First Finnish War 1920. Peace negotiations between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and Finland

The Finnish War lasted 105 days. During this time, over one hundred thousand Red Army soldiers died, about a quarter of a million were wounded or dangerously frostbitten. Historians are still arguing whether the USSR was an aggressor and whether the losses were unjustified.

A look back

It is impossible to understand the reasons for that war without an excursion into the history of Russian-Finnish relations. Before gaining independence, the “Land of a Thousand Lakes” never had statehood. In 1808 - an insignificant episode of the twentieth anniversary of the Napoleonic Wars - the land of Suomi was conquered by Russia from Sweden.

The new territorial acquisition enjoys unprecedented autonomy within the Empire: the Grand Duchy of Finland has its own parliament, legislation, and since 1860 - its own monetary unit. For a century, this blessed corner of Europe has not known war - until 1901, Finns were not drafted into the Russian army. The population of the principality increases from 860 thousand inhabitants in 1810 to almost three million in 1910.

After the October Revolution, Suomi gained independence. During the local civil war, the local version of the “whites” won; chasing the “reds”, the hot guys crossed the old border, and the First Soviet-Finnish War began (1918-1920). Bleeded Russia, having still formidable white armies in the South and Siberia, chose to make territorial concessions to its northern neighbor: as a result of the Tartu Peace Treaty, Helsinki received Western Karelia, and the state border passed forty kilometers northwest of Petrograd.

It is difficult to say how historically fair this verdict turned out to be; The Vyborg province inherited by Finland belonged to Russia for more than a hundred years, from the time of Peter the Great until 1811, when it was included in the Grand Duchy of Finland, perhaps also as a sign of gratitude for the voluntary consent of the Finnish Seimas to pass under the hand of the Russian Tsar.

The knots that later led to new bloody clashes were successfully tied.

Geography is a sentence

Look at the map. It's 1939, and Europe smells of a new war. At the same time, your imports and exports mainly go through seaports. But the Baltic and the Black Sea are two big puddles, all the exits from which Germany and its satellites can clog in no time. The Pacific sea routes will be blocked by another Axis member, Japan.

Thus, the only potentially protected channel for export, for which the Soviet Union receives the gold it desperately needs to complete industrialization, and the import of strategic military materials, remains only the port on the Arctic Ocean, Murmansk, one of the few year-round ice-free harbors in the USSR. The only railway to which, suddenly, in some places passes through rugged deserted terrain just a few tens of kilometers from the border (when this railway was laid, back under the Tsar, no one could have imagined that the Finns and Russians would fight on opposite sides barricades). Moreover, at a distance of a three-day journey from this border there is another strategic transport artery, the White Sea-Baltic Canal.

But that’s another half of the geographic troubles. Leningrad, the cradle of the revolution, which concentrated a third of the country's military-industrial potential, is within the radius of one forced march of a potential enemy. A metropolis, whose streets have never been hit by an enemy shell before, can be shelled from heavy guns from the very first day of a possible war. Baltic Fleet ships are losing their only base. And there are no natural defensive lines, right up to the Neva.

friend of your enemy

Today, wise and calm Finns can only attack someone in an anecdote. But three quarters of a century ago, when, on the wings of independence gained much later than other European nations, accelerated national building continued in Suomi, you would have had no time for jokes.

In 1918, Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim uttered the well-known “oath of the sword,” publicly promising to annex Eastern (Russian) Karelia. At the end of the thirties, Gustav Karlovich (as he was called during his service in the Russian Imperial Army, where the path of the future field marshal began) is the most influential person in the country.

Of course, Finland did not intend to attack the USSR. I mean, she wasn't going to do this alone. The young state's ties with Germany were, perhaps, even stronger than with the countries of its native Scandinavia. In 1918, when the newly independent country was undergoing intense discussions about the form of government, by decision of the Finnish Senate, Emperor Wilhelm's brother-in-law, Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse, was declared King of Finland; For various reasons, nothing came of the Suoma monarchist project, but the choice of personnel is very indicative. Further, the very victory of the “Finnish White Guard” (as the northern neighbors were called in Soviet newspapers) in the internal civil war of 1918 was also largely, if not completely, due to the participation of the expeditionary force sent by the Kaiser (numbering up to 15 thousand people, despite the fact that the total number of local “reds” and “whites”, who were significantly inferior to the Germans in terms of fighting qualities, did not exceed 100 thousand people).

Cooperation with the Third Reich developed no less successfully than with the Second. Kriegsmarine ships freely entered Finnish skerries; German stations in the area of ​​Turku, Helsinki and Rovaniemi were engaged in radio reconnaissance; from the second half of the thirties, the airfields of the “Land of a Thousand Lakes” were modernized to accept heavy bombers, which Mannerheim did not even have in the project... It should be said that subsequently Germany, already in the first hours of the war with the USSR (which Finland officially joined only on June 25, 1941 ) actually used the territory and waters of Suomi to lay mines in the Gulf of Finland and bombard Leningrad.

Yes, at that time the idea of ​​​​attacking the Russians did not seem so crazy. The Soviet Union of 1939 did not look like a formidable adversary at all. The asset includes the successful (for Helsinki) First Soviet-Finnish War. The brutal defeat of the Red Army soldiers from Poland during the Western Campaign in 1920. Of course, one can recall the successful repulsion of Japanese aggression on Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, but, firstly, these were local clashes far from the European theater, and, secondly, the qualities of the Japanese infantry were assessed very low. And thirdly, the Red Army, as Western analysts believed, was weakened by the repressions of 1937. Of course, the human and economic resources of the empire and its former province are incomparable. But Mannerheim, unlike Hitler, did not intend to go to the Volga to bomb the Urals. Karelia alone was enough for the field marshal.

Negotiation

Stalin was anything but a fool. If to improve the strategic situation it is necessary to move the border away from Leningrad, so it should be. Another question is that the goal cannot necessarily be achieved only by military means. Although, honestly, right now, in the fall of ’39, when the Germans are ready to grapple with the hated Gauls and Anglo-Saxons, I want to quietly solve my little problem with the “Finnish White Guard” - not out of revenge for an old defeat, no, in politics following emotions leads to imminent death - and to test what the Red Army is capable of in a battle with a real enemy, small in number, but trained by the European military school; in the end, if the Laplanders can be defeated, as our General Staff plans, in two weeks, Hitler will think a hundred times before attacking us...

But Stalin would not have been Stalin if he had not tried to settle the issue amicably, if such a word is appropriate for a person of his character. Since 1938, the negotiations in Helsinki had been neither shaky nor slow; in the fall of 1939 they were moved to Moscow. In exchange for the Leningrad underbelly, the Soviets offered twice the area north of Ladoga. Germany, through diplomatic channels, recommended that the Finnish delegation agree. But they did not make any concessions (perhaps, as the Soviet press transparently hinted, at the suggestion of “Western partners”) and on November 13 they left for home. There are two weeks left until the Winter War.

On November 26, 1939, near the village of Mainila on the Soviet-Finnish border, the positions of the Red Army came under artillery fire. The diplomats exchanged notes of protest; According to the Soviet side, about a dozen soldiers and commanders were killed and wounded. Whether the Maynila incident was a deliberate provocation (as evidenced, for example, by the absence of a named list of victims), or whether one of the thousands of armed men, tensely standing for long days opposite the same armed enemy, finally lost their nerve - in any case , this incident was the reason for the outbreak of hostilities.

The Winter Campaign began, where there was a heroic breakthrough of the seemingly indestructible “Mannerheim Line”, and a belated understanding of the role of snipers in modern warfare, and the first use of the KV-1 tank - but for a long time they did not like to remember all this. The losses turned out to be too disproportionate, and the damage to the international reputation of the USSR was severe.

After the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Germany went to war with Poland, and relations between the USSR and Finland began to strain. One of the reasons is a secret document between the USSR and Germany on delimiting spheres of influence. According to it, the influence of the USSR extended to Finland, the Baltic states, western Ukraine and Belarus, and Bessarabia.

Realizing that a major war was inevitable, Stalin sought to protect Leningrad, which could be shelled by artillery from Finnish territory. Therefore, the task was to move the border further north. To resolve the issue peacefully, the Soviet side offered Finland the lands of Karelia in exchange for moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus, but any attempts at dialogue were suppressed by the Finns. They didn't want to come to an agreement.

Reason for war

The reason for the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 was an incident near the village of Mainila on November 25, 1939 at 15:45. This village is located on the Karelian Isthmus, 800 meters from the Finnish border. Mainila was subjected to artillery shelling, as a result of which 4 representatives of the Red Army were killed and 8 were wounded.

On November 26, Molotov summoned the Finnish ambassador in Moscow (Irie Koskinen) and presented a note of protest, stating that the shelling was carried out from the territory of Finland, and that the only thing that saved him from starting a war was that the Soviet army had an order not to succumb to provocations.

On November 27, the Finnish government responded to the Soviet note of protest. Briefly, the main provisions of the answer were as follows:

• The shelling actually took place and lasted approximately 20 minutes.
• The shelling came from the Soviet side, approximately 1.5-2 km southeast of the village of Maynila.
• It was proposed to create a commission that would jointly study this episode and give it an adequate assessment.

What really happened near the village of Maynila? This is an important question, since it was as a result of these events that the Winter (Soviet-Finnish) War was unleashed. The only thing that can be stated unequivocally is that there really was shelling of the village of Maynila, but who carried it out is impossible to establish through documentation. Ultimately, there are 2 versions (Soviet and Finnish), and each needs to be evaluated. The first version is that Finland shelled the territory of the USSR. The second version is that it was a provocation prepared by the NKVD.

Why did Finland need this provocation? Historians talk about two reasons:

1. The Finns were a political tool in the hands of the British, who needed war. This assumption would be reasonable if we consider the winter war in isolation. But if we remember the realities of those times, then at the time of the incident a world war was already underway, and England had already declared war on Germany. England's attack on the USSR automatically created an alliance between Stalin and Hitler, and this alliance would sooner or later hit England itself with all its might. Therefore, to assume this is tantamount to assuming that England decided to commit suicide, which, of course, was not the case.
2. They wanted to expand their territories and influence. This is an absolutely stupid hypothesis. This is from the category - Liechtenstein wants to attack Germany. It's nonsense. Finland had neither the strength nor the means for war, and everyone in the Finnish command understood that their only chance of success in the war with the USSR was a long defense that would exhaust the enemy. With such situations, no one will disturb the den with the bear.

The most adequate answer to the question posed is that the shelling of the village of Mainila is a provocation of the Soviet government itself, which was looking for any excuse to justify the war with Finland. And it was this incident that was subsequently presented to Soviet society as an example of the treachery of the Finnish people, who needed help to carry out the socialist revolution.

Balance of forces and means

It is indicative how the forces were correlated during the Soviet-Finnish war. Below is a brief table that describes how the opposing countries approached the Winter War.

In all aspects except infantry, the USSR had a clear advantage. But conducting an offensive, superior to the enemy by only 1.3 times, is an extremely risky undertaking. In this case, discipline, training and organization come to the fore. The Soviet army had problems with all three aspects. These figures once again emphasize that the Soviet leadership did not perceive Finland as an enemy, expecting to destroy it in the shortest possible time.

Progress of the war

The Soviet-Finnish or Winter War can be divided into 2 stages: the first (December 39th - January 7th 40th) and the second (January 7th 40th - March 12th 40th). What happened on January 7, 1940? Timoshenko was appointed commander of the army, who immediately set about reorganizing the army and establishing order in it.

First stage

The Soviet-Finnish war began on November 30, 1939, and the Soviet army failed to carry it out briefly. The USSR army actually crossed the state border of Finland without declaring war. For its citizens, the justification was the following - to help the people of Finland in overthrowing the bourgeois government of the warmonger.

The Soviet leadership did not take Finland seriously, believing that the war would be over in a few weeks. They even mentioned a figure of 3 weeks as a deadline. More specifically, there should be no war. The Soviet command's plan was approximately as follows:

• Send in troops. We did this on November 30th.
• Creation of a working government controlled by the USSR. On December 1, the Kuusinen government was created (more on this later).
• Lightning-fast attack on all fronts. It was planned to reach Helsinki in 1.5-2 weeks.
• Declining the real government of Finland towards peace and complete surrender in favor of the Kuusinen government.

The first two points were implemented in the first days of the war, but then problems began. The blitzkrieg did not work out, and the army was stuck in the Finnish defense. Although in the initial days of the war, until approximately December 4, it seemed that everything was going according to plan - Soviet troops were moving forward. However, very soon they stumbled upon the Mannerheim line. On December 4, the armies of the eastern front (near Lake Suvantojärvi), on December 6 - the central front (Summa direction), and on December 10 - the western front (Gulf of Finland) entered it. And it was a shock. A huge number of documents indicate that the troops did not expect to encounter a well-fortified defense line. And this is a huge question for the Red Army intelligence.

In any case, December was a disastrous month that thwarted almost all the plans of the Soviet Headquarters. The troops advanced inland slowly. Every day the pace of movement only decreased. Reasons for the slow advance of Soviet troops:

1. Terrain. Almost the entire territory of Finland is forests and swamps. It is difficult to use equipment in such conditions.
2. Application of aviation. Aviation was practically not used in terms of bombing. There was no point in bombing villages adjacent to the front line, since the Finns were retreating, leaving behind scorched earth. It was difficult to bomb the retreating troops, since they were retreating with civilians.
3. Roads. While retreating, the Finns destroyed roads, caused landslides, and mined everything they could.

Formation of the Kuusinen government

On December 1, 1939, the People's Government of Finland was formed in the city of Terijoki. It was formed on territory already captured by the USSR, and with the direct participation of the Soviet leadership. The Finnish people's government included:

• Chairman and Minister of Foreign Affairs – Otto Kuusinen
• Minister of Finance – Mauri Rosenberg
• Minister of Defense - Axel Antila
• Minister of the Interior – Tuure Lehen
• Minister of Agriculture – Armas Eikia
• Minister of Education – Inkeri Lehtinen
• Minister for Karelia Affairs – Paavo Prokkonen

Outwardly it looks like a full-fledged government. The only problem is that the Finnish population did not recognize him. But already on December 1 (that is, on the day of its formation), this government concluded an agreement with the USSR on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the FDR (Finnish Democratic Republic). On December 2, a new agreement is signed - on mutual assistance. From this moment on, Molotov says that the war continues because a revolution took place in Finland, and now it is necessary to support it and help the workers. In fact, it was a clever trick to justify the war in the eyes of the Soviet population.

Mannerheim Line

The Mannerheim Line is one of the few things that almost everyone knows about the Soviet-Finnish war. Soviet propaganda said about this fortification system that all the world generals recognized its impregnability. This was an exaggeration. The line of defense was, of course, strong, but not impregnable.

The Mannerheim Line (as it received this name already during the war) consisted of 101 concrete fortifications. For comparison, the Maginot Line, which Germany crossed in France, was approximately the same length. The Maginot Line consisted of 5,800 concrete structures. In fairness, it should be noted the difficult terrain conditions of the Mannerheim Line. There were swamps and numerous lakes, which made movement extremely difficult and therefore the defense line did not require a large number of fortifications.

The largest attempt to break through the Mannerheim Line at the first stage was made on December 17-21 in the central section. It was here that it was possible to occupy the roads leading to Vyborg, gaining a significant advantage. But the offensive, in which 3 divisions took part, failed. This was the first major success in the Soviet-Finnish war for the Finnish army. This success came to be called the “Miracle of Summa.” Subsequently, the line was broken on February 11, which actually predetermined the outcome of the war.

Expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations

On December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. This decision was promoted by England and France, who spoke of Soviet aggression against Finland. Representatives of the League of Nations condemned the actions of the USSR in terms of aggressive actions and the outbreak of war.

Today, the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations is cited as an example of the limitation of Soviet power and as a loss in image. In fact, everything is a little different. In 1939, the League of Nations no longer played the role it had been assigned following the First World War. The fact is that back in 1933, Germany left it, refusing to comply with the demands of the League of Nations for disarmament and simply left the organization. It turns out that at the time of December 14, the League of Nations de facto ceased to exist. After all, what kind of European security system can we talk about when Germany and the USSR left the organization?

Second stage of the war

On January 7, 1940, the Headquarters of the Northwestern Front was headed by Marshal Timoshenko. He had to solve all the problems and organize a successful offensive of the Red Army. At this point, the Soviet-Finnish war took a break, and no active operations were carried out until February. From February 1 to 9, powerful attacks began on the Mannerheim line. It was assumed that the 7th and 13th armies were to break through the defense line with decisive flank attacks and occupy the Vuoksy-Karkhul sector. After this, it was planned to move to Vyborg, occupy the city and block the railways and highways leading to the West.

On February 11, 1940, a general offensive of Soviet troops began on the Karelian Isthmus. This was a turning point in the Winter War, as units of the Red Army managed to break through the Mannerheim Line and begin advancing deeper into the country. We advanced slowly due to the specifics of the terrain, the resistance of the Finnish army and severe frosts, but the main thing was that we advanced. At the beginning of March, the Soviet army was already on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay.

This effectively ended the war, since it was obvious that Finland did not have much strength and means to contain the Red Army. From that time on, peace negotiations began, in which the USSR dictated its terms, and Molotov constantly emphasized that the conditions would be harsh, because the Finns forced the war to start, during which the blood of Soviet soldiers was shed.

Why did the war last so long

According to the Bolsheviks, the Soviet-Finnish war was supposed to end in 2-3 weeks, and the decisive advantage was to be given by the troops of the Leningrad district alone. In practice, the war dragged on for almost 4 months, and divisions were assembled throughout the country to suppress the Finns. There are several reasons for this:

• Poor organization of troops. This concerns the poor performance of the command staff, but the bigger problem is coherence between the branches of the military. She was practically absent. If you study archival documents, there are a lot of reports according to which some troops fired at others.
• Poor security. The army was in need of almost everything. The war was fought in winter and in the north, where the air temperature dropped below -30 by the end of December. And at the same time, the army was not provided with winter clothing.
• Underestimating the enemy. The USSR did not prepare for war. The plan was to quickly suppress the Finns and solve the problem without war, attributing everything to the border incident of November 24, 1939.
• Support for Finland by other countries. England, Italy, Hungary, Sweden (primarily) - provided assistance to Finland in everything: weapons, supplies, food, airplanes, and so on. The greatest efforts were made by Sweden, which itself actively helped and facilitated the transfer of assistance from other countries. In general, during the Winter War of 1939-1940, only Germany supported the Soviet side.

Stalin was very nervous because the war was dragging on. He repeated - The whole world is watching us. And he was right. Therefore, Stalin demanded a solution to all problems, restoration of order in the army and a speedy resolution of the conflict. To some extent this was achieved. And quite quickly. The Soviet offensive in February-March 1940 forced Finland to peace.

The Red Army fought extremely undisciplinedly, and its management does not stand up to criticism. Almost all reports and memos about the situation at the front were accompanied by a postscript - “an explanation of the reasons for the failures.” I will give some quotes from Beria’s memo to Stalin No. 5518/B dated December 14, 1939:

• During the landing on the island of Sayskari, a Soviet plane dropped 5 bombs, which landed on the destroyer "Lenin".
• On December 1, the Ladoga flotilla was fired upon twice by its own aircraft.
• When occupying the island of Gogland, during the advance of the landing forces, 6 Soviet aircraft appeared, one of which fired several shots in bursts. As a result, 10 people were injured.

And there are hundreds of such examples. But if the situations above are examples of the exposure of soldiers and troops, then next I want to give examples of how the equipment of the Soviet army took place. To do this, let us turn to Beria’s memo to Stalin No. 5516/B dated December 14, 1939:

• In the Tulivara area, the 529th Rifle Corps needed 200 pairs of skis to bypass enemy fortifications. This could not be done, since the Headquarters received 3,000 pairs of skis with broken points.
• The new arrivals from the 363rd Signal Battalion include 30 vehicles in need of repair, and 500 people are wearing summer uniforms.
• The 51st Corps Artillery Regiment arrived to replenish the 9th Army. Missing: 72 tractors, 65 trailers. Of the 37 tractors that arrived, only 9 are in good condition, out of 150 machines - 90. 80% of the personnel are not provided with winter uniforms.

It is not surprising that against the backdrop of such events there was desertion in the Red Army. For example, on December 14, 430 people deserted from the 64th Infantry Division.

Help for Finland from other countries

In the Soviet-Finnish war, many countries provided assistance to Finland. To demonstrate, I will cite Beria’s report to Stalin and Molotov No. 5455/B.

Finland is helped by:

• Sweden – 8 thousand people. Mainly reserve personnel. They are commanded by career officers who are on “vacation.”
• Italy - number unknown.
• Hungary – 150 people. Italy demands an increase in numbers.
• England - 20 fighter aircraft are known, although the actual number is higher.

The best proof that the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 took place with the support of the Western countries of Finland was the speech of Finnish Minister Greensberg on December 27, 1939 at 07:15 to the English agency Havas. Below I quote the literal translation from English.

The Finnish people thank the English, French and other nations for the assistance they provide.

Greensberg, Minister of Finland

It is obvious that Western countries opposed the USSR aggression against Finland. This was expressed, among other things, by the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations.

I would also like to show a photo of Beria’s report on the intervention of France and England in the Soviet-Finnish war.

Conclusion of peace

On February 28, the USSR handed over to Finland its terms for concluding peace. The negotiations themselves took place in Moscow on March 8-12. After these negotiations, the Soviet-Finnish war ended on March 12, 1940. The peace terms were as follows:

1. The USSR received the Karelian Isthmus along with Vyborg (Viipuri), the bay and islands.
2. The western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, together with the cities of Kexgolm, Suoyarvi and Sortavala.
3. Islands in the Gulf of Finland.
4. Hanko Island with its maritime territory and base was leased to the USSR for 50 years. The USSR paid 8 million German marks for rent annually.
5. The agreement between Finland and the USSR of 1920 has lost its force.
6. On March 13, 1940, hostilities ceased.

Below is a map showing the territories ceded to the USSR as a result of the signing of the peace treaty.

USSR losses

The question of the number of USSR soldiers killed during the Soviet-Finnish War is still open. The official history does not answer the question, speaking in veiled terms about “minimal” losses and focusing on the fact that the objectives were achieved. There was no talk about the scale of the Red Army's losses in those days. The figure was deliberately underestimated, demonstrating the success of the army. In fact, the losses were huge. To do this, just look at report No. 174 of December 21, which provides figures on the losses of the 139th Infantry Division over 2 weeks of fighting (November 30 - December 13). The losses are as follows:

• Commanders – 240.
• Privates - 3536.
• Rifles - 3575.
• Light machine guns – 160.
• Heavy machine guns – 150.
• Tanks – 5.
• Armored vehicles – 2.
• Tractors – 10.
• Trucks – 14.
• Horse composition - 357.

Belyanov's memo No. 2170 dated December 27 talks about the losses of the 75th Infantry Division. Total losses: senior commanders - 141, junior commanders - 293, rank and file - 3668, tanks - 20, machine guns - 150, rifles - 1326, armored vehicles - 3.

This is data for 2 divisions (much more fought) for 2 weeks of fighting, when the first week was a “warm-up” - the Soviet army advanced relatively without losses until it reached the Mannerheim Line. And during these 2 weeks, of which only the last was actually combative, the OFFICIAL figures are losses of more than 8 thousand people! A huge number of people suffered frostbite.

On March 26, 1940, at the 6th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, data on USSR losses in the war with Finland were announced - 48,745 people killed and 158,863 people wounded and frostbitten. These are official figures and therefore greatly underestimated. Today, historians give different figures for the losses of the Soviet army. It is said that between 150 and 500 thousand people died. For example, the Book of Combat Losses of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army states that in the war with the White Finns, 131,476 people died, went missing, or died from wounds. At the same time, the data of that time did not take into account the losses of the Navy, and for a long time people who died in hospitals after wounds and frostbite were not taken into account as losses. Today, most historians agree that about 150 thousand Red Army soldiers died during the war, excluding the losses of the Navy and border troops.

Finnish losses are listed as follows: 23 thousand dead and missing, 45 thousand wounded, 62 aircraft, 50 tanks, 500 guns.

Results and consequences of the war

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, even with a brief study, points to both absolutely negative and absolutely positive aspects. The negative is the nightmare of the first months of the war and the huge number of victims. By and large, it was December 1939 and early January 1940 that demonstrated to the whole world that the Soviet army was weak. That's how it really was. But there was also a positive aspect: the Soviet leadership saw the real strength of its army. We have been told since childhood that the Red Army has been the strongest in the world almost since 1917, but this is extremely far from reality. The only major test of this army was the Civil War. We will not now analyze the reasons for the victory of the Reds over the Whites (after all, we are now talking about the Winter War), but the reasons for the victory of the Bolsheviks do not lie in the army. To demonstrate this, it is enough to just quote one quote from Frunze, which he voiced at the end of the Civil War.

All this army rabble needs to be disbanded as soon as possible.

Frunze

Before the war with Finland, the leadership of the USSR had its head in the clouds, believing that it had a strong army. But December 1939 showed that this was not the case. The army was extremely weak. But starting in January 1940, changes were made (personnel and organizational) that changed the course of the war, and which largely prepared a combat-ready army for the Patriotic War. This is very easy to prove. Almost the entire December of the 39th Red Army stormed the Mannerheim line - there was no result. On February 11, 1940, the Mannerheim line was broken through in 1 day. This breakthrough was possible because it was carried out by another army, more disciplined, organized, and trained. And the Finns did not have a single chance against such an army, so Mannerheim, who served as Minister of Defense, even then began to talk about the need for peace.

Prisoners of war and their fate

The number of prisoners of war during the Soviet-Finnish war was impressive. At the time of the war, there were 5,393 captured Red Army soldiers and 806 captured White Finns. Captured Red Army soldiers were divided into the following groups:

• Political leadership. It was political affiliation that was important, without singling out rank.
• Officers. This group included persons equated to officers.
• Junior officers.
• Privates.
• National minorities
• Defectors.

Particular attention was paid to national minorities. The attitude towards them in Finnish captivity was more loyal than towards representatives of the Russian people. The privileges were minor, but they were there. At the end of the war, a mutual exchange of all prisoners was carried out, regardless of their belonging to one group or another.

On April 19, 1940, Stalin orders everyone who was in Finnish captivity to be sent to the Southern Camp of the NKVD. Below is a quote from the Politburo resolution.

All those returned by the Finnish authorities should be sent to the Southern camp. Within three months, ensure all the necessary measures are taken to identify persons processed by foreign intelligence services. Pay attention to dubious and alien elements, as well as those who voluntarily surrendered. In all cases, refer cases to court.

Stalin

The southern camp, located in the Ivanovo region, began work on April 25. Already on May 3, Beria sent a letter to Stalin, Molotov and Timoschenko, informing that 5277 people had arrived at the Camp. On June 28, Beria sends a new report. According to it, the Southern camp “receives” 5,157 Red Army soldiers and 293 officers. Of these, 414 people were convicted of treason and treason.

The myth of war - Finnish “cuckoos”

“Cuckoos” is what Soviet soldiers called snipers who continuously fired at the Red Army. It was said that these are professional Finnish snipers who sit in trees and shoot almost without missing. The reason for such attention to snipers is their high efficiency and the inability to determine the point of the shot. But the problem in determining the point of the shot was not that the shooter was in a tree, but that the terrain created an echo. It disoriented the soldiers.

Stories about “cuckoos” are one of the myths that the Soviet-Finnish war gave rise to in large numbers. It’s hard to imagine in 1939 a sniper who, at air temperatures below -30 degrees, was able to sit on a tree for days, while firing accurate shots.

The Soviet-Finnish war, everything seems to be clear with it, the USSR is the aggressor, Finland is the victim, but there is a different point of view on this issue.
Yu.I. Mukhin "Crusade to the East" (http://lib.rus.ec/b/162956/read#t32)
Chapter 5. War as a cure for stupidity

I think that on the issue of NATO expansion to the East we are behaving the way our opponents want - we are resisting it. Is it necessary? These doubts came to my mind when I thought about the Soviet-Finnish war - the stupidest war of our century.
Defense of Leningrad

Leningrad is extremely vulnerable from a military point of view. Even without aviation, the capture of Leningrad is not a big problem for a strong enemy fleet. For the main calibers of artillery of enemy battleships, Kronstadt is not a great obstacle, and when the Leningrad ports are captured, the supply of troops by sea turns the Leningrad region into an area from which the enemy army can easily strike at the heart of Russia.

Therefore, the main idea of ​​​​the defense of St. Petersburg among the tsars was to prevent the enemy fleet from approaching the St. Petersburg approaches. For this purpose, the Gulf of Finland and all approaches to it were blocked with minefields during the First World War. But the mines can be removed. Therefore, the main task of the Baltic Fleet was to prevent the breakthrough of minefields - its ships were supposed to sink enemy ships when trying to remove mines.

However, it was easier for the king. If you look at the map of the Russian Empire, you will see that the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland is Finland, which was then part of the Russian Empire, and the southern coast is the imperial Baltic states. The Baltic Fleet was at home everywhere; its coastal batteries stood on both sides of the bay, covering the minefields from enemy minesweepers and preventing enemy ships from passing these batteries to St. Petersburg.

Even the day before the announcement of World War I, Vice Admiral Essen, commander of the Baltic Fleet, placed more than three thousand mines on the Tallinn-Helsinki line (Central Position), then their number was increased to 8 thousand, with 25 coastal batteries defending the position from the Finnish and Estonian coasts, which had 60 only 305-mm powerful guns, firing shells weighing half a ton. Therefore, throughout the entire war the Germans made virtually no serious attempts to break through to Petrograd.

But in the USSR after the Revolution, nothing remained of this. Almost the entire southern coast belonged to Estonia, and from the Finnish border it was possible to fire at Leningrad from field guns. Sea mines, of course, could be laid, but not protected from the shore, they would be instantly removed. The situation of both Leningrad and the USSR was tragic in its defenselessness.

And Hitler in Mein Kampf did not hide the fact that the Third Reich would be built on the territories of the USSR. Therefore, when Germany annexed Austria on March 12, 1938, it was the first call for the USSR. And already in April 1938, the Finnish government secretly received the first Soviet proposals. The USSR asked Finland to guarantee that it would resist the Germans if they attacked Finland, for which the Soviet Union offered its troops, navy and weapons. The Finns refused.

The USSR was looking for options. By the fall, he no longer offered a direct agreement, did not offer troops, but only asked for an agreement on the protection of the shores of Finland by the Baltic Fleet if Finland was attacked by the Germans. The Finns again refused and did not even try to continue negotiations. Meanwhile, England and France had already betrayed Czechoslovakia and the USSR in Munich. The USSR's ally, France, refused to defend Czechoslovakia; the second ally, Czechoslovakia itself, surrendered the Sudetenland to the Germans without firing a single shot. It became clear that for the West, all agreements on military alliances are nothing more than a piece of paper. To defend Leningrad, something more realistic was required; we had to rely only on our own strength.

In October 1938, the USSR offered the Finns assistance in building a military base on the Finnish island of Gogland in the Gulf of Finland and the right, if Finland could not cope with the defense of this island, to defend it jointly. The Finns refused.

The Soviet Union asked Finland to lease four small islands in the Gulf of Finland for 30 years. The Finns refused.

Then the USSR asked to exchange them for its territory. At this stage, the former brave (Order of St. George) general of the Russian army, and by that time the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, learned about the negotiations. He immediately proposed to the Finnish government to exchange not only the requested islands, but also the territory of the Karelian Isthmus, which the Soviet side did not even remember at that time. This shows how understandable the Soviet Union's requests were from a military point of view and how stupid the subsequent statements were that the USSR allegedly wanted to “capture Finland.”

Finnish Marshal Mannerheim fought the entire Second World War on the side of the Axis countries, and it was they and their accomplices who were tried by the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal. Mannerheim escaped trial, but this did not make his guilt any less. In addition, no matter how you look at it, Mannerheim in 1939-1944. lost two wars, which is also not the best recommendation for a marshal. Therefore, in his memoirs, Mannerheim dodges as best he can in order to obscure these two points and present the events of those times in a light favorable to the Finns. From this point of view, it would be beneficial for him to forget something in history and claim that in 1939 the war between Finland and the USSR began because the USSR wanted to capture and enslave the Finns. But let’s give Mannerheim his due - in this case he did not want to appear foolish and regarding the flaring up conflict he writes:

“On March 5, 1939, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov, through the Ambassador of Finland in Moscow, Yurie Koskinen, proposed starting new negotiations. This time, the Soviet Union demanded a 30-year lease on the islands of the Gulf of Finland, Gogland, Lavansaari, Seskar and both Tyutyar-saari islands. The goal of the Soviet Union was not to build fortifications on these islands, but to use them as observation points on the way to Leningrad. Acceptance of these proposals would mean improved relations between our countries and economic cooperation beneficial to us.

In a response sent on March 8, the Finnish government stated that it could not talk about transferring the islands to another state, since they are an inseparable part of the territory, the inviolability of which the Soviet Union itself recognized and approved in the Tartu Peace Treaty, when these islands were declared neutral territory . The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, it was felt, expected such a response and directly offered to transfer to Finland part of the territory of Eastern Karelia, lying north of Lake Ladoga, as compensation. This proposal was rejected on March 13. To this Litvinov noted that he did not consider the answer final.

For further negotiations, the Soviet government sent its ambassador in Rome, Stein, who had previously held a diplomatic position at the USSR Embassy in Finland, to Helsinki, and on March 11 he contacted Foreign Minister Erkko. Guided by previous motives, Stein argued that the security of Leningrad in the event of an attack on it from the Gulf of Finland depended on the transfer of these islands to the use of the Soviet Union, and believed that the best solution would be an agreement on their lease. Such a decision would guarantee the preservation of Finnish neutrality. The Soviet government is also prepared to exchange the islands for an area of ​​183 square kilometers located near our eastern border. Finland's written commitment to oppose any violation of its neutrality was considered meaningless unless it was accompanied by practical measures. The Finnish government continued to maintain its negative position.

I thought that we should agree with the Russians in one way or another if by doing so we would improve relations with our powerful neighbor. I spoke with Foreign Minister Erkko about Stein's proposal, but I was unable to persuade him. I also visited President and Prime Minister Cajander to express my views in person. I noticed that the islands are of no importance for Finland, and since they are neutralized, we have no opportunity to protect them. Finland's authority, in my opinion, will also not suffer if we agree to an exchange. For the Russians, these islands, which block access to their naval base, are of great importance, and therefore we should try to take advantage of the rare trump cards that we have at our disposal.

My point of view was not understood. They answered me, in particular, that a government that decided to propose anything similar would immediately be forced to resign, and that not a single politician would be ready to oppose public opinion in this way. To this I replied that if there really is no person who would risk his popularity among the people in the name of such a vital matter for the state, then I offer myself at the disposal of the government, because I am confident that people will understand my honest intentions. I went even further, noting that it would be beneficial for Finland to come up with a proposal to withdraw the border line from Leningrad and receive good compensation for this. Even when Vyborg-Skalyani rejoined Finland in 1811, many were of the opinion that the border was too close to St. Petersburg. Minister of State Rehbinder, in particular, thought so, and, as I often heard at home, my grandfather’s father, State Councilor S.E. Mannerheim, took the same point of view.

I seriously warned that Ambassador Stein should not leave for Moscow empty-handed. However, this is what happened. On April 6, he left Helsinki without completing the task assigned to him.

Parliament was not informed of the purpose of Stein's visit. One can only regret the short-sighted concealment of this fact.”

Firstly, we note that Mannerheim considered it necessary to dissociate himself from the pre-war policy of the Finnish clique, which caused the war, and this is not accidental: as you will see below, all of Finland’s neighbors, the Scandinavian countries, dissociated themselves from this policy. When Mannerheim wrote his memoirs, all this was still fresh in his memory; it was still impossible to imagine the USSR as an unprincipled aggressor, as is done today. I do not believe that Mannerheim knew so little about these negotiations, but his apparent removal from the then government is remarkable.

Then, before the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia, Finland was never a sovereign state, that is, it never had its own territory. Finnish tribes inhabited either the territory of Sweden or the territory of Russia. The territory that Finland had in 1939 is the product of an agreement between the post-revolutionary Finns and Lenin. (Moreover, the Bolsheviks at that time had no concern for the future security of Russia; they “liberated” all the peoples of Russia in order to reduce the number of their enemies in the camp of the counter-revolution. They even “liberated” Ukraine, de facto recognizing the rebellion on its territory as legal.) And the fact that the treaty agreed upon, but may be changed by agreement. Finland could not change its territory at the request of Sweden or Germany - it did not agree with them and was not located on their former territories. But the Finnish government was obliged to conclude a new, mutually beneficial agreement with Russia, since there was nothing illegal about it. After all, it was not for nothing that Mannerheim offered himself as responsible for the exchange of territories - this would have brought him nothing but glory, since the territory of Finland was increasing at the suggestion of the USSR.

This is also confirmed by the fact that the Finnish government carefully concealed the essence of the USSR’s requests not only from the Finnish people, whom it allegedly feared in this matter, but also from the legislative branch. And this suggests that the Finnish government’s arguments were so far-fetched that they could not be discussed not only in the press, but also in parliamentary commissions. The USSR's demands were reasonable and fair.

It is interesting that at first the USSR did not even mention the transfer of the Karelian Isthmus to it, although the absurdity of such a close border was visible to the Finns themselves even a century and a half ago. But such a location of the border was unacceptable only in the case where the neighboring state was hostile. And the Grand Duchy of Finland, although it had its own currency and even its own standard time, was still part of the Russian Empire - why should the kings be afraid of the fact that the border of the principality lies 20 versts from the capital? The USSR was not afraid of this border as long as they considered the Finns neutral and not involved in any aggressive plans against the USSR.

But as soon as the Finns refused the USSR its absolutely legitimate requests to protect Leningrad, the question could not help but arise, why are they doing this? Why, hiding from the people and Parliament, are they trying to weaken the USSR in its future conflict with Germany? After all, no matter who wins the approaching war between the USSR and Germany, if Finland remains neutral, it will not benefit from it. Consequently, Finland did not intend to remain neutral in a future war and, which logically resulted from the behavior of the Finnish government: by weakening the defense of Leningrad, Finland planned to attack the USSR at a convenient moment. Now, naturally, the question of the Finnish border in the suburbs of Leningrad could not help but arise.

In March 1939, Germany completely occupied Czechoslovakia, and under these conditions, the Soviet Union formulated Finland’s final proposals: to lease to it for 30 years a plot of land on Cape Hanko (at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland) and to profitably exchange the Finnish territory of the Karelian Isthmus (up to defensive "Mannerheim Line") over a much larger territory of the USSR. Moreover, it was Cape Hanko that remained the main request. And this can be seen in the negotiations.

When the Finns seemed to agree to move the border on the Karelian Isthmus not by the requested 20-70 km, but only by 10 and exchange this territory for Soviet territory, they received in response: “the proposal is not acceptable, but is subject to re-examination”, - and in the language of diplomats who have not resolved the main question, such an answer is agreement. But on the issue of the military base at Cape Hanko, the Soviet side, for obvious reasons, was principled and looked for conceivable and unimaginable options. It is characteristic that even if Molotov negotiated with Germany, Stalin personally spoke with the Finnish delegation. What did he not offer! We will not talk about the economic side, about the amount of compensation, about prices in mutual trade. When the Finns said that they could not tolerate a foreign base on their territory, he proposed to dig a canal across Cape Hanko and make the base an island, offered to buy a piece of land on the cape and thereby make the territory Soviet, and having received a refusal and interrupting negotiations, it would seem, completely, a few days later he returned to them again and offered the Finns to buy several small uninhabited islands off Cape Hanko, which the Finnish delegation, not very strong in geography, had not even heard of.

The magazine "Rodina" for December 1995 provides a map of the latest territorial proposals of the USSR to Finland. Judging by the absurd smallness of the territory asked from the Finns and the vastness of the Soviet territory offered in return, one can already see how important this damned Cape Hanko was for the USSR.

When you read the description of the negotiations at that time, it becomes indisputable that the Finns were clearly looking for war and would never agree to any requests from the USSR. That is, if, say, the USSR agreed to the Finns’ proposal to move the border by 10 km and only, then the next step the Finns would take back this agreement. When parties want to reach an agreement, they look for options and benefits. Let's say the USSR offered to pay for the resettlement of Finns from the Karelian Isthmus. But the Finnish side was not interested in how much he would pay. The Finns seemed to agree to the exchange, but they were not interested in where the USSR would give them land, or how beneficial this territory would be for them - they did not bargain. And this obviously proves that the Finns conducted negotiations as a matter of form, without intending to actually reach an agreement. They negotiated from a position of strength and with the clear intention of starting a war. The reader may be surprised - where did Finland get its strength against the USSR?!
Brain fog

The fact is that we almost always make a mistake - we look at the events of those days with today's eyes. Today we know what the USSR was, we know that it almost alone withstood the onslaught of all of Europe and won. But who knew this then - in 1939?

Let's go back to that time and look at Russia through the eyes of those people. By the beginning of World War II, Russia had been unable to win a single war for more than 100 years. The landing of the British and French near Sevastopol in 1854 forced Russia to surrender. The Balkan War, formally won, was carried out so weakly and ineptly that they tried not to consider it even when training Russian officers. The war was lost to Japan, a small country. In 1914, the Russian army was almost twice as large as the Austro-German army and was unable to do anything. In 1920, newly fledgling Poland seized a huge piece of territory from the USSR. Why Poland! In 1918, the White Finns crushed Soviet power in Finland with brutal mercilessness. And if during the battles there were only 4.5 thousand killed on both sides, then after the battles the White Finns shot 8,000 prisoners and 12,000 died of starvation in their concentration camps. All Russian Bolsheviks were mercilessly killed on Finnish territory. And Soviet Russia was not even able to lift a finger to help them. After all, Hitler’s definition of the USSR as a “colossus with feet of clay” did not come from a vacuum.

All Finnish intelligence was conducted through the then Soviet dissidents and their interest in corresponding distortion of reality was certainly not taken into account. The Finnish secret police, for example, reported to the government on the eve of the war that in the USSR 75% of the population hated the regime. But this meant that all you had to do was enter the USSR, and the population itself would destroy the Bolsheviks and greet the “liberating army” with bread and salt. The Finnish General Staff, based on an analysis of Blucher’s incomprehensible actions on Khasan, reported that the Red Army was not only unable to attack, but also to defend. Given such weakness of the enemy, it would have been a sin not to take advantage of it, and the Finnish government had no doubt that, one on one, Finland was capable of waging a war with the USSR for at least six months and winning. And it was confident that in such a long period of time it would be able to win over any of the great countries as allies.

And there were such countries. Moreover, they were obvious. Since September 3, 1939, the British and French empires have been at war with Germany. There were no battles on land - the Germans, French and British sat in the trenches opposite each other and did not shoot until May 1940. Only the navy and aviation showed some activity.

The relative safety of the British Isles could only be ensured if the British fleet was able to ensure the safety of maritime transport. And this security was clearly threatened by the German fleet. If you look at a map of Europe, you will see that the Germans had the same problems as the USSR with the defense of Leningrad. For the Germans, the North Sea was something similar to the Gulf of Finland for the USSR. Their fleet could more or less safely enter the Atlantic only if Norway was neutral or friendly. But if the British had drawn Norway into the war on their side, the exit from the North Sea would have been blocked by air and naval bases on both sides: from the British Isles and from Norway. The Norwegians stubbornly did not want to enter the war, and the British prepared an attack on Norway in early April 1940 with the aim of capturing it. (It must be said that, unlike the Soviet-Finnish war, no one blames the British for this.) However, the Germans were literally hours ahead of the British and on April 9, 1940, they were the first to land in Norway, capturing it and establishing themselves in it. But we got ahead of ourselves - at a time when the Soviet-Finnish war had already ended.

And long before that, even before the start of the war, at the end of August 1939, two German raiders left for the Atlantic and Indian oceans: the “pocket” battleships Graf Spee and Deutschland. The second managed to return to Germany, but the Spee, having sunk several dozen British merchant ships, received minor damage in the battle on December 7, 1939, and the crew was forced to scuttle it off Montevideo on December 17, 1939. The reason is that the Germans, after minor lost such an expensive ship, it was obvious to the British: “If Germany had access to those repair services that Great Britain acquired in advance in all strategic points of the globe, the Graf Spee would be able to replenish its ammunition and quickly repair minor damage that could lead to serious consequences in the event of a storm. But German ships were deprived of such an opportunity in distant seas,” writes British historian Len Deighton. He is wrong, in 1939 Germany had one such base in distant seas - in the Barents Sea they could use the ice-free port of Murmansk, since they had a friendship treaty with the USSR.

Therefore, it is obvious that the British and French in 1939-1941. were interested in seizing the Kola Peninsula from the USSR. Naturally, they did not dare to do this themselves. But if someone did this for them, they would certainly help such a state, even if this caused a declaration of war on the distant, and therefore safe, USSR. So Finland’s calculations that it would be helped in the war with the USSR were justified and real.

It must be said that the British know how to keep secrets about their vile role in the Second World War - just like the Hess case, which is discussed in more detail in the Appendix to this book. But it was not possible to keep the secret about Finland’s incitement against the USSR. The archives of Britain were available, and the Soviet historian describes the Anglo-French fuss as follows:

“On January 24, 1940, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff of England, General E. Ironside, presented the memorandum “The Main Strategy of the War” to the War Cabinet.

“In my opinion,” Ironside emphasized, “we can provide effective assistance to Finland only if we attack Russia from as many directions as possible and, most importantly, strike Baku, an oil production area, in order to cause a serious state crisis in Russia". Ironside, expressing the opinion of certain circles of the British government and command, was aware that such actions would inevitably lead the Western allies to war with the USSR, but in the current situation he considered it completely justified.

... Around the same time, the French general staff also assessed the situation. On January 31, General M. Gamelin, expressing the point of view of the French General Staff, confidently stated that in 1940 Germany would not attack Western countries, and proposed to the British government a plan for landing an expeditionary force in Petsamo in order, together with Finland, to launch active military operations against the Soviet Union. Union. According to the French command, the Scandinavian countries are not yet “ripe” for independent action on the side of Finland. The landing of an expeditionary force would strengthen their resolve and encourage them in the fight against the Soviet Union.

The British government was, in principle, ready to go to war with the USSR. “Events seem to lead to the fact,” Chamberlain said on January 29 at a cabinet meeting, “that the allies will openly engage in hostilities against Russia.” However, when assessing the maturity of the Scandinavian countries, the British expressed fear that the participation of Anglo-French troops on the side of Finland would scare away the Scandinavians from fighting the USSR, then Norway and Sweden would again “crawl into the shell of a policy of neutrality.”

On February 5, the English prime minister went to Paris to discuss with the French at the Supreme Military Council a specific plan for joint intervention in Northern Europe.

At the council, Chamberlain put forward a plan to land an expeditionary force in Norway and Sweden, which, in his opinion, would expand the Finnish-Soviet military conflict and at the same time block the supply of Swedish ore to Germany. However, the first task was the main one. “Preventing the defeat of Finland by Russia this spring is extremely important,” the resolution of the British War Cabinet emphasized, “and this can only be done by significant forces of well-trained troops sent from Norway and Sweden or through these countries.” Daladier joined Chamberlain's opinion. In addition to the French contingents, it was decided to send the 5th, 44th and 45th British infantry divisions, formed specifically for sending to France, to the Scandinavian theater and Finland.

On February 13, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee instructed its representatives in the Allied Joint Military Committee to prepare a directive on the basis of which the headquarters planning authorities could prepare a plan of action for the Anglo-French troops in Northern Finland, the “Petsama Operation,” which provided for the landing of more than 100 thousand Anglo-French troops. troops in Norway and Sweden.

When considering this plan on February 15, the Chief of the Imperial Staff, General Ironside, emphasized that the troops that would operate in Northern Finland must have a line of communication. If they land at Petsamo, they will be forced to turn either east, capturing Murmansk and the Murmansk railway, or west, opening their way through Narvik.

As a result of the discussion, it was decided to assist Finland by landing troops in Petsamo or its environs with the aim of cutting the Murmansk railway, and subsequently capturing Murmansk in order to turn it into a base for the operation.

The first section of the plan, which set out the political factors that might influence the course of the operation, stated that a landing in the Petsamo area would inevitably bring the Allied forces into direct and immediate conflict with the Russian armed forces, and therefore it should be assumed that the war with Russia will be a natural result, since the invasion of Russian territory will be a necessary component of the upcoming operation.

...Two weeks later, a meeting of the Allied Supreme Military Council took place in London. Chamberlain opened it with the words: “Of recent events, the most important is the collapse of Finland... This collapse has had a great influence on the general situation and must be frankly regarded as a blow to the Allied cause.” The unexpected outcome of the campaign in the north, according to Chamberlain, caused a terrible depression in neutral countries and among the allies themselves."

And British historian Leah Deighton explains why the British failed to keep secret their plans to attack the USSR after Finland:

“The French Air Force allocated five squadrons of Martin Maryland bombers, which were to fly from bases in northeastern Syria and strike Batumi and Grozny. In a purely Gallic touch, code names were used to designate targets: Berlioz, Cesar Frank and Debussy. The RAF was to deploy four squadrons of Bristol Blenheim bombers and a squadron of antediluvian single-engine Vickers Wellesleys based at Mosul airfield in Iraq.

To prepare for the night raid, aerial photography of the targets had to be carried out. On March 30, 1940, a civilian Lockheed 14 Super-Electra with passenger aviation markings took off from RAF Habbaniya airfield in Iraq. The crew was dressed in civilian clothes and carried false documents. These were pilots from the 224th Squadron of the Royal Air Force, which was armed with Lockheed Hudson aircraft, the military version of the Electra. The British had no trouble photographing Baku, but when scouts went to photograph oil piers in the Batumi area on April 5, Soviet anti-aircraft gunners were ready for the meeting. Elektra returned with only three-quarters of its potential targets on the negatives. All images were forwarded to the General Headquarters of the forces in the Middle East in Cairo to create flight maps with target designations.

... Just before the surrender of France, a German officer of the 9th Panzer Division, inspecting the captured headquarters train, discovered a plan for an air attack. Carelessly typed documents lay in a folder on which was written by hand: “ATTAQUE AER1 ENNEDU PETROLE DU CAUCASE.” Liaison effectue au G. Q. C. Aerien le avril 1940“.

A large stamp with the words "TRES SECRET" made these documents even more tantalizing. As did the lack of a date. The Germans cheerfully published all these documents along with the Anglo-French plan to invade Norway under the pretext of helping the Finns. It was a magnificent propaganda move, and now, looking Looking at these yellowed pages, one wonders whether the leaders of Western countries were in their right minds when they approved such crazy adventures."

Having such potential allies behind them, the Finns were filled with optimism, and Finland’s usual plans for war with a neighbor in relation to the USSR were exclusively offensive. (Finland abandoned these plans only a week after the start of the war, when it actually tried to attack.) According to these plans, the fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line” repelled an attack from the south, and the Finnish army advanced along the entire front east into Karelia. The border of the new Finland was supposed to be pushed back and run along the line Neva - the southern shore of Ladoga - the eastern shore of Lake Onega - the White Sea.

Strictly speaking, this is incomprehensible to the mind: how could Finland, with its 3.5 million population, have plans to seize the territory of the USSR with its 170 million?! Nevertheless, the work of a commission of Russian-Finnish historians in Finnish archives leads to precisely this conclusion. From the operational plans of the Finnish army, preserved in the Military Archives of Finland, it follows that “it was planned immediately after the attack of the USSR to go on the offensive and occupy a number of territories, primarily in Soviet Karelia... the command of the Finnish army finally abandoned these plans only a week after the start of the “winter war“, since the Red Army grouping in this direction turned out to be unexpectedly powerful.” Finland was going to establish a new border with the USSR along “the Neva, the southern shore of Lake Ladoga, Svir, Lake Onega and further to the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean (including the Kola Peninsula).” Like this!

At the same time, the area of ​​Finland doubled, and the land border with the USSR was reduced by more than half. The border would run entirely along deep rivers and sea-like lakes. It must be said that the goal of the war set by the Finns, if it were achievable, does not raise doubts about its reasonableness.

Even if there were no Finnish documents on this matter, these offensive plans could be guessed. Look at the map again. The Finns strengthened with the “Mannerheim Line” a small piece (about 100 km) of the border with the USSR on the Karelian Isthmus - exactly in the place where, according to plans, their permanent border should have passed. What about the thousand kilometers of the rest of the border? Why didn't the Finns strengthen it? After all, if the USSR wanted to capture Finland, the Red Army would have marched there from the east, from Karelia. The Mannerheim Line is simply meaningless if Finland really intended to defend and not attack. But, in turn, with Finland’s offensive plans, the construction of defensive lines on the border with Karelia became pointless - why spend money on it if Karelia goes to Finland and fortifications will have to be built, or rather, completed, on the new border! On the border that was to be conquered in 1939.

Yes, from the point of view of the Finnish state, the plan to move the border to an advantageous point and double the Finnish territory was reasonable. But, I repeat, it was based on self-deception: the criminal actions of the “fifth column” in the USSR, expressed in the treacherous behavior of Marshal Blucher in the battles with the Japanese on Lake Khasan, were accepted as the Red Army’s inability to fight at all. They probably did not believe the reports of the Soviet press about the victories at Khalkhin Gol, but they believed the political intelligence, which claimed that 75% of Soviet citizens hated the Soviet regime. In addition, the moment of interest of England and France in the victory of Finland could not be missed. The opportunity was so tempting that the Finns went straight to starting a war.

Moreover, the Finnish government looks no more stupid than Hitler. In 1941, Hitler vigorously attacked the USSR, and already on April 12, 1942, he issued an idiotic tirade to explain the failure of the blitzkrieg: “The entire war with Finland in 1940 - as well as the entry of the Russians into Poland with outdated tanks and weapons and dressed inappropriately.” uniformed soldiers is nothing more than a grandiose campaign of disinformation, since Russia at one time had weapons that made it, along with Germany and Japan, a world power.” According to Hitler, it turns out that Stalin deliberately pretended to be weak so as not to frighten Hitler before attacking the USSR. That is, in 1941, Hitler passed off his desire to see the USSR weak as reality.

I repeat, in those years, Finland’s aggressiveness was obvious. After all, if the USSR, having started the war, decided to capture Finland, then the rest of the Scandinavian countries stood in line. They should have been scared, they should have gone to war immediately. But... When the USSR began to be expelled from the League of Nations, of the 52 states that were part of the League, 12 did not send their representatives to the conference at all, and 11 did not vote for expulsion. And among these 11 are Sweden, Norway and Denmark. That is, Finland did not seem like an innocent girl to these countries, and the USSR did not look like an aggressor.

Mannerheim is extremely angry about this circumstance, but he cannot oppose anything to it, except for an extremely stupid reference to Uruguay and Colombia: “However, it immediately became clear again that Finland cannot expect active help from the Scandinavian countries. While countries such as Uruguay, Argentina and Colombia decisively took our side at the Assembly of the League of Nations, Sweden, Norway and Denmark declared that they would not take part in any sanctions against the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Scandinavian countries abstained from voting on the issue of expelling the aggressor from the League of Nations.”

Finland's aggressive plans are confirmed directly. In 1941, the Finns, together with the Germans, attacked the USSR. We began to energetically try to bring Finland out of the war peacefully. At the request of the USSR, England and the USA became mediators. The Soviet Union proposed returning to Finland the territories occupied in the winter war of 1939-1940 and also making territorial concessions. The Anglo-Americans insisted, threatening Finland with war. But the Finns did not give in, and in a response note to the United States on November 11, 1941, Finland stated: “Finland seeks to neutralize and occupy the enemy’s offensive positions, including those lying beyond the 1939 borders. It would be urgently necessary for Finland and in the interests of the effectiveness of its defense to take such measures already in 1939 during the first phase of the war, if only its forces were sufficient for this.” You can read about this for yourself in the selection of documents from the Rodina magazine I mentioned. They are all the more convincing because the entire magazine is designed in a purely anti-Soviet spirit.

I would not call everything written above stupidity; in this case, the Finnish government based its decisions on clearly erroneous data. His stupidity lies elsewhere.

Having lived with Russia and in Russia for so many years, the Finns did not understand it, did not understand that from it they could receive a thousand times more benefits, and the maximum possible protection, if only they were friendly to it.

They did not understand that there are no countries in the West that would really help such a small country as Finland in the matter of war. After all, by that time the Finns had already seen how the West, having despised the then NATO - the Eastern Pact - threw Czechoslovakia to the mercy of the Germans.
In Finland, everyone was ready and the Finns were impatient

In the fall of 1939, the USSR concluded assistance agreements with the Baltic countries. Their status did not change. They remained bourgeois and independent, but Soviet military bases were located on their territory. The southern coast of the Gulf of Finland has become more or less protected. As a reciprocal gesture, the Soviet Union transferred a large piece of its territory to bourgeois Lithuania, along with the Lithuanian capital Vilnius, then Vilno.

The problem of the northern shore of the bay remained. Stalin invited the Finnish delegation to negotiations, intending to conduct them personally. Molotov made the invitation on October 5. The Finns immediately began rattling their weapons and embarked on the warpath. On October 6, Finnish troops began to advance to their starting lines. On October 10, the evacuation of residents from border towns began; on October 11, when the Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, the mobilization of reservists was announced. Until November 13, for more than a month, Stalin tried to persuade the Finns to provide the USSR with a base on Hanko. Useless. Except that during this time the Finnish side demonstratively evacuated the population from the border areas, from Helsinki and increased the size of the army to 500 thousand people. “However, now the starting situation was completely different - I wanted to shout that the first round was ours. We were able to transfer both the covering troops and the field army to the front on time and in excellent condition. We received enough time - 4-6 weeks - for combat training of troops, familiarizing them with the terrain, to continue the construction of field fortifications, preparation of destructive work, as well as for laying mines and organizing minefields,” Mannerheim rejoices in his memoirs.

Even large countries, such as the USSR, allow no more than 15 days for their mobilization. And Finland, as we see, not only completely mobilized, but was also idle for a month and a half.

In this regard, I would like to draw attention to a trivial episode that preceded the war. Four days before the start of the war between the USSR and Finland, on November 26, 1939, the Finns fired artillery into the territory of the USSR, and 3 Red Army soldiers were killed and 6 wounded in the Soviet garrison of the village of Mainila. Today, naturally, Russian and Finnish historians have “established” that either these shots did not occur at all, or the Soviet Union itself fired at its troops in order to obtain a pretext for war. I will not dispute these statements, since after half a century of anti-Stalin hysteria, the majority of the population believes in such nonsense unconditionally. But I must pay attention to the fact that the incident in Mainila was in no way a pretext for war, since already on November 27, the Soviet government stated in its note: “The Soviet government does not intend to inflate this outrageous act of attack by units of the Finnish army, it may be bad controlled by the Finnish command. But it would like such outrageous facts not to occur in the future.” That's all. That is, in the scale of losses in the ensuing battles, this incident could easily be forgotten. From the point of view of losses in peacetime, this event could also be forgotten, since before World War II there was never peacetime on the borders of the USSR: from February 1921 to February 1941, the USSR border guards lost only 2,443 people killed in clashes on the border.

But what’s interesting is that it’s not only anti-Soviet historians who dwell on this case. Mannerheim, who already had something to write about, devotes a disproportionate amount of space to this provocation, and it is obvious that he is lying. For example, when he forgets that he needs to justify himself in this provocation and writes: “The unification of the main part of the covering troops (1st and 2nd brigades) into a new division subordinate directly to the army commander also did not imply a passive position. Back on November 3, I instructed Lieutenant General Esterman to create such a grouping of troops that would ensure the most effective defense of the border zone. This was repeated in an order dated November 11, in which he once again drew his attention to how important it is to defend, with large forces, the positions built between the border and the main line of defense.”

Here we must remember that the Finns built the most powerful fortifications (“Mannerheim Line”) not on the border itself, but in the depths of their territory - at a distance of 20 to 70 km. But they, as you read from Mannerheim, were not going to surrender this space without a fight, and long before the war they brought large forces into it with the task of brutal defense. And such defense, of course, is impossible without artillery.

But when Mannerheim returned several times to bombard Soviet territory on November 26, evidence that this could not have happened comes from the claim that there was no artillery at all in the territory between the border and the “Mannerheim Line.”

“The situation was undoubtedly troubling. Any day the Russians could organize a provocation that would give them a formal reason to attack Finland. I gave orders on land, on water and in the air to carefully avoid any activity which the Russians might use as a pretext for provocation, and ordered all batteries to be withdrawn to such a distance that they could not open fire across the border. To monitor the execution of the order, I sent an artillery inspector to the isthmus.”

“And now the provocation that I had been expecting since mid-October has happened. When I personally visited the Karelian Isthmus on October 26, General Nenonen assured me that the artillery was completely withdrawn behind the line of fortifications, from where not a single battery was able to fire a shot beyond the border.”

After all, this is an obvious lie: Mannerheim could not simultaneously assign the troops the task of defending the forefield with “large forces” and at the same time take away the artillery from the troops, and even send the commander (“inspector”) of the artillery of the Finnish army to the border! What should he do there if the artillery is withdrawn? Another point: the Soviet Union announced the shelling of its territory on November 27 and before that, in theory, no one could have known about it, including Mannerheim. Then why did Mannerheim “personally visit” the scene of events on the day of the shelling - November 26?

This clumsy lie about an incident that, it would seem, is not worth a damn, leads to the idea that the Finns really fired at Soviet territory, provoking the USSR to war. And if you think about it, there is nothing surprising in this. By December 1939, the Finns had already been ready for war for the second month, but the USSR did not start it and did not start it, trying to resolve the issues through negotiations. But the Finns themselves could not start a war, otherwise even Uruguay and Colombia would not have voted for them in the League of Nations. We had to provoke the USSR in such a simple way.
Treatment of stupidity

What can you do? War is war. And on November 30, the Leningrad Military District began to tame the obstinate Finland. The matter was not without difficulties. It was winter, the terrain was very difficult, the defense was prepared, the Red Army was poorly trained. But most importantly, Finns are not Poles. They fought fiercely and stubbornly. It goes without saying that Marshal Mannerheim asked the Finnish government to yield to the USSR and not bring matters to war, but when it began, he led the troops skillfully and decisively. Only by March 1940, when the Finnish infantry had lost 3/4 of its strength, did the Finns ask for peace. Well, the world is the same. They began to create a military base on Hanko; instead of the territory up to the “Mannerheim Line” on the Karelian Isthmus, they took the entire isthmus with the city of Vipuri, now Vyborg. The border was moved almost all the way into Finland. Stalin was not going to forgive the Finns for the killed Soviet soldiers.

A couple of words should also be said about the goals of the war, since the entire “world community” is sure that the USSR wanted to conquer Finland, but it did not work out. This idea passes not only without discussion, but also without real evidence. Meanwhile, just look at the map of Finland and try to plan a war to capture it yourself. I am sure that even a fool would not have attempted to capture it across the Karelian Isthmus, since it was in this place that the Finns had three-line fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line”. But along the thousand kilometers of the rest of the border with the USSR, the Finns had nothing. In addition, in winter time this area was passable. Surely anyone, even an amateur, will plan for the entry of troops into Finland through unprotected sections of the border and its dismemberment into parts, deprivation of communications with Sweden and access to the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia. If the goal is to capture Finland, there is no other way to act.

But in reality the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. proceeded like this. According to Soviet pre-war ideas, a rifle division should have an offensive zone with a defense breakthrough of 2.5-3 km, and in defense - no more than 20 km. And on the unprotected section of the Soviet-Finnish border from Lake Ladoga to the Barents Sea (900 km in a straight line) 9 rifle divisions were deployed against the Finnish troops, i.e., one Soviet division accounted for 100 km of front, and this is the front that the division and cannot defend. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that parts of these divisions were surrounded by the Finns during the war. But on the Karelian Isthmus against the “Mannerheim Line”, with a length of 140 km along with lakes, the 28th, 10th, 34th, 50th, 19th, 23rd, 15th and 3rd Rifle Corps, 10th Tank Corps operated (from south to north) , as well as separate tank brigades and units of the RGK, i.e. at least 30 divisions.

From the way the Soviet command positioned its troops, it is quite obvious that it did not intend to conquer and occupy Finland; the goal of the war was to deprive the Finns of the “Mannerheim Line” - a defensive belt that the Finns considered impregnable. Without these fortifications, even the Finns should have realized that with a hostile attitude towards the USSR, no fortifications would save it.

It must be said that the Finns did not understand this hint the first time, and in 1941 Finland again started a war with the USSR and this time chose a worthy ally - Hitler. In 1941, I remind you, we asked her to come to her senses. Useless. Great Finland from the Baltic to the White Sea did not allow the Finns to live in peace, and the new border along the White Sea-Baltic Canal system fascinated them like a rabbit boa constrictor. Mannerheim writes: “In accordance with the plan, the military actions of our troops in the following months were divided into three main stages: first the liberation of Ladoga Karelia, then the return of the Karelian Isthmus, and then advancement deep into the territory of Eastern Karelia.

The directive for an offensive north of Ladoga was approved on June 28. Our troops, stationed approximately on the line between Kitee and Ilomantsi, initially included two army corps (6th Army Corps under the command of Major General Talvela and 7th Army Corps under the command of Major General Hägglund), which included only five divisions , as well as “Group O” under the command of Major General Oinonen (cavalry brigade, 1st and 2nd brigades of rangers, as well as one partisan battalion) - were brought together into one unit of 100,000 people, which was called the Karelian Army. The chief of the general staff, Lieutenant General Heinrichs, was appointed to command it; and Lieutenant General Hanell was transferred to his place in the General Staff.

The last paragraph of the order indicated that the final frontier of the operation would be the Svir River and Lake Onega.

In fact, the Finns in this case personify the Russian proverb “the beaten one is itching.” You can even respect them for their exceptional tenacity - after all, they tried to swallow Karelia with their last breath, so to speak, sticking out their tongues up to their waists. “Finland was gradually forced to mobilize its trained reserves down to people aged 45, which did not happen in any country, not even in Germany,” admits Mannerheim.

In 1943, the USSR again offered peace to Finland. In response, the Prime Minister of Finland concluded a personal pact with Hitler that he would not leave the war until Germany was completely victorious. In 1944, our troops went deep into Finland, breaking through the newly rebuilt “Mannerheim Line” without much trouble. Things smelled like frying. The Prime Minister resigned with his personal commitment to the Fuhrer, and Baron Karl Mannerheim was appointed in his place. He concluded a truce. During the peace negotiations, Molotov forced the Finns to disarm the Germans on their territory and planed Finland from all sides. I didn’t particularly set my sights on the swamps, I took what was better. This was the training the USSR foreign ministers had at that time. In the north he took the Petsamo region with its nickel reserves, the Vyborg region and so on. The only thing - instead of; 600 million dollars of indemnity in five years was reduced to 300 million in six years.

Well, isn't it stupid? They offered Finland to peacefully increase its territory. But no - almost six years of war, the greatest military tension, killed, crippled. In the name of what? So that Finland becomes smaller than before the war?

Let's imagine that the Finns were our allies and fought the Germans, say, in Norway. After all, they showed themselves to be excellent soldiers, and the tsar rewarded Mannerheim not without merit.

In 1945, Stalin, despite protests from the United States and England, transferred vast territories of Germany to Poland. Both Churchill and Roosevelt considered Poland unworthy, protested and, as it now turns out, were right. Stalin was mistaken when he believed that the Poles were cured of meanness. But if Finland had participated in the war on our side, then it is possible that Stalin, simultaneously with the transfer of German lands to Poland, would have moved Belarus to the west and our border, giving the Kaliningrad region a more reliable support. Then why not assume that he would transfer Karelia to Finland, as Hitler’s ally and victor?

Stupid, extremely stupid war. Its only positive aspect is that Finland’s brain began to become enlightened.
And it was unbearable!

In the winter of 1999-2000, the entire “democratic public” of Russia celebrated its 60th anniversary; Finnish victory over Stalin's Soviet Union! in the war in the winter of 1939-1940.

There were difficulties. Not everyone in the country is an idiot, and some people remember that in March 1940, Finland surrendered, not the USSR.

True, the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, ended his order to the Finnish troops on the actual surrender of March 13, 1940 with the words: “We have the proud consciousness that we have a historical mission, which we will still fulfill - to defend Western civilization, it has been since ancient times was our inherited share; but we also know that we will repay our debt to the West to the last coin.” You cannot envy “Western civilization”: as soon as there are scoundrels in the world, they immediately begin to defend it. If you remember, Hitler attacked the USSR precisely for this purpose.

I don’t know how it is with the West, but Mannerheim really paid off Finland’s debt to the USSR down to the last coin - Stalin saw to it. So judge, how can we celebrate Finland’s victory over the USSR with such facts? How stupid the Moscow Limita is, but even she can guess that she is fattening up by exporting nickel to the West from those mines that were legally mined in this “lost” war.

What should the bastard counterfeiters do? We have to force out a version exclusively for Russian goats that the USSR lost the war because its combat losses were several times higher than those of the Finnish army. It’s a pathetic idea, but it also needs to be confirmed somehow.

The situation matured, and in 1996 M.I. Semiryaga clarified that in the war of 1939-1940. There were 70 thousand Soviet killed and missing, and another 176 thousand wounded and frostbitten. No, says A.M. Nosov, I think better: there were 90 thousand killed and missing, and 200 thousand wounded. It would seem that everyone was counted, but it’s not enough, guys, it’s not enough, here we need apothecary precision. And by 1995, the Russian historian P. Aptekar calculated quite accurately - it turns out that there were only 131,476 people killed and missing. But he didn’t even count the wounded—hundreds of thousands, apparently. As a result, Kommersant-Vlast of March 30, 1999 already boldly estimates the losses of the USSR in that war at half a million, i.e. the count is already in the millions! That's right, why feel sorry for them, Stalin's scoops?

What about the Finnish losses? The Finnish historian T. Vihavainen “counted them accurately” - 23 thousand. In connection with which P. Aptekar joyfully counts and even highlights in bold: “It turns out that even if we assume that the irretrievable losses of the Red Army amounted to 130 thousand people, then For every Finnish soldier and officer killed, five of our compatriots were killed and frozen to death.”

Well, how can we call this ratio if not a great victory for Finland in that war? The “democratic public” can safely celebrate this victory.

True, the question arises: why then did Finland surrender with such low losses? By November 1939, the Finns mobilized 500 thousand people into the army and shutskor (fascist military units). And according to Finnish data, their total losses (including wounded) were 80 thousand people, or 16%.

Let's compare. From June 22 to December 31, 1941, the Germans on the Soviet front lost 25.96% of all ground forces in the East; after a year of war, these losses reached 40.62%. But the Germans continued to advance until mid-1943. And why did the Finns, with their 16%, suddenly no longer want to go to the shores of the White Sea?

After all, the Finns had only “to stand for a day and hold out for the night.” The Allies had already begun transferring squadrons to bomb Baku, and ships with troops had already left England to help Finland. Mannerheim recalls: “Information about assistance from Western countries, requested by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arrived on March 7. They were prepared by the Chief of the British General Staff, General Ironside, and looked like this:

The first echelon, which will include the Anglo-French division, will be transported by sea to Narvik on March 15. Its composition:

– Two and a half brigades of French Alpine riflemen – 8500 people;

– Two battalions of the “foreign legion” – 2000 people;

– One battalion of Poles – 1000 people;

– 1st British Guards Brigade – 3500 people;

– 1st British ski battalion – 500 people.

Total: 15,500 people.

The listed troops are selected units. At the same time, 3 service battalions will be sent out.

The second echelon would consist of three British divisions, each numbering 14,000 men. The total number of combat troops will increase to 57,500 people.

According to calculations, the first echelon should arrive in Finland at the end of March, and the troops of the second echelon will follow it as soon as railway capacity allows.”

So why didn’t they wait a couple of weeks, why did they surrender if the bourgeois army was close, and the spring thaw had already begun?

Finnish historian I. Hakala writes that by March 1940 Mannerheim simply had no troops left. Where did they go? And the historian Hakala gives the following phrase: “According to experts, the infantry lost approximately 3/4 of its strength (already 64,000 people in mid-March). Since the infantry at that time consisted of 150,000 people, its losses were already 40 percent.”

No, gentlemen, in Soviet schools they didn’t teach how to count: 40% is not 3/4. And Finland did not have 150 thousand infantry. The fleet was small, there were almost no aviation and tank troops (even today the Finnish Air Force and Navy, together with border guards - 5.2 thousand people), 700 artillery guns - a maximum of 30 thousand people. Whatever one may say, apart from the infantry there were no more than 100 thousand troops. Consequently, 400 thousand fall on the infantry. And infantry losses of 3/4 mean losses of 300 thousand people, of which 80 thousand should be killed.

But this is a calculation, and how can you confirm it if the “democrats” have all the archives, and they do whatever they want with them? All that remains is to wait.

And the wait will be worth it. Apparently, also for the anniversary of the Soviet-Finnish war, historian V.P. Galitsky. in 1999 he published a small book “Finnish prisoners of war in NKVD camps.” He tells how it was for them, the poor ones. Well, along the way, having rummaged through our and Finnish archives, he, without thinking, cites the losses of the parties not only in prisoners, but also in general, and not only our inflated ones, but also, apparently, genuine Finnish ones. They are as follows: total losses of the USSR - 285 thousand people, Finland - 250 thousand. Killed and missing: the USSR - 90 thousand people, Finland - 95 thousand people.

Now this looks like the truth! With such losses, it becomes clear why the Finns surrendered without waiting for steamships with Poles and British to sail to them. It was unbearable!

friend of your enemy

Today, wise and calm Finns can only attack someone in an anecdote. But three quarters of a century ago, when, on the wings of independence gained much later than other European nations, accelerated national building continued in Suomi, you would have had no time for jokes.

In 1918, Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim uttered the well-known “oath of the sword,” publicly promising to annex Eastern (Russian) Karelia. At the end of the thirties, Gustav Karlovich (as he was called during his service in the Russian Imperial Army, where the path of the future field marshal began) is the most influential person in the country.

Of course, Finland did not intend to attack the USSR. I mean, she wasn't going to do this alone. The young state's ties with Germany were, perhaps, even stronger than with the countries of its native Scandinavia. In 1918, when the newly independent country was undergoing intense discussions about the form of government, by decision of the Finnish Senate, Emperor Wilhelm's brother-in-law, Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse, was declared King of Finland; For various reasons, nothing came of the Suoma monarchist project, but the choice of personnel is very indicative. Further, the very victory of the “Finnish White Guard” (as the northern neighbors were called in Soviet newspapers) in the internal civil war of 1918 was also largely, if not completely, due to the participation of the expeditionary force sent by the Kaiser (numbering up to 15 thousand people, despite the fact that the total number of local “reds” and “whites”, who were significantly inferior to the Germans in terms of fighting qualities, did not exceed 100 thousand people).

Cooperation with the Third Reich developed no less successfully than with the Second. Kriegsmarine ships freely entered Finnish skerries; German stations in the area of ​​Turku, Helsinki and Rovaniemi were engaged in radio reconnaissance; from the second half of the thirties, the airfields of the “Land of a Thousand Lakes” were modernized to accept heavy bombers, which Mannerheim did not even have in the project... It should be said that subsequently Germany, already in the first hours of the war with the USSR (which Finland officially joined only on June 25, 1941 ) actually used the territory and waters of Suomi to lay mines in the Gulf of Finland and bombard Leningrad.

Yes, at that time the idea of ​​​​attacking the Russians did not seem so crazy. The Soviet Union of 1939 did not look like a formidable adversary at all. The asset includes the successful (for Helsinki) First Soviet-Finnish War. The brutal defeat of the Red Army soldiers from Poland during the Western Campaign in 1920. Of course, one can recall the successful repulsion of Japanese aggression on Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, but, firstly, these were local clashes far from the European theater, and, secondly, the qualities of the Japanese infantry were assessed very low. And thirdly, the Red Army, as Western analysts believed, was weakened by the repressions of 1937. Of course, the human and economic resources of the empire and its former province are incomparable. But Mannerheim, unlike Hitler, did not intend to go to the Volga to bomb the Urals. Karelia alone was enough for the field marshal.

To the seventieth anniversary of the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940

Secrets of birth

The Soviet-Finnish wars were unlucky with historiography. The first two Soviet-Finnish wars (May 15, 1918-October 14, 1920 and November 6, 1921-March 21, 1922) were practically erased from the history of Soviet-Finnish relations. The Fourth War (June 25, 1941 - September 19, 1944) remained in the shadow of the greatest tragedy of the Siege of Leningrad and more strategically important events on other fronts of the Great Patriotic War. And the most famous third, also called the “Winter War”, “Finnish”, “Third Soviet-Finnish”, “Finnish Campaign of 1939-1940”, “Soviet-Finnish Armed Conflict of 1939-1940”, and, at the suggestion Alexander Tvardovsky’s “That Unfamous War” has become overgrown with a significant number of myths and legends, closely related both to the myth-making around the “Stalin era” and to the personal ideological predilections of historians.

Meanwhile, a historical event does not arise suddenly; it has prerequisites, consequences, and internal logic, forming a continuous chain where everything is closely interconnected. Add to this that any event does not occur in a vacuum, but is surrounded by a conflict of interests, the struggle of states, intelligence services, corporations, parties, ideas, and is influenced by many external factors - and you get the difficult task of describing a relatively reliable picture of the event. Do not get involved in the intricacies of events - you will turn out to be something like Edward Radzinsky. To delve too deep will result in a multi-volume study, in the middle of which you forgot where you started, and at the end - why you actually wrote.

Therefore, in this article I will try to briefly outline the main milestones of the third Soviet-Finnish war, without dwelling on well-known details, but only trying to understand the internal logic of the event, connecting it with the processes that were taking place in the world at that time and in the USSR.

Divorce and maiden name

The Baltic states have always been a point of geopolitical tension for Russia. The confrontation for dominance in this region between Russia, Sweden, Poland and Germany has such a long history that describing it is almost hopeless, just like looking for an answer to our favorite question “who is to blame?”

Yes all. And no one. The logic of the development of states required expansion towards the Baltic, practical politics never bothered with questions about the “primacy of universal human values”, everyone was eager to capture the most important strategic positions. And as a result, from 1809 to 1917, Finland was part of the Russian Empire as the Grand Duchy of Finland.

Moreover, with such broad autonomy in internal self-government that it would be more logical to talk about a union of the two states. Suffice it to say that Finland had its own currency, its own electoral legislation (In 1906, an election law was adopted that gave women the right to vote. Finland became the first country in Europe where women received the right to vote), and a number of other “preferences and liberties” completely knocking Finland out of the definition of “Russia is a prison of nations.” In relation to Finland, the principles voiced by Alexander I were strictly observed, who said: “Finland is not a province. Finland is a state."

It is also important that the activities of the security department on the territory of Finland were extremely limited, which made the Grand Duchy a real paradise for revolutionaries of all stripes. Suffice it to recall Konni (Konrad Victor) Zilliacus (Finnish: Konni Zilliacus, December 18, 1855 - June 19, 1924, Helsinki), Finnish politician, writer, revolutionary, organizer and leader of the Finnish Active Resistance Party, and part-time Japanese spy, not particularly this fact and concealed.

Acting completely legally, Zilliacus organized a channel for the delivery of weapons and illegal literature to Russia (the famous steamship John Grafton, filled to the brim with weapons for revolutionaries in Russia, was his work). In addition, through his supervisor, Colonel Motojiro Akashi, he gave money to the revolutionaries (including for holding a conference in Geneva in 1905). The political views of Zilliacus the Pope were described in the most exhaustive terms by his son, Zilliacus Jr.: “From childhood, I brought two ideas that were firmly entrenched in my head: first, that someday there will be a revolution in Russia, and it will be something great and good, which All liberal and civilized people are waiting. Second, that the Russians are a backward, barbaric and semi-Asian nation from which the rest of the world has nothing to learn politically, although the revolution should liberate the Finns and Poles and allow Russia to begin to catch up with the West.”

An empire in which such Zilliacus operate without much concealment cannot last long, February 1917 broke out.

The February revolution itself served as a powerful detonator for the separatist aspirations of the outskirts and autonomies. But there was still a chance - the Finns, contrary to the calls of the nationalists, were in no hurry to secede from the Empire. And here something incomprehensible and, for me personally, mysterious happens. The Diet of Finland resumes its work, which on July 18, 1917 passes a law restoring the autonomous rights of Finland (significantly curtailed after 1905), and Finland is considered as part of Russia. However, this law is rejected by the Russian Provisional Government (which included many figures closely associated with the Finns during the period of the struggle against the autocracy), Russian troops disperse the Seimas and occupy its building. The road has been cleared for Finnish nationalists, a campaign against “Russian imperialism” is being carried out at lightning speed (with the full support of German intelligence and Swedish industrialists), which has consolidated Finnish society. And on December 6, 1917, Finland proclaims its independence. The divorce has occurred. But the property has not yet been divided.

Wars of succession

In Finnish historical literature, military actions in 1918-1920. against the RSFSR were qualified not as an armed uprising against another, foreign, state, but as a “struggle for Eastern Karelia”, as a national, historical internal Finnish task, allegedly lying outside the sphere of international relations and outside the laws of international law.

In Soviet historical literature, the assessment was given more specifically and, although it was clearly class-based, it was limited in time and space: “the White Finnish adventure in Karelia in 1919.” However, the essence of these wars was precisely the struggle for the territorial inheritance of the Russian Empire.

Having learned all the necessary lessons from the collapse of the Russian army by the Provisional Government, Army Lieutenant General Carl Gustav Mannerheim, who became commander-in-chief of the Finnish army in January 1918, acted decisively and brutally in the fight against the Finnish Bolsheviks.

The civil war in Finland lasted 108 days, claimed 35 thousand lives, after which internal confusion and vacillation in Finland ceased for a long time. But having gotten rid of the internal enemy, the government remembered that it had long-standing territorial claims against Russia. It was about “the return of the primordial Finnish lands, torn away by Russia” (and how could it be otherwise, precisely the primordial and precisely torn away ones). Nothing personal, healthy cynicism, the usual practice of interstate relations - “it’s a sin not to pinch a weak neighbor.” Since February, Finnish troops began penetrating into Russian territory - into Eastern Karelia. The main directions of the movement were the cities of Ukhta and Kem, yes, exactly the famous “Kemskaya volost”, which became a household name after the film “Ivan Vasilyevich changes his profession”.

On February 23, 1918, exactly on the day of the creation of the Red Army, Mannerheim officially declared that “he will not sheathe his sword until Eastern Karelia is liberated from the Bolsheviks.” And on February 27, the Finnish government sent a petition to Germany so that, as a country fighting against Russia, considering Finland as an ally of Germany, it would demand that Russia make peace with Finland on the basis of the annexation of Eastern Karelia to Finland. The future border with Russia proposed by the Finns was supposed to run along the line Eastern coast of Lake Ladoga - Lake Onega - White Sea.

However, Finland’s demands were not limited to this; already on March 6, Prime Minister Per Evind Svinhufvud stated that Finland was ready to make peace with Soviet Russia on “moderate Brest conditions”, that is, if Eastern Karelia and part of the Murmansk railway went to Finland roads and the entire Kola Peninsula.

What was considered “moderate” in this case remained a mystery; in everyday terms, the Finns demanded an increase in their own territory by almost 40%. And then a very unpleasant event occurred for naive Finnish politicians. Germany, represented by Kaiser Wilhelm II, quite calmly stated that “Germany will not wage war for Finnish interests with the Soviet government, which signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and will not support Finland’s military actions if it moves them beyond its borders.”

This was stated by the Germany that “set up” the Finnish army, putting together the schutzkor into combat units. This was stated by Germany, which created the Finnish huntsmen, the elite of the Finnish army.

This was stated by Germany, whose representative and chief military adviser in Finland, von der Goltz, assured the Finns of full support for their actions against Russia.

For Mannerheim, such a situation was a slap in the face. It became obvious that the young Finnish state was simply used as a threat in negotiations with Russia, and then discarded as unnecessary.

Moreover, throughout 1918, Germany practically stopped the Finnish threat to Soviet Russia:

On July 12, 1918, the Finnish General Staff prepared a project for moving the Finnish border with Russia on the Karelian Isthmus in exchange for generous compensation with the territory of Eastern Karelia. The project was signed by Major General Karl F. Wilkmann (Vilkamaa), approved by the German commander General Ludendorff.

On July 19, 1918, Ludendorff proposed to State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs P. Ginze that Finland cede to Russia part of the Karelian Isthmus beyond Eastern Karelia and the Murmansk region; The German command hoped to use joint Finnish-German forces to expel the British from the North, since the Russians alone could not do this.

Mannerheim remembered this lesson for the rest of his life and did not fail to repay Germany during the seven-month Lapland War (September 1944 - April 1945).

However, the temptation to acquire a hefty territorial bite turned out to be stronger than the insults; Russia was too weakened, and the Finns took a risk.

The fighting continued until October 14, 1920, when the forces of the parties were completely exhausted, and a fragile balance was established at the front. One more fresh division would have been enough for either side - and the scales would have tipped towards victory for the country possessing such a division. But it was not found.

The result of this war was the Tartu Peace Treaty, which secured for Finland the annexation of Western Karelia to the Sestra River, the Pechenga region, the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula and most of the Middle Peninsula.

However, under the terms of the agreement, Russia defended the right to free transit of goods to Norway through the Pechenga region.

The final point in Finland’s struggle for the inheritance of the Russian Empire was set by the second Soviet-Finnish war on November 6, 1921-March 21, 1922, when an attempt by a Finnish-Karelian contingent of 5 to 6 thousand bayonets to annex part of eastern Karelia (demilitarized under the terms of the Tartu Treaty) was harshly repelled reinforced units of the Red Army. The contingent itself, having suffered serious losses (according to some sources - up to 15% of personnel), was partially scattered and partially expelled to Finland.

Birth of a conflict

The period 1918 - 1920 was probably the most unique period in modern history. If there were a book of records of precisely those years that became bifurcation points in the history of mankind, then the 18-20s of the 20th century would certainly be recorded in them as the years in which the origins of the absolute majority of conflicts of the 20th century were created (and some of them last and to the present day, hitting states and peoples with “shots from the past”).

And the two Soviet-Finnish wars, and the Treaty of Tartu, and the Moscow Agreement of 1922 (following the results of the second war) did not resolve a single contradiction between the USSR and Finland. Moreover, these events gave rise to the preconditions for a new, tougher confrontation.

“But a sediment remains,” says a well-known joke. What is it like, the residue of two Soviet-Finnish wars?

Let's start with the main thing. The current configuration of the state border did not satisfy either side. 32 kilometers to the second capital, to a sacred symbol (“the cradle of the revolution”), to the center of a strategically important industrial area - this is an unacceptable situation for any state. The military-geographical vulnerability of Almaty in the recent past became the reason for the transfer of the capital of Kazakhstan to Astana. But here this option was not suitable by definition. In Russia, the 20s were a period of fierce struggle for power between various party groups. And while the positions of the “internationalists” (Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, etc.) were quite strong, no one really bothered with the vulnerability of Leningrad, what can it survive until the world revolution, and then the World Republic of Soviets, and the question of strategic positions is lost meaning. But as soon as the statists won, the attitude towards the issue of the security of Leningrad, the security of the Russian North, acquired a completely different significance.

On the other hand, the Finns were not satisfied with the results of the wars. They believed (and quite rightly) that the reason for the failures in the wars was the contradictory policies of the Finnish governments. I did not make a reservation - namely governments, because in three years, during two wars, there were five (!) of these governments in Finland. And all with different orientations (political, of course):

	Current Policies	Orientation
May - December 1918	Regent P.E. Svinhufvud Prime Minister Yu.K. Laasikivi Minister of Foreign Affairs O.E. Stenroot	Germany
	Regent K.G. Mannerheim Prime Minister L.Yu. Ingman
April - July 1919	Regent K.G. Mannerheim Prime Minister C. Castrén Foreign Minister K. Enkel	Course towards war with Russia in a coalition with anti-Bolshevik forces (including within Russia)
July 1919 - April 1920	President K.Yu. Stolberg Prime Minister Yu.Kh. Vennola	For securing annexation without war
April 1920 - April 1921	President K.Yu. Stolberg Premier R. Erich Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Hoolsti	The struggle within the government of two tendencies: war and peace

In addition, following the results of two wars, three theses were fixed in the consciousness of Finnish society:

1. The USSR is a consistent enemy and the main threat to the security of Finland.

2. Peaceful coexistence with the “Bolshevik barbarians” is impossible.

3. Finland’s historical mission is to fight for the return of “original Finnish territories” and counter the “Bolshevik threat” in the Baltic region.

From this it logically followed that it was Finland that had the task of organizing and leading the “anti-Bolshevik struggle” and countering “communist expansion.” Finland’s claims, to use modern terminology, to the role of a regional superpower followed from this (albeit not so logically).

Only two states of the then Europe - Poland and Finland (excluding the USSR, this is a separate issue) so clearly proclaimed the primacy of ideology (with a slight touch of messianism) in their foreign policy. Only two states of the then Europe - Poland and Finland - were ready to defend their principles to the end, that is, to the point of armed conflict with the USSR. And it was they who became active participants in that “European Kama Sutra”, a tangle of intelligence intrigues, diplomatic maneuvers, political bargaining, corporate competitive wars, which led to the tragedy of World War II. But that is another story…