These days, 73 years ago, the battles in the Myasny Bor area were coming to a sad conclusion. The chain of events that followed the Lyuban offensive operation, which was carried out by units of the 2nd shock, 4th, 52nd, 54th and 59th Soviet armies, was ending. The goal of this operation, which began in winter, was to break the blockade of Leningrad and defeat units of the 18th German Army, and the capture of the city of Lyuban, after which the operation was later named, was a private task of the large offensive operation of the Volkhov Front. The center of defense of the German group in the Lyuban direction was the city of Chudovo. The 54th Army, with a strike from Pogostye to Lyuban, was supposed to meet there with units of the 2nd Shock Army, which had broken through the German front between the villages of Myasnoy Bor and Spasskaya Polist, which corresponded to the plan to encircle the enemy’s Chudovskaya group.
Due to the voluntary surrender of the last commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov, and his subsequent activities in creating the Russian Liberation Army, as well as the unsuccessful completion of the operation with a large number of killed and missing, these battles are poorly described in literature, and the soldiers of the 2nd shock, who survived the meat grinder of the “Volkhov Cauldron”, but were captured, were branded traitors.
The situation in the area of operations of the 2nd Shock and 54th Armies that had developed by the beginning of spring 1942 was mirrored for the German and Soviet troops: the 2nd Shock Army broke through the German front north of Novgorod, cut the Novgorod-Chudovo and Novgorod-Leningrad railways, and half the distance to the positions of the troops defending the besieged city. The supply of Soviet troops passed through a bottleneck created in German positions at the very beginning of the operation, which could not be expanded despite repeated attempts; a corridor was formed on the German side, in the center of which was the city of Lyuban. Soviet troops made efforts to encircle the Germans, and they, in turn, tried to cut the neck through which the 2nd Shock Army was supplied. The main and most important difference in the position of the two opposing sides was in the supply routes for the warring troops. The Red Army did not have a developed network of roads; the area between Spasskaya Polist and Myasny Bor was very swampy and with a large number of small rivers and streams. While there were frosts, this was not a big problem, but with the onset of spring the ice melted and roads had to be built. Construction proceeded under constant shelling, and the delivery of goods to the 2nd Shock Army proceeded intermittently, accompanied by great difficulties and losses. The Germans had a favorable situation for supplying their units; they controlled a section of the Leningrad-Moscow railway and a parallel highway between the same cities at that point, which made it possible to use both a large number of trucks and captured Soviet locomotives and wagons.
Map of the Lyuban offensive operation
As a result of bloody battles, the Soviet offensive fizzled out by mid-April 1942 without achieving its goals. The troops suffered heavy losses, units found themselves in a semi-encirclement - a pocket, and by the end of April the focus of the fighting shifted to the supply corridor of the 2nd Shock Army, the fighting became fierce, often turning into hand-to-hand combat. At the same time, on April 20, 1942, Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov was appointed to the post of commander of the 2nd Shock Army.
Major General A. A. Vlasov during the battles near Moscow
Vlasov was not new to the war, he fought on the Southwestern Front, first as commander of the 4th Mechanized Corps, and then as commander of the 37th Army, defended Kiev, commanded the troops of the 20th Army in the Battle of Moscow, from March 8 In 1942, he was appointed to the post of deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.
Having taken control of the troops, Lieutenant General Vlasov assessed the current situation: the condition of the troops inside the bag was quite deplorable, people were weakened and starving, there were problems with uniforms, especially shoes, there was a huge shortage of personnel in the units, most of the units were such only on paper. In addition, the defense lines pass through areas flooded with melt water and swamps, there are very few places where you can dry and warm up, in addition, such places are under regular artillery fire and bombing by German aircraft, there are problems with evacuating the wounded, there is a disdainful attitude towards the bodies of the dead, etc. .To. there is no strength and opportunity to remove and bury them, all this contributes to the spread of diseases and a decline in the morale of the troops. However, troops continue to fight and there are no mass surrenders.
The inevitable death of the 2nd Shock Army
Leningrad was entrusted to the care of Meretskov, who was appointed commander of the Volkhov Front, which was created to unite the armies operating east of the Volkhov River. The front's tasks were to prevent the enemy's attack on Leningrad, and then, with the participation of the Leningrad Front, to defeat the enemy and break the blockade of the northern capital. The first attacks there began at the end of December, but then, according to Meretskov himself, the need became obvious “to pause the offensive of the 4th and 52nd armies, put them in order, replenish them with people, weapons and with the approach of the 59th and 2nd armies.” th shock armies attack the enemy again. However, trying to break through the blockade of Leningrad, whose situation was extremely difficult, as quickly as possible, the Headquarters believed that the offensive of the Volkhov Front troops should develop without an operational pause. We were repeatedly demanded to speed up preparations for the offensive with all our might and to cross the line of the Volkhov River as soon as possible.” Mehlis was sent to the Volkhov Front as a representative of the Headquarters, “who urged us on hourly.” But, despite this, Meretskov was able to achieve that “the date for going on the offensive with all front forces was postponed to January 7, 1942. This made concentration easier, but a breakthrough on the move was now no longer possible, since the enemy had thoroughly entrenched himself behind the river and on the bridgeheads and had organized a fire system. It was possible to continue the operation only by breaking through the enemy defenses... However, at the appointed time, the front was not ready for the offensive. The reason was again the delay in the concentration of troops. In the 59th Army, only five divisions arrived on time and had time to deploy, while three divisions were on the way. In the 2nd Shock Army, slightly more than half of the formations occupied their original position. The remaining formations, army artillery, vehicles and some units followed the only railway. The aviation did not arrive either...”
The Volkhov Front had practically no rear services and units - they did not have time to collect and organize them. Supplies came, as they say, “on wheels,” despite the fact that there were no equipped routes for transporting everything necessary. The main transport force was horses, which, in turn, needed food.
“The lack of preparation for the operation also predetermined its outcome,” Meretskov recalled. “The enemy met the front forces that went on the offensive on January 7 with strong mortar and machine gun fire, and our units were forced to retreat to their original position. Other shortcomings also emerged here. The fighting showed unsatisfactory training of troops and headquarters. The commanders and staffs failed to manage the units and organize interaction between them. To eliminate the identified shortcomings, the Front Military Council asked Headquarters to postpone the operation for another three days. But these days were not enough. On January 10, a conversation took place between Headquarters and the Military Council of the front via direct wire. It began like this: “According to all data, you are not ready to attack by the 11th. If this is true, we must wait another day or two to advance and break through the enemy’s defenses.” To prepare the offensive for real, it took at least another 15–20 days. But such terms were out of the question. Therefore, we gladly seized on the delay of the offensive for two days proposed by Headquarters. During the negotiations, they asked for one more day. The start of the offensive was thus postponed to January 13, 1942.”
Considering that the enemy expected the Red Army to attack in well-prepared positions, equipped with a system of resistance nodes and strongholds, with a large number of bunkers and machine-gun sites, there was not much chance of success. The front line of the German defense ran along the western bank of the Volkhov River, and the second defensive line ran along the embankment of the Kirishi-Novgorod railway line. And this entire line of defense was occupied by thirteen Wehrmacht divisions.
According to Meretskov, “the general ratio of forces and means by mid-January was, if we do not take into account tank forces, in favor of our troops: in people - 1.5 times, in guns and mortars - 1.6 times and in aircraft - 1 ,3 times. At first glance, this ratio was quite favorable for us. But if we take into account the poor provision of weapons, ammunition, all types of supplies, and finally, the training of the troops themselves and their technical equipment, then our “superiority” looked in a different light. The formal superiority over the enemy in artillery was negated by the lack of shells. What's the use of silent guns? The number of tanks was far from sufficient to provide escort and support for even the first echelons of infantry...” Under such circumstances, the infamous Lyuban operation began, which did not achieve any of the intended goals.
On January 13, 1942, Soviet troops went on the offensive. The vanguards of the 2nd Shock Army crossed the Volkhov River and liberated several settlements. A week later we reached the second German defensive line, located along the Chudovo-Novgorod railway and highway, but failed to capture it on the move. After three days of fighting, the army still managed to break through the enemy defense line and capture Myasny Bor. But then the offensive stalled.
On March 9, a delegation led by Voroshilov and Malenkov arrived at the Volkhov Front to assess the situation. However, time was lost: on March 2, at a meeting with Hitler, a decision was made to go on the offensive on Volkhov before March 7.
At the beginning of April 1942, Meretskov sent his deputy, Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov, at the head of a special commission of the Volkhov Front, to the encircled 2nd Shock Army to assess the state of affairs in it. For three days, the commission collected information, and then returned to the front headquarters, where on April 8 a report was read out on the shortcomings found in the units. A. A. Vlasov remained in the 2nd Army - its commander, General N. K. Klykov, became seriously ill and was sent by plane to the rear. And soon the Council of the Volkhov Front, led by Meretskov, supported the idea of appointing Vlasov as commander, since he had experience in withdrawing troops from encirclement. On June 21, 1942, a narrow corridor, less than a kilometer wide, was broken through, which was held for two days, and then, after prolonged fighting, by the morning of June 24, it was opened again. But a day later the life-saving corridor was completely blocked. About sixteen thousand people managed to escape from the encirclement, after which the notorious disaster at Myasny Bor broke out. The 2nd Shock Army practically ceased to exist, and its commander Vlasov surrendered to the Germans.
According to the data given in the publication “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century,” the irretrievable losses of the Volkhov Front and the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front during the Lyuban operation from January 7 to April 30, 1942 amounted to 95,064 people, sanitary losses - 213,303 people, in total – 308,367 people. Only every twentieth of those who took part in the operation survived, avoiding capture, death or injury.
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On April 6 of this year, in the village of Tesovo-Netylsky, Novgorod district, Novgorod region, a military-historical reconstruction of several combat episodes of April-May 1942 took place. Soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army fought here with the Germans for a rather narrow supply corridor. The official name of the event is international festival "Forgotten feat - Second Shock Army". Several hundred reenactors took part in an unusual festival, which was filmed for the military-historical portal WarSpot.
The action turned out to be noteworthy for several details: exhibits from the Tesovsky Museum of Narrow-Gauge Railway Transport were used, and the reconstruction took place in the same places where heavy fighting took place. For the first time I saw that some elements of drama were included in the script of a military-historical reconstruction, and I noticed a decent number of participants who thoughtfully worked on their appearance. Well, “civilians” turned out to be extremely appropriate. Perhaps this was one of the most interesting reconstructions I have ever seen.
*****
Brief historical background: when the city on the Neva was already blocked and, without surrendering, was subjected to constant attacks by the Germans, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command took measures to relieve the blockade of Leningrad. In December 1941, attempts were made to counter-offensive in the area of the city of Tikhvin, and the success of the attackers was to be supported by the troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and North-Western fronts. A joint simultaneous powerful strike by all forces did not work out, the operation stalled, from the Tikhvin strategic offensive it turned into the Lyuban offensive, first, and then defensive, which in turn transformed into an operation to withdraw troops from encirclement.
The Volkhov Front began the Lyuban operation in January 1942, in a fierce winter with forty-degree frosts. Several stages of the offensive led to the formation of a breakthrough zone, shaped like a bottle with a neck in the Myasnoy Bor area. Our troops managed to push back the Germans, but there was a threat of encirclement, the Red Army’s offensive stopped and the “bottle” began to rapidly turn into a “cauldron”.
In April 1942, the army moved from unsuccessful offensive actions to defensive ones. On April 20, 1942, General A. A. Vlasov was appointed commander of the 2nd Shock Army. Under his leadership, the already surrounded troops tried to break out of the “bag” to their own. Being almost completely isolated, the soldiers and commanders of the Second Shock fought fiercely with the enemy.
The encircled troops were supplied through the only “corridor” that remained just near Myasny Bor, between Polist and Glushitsa. It was he who later received the name “Valley of Death” due to the large number of those who were breaking through the encirclement who died under German fire. The "Valley" was known to the Germans as "Eric's Corridor". In June 1942, the Germans managed to eliminate this only corridor. The encirclement was completed, and the destruction of the Second Shock soldiers by the Germans continued.
During May-June, the Second Shock Army under the command of A. A. Vlasov made desperate attempts to break out of the bag. Having given his troops the order to leave the encirclement as best he could, Vlasov himself, with a small group of soldiers and staff workers, after several weeks of wandering, was captured by the Germans. While in the Vinnitsa military camp for captured senior officers, Vlasov agreed to cooperate with the Nazis and headed the “Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia” (KONR) and the “Russian Liberation Army” (ROA), composed of captured Soviet military personnel. So, because of one person, an undeserved shadow of betrayal fell on the tragedy and death of an entire army.
I wrote more (but still quite briefly) about these places here. If the topic interests you, read the very detailed and difficult in every sense book by B.I. Gavrilov entitled “In Myasnoy Bor, in the Valley of Death. The feat and tragedy of the 2nd Shock Army."
“I saw this sleeper after the war. It is kept in the Novgorod museum. In the fall of 1966, she was found by Nikolai Ivanovich Orlov, a lineman at the Spasskaya Polist station. We managed to find the address of one of the authors of the unusual poster - Sergei Ivanovich Veselov. He told me that there were six of them: Russians Anatoly Bogdanov, Alexander Kudryashov, Alexander Kostrov and he, Sergei Veselov, Tatar Zakir Uldenov and Moldavian Kostya (his friends did not remember his last name). All from the 3rd Saber Squadron, 87th Cavalry Division. For five days, hungry, they wandered around enemy lines. During the day they sat in shelter, at night they walked east, guided by the lightning of a distant cannonade. When the sounds of battle began to be heard clearly, the friends decided to make a last stop and gather their strength. A dugout was spotted in the railway embankment. We went into it. The floor of the dugout was littered with spent cartridges, apparently our machine gunners were fighting off the enemy here. Kostya picked up the shell casing and placed it on the blackened sleeper that lay right there in the dugout.
“Look how great it stands out. It will be visible from afar,” he said (as S.I. Veselov writes). - Let's write a letter.
Which letter? - we were surprised.
But let’s hammer the cartridges into the sleeper so that the words come out. Let everyone read it.
I liked the idea. But what to knock out on the sleeper?
You seem to be a party member, you know better,” Kostya told me.
I offered:
- “We will win anyway.”
It’s long,” Kostrov objected. - Let's just say: “We will win!”
Kostya found a stone and began to hammer the cartridge case. She entered tightly - she bent. Kostya corrected her and hit her with the stone again. He was replaced by Sasha Kostrov. He beat me until he hurt his hand. So we took turns. And someone was on duty outside. Having finished the “letter”, they laid the sleeper across the path: let everyone see who passes here.
They crossed the front line under fire. Sasha Kostrov was killed. Both my legs were broken. Kostya and Anatoly Bogdanov carried me out to their people.”
from the book by K. F. Kalashnikov “The Right to Lead”
Before, in fact, the reconstruction, those who wished could get acquainted closely with the narrow-gauge variety of railway transport.
A rally was supposed to take place at the village memorial in the middle of the day. So that festival guests do not have doubts “Where should we go first?”, a narrow gauge train ran between the site and the memorial. It might seem like a small thing, but it’s quite possible to take off your hat to the organizers for this alone. It was imperative to attend the rally, and at the same time we took a ride on a rare narrow-gauge train. Personally, this is my first time.
Funeral salvo. The word “pleased” in this context is not very appropriate, but when the boys, after laying wreaths by the adults, rushed to collect spent cartridges, it somehow let go inside. They are normal boys, their values are normal and their memory of the event will remain correct. What they all say is true: it’s not the dead who need it, the living need it.
Heavy German weapons. This is the first time I've seen this during a reconstruction. Schwere Wurfgerat 40 (Holz). Wooden frame with a 32-cm Wurfkorper Flamm inside. A 32 cm incendiary rocket filled with crude oil. The maximum flight range of the missile was about 2000 meters with a maximum speed of 150 m/s. It was launched directly from the packaging frames, flew to the target very reluctantly, there was no need to talk about any accuracy. However, when firing across a dry meadow or forest, a mine explosion caused a fire of up to 200 square meters with a flame height of up to two to three meters. The explosion of a mine charge (weighing 1 kg) created an additional fragmentation effect.
English-language sources report that it was this installation that received the nickname “Land Stuka” (U87 dive bomber), because of the... roar (howl) that the missiles emitted at launch. The rocket engine operates in the first third of the flight path, and then it flies by inertia. That is, they jammed the missiles of their crew, and then fell silently on enemy positions. “Im Soldatenjargon wurde es als “Stuka zu Fu?” (auf Grund des ahnlich charakteristischen Pfeifgerauschs wie bei der Ju 87 "Stuka") oder "Heulende Kuh" bezeichnet."
Jokes aside: At the end of 1941, the command of the Leningrad Front, in preparation for breaking the blockade of Leningrad surrounded by German troops, instructed engineers of the Leningrad artillery range S.M. Serebryakov and M.N. Aleshkov to develop heavy high-explosive and incendiary rocket mines. The need for such mines arose due to the fact that, despite the presence of a significant number of guns for the destruction of enemy defensive structures, the Leningrad Front did not have a sufficient amount of ammunition for them. The task assigned to the engineers was greatly facilitated by the fact that in mid-March, Soviet troops operating in the Volkhov area captured a German ammunition depot in the village of Konduya, which also stored 28Wurkor-per Spr turbojet shells. (280 mm high explosive mine) and 32 Wurkurper M.F1.50 (320 mm incendiary mine). Their design was adopted as the basis for the creation of Soviet turbojet shells M-28 (MTV-280) and M-32 (MTV-320). On the Leningrad Front, the abbreviated name “MTV” (heavy rotating mine) was used.
By July 1942, military representatives accepted 460 M-28 mines and 31 M-32 mines from Leningrad enterprises. The first were equipped with the explosive "sinal", and the second - with a flammable liquid. Military tests were carried out on July 20, 1942 in combat conditions: 192 heavy M-28 mines (more than 12 tons of explosives and steel) immediately covered two enemy battalions - Spanish volunteers from the Blue Division and the Germans who were changing them at that hour in the fortified area of Staro-Panovo . The shooting was carried out using “frame” type launchers, on which sealed boxes with mines were placed (four for each installation). These boxes were used both for storing and transporting mines, and for launching them. The same principle was used to create the Soviet M-30 and M-31 missiles.
Well, it's time to start. To make it even more believable, cold rain fell mercilessly, the wind grew stronger, and everything in nature became the way I like it.
Inscriptions on the pillar (from top to bottom):
Field Gendarmerie
Sapper battalion
Berlin - 1321km
250th Infantry Division
Inscriptions on the pillar (from top to bottom):
Finev Meadow. Under fire! Drive without stopping!
Field Gendarmerie
Sapper battalion
Berlin - 1321km
250th Infantry Division
The Germans reoccupied the station.
Introduction
Chapter I. Creation of the Volkhov Front
Chapter II. Lyuban offensive operation
Chapter III. Appointment of Vlasov
Chapter IV. Tragedy of the 2nd Shock
Conclusion
Applications
Bibliography
Introduction
Cursed and killed.
Victor Astafiev
The Great Patriotic War... Just three words, but how much grief, adversity, pain, suffering and heroism lie behind these words. War in any Fatherland gives birth to both its heroes and its traitors. War reveals the essence of events, the essence of every person. War poses a dilemma for everyone: to be or not to be? To die of hunger, but not to touch the unique planting materials, as was the case in besieged Leningrad, or to change the oath and cooperate with the enemy for a ration of bread and additional food?
History is made by people. Ordinary people, not alien to human vices. It is they who elevate or belittle certain circumstances of life.
Victories and defeats... In what way, by what means were they achieved? How many destinies and lives have been ground through the meat grinder of war! There is no clear answer. What matters is how a person emerges from the crucible of trials, how he behaves, how his actions even influence the course of history. After all, history is created and written by people.
My choice of the topic of work was influenced by the fact that the history of the combat path of the 2nd Shock Army is interesting to study, especially in the period from January to June 1942. This topic is also interesting because it is inextricably linked with the name of the traitor A.A. Vlasov.
The topic of the 2nd Shock Army is relevant today. Only now, 60 years after the end of the Great Patriotic War, is a rethinking of those distant events taking place, when the political course of the country is changing, more and more archives and sources are being opened, more and more documents and memories of participants in those distant events are being made public, more and more books and articles are appearing. It is not without reason that a few weeks ago a monument to the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army was unveiled in Myasnoy Bor, Novgorod Region, the opening of which was attended by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation S.B. Ivanov.
The purpose of the work is to objectively show what happened to the 2nd Shock Army during the Lyuban operation, what caused it, what events influenced the further fate of Lieutenant General of the Red Army Andrei Andreevich Vlasov. Try to understand how the “Stalinist general” could become not just a traitor, but the leader of the Russian Liberation Army movement. The task is to draw general conclusions based on the literature of the 2nd Shock Army, the memories of veterans, and research works about Vlasov.
Speaking of historiography, it must be said that even in recent times, almost everything connected with the 2nd Shock Army and its commander was prohibited. In any case, there was little material and there was one officially accepted point of view - the general and the soldiers of his army - the “Vlasovites” - were traitors. And there is no need to talk a lot about them, study those distant events, analyze them, objectively approaching all the details of that tragedy.
The process of studying the actions of the 2nd Shock, as well as the biography of A.A. Vlasov, began only in the first half of the 90s of the last century. Of course, you can find information about the 2nd Shock Army in the literature of the 1970s - 1980s, but this information is very scarce, and there is no mention of General Vlasov. For example, in the book “On the Volkhov Front” published in 1982, in the table on page 342 in the column of the commander of the 2nd Shock Army in the period from April 16 to July 24, 1942, Vlasov’s surname does not appear. In general, looking at this table, one gets the impression that during this period the 2nd Shock Army disappeared from the Volkhov Front. In the collection of articles “On the Volkhov Front,” Vlasov is also not mentioned.
The most complete information about military operations and the formation of the 2nd Shock Army can be found in the collection “Lyuban Offensive Operation. January - June 1942." The compilers of the collection, K.K. Krupitsa and I.A. Ivanova, objectively described the combat operations of the Shock Army. But this is already 1994...
Works about the biography of A.A. Vlasov, about his career, as well as about his further activities began to appear only in recent years. All the authors of the works I studied are unanimous in the opinion that Vlasov is a traitor. For example, in N. Konyaev’s book “Two Faces of General Vlasov: Life, Fate, Legends,” the author provides an analysis of the activities of A. A. Vlasov, and also studies his biography in detail. Also interesting is the work of Yu.A. Kvitsinsky. “General Vlasov: the path of betrayal,” which describes in sufficient detail the captivity and further activities of the general.
Important for writing the research were books, memories, memoirs, diaries of other authors, whose names are indicated in the list of used literature.
Today's generation can give an objective assessment of those distant events in accordance with their honor and conscience, moral and ethical priorities.
Chapter I . Creation of the Volkhov Front
The defense of Leningrad occupies one of the most tragic and heroic pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War. The enemy expected to capture Leningrad two weeks after the attack on the USSR. But the resilience and courage of the Red Army and the people's militia thwarted the German plans. Instead of the planned two weeks, the enemy fought his way to Leningrad for 80 days.
From the second half of August to mid-September 1941, German troops tried to storm Leningrad, but did not achieve decisive success and proceeded to blockade and siege of the city. On October 16, 1941, eight German divisions crossed the river. Volkhov and rushed through Tikhvin to the river. Svir to connect with the Finnish army and close the second blockade ring east of Lake Ladoga. For Leningrad and the troops of the Leningrad Front, this meant certain death
The enemy, after joining with the Finns, was going to attack Vologda and Yaroslavl, intending to form a new front north of Moscow and, with a simultaneous strike along the October Railway, encircle our troops of the North-Western Front. Under these conditions, the Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, despite the critical situation near Moscow, found the opportunity to strengthen the 4th, 52nd and 54th armies, which were defending in the Tikhvin direction, with reserves. They launched a counter-offensive and by December 28th drove the Germans back beyond the Volkhov.
During these battles, the Soviet Headquarters developed an operation to completely defeat the Germans near Leningrad. To complete the task, the Volkhov Front was formed on December 17. It included the 4th and 52nd armies and two new armies from the Headquarters reserve - the 2nd Shock (formerly the 26th) and the 59th. The front under the command of Army General K.A. Meretskov had to use the forces of the 2nd Shock, 59th and 4th Armies, together with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front (located outside the blockade ring), to destroy the enemy’s Mginsk group and thereby break the blockade of Leningrad, and with a strike in the southern direction with the forces of the 52nd army to liberate Novgorod and cut off the enemy's escape routes in front of the North-Western Front, which was also going on the offensive. Weather conditions were favorable for the operation - in the wooded and swampy area, the harsh winter shackled the swamps and rivers.
Even before the start of the operation, individual units and units of the 52nd Army, on December 24 - 25, crossed the Volkhov on their own initiative to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold on the new line, and even captured small bridgeheads on the western bank. On the night of December 31, the Volkhov was crossed by units of the newly arrived 376th Infantry Division of the 59th Army, but no one managed to hold the bridgeheads.
The reason was that just the day before, on December 23-24, the enemy completed the withdrawal of his troops beyond the Volkhov to previously prepared positions and brought up reserves of manpower and equipment. The Volkhov group of the 18th German Army consisted of 14 infantry divisions, 2 motorized and 2 tank. The Volkhov Front, with the arrival of the 2nd shock and 59th armies and units of the Novgorod Army Group, gained an advantage over the enemy in manpower by 1.5 times, in guns and mortars by 1.6 times, and in aircraft by 1.3 times.
On January 1, 1942, the Volkhov Front united 23 rifle divisions, 8 rifle brigades, 1 grenadier brigade (due to a lack of small arms it was armed with grenades), 18 separate ski battalions, 4 cavalry divisions, 1 tank division, 8 separate tank brigades, 5 separate artillery regiments, 2 high-power howitzer regiments, a separate anti-tank defense regiment, 4 guards mortar regiments of rocket artillery, an anti-aircraft artillery division, a separate bomber and separate short-range bomber air regiment, 3 separate attack and 7 separate fighter air regiments and 1 reconnaissance squadron.
However, the Volkhov Front had a quarter of its ammunition at the beginning of the operation, the 4th and 52nd armies were exhausted by the battles, and 3.5 - 4 thousand people remained in their divisions. instead of the regular 10 - 12 thousand. Only the 2nd Shock and 59th armies had a full complement of personnel. But on the other hand, they almost completely lacked gun sights, as well as telephone cables and radio stations, which made it very difficult to control combat operations. The new armies also lacked warm clothing. In addition, the entire Volkhov Front lacked automatic weapons, tanks, shells, and vehicles.
On December 17, 1941, the first echelons of the 2nd Shock Army began to arrive at the newly formed Volkhov Front. The army included: a rifle division, eight separate rifle brigades, two separate tank battalions, three guards mortar divisions and an artillery regiment of the RGK. The 2nd Shock Army began to form at the end of October 1941 on the territory of the Volga Military District. The bulk of its personnel were drafted from the southern and steppe regions and saw forests and swamps for the first time on the Volkhov Front. The fighters cautiously walked around the thickets of the forest and crowded together in the clearings, which made them an excellent target for the enemy. Many soldiers did not have time to undergo basic combat training. The skiing units did not shine with their training either. Some skiers, for example, preferred to walk through deep snow, carrying skis like an unnecessary burden on their shoulders. Great efforts were required to turn these recruits into skilled fighters.
On January 7, 1942, the troops of the Volkhov Front, without completing the regrouping, without concentrating aviation and artillery, and without accumulating the necessary reserves of ammunition and fuel, tried to break through the enemy’s defenses on the river. Volkhov.
First, its main shock group (4th and 52nd armies) switched to active combat operations, and then the troops of the 59th and 2nd shock armies gradually began to be drawn into the battle.
8 For three days, General Meretskov’s armies tried to break through the enemy’s defenses. However, the offensive was not successful.
The attempt of the 54th Army was also unsuccessful. One of the reasons for such an unsuccessful start to the operation was the unpreparedness for the offensive of the 2nd Shock Army of General Sokolov. But back on January 7 at 00.20, in a combat report to the Supreme Commander of the Volkhov Front, he reported: “The 2nd Shock Army took its starting position along the eastern bank of the river. Volkhov is ready to launch an offensive in the morning 7.1. with the help of five brigades and the 259th Infantry Division.
Despite the fact that the concentration was not completed, the 2nd Shock Army would go on the offensive on January 7. The main difficulties: the army artillery of the 2nd Shock Army did not arrive, its guards divisions did not arrive, aviation was not concentrated, vehicles did not arrive, ammunition reserves had not been accumulated, the tense situation with food fodder and fuel had not yet been corrected...”
By the way, by the beginning of January, the provision of rifle divisions and brigades with artillery weapons did not exceed 40% of the staff. On January 1, 1942, the front had a total of 682 guns of 76 mm caliber and larger, 697 mortars of 82 mm and larger, and 205 anti-tank guns.
And although the ratio in artillery assets was 1.5:1 in favor of the Soviet troops, still, as a result of the slow concentration of artillery, it was not possible to create a decisive superiority over the enemy by the beginning of the offensive. The enemy outnumbered the front forces in anti-tank guns by 1.5 times, and in large-caliber guns by 2 times. Already during the offensive, the attack by infantry and tanks was preceded by short fire raids. Artillery support for the attack and support of the battle in depth was carried out with concentrated fire and fire at individual targets, at the request of the commanders of the rifle units. But before the start of the attack, the infantry and tanks failed to suppress the enemy’s fire weapons and disrupt their fire system. As a result, the attacking units immediately encountered organized fire from all types of weapons.
The Volkhov Front Air Force was in an even worse situation. The front had only 118 combat aircraft available, which was clearly not enough.
At the beginning of January 1942, the front commander set a difficult task for aviation: to prepare for bombing strikes in the Lyuban offensive operation within 5–7 days. The main efforts were planned to be concentrated on covering and supporting the troops of the 2nd Shock Army and the 59th Army.
However, as a result of heavy losses in the operations of the initial period of the war and in the operations carried out in the summer and autumn of 1941, Soviet aviation was unable to gain strategic air supremacy, which means that it could not provide effective support for the advancing troops even now. Quantitative superiority over enemy aircraft, lost in 1941, was regained only in the spring of 1942.
If on December 6, 1941 it was 1: 1.4 in favor of the enemy, then already in May 1942 it was 1.3: 1 in favor of Soviet front-line aviation. All this was achieved by increasing the production capacity of the aviation industry, which ensured a continuous increase in the number of aircraft supplied to the front. The next reason that affected the weak effectiveness of the Volkhov Front Air Force was that in terms of share, army aviation accounted for more than 80%, and front-line aviation accounted for less than 20% of air regiments. In the German Air Force at the same time, only about 15% of the aviation forces were part of the field armies, the remaining 85% were air fleets directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the German Air Force and carried out combat missions only in operational cooperation with ground forces.
This made it much easier for the fascist command to organize and concentrate the main forces of the Luftwaffe in the main direction of operations of its troops, and did not require the transfer of aviation efforts from one direction to another, or the creation of large aviation reserves.
The concentration of significant front aviation forces in combined arms armies led in the first year of the war to the dispersal of already limited aviation forces and excluded centralized control and its massive use on the front scale. And the subordination of the front air forces to the commander of the front forces excluded centralized control of the Red Army air forces on the part of their commander and made it difficult for them to be massively used in strategic directions. And all this taken together reduced the effectiveness of the combat operations of the Red Army Air Force both on the Soviet-German front as a whole and in the zones of each front. The Air Force was “confined” into a framework that did not allow it to fully realize its maneuver and strike capabilities. Here is an excerpt from the directive of the commander of the Red Army Air Force - deputy NPO of the USSR dated January 25, 1942, Colonel General of Aviation P.F. Zhigareva:
“The use of frontline aviation, given its limited number, is currently being carried out incorrectly. The commanders of the Air Forces of the fronts, instead of purposefully massing aviation on the main axes against the main enemy objects and groups that impede the successful solution of the front's tasks, disperse the means and efforts of aviation against numerous objects on all sectors of the front. This is confirmed by the even distribution of aviation between the armies... Massive aviation actions on the part of the commanders of the Air Forces of the fronts in the interests of the planned operations are carried out hesitantly or are completely absent.”
Thus, in addition to the unpreparedness of the 2nd Shock Army, the front-line operation was doomed primarily due to the lack of decisive superiority over the enemy in both artillery, tanks and aviation, the improper use of forces and means, and the dispersion of their efforts along the entire front. instead of massive application in the main directions. But this is on the one hand. On the other hand, in addition to the fact that the Soviet command missed the factor of surprise, precious time was lost, the grouping of artillery, tanks and aviation was subsequently built up very slowly due to the lack of significant reserves at Headquarters. Given this state of affairs, the necessary massing of forces and means was practically hardly possible. And the imperfections in the organizational structure of the Air Force deprived ground troops of sufficiently effective air support.