreme
Commander-in-Chief
Wehrmacht
Fuhrer's headquarters
May 13, 1941
Decree
on the conduct of military proceedings
and about special actions of troops. The military proceedings of the Wehrmacht serve primarily to maintain discipline.
The wide extent of the zone of combat operations in the East, the form of warfare and the characteristics of the enemy pose tasks for military courts, which during military operations, up to consolidation in the occupied areas, can be solved with their small number of personnel only if the legal proceedings are limited to the main task . [...]
Consideration of criminal cases against representatives of the Wehrmacht and civilians for their actions against the local population.
1. There will be no mandatory prosecution for acts against enemy civilians committed by members of the Wehrmacht and civilians, even if the act constitutes a war crime or misdemeanor.
2. In considering such actions, it must be borne in mind that the defeat of 1918, the subsequent period of suffering of the German people and the struggle against National Socialism with countless bloody victims of the movement are largely due to Bolshevik influence, and no German has forgotten this.
3. The judge decides whether disciplinary action should be imposed in such cases or whether a trial is necessary. The judge orders the prosecution of acts against local residents in military courts only when it comes to non-compliance with military discipline or a threat to the safety of troops. This applies, for example, to serious offenses based on sexual promiscuity, predisposition to crime, or to signs indicating the savagery of troops. Criminal actions resulting in the senseless destruction of military locations, as well as supplies or other spoils of war to the detriment of friendly troops are subject to strict condemnation.
[...]
On behalf of the head of the Supreme
Wehrmacht command signed by Keitel
Text 30
Instruction from the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Food Herbert Backe to district agricultural managers dated June 1, 1941 on behavior towards Russians in occupied territory.
La V.No. 52/41 Kdos Secret!
12 requirements
to the behavior of the Germans in the East and the treatment of the Russians. [...]
Don't talk, act. You will never be able to “talk” Russians or convince them with speeches. He can speak better than you, since he is a born dialectician and has inherited “philosophizing.” In conversations and debates, you will be the loser. You should take action. The Russian is only impressed by action, because he himself is effeminate and sentimental.
[...] Russians only want to be a controlled mass. The arrival of the Germans will have such an effect on them, for thereby their own desire will be fulfilled: “Come and rule over us.” Therefore, the Russian should not get the impression that you are hesitating. You must be a man of action, a man of action who, without debate, without long useless conversations and without philosophizing, determines what needs to be done and clearly gives orders. Then the Russian will obediently serve you. Do not approach with German standards and customs, forget everything German except Germany itself. [...]
Need, hunger, contentment with little is the lot of Russian people for centuries. His stomach is stretchable, so no false sympathy. Don't try to impose the German standard of living and change the Russian way of life.
Rely completely on yourself, so no complaints or requests for help from higher-ups. Help yourself, and may God help you!
Text 31
Order of the Wehrmacht High Command dated June 6, 1941 regarding the treatment of political commissars of the Soviet Army.
The order (“Order on Commissars”) was signed by the head of the Wehrmacht High Command, Field Marshal General Keitel.
Appendix to VKV/V Dept.L 4/Ku No. 44822/41 city manager.
Basic guidelines for the treatment of political commissars.
In the fight against Bolshevism, one cannot build relations with the enemy on the principles of humanism and international law. It is precisely from political commissars of all ranks, as bearers of resistance, that we should expect hatred, cruel and inhumane treatment of our prisoners.
Troops must be aware of the following:
1) In this war, mercy and compliance with international legal norms in relation to these elements are inappropriate. They pose a threat to our security and to the rapid pacification of the occupied areas.
2) Political commissars are the initiators of barbaric Asian methods of struggle. Therefore, it is necessary to fight them without condescension, with all mercilessness. Therefore, if they are captured in battle or while offering resistance, it is necessary to deal with them using weapons.
Otherwise, you need to do the following: [...]
2) Political commissars, as members of enemy forces, have a special insignia - a red star with an embroidered sickle and hammer on the sleeve (for details, see “Armed Forces of the USSR” of the Department of Foreign Armies dated January 15, 1941 in Appendix 9d). They should be done immediately, i.e. still on the battlefield to separate from other prisoners of war. This is necessary to deprive them of any possibility of influence on the captured soldiers. These commissars are not considered soldiers; they are not subject to international legal protection for prisoners of war. Once separated from prisoners of war, they should be destroyed. [...]
34 Plan of attack of the German Wehrmacht on the Soviet Union, June 1941.
Text 32
Excerpt from the diary of Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels dated June 16, 1941 regarding the attack on the Soviet Union.
The Fuhrer believes that the action will last about 4 months, I think less. Bolshevism will collapse like a house of cards. We are facing an unprecedented victorious campaign. We need to act. [...] Cooperation with Russia was actually a stain on our honor. Now it will be washed away. What we have fought against all our lives will now be destroyed. I say this to the Fuhrer, and he completely agrees with me. I must say a good word about Rosenberg, whose life's work is once again vindicated by this action. The Fuhrer says: whether we are right or wrong, we must win. This is the only way. And he is correct, moral and necessary. And if we win, then who will ask us about the methods. There is so much on our conscience that we must defeat, otherwise our entire people and we, at the head of everything that is dear to us, will be destroyed. So, let's get to work! [...]
35 Wilhelm Keitel (1882-1946), photo 1939. Born in Helmscherode (Harz). In military service since 1901. During the First World War - an officer of artillery and the general staff. In 1934 he was awarded the rank of major general. In 1935, head of the Wehrmacht department in the Reich War Ministry. In 1936 he was awarded the rank of lieutenant general. In 1937 he became an artillery general. In 1938 he was awarded the rank of Colonel General, in 1940 - Field Marshal General. As Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht (from February 1938), he was responsible for developing Hitler's instructions for the conduct of war (for example, the “Commissar Order”) and for monitoring its implementation, as well as for monitoring military planning. 8. 5.1945 signed the act of unconditional surrender. 1. 10. 1946 sentenced to death by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. Executed 10/16/1946
36 Walter von Brauchitsch (1881-1948), photo 1941. Born in Berlin. In 1900 he was awarded the rank of lieutenant. During the First World War he held various positions in the general staff of the Western Front. After the war, he became a Reichswehr staff officer. In 1931 he was awarded the rank of major general, in 1933 - lieutenant general, in 1936 - artillery general. In 1938, he received the rank of colonel general and was appointed commander-in-chief of the ground forces. In July 1940 he became field marshal general. After the defeat near Moscow in December 1941, he was removed from his post. At the end of the war he was in English captivity. On October 18, 1948, he died in an English military hospital in Hamburg-Barmbek.
37 Franz Halder (1884-1972), photo 1939. Born in Würzburg. Service in the army (artillery) since 1902, in 1904 awarded the rank of lieutenant. During the First World War he served in the General Staff, then in the Reichswehr and the Reichswehr Ministry. In 1934 he was awarded the rank of major general, in 1936 - lieutenant general, in 1938 - artillery general. In September 1938 he became chief of the general staff of the ground forces. In 1940 he was awarded the rank of Colonel General. After conflicts with Hitler on tactical issues in September 1942, he was dismissed and transferred to the command reserve; in January 1945 he finally left military service. In 1938 he had contacts with Resistance circles, but without active participation. After the assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944, he was kept under house arrest by the Gestapo for some time at Prinz Albrecht Strasse 8. Released by the Americans from the concentration camp in Dachau. Died April 2, 1972 in Aschau/Chiemgau.
38 Feodor von Bock (1880-1945), photo 1940. Born in Küstrin. In 1898 he became an officer. From 1912 to 1919 - officer of the general staff. In 1916 he was promoted to the rank of major. Awarded the Order of Pour-le-Merit (For Merit). After the First World War he served in the War Ministry. In 1931 he was awarded the rank of lieutenant general. From 1935 to 1938, as an infantry general, he was commander-in-chief of the 3rd Army Corps in Dresden. In the spring of 1938 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the 8th Army in Austria. During the attack on Poland - Commander-in-Chief of the Nord Group of Forces, during the attack on France in 1940 - Group of Forces B. Awarded the rank of Field Marshal. In the war against the Soviet Union, he was first the commander-in-chief of the Group of Forces Center, from January 1942 until his replacement in July by the Group of Forces Süd. Killed on May 3, 1945 during an air raid.
Wilhelm von Leeb (1876-1956), photo 1940. Born in Landsberg am Lech. In 1895 he joined the Bavarian army. During the First World War - an officer of the general staff. In 1919 he became a member of the volunteer corps. After the war he served in the Reichswehr Ministry and in the Reichswehr. In 1929 he was awarded the rank of major general, in 1930 - lieutenant general, in 1934 - artillery general. In March 1938, he was retired with the rank of Colonel General and again called up to serve during the occupation of the Sudetenland. In 1939 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Group of Forces Ts. In 1940 he became a field marshal general. After the attack on the Soviet Union - Commander-in-Chief of the Nord Group of Forces. In January 1942 he was again dismissed. From May 2, 1945 he was in American captivity. On October 22, 1948, he was sentenced to three years in prison, taking into account the time spent in captivity. Died on April 29, 1956 in Fussen.
40 Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt (1875-1953), photo 1939. Born in Aschersleben. Since 1892 - in the army. During the First World War - an officer of the general staff. In 1927 awarded the rank of major general, in 1929 - lieutenant general, in 1932 - infantry general, in 1938 - colonel general. In November 1938 he was dismissed, and in the summer of 1939 he was again drafted into the army. During the invasion of Poland - the commander-in-chief of the Sud group of forces, in France - of the A group of troops, in the Soviet Union - of the Sud group of troops. In November 1941 he was dismissed. In March 1942, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Western Group of Forces West. Since the summer of 1944, he led the “court of honor” of the Wehrmacht. After the end of the war, he was in American and English captivity; on May 5, 1949, he was released for health reasons. Died on February 24, 1953 in Hannover.
41 Erich Hoepner (1886-1944) - no date. Born in Frankfurt an der Oder. Since 1905 - in the army. During the First World War he was an officer. In 1933 he was appointed chief of the general staff in the 1st military district of Koenigsberg. In 1938 he was appointed commander of the 16th Army (Tank) Corps. He took part in campaigns in Poland and France. In 1940 he was awarded the rank of Colonel General. He was the commander-in-chief of Panzer Group 4 (from January 1942 - the 4th Tank Army) as part of the Nord Group of Forces, and from October 1941 as part of the Center Group of Forces. After an unauthorized order to retreat near Moscow in January 1942, he was dismissed from the Wehrmacht. Had connections with the military resistance. After the assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944, he was arrested. On 8/8/1944 he was sentenced to death and hanged.
42 Walter von Reichenau (1884-1942), photo 1942. Born in Karlsruhe. Since 1903 - in the army. During the First World War - an officer of the general staff. In 1933 he was appointed chief of the ministerial department (from February 1934 - the Wehrmacht department) in the Ministry of the Reichswehr. In 1934 he was awarded the rank of major general, in 1935 - lieutenant general, in 1936 - artillery general. When entering Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and during the attack on Poland in September of the same year, he was commander-in-chief of the 10th Army. In October 1939 he became a colonel general. Then he was commander of the 6th Army in Group B. In July 1940, he was awarded the rank of Field Marshal. Entered the territory of the Soviet Union with the 6th Army as part of the Süd group of forces, in December 1941 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Süd group of troops. Died suddenly on January 17, 1942 near Poltava.
43 Hermann Hoth (1885-1971), photo 1941. Born in Neuruppin. Since 1904 - in the army. In 1934 he was awarded the rank of major general, in 1936 - lieutenant general, in 1938 - infantry general. As commander of the 15th Army Corps (expanded to the 3rd Tank Group in 1940), he took part in the war against Poland and France, as well as in the attack on the Soviet Union. In October 1941 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the 17th Army, in June 1942 - the 4th Tank Army. After the surrender of Kyiv in December 1942, he was removed from his post. In April 1945 he became commander in Erzgebirge. At the Nuremberg trials against the Wehrmacht High Command he was sentenced to 15 years in prison; in 1954 he was pardoned and released from prison. Died 25.1. 1971 in Goslar.
44 Discussion of the situation and issuance of orders in one of the German units immediately before the attack on June 22, 1941.
45 Appendix No. 2 to the instructions for deployment and combat operations according to the “Barbarossa Plan” for Panzer Group 4 (General Hoepner) dated May 2, 1941 regarding the nature of the war. “The war against Russia is one of the most important stages in the struggle for the existence of the German people. This is the ancient battle of the Germans against the Slavs, the defense of European culture from the Muscovite-Asian invasion, the defense against Jewish Bolshevism. The goal of this war is the defeat of today's Russia, so it must be waged with unprecedented cruelty. Each combat operation, both in planning and in its execution, must be carried out with an unshakable will for the merciless total extermination of the enemy. In particular, there is no mercy towards representatives of the Russian-Bolshevik system.”
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In his book, which was pompously titled “My War,” as well as in numerous speeches, Hitler proclaimed that the Germans, as a superior race, needed more living space.
At the same time, he did not mean Europe, but the Soviet Union, its European part. The mild climate, fertile lands and geographic proximity to Germany - all this made Ukraine, from his point of view, an ideal place for a German colony. He took the experience of British colonization in India as a basis.
According to his plan, the Aryans should live in beautiful houses, enjoy all the benefits, while the fate of other peoples is to serve them.
Negotiations with Hitler
Although the plan was excellent, certain difficulties arose with its implementation. Hitler understood perfectly well that it would hardly be possible to conquer Russia so quickly, due to its territorial size and large population, like Europe. But he firmly hoped to carry out a military operation before the onset of the famous Russian frosts, realizing that getting bogged down in the war was fraught with defeat in it.
Joseph Stalin was not ready for the start of the war. According to some historians, he sincerely believed that Hitler would not attack the USSR until he defeated France and Great Britain. But the fall of France in 1940 made him think about the possible threat from the Germans.
Therefore, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov was delegated to Germany with clear instructions - to drag out negotiations with Hitler for as long as possible. Stalin's calculation was aimed at the fact that Hitler would not dare to attack closer to the fall - after all, then he would have to fight in the winter, and if he did not have time to act in the summer of 1941, then he would have to postpone his military plans until next year.
Plans to attack Russia
Plans for an attack on Russia by Germany have been developed since 1940. Historians believe that Hitler canceled Operation Sea Lion, deciding that with the fall of the Soviet Union the British would surrender on their own.
The first version of the offensive plan was made by General Erich Marx in August 1940 - in the Reich he was considered the best specialist on Russia. In it, he took into account many factors - economic opportunities, human resources, vast territories of the conquered country. But even careful reconnaissance and development of the Germans did not allow them to discover the reserve of the Supreme High Command, which included armored forces, engineering troops, infantry and aviation. Subsequently, this became an unpleasant surprise for the Germans.
Marx developed an attack on Moscow as the main direction of attack. Secondary strikes were to be directed at Kyiv and two diversionary strikes through the Baltic states to Leningrad, as well as Moldova. Leningrad was not a priority for Marx.
The plan was developed in an atmosphere of strict secrecy - disinformation about Hitler’s plans to attack the Soviet Union was spread through all channels of diplomatic communication. All troop movements were explained by exercises or redeployments.
The next version of the plan was completed in December 1940 by Halder. He changed Marx's plan, highlighting three directions: the main one was against Moscow, smaller forces were to be concentrated on advancing towards Kyiv, and a major attack was to be made on Leningrad.
After the conquest of Moscow and Leningrad, Harold proposed moving towards Arkhangelsk, and after the fall of Kyiv, the Wehrmacht forces were to head to the Don and Volga region.
The third and final version was developed by Hitler himself, codenamed "Barbarossa". This plan was created in December 1940.
Operation Barbarossa
Hitler put the main focus of military activity on moving north. Therefore, Moscow and Leningrad remained among the strategically important targets. Units moving south were to be tasked with occupying Ukraine west of Kyiv.
The attack began early on the morning of Sunday 22 June 1941. In total, the Germans and their allies committed 3 million soldiers, 3,580 tanks, 7,184 artillery pieces, 1,830 aircraft and 750,000 horses. In total, Germany assembled 117 army divisions for the attack, not counting the Romanian and Hungarian ones. Three armies took part in the attack: “North”, “Center” and “South”.
“You just have to kick in the front door, and the entire rotten Russian structure will fall down,” Hitler said smugly a few days after the start of hostilities. The results of the offensive were truly impressive - 300,000 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were killed or captured, 2,500 tanks, 1,400 artillery pieces and 250 aircraft were destroyed. And this is only based on the central advance of German troops after seventeen days. Skeptics, seeing the catastrophic results of the first two weeks of hostilities for the USSR, predicted the imminent collapse of the Bolshevik empire. But the situation was saved by Hitler’s own miscalculations.
The first advances of the fascist troops were so fast that even the Wehrmacht command was not prepared for them - and this jeopardized all supply and communication lines of the army.
Army Group Center stopped on the Desna in the summer of 1941, but everyone believed that this was only a respite before the inexorable movement. But in the meantime, Hitler decided to change the balance of power of the German army. He ordered the military units led by Guderian to head towards Kyiv, and the first tank group to go north. was against Hitler’s decision, but could not disobey the Fuhrer’s order - he repeatedly proved his rightness as a military leader with victories, and Hitler’s authority was unusually high.
Crushing defeat of the Germans
The success of the mechanized units in the north and south was as impressive as the attack on June 22 - huge numbers of dead and captured, thousands of units of equipment destroyed. But, despite the results achieved, this decision already contained defeat in the war. lost time. The delay was so significant that the onset of winter occurred before the troops achieved the goals set by Hitler.
The army was not equipped for the winter cold. And the frosts of the winter of 1941-1942 were especially severe. And this was a very important factor that played a role in the loss of the German army.