However, there is no need to talk about strengthening the Western Front with the 33rd Army, since the army united in its composition formations that had already been fighting as part of the neighboring armies of the Western Front for a certain period of time and suffered heavy losses in personnel, weapons and equipment. The only exception was the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, transferred by decision of Headquarters from the Southwestern Front.

Commander 2nd Rank M. G. Efremov. Photo 1939

Commander of the Western Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General G. K. Zhukov

In this case, there was the fact of organizing more rational command and control of troops in directions along the highways leading to Moscow, one of which, the Kiev Highway, was to be covered by the troops of the 33rd Army.

Having received the order, brigade commander D.P. Onuprienko gave instructions to the acting chief of staff of the army, Colonel B.V. Safonov, to collect the necessary information about the formations that were to be part of the army in order to prepare an action plan for the coming period by the set time. Onuprienko understood that in the near future, until the new commander arrived, the entire burden of organizational work would fall on him, especially since the new chief of staff of the army, Major General A.K. Kondratyev, had not yet arrived.

Dmitry Platonovich was certainly offended by the removal of the commander of the 33rd Army from his post, especially since during the three months of continuous fighting while he led it, he did not have any particular complaints from the front command. However, he greeted the news that it was Lieutenant General Efremov who had been appointed commander of the army with some sense of satisfaction. They had never met before, but he had heard about the high authority of the new commander among those officers and generals who happened to serve under his command.

Since July 1941, Brigade Commissar M.D. Shlyakhtin was a member of the Army Military Council. Mark Dmitrievich Shlyakhtin and brigade commander Onuprienko developed good official and friendly relations, especially since they had a lot in common: they were the same age, both “grew up” in the depths of the NKVD system.

In accordance with the order of the commander of the Western Front, the army included: 1st Guards Motorized Rifle, 110th, 113th, 222nd Rifle Divisions, 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade and 9th Tank Brigade.

The command of the Western Front and the 33rd Army placed special hopes on the 1st Guards Moscow Proletarian Motorized Rifle Division, seasoned in previous battles with the Nazi invaders during the fighting on the Southwestern Front, well equipped with personnel, weapons and military equipment. After transportation by rail from the city of Sudzha, Kursk region, the division was supposed to take up defensive positions directly on the approaches to Naro-Fominsk.

The 110th and 113th rifle divisions, which became famous in the battles for Borovsk, as well as the 151st motorized rifle brigade, at that time, under enemy pressure with heavy fighting, were retreating in the general direction to Naro-Fominsk.

The 110th and 113th SD were formed in July 1941 in the Kuibyshevsky and Frunzensky districts of Moscow, respectively, and received the name: 4th and 5th divisions of the people's militia of the city of Moscow. The division commanders were Colonels S. T. Gladyshev and K. I. Mironov.

Having participated in previous battles with the Nazi invaders as part of the 43rd Army, the divisions suffered very heavy losses, both in personnel and in weapons. For example, on October 16, 1941, the 113th SD consisted of only about 2,000 soldiers and commanders, having lost 558 people only during the last battles in the Borovsk area.

Deputy commander of the 33rd Army, brigade commander D. P. Onuprienko. Post-war photo. Member of the Military Council of the 33rd Army, Brigade Commissar M. D. Shlyakhtin. Photo from 1941

Commander of the 110th Infantry Division, Colonel S. T. Gladyshev. Post-war photo. Commander of the 113th Infantry Division, Colonel K. I. Mironov

Despite the very high assessment of the activities of the 110th SD and its command during the fighting for Borovsk, given by G.K. Zhukov, its commander, Colonel S.T. Gladyshev, a few days later, at the end of October 1941, for the loss of control of the division during the period of withdrawal to the Naro-Fominsk region, he was removed from his post.

The fate of the commander of the 113th SD, Colonel K.I. Mironov, turned out to be tragic. Having traveled with the division as part of the 33rd Army the entire battle route from Naro-Fominsk to Vyazma, Konstantin Ivanovich died in battle on April 17, 1942 during a breakthrough from encirclement in the area of ​​the village of Fedotkovo. His burial place, like many other people around him, remained unknown.

The 222nd Rifle Division, which was previously part of the 5th Army, was at that time marching along two routes in marching order in the direction of Naro-Fominsk. The division was commanded by Colonel Timofey Yakovlevich Novikov, who took office just two days ago.

Despite the complexity of the situation, which was characterized primarily by the absence of a continuous defense front and the confusion that reigned in the command and control of units and formations due to the forced withdrawal of our troops, by 12 noon the army headquarters had a certain idea of ​​their condition and the nature of the conduct of combat operations. In accordance with the order of the commander of the Western Front, by 15:00 the army headquarters under the leadership of brigade commander D.P. Onuprienko prepared a document called “Action Plan of the 33rd Army”, in which the subordinate formations were assigned combat missions for the offensive planned for the second half of the 19th October .

Due to sudden changes in the situation in the army zone, the drawn up plan did not correspond to the real state of affairs, as was shown by the subsequent course of events. Thus, by this time the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade had already left Vereya under enemy pressure and in the afternoon of October 18 fought with units of the 258th Infantry Division east of the city.

Commander of the 222nd Infantry Division, Colonel T. Ya. Novikov

The brigade again suffered very heavy losses in personnel, a significant number of soldiers and commanders were listed as missing. In the evening of that day, the commissar of the 455th MSB of the 151st brigade, senior political instructor Ershov, was shot because the battalion, succumbing to panic, left the occupied line of defense and retreated back without orders, dragging other units with it.

At that time, the 110th SD was fighting at the line of Mishukovo, Ilyino, Kozelskoye, Klimkino. One rifle battalion occupied the village of Kuzminki, intercepting the road to Naro-Fominsk. In front of the division's front, units of the enemy's 258th Infantry Division, supported by several tanks, were advancing.

The 113th SD with two rifle regiments occupied defense on the eastern bank of the river. Protva from Lapshinka to Krivskoye. Another regiment defended on the outskirts of the village of Gorodnya, 7 km northeast of Maloyaroslavets, the same settlement that housed the headquarters of Napoleon, who was retreating with his army from Moscow, during the famous Battle of Maloyaroslavets on October 12 (24), 1812 years of the vanguard of the French army with the corps of generals D. S. Dokhturov and N. I. Raevsky.

There was no continuous front of defense. Moreover, the gap not covered by troops between the 151st MSBr and the 110th SD was about 18 km. If the enemy managed to discover this gap in the defense of our troops and use mobile formations in this direction, the consequences for the entire Western Front would be most negative.

The 222nd SD, advancing in this direction, could cover it, at best, only in a day - in the second half of October 19. At this moment, the division, which included only two regiments - the 479th and 774th SP, was on the march. The 479th SP, following on foot along the road from Kubinka to Naro-Fominsk, reached the village. Tashirovo, the 774th joint venture was on the approach to Naro-Fominsk, following the Kyiv highway.

The location and condition of the 9th Tank Brigade, which operated the day before together with the 110th SD, could not be ascertained.

The 600th anti-tank artillery regiment and the 978th ​​artillery regiment were in firing positions on the western outskirts of Naro-Fominsk.

The combined rifle battalion of the Naro-Fominsk garrison occupied the defense along the western outskirts of Naro-Fominsk.

At 16:30 the first echelon of the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division arrived at Nara station and began to unload. The remaining echelons, due to the incessant enemy air strikes on Nara station, were forced to unload at Aprelevka station and march to the indicated area under their own power. Brigade commander Onuprienko ordered the division commander to immediately advance the arriving units to the western outskirts of Naro-Fominsk and cover the city from Borovsk, from where the enemy’s 258th Infantry Division was expected to attack.

Commander of the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel A. I. Lizyukov

The 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division was commanded by Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel A.I. Lizyukov, who was awarded this high rank at the very beginning of the war for his skillful command and control of troops in battles with the Nazi invaders and the courage and heroism displayed.

By the end of October 18, the command and headquarters of the 33rd Army were able to take control of the situation in the army zone, preparing in the morning with active actions to prevent the development of the enemy’s offensive. The lack of reliable communication with subordinate headquarters and, as a consequence, weak management organization sharply limited the ability of the army command to influence the course of events. In essence, the connections were left to their own devices. The situation was somewhat reminiscent of the course of hostilities near Vyazma in early October, with the only difference that this time the enemy did not manage to penetrate deeply into our defenses and cover the flanks of the retreating troops: despite the overall superiority in manpower and equipment, this was not enough for him clearly not enough.

October 19, 1941

All day long, units of the 33rd Army fought heavy battles with the enemy. The action plan developed the day before by army headquarters was never implemented because it did not correspond to the situation. The initiative was in the hands of the enemy, and the army units had to repel one of his attacks after another, without thinking about an offensive. The only thing that was possible to do in accordance with the plan was to move the 222nd SD to the unoccupied defense sector in the army zone and, albeit not completely, cover the gap between the 151st MSBr and the 110th SD.

The 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade fought bloody battles with units of the enemy's 258th Infantry Division east of Vereya, occupying the line: the edge of the forest east of the village of Godunovo, Kupelitsy, the edge of the forest east of the village of Zagryazhskoye. One motorized rifle battalion of the brigade fought, occupying defenses along the eastern bank of the Protva River near Sloboda Embankment. The situation of the brigade units was extremely difficult: ammunition was running out, and for the third day the soldiers and commanders had not received any food except bread.

By 19:00, the 222nd SD, with the forces of the 479th SP, sapper, anti-aircraft and barrage battalions, took up defense at the line: height from elevation. 224.0, Potaraschenkov, Smolinskoye, Berezovka and immediately entered into battle with the enemy who was trying to advance in the direction of Nazaryevo.

From the operational report of the division headquarters:

“...3. 479 SP defends the line at level. 200, POTARASHCHENKOV, SMOLINSKOE.

4. The sapper battalion defends the heights. 224.0, (excl.) elev. 200.

5. The anti-aircraft battalion defends the eastern encirclement. NAZAREVO.

6. Zahradbattalion defends the RADIONCHIK area.

7. There are no neighbors to the right or left."

Attempts by enemy infantry to infiltrate in small groups deep into its defenses were repulsed by the fire of our fighters. Realizing that the division clearly did not have enough strength to defend the line indicated to it and at the same time launch an attack on Vereya with part of its forces, the army headquarters in the afternoon sent two rifle battalions to reinforce it.

175th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 1st Guards. The MSD, as ordered by the army commander, immediately after unloading began to take up defensive positions along the western and southwestern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk, encircling the city in a semi-ring. The flanks of the regiment rested on the Nara River: the right - at the brick factory, the left - at the railway bridge.

The 110th SD occupied the line: Tatarka, height from elevation. 191.2, Inyutino, Ermolino.

All day there was no information about the position of the 113th SD units. Several liaison officers sent by army headquarters did not return. It was only known that the division fought heavy battles with superior enemy units, presumably at the line ex. Ermolino, along the eastern bank of the Protva River, Malanyino, Skuratovo.

In the middle of the day, the army commander, Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov, arrived at the army headquarters. There are different data about the time of his arrival in the army. The assistant chief of army intelligence, Captain A. M. Sobolev, claims that he arrived in the army on October 18, 1941.

The book “Hero Commander,” based on the memoirs of army veterans, indicates the date - October 17.

According to documents of the Main Personnel Directorate of the Red Army, the date of General Efremov’s assumption of office is October 25.

However, an analysis of archival documents allows us to draw an unambiguous conclusion that Mikhail Grigorievich Efremov arrived at army headquarters and began performing his duties as army commander in the middle of the day on October 19, 1941. All documents on October 18, as well as the first half of October 19, were signed by brigade commander Onuprienko, but already at the disposal of the regimental commissar M. A. Rza-Zade on his assumption of the post of chief of the Naro-Fominsk garrison, handed to him at 17:30 on October 19, 1941 year, the name is General Efremov. All subsequent documents, instructions and orders preserved in the archive were signed by Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov.

In the afternoon, reinforcements in the amount of 1,750 people, armed with rifles, two heavy and two light machine guns, arrived at the Nara station for the 173rd SD, which was previously part of the 33rd Army. General Efremov immediately sent a telegram to the Chief of Staff of the Western Front, Lieutenant General V.D. Sokolovsky, in which he asked to use this reinforcement for the 222nd SD, to which he soon received the consent of the front headquarters.

The situation in the army's defense zone continued to deteriorate hourly. Formations and units of the army, drained of blood in previous battles, offered stubborn resistance to the enemy, but were forced to retreat. Ammunition was running out, and there were big problems with organizing food. The troops were forced to make do with dry rations or whatever the local population of villages and hamlets caught in the combat zone could help with.

The situation in the defense zones of the remaining armies defending on the approaches to Moscow was equally difficult. Only thanks to the courage and dedication of the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, it was possible with the last of their strength to hold back the onslaught of the German hordes rushing towards the capital of our Motherland. In connection with the threatening situation created on the outskirts of Moscow, and in order to mobilize the efforts of the troops and population of the capital to repel the enemy, the State Defense Committee on October 19, 1941 adopted a resolution to impose a state of siege in Moscow and its surrounding areas.

October 20, 1941

Early in the morning, an order was sent to all subordinate units from the commander of the 33rd Army, Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov, in which combat missions were defined to firmly hold the occupied defense lines. 1st Guards The MSD, in addition, received the task of being ready to destroy the enemy group in the Oreshkovo, Bashkardovo, and Mityaevo areas.

However, the 458th and 479th PP of the 258th Infantry Division of the enemy, who regrouped their battle formations overnight, after massive artillery and aviation preparation, with the support of 10–15 tanks, went on the offensive along the Borovsk-Balabanovo highway, delivering the main blow in areas which were defended by soldiers of the 1289th and 1291st rifle regiments of the 110th SD.

The soldiers and commanders repelled the first enemy attack. However, then, when the enemy infantry, having regrouped their forces and equipment, again went on the attack, some confusion arose in the ranks of the defenders, both regiments wavered and, leaving the occupied line, began to retreat in panic. The enemy, noticing this, increased artillery fire and, increasing efforts, attempted to outflank the 1291st rifle regiment, as a result of which the withdrawal of the 110th rifle division turned into a flight. Pursued by the attacking enemy, the 1291st and 1289th joint ventures began to randomly retreat along the Kyiv highway.

Soon the disorganized retreat turned into a stampede. There was no longer any talk of any resistance to the enemy. Completely demoralized units of the 1291st joint venture, having crossed the river somewhat south of Naro-Fominsk. Nara did not even try to organize defense on its eastern bank.

Moscow militias. The 33rd Army included three divisions of the Moscow people's militia (4th, 5th and 6th)

The 1287th joint venture, defending at some distance from the main forces of the division, also could not withstand the enemy’s attack, which also began to disorganizedly retreat in the northern and northeastern directions south of the Kyiv highway. At the request of the commander of the 110th SD, Colonel S. T. Gladyshev, the chief of staff of the 43rd Army, Colonel A. I. Bogolyubov, ordered to cover the withdrawal of the units of the 1287th SP with the fire of rocket launchers, which fired three salvoes at the enemy, which allowed the retreating units to avoid complete defeat and destruction.

In this critical situation, the command of the 110th SD was unable to keep the threads of control in its hands, and, carried away by the flight of its subordinate units, it also rushed east to the border of the Nara River. Many, even experienced, commanders then found themselves hostage to the current situation, and not all of them managed to realize their commander potential. The division practically did not exist at this time. Units and subunits fled, leaving the occupied line wherever their eyes looked. Panic gripped not only the troops, but also the headquarters, which, as they say, God himself ordered to hold the reins of control, no matter what. The headquarters of the 110th SD was discovered only two days later, far beyond its defense line.

From the combat log of the 33rd Army:

“...Having pushed back units of the 110th SD, the pr-k occupied ILYNO, MISHUKOVO, KOZELSKOE by 12.00. Units of the 110th SD retreat to a new line for defense. The infantry units, retreating, abandoned the material part of the artillery, which was removed from the battle by the artillerymen. At 15.35 the pr-k was occupied by MISHUKOVO, TATARKA ... "

Thus, the Kyiv-Moscow highway turned out to be unprotected by our troops, which allowed the enemy to reach directly into the Naro-Fominsk area in a matter of hours.

Having learned about this, being at the army command post, located in the village of Novo-Fedorovka (now Volodarsky Street. - Note author), General Efremov sent the following order to the command of the 110th SD:

“TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 110th SD COLONEL GLADYSHEV

COMMISSIONER OF THE DIVISION BAT. COMMISSAR BORMATOV

1. You opened the way to Naro-Fominsk for the enemy, running to a new frontier, frightening yourself.

2. The Military Council gives you until the morning to restore your previous position, until the enemy figures out your flight in the dark.

3. If the situation is not restored by 7–8 o’clock on 21.10, you will be immediately put on trial as deserters, organizers of flight from the battlefield, for failure to comply with combat orders.

(Lieutenant General EFREMOV.)

However, no matter how hard Major Kuzmin, who was tasked with conveying this order to the army commander, tried, he failed to locate the headquarters of the 110th SD and find the division commander, Colonel S.T. Gladyshev. Only at about 9 o'clock in the evening did army headquarters receive information that the headquarters of the 110th SD had concentrated in the area of ​​the village of Kamenskoye in the afternoon. Two more officers were sent to establish contact with him.

After some time, a new alarming message was received, this time that units of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, unable to withstand the blow of superior enemy forces, began to randomly retreat in an eastern direction, suffering heavy losses. Communication with the brigade was lost. But, despite the falling night, a fierce battle continued to rage to the west and southwest of Naro-Fominsk. Units and units of the retreating divisions were mixed up, it was impossible to understand who was where. But even in this most difficult situation, our soldiers and commanders continued to inflict heavy losses on the enemy, regardless of anything.

On the approaches to the capital. October 1941

At 10 p.m., the head of the Special Department of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, State Security Lieutenant Timofeev, left for the brigade, carrying with him a telegram from the Army Military Council to transmit it to the brigade command:

“TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 151st IRBM, MAJOR EFIMOV

MILITARY COMMISSIONER OF THE BRIGADE ST. BATTALION COMMISSIONER PEGOV

1. I warn you: if the brigade withdraws again without the permission of the army commander, you will be brought to justice...

(M. EFREMOV, M. SHLYAKHTIN, B. SAFONOV.")

The 222nd SD, with the forces of one rifle regiment and separate battalions of the division, continued to defend the previous line. The 774th joint venture, which was advancing in marching order into the division's defense zone, has still not arrived in the area indicated to it.

The situation continued to deteriorate every minute. The 113th SD left its line, which, having no contact with the army headquarters and its neighbor on the right - the 110th SD, due to the threat of the enemy flanking, by order of the division commander, retreated to the eastern bank of the river. Istya.

The army command, knowing the state of subordinate formations and units, their extremely low manning of fighters, and especially command personnel, foresaw that it would be very difficult for the troops to withstand the onslaught of superior enemy forces, but no one could have imagined that events would take such a negative turn within one day .

The army command hoped that the measures taken would be able to stabilize the front of subordinate formations and units and stop the enemy’s advance. There was no longer any need to think about attacking Vereya, as had been planned the day before.

In the afternoon, information began to arrive that advanced enemy units had been found in the immediate vicinity of Naro-Fominsk, but the army headquarters could not confirm or refute this data. One of the weak points in the organization of control of units and formations of the 33rd Army in the first days of the battles for Naro-Fominsk was the low level of organization of communications with subordinate formations, due to the lack of necessary means of communication both in the army and in subordinate formations.

The army headquarters had to transmit most of its instructions and instructions through liaison officers, which greatly complicated the management of formations, did not allow timely transmission of orders and instructions, or receipt of the necessary data and information from subordinates to assess the current situation and make decisions. In rare, urgent cases, orders and instructions were transmitted by radio, but radio equipment was also sorely lacking.

Due to the lack of accurate data on the locations of headquarters, which moved several times a day, often without coordination with a higher commander, the necessary transport and the poor condition of roads, all combat documents, both from army headquarters to subordinate headquarters, and from subordinate headquarters to army headquarters, were delivered very late and often no longer had the proper value due to changes in the situation that had occurred during this time.

The only consolation of this day was the message from the commander of the 1st Guards. MSD Colonel A.I. Lizyukov that all units of the division unloaded at Aprelevka station and were moving to the areas indicated by him.

October 21, 1941

During the night of October 21, formations and units of the 33rd Army continued to fight heavy defensive battles with the advancing enemy, who the day before managed to encircle a number of units and units of the 110th SD and the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade. The position of the 1289th SP of the 110th SD, which was surrounded north of the Bashkino crossing, was especially difficult.

The 151st MSBr, holding back the enemy's onslaught, fought at the line: Novonikolskoye, Aleksino, Simbukhovo. 4 km north of it, in the Petrishchevo area, a separate cavalry regiment held the defense.

In the operational summary for the day, the brigade commander reported:

“I inform you that the reinforcement sent for the 151st MSBR, in the amount of 750 people, has not yet arrived to me. My attempts to find it fail, because it is unknown which route it follows.

At the same time, I inform you that I am forced to carry out a different task than what I have by your order, because, in spite of everything, SIMBUKHOVO enters the zone of the 222nd SD, the latter takes up defense in the NAZAREVO region. In order not to open the way to the enemy through SUBBOTINO - SIMBUKHOVO to the MINSK highway, I am forced to defend the indicated points, for which I do not have enough strength.

(Commander of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, Major EFIMOV.")

The 222nd SD continued to hold the line of Subbotino, Potaraschenkov, Smolinskoye, Semidvore. Individual enemy units, having bypassed the left flank of the division, acted in its rear, threatening to cut off the division's communications.

Commander of the 5th Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel M. G. Sakhno

175th MSP 1st Guards. The MSD under the command of Lieutenant Colonel P.V. Novikov, reinforced by a platoon of tanks, took up defense at the line: the northern outskirts of Gorodishche (now this is the area of ​​​​Naydova-Zhelezova Street. - Note author), western outskirts of Naro-Fominsk, height from elev. 201.8, further east to the Nara River. At the same time, the regiment was preparing for the offensive, which was planned by the army command for the morning of October 22.

The 1st company of the 175th MRR, under the command of Lieutenant Miradonov and political instructor Kozhukhov, sent by order of the division commander to reconnaissance along the Moscow-Kyiv highway in the direction of Balabanovo, in the area of ​​the village of Shchekutino, unexpectedly encountered the enemy. The company fought with him for almost three hours and was only able to retreat to its original position under the cover of darkness. The 4th company of the same regiment, sent on reconnaissance to Kamenskoye, having reached Ateptsevo, was stopped by strong enemy mortar fire. This meant that settlements located only 3–5 km from Naro-Fominsk were occupied by the enemy.

In the first half of the day, two battalions of the 6th MRR took up defense on the southern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk, Nara station, the Vegetable state farm (now a number of streets in the city of Naro-Fominsk on the eastern bank of the Nara River south of the railway bridge, inclusive of Pogodina Street. - Note author), Afanasovka. The location of the regimental headquarters and the first battalion, which got lost during the march from the Aprelevka unloading station, was unknown.

Military Commissar of the 5th Tank Brigade, Hero of the Soviet Union, senior battalion commissar A. V. Kotsov

The division's main striking force, the 5th Tank Brigade, which consisted of 38 tanks and 8 armored vehicles, arrived in full force in the morning at the specified concentration area, 1 km northwest of the village of Novo-Fedorovka. The brigade was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel M. G. Sakhno, the military commissar of the brigade was Hero of the Soviet Union A. V. Kotsov, who was awarded this high title for Khalkhin Gol.

Thus, the section of the 33rd Army’s defense zone, unprotected by troops, in the direction of the most likely enemy offensive, was reliably covered.

The 113th SD spent the whole night working on engineering equipment for the defense line it occupied along the river. Istya on the site: Shilovo, Staro-Mikhailovskoye, Kiselevo, state farm "Pobeda". The division's artillery (5 guns of the 109th Civil Aviation Regiment) took up firing positions on the western edge of the forest east of Alopovo.

The army command continued to be most concerned about the fate of the 110th SD, from which no information was received during the day, and the liaison delegates sent to the division did not return to army headquarters. At this time, the main part of the units of the 1287th and 1291st joint ventures and the division headquarters were already on the eastern bank of the river. Nara in the adjacent forests.

The greatly depleted units of the 1289th joint venture, which broke out of encirclement at night, fighting off the enemy with bayonets and grenades, retreated in small, scattered groups in the direction of Bashkino, Rozhdestvo, Kotovo. Near the village of Kotovo, the remnants of the regiment again found themselves surrounded by the enemy, but despite this, the soldiers and commanders continued to courageously fight against him. After the regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel N. A. Galagyan and the regiment commissar, senior political instructor A. M. Terentyev, were captured wounded, a small group of Red Army soldiers and commanders was able to break out of the encirclement on the night of October 22 and reach the area of ​​the village of Konopelovka, 1.5 km north. west of Naro-Fominsk.

Commander of the combined detachment, then of the 1289th joint venture, Major N. A. Bezzubov. Photo 1935

Almost at the same time, somewhat to the right of the defense sector of the 175th Motorized Rifle Regiment, in the area of ​​the Tashirovsky turn, with a detachment of 150 people, the commander of the 1283rd Marine Corps of the 60th Rifle Division, Major N. A. Bezzubov, left the encirclement.

The army commander, General Efremov, ordered Major Bezzubov to unite under his command the remnants of the 1289th SP and his regiment into a separate detachment and take up defense along the eastern bank of the Nara River, to the right of the 175th MRR.

Major Bezzubov's detachment, by the will of fate, will be destined to play an important role in the defense of Naro-Fominsk. Throughout the entire period of fighting in the Naro-Fominsk direction, the fighters and commanders of the detachment will honorably fulfill their assigned tasks for the defense of this area, repelling more than a dozen enemy attacks, inflicting heavy losses on him. Much credit for this will belong to the skillful organizer, brave and competent commander, Major Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bezzubov, who in a month and a half will become commander of the 110th Infantry Division.

At this time, the headquarters of the 110th SD and headquarters units, numbering about 250 people, concentrated in the forest south of Sotnikovo, but no one knew about it. The division headquarters still had no contact with the army headquarters and subordinate units.

At midnight, an alarming radiogram was received from the headquarters of the Western Front:

“According to available data, the enemy with a small number of tanks reached TASHIROVO (5 km north-west NARO-FOMINSK) at 16.30.

THE COMMANDER ORDERED: Immediately identify the actual situation in the TASHIROVO area and this very night throw the enemy out of TASHIROVO and cover the direction to KUBINKA, capturing and firmly securing PLESENSKY with the forces of a rifle battalion, tanks up to the battalion; KUZMINKA - an infantry battalion with tanks and at least a battalion to have in TASHIROVO.

Deliver execution by 8.00 on October 22, 1941.” .

Some time later, another radiogram was received from the headquarters of the Western Front, concerned about the state of affairs in the Naro-Fominsk area:

“The commander ordered: immediately establish the actual position of the 110, 113, 222 SD and 151 MSBR.

During the night, knock out the enemy from TASHIROVO and occupy with forces up to a battalion, reinforced with tanks, each of the following points: TASHIROVO, PLESENSKOE, KUZMINKA and stubbornly defend, preventing the enemy from reaching KUBINKA.

Organize a perimeter defense in the area between 222 and 110 SD.

1 MRD immediately concentrate NARO-FOMINSK, pulling up echelons from APRELEVKA and ALABINO."

By the end of the day, the headquarters of the 33rd Army had the most contradictory information both about the actions and location of the enemy, and about the position of its formations. The weather also made its own adjustments to the actions of the troops. The roads, due to the autumn thaw, were practically impassable for wheeled vehicles, with the exception of the Naro-Fominsk - Kubinka and Naro-Fominsk - Bekasovo highways.

Most German generals in their memoirs written after the war, revealing the reasons for the failures of the German troops, pay a lot of attention to “Her Majesty the Weather,” which, in their opinion, became almost the root cause of their defeat, forgetting that the roads had fallen into disrepair on both sides of the front. Not only German soldiers and officers, but also our soldiers and commanders were frozen from the extreme cold.

An analysis of captured documents shows that weather conditions became a factor that only complicated the situation that began to develop for the Center Civil Aviation Units as a result of increased resistance by the Red Army troops. It is no coincidence that the OKH report of October 18, 1941 focused primarily on the “high defense capability of the Russians” and not on weather conditions. The next day, in the next report of the command of the German ground forces, an entry appeared:

“...At the front of the 4th Panzer Group, the enemy still puts up stubborn resistance and does not surrender an inch of land or a single house without a fight...”.

On September 3, 1941, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Feodor von Bock, ordered his troops to take all necessary measures to prepare for action in conditions of autumn thaw and low temperatures.

The extremely difficult situation that developed in many sectors of the Soviet-German front forced the command of the Red Army to take a number of measures that have been ambiguously assessed for many years after the end of the war. One of these measures was the creation of barrage detachments. The order for their creation was issued by the Supreme Command Headquarters back in mid-September 1941, however, due to the lack of personnel in the armies and divisions, they were in no hurry to implement it, no matter how paradoxical it may sound. And where they were formed, they often participated in repelling the enemy’s offensive in one chain, together with combat units.

The events of recent days in the zone of action of the Western Front, numerous cases of unauthorized abandonment of occupied lines, and sometimes simply flight from the battlefield, forced the command of the Western Front to once again remember this “draconian” measure. On October 21, 1941, a document signed by General of the Army G.K. Zhukov and member of the Military Council of the Front N.A. Bulganin was sent to the Military Councils of the Armies, which required within two days to form in each rifle division a barrage detachment of no more than a battalion, in counting one company per rifle regiment, subordinate to the division commander and having at its disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks, several tanks and armored vehicles.

The barrage detachments were assigned the following task: “...direct assistance to the com. composition in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in divisions, stopping the flight of panic-stricken military personnel, without stopping at the use of weapons, eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, supporting honest combat elements of the division, not subject to panic, but carried away by the general flight.”

October 22, 1941

German troops, using the darkness and gaps in the battle formations of formations and army units, on the night of October 22, 1941, quietly reached the western and southwestern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk, the regional center of the Moscow region, located 70 km from the center of the capital with southwestern direction, near the Kiev highway, the construction of which began several years before the war.

The advanced units of the enemy's 258th Infantry Division, which reached the settlements of Tashirovo and Novinskoye, located 5–6 km northeast of Naro-Fominsk, did not have any troops in front of them, except for several hundred soldiers and detachment commanders under the command of Major Bezzubov, who were occupying the defense along the eastern bank of the river. Nara.

The army commander clarified the situation all night, listened to reports from formation commanders and service chiefs, and when reinforcements for the 222nd SD arrived - 2,600 people, he found time to talk with him. After the conversation, Mikhail Grigorievich ordered to send 1,300 people to the 222nd SD, and distribute the second half of the replenishment between units of the 1st Guards. MSD of Colonel Lizyukov and the detachment of Major Bezzubov, which some time ago was given the task of knocking out the enemy from the outskirts of Naro-Fominsk in the morning.

Only the lack of reliable information about the strength of the enemy and the nature of his actions can explain the formulation by the army commander of such an unrealistic combat mission. Thus, a detachment under the command of Major Bezzubov, equal in size to two battalions, received an order to destroy the enemy in the area of ​​the Tureika rest house, Tashirovo, Cheshkovo, Redkino, Aleshkovo, Alekseevka and, upon completion of this task, move on to the defense of the line: Nikolskoye - Plesenskoye, Cheshkovo , Alekseevka, which was beyond the strength of an entire rifle division. But this will become clear only in the morning, when parts of the 1st Guards. The MSD and the combined detachment of Major Bezzubov will face an enemy clearly superior in strength.

At 5:30 a.m., after a short artillery preparation, Major Bezzubov’s detachment began a battle with enemy units in the area of ​​the village of Konopelovka. At six o'clock the 1st Guards went on the offensive. MSD.

The 175th MRR, reinforced by a platoon of tanks, had the task of destroying the enemy on the approaches to Naro-Fominsk and reaching the line except. Alekseevka, siding 75 km (now Latyshskaya station. - Note author), Kotovo.

The 3rd battalion of Captain A.I. Krasnochiro moved forward 1–1.5 km and, reaching the edge of the forest 1 km southwest of the height from elevation. 201.8, was stopped by strong enemy machine gun and artillery fire.

The 2nd battalion of senior lieutenant P. M. Andronov, advancing to the left, on the approaches to the 75 km junction, was stopped by strong enemy artillery and mortar fire from the village of Kotovo.

The regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel P.V. Novikov, who led the battle with the NP, who was located in the offensive area of ​​the 3rd battalion, saw how the attack of his units began to choke. It was obvious that the enemy had well thought out the fire system and the construction of defense, and the presence of a large number of fire weapons - artillery, mortars and machine guns - made it possible to defeat our attacking units from long distances.

At the same time, the 6th MRR went on the offensive, trying to reach the Elagino-Gorchukhino line. When approaching Gorchukhino, the regiment's units were met by strong enemy artillery, mortar and machine gun fire. The situation was aggravated by the fact that its aviation was actively operating, delivering strong bombing attacks on the regiment's battle formations. The rifle battalions, suffering losses, were forced to lie down and engage in fire combat with the enemy at the reached line. The regiment headquarters, located in the area of ​​the Vegetable state farm, was also repeatedly bombed from the air.

Units of the 258th Infantry Division, reinforced with tanks, occupying defenses along the western bank of the Nara River in the Tashirov area, the Tureika rest house, without much difficulty repelled an attempt by Bezzubov’s detachment to seize a bridgehead on the opposite bank of the river. Nara. Having suffered losses, the detachment retreated to the eastern bank and took up defense in the area: the Konopelovka dacha, a bend in the road, 700 m east of Tashirovo, the Tureika rest house.

In the afternoon, the enemy crossed the river at a bottleneck. Nara and captured the Konopelovka dacha, knocking out one of the units of Major Bezzubov’s detachment defending there. Part of the German infantry reached the military town, but was stopped by fire from the 2nd rifle company of the 1st battalion, which was defending in the area of ​​the military town. The battalion was commanded by senior political instructor A.I. Antonov.

After the 3rd battalion was stopped by enemy fire, the commander of the 175th MRR, Lieutenant Colonel Novikov, decided, together with the regimental commissar, battalion commissar A. M. Myachikov, to move to the regimental command post and report to the division commander about the situation. Driving by car along one of the streets on the northwestern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk, they unexpectedly came across a column of our trucks, which occupied the entire narrow roadway; there was no way to get around them. Shooting was heard ahead to the right, near the factory workers' town. P.V. Novikov ordered the driver to find a detour along a nearby street, and he, the commissar and the adjutant, decided to get to the regimental headquarters, which was located not far from the church across the Nara River, on foot.

However, it didn't take long to walk. From the cross street, about one hundred and fifty meters from them, frightened soldiers from the rear units and car drivers began to run out one after another. They quickly crossed the road and disappeared behind the houses on the opposite side of the street. To the right ahead the shooting continued to increase. Novikov tried to detain the Red Army soldiers who fled in panic, but no one paid attention to his shout. Suddenly a group of German soldiers appeared on a nearby street. There were about ten of them. Opening fire from small arms on the move, with their first shots they killed the adjutant of the regiment commander, Nikolai Stein, and seriously wounded Novikov. Having fired several more bursts along the street, the German infantrymen crossed to the other side and slowly headed down towards the city center.

Battalion Commissar Myachikov, frail and short in stature, carried the seriously wounded commander for some time, and then, exhausted, crawled with him on all fours.

The regimental headquarters learned from the regiment commander's driver that German machine gunners had infiltrated the southwestern part of Naro-Fominsk and were causing panic there. He was the first to raise the alarm. Making his way to the factory along a side street, the driver first came across a group of soldiers running across the street and hastily firing back, and then came under fire from enemy machine gunners. The car arrived at headquarters with a broken body.

After some time, regimental commissar A. M. Myachikov appeared at the location of the rifle company of the 2nd battalion, defending near the city park, in a wet overcoat, stained with the commander’s blood and thickly soiled with mud.

Not far from the park, near a stone bridge, he found the division commander and commissar. Next to them, at a fork in the street, a platoon of tanks was at the ready. The regimental commissar reported to them what had happened. Colonel Lizyukov ordered Myachikov to take one of the tanks and immediately fight his way to the place where the wounded regiment commander remained.

The tank took off, jumped across the bridge and, without slowing down, rushed along the main street up the mountain, past the gates of the spinning and weaving factory, past the city council building, to the place where Lieutenant Colonel P. V. Novikov remained. But he was no longer in that place. Later, Lieutenant Colonel Novikov was found among the soldiers and commanders who fell during the battle in the city. This is how one of the best commanders of the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, a fearless and courageous officer, commander of the 175th Motorized Rifle Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Pavel Veniaminovich Novikov, died.

By ten o'clock in the afternoon, having suffered significant losses in personnel, the 175th MRR and 6th MRR were forced to go on the defensive at the reached line, and then, under the pressure of superior enemy forces, began to retreat to the western and southwestern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk , where fairly large enemy forces have already infiltrated. Part of the units of the 175th SME was surrounded in the area of ​​the factory village.

At 11 o’clock the command post of the army headquarters in Novo-Fedorovka was bombed by six enemy aircraft, and therefore the army commander gave the command to move the command post first to the village of Kuznetsovo, and from 16 o’clock to the village of Yakovlevskoye, located northeast of Naro-Fominsk .

In the afternoon, individual enemy units tried to cross to the eastern bank of the Nara River, near the northern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk. However, the soldiers of the 2nd battalion of the 175th MRR repelled his attack, preventing the enemy from reaching the eastern bank.

An exceptionally difficult situation has developed throughout the army's combat zone. Heavy fighting took place in all sectors, but it was especially difficult for units of the 1st Guards. MSD. The rifle battalions of the 6th and 175th MRR fought the enemy without fire contact with each other, surrounded by a number of units, fighting in a city where it is especially difficult to maintain interaction with neighbors and one cannot rely on the support of one’s own artillery fire.

The army commander felt great concern about the state of affairs on the right flank, where the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade was fighting, from which not a single combat report was received throughout the day. There was no radio contact with the brigade.

The day before, the brigade, with the remnants of its units, fought heavy, bloody battles with the advancing enemy on a wide front, which at times reached 14 km, for which there was clearly neither the strength nor the means. The battalions fought without having any tactical or fire communication with each other. The brigade headquarters practically did not control the actions of subordinate units, due to the lack of communication, the remoteness of the units and the weak organization of control on the part of the brigade command. The battalions, in essence, were left to their own devices. During a week of continuous fighting, the brigade's strength was reduced sixfold, and only three tanks remained in the tank battalion.

The 455th MSB held back the enemy advance, defending on the eastern outskirts of Novo-Nikolskoye.

The 454th MSB fought with the enemy south of the village. Novo-Ivanovskoye, but the brigade headquarters did not have exact information about it.

The 453rd SME, which consisted of only about 90 people, defended the Aleksino line, the northern outskirts of Simbukhovo.

On the right flank of the brigade, the remnants of units of the 185th joint venture, numbering 32 people, fought with the enemy. By the end of the day, due to the losses suffered, the regiment ceased to exist.

At about 12 o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy with a force of up to two companies, taking advantage of the absence of a continuous defense front between the 454th and 455th infantry infantry regiments, went to their rear, attacked the brigade headquarters located in Kolodkino, and defeated it. The remnants of the headquarters retreated to the village of Arkhangelskoye.

At 15:00, army headquarters received a report from the commander of the 222nd SD, which reported that the division had been fighting with enemy units at the Subbotino-Nazaryevo line since the morning. The enemy tried to bypass the division from the right flank in the area of ​​​​the village of Semidvorye. The division command was forced to ask for help from the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade. Through joint efforts, the enemy's advance was stopped.

In the afternoon, reinforcements of 1,300 people arrived in the division, and almost simultaneously the 774th SP arrived. This made it possible to somewhat stabilize the situation in this direction.

The headquarters of the 110th SD was located in the forest south of the village of Sotnikovo, without any information about where the subordinate units were located, with the exception of the 1287th SP, whose units were located nearby. There was no communication with other regiments, as well as with army headquarters.

The units of the 1287th joint venture, which escaped defeat during the retreat, were at that time in the area of ​​​​the settlements of Shalamovo and Myza, leaving behind the Nara River and not even making an attempt to take up defense on its eastern bank. For the fifth day, the soldiers and commanders ate, as they say, whatever God sent them.

The 1289th joint venture, in fact, did not exist. Only separate groups of his fighters managed to retreat to the eastern bank of the river. Nara in the Tashirovo district.

But the most amazing thing happened to the 1291st joint venture, which, carried away by an unknown force, continued its flight to the east, leaving both Naro-Fominsk and Aprelevka far behind.

The command of the 113th SD, also in some confusion, by the end of the day still managed to take control of the situation in the subordinate units, despite the fact that a number of units were also located unknown where. With the remnants of the rifle regiments, the division took up defense at the line: the forest east of Aristov, the forest east of Staro-Mikhailovsky, Alopovo. The division headquarters was located in the village of Savelovka. There was also no connection with army headquarters, and there was no food or ammunition.

During six days of fighting in the Naro-Fominsk direction from October 16 to October 21, 1941, the 110th Rifle Division alone lost 6,179 soldiers and commanders killed, wounded and missing.

At 4 p.m., Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov, understanding the complexity of the situation that was developing in the Naro-Fominsk area, was forced to send the following report to the commander of the Western Front troops:

“KOMZAPFRONT TO GENERAL ZHUKOV.

1. By 16.00 the situation is very serious for the city of NARO-FOMINSK.

The enemy, infiltrating through forests and throwing out landings of his thugs, surrounds the city, pushing out units of the 1st Motorized Rifle Division and a sent up regiment of 1,200 soldiers of the 110th Motorized Rifle Division.

2. The enemy suffers huge losses from our actions, but our losses are also large.

3. By 16.00 on 10/22/41 the enemy occupies the following position: up to the infantry regiment with tanks in the region of TASHIROVO, RED TUREYKA, ALEXEEVKA. Up to 2 regiments directly southwest and south of the city. Before the motorized infantry regiment advances on AFANASOVKA from the south.

Unidentified forces cut the highway near ZOSIMOV PUSTIN. Part of the enemy broke into the northern encirclement. cities. The 175 MP battalion and the 6 MP battalion are fighting in KOTOVO, ATEPTSEVO.

4. The enemy's actions are continuously supported by his aviation. I urge you to help our aviation by bombing the convoy moving from KUZMINK towards the city.

Please send several U-2 aircraft to establish contact.

(Commander of the 33rd Lieutenant General M. EFREMOV,) (Member of the Military Council, Brig, Commissar M. SHLYAKHTIN.)

By evening, the battle for Naro-Fominsk reached its highest point. The enemy, having increased their efforts, brought fresh reserves into the battle. Soldiers and commanders of the 1st Guards. The MSD fought heroically, not paying attention to the fact that at times it was impossible to understand where the enemy was and where our units were.

The 1st battalion of the 175th MRP, which fought all day surrounded, was only able to break through to its own people in the evening and retreat to the eastern bank of the river. Nara. The 3rd battalion fought in the southwestern part of the city, being pressed by the enemy to the river. Thus, by the end of the day, most of Naro-Fominsk was in enemy hands.

Towards evening, taking advantage of the lack of a continuous front at the junction of the 1st Guards. The MSD and the 110th SD, up to the infantry company of the 479th PP, penetrated deep into our defense, reaching the area of ​​the Zosimova Pustyn station, not far from the army command post. To destroy the infiltrated enemy infantry, the army commander sent a small detachment made up of soldiers from headquarters and rear units.

At 18.50 the army headquarters received a menacing telegram from the front commander:

“COMMANDARM 33 EFREMOV

The enemy, taking advantage of your slowness, carelessness and lack of understanding of the importance of the Cuban direction, intercepted the highway in small groups.

I order to immediately deploy the entire 1st Motorized Rifle Division, destroy the enemy in the area of ​​TASHIROVO, PLESENSKOE, KUZMINKA and close the gap between the 222nd SD and 110th SD, occupying the front PLESENSKOYE, ATEPTSEVO.

The tank brigade is immediately brought into action to destroy the enemy in the TASHIROVO area and clear the highway.

I warn you, if you sit idly by, the enemy will immediately occupy the KUBINKA area and put the 5th ARMY in a catastrophic situation.

(ZHUKOV, BULGANIN.")

Army General G.K. Zhukov can be understood: there was a clear threat of an enemy breakthrough to Moscow. The enemy pushed ahead, realizing that if now he could not make his way to Moscow, it would be much more difficult to do so in the future. However, the order is quite strange, to say the least. How was it possible at that moment to deploy the entire 1st Guards. MSD in order to destroy the enemy in the Tashirovo area, if the division had been fighting a bloody battle for 24 hours in direct contact with the enemy in the urban areas of Naro-Fominsk?

The headquarters of the Western Front, apparently, at that time did not fully control the situation that had developed in the Naro-Fominsk direction.

It was not only the 33rd Army that had a hard time. All the armies of the Western Front put up fierce resistance to the enemy with all their might. The troops suffered incredibly heavy losses: divisions, in terms of their numbers and capabilities, became regiments, regiments - battalions, battalions - companies. The number of killed and wounded grew, and the number of missing persons reported in reports was incredibly large. In some formations and units there were several times more of them than the killed and wounded combined.

By the end of the day, not only the 110th SD practically did not exist, but also the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, the remnants of which still continued to resist the enemy in the surrounding forests. The coming night caused the cannonade of the battle to subside somewhat, but everyone understood that the denouement was still ahead. The troops were preparing for further struggle for Naro-Fominsk and its environs. It was hard for everyone: the infantrymen, the artillerymen, and the rear soldiers. Soldiers of all specialties worked with incredible effort to ensure the combat operations of the troops fighting at Naro-Fominsk.

Soldiers of the 22nd separate sapper battalion, under continuous fire, worked throughout the day to restore the Shelomovo-Bekasovo road in order to organize the supply of materiel to army formations and units. Signalmen, doctors, and soldiers from the rear units worked tirelessly.

October 23, 1941

In a combat report to the commander of the Western Front on the results of the day's military operations, sent at 4 a.m., the Military Council of the 33rd Army reported:

"1. During 10/22/41. The enemy conducted an energetic offensive on the TASHIROVO, BALABANOV front, with the main efforts in the direction of NARO-FOMINSK.

2. 1 GMSD, 1289 SP and MAJOR BezZUBOV’S DETACHMENT, advancing in the TASHIROVO, ATEPTSEVO sector, encountered two enemy infantry divisions supported by 27 bombers. One enemy infantry division - 258, was advancing south of the KUZMINKA, NARO-FOMINSK road, and another division, of unknown numbering, was advancing along the road from KUZMINKA and north of it.

As a result of the day's battle, the enemy suffered heavy losses, and by the end of 22.10 our units held the line along the eastern bank of the river. NARA in the area east of ERMAKOVO, dachas south of the city and further south to IVANOVKA. An attempt to intercept roads from NARO-FOMINSK to the north. in the area of ​​ZOSIMOV PUSTIN were suspended, the advanced parts of the encircling column up to the infantry regiment stopped in the forest south of ZOSIMOV PUSTIN. 1 HMSD is preparing a counterattack to capture the western part of the city. The highway to KUBINKA is provided by reconnaissance, reinforced by tanks.

3. According to data delivered at 20.00 on 10/22/41. a pilot from the 110th and 113th divisions, the latter upset by the day's battle with the advancing enemy. 110 SD with a force of up to 200 fighters with the remaining artillery (three batteries) was held by KAMENSKOYE. 113 SD, up to 400 soldiers, retreated under enemy pressure to the edges of the forest east of the ARISTOVO, MASHKOVO line. The position of these divisions is being clarified by Shtarm.

4. I have no reports about the actions of the 151st MSBR and 222nd division. According to Shtarm, the 151st MSBR retreated to ARKHANGELSK by 13.00 on 22.10.

(Commander of the 33rd Army) (Lieutenant General M. EFREMOV.")

At night, a message was received from the front headquarters about the condition and location of units of the 110th and 113th SD, in search of which one of the officers of the front operational department was sent.

“COMMANDARM 33 EFREMOV

According to the liaison officer of the Front Headquarters, the 110th SD occupies the defense of KAMENSKOE, RYZHKOVO, and KLOVO headquarters.

Position at 16.30 22.10. there is no enemy in front of the front. The enemy on the right flank of the division occupies ATEPTSEVO, SLIZNEVO. At the front, the defense is occupied by only 200 people, according to HO-1 of Stadiv 110, where the rest of the people, he does not know, are supposedly gathering somewhere. The division has no food or fire supplies.

113 SD at the same time 16.30 22.10 occupied defense on the eastern forest front. ARISTOVO, forest east. STARO-MIKHAILOVSKOE, ALOPOVO. Stand 113 - elevation. 160.8 southwest SAVELOVKA.

The enemy in front of the division on the right flank is up to 2 companies, in the center there are small groups, on the left flank there are up to 3 battalions with individual tanks.

In the division, in the regiments on the line of defense, the right-flank regiment has 150 people, the central regiment has 175 people, and the left-flank regiment has 90 people. The artillery has absolutely no shells and very little ammunition. There is no food in the division. According to the division commander, the vehicles sent for shells and food had not yet arrived by 16.30 and he did not know where they were.

COMFRONT ORDERED:

Send a member of the Army Military Council with commanders to the division to restore order in the divisions and take immediate measures to provide the divisions with food and fire supplies.

Establish regular communications with division delegates, radio and communications aircraft.

Deliver the execution.

(SOKOLOVSKY, KAZBINTSEV.")

In the morning, a messenger arrived from the commander of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, who conveyed a report from the brigade commander about the results of the battle over the past day, which allowed the army headquarters to obtain some information about the state of affairs in the brigade.

"TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 33rd ARMY

I report that on October 22, 1941 at 11.00, units of the 151st MSBR occupied the position of: 185 joint venture consisting of 32 people. defended NIKOLAEVKA, securing the right flank of the brigade, 453 SMEs firmly held the line: TAGANOVO - ALEXINO, launching counterattacks three times, knocking out the enemy from the east. banks of the river ISMA (composition of 150 people), 455 SMEs from 2 hours on 10/22/41 together with two squadrons of the 1st OS. KAV. THE REGIMENT defended NOVO-NIKOLSKOYE, NOVO-MIKHAILOVSKOE, preventing the 151st MSBR from encircling from the right flank (the number of 455 MSRBs is 90 people).

On the morning of October 22, 1941, the enemy, in groups up to a battalion company, with mortars, began to penetrate through the brigade’s combat formations on the right flank, trying to reach the VEREYA - DOROKHOVO highway, in the GRibtsovo - NOSODINO section.

I took measures to eliminate the enemy who had broken through - all available reserves were sent out, retreating units of the 50th SD were organized, as a result of which the enemy was stopped.

At 11.00 on October 22, 1941, the enemy, with a force of up to a company of machine gunners, with two machine guns and mortars, attacked the headquarters of the 151st MSBR.

Within 30 min. the headquarters held out, after which I decided to withdraw the headquarters to the forest, since there was no one to defend the headquarters. Having gone out into the forest, he tried to reach his troops in the SIMBUKHOVO district, but this was not possible.

Currently, the units of the brigade are in the following position: 200 people. defend SIMBUKHOVO (453 SMEs and 1 company of 455 SMEs), the remaining units defend the line: GRibtsovo - NIKOLSKOE. The units defending this line include: repair. company 455 SME - up to 100 people in total. The 185th joint venture, operating with the 151st MSBR, having 32 people on October 22, 1941, lost the last ones by the morning of October 23, 1941...

(EFIMOV.")

The 222nd SD fought with the enemy in the Subbotino area, altitude from elev. 224.0, Nazaryevo. Considering the difficult situation in the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, the army commander ordered the division commander, Colonel Novikov, to subjugate the remnants of the brigade and organize defense in this direction. However, soon the situation in the 222nd SD zone, which the enemy began to outflank, deteriorated sharply, and the division command was forced to take urgent measures to avoid encirclement and defeat. There was no longer any talk of interaction with the remnants of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade.

With the onset of dawn, throughout the entire defense zone of the 1st Guards. The MSD again broke out in a fierce battle. The enemy's actions were actively supported by aviation, which throughout the day carried out bombing strikes either on the battle formations of our troops or on artillery firing positions, not forgetting to periodically shoot the rear columns from the air. Separate units of the 175th MRR continued to conduct street battles in residential areas of Naro-Fominsk, repelling fierce enemy attacks. The southwestern part of the city changed hands twice during the day.

Ruins of a shed building. The photo was taken in December 1941, immediately after the liberation of Naro-Fominsk

In the buildings of the spinning and weaving factory and the factory town there was a battle for literally every floor, for every stairwell.

In the afternoon, the enemy, pushing our troops towards the Nara River, “on the shoulders” of the retreating units of the 3rd battalion of the 175th MRR, reached a stone bridge and crossed it to the eastern bank, capturing a bridgehead in the area of ​​the Church of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker. A bloody battle broke out right next to the church, where soldiers of the reconnaissance company were defending themselves. Separate enemy units reached the area of ​​Nara station, where the headquarters of the 6th MRR was located.

By evening, the battle for Naro-Fominsk acquired an even more brutal character. The enemy, unable to withstand the fierce counterattacks of Colonel Lizyukov's guards, was forced to retreat to the west bank by the end of the day. Lizyukov's guards, having gained a foothold on the eastern bank, during a surprise attack, knocked out the enemy from a shed factory building on the territory of a weaving and spinning factory, located in a bend of the Nara River and adjacent to one of the bridges, and took up defense there. Soldiers of the 4th rifle company of the 175th MRR under the command of senior lieutenant A.I. Kudryavtsev and political instructor Dyakov defended this building during the entire period of the battle for Naro-Fominsk.

A small detachment of the 175th MRR under the command of battalion commissar A. M. Myachikov also successfully completed its task. The detachment drove the Germans out of the military town and village of Konopelovka, which the enemy occupied the night before. The Cuban highway has once again become free for travel.

Church of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker, destroyed during the fighting with the enemy at the end of October 1941.

The remaining formations and units of the army also fought with the enemy all day. The situation in the defense zone of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade continued to be especially difficult. The brigade commander, Major Efimov, having completely lost control over the course of hostilities, after the enemy destroyed the brigade headquarters, abandoned the battlefield and, together with the brigade commissar, senior battalion commissar Pegov, independently arrived at the army headquarters. However, neither he nor the commissar were able to report anything specific about the position and condition of the brigade units. According to unverified data, part of the brigade’s units retreated to the line Simbukhovo, Dorokhovo, while another part operated in the area of ​​the village of Arkhangelskoye.

General Efremov, together with members of the Military Council of the Army, Brigade Commissar Shlyakhtin and Major General Kondratyev, gave a proper assessment of the actions of the commander and commissar of the brigade, qualifying them as a shameful flight from the battlefield. They were given the task of immediately leaving for the brigade, finding and collecting the remaining units and continuing to carry out the assigned combat mission.

The 222nd SD fought all day with units of the 258th Infantry Division, occupying defense along the line: Subbotino, Nazaryevo, Semidvorye, with a front to the south-west. The enemy, with the support of tanks and artillery fire, sought not only to capture the indicated settlements, which were heroically defended by the division’s soldiers together with the remnants of the units of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, but also to encircle parts of the division. In the afternoon, units of the division, under threat of encirclement, were forced to fight to retreat to the area of ​​the settlements of Shubinka and Bavykino. But, despite the measures taken, the enemy still managed to close an encirclement ring around the division.

Late in the evening, the division received the task - in the morning of October 24, to strike in the direction of Slepushkino, Gorki, Maurino, break through the enemy encirclement and reach the Maurino line, the propaganda post school, where to take up defense.

The situation on the left flank of the army continued to be very difficult. The ten-kilometer section of terrain from Ateptsevo to Kamensky was still not occupied by our troops, and only the enemy’s lack of sufficient forces and means did not allow him to move forward and completely cut off the extremely small 110th and 113th SD from the main forces of the army and destroy their.

By order of the commander of the 110th SD, Colonel Gladyshev, the 1287th SP, which by that time had only about 200 people with six 85-mm guns and a battery of anti-tank artillery, took up defense at the line: Kamenskoye, Klovo. There was still no connection with army headquarters, so there was no supply. There had been no food for a long time; we had to count every shell and cartridge. The division's situation was simply catastrophic.

The 113th SD, which had only about 450 soldiers and 9 guns in its units, left its positions at night and, on the orders of the division commander, retreated to the line: Ryzhkovo, Nikolsky Dvors, the forest to the northeast, intercepting the road leading from the Warsaw Highway to Romanovo .

Chief of Army Staff, Major General A.K. Kondratyev. Photo 1938

One of the reasons that significantly complicated the conduct of a stable defense by the formations of the 33rd Army at that time was the fact that they fought the enemy in isolation from each other, under the threat of the enemy flowing around the flanks.

The 151st MSBr held the defense, located four kilometers from the 222nd SD, which, in turn, fought 14 km (!) from the 1st Guards. MSD. The area of ​​terrain not occupied by troops between the 1st MSD and the left-flank divisions was about 10 km. The 113th SD and 110th SD also did not have a continuous front, conducting combat operations at a distance of up to 3 km from each other.

Having analyzed the current situation, Lieutenant General Efremov came to the conclusion that if the gaps between formations are not eliminated, it will be impossible to hold the occupied line. The army commander made a decision by withdrawing units of the 222nd SD and 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade to the river line. Nara, on the Maurino - Lyubanovo sector, join them to the right flank of the 1st Guards. MSD, and having occupied the 110th and 113th SD lines of Baraki, Gorchukhino, Mogutovo, Machikhino, create a continuous line of defense with the 1st Guards. MSD south of Naro-Fominsk. In addition, in order to coordinate the actions of our troops in the area of ​​​​the pioneer camp, located at the fork in the roads to Kubinka and Vereya, the army commander ordered the combined detachment of Major Bezzubov to be reassigned to the commander of the 1st Guards. MSD.

The proposal of the commander of the 33rd Army, despite its apparent expediency, was initially ambiguously assessed by the command of the Western Front, but this time reason won over emotions, and Army General G.K. Zhukov allowed the troops to be withdrawn to the line indicated by General Efremov. At the same time, the front commander quite reasonably demanded that the front line of defense of the 110th and 113th SD should be closer to the river. Nara, for which it was necessary to knock out the enemy from a number of settlements on its eastern bank, which he had previously occupied.

By closing its battle formations and eliminating gaps not occupied by troops, the 33rd Army increased the reliability of its defensive lines, which played an important role in the psychological stability of the troops, who were already tired of fighting, constantly under the threat of being outflanked by the enemy. During October 22 and 23 alone, anti-aircraft artillery units of the army and the front destroyed five enemy aircraft, of which 2 bombers were in the area of ​​the village of Alabino and 3 in the area of ​​the village of Novo-Fedorovka.

October 24, 1941

The third sleepless night of fighting for Naro-Fominsk began. At one o'clock in the morning a telegram unexpectedly arrived from the front headquarters with the following content:

“COMMANDARM 33 EFREMOV

FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY

Divisional Commander 1st MSD LIZYUKOV, COMMISSAR 1st MSD MESHKOV

Comrade STALIN personally ordered the transfer to Comrade. LIZYUKOV and comrade. MESHKOV that he considers it a matter of honor for the 1st MRD to clear NARO-FOMINSK of the enemy by the morning of 24.10. On the execution of this order, Comrade. LIZYUKOV and comrade. Report to MESHKOV on October 24th personally Comrade. STALIN

(ZHUKOV, BULGANIN.")

Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov immediately summoned the commander and commissar of the division, the commanders of the 175th and 6th MRR to the army command post and, in the presence of members of the Army Military Council, informed them of the contents of the telegram. According to eyewitnesses, for a moment there was dead silence in the headquarters premises. None of those present expected such a reaction from the country's leadership to the course of hostilities in the Naro-Fominsk region. The meeting and setting of tasks were extremely short, everyone present understood well what this telegram meant for each of them. It was clear: we must either die or complete the assigned task. It should be noted that in the three days of previous battles for Naro-Fominsk, the division had already lost 1,521 people, including: killed - 115 people, wounded - 386, missing - 1,020.

Report card of the Wehrmacht General Staff. Troop position as of October 24, 1941

In the morning, a fierce battle flared up with renewed vigor. The first to attack were the soldiers of Bezzubov’s detachment, who, according to the army command’s plan, were supposed to divert part of the enemy forces defending on the northeastern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk to themselves in order to facilitate the actions of the rest of the division.

The detachment of Major Bezzubov, reassigned the day before to the commander of the 1st Guards. MSD, made an attempt to force the river. Nara in the area of ​​the Konopelovka dacha, however, having suffered heavy losses and not completing the assigned task, was forced to retreat to the Naro-Fominsk - Kubinka highway.

Units of the 258th Infantry Division, in turn, also made an attempt to reach the eastern bank of the river. Nara, but their attack was repulsed by the artillery fire of the division and the soldiers of Bezzubov’s detachment. A major role in repelling this enemy attack was played by six tanks, which were allocated the day before by the commander of the 5th Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel M. G. Sakhno, on the orders of the commander of the 1st Guards. MSD.

At six o'clock in the morning, after a short artillery preparation, units of the 175th and 6th MRR, in cooperation with tankers of the 5th Tank Brigade, went on the offensive against the enemy defending in the residential areas of the city of Naro-Fominsk. Particular hope was placed on the tankers. The infantry actions were supported by thirteen T-34 tanks: the 175th Small Rifle Regiment was assigned 7 tanks, the 6th Small Rifle Regiment - 6. Several volleys of Guards mortars were fired at the German units defending along the western bank of the river.

However, as soon as our units went on the attack, the enemy immediately opened hurricane mortar and rifle-machine gun fire, his artillery carried out several strong fire raids on the front line and command posts of units and subunits on the eastern bank of the river. Nara. But, despite this, the battalions of the 175th SME, which consisted of about 500 people, were able to reach the factory railway line by 9 o’clock in the morning. The enemy intensified fire on our attacking units and, by transferring some troops from unattacked areas, was able to slow down the regiment's advance. Soon, during the counterattack he carried out, the 3rd battalion found himself surrounded, fighting in one of the residential areas in the city center.

The 6th MRR, advancing to the left, slowly advanced towards the city center from the southwestern side. The enemy's resistance was growing all the time.

By 2 p.m., the advance of both regiments was completely stopped by the enemy. The battle became bloody and protracted. Soon information was received that the 2nd battalion of the 6th MRP, having lost more than half of its personnel, began to retreat to the river under pressure from the 479th PP. Nara.

From radio interceptions of enemy communications, it became known that units of the 258th Infantry Division defending Naro-Fominsk were expecting reinforcements to arrive in the near future. The division command was forced to send a report to army headquarters, which said:

“The division has no reserves; motorized rifle regiments suffered significant losses in personnel.

The approach of new enemy units will put the division in a difficult position."

But the army commander was in no hurry to give the command to retreat, and only an hour and a half later, when it became clear that further continuation of the offensive was pointless, Colonel Lizyukov received the order to retreat to his original position.

At 6 p.m., Bezzubov’s detachment made a second attempt to cross the river. Nara on his left flank in the area of ​​the brick factory. The attack was preceded by an artillery fire raid from two divisions of the 486th Civil Aviation Regiment, but the task was again unsuccessful. The detachment retreated to its original position, taking up defense along the eastern bank of the Nara River, at the line: excl. Tashirovo, Gorodishche.

By the end of the day, the 4th rifle company of the 175th MP, under the command of Senior Lieutenant Kudryavtsev, continued to hold one of the buildings of the weaving and spinning factory, while the remaining units were engaged in a firefight with the enemy, located near the river. The enemy conducted heavy artillery fire, trying to force the division's units to retreat to the eastern bank of the river. Nara. The 3rd battalion of the regiment, numbering about 40 people, managed to escape from the encirclement, was withdrawn to the reserve of the regiment commander and took up defense along the eastern bank of the Nara River.

The 6th MRR with one rifle battalion continued to fight on the southern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk. Two other battalions held the line: excl. Nara station, Afanasovka, Ivanovka, covering the left flank of the division.

At 19:45, when the army commander was at the OP of the 1st Guards. MSD, a new telegram has arrived from the Military Council of the Western Front:

"T. EFREMOV

FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 1st MRD Comrade LIZYUKOV, TO THE COMMISSAR OF THE 1st MRD MESHKOV

T. LIZYUKOV and Comrade MESHKOV have still not reported anything about the execution of Comrade STALIN’s order. Send the report immediately and provide us with a copy.

(ZHUKOV, BULGANIN.")

But there was, in fact, nothing to report. The day of fighting for the city did not bring the desired result, not to mention the fact that the division lost more than 50% of its personnel on the streets of Naro-Fominsk. The total losses of personnel of the combat units of the 6th and 175th MRR over the four days of fighting were enormous and, according to the report of the division headquarters, amounted to up to 70%.

According to radio interception data and the testimony of a captured prisoner, the enemy concentrated his main efforts on capturing bridges across the river. Nara, in order to block the retreat route for division units to the opposite bank and surround them in city blocks on the western bank of the river.

After much deliberation, it was decided to send a telegram with the following content to I.V. Stalin and the headquarters of the Western Front:

"MOSCOW. TOV. STALIN.

COPY OF PRODUCT. ZHUKOV, TOV. BULGANIN.

By 20.00 he captured the northern, western, northwestern, central and southeastern parts of the city of NARO-FOMINSK. Stubborn fighting continues. We'll give you the details in code.

(LIZYUKOV, MESHKOV 10.24.41. 21.40 ".)

For some time after sending this telegram, everyone waited with bated breath for the reaction of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the commander of the Western Front to the report of the command of the 1st Guards. MSD. However, there was no answer to it and no additional questions to the division command either from I.V. Stalin or from Army General Zhukov.

At this time, no less bloody battles continued in other sectors of the front. The 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade defended itself with separate strongholds at the front: excl. Lyakhovo, Yastrebovo, Yumatovo, Radchino. According to unverified data, no more than 600 soldiers and commanders remained alive in the brigade.

The 222nd SD, consisting of about four thousand soldiers and commanders, completed the task set by the army commander and fought out of the encirclement, breaking through the enemy’s defenses in the Shubinka-Bavykino sector. By the end of the day, the division's regiments were occupying defenses at the line:

774th SP - Maurino, excl. Lyubanovo;

479th SP - Lyubanovo, school north of Tashirov.

According to intelligence data, in the area of ​​the village. Tashirovo was located before the enemy infantry battalion with tanks, and in the village of Novinskoye - up to the infantry company.

By order of the army commander, the Moscow marching battalion of 1,275 people, intended to replenish the 110th SD, covered the gap between the 1st Guards. MSD and 110th SD, taking up defense at the line: barracks, then along the edge of the forest northeast of the settlements of Gorchukhino and Ateptsevo.

Commander of the 110th Infantry Division, Colonel I. I. Matusevich. Post-war photo

In the morning, army headquarters was finally able to establish contact with the headquarters of the 110th and 113th Infantry Divisions, thanks to which comprehensive information was obtained about their condition and location. The acting chief of army logistics, Lieutenant Colonel A.N. Lagovsky, was given the task of preparing transport with food and ammunition to be sent to the division.

The 1287th SP of the 110th SD continued to occupy the defense in the Kamensky area, the rear and headquarters units of the division were in the Shalamovo, Myza, Sotnikovo area. The division headquarters was located in the village of Sotnikovo. In total, the division had 2,653 soldiers and commanders.

According to the report of the division commander, the 1291st joint venture, consisting of 691 people, was putting itself in order while in the village of Puchkovo. How he ended up there, 40 km northeast of Naro-Fominsk, only God knows.

Colonel I. I. Matusevich immediately received a task from the army commander: on October 25, with the available forces and means, in cooperation with the 1st Guards. MSD, destroy the enemy in the area of ​​Chukhino, Ateptsevo, Sliznevo and capture the line: Gorchukhino, Ateptsevo, Sliznevo, then advance in the direction of Nefedovo and by the end of the day reach the line: Kozelskoye, Ivakino. The depth of the task was about 15 km.

It is difficult to say how General Efremov motivated his decision, setting, in fact, such an impossible task for the demoralized division. Of course, it was necessary to take the initiative into one’s own hands and improve the general situation in the combat zone, but by setting such tasks it was possible, at best, to lose the fighting spirit in the troops, and at worst, to lose the last combat units of the division.

The situation in the 113th SD remained difficult. The division's regiments, which still did not have military numbers, took up defensive positions at the line:

2nd joint venture, numbering 150 people with 4 light and 2 heavy machine guns and 4 guns - Kamenskoye, Klovo;

1st SP - height from elevation. 208.3, road from the village of Romanovo to the village of Savelovka;

The 3rd joint venture defended Romanovo, covering the roads leading from Romanovo to Panino and Shibarovo.

The division's sapper battalion covered the ford east of Ryzhkovo.

The enemy pulled up reserves from the depths, but did not take active actions, with the exception of the area of ​​the height with elevation. 208.3, where up to the infantry company tried to attack the positions occupied by units of the 1st joint venture.

The division had a large shortage of commanders at various levels, including the vacant position of commander of the 3rd joint venture, and the situation with the staffing of headquarters was no better. The chief of staff of the division, Major N. S. Stashevsky, reported to the chief of staff of the army:

“The division headquarters is currently completely understaffed. There is absolutely no staff at the headquarters of the 5th and 4th units; there is no one to deal with logistics issues and personnel accounting.

There are only 4 commanders at the headquarters who do not know the headquarters service.

Regimental and battalion headquarters are also not fully staffed. There are no technical communications equipment, cables, or telephones on the shelves.

I ask you to take urgent measures to staff the headquarters and technical personnel. means of communication."

The commander of the 113th SD, Colonel K.I. Mironov, towards the evening, also received a combat mission for an offensive the next day, and, like the 110th SD, it was absolutely impossible. The division was supposed to, advancing in the direction of Klovo, Shilovo, Lapshinka, capture the line: Shilovo, Aristovo, Alopovo.

In addition to the 110th and 113th SD, they received a combat mission for the offensive of the 1st Guards. MSD and Moscow marching battalion.

With the onset of darkness, the battle for the city of Naro-Fominsk began to slowly subside.

On the day of the battle, according to the report of the division headquarters, the 1st Guards. MSD lost 43 people killed, 97 wounded and 621 missing. Total 761 soldiers and commanders. This was the terrible result of just one day of battle for one division.

The very large number of missing persons (in this case - 81.6%) clearly demonstrates the complete apathy of the soldiers and commanders towards their fate. The stupidity and futility of daily attacks carried out by commanders only so that the senior commander would not reproach them for inactivity gave rise to people's indifference to what was happening: they hated the enemy and no longer wanted to live. Therefore, the weakest Red Army soldiers and junior commanders in terms of psychological stability stopped resistance at the first opportunity and surrendered. Captivity for many of them was deliverance from the daily hell of war and bacchanalia that was happening in units and formations during that period.

75% of the total number of missing persons accounted for soldiers and commanders who surrendered, and only 25% for those whose death on the battlefield went unnoticed by their comrades in the heat of the fight against the enemy, as well as the wounded who were captured unkindly will, but according to the circumstances of the combat situation.

October 25, 1941

From early morning the battle flared up with renewed vigor. Throughout the first half of the day, units of the 1st Guards. The MSD not only had no progress, but also had difficulty holding back attacks from superior enemy forces, being subjected to severe artillery and mortar fire. At about 2 p.m., the enemy launched an air strike on our troops with a group of up to 25 aircraft and launched a decisive attack.

The 175th MRR, which had only about 250 people before the start of the battle and defended itself in houses and buildings directly near the river bank, suffered heavy losses and was soon forced to retreat to the opposite bank.

Two companies of the 2nd battalion of the 6th MRP with a platoon of tanks fought all day on the southern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk. One company held the defense at Nara station.

The 1st battalion with three tanks, occupying defenses in the barracks area on the southern outskirts of the city, covered the Kiev highway.

The 3rd battalion defended the settlements of Afanasovka and Ivanovka.

During the battle during the day, the tankers of the 5th Tank Brigade lost 5 tanks.

The unknown village of Novo-Fedorovka became the home of four command posts that day: the 33rd Army, the 1st Guards. MSD, 175th MRP and 5th Tank Brigade.

The archive preserves an interesting document from that time, which allows us to assess the state and capabilities of the formations of the 33rd Army at that time. For some unknown reason, there is no data on the status of the 110th SD, communication with which has already been established.

Information on the combat and numerical strength of the formations of the 33rd Army as of October 25, 1941.

Name of connections	Beginning compound	Private and Jr. beginning compound	Total	Screw. and auto. screw.	Art. pool.	Manual pool.	Mortars
1st Guards MSD	857	7712	8569	6732	92	181	57
151 MSBR	124	991	1115*	942	3	13	-
113 SD	185	990	1175	1003	2	6	-
222 SD	360	3032	3392	1934	17	25	6
Replenishment for the 1st Guards. MSD	21	2208	2229	-	-	-	-
For the army	1547	14 933	16 480	11 613	130	247	63

* The data does not correspond to the true state of affairs. There were no more than 600 people left in the brigade. - Note author.

What is striking is the fact that for 12,725 soldiers and junior commanders of the 113th, 222nd SD and 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade there are only 11,613 rifles and machine guns, i.e. 735 people did not have small arms at that time.

The commander of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, Major Efimov, together with the commissar and the surviving commanders and political workers, tried throughout the day to somehow organize the battle of their scattered units, but little came of it.

By the end of the day, the headquarters of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade found itself in Sofyino, a village located in the north of the Nara Ponds, outside the combat zone of the brigade and the 33rd Army, in the defense zone of the 5th Army, and also at a considerable distance from the subordinate battalions. It was from there that Major Efimov’s report came about the state of affairs in the brigade, which indicated that there was no defense as such in the brigade’s zone. From everything it was felt that both the commander and the commissar of the brigade were in complete confusion. The uncertainty of the brigade’s command was transferred to subordinate units, which were not particularly psychologically stable anyway, more than once leaving their positions without orders or apparent circumstances.

Not paying attention to such a deplorable state of affairs in the brigade, the army commander ordered Major Efimov in the morning with part of his forces to go on the offensive and knock out the enemy from the settlements of Kryukovo and Bolshie Gorki. Major Efimov, together with the brigade commissar, battalion commissar Pegov, took all measures to carry out the received order from the army commander. Surprisingly, by the morning they managed not only to find the commanders of the 453rd and 455th MSB, but also to assign the battalion commanders the task of capturing the villages of Kryukovo and Bolshie Gorki, and also to provide assistance in resolving a number of issues related to the organization of the offensive. Finally, we managed to feed the personnel, who in recent days had been eating only what they could get from the local population.

As one would expect, the left-flank divisions were unable to complete their assigned task of capturing the line on the opposite bank of the Nara River.

The 110th SD reached the approaches to the settlements of Gorchukhino, Ateptsevo, Sliznevo, where it was stopped by mortar fire from the enemy defending in these settlements, and artillery fire from the opposite bank of the river. Nara. By the end of the day, units of the division moved to the defense of the line, which ran along the edge of the forest northeast of the indicated settlements. Based on the size, capabilities and condition of the division, this was already an undoubted success, although the army command was extremely dissatisfied with the fact that the division did not complete its assigned task.

The 113th SD, which, according to the report of the division headquarters, consisted of “... 1330 people with 1052 rifles,” after an unsuccessful attack on Kamenskoye, Klovo, Ryzhkovo, moved to the defense of the line that ran along the edge of the forest northeast of these settlements.

Despite the fact that the 110th and 113th rifle divisions did not complete the combat mission set by the army commander, they managed to achieve the main thing: the left flank of the army acquired a certain stability, and the units operating here were able to enter into tactical and fire communication with each other, which was very important in this difficult environment.

October 26, 1941

1st Guards The MSD continued to engage the enemy throughout the day. By the end of the day, units of the 175th MP managed to capture the village near the Berezovka stream, located on the eastern bank of the Nara River, which was controlled by units of the 479th PP of the 258th Infantry Division for two days.

Active combat operations of the army troops that day took place on the right flank of the army, in the zone of the 151st MSBr, despite the fact that the units that were part of the brigade were extremely small in number and fought at a considerable distance from each other.

The brigade, which at that time numbered only about 600 soldiers and commanders, occupied a 14 km long defense line from Lyakhov (near the Mozhaisk highway) to Radchino (east of Golovkovo). The brigade headquarters was still located in Sofyino near the Nara Ponds, 8 km from the front line.

At 6 o'clock in the morning, the 453rd MSB, with the support of two T-26 tanks remaining in service, from the state farm Golovkovo, Radchino went on the offensive against the enemy defending in the village of Kryukovo. The enemy met our attacking units with heavy artillery and mortar fire. The battle became protracted, but the battalion's units, despite the losses, slowly moved forward.

As the battalion approached Kryukovo, the enemy, with a force of up to one and a half companies of infantry, supported by mortar fire, unexpectedly carried out a strong counterattack, as a result of which the 3rd company and the battalion headquarters were cut off from the rest of the units and, suffering heavy losses, retreated to Yakshino. The first and second companies, surrounded, continued to fight the enemy and almost completely died on this field.

At 15:00, the newly formed 455th MSB from different groups of soldiers and commanders, numbering 131 people, also began an attack on the village of Kryukovo from the direction of the hospital, but the enemy did not allow him to even approach the village.

The 454th MSB, with 255 men, continued to hold the occupied defense area west of Brykin during the day, conducting fire combat with the enemy.

The 1st Cavalry Regiment, which was in the reserve of the brigade commander, in the area southwest of Zhikharev, did not take part in the hostilities and only towards the end of the day, having allocated a detachment of 80 dismounted cavalry with machine guns and guns, made an unsuccessful attempt in cooperation with 774 - SP 222nd SD to knock out the enemy from the village of Maurino.

Thus, the attempt of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade to fulfill the task set by the army headquarters to capture Kryukovo and Bolshie Gorki ended in complete failure. Having suffered significant losses, parts of the brigade were forced to retreat to their original position.

The 774th and 479th SPs of the 222nd SD occupied defense along the eastern bank of the Nara River at the same line: from Maurin to the school north of Tashirov.

The attempt made by the 774th joint venture, together with a unit of the 1st cavalry regiment, to capture Maurino failed. The enemy stopped their advance with strong machine-gun and mortar fire at the edge of the forest, 700 m north of Maurin, and did not allow the attackers to even approach the village. The division headquarters was located in Myakishev.

At night, at 3:30 a.m., the 110th SD, unexpectedly for the enemy, went on the offensive, with the task of capturing the settlements of Gorchukhino, Ateptsevo, and Sliznevo. The detachment under the command of the assistant chief of staff of the 1291st Infantry Regiment, Captain S.G. Izakson, acted rapidly, whose fighters and commanders in the morning, during a fierce attack, knocked out the enemy from the village of Gorchukhino and gained a foothold in the village.

On the left flank of the division, during a bayonet attack, one of the units broke into the village of Sliznevo. Some time later, the enemy, having brought up reinforcements, launched a counterattack with the support of four tanks and forced our soldiers to retreat to their original position, to the edge of the forest west of Sliznevo.

At 4 o'clock in the morning, units of the 113th SD launched an attack on the enemy defending in the village. Kamenskoye and south of it. However, the enemy repelled their attack without much difficulty, and during the counterattack forced our units to retreat to the eastern bank of the Nara River, occupying the village of Romanovo, which had previously been defended by one of the battalions of the 3rd joint venture, and the dominant heights at elevation. 208.3, where one of the companies of the 1st joint venture occupied the defense. Thus, the division not only failed to complete its assigned task, but was also forced to leave to the enemy part of the territory it had previously occupied.

October 27, 1941

Having received information that the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade failed to complete the assigned task of capturing Kryukov and Bolshie Gorki, the army commander, General Efremov, ordered the chief of staff of the army, General A.K. Kondratyev, to immediately send an order to the brigade commander: by the end of the day, no matter what. began to take control of the settlement of Bolshie Gorki.

Having received the order from the army commander, the brigade commander, Major Efimov, sent the commander of the 454th MSB a short combat order:

"COMMANDER 454 SME

Completing the task of capturing MAURINO - GORKI is a condition for completing the task of the entire army.

I ORDER:

MAURINO - master the roller coaster at any cost, at any cost. To persons who do not comply with the order, apply all measures in full, using all their rights...

(Commander of the 151st MSBR, Major EFIMOV. 10/27/41.")

The brigade again received an obviously impossible order from the army command. Major Efimov, setting the task for the battalion commander to capture the settlements of Maurino and Gorki, of course, understood that the battalion, having 270 people, without artillery support had no way to capture these settlements, but he could not do anything.

At this time, the 454th MSB occupied defense in the Brykin area, located 11 km from the village of Bolshie Gorki and 9 km from Maurin. The distance between these settlements was about 5 km. In addition, on the way to Bolshie Gorki there was a village. Kryukovo, that is, it was first necessary to destroy the German units defending in Kryukovo, and only after that continue the attack on Bolshie Gorki.

The battalion's successive offensive, first on Maurino and then on Bolshaya Gorki, was also fraught with great difficulties, since even in the event of a successful battle for Maurino, the subsequent attack on Bolshie Gorki would most likely have been repulsed by enemy fire defending in Kryukov, as this and it was done by him the day before.

While the command of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade was preparing for the attack on Maurino and Bolshie Gorki, the army headquarters received a directive from the Military Council of the Western Front dated October 27, 1941 by telegraph, which was ordered to be immediately brought to the attention of the formation and unit commanders:

“The Military Council of the Front considered the decision of the Military Council of the 33rd ARMY of October 23, 1941 on the issue of the commander of the 151st MSBR, Major EFIMOV, and the Military Commissar of the brigade, PEGOV, leaving his brigade.

The Military Council of the 33rd ARMY, having qualified the act of EFIMOV and PEGOV as a shameful flight from the battlefield and a treacherous act dooming the 151st BRIGADE to complete collapse, at the same time, by the above decree, instructed EFIMOV and PEGOV to immediately go to the formation to carry out a combat mission and assemble a unit.

The military council of the front considers such a decision harmful and objectively provocative, allowing for desertion and even betrayal while leaving such commanders and commissars in their places.

The decision of the Military Council of the 33rd ARMY, in this regard, is cancelled.

The front prosecutor and the Head of the Special Department of the Front should immediately go to the 33rd ARMY, conduct an investigation into this matter and, if the desertion of EFIMOV and PEGOV is confirmed from the field, immediately shoot them in front of the commanders.

The commander of the 33rd ARMY, EFREMOV, and the Member of the Military Council of the 33rd ARMY, Shlyakhtin, are severely reprimanded with a warning that in the future, for their conciliatory attitude towards such shameful behavior of commanders and political workers, they themselves will be removed from their posts and put on trial.

Bring this decision to the attention of the Military Councils of armies, commanders and commissars of divisions, formations and units.

(ZHUKOV, BULGANIN.")

The fate of the command of the 151st MSBR was decided, but neither Major Efimov nor the senior battalion commissar Pegov knew anything about this and continued to take measures to fulfill the task set by the army commander.

Leaving the previously occupied defense sector completely unprotected, units of the 454th MSB marched throughout the night of October 27 to the Maurin area, where they arrived at 4 o’clock in the morning. The commander and commissar of the brigade were at the command post of the cavalry regiment on the outskirts of the village of Zhikharevo and from there they supervised the preparation of the brigade for the attack on Maurino. Despite the fact that the army commander ordered to drive the enemy out of Maurino on October 27, Major Efimov decided to launch an offensive on the morning of October 28, due to the fact that the battalion was unable to conduct an offensive due to the fatigue of its personnel after a night march in completely impassable conditions.

Units of the 454th MSB, together with part of the forces of the 1st separate cavalry regiment, spent the whole day putting themselves in order, conducting reconnaissance and preparing for the attack on Maurino, where, according to intelligence, the enemy battalion was defending. However, the forces and means to capture the populated area, which the enemy had turned into a well-equipped stronghold with a well-thought-out fire system, were clearly not enough. From the eastern side, units of the 774th SP of the 222nd SD were supposed to attack Maurino.

In the midst of preparing the units for the offensive, representatives of the army headquarters, the Special Department and the Military Tribunal of the Western Front arrived at the brigade, who had in their hands a copy of the directive of the commander of the Western Front, received in the morning. Along with them arrived a new brigade commander, Major Kuzmin, and a new commissar, senior political instructor Yablonsky.

Major Efimov and senior political instructor Pegov were immediately removed from command of the brigade and arrested.

The 222nd SD, continuing to defend the occupied defense zone, part of the forces of the 774th SP was preparing for an attack on Maurino from the eastern side.

1st Guards The MSD continued the battle for Naro-Fominsk, although it had long been clear that the city could not be recaptured from the enemy with the available forces and means. The reinforcement received at night, in the amount of 533 people, was immediately distributed into parts, and already on the same day the bulk of it took part in the battles for the city.

Realizing how much attention the command of the Western Front and the Supreme High Command paid to the course of military operations for Naro-Fominsk, the army command was forced to conduct meaningless military operations on the southwestern outskirts of the city and send reports to the front headquarters of the corresponding content, in which there were more illusions than truth:

“...1 MSD - no significant changes in location. He is fighting stubbornly for the final capture of the city...”

Of course, there could be no talk of any capture of the city. The enemy's 258th Infantry Division managed to turn the city into a strong stronghold, also concentrating significant reserves west of Naro-Fominsk. A significant amount of artillery weapons allowed the German units, already at the initial stage of the offensive of our units, to inflict heavy losses on them from a long distance.

By the end of the day, the situation in the combat zone of the 1st Guards. The MSD has not changed. The division had to conduct combat operations with an eye on the flanks, which were not sufficiently protected. There was no contact with neighbors, although there was no particular reason to count on their help in case of emergency. The reinforcements allocated to the division could not make up for its losses, both in quantity and especially in quality. The formation of a division's battle formation in one echelon on a wide front, with the allocation of a minimum reserve, did not allow it to have a sufficient number of forces and means in the direction of concentration of the main efforts, which doomed its actions to failure in advance.

In the afternoon another encrypted telegram arrived from the headquarters of the Western Front:

“COMMANDARM EFREMOV

DIVISION COMMANDER LIZYUKOV

Your actions to take over NARO-FOMINSK are completely wrong. Instead of encircling and isolating the enemy in the city, you chose protracted, grueling street battles, in which you also use tanks, as a result of which you suffer huge losses in people and tanks.

I ORDER:

By attacking the flanks of 1st GMSD, push back the ave in the southern and south-west. directions, isolate the enemy occupying part of the city, and block part of the forces, thus destroying the city.

I prohibit the use of tanks in the city.

(ZHUKOV, BULGANIN, SOKOLOVSKY.")

The headquarters of the Western Front, apparently, still did not know and did not understand the full complexity of the situation in the Naro-Fominsk region, not even trying to realize that, drained of blood by heavy losses during continuous, multi-day battles, the formations of the 33rd Army were holding back the onslaught with their last strength enemy, and there was no need to talk about active offensive actions.

Deadly tired during the six-day battles with the enemy, having practically taken no food during this time except bread, the Red Army soldiers and junior commanders sometimes fell asleep in their hastily constructed trenches and cells right during the battle.

The 110th SD, continuing to restore the combat effectiveness of its units and subunits, conducted active combat operations in small groups of trained soldiers and commanders separated from the battalions, giving the enemy no rest. The battalion of the 1287th joint venture continued to hold the village of Gorchukhino, which was repeatedly attacked by the enemy. The battle for this settlement, which at times turned into bayonet battles, continued throughout the day, but the enemy failed to capture it.

In the morning, part of the units of the 1287th and 1291st joint ventures and a combined company of the Moscow marching rifle battalion launched an attack on Sliznevo. Setting an example for the soldiers and commanders, the attack was personally led by the division commander, Colonel I. I. Matusevich and the division military commissar V. V. Kilosanidze. The enemy, having met the attackers with strong machine-gun and mortar fire, forced them to lie down and then retreat to their original position. A repeated attack on Sliznevo, carried out at night, also did not produce positive results.

In his report to the army commander about the main reasons for the division’s unsuccessful actions to capture the village of Sliznevo, the division commander, Colonel Matusevich, reported:

“The main reasons for failure are:

a) lack of artillery fire, mortars, and especially machine guns; the existing 120-mm mortars are not provided with mines;

b) the lack of communications means does not make it possible to use divisional artillery fire from closed OPs. Firing from closed positions is impossible, since the guns are disabled by enemy mortar fire;

c) a large shortage of command personnel and their inability to manage and lead troops, as a result of which, operating in forested areas, units are scattered throughout the forest and this command staff cannot gather them.

As a result of extreme fatigue during the continuous conduct of hostilities, with insufficient technical equipment, staff shortages, constant understaffing from different units by Red Army soldiers assembled in barrage detachments, irregular supply of food, lack of hot food (no kitchens, insufficient number of transport, extremely poor condition of roads) stability in battle is weak."

The 3rd SP of the 113th SD, which had left Romanovo the day before, received an order from the division commander to drive the enemy out of the village. Having reached the eastern edge of the forest northeast of Romanov, the attacking units were met by strong mortar and rifle-machine gun fire from the enemy and were unable to complete the assigned task, losing about 60 people killed and wounded. The actions of the 2nd joint venture in the offensive in the direction of the village of Iklinskoye were equally unsuccessful. After several unsuccessful attacks, Colonel Mironov gave the order to the unit commanders to retreat to their original position.

The strength of the division's combat units continued to remain extremely low. At that time, the 1st joint venture had only 15 people (!) in its rifle battalions, the 2nd joint venture - 108 people, and the 3rd joint venture - 220.

One cannot help but admire the courage and resilience of these people who, being in inhumane conditions, fought day and night, holding back the onslaught of German troops rushing towards Moscow. But it is necessary to take into account that in order to conduct combat operations, it was also necessary to deliver ammunition, food, military-technical and other necessary equipment to the formations and units of the army. The condition of the roads at that time, as well as the weather, not only made it difficult to transport material resources, but simply turned this event into an impossible task. Probably, nature itself, God himself, realizing the scale of this universal catastrophe called the Second World War, seemed to reconcile people, forcing them to stop this bloody massacre.

“...The roads in the army zone are impassable, even for horse-drawn vehicles; vehicle movement is only possible along the highway.

Delivery of ammunition to the left flank of the army of 110 and 113 SD is carried out manually at a distance of 20–25 km."

October 28, 1941

Early in the morning, units of the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division began, as it turned out later, the last attempt to drive the enemy out of Naro-Fominsk.

The division's combined detachment, composed of soldiers of the 175th MRR and tankers of the 12th tank regiment of the 5th Tank Brigade, under the overall command of the commander of the 175th MRR, Major N.P. Baloyan, was supposed to break through the city to the southwestern outskirts and gain a foothold there.

In the pre-dawn twilight, tanks with a landing force of infantry rushed at high speeds along the stone bridge into the city center, but the enemy was on alert and immediately opened strong barrage fire. The sky lit up with rockets. Only the first vehicles that managed to use the surprise factor were able to jump across the bridge and break into the city. The remaining tanks were hit and set on fire by enemy artillery near the main building of the weaving and spinning factory. The KB tank under the command of Lieutenant G. Khetagurov was able to penetrate the furthest into the enemy’s defenses, but he, too, having received damage, was forced to retreat to the factory building, where the soldiers of Senior Lieutenant Kudryavtsev’s company occupied the defense.

The small battalions of the division, having gone on the offensive, immediately came under heavy enemy fire. Having advanced four hundred meters forward, to the area of ​​the city hospital, they were stopped by the enemy and, suffering heavy losses, fought with him at the reached line.

At the same time, units of the 1289th joint venture under the command of Major Bezzubov crossed the Nara River in the area of ​​the Konopelovka dacha, trying to seize a small bridgehead on the western bank. At the cost of heavy losses, the regiment was able to gain a foothold on the opposite bank, but strong machine-gun and mortar fire from the enemy prevented it from moving forward.

Every two hours, reports were sent to army headquarters on the state of affairs and the progress of the assigned task, but there was nothing significant in these reports - the offensive was clearly stalled. The enemy did not let them raise their heads; the division’s units paid too high a price for every meter of conquered territory, but an order is an order, and it had to be carried out. There is no doubt about the ferocity of the battles for Naro-Fominsk on this day, all the more surprising are the reporting documents of the headquarters of the 1st Motorized Rifle Division, studying which one might think that no military operations took place in the Naro-Fominsk area on that day.

From the operational report of the headquarters of the 1st Guards. MSD No. 012 at 16.00 10.28.41:

“...Loss of personnel for 10/28/41 according to indicative data:

175 MP lost killed - 1, wounded - 36; 6 MP lost killed - 6, wounded - 23; 5 TBR and 13 AP have no personnel losses.”

For 9 hours of continuous battle, when the regiments, according to the report of the division headquarters, could not raise their heads due to strong artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire from the enemy, without any progress, the losses of the division units amounted to only 7 people killed.

The 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, with the forces of the 454th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 1st Separate Cavalry Regiment, in cooperation with the battalion of the 774th SP of the 222nd SD, early in the morning, after a short artillery preparation carried out by the artillery forces of the 222nd Division, launched an attack on Maurino . Despite heavy losses, soldiers of the 454th MSB and dismounted cavalrymen of the 1st Cavalry Regiment burst into the northern outskirts of Maurino at 11 o’clock and began a battle with the enemy in the village. There was a desperate struggle for every house.

Taking advantage of the brigade’s success, units of the 774th SP of the 222nd SD burst into the eastern outskirts of Maurino. However, the enemy did not even think of retreating. Having pulled up a company of infantry from Kryukov, the enemy, with a strong counterattack, supported by mortar fire, forced the soldiers of the 454th MSB and the cavalrymen of the 1st Cavalry Regiment to retreat to its northern outskirts. By this time, parts of the brigade had suffered very heavy losses: out of 250 soldiers and commanders who took part in the attack on Maurino, no more than 60 people remained alive.

At 6 p.m., German artillery launched a heavy fire attack on the northern outskirts of Maurino and forced the remnants of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade to retreat to the edge of the forest 500 m north and east of the village. Somewhat earlier, the battalion of the 774th SP retreated to its original position. Despite the heroism and courage of the fighters and commanders, Maurin was not captured.

The position of the brigade's battalions was very difficult. Almost continuous battles with the enemy for two weeks, lack of normal nutrition, large losses among personnel, and especially among the command staff of the unit, platoon and company led to complete moral and physical exhaustion of the soldiers and commanders. Battalions and companies existed only on paper.

In the 455th MSB, after two days of fighting for Kryukovo, only 40 people remained in the ranks.

While the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade was fighting the enemy for Maurino, the headquarters of the 5th and 33rd armies were fighting over who would have the brigade at their disposal. In the afternoon, a telegram was received from the headquarters of the Western Front, in which her fate finally seemed to be decided. According to the order of the commander of the Western Front, it became part of the 33rd Army.

The chief of staff of the 33rd Army, Major General A. Kondratyev, sent a telegram with the following content to the headquarters of the 151st MSBr and the 5th Army:

“TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 151st IRBM

copy: TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH ARMY

According to a telegram from the headquarters of the Western Front, the 151st MSBR becomes completely subordinate to the 33rd ARMY.

THE COMMANDER ORDERED:

1. The brigade should be immediately regrouped on the right flank of the 222nd SD in the area of ​​LYUBANOVO, MAURINO..."

However, the liaison officer, who went to the headquarters of the 5th Army with the text of this telegram, brought it back with a resolution from the chief of staff of the 5th Army, Major General A. A. Filatov:

“CHIEF OF STAFF 33 A

Based on personal negotiations with the chief of staff of the FRONT 151 BRIGADE, the BRIGADE temporarily remains in place until the final decision of the Comfront.”

The final decision was made at night. For an unknown reason, the front commander, General Zhukov, changed his initial decision and gave the order to reassign the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade to the commander of the 5th Army.

Units of the 222nd SD fought with the enemy all day. The offensive of the battalion of the 774th SP in cooperation with part of the forces of the 151st MSBr on Maurino was repulsed by the enemy. An attempt by the 779th joint venture, together with part of the units of the 774th joint venture, to drive the enemy out of Tashirov also ended unsuccessfully.

By the end of the day, the 110th SD captured Sliznev.

The army commander, General Efremov, reported to the front headquarters in a combat report for the day:

“...During the attack on SLIZNEVO, exceptionally courageous and decisive actions of soldiers and commanders were noted, who managed to knock out a stubbornly defending enemy, well equipped with automatic weapons, supported by three tanks, from a populated area in the night.”

Part of the division's forces conducted combat operations in the direction of the village. Ateptsevo, however, here the enemy managed to repel the attacks of its units.

During the day, the 113th SD repelled attacks by small enemy units from the Chichkovo direction.

The fighting in the army zone continued until late at night. No one knew that this was the last day of offensive battles of army formations and units against German troops. Within a few hours, the commander of the Western Front would receive an order to go on the defensive.

October 29, 1941

At 2:45 a.m. a telegram from the Military Council of the Western Front was received with the following content:

“TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 33rd ARMY.

You have not completed the task set by the Western Front. You poorly organized and prepared the offensive, as a result of which, without completing the task, you suffered heavy losses.

In this regard, the Military Council of the Western Front considers it useless to continue the offensive.

I ORDER:

at the army front, move to a stubborn defense on the occupied line, continuing to clear NARO-FOMINSK with small detachments.

Create a strong anti-tank defense, echeloned in depth, strengthening it with tanks placed in ambush.

Create a reserve in the army, having it on the NARO-FOMINSK highway.

Immediately begin restoring the army divisions and putting them in order, first of all, the 1st Guards. MSD.

Continue to destroy and exhaust the enemy with small fighter squads.

(ZHUKOV, BULGANIN.")

The army headquarters, in accordance with the telegram from the commander of the Western Front, gave preliminary orders to the army formations to switch to defense on the occupied lines and began to develop a decision on defense and prepare an order.

The 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, together with its defense zone, was transferred to the 5th Army of General Govorov. The brigade's stay as part of the 33rd Army was short-lived, only eleven days, but during this short period its soldiers and commanders, covering the right flank of the army, did not allow the enemy to freely break through to Naro-Fominsk from the northwestern direction. During many days of continuous battles with the enemy, the brigade inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment. There were also significant shortcomings, but who didn’t have them then: both fighters and commanders were just learning to fight for real.

The next day, in his report to the commander of the 5th Army on the results of the combat operations of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade over the past period and the condition of the subordinate units, the new brigade commander, Major Kuzmin, reported:

“As a result of the battles from 13 to 29.10.41. The 151st MSBR suffered very significant losses in personnel and weapons. The personnel of the battalions was replaced almost completely twice, and yet on 10/30/41. battalions consist of from 20 to 60 people. The most difficult situation is with the command staff. The battalions are commanded by junior lieutenants, only one 455th SME is commanded by a senior lieutenant. There are no company commanders, nor platoon commanders. Thus, even if the brigade is replenished with Red Army personnel, it is impossible to create full-fledged battalions, and in the present situation, when the battalions are only designated, the brigade is able to carry out combat missions that are feasible for one or two rifle companies.

In addition to the battalions, the brigade has two T-26 tanks and artillery divisions consisting of 7 guns. I ask you to replenish the brigade with personnel and, first of all, command staff...

(Commander of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, Major KUZMIN.")

A few days later, the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade was disbanded.

The 222nd SD, occupying defense at the line: the edge of the forest north of Maurino, Lyubanovo, the Tashirovo school, part of the forces of the 774th SP was preparing for a new offensive on Maurino.

1st Guards The MSD occupied defense along the eastern bank of the Nara River at the line: excl. Ateptsevo, barracks, a large stone bridge near the Church of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker, a pioneer camp at the Tashirovsky turn.

Units of the division continued to fight in small units on the eastern and northeastern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk, as well as in the area of ​​the weaving and spinning factory, where a rifle company of the 175th MRR held one of the buildings. German troops controlled the main part of the city. Until the enemy company again infiltrated the eastern bank of the Nara River, in the area of ​​the village of Berezovka, threatening a breakthrough to the Moscow-Kyiv highway.

The position of the division's units was as follows:

The 1289th defended the line: excl. Tashirovo school, state farm, Ogorodniki artel, with headquarters in a military town.

The 175th MRR occupied defense along the eastern bank of the Nara River, from the Ogorodniki artel to the railway bridge over the Nara River. The regiment's headquarters was located in the village of Novo-Fedorovka.

The 6th MRR with one battalion covered the crossroads of the Moscow - Kyiv, Naro-Fominsk - Ateptsevo roads, with the other it fought the enemy who had penetrated into the village of Berezovka. Closer to night, the battalion received the task of moving to defense at the line: railway bridge, excl. Gorchukhino. The regiment's headquarters was located in the area of ​​Nara station.

The 110th SD, as a result of an enemy counterattack of up to two companies with three tanks, was forced to leave the village of Sliznevo at 8:30 a.m. Attempts by division units to recapture Sliznevo, made in the afternoon, were unsuccessful, despite the fact that one of the German tanks was knocked out during the battle. By the end of the day, units of the division took up defensive positions along the line: Gorchukhino, the western edge of the forest east of Ateptsev, the edge of the forest east of Sliznev.

The 113th SD defended along the edge of the forest northeast of the settlements of Kamenskoye, Klovo, and Ryzhkovo.

At 9:40 a.m., army commander General Efremov signed a combat order to go on the defensive:

“BATTLE ORDER No. 061. STORM 33. YAKOVLEVSKOYE. 29.10.41.

1. At the army front, the enemy with forces of up to two divisions (part 7 PD, 258 PD and part 3 MD) offers stubborn resistance.

In the coming days we should expect an offensive in the NARO-FOMINSK and TASHIRO-CUBAN directions...

3. 33 ARMY: 222 SD, 1 GV. MSD, 110 and 113 SD, 486 GAP, 557 PAP, 2/364 KAP, 1/109 GAP, 600 AP PTO, 989 AP PTO, 509 AP PTO, 2/13 GV. MIN. DIVISION, 5 DEPARTMENT. GV. MIN. DIVISION, continuing to clear the western part in small detachments. part of the city of NARO-FOMINSK and the left bank of the river. NARA from the enemy, in the morning of 29.10 goes to defense along the left bank of the river. NARA on the section LYUBANOVO (10 km north-west of NARO-FOMINSK), RYZHKOVO (18 km south-east of NARO-FOMINSK).

4. 222 SD with 509 AP PTO, 2/364 KAP and 2/13 GV. MIN DIVISION, airborne. The anti-tank rifle, in cooperation with the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, destroy the enemy in the MAURINO area during 29.10 and move to a stubborn defense along the left bank of the river. NARA on the site: LYUBANOVO, RED TUREYKA (ERMAKOVO); especially tightly occupy the approaches to the CUBAN highway, creating PTR in the areas:

a) LYUBANOVO, NEW;

b) road junction with elevation. 182.5;

c) MAL. SEMYONYCHI, GOLOVENKINO.

Provide a junction with 5 A. Select no less reinforced

battalion reserve division and located in the MAL area. SEMENYCHI...

5. 1 GV. MSD with 600 AP PTO, 486 GAP, 557 PAP, 5 departments. MIN. DIVISION, four anti-tank rifle platoons, continuing to clear the reserve. part of the city of NARO-FOMINSK in small detachments, go to a stubborn defense along the left bank of the river. NARA on the KRASNAYA TUREYKA (ERMAKOVO) site, (claim) GORCHUKHINO. Create PTR in the areas:

a) DACHA KONOPELOVKA (D. O. TUREIKA);

b) east part of NARO-FOMINSK;

c) ALEXANDROVKA;

d) BEKASOVO, ONCE. BEKASOVO. Reinforce the PTR with tanks placed in ambushes.

Have a reserve of an equally reinforced battalion with tanks in the NOVO-FEDOROVKA area...

6. 110 SD with it one shot. PTR during 29.10 destroy the enemy in ATEPTSEVO and move on to a stubborn defense along the left bank of the river. NARA on the GORCHUKHINO site, (claim) CHICHKOVO.

Create PTR in the areas:

a) VOLKOVSKAYA DACHA;

b) MAYBE...

7. 113 SD with 1/109 GAP, two batteries of 989 AP PTO, in the morning of 29.10 go to a stubborn defense along the left bank of the river. NARA on the CHICHKOVO, RYZHKOVO site. Create PTR in the areas:

a) KAMENSKOYE;

c) SERGOVKA, PLACE;

d) MACHIKHINO.

KP - PLAXINO.

8. Continue to destroy and exhaust the enemy with small fighter squads...”

Having received the order to switch to defense, army units and formations began to equip the specified lines with engineering equipment.

Commander of the 1st Guards. MSD Colonel Lizyukov, by his order, assigned the defense of the left bank of the river to the 1289th Infantry Regiment. Nara is north of Gorodishche, in the area from Krasnaya Tureyka to the ravine through which an unnamed stream flowed.

The 175th Rifle Regiment was ordered to defend the left bank of the Nara south of Major Bezzubov's 1289th Rifle Regiment, from the ravine to the railway bridge inclusive.

The 6th SME was supposed to defend from the railway bridge to the village of Gorchukhino.

In front of the front of the 1st Guards. The MSD was fought by units of the 478th and 479th regiments of the 258th Infantry Division, which took up defensive positions in Naro-Fominsk and its immediate surroundings.

Gradually, the banks of the Nara River, both left and right along its course, began to be surrounded by trenches, trenches, residential dugouts, command and staff dugouts.

According to intelligence data, the enemy was pulling up reserves from the depths, preparing for a new offensive, which could begin, according to the assumption of the Red Army command, in the very near future.

October 30, 1941

The 222nd SD continued to occupy defenses along the northeastern bank of the river. Nara was in the zone indicated to her and actively carried out work on fortification equipment for the units’ defense areas.

The 774th joint venture defended along the southwestern edge of the forest northeast of Maurin, covering the Maurino-Dyutkovo road;

The 113th joint venture, reassigned the day before the division, took up defense at the line: excl. Lyubanovo to the mouth of the Inevka stream;

The 479th joint venture occupied the defense in the sector: excl. the mouth of the Inevka stream along the edge of the forest to the Tashirovo school.

1st Guards The MSD continued work on fortification equipment in the units' defense areas.

The right-flank 5th company of the 1289th joint venture, together with the battalion of the 479th joint venture of the 222nd infantry division, attempted to destroy the enemy in the Tashirovo MTS area, but, having suffered heavy losses, retreated to its original position.

By 2 p.m., the units of the 175th SME occupied the following position:

The 3rd battalion was entrusted with the defense of Konopelovka and the military camp.

The 1st battalion defended along the eastern bank of the Nara River at the line: the state farm, the Ogorodniki artel to the mouth of the Gvozdnya stream.

The 5th and 4th companies of the 2nd battalion defended from the mouth of the Gvozdnya stream to the railway bridge and from the bridge to the village of Berezovka, respectively. The 6th company was in reserve, located in the center of the village of Novo-Fedorovka.

The 6th MRR, with the forces of the 3rd battalion, continued to hold part of the eastern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk, conducting street battles with the enemy 500–700 meters south of the Kamenny Bridge. The battalion received the task on the night of October 30 to enter the second echelon, concentrating in the area of ​​​​the Vegetable state farm.

The 2nd battalion fought with the enemy, who had penetrated the northwestern outskirts of the village of Berezovka.

The 1st battalion occupied the defense at the line: excl. barracks, excl. Gorchukhino. Despite the fact that there were no active hostilities that day, the losses of the division (without the 1289th joint venture) from enemy artillery fire and mortars amounted to 170 people killed and wounded.

Due to the fact that the army commander ordered the inclusion of s. Tashirovo in the defense zone of the 1st Guards. MSD, division commander Colonel Lizyukov ordered Major N. A. Bezzubov to “clear the east of the enemy.” river bank NARA, opposite the village of TASHIROVO, starting from MTS, and organize a stubborn defense of the east. banks of the river NARA against the village of TASHIROVO."

The 110th SD, occupying the defense at the same line, part of the forces of the 1287th SP fought for Ateptsevo, and the 1291st SP fought for Sliznevo. The units of the enemy's 8th Motorized Regiment defending there, with a force of up to a company in each populated area, repelled the attacks of our units with mortar fire and forced them to retreat to their original position. The division headquarters was located in the village of Volkovskaya Dacha.

Units of the 113th SD continued to occupy and improve in engineering terms the line: excl. Chichkovo, Kamenskoye, Ryzhkovo, a bend in the river 1 km to the south.

Late in the evening, an encrypted telegram was received from the front headquarters, which outlined the directive of the commander of the Western Front troops on measures to disrupt the offensive of the Nazi troops on Moscow No. 0428.

October 31, 1941

The 222nd SD with reinforcement equipment occupied the previous line of defense. Artillery units and subunits assigned to reinforce the division occupied firing positions in the depths of the defense, some artillery units were involved in creating an anti-tank defense line in the areas: the northeastern outskirts of Maurino, the northeastern outskirts of Lyubanovo, Novaya and Myakishevo. The division commander's combined arms reserve - the 3rd battalion of the 479th joint venture, the reconnaissance company and the division command post were located in the forest north of the village of Malye Semenychi.

The enemy took up defensive positions on the western bank of the river. Nara, concentrating up to an infantry regiment in the village of Tashirovo and its environs. At least a company of infantry was located in the MTS on the eastern bank of the Nara River, which German units captured the day before, turning it into their stronghold.

Units of the 1st Guards. MSD continued engineering work to equip defense areas. The 6th MRR fought with the enemy between the railway and the Berezovka stream. However, the attack launched by the 2nd Battalion, supported by the division's artillery, was unsuccessful. On the opposite bank of the river there remained only one company of the 175th MRP, senior lieutenant Kudryavtsev, defending in one of the factory buildings.

Units of the 110th SD occupied the former defense areas, carrying out work on their engineering equipment. A platoon of anti-tank rifles, allocated to the division commander, was in firing positions, covering the main tank-threat direction in the area of ​​​​the village of Ateptsevo.

The 113th SD continued to improve the occupied defense line. The division's command post moved to Plaksino. The combat report from the headquarters of the 113th SD for the day noted:

“...During the night, engineering work was carried out to equip the defensive sector with full-profile trenches and to equip anti-tank guns in KAMENSKOYE, KLOVO, RYZHKOVO, and PLAKSINO.

The lack of entrenching tools slows down the pace of work - the division has only 63 shovels, and there are also no PP and PT obstacles...”

In the afternoon, another replenishment arrived for army units and formations, among them there were many Muscovites: workers of the Moscow Automobile Plant, metallurgists from the Hammer and Sickle plant, fitters from the Mytishchi plant, railway workers, workers and other specialists from many Moscow enterprises.

Replenishment arrived almost every day and in quantitative terms, if not completely, then to a large extent covered the losses of the troops, which could not be said about the quality of its training and weapons. Needless to say, such a replenishment did not have the best effect on the moral and psychological state of the soldiers and commanders.

However, the reinforcements arrived practically unarmed. The commander of the 113th SD, Colonel K.I. Mironov, was forced to send a telegram with the following content to army headquarters:

“TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE 33rd ARMY

The division's artillery supply does not have any unnecessary military weapons.

Meanwhile, reinforcements have been arriving in recent days almost without any weapons. So, on October 29, 1941, 210 people arrived. with one easel, one light machine gun and 29 rifles.

On October 30, 1941, 85 people arrived with 33 rifles.

Arriving reinforcements to a division without weapons has a demoralizing effect on the remaining fighters of the division.

I ask for your order to send reinforcements with full military weapons.

(Commander of the 113th SD Colonel MIRONOV.)

October 1941 was the most difficult period of the Moscow Battle. The troops of the Western, Kalinin and Bryansk fronts, finding themselves in a difficult operational situation, managed to counter the energetic attempts of the German troops of Army Group Center to break through to Moscow. Formations and units of the Red Army, suffering heavy losses, nevertheless actively delayed the advance of enemy troops to Moscow, exhausted them in the most difficult struggle, winning such precious time for organizing defense on the approaches to the capital. However, the mortal danger for Moscow and the entire country was increasingly intensifying.

Notes:

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 7, l. 1.

TsAMO RF, f. 208, op. 2511, d. 1029, l. 177–178. - Emphasized by the author.

See: Combat composition of the Soviet Army. Part 1. July - December 1941 - M.: VNUGSH, 1963. P. 50–51.

See: Formation and resubordination of combined arms armies 1941–1945. - M.: GS. pp. 42–43.

See: Zhukov G.K. Memories and Reflections. - M.: APN, 1970. P. 334.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 125, l. 23.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 2, l. 30–31.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 13, l. 18.

Lizyukov Alexander Ivanovich was born on March 26, 1900 in Gomel (now the Republic of Belarus). Hero of the Soviet Union (1941). Major General (1942). He took an active part in the Civil War, being the chief of artillery and deputy commander of an armored train. In the pre-war years he graduated from the armored vehicle school and the Frunze Military Academy. For several years he taught tactics at the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization. For four years he commanded a heavy tank regiment, and then for another four years - a separate tank brigade. During the period of command of the regiment, for the excellent combat training of the unit, he was awarded the Order of Lenin. The war found him in the position of deputy commander of the 36th Tank Division of the 17th Mechanized Corps. From August to November 1941 - commander of the 1st Proletarian Motorized Rifle Division, which under his command earned the high rank of “Guards” in battles. Since November 1941 - commander of the operational group as part of the 16th Army of General K. K. Rokossovsky. Since December 1941, commander of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps. In April 1942, he was appointed commander of the 2nd Tank Corps, on the basis of which the 5th Tank Army was formed, of which Major General Lizyukov became commander in June 1942. Due to the unsuccessful actions of the army on the western bank of the river. Don 5th Tank Army was disbanded, and Lizyukov was again appointed commander of the 2nd Tank Corps. On July 25, 1942, during the fighting in the area of ​​the village. Medvezhye, Semiluksky District, Voronezh Region, Major General A.I. Lizyukov died. He was awarded two Orders of Lenin and the medal “XX Years of the Red Army”. - Author's note.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 5, l. 1.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 13, l. 21, 26.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 21, l. 48.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 2, l. 47.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 2, l. 49.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 4, l. 43.

Bezzubov Nikolai Alexandrovich was born on December 11, 1902 in the village of Zheludki, Palkinsky district, Yaroslavl region. In 1930 he graduated from the Ryazan Infantry School and served in various command positions. In May 1938, he was appointed battalion commander of the 131st joint venture of the 44th infantry regiment, and exactly a year later he became commander of the 556th joint venture. Before the war, he completed the Shot course and was appointed regiment commander. During the battles near Naro-Fominsk, he commanded the 1289th joint venture, then the 110th SD of the 33rd Army. For his skillful command of the regiment during the fighting near Naro-Fominsk, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In June 1942, he was awarded the military rank of colonel. After commanding the 110th SD, he was at the disposal of the GUK, commanded the 10th motorized rifle brigade, and was deputy commander of the 303rd SD. Acting as commander of the 100th SD, he was seriously wounded in battle on July 27, 1943 and died from his wound on the same day. - approx. author.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 13, l. 67.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 13, l. 68.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 13, l. 108.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 13, l. 159.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 2, l. 91.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 13, l. 71.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 21, l. 60.

TsAMO RF, f. 3391, on. 1, d. 5, l. 150–151.

The pioneer camp was located near the fork in the roads Naro-Fominsk - Kubinka, Naro-Fominsk - Vereya and bore the name characteristic of the pre- and post-war years - “Iskra”. Having survived the first months of fighting in the Naro-Fominsk direction and surviving fascist artillery fire in early December 1941, it was destroyed during the period of perestroika and glasnost in the mid-90s. The only reminder of the brutal battles with the German invaders during the Battle of Moscow is the well-preserved monument at the mass grave, where 452 soldiers and the commander of the 1289th Infantry Regiment are buried, from which a copper plate with the names of the soldiers and commanders was stolen several years ago by some scoundrels . For some time, the headquarters of the 1289th Infantry Regiment was located on the territory of the pioneer camp; it was here that the soldiers of the regiment under the command of Major N.A. Bezzubov would fight with enemy infantry and tanks during his last attack on the Naro-Fominsk direction in early December 1941. - Note author.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 2, l. 94–95.

TsAMO RF, f. 1044, on. 1, d. 4, l. 112.

Ibid., l. 117–118.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 6, l. 25.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 6, l. 19.

33 separate ski battalion 43 armies of the Western Front

33 separate ski battaliondoes not appear in the list of ski battalions participating in the battles, and the period of its entry intoactive armyyu unknown. However, the battalion composition Western Frontparticipated in battles with the enemy groupin the area of ​​​​Zakharovo on the Vyazemsky direction.

Little is known about 33 OLB; it was allegedly formed on the territory of the Krasnoyarsk Territory in Krasnoyarsk in 290 ZLP 43 ZLBR, and subsequently became part of the Western Front. The path to the front was supposedly through the Molotov region and Moscow.

He supposedly arrived at the front on February 12, 1942 and was assigned to 43 A, which during this period tried to break through the ring to the encircled units of 33 A.

On February 3, the enemy closed an encirclement ring around 4 divisions of 33 A, 9 Guards SD, which was in this area (literally the day before, it came out of the breakthrough and became part of 43 A) immediately joined the battle.

The 40th joint venture occupied defense in the area of ​​​​the settlements of Kolodezi, Frolovka, Myakoty.

The 258th joint venture defended north and east of Novaya Derevnya.

The 3rd battalion of the 131st joint venture defended the village of Bely Kamen and the fork in the road on the western edge of the grove east of Pinashino. It should be noted that the 9th Guards Rifle Division was not such a complete formation, so on February 8 the combat strength of the division was as follows: 258 joint ventures - 50 bayonets, 40 joint ventures - 50 bayonets, 131 joint ventures - 15 bayonets.

Gradually, the enemy stronghold in Zakharovo became the center of the efforts of the 9th Guards SD.

The importance that the command of the Western Front attached is clear from the telegram sent by Army Commander 43 at 16-00 on February 9, 1942

« 1. The Supreme and Commander-in-Chief of the direction demand to take Zakharovo at any cost and whatever the cost, since the situation near Efremov became even more complicated and the enemy began to spread from the north to Ivashutino (18 km northwest of Zakharovo. - Ed.) .

2. We cannot allow Efremov to be surrounded.

3. Today a train with skiers arrived at Maloyaroslavets, in which there are over 2000; At dawn, 1,000 reinforcements from among those who had recovered were sent from Moscow to Medyn by motor transport. Golushkevich »

In all likelihood, among the arriving skiers there were also skiers from the 33rd OLB, as well as from the 34th, 35th, and 36th OLB.

Beloborodov A.P. This is how he described the enemy’s defense in this locality: “They concentrated large forces here: the regiment of the 2nd SS Brigade, the 95th Regiment of the 17th Infantry Division, the 17th Artillery Regiment, heavy howitzer and anti-tank divisions. Hundreds of artillery and mortar barrels met our attacking infantry with dense fire, and dozens of enemy bombers hovered over the battlefield every day. »

The 33rd OLB arrived at Zakharov to reinforce the 9th Guards SD, presumably on February 12th. On February 12, the division was replenished with ammunition and reinforcements.

Beloborodov described this fight as follows: “We discussed the plan for the upcoming offensive drawn up by headquarters, added some things to it, clarified some things. The plan was based on three main requirements: attack the enemy unexpectedly; reliably suppress fire weapons of a strong point; carry out a wide maneuver with available forces.

Over the past week, the Nazis have become accustomed to the fact that our attacks on the village of Zakharove begin either in the morning or in the evening, with the onset of darkness. It was decided to attack the enemy in the second half of a short winter day, two hours before sunset. There will be an element of surprise.

Our artillery, having a limited, but still much larger supply of shells than before, will be able to produce several powerful artillery attacks. The artillery preparation plan provided for a double transfer of fire from the enemy’s front edge to the depths of his defense and back. This is a tried and tested method. It always confuses the defenders, preventing them from detecting the start of an infantry attack.

The attack of the strong point from the front will be complemented, firstly, by a deep encircling of it from the south by the 258th regiment, and secondly, close interaction with its neighbors - units of the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle and 17th Rifle Divisions.

Our plan took into account one more circumstance. Week-long battles undermined the combat effectiveness of the fascist garrison. The prisoners claimed that “soldiers are dying on the front line like flies,” and that there were also great losses among the officers. Two or three officers remained in the battalions, and the commander of one of the regiments defending Zakharov was also killed.

By the morning of February 13, parts of the divisions - after regrouping - took up their original positions. The first half of the day passed in a rare skirmish. At 14.00, the chief of artillery, Captain Poletsky, transmitted a code signal via communication, and both of our artillery regiments and the mortar division opened fire. The enemy front line was covered in smoke. Then shells began to explode in the depths of the strong point, overwhelming German batteries and concentrated reserves. When, according to our calculations, the Nazis rushed from cover into the trenches to meet the infantry attack, Poletsky again transferred fire to the first trench. This happened twice. The enemy soldiers began to rush about.

The first to attack was the 3rd battalion of the 258th regiment, led by Senior Lieutenant T.K. Kryshko. The company of Senior Lieutenant V.P. Kraiko entered a long and deep ravine and moved along the ice of the Dezhna River to the village of Zakharov. This was the only hidden approach to the strong point. The enemy fire system, apparently, was greatly disrupted by artillery barrage. Hardly a quarter of all the batteries and machine gun emplacements we had previously identified were able to open fire. Kraiko's company burst into the eastern outskirts of the village and engaged in close combat, knocking out the Nazis from houses and barns with a bayonet and grenade. The men of Lieutenant S.S. Tretyakov’s machine-gun platoon installed “maxims” in the attics of captured houses and fired accurately at the enemy. Senior Sergeant P.F. Chibisov, Sergeant S.G. Zuev, Red Army soldiers V.V. Gusev and I.O. Zhilimov destroyed two mortar and three machine-gun crews.

Reporting all this, Major Romanov added that two other battalions were also fighting on the outskirts of the village.

Good news also came from the right flank. The 40th regiment of Lieutenant Colonel D.S. Kondratenko and the 33rd ski battalion of Captain P.V. Boyko burst into the strong point from the north.

Around four o'clock in the afternoon an event occurred that had a great influence on the outcome of the battle. Two companies of the 258th regiment of Major Romanov went around Zakharovo on skis in deep snow and straddled the only road connecting the fascist stronghold with its rear. The armored personnel carriers plying along the road were shot down with anti-tank rifles by the crews of the Red Army soldiers G.I. Belov and A.V. Akhmedzhanov. Soon a report came from there that an enemy column - six tanks and infantry on trucks - was moving towards the village from the west. We moved anti-tank artillery to the road. Its well-aimed fire, combined with a fire attack from a heavy howitzer battalion, destroyed the enemy's reserves. The artillerymen burned four tanks and a dozen trucks.

By evening the village was completely liberated. Only a few small units of the Nazis managed to break through to the west. Essentially, the entire enemy group, which consisted of two infantry regiments and five artillery divisions, was defeated. This was a combat success that we achieved in cooperation with other units. The entry in the combat log shows how the division personnel perceived him. The phrase is highlighted from the general text in large, clear letters: “At 17.00 ZAKHAROVO - SOVIET!” »

Operational report of the General Staff of the spacecraft "9th Guards SD, 17th and 415th SD captured Zakharovo. »

In the following days, the 9th Guards SD repelled enemy counterattacks and slowly advanced towards the Vorya River, to connect with units of 33A ."

The ZhBD 9 GSD talks in more detail about the role of skiers in the battles for Zakharovo.

"The 33rd separate ski battalion (minus one ski company) by 15-00 concentrated in the valley in the east of Frolovka. Under the cover of artillery fire, the battalion went and, with a strike from the north-west, helped 40 rifle regiments capture the northern half of Zakharovo and clear Zakharovo of the enemy. At 22, the battalion is put in order and organizes the defense of Zakharovo from the north."

How valuable the battalion was for the division can be seen from the entry in the ZhBD for February 14 - " 33 Separate ski battalion - division strike group - concentrated in Zakharovo."

The 33rd Ski Battalion, together with the 9th Guards SD, took part in the battles for Korkodinovo, Ilyinki, Berezki, and Grechishenki. It should be noted that the situation in strip 43 A was far from calm, the enemy often launched counterattacks supported by tanks and aircraft, and often our units were forced to retreat, but the guardsmen and skiers fought to the death, repelling enemy attacks.

At least until February 16, the battalion defended Zakharovo. At the same time, skiers sent out reconnaissance groups, so on February 14, several skiers died in the area of ​​​​the village of Grechishenki.

On February 26, soldiers of the 9th Guards Rifle Division, 18th Tank Brigade and 33rd Ski Battalion with a swift attack liberated the villages of Ilyenki and Korkodinovo from the enemy. During a fierce battle, they destroyed the headquarters of two German regiments of the 17th Infantry Division and captured large trophies, including 16 guns.

Operational report of the General Staff of the spacecraft " February 27, 9th Guards the SD captured Savino (4 km southeast of Temkino) with one regiment and fought for the capture of Beryozka...

Parts of the 9th Guards. SD, 415 and 17 SD in the Korkodinovo area, up to two battalions of enemy infantry were destroyed, an artillery regiment and headquarters of 21 and 55 PP 17 Infantry were destroyed »
ZhBD 9 GSD talks about this fight in more detail.
"

25.02.42

Up to the infantry regiment (units 21 and 55 PP 17 Infantry) continue to defend Pinashino, Savino and the forest west of Grechishchenka.

The 18th Guards SP with its 1st battalion, together with the 33rd ski battalion, made repeated attempts to attack the forest in the southwest. Buckwheat in the direction of Krapivka. All attempts were repulsed by organized enemy fire from the eastern edge of the forest. Korkodinovo.

26.02.42

During the night, the 18th joint venture with 33 ski battalions handed over the combat sector to the commander of the 31st Guards joint venture - Grechishenki, concentrated for the attack on Korkodinovo. At 13:00 the regiment captured Ilyinki, where the convoy was broken up and a lot of wine was poured out. The accompanying German soldiers were killed, unexpectedly expecting our advance from this direction. The convoy was completely captured and evacuated to the rear. At 16-00, the regiment repelled the enemy counterattack from Krasnoe, overcoming strong fire resistance from Savino, Mamushi, Valukhovo, suffering heavy losses, with a swift attack knocked the enemy out of Korkodinovo and captured it.

At 18-00 the regiment reached the river east of Berezki, where it put itself in order, tightened up the convoys and artillery and prepared for the attack on Berezki. According to the testimony of a prisoner, the headquarters of 21 and 55 PP 17 PD were destroyed in Korkodinovo.

The regiment had 56 casualties, 146 wounded.

16 captured guns, 45 carts, 10 trailers with shells, 16 machine guns, 53 rifles, 10,000 cartridges, 121 horses, 442 shells, 5 mortars, 2 kitchens, 2 radio stations, 1 motor vehicles, 1 ambulances, 5 machine guns. Staff documents were captured.

The enemy showed stubborn resistance to the advancing units. resistance, its aviation continuously influenced the combat
unit orders, up to 500 sorties per day . »

The strength of the fighting can be judged by the fact that9th Guards Rifle Division, advancing on the Berezki stronghold, repelled ten counterattacks and withstood three enemy air raidsfor the day of the battle - March 5. Enemy counterattacks were more like counterattacks; the enemy 43 A during this period were units of 20 and 5 tank, 3 motorized and 17 infantry divisions of the enemy, reinforced by various individual units and artillery. Of course, all enemy units were badly battered, but still it was a strong enemy and it was not easy to break through its defenses. On other days, the losses of our regiments reached 90% (up to 80 people per day); the documents of the 9th Guards Rifle Division stated that there were no battalion commanders or battalion headquarters left in the ranks.

It can be assumed that the battalion continued to fight as part of the 9th Guards SD until its disbandment. In the battles in the Vyazemsky direction, the battalion suffered heavy losses, so the report dated May 28 indicated that the missing “ in '33 ski battalion - 280 people.».

Such large losses of missing skiers can be attributed to the ferocity of the battles, from which rifle companies did not leave for days and died completely in their positions, for this reason search engines are still finding unburied soldiers and commanders of riflemen and skiers. The mention in the ZhBD 9 GSD of the death of many battalion headquarters confirms that there was simply no one to keep a roll-by-call record of losses in such a difficult situation.

Nothing is known yet about the subsequent battles of the 33rd OLB.

When 33 the separate ski battalion was officially disbandedunknown, presumably the battalion was sent to replenish the 9th Guards SD at the end of February 1942.

This is an unfinished article about the battle path 33 a separate ski battalion will be supplemented in the future.

33rd Army. January - April 1942.

On the anniversary of the death of the Western group of the 33rd Army of General Efremov

By April 1942, the Germans had come to their senses after the defeat near Moscow and began to systematically destroy the Soviet units that had penetrated their location in the Vyazma area.

The first to come under attack was the Western group of the 33rd Army, led by army commander Lieutenant General Mikhail Grigorievich Efremov.

After several days of fierce fighting, lacking weapons and ammunition, the Western group made a breakthrough along the shortest route - to connect with units of the 43rd and 49th armies. This breakthrough, as we know, ended with the death of Efremov and the commanders of his headquarters, and the capture of a large number of soldiers and commanders.

Historians are still arguing about how events developed in the last days of the existence of the Western Group of the 33rd Army.

Questions arise literally for every episode: when did the breakthrough from the Shpyrevsky forest begin, where and with what forces did it take place, how did the breakthrough take place across the Belyaevo-Buslava road, what routes did the groups of General Efremov, Colonel Kuchinev, Lieutenant Colonel Kirillov, Captain Stepchenko take, what was the fate of those remaining in Shpyrevsky forest parts.

The impetus for studying the topic of the latest battles was a long-standing discussion on the Vif 2ne .org forum, in which chapters from A.V. Isaev’s book “Georgy Zhukov. The King’s Last Argument,” in which he placed all responsibility for the failure at Vyazma on Army Commander-33 Efremov, who failed to implement G.K. Zhukov’s good plan.

My conclusions based on studying the documents are as follows:

1. The order to attack Vyazma with part of the forces of the 33rd Army was a gamble:

Neither the command of the Western Front nor the command of the 33rd Army knew the composition of the enemy grouping in the Vyazma area;

The front command incorrectly assessed the combat effectiveness of the German troops opposing the 43rd, 49th and 50th armies, and believed that these armies would take Yukhnov as soon as possible and continue moving west;

The divisions of the 33rd, 43rd, 49th, 50th armies and Belov's cavalry corps were weakened by previous battles and needed replenishment and rest;

The front command considered the main direction to be the capture of Yukhnov, and not the attack on Vyazma. The commanders of the armies also oriented themselves accordingly;

The front command was unable to provide air cover for the advancing troops. The aviation of the 33rd Army could not do this due to its small numbers and the predominance of U-2 type aircraft;

Snow drifts extremely limited the possibilities of both maneuver and supply of the advancing troops. The advancing units reached Vyazma without food supplies and ammunition;

The front command ignored the threat to the right flank of the 33rd Army (on which the enemy had constant influence) in the Kamenka-Zubovo-Klimovo area), as well as the lag of the troops of the 43rd Army advancing to the left.

2. A breakthrough from the encirclement of the 33rd Army group was real:

The choice of the direction of the breakthrough in the direction of the 43rd Army was determined by the current situation;

Ensuring a breakthrough by the Air Force and, when approaching the front line, by the artillery of the 43rd Army, made it possible to break through the sparse German battle formations.

3. The death of the Western group was due to the following factors:

The low equipment of the Soviet troops with radio communications. The loss of the only radio station in Efremov’s group did not allow coordinating actions with the 43rd Army, incl. in terms of artillery support for the breakthrough;

The delay in ordering a breakthrough led to the onset of a thaw and ruled out the massive use of aviation to ensure a breakthrough. In addition, the opening of the rivers sharply reduced the possibility of maneuver.

Sources

Currently, basic information on these battles has been collected:

In the book by Vladimir Melnikov “Were they sent to death by Zhukov? The death of the army of General Efremov";

At the forum “In the middle reaches of the Ugra River”

In the book by Sergei Mikheenkov “The Tragedy of the 33rd Army”;

In TsAMO documents posted on the websites:

Materials from the following sites were also used:

https :// rkka . ru

Personalities

Bogolyubov Alexander Nikolaevich	major general	Chief of Staff 43 A
Vasily Semenovich	Colonel	Chief of Artillery 113 Infantry Division
Konstantin Dmitrievich	major general	Commander 43 A
Golushkevich Vladimir Sergeevich	major general	Chief of Staff Western front
Ermashkevich Boris Kirikovich		Head of intelligence department 33 A
Vladimir Vladislavovich		Commander of a partisan detachment (regiment)
Zakharkin Ivan Grigorievich	lieutenant general	Commander 49 A
Kazankin Alexander Fedorovich	Colonel	Commander of the 4th Airborne Corps
Kirillov Joseph Konstantinovich	lieutenant colonel	Head of the 1st department of headquarters of the 160th Infantry Division
Maria Alexandrovna	civilian	Radio operator of intelligence department 33 A (pseudonym “Kuznetsova”, call sign r/st “Zarya”)
Kolesnikov Venedikt Vladimirovich		Operations Department of the Western Headquarters. front
Kondyrev Vladislav Ivanovich		Acting chief of operations. headquarters department 33 A
Nikolay Ivanovich	regimental commissioner	Military Commissar 113 Infantry Division
Vladimir Georgievich	Colonel	Commander of the 338th Infantry Division
Konstantin Ivanovich	Colonel	Commander of the 113th Infantry Division
Onuprienko Dmitry Platonovich		Deputy commander 33 A
Nikolay Demyanovich	major general	Head of Communications Department, Western front
Samsonov Illarion Gavrilovich	Colonel	Head of the staffing department of headquarters 33 A (head of the rear of the Western group)
Stepchenko Ivan Sergeevich		Commander 1292 sp 113 sd
Tretyakov Andrey Rodionovich		Head of art. supply 160 sd
Turantaev Vladimir Vladimirovich		Assistant Chief of the Operations Department of Headquarters 43 A
Ivan Vasilievich	Colonel	Deputy beginning operational department Zap. front
Shioshvili Panteleimon Shisevich	lieutenant colonel	Head of intelligence department 43 A
Nikolay Nikitich	Colonel	Commander of the 160th Infantry Division

Combat composition of the Western Group of the 33rd Army by April 1942

	1288 sp, 1292 sp
	1295 sp,1297 sp
	1134 sp, 1136 sp, 1138 sp

During the Battle of Moscow, units of the 33rd Army defended the Borovsky district. The defense line ran along the river. Nara, and the city of Naro-Fominsk became an insurmountable barrier for the advancing Nazi invaders. During the December counteroffensive, on January 4, 1942, units of the 33rd Army liberated Borovsk. By mid-January 1942, the Borovsky district was completely liberated from the invaders.

this section is dedicated to military units and units that were part of the 33rd Army from October 1941 to January 15, 1942.

110th SD (rifle division)

201st Latvian SD

I. Active army. Reserve front. 33rd Army:

17th Infantry Division,

18th Infantry Division,

60th Infantry Division,

113th Infantry Division,

173rd Infantry Division,

876 artillery regiment VET,

878 artillery regiment VET.

Notes:

17th Infantry Division. II formation

Renamed from the 17th Moscow People's Militia Division.

In the active army 09.26.1941 - 05.9.1945.

1312th Infantry Regiment,

1314th Infantry Regiment,

1316th Infantry Regiment,

980th artillery regiment,

129 ski battalion,

102nd separate anti-tank fighter division (from 12/30/41),

266 anti-aircraft artillery battery (161 separate anti-aircraft artillery division) - until 03/30/43,

477th mortar division (from 11/22/41 to 10/26/42),

479 reconnaissance company,

464 engineer battalion,

280th separate communications battalion (109th separate communications battalion, 725th and 385th separate communications company),

88 (292) medical battalion,

115th separate chemical defense company,

316th motor transport company,

271 field bakeries,

696 divisional veterinary hospital,

924 field postal station,

324 field cash desk of the State Bank.

18th Infantry Division II formation

Renamed from the 18th Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia. In the active army from 09/26/1941 - 01/05/1942.

Transformed into the 11th Guards Rifle Division on January 5, 1942.

1306th Infantry Regiment (until December 7, 1941),

1308th Infantry Regiment (until 12/26/41),

1310th Infantry Regiment (until October 22, 1941),

365th Infantry Regiment (from 10/24/41),

518th Infantry Regiment (from 11/28/41),

282nd Infantry Regiment (from 12/13/41),

978 artillery regiment,

702 separate anti-aircraft artillery division,

477 reconnaissance company,

461 engineer battalion,

866th separate communications battalion,

500th medical battalion,

344th separate chemical defense company,

312th motor transport company,

927 field postal station,

394 field cash desk of the State Bank.

60th Infantry Division Renamed from the 1st Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia.

In the active army - 9/26/41–01/3/42, 02/01/42–02/09/44, 03/05/44–05/09/45.

1281 rifle regiment,

1283 Infantry Regiment,

1285th Infantry Regiment,

969 artillery regiment,

71 separate anti-tank fighter divisions,

468 reconnaissance company,

696 (84) engineer battalion,

857th separate communications battalion,

491st medical battalion,

330th separate chemical defense company,

327th motor transport company,

260 field bakery,

180th divisional veterinary hospital,

968 field postal station,

27 field cash desk of the State Bank.

113 Infantry Division. II formation.

In the active army 9/26/41–02/02/43, 03/6/43–05/9/45.

1288th Infantry Regiment,

1290th Infantry Regiment,

1292 rifle regiment,

972 artillery regiment,

204 (456) engineer battalion,

203rd motor transport company,

263 field bakery,

932 field postal station,

1140 field cash desk of the State Bank.

173rd Infantry Division. II formation.

Renamed from the 21st Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia. In the active army 26.9.41–1.2.43.

Transformed into the 77th Guards Rifle Division on 03/01/1943.

1311th Infantry Regiment,

1313 Infantry Regiment,

1315th Infantry Regiment,

979 artillery regiment,

252nd separate anti-tank fighter division (from 02/19/42),

280 anti-aircraft artillery battery (768 separate anti-aircraft artillery division),

478 reconnaissance company,

464 engineer battalion,

867th separate communications battalion,

309 medical battalion (501 medical battalion - I) - until 10/25/41, 501 medical battalion (II) - from 11/28/41,

345th separate chemical defense company,

313 motor transport company,

270 field bakery,

191 divisional veterinary hospital,

832 (930) field postal station,

429 field cash desk of the State Bank.

876 artillery regiment VET. In the active army 07/30/1941–12/24/1941. Disbanded.

878 artillery regiment VET. In the active army 08/03/1941–12/24/1941. Disbanded.

I. Active army.

Western Front

110th Infantry Division,

113th Infantry Division,

222nd Infantry Division.

600 artillery regiment VET,

989 artillery regiment VET,

2/364 Corps Artillery Regiment,

5/7 Guards Mortar Regiment,

2/13 Guards Mortar Regiment,

Military history department

Combat composition of the Soviet army

(January-December 1942)

Moscow, 1966. *

Notes:

1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division.

In the active army 09/22/1941 - 01/23/1943.

35th Guards Artillery Regiment,

18th medical battalion,

4th motor transport battalion,

9 field bakery,

218 field postal station,

63 field cash desk of the State Bank.

II. Guards rifle and motorized rifle divisions.

110th Infantry Division,

II formation

Renamed from the 4th Moscow People's Militia Division.

In the active army 9/26/1941-4/9/1943.

Transformed into the 84th Guards Rifle Division on April 10, 1943

1287th Infantry Regiment,

1289 rifle regiment,

1291 rifle regiment,

971st artillery regiment,

470 reconnaissance company,

463 engineer battalion,

859th separate communications battalion,

493rd medical battalion,

329th motor transport company,

262 field bakery,

754 field postal station,

599 field cash desk of the State Bank.

113 Infantry Division.

II formation.

Renamed from the 5th Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia.

1288th Infantry Regiment,

1290th Infantry Regiment,

1292 rifle regiment,

972 artillery regiment,

239th separate anti-tank fighter division,

275 anti-aircraft artillery battery (275 separate anti-aircraft artillery division) - until 6.5.43,

149 (471) reconnaissance company,

204 (456) engineer battalion,

228 separate communications battalion (644 separate communications battalion, 860 separate communications company),

201 (494) medical battalion,

150th separate chemical defense company,

203rd motor transport company,

263 field bakery,

21 divisional veterinary hospital,

932 field postal station,

1140 field cash desk of the State Bank.

222nd Infantry Division.

In the active army 7/15/1941-9/10/1944, 10/19/1944-5/9/1945.

757 (457) rifle regiment,

774th Infantry Regiment,

787 (479) rifle regiment,

389 engineer battalion,

261 motor transport company,

351 field bakeries (484, 353 field bakeries),

317 field postal station,

Active army. Lists of troops

List No. 5 of rifle, mountain rifle, motorized rifle and motorized divisions that were part of the active army during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

I. Rifle and mountain rifle divisions.

Note:

In 1941 - 1943, the Red Army had two howitzer artillery regiments numbered 109.

486 howitzer artillery regiment - 486 cannon (howitzer) artillery regiment.

In the active army 07/15/1941 - 07/21/1941, 10/16/1941 - 9/11/1943. 12/26/1943 - 5/9/1945.

557th cannon artillery regiment RVGK - 557th corps cannon artillery regiment.

Formed on the basis of the 598th separate artillery battalion.

In the active army 10.15.1941 - 05.9.1945.

Active army. Lists of troops.

Lists of formations, units and institutions of the Soviet Army with the dates for their entry into the active army

I. Artillery regiments.

a) cannon and howitzer regiments of military artillery and artillery of the RGK

600 anti-tank artillery regiment - 600 anti-tank artillery regiment - 600 light artillery regiment.

In the active army - 10.18.1941 - 05.9.1945.

989 artillery regiment VET - 989 light artillery regiment.

In the active army - 10.18.1941 - 01.15.1942, 02.23.1942 - 06.13.1942.

Disbanded.

Active army. Lists of troops.

Lists of formations, units and institutions of the Soviet Army with the dates for their entry into the active army

List No. 13 of Artillery, mortar, anti-aircraft machine gun regiments and air defense regiments of railway echelons that were part of the active army during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

I. Artillery regiments

teatrskazka.com/Raznoe/Perechni_voisk/Perechen_13_03.html

364 howitzer (corps) artillery regiment.

In the active army 07/15/1941 - 09/11/43.

Tasked with manning the 118th heavy howitzer artillery brigade.

Active army. Lists of troops.

Lists of formations, units and institutions of the Soviet Army with the dates for their entry into the active army

List No. 13 of Artillery, mortar, anti-aircraft machine gun regiments and air defense regiments of railway echelons that were part of the active army during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

I. Artillery regiments

a) Cannon and howitzer regiments of military artillery and artillery of the RGK

teatrskazka.com/Raznoe/Perechni_voisk/Perechen_13_01.html

5th Division of the 7th Guards Mortar Regiment.

7th Guards Mortar Regiment (1 formation).

In the active army 09/24/1941 - 11/17/1941.

Disbanded.

2nd Division of the 13th Guards Mortar Regiment,

13th Guards Mortar Regiment, was part of the active army 10/15/1941 - 12/15/1941, disbanded.

Active army. Lists of troops.

Lists of formations, units and institutions of the Soviet Army with the dates for their entry into the active army.

List No. 13 of Artillery, mortar, anti-aircraft machine gun regiments and air defense regiments of railway echelons that were part of the active army during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

III. Guards mortar regiments.

teatrskazka.com/Raznoe/Perechni_voisk/Perechen_13_08.html

5th Tank Brigade

formed on September 17 (according to other sources on September 24), 1941 in the city of Mozhaisk (Moscow region) on the basis of the 12th tank regiment of the 1st tank division (II formation). Resolution of the State Defense Committee No. 671ss of September 13, 1941. GABTU was obliged to complete the formation of the brigade by September 23, 1941.

Brigade management,

Control Company,

reconnaissance company,

5th Tank Regiment: 1st Tank Battalion, 2nd Tank Battalion, 3rd Tank Battalion,

Motorized Rifle Battalion,

Anti-tank division,

Anti-aircraft division,

Motor transport company,

Repair company,

Medical platoon.

She was in the active army from 09/28/1941 to 03/05/1942. On March 5, 1942, it was reorganized into the 6th Guards Tank Brigade "a".

Brigade commander Lieutenant Colonel Sakhno Mikhail Gordeevich (09/17/1941 to 03/05/1942) transformation of the brigade.

Chief of Staff of the brigade, Major Polushkin Mikhail Aleksandrovich (since November 1941);

Head of the political department, battalion commissar Alexander Grigorievich Katilov (from 09/20/1941 to 12/28/1941), battalion commissar Leonid Konstantinovich Mirgorodsky (from 01/07/1942 to?)

tankfront.ru/ussr/tbr/tbr005.html

5th Tank Brigade

Formed on the basis of the 12th tank regiment of the 1st tank division

In the active army 10/23/41 - 3/5/1942.

Active army. Lists of troops.

Lists of formations, units and institutions of the Soviet Army with the dates for their entry into the active army.

List No. 7. Management of brigades of all branches of the military.

1. Active army

Western Front

33rd Army 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division

110th Infantry Division

113th Rifle Division

222nd Rifle Division

109 howitzer artillery regiment

486 howitzer artillery regiment

557th cannon artillery regiment RVGK,

600th Artillery Regiment VET

989 artillery regiment VET,

2/13 Guards Mortar Regiment

16th separate guards mortar division,

Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff

Military history department

Combat composition of the Soviet army

(January-December 1942)

Responsible editor: Major General A. N. Grylev.

Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense

Moscow, 1966.

Note:

1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division.

Reformed from the 1st Tank Division. The new numbering of the division's units was assigned on February 19, 1942.

In the active army 09/22/1941-01/23/1943.

Reformed into the 1st Guards Rifle Division (II).

1 Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment,

3rd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment,

35th Guards Artillery Regiment,

17th Guards Separate Anti-Tank Fighter Division,

29th Guards Separate Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion,

2nd Guards Reconnaissance Battalion,

20th Guards Engineer Battalion,

23rd Guards Separate Signal Battalion,

18 medical battalion,

9 field bakery,

218 field postal station,

63 field cash desk of the State Bank.

110th Infantry Division

113 Infantry Division.

II formation.

Renamed from the 5th Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia.

In the active army 9/26/41 - 02/02/43, 03/6/43 - 05/9/45.

1288th Infantry Regiment,

1290th Infantry Regiment,

1292 rifle regiment,

972 artillery regiment,

239th separate anti-tank fighter division,

275 anti-aircraft artillery battery (275 separate anti-aircraft artillery division) - until 6.5.43,

149 (471) reconnaissance company,

204 (456) engineer battalion,

228 separate communications battalion (644 separate communications battalion, 860 separate communications company),

201 (494) medical battalion,

150th separate chemical defense company,

203rd motor transport company,

263 field bakery,

21 divisional veterinary hospital,

932 field postal station,

1140 field cash desk of the State Bank.

222nd Rifle Division

757 (457) rifle rifle,

774th Infantry Regiment,

787 (479) rifle regiment,

666 (664) artillery regiment,

722 howitzer artillery regiment (until 10/15/41),

297 reconnaissance company (297 reconnaissance battalion),

602 separate communications battalion (602, 426 separate communications company),

391st medical battalion,

351 php (484, 353 php),

124 (170) dvl,

486 howitzer artillery regiment

557th cannon artillery regiment RVGK,

600th Artillery Regiment VET

989 artillery regiment VET,

2/364 Corps Artillery Regiment

5th Tank Brigade.

I. Active army.

Western Front

1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division,

93, rifle division

110th Infantry Division,

113th Infantry Division,

201st rifle division,

222nd Infantry Division,

338th Infantry Division,

separate consolidated rifle regiment (b/n),

23rd separate ski battalion,

24th separate ski battalion,

109 howitzer artillery regiment

364th Howitzer Artillery Regiment

386 howitzer artillery regiment

320th artillery regiment

403rd Artillery Regiment

557th artillery regiment,

551 artillery regiment VET,

600 artillery regiment VET,

18th separate guards mortar division

25th separate guards mortar division

42 separate guards mortar division,

3/590 howitzer artillery regiment.

246 separate Sat,

Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff

Military history department

Combat composition of the Soviet army

(January-December 1942)

Responsible editor: Major General A. N. Grylev.

Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense

Moscow, 1966.

Notes:

110th Infantry Division. II formation.

Renamed from the 4th Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia. In the active army 09.26.1941-04.9.1943.

Transformed into the 84th Guards Rifle Division on April 10. 1943

1287th Infantry Regiment,

1289 rifle regiment,

1291 rifle regiment,

971st artillery regiment,

200th separate anti-tank fighter division,

274 anti-aircraft artillery battery (695 separate anti-aircraft artillery division),

470 reconnaissance company,

463 engineer battalion,

859th separate communications battalion,

493rd medical battalion,

332 separate chemical defense company,

329th motor transport company,

262 field bakery,

720 divisional veterinary infirmary (from 12/01/41),

754 field postal station,

599 field cash desk of the State Bank.

113th Infantry Division.

II formation.

Renamed from the 5th Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia.

In the active army 09.26.1941-02.02.1943, 03.06.1943-9.5.1945.

1288th Infantry Regiment,

1290th Infantry Regiment,

1292 rifle regiment,

972 artillery regiment,

239th separate anti-tank fighter division,

275 anti-aircraft artillery battery (275 separate anti-aircraft artillery division) - until 6.5.43,

149 (471) reconnaissance company,

204 (456) engineer battalion,

228 separate communications battalion (644 separate communications battalion, 860 separate communications company),

201 (494) medical battalion,

150th separate chemical defense company,

203rd motor transport company,

263 field bakery,

21 divisional veterinary hospital,

932 field postal station,

1140 field cash desk of the State Bank.

222nd Infantry Division.

In the active army: 7/15/1941 - 9/10/44, 10/19/1944 - 05/9/1945.

757 (457) rifle regiment,

774th Infantry Regiment,

787 (479) rifle regiment,

666 (664) artillery regiment,

722 howitzer artillery regiment (until 10/15/41),

43rd separate anti-tank fighter division,

297 reconnaissance company (297 reconnaissance battalion),

389 engineer battalion,

602 separate communications battalion (602, 426 separate communications company),

391st medical battalion,

309 separate chemical defense company,

351 php (484, 353 php),

124 (170) divisional veterinary hospital,

317 field postal station,

338th Infantry Division.

I formation.

In the active army 3.12.41-24.5.42.

Directed towards the formation of the 113th Infantry Division (II).

1134th Infantry Regiment.

1136th Infantry Regiment.

1138th Infantry Regiment,

910th artillery regiment,

258th separate anti-tank fighter division,

634 anti-aircraft artillery battery (634 separate anti-aircraft artillery division),

510th mortar battalion,

409 reconnaissance company,

479 engineer battalion,

798th separate communications battalion,

432nd medical battalion,

425 separate chemical defense company,

201 field bakeries,

770 divisional veterinary hospital,

143 field postal station,

777 field cash desk of the State Bank.

Active army. Lists of troops.

551 anti-tank artillery regiment, also known as 551 anti-tank fighter regiment, 551 light artillery regiment, 10/21/1941 - 04/22/1944, 05/28/1944 - 05/9/1945.

Active army. Lists of troops.

List No. 13 of Artillery, mortar, anti-aircraft machine gun regiments and air defense regiments of railway echelons that were part of the active army during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

I. Artillery regiments

c) anti-tank artillery regiments, anti-tank artillery regiments, anti-tank artillery regiments and light artillery regiments.

590 howitzer artillery regiment, separated from the 403 howitzer artillery regiment.

In the active army 06/22/1941 - 06/25/1943.

Directed to form the 119th howitzer artillery brigade.

Active army. Lists of troops.

List No. 13 of Artillery, mortar, anti-aircraft machine gun regiments and air defense regiments of railway echelons that were part of the active army during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

I. Artillery regiments

a) Cannon and howitzer regiments of military artillery and artillery of the RGK.

See magpies began to chatter wildly behind the hill. The forest, waking up, was filled with its usual sounds. But there, behind the hill, something large, alarming, with an unknown force was approaching the Nameless Stream. Here, by the stream, no sounds had yet been heard; only the air, compressed as if tight in anticipation, gave all the forest inhabitants time to flee from the approaching SOMETHING. The bear, growling dissatisfiedly and turning towards the hill, walked up the stream, as if despising itself for cowardice in front of the dark SOMETHING, justifying itself to itself with a dissatisfied roar. Smaller living creatures simply habitually hid in their lairs and shelters, without experiencing moral torment. But even this forest little thing, always hiding from everyone, understood with an animal instinct that what was approaching was much worse than the strongest forest fire. It was as if Death itself was approaching. Behind the hill a column was crawling through the taiga. A column of two hundred vehicles: carts and trucks with the wounded, guns on the front ends and forks of trucks, field kitchens, workshops and radio stations. City on wheels, division. Exhausted people walked parallel to the cars through the forest. The war and the order moved this colossus, so clumsy in the virgin taiga, into the quiet autumn forest, forever changing the lives of thousands of people. The enemy was on our heels, he was ahead of us in small reconnaissance groups, setting up ambushes along the way. He swept away the rare rearguard screens and followed the trail, like a well-trained hunting dog following the bloody trail of a wounded animal. And the division was a wounded one, bled dry in the defensive battles of the first weeks of fighting; like a wounded animal, it crawled deeper and deeper into the Karelian taiga. Drops of human lives leaving a trail across the taiga. At night, the division, twisting the veins from the soldiers’ hands, dragged vehicles, property and weapons through hundreds of swamps and swamps. Knocking hundreds of pairs of shoes and boots into the black streams of swamp paths and moss glades, she walked forward and broke away from the enemy’s vanguard. But with the first ray of sunshine, aviation found a living black snake of the columned path among the emerald-amber autumn forest. Tearing out whole shreds from the body of the taiga, the artillery began to strike. Black columns of stinking swamp slurry rose to the right, left and among walking people and cars. Turning the living into black statues and burying the fallen forever. The horses were tearing from the reins and neighing wildly, rearing up, lifting the people holding the reins, black with dirt, into the sky. They fell off the newly laid road along with the carts and drowned with a wild neigh. People died quietly. A gap, a black pillar, a mound of gray overcoat in a black swamp wound, a faint splash and bubbles in the water. Mat, screams of the living, howls and screams of the wounded with their legs and arms torn off. Scarlet wounds on black bodies, painful to the eyes, with dazzling white, protruding bone chips. Grinding of teeth from impotent anger, from self-hatred for not being able to respond, to fight back, to yank the shutter and, painfully squeezing the butt of the butt with a finger white from tension, press the trigger of the rifle. This hatred, pouring out with the force of a platoon, pushes a stalled lorry loaded with shells off the road. In five minutes he reloads the cart with the wounded, pulls it from the clearing along with the dead horses. This hatred for those who died so easily, without an “answer” from their comrades, as payment for their dull, aching fear of many days, takes a step forward with the command: “Volunteers, get out of the ranks!” This command sounds every evening, when the roar of artillery ceases and the howl of planes leaves the blue Karelian sky. And every evening a platoon of volunteers remains at the top and sees off the departing column in order to give it a chance and get a chance to take revenge themselves. Unnecessary: ​​gas masks, duffel bags fly to the ground. Such expensive and important things in life, it would seem, cease to have any value when you take a step forward. This step is probably the most important in life on Earth and in life after, it is this step that forever kills vicious feelings: fear, lies, meanness, cowardice, envy, hypocrisy. This step, like a filthy snake, crushes everything vicious in a person, elevating him above himself and above others. The most important step in life, the most conscious and, often, the last. With roars, screams, groans of the wounded, hoarse commands, strained coughing of people and neighing of exhausted horses, the column went into the darkness, but without turning back to life. And they, having taken their main step, smoked in the ensuing darkness, straightened their shoulders, shook off the trash that was now unnecessary in their new, short life, and moved in a tight formation to “saddle” the heights. We were sitting on an ancient pine tree fallen by the wind, and they passed by us. Under our feet there were gas masks abandoned by them and unnecessary things in the high-rise. And then the battle raged at the heights and we saw this battle. We saw them take this important step. Being a search engine is now fashionable. Hundreds of young people go to the forests to feel the spirit of war, heroism, and romance. This is probably good. Is it just the concept of “fashionable”? But what is the real motivation? I asked the young guys and girls who came to the front-line forest: “What do you see here, around you?” There were different answers. “Beautiful nature. Beautiful forest. There are many animals and birds." It's great that they see beauty. But this is a little different. Or not at all. And this is not grumbling about a “bygone era.” To search and find you need to see war. You need to see an explosion at a floating crater, feel the rotten smell of burnt explosives, you need to see in detail the flight of hot fragments and then you will find, maybe tens of meters from it, a soldier killed by them. You don’t just have to remain silent during a moment of silence and take off your hat at a mass grave. You need to take off your hat in front of the formation of those who have taken their main step, take off your hat and see this formation. You need to not just be silent and think about the new iPhone or how cool it is that I will tell you about my trip “on shift” at school or college. It is necessary, it is simply necessary to think about them, talk to them and say “thank you” to them for taking this step. You need to go not for romance, but for work, the kind after which you don’t even have the energy for night gatherings. They don’t have enough time to drink tea before going to bed. And at night, before my eyes, a line of faces, faces, faces, one after another. It is necessary to ask yourself the same question every day: “Could I take this most important and important step?” And the more difficult it is to answer it honestly, the longer there is no clear answer, the more honest you will be with them and with yourself. Many of us still have not answered. Author: Sergey Machinsky