The fighting of the Mujahideen against Soviet soldiers was particularly brutal. For example, the authors of the book “Battles that Changed the Course of History: 1945-2004” make the following calculations. Since opponents considered the Russians to be “interventionists and occupiers,” when counting those killed, about 5 thousand per year—13 people died per day in the Afghan war. There were 180 military camps in Afghanistan, 788 battalion commanders took part in military operations. On average, one commander served in Afghanistan for 2 years, therefore, in less than 10 years, the number of commanders changed 5 times. If you divide the number of battalion commanders by 5, you get 157 combat battalions in 180 military camps.
1 battalion – no less than 500 people. If we multiply the number of towns by the number of one battalion, we get 78,500 thousand people. Troops fighting the enemy need a rear. The auxiliary units include those who transport ammunition, replenish provisions, guard roads, military camps, treat the wounded, and so on. The ratio is approximately three to one, meaning another 235,500 thousand people were in Afghanistan per year. Adding the two numbers, we get 314,000 people.
According to this calculation by the authors of “Battles that Changed the Course of History: 1945-2004”, over 9 years and 64 days, a total of at least 3 million people took part in military operations in Afghanistan! Which seems like absolute fantasy. Approximately 800 thousand participated in active hostilities. The losses of the USSR were at least 460,000 people, of which 50,000 were killed, 180,000 were wounded, 100,000 were blown up by mines, about 1,000 people are listed as missing, more than 200,000 people were infected with serious diseases (jaundice, typhoid fever). These numbers show that the data in the newspapers is underestimated by a factor of 10.
It must be admitted that both the official data on losses and the figures given by individual researchers (probably biased) are unlikely to correspond to reality.
On May 15, 1988, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began. The operation was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. Soviet troops have been in the country since December 25, 1979; they acted on the side of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
The decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by a secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee. The official purpose of the entry was to prevent the threat of foreign military intervention. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee used repeated requests from the Afghan leadership as a formal basis.
A limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) found themselves directly drawn into the civil war that was flaring up in Afghanistan and became its active participant.
The armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) on the one hand and the armed opposition (Mujahideen, or dushmans) on the other took part in the conflict. The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. During the conflict, the dushmans were supported by military specialists from the United States, a number of European NATO member countries, as well as Pakistani intelligence services.
December 25, 1979 The entry of Soviet troops into the DRA began in three directions: Kushka-Shindand-Kandahar, Termez-Kunduz-Kabul, Khorog-Fayzabad. The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar.
The Soviet contingent included: the command of the 40th Army with support and service units, four divisions, five separate brigades, four separate regiments, four combat aviation regiments, three helicopter regiments, one pipeline brigade, one logistics brigade and some other units and institutions.
The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conventionally divided into four stages.
1st stage: December 1979 - February 1980 Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, placing them in garrisons, organizing the protection of deployment points and various objects.
2nd stage: March 1980 - April 1985 Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the DRA.
3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986. The transition from active combat operations mainly to supporting the actions of Afghan troops by Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special forces units fought to stop the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of 6 Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.
4th stage: January 1987 - February 1989. Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership’s policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.
On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation in the DRA. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its contingent within a 9-month period, starting on May 15; The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.
In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. On February 15, 1989, Soviet troops completely withdrew from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.
The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; Available estimates range from 670 thousand civilians to 2 million in total.
According to Harvard professor M. Kramer, an American researcher of the Afghan war: “During the nine years of war, more than 2.5 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, and several million more became refugees, many of whom fled the country.” . There appears to be no precise division of victims into government soldiers, mujahideen and civilians.
USSR losses:
Total - 13,833 people. These data first appeared in the Pravda newspaper in August 1989. Subsequently, the final figure increased slightly, presumably due to those who died from the consequences of wounds and illnesses after leaving the armed forces.
As of January 1, 1999, irretrievable losses in the Afghan war (killed, died from wounds, diseases and accidents, missing) were estimated as follows:
- Soviet Army - 14,427
- KGB - 576
- Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28
Total - 15,031 people. Sanitary losses - almost 54 thousand wounded, shell-shocked, injured; 416 thousand sick.
According to the testimony of Vladimir Sidelnikov, a professor at the Military Medical Academy of St. Petersburg, the final figures do not take into account military personnel who died from wounds and illnesses in hospitals on the territory of the USSR.
In a study of the Afghan War conducted by General Staff officers under the leadership of Prof. Valentina Runova, an estimated 26 thousand dead, including those killed in battle, those who died from wounds and illnesses, and those killed as a result of accidents:
Of the approximately 400 military personnel considered missing in action during the war, a certain number of prisoners were taken by Western journalists to the countries of Western Europe and North America. According to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as of June 1989, about 30 people lived there. Three people, after the statement by the USSR Prosecutor General that former prisoners would not be subject to criminal prosecution, returned to the Soviet Union. According to data from 02/15/2009 of the Committee on the Affairs of Internationalist Soldiers under the Council of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth (CIS) Member States, 270 people remained on the list of missing Soviet citizens in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.
Number of dead Soviet generals, according to press publications, is four people, sometimes called the number 5:
|
Title, position |
Circumstances |
||||
|
Vadim Nikolaevich Khakhalov |
Major General, Deputy Commander of the Air Force of the Turkestan Military District |
Lurkokh gorge |
Died in a helicopter shot down by the Mujahideen |
||
|
Petr Ivanovich Shkidchenko |
Lieutenant General, Head of the Combat Operations Control Group under the Minister of Defense of Afghanistan |
Paktia Province |
Died in a helicopter shot down by ground fire. Posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation (07/04/2000) |
||
|
Anatoly Andreevich Dragun |
Lieutenant General, Head of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces |
DRA, Kabul? |
Died suddenly during a deployment to Afghanistan |
||
|
Nikolay Vasilievich Vlasov |
Major General, Advisor to the Commander of the Afghan Air Force |
DRA, Shindand Province |
Shot down by a hit from a MANPADS while flying on a MiG-21 |
||
|
Leonid Kirillovich Tsukanov |
Major General, Advisor to the Artillery Commander of the Afghan Armed Forces |
DRA, Kabul |
Died from illness |
Losses in equipment, according to official data, amounted to 147 tanks, 1,314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD, BRDM), 510 engineering vehicles, 11,369 trucks and fuel tankers, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters. At the same time, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, information on the number of combat and non-combat aviation losses, losses of aircraft and helicopters by type, etc. was not published.
Some Soviet military personnel who fought in Afghanistan suffered from the so-called “Afghan syndrome” - post-traumatic stress disorder. Testing conducted in the early 1990s showed that at least 35-40% of participants in the war in Afghanistan were in dire need of help from professional psychologists.
Economic losses of the USSR
About 800 million US dollars were spent annually from the USSR budget to support the Kabul government.
The last Soviet decade was marked by the Afghan War (1979-1989). The course of the war, in short, today is not known to every resident of Russia and other countries. In the 90s, due to rapid reforms and economic crises, the Afghan campaign was almost crowded out of public consciousness. But today, when a lot of work has been done by historians and researchers, all ideological clichés have disappeared, and a good opportunity has arisen to take an impartial look at the events of those years.
Prerequisites
In Russia and throughout the post-Soviet space, the Afghan War, briefly speaking, is associated with a ten-year period (1979-1989) when the armed forces of the USSR were present in this country. In fact, this was only one part of a long civil conflict. The prerequisites for its emergence appeared in 1973, when the monarchy was overthrown in Afghanistan. The short-lived regime of Muhammad Daoud came to power. It ceased to exist in 1978, when the Saur (April) revolution took place. After her, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) began to rule the country, which proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).
The organization was Marxist, which made it similar to the Soviet Union. Leftist ideology has become dominant in Afghanistan. Just like in the USSR, they began to build socialism there. However, by 1978 the country already existed in conditions of ongoing chaos. Two revolutions, a civil war - all this destroyed stability in the region.
The socialist government was opposed by various forces, but primarily by radical Islamists. They considered members of the PDPA to be enemies of the entire Afghan people and Islam. In essence, (jihad) was declared against the new political regime. Mujahideen detachments were created to fight the infidels. It was with them that the Soviet army fought, for which the Afghan War soon began. Briefly, the success of the Mujahideen can be explained by their skillful propaganda work in the country. For Islamist agitators, the task was made easier by the fact that the vast majority of the Afghan population (about 90%) was illiterate. In the state outside the big cities, tribal orders reigned with extremely patriarchal views of the world. Religion certainly played a significant role in such a society. These were the reasons for the Afghan War. They were briefly described in official Soviet newspapers as providing international assistance to the friendly people of a neighboring country.
No sooner had the PDPA come to power in Kabul than Islamist-fuelled attacks began in the rest of the country’s provinces. The Afghan leadership began to lose control of the situation. Under these conditions, in March 1979, it first turned to Moscow for help. Subsequently, such messages were repeated several more times. There was nowhere else to wait for help from the Marxist party, surrounded by nationalists and Islamists.
For the first time, the issue of providing assistance to Kabul “comrades” was considered in the Kremlin on March 19, 1979. Then Brezhnev spoke out against armed intervention. However, time passed, and the situation at the borders of the USSR became worse. Gradually, members of the Politburo and other senior government officials changed their minds. For example, the Minister of Defense believed that the Afghan war, in short, could pose a threat to Soviet borders.
In September 1979, another coup took place in Afghanistan. This time the leadership in the ruling PDPA party has changed. He became the head of the party and state. Through the KGB, the Soviet Politburo began to receive reports that he was a CIA agent. These reports further influenced the Kremlin to intervene militarily. At the same time, preparations began for the overthrow of Amin. At the suggestion of Yuri Andropov, it was decided to replace Babrak Karmal, who was loyal to the Soviet Union, in his place. This member of the PDPA was at first an important person in the Revolutionary Council. During party purges, he was first sent as ambassador to Czechoslovakia, and then declared a traitor and conspirator. Karmal, who was in exile at that moment, remained abroad. At the same time, he moved to the USSR, becoming a figure on whom the Soviet leadership put their bets.
Making a decision to send troops
On December 12, 1979, it became finally clear that the USSR would begin its own Afghan war. After briefly discussing the latest reservations in the documents, the Kremlin approved the operation to overthrow Amin.
Of course, hardly anyone in Moscow then realized how long this military campaign would drag on. But from the very beginning, the decision to send troops had its opponents. Firstly, Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov did not want this. Secondly, he did not support the decision of the Politburo. This position of his became an additional and decisive reason for the final break with Leonid Brezhnev and his supporters.
Direct preparations for the transfer of the Soviet army to Afghanistan began the next day, December 13. The Soviet special services tried to organize an assassination attempt on Hafizzulu Amin, but the first pancake came out lumpy. The operation hung in the balance. Nevertheless, preparations continued.
Storming of Amin's Palace
The deployment of troops began on December 25. Two days later, Amin, while in his palace, felt ill and lost consciousness. The same thing happened to some of his close associates. The reason for this was poisoning, which was organized by Soviet agents who worked as cooks at the residence. Amin was given medical assistance, but the guards sensed something was wrong.
At seven o'clock in the evening, not far from the palace, a Soviet sabotage group stalled in its car, which stopped near the hatch that led to the distribution center of all Kabul communications. The mine was safely lowered there, and a few minutes later there was an explosion. Kabul was left without electricity.
Thus began the Afghan War (1979-1989). Briefly assessing the situation, the commander of the operation, Colonel Boyarintsev, ordered the assault on Amin’s palace. The Afghan leader himself, having learned about the attack by unknown military personnel, demanded that his entourage ask for help from the Soviet Union (formally, the authorities of the two countries continued to remain friendly to each other). When Amin was informed that USSR special forces were at his gate, he did not believe it. It is not known exactly under what circumstances the head of the PDPA died. Most eyewitnesses later claimed that Amin committed suicide even before Soviet soldiers appeared in his apartment.
One way or another, the operation was successfully carried out. Not only the palace was captured, but the whole of Kabul. On the night of December 28, Karmal arrived in the capital and was declared head of state. The USSR forces lost 20 people (among them were paratroopers and special forces). The commander of the assault, Grigory Boyarintsev, also died. In 1980, he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Chronology of the conflict
According to the nature of the fighting and strategic objectives, a brief history of the Afghan War (1979-1989) can be divided into four periods. In the winter of 1979-1980. Soviet troops entered the country. Military personnel were sent to garrisons and important infrastructure facilities.
The second period (1980-1985) was the most active. The fighting took place throughout the country. They were offensive in nature. The Mujahideen were destroyed and the army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was improved.
The third period (1985-1987) is characterized by Soviet aviation and artillery operations. Activities using ground troops were carried out less and less, until they finally came to naught.
The fourth period (1987-1989) was the last. Soviet troops were preparing to withdraw. At the same time, the civil war in the country continued. The Islamists were never completely defeated. The withdrawal of troops was caused by the economic crisis in the USSR and a change in political course.
Continuation of the war
When the Soviet Union first sent its troops into Afghanistan, the country's leadership argued its decision by saying that it was only providing assistance, in accordance with numerous requests from the Afghan government. Following fresh developments, the UN Security Council was convened at the end of 1979. An anti-Soviet resolution prepared by the United States was presented at it. The document was not supported.
The American side, although it did not actually take part in the conflict, actively financed the Mujahideen. The Islamists had weapons purchased from the West. Thus, in fact, the cold confrontation between the two political systems received a new front, which became the Afghan war. The progress of the war was briefly covered in all world media.
The CIA organized several training and educational camps in neighboring Pakistan, in which Afghan Mujahideen (dushmans) were trained. The Islamists, in addition to American funding, received money from the drug trade. In the 80s, this country became the world leader in the production of heroin and opium. Often the goal of Soviet operations was precisely the destruction of these industries.
The causes of the Afghan War (1979-1989), in short, sent a huge mass of the population into confrontation, who had never before held a weapon in their hands. Recruitment into the ranks of dushmans was led by a wide network of agents throughout the country. The advantage of the Mujahideen was that they did not have a specific center. Throughout the armed conflict it was a collection of numerous heterogeneous groups. They were controlled by field commanders, but there was no “leader” among them.
The low effectiveness of guerrilla operations was fully demonstrated by the Afghan War (1979-1989). Brief summaries of many Soviet offensives were mentioned in the media. Many raids were nullified by the enemy’s effective propaganda work among the local population. For the Afghan majority (especially in deep provinces with a patriarchal structure), Soviet military personnel have always been occupiers. The common people did not feel any sympathy for the socialist ideology.
"Politics of National Reconciliation"
In 1987, the implementation of the “policy of national reconciliation” began. At its plenum, the PDPA renounced its monopoly on power. A law appeared that allowed opponents of the government to create their own parties. The country has a new Constitution and a new president, Mohammed Najibullah. All these measures were taken to end the war through compromise and concessions.
At the same time, the Soviet leadership, led by Mikhail Gorbachev, set a course to reduce its own weapons, which meant the withdrawal of troops from the neighboring country. The Afghan war (1979-1989), in short, could not be waged in the conditions of the economic crisis that began in the USSR. In addition, the Cold War was already on its last legs. The USSR and the USA began to agree among themselves by signing numerous documents on disarmament and ending the escalation of the conflict between the two political systems.
Mikhail Gorbachev first announced the upcoming withdrawal of Soviet troops in December 1987, while on an official visit to the United States. Soon after this, the Soviet, American and Afghan delegations sat down at the negotiating table in Geneva, Switzerland. On April 14, 1988, following the results of their work, program documents were signed. Thus the history of the Afghan War came to an end. Briefly, we can say that according to the Geneva agreements, the Soviet leadership promised to withdraw its troops, and the American leadership promised to stop funding opponents of the PDPA.
Half of the USSR military contingent left the country in August 1988. In the summer, important garrisons were left in Kandahar, Gradez, Faizabad, Kundduz and other cities and settlements. The last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan on February 15, 1989 was Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. The whole world saw footage of how the military crossed and crossed the Friendship Bridge across the border river Amu Darya.
Losses
Many events of the Soviet years were subject to a one-sided communist assessment. Among them was the history of the Afghan war. Dry reports briefly appeared in newspapers, and television talked about the continued successes of internationalist soldiers. However, until the start of Perestroika and the announcement of the policy of glasnost, the USSR authorities tried to keep silent about the true scale of their irretrievable losses. Zinc coffins containing conscripts and privates returned to the Soviet Union semi-secretly. The soldiers were buried without publicity, and for a long time there was no mention of the place and cause of death on the monuments. A stable image of “cargo 200” appeared among the people.
Only in 1989, the Pravda newspaper published real data on losses - 13,835 people. By the end of the 20th century, this figure reached 15 thousand, since many military personnel died in their homeland for several years due to injuries and illnesses. These were the real consequences of the Afghan war. Briefly mentioning her losses only further intensified her conflict with society. By the end of the 80s, the demand to withdraw troops from the neighboring country became one of the main slogans of Perestroika. Even earlier (under Brezhnev) dissidents advocated this. For example, in 1980, the famous academician Andrei Sakharov was sent into exile in Gorky for his criticism of the “solution to the Afghan issue.”
Results
What are the results of the Afghan war? In short, Soviet intervention extended the life of the PDPA exactly for the period for which USSR troops remained in the country. After their withdrawal, the regime suffered agony. Mujahideen groups quickly regained their own control over Afghanistan. Islamists even appeared at the borders of the USSR. Soviet border guards had to endure enemy shelling after the troops left the country.
The status quo was broken. In April 1992, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was finally liquidated by Islamists. Complete chaos began in the country. It was divided by numerous factions. The war of all against all continued there until the invasion of NATO troops at the beginning of the 21st century. In the 90s, the Taliban movement appeared in the country, which became one of the leading forces of modern world terrorism.
In the mass post-Soviet consciousness, the Afghan war became one of the most important symbols of the 80s. Briefly for school, today they talk about it in history textbooks for grades 9 and 11. Numerous works of art are dedicated to the war - songs, films, books. Assessments of its results vary, although at the end of the USSR the majority of the population, according to sociological surveys, were in favor of withdrawing troops and ending the senseless war.
Personnel losses according to official data. From a certificate from the USSR Ministry of Defense: “In total, 546,255 people passed through Afghanistan. Losses of personnel of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Republic of Afghanistan in the period from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989. A total of 13,833 people were killed, died from wounds and illnesses, including 1,979 officers (14.3%). A total of 49,985 people were injured, including 7,132 officers (14.3%). 6,669 people became disabled. 330 people are wanted.”
Awards. More than 200 thousand people were awarded orders and medals of the USSR, 71 of them became Heroes of the Soviet Union.
Afghan figures. Another certificate published in the Izvestia newspaper provides a statement from the Afghan government “about the losses of government troops - during 5 months of fighting from January 20 to June 21, 1989: 1,748 soldiers and officers were killed and 3,483 were wounded.” Recalculating losses for one year from a 5-month period, we find that approximately 4,196 people could have been killed and 8,360 wounded. Considering that in Kabul, both in the Ministry of Defense and in other government bodies, Soviet advisers controlled any information, especially from the front, it is quite obvious that the figures for losses of Afghan military personnel indicated in the newspaper are not only clearly underestimated, but also the ratio between wounded and killed. Nevertheless, even from these fake figures it is possible to approximately determine the actual losses of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
13 people daily! If we assume that the fighting of the Mujahideen against Soviet troops in the same areas was carried out with even greater ferocity and intensity, as against “non-believers and occupiers,” then we can roughly estimate our losses for the year to be equal to at least 5 thousand killed - 13 people per day . The number of wounded is determined from the ratio of losses according to the certificate of our Ministry of Defense 1:3.6, therefore, their number will be about 180 thousand over ten years of war.
Permanent contingent. The question is, how many Soviet military personnel took part in the Afghan War? From fragmentary information from our Ministry of Defense we learn that there were 180 military camps in Afghanistan and 788 battalion commanders took part in the hostilities. We believe that on average a battalion commander lived in Afghanistan for 2 years. This means that during the 10 years of war, the number of battalion commanders was renewed 5 times. Consequently, there were constantly about 788:5 - 157 combat battalions in Afghanistan each year. The number of military camps and the number of battalions agree quite closely with each other.
Assuming that at least 500 people served in the combat battalion, we get that there were 157 * 500 = 78,500 people in the active 40th Army. For the normal functioning of troops fighting the enemy, auxiliary units of the rear are necessary (supply of ammunition, fuels and lubricants, repair and technical workshops, guarding caravans, guarding roads, guarding military camps, battalions, regiments, divisions, armies, hospitals, etc. .). The ratio of the number of support units to combat units is approximately 3:1 - this is approximately 235,500 more military personnel. Thus, the total number of military personnel permanently stationed in Afghanistan each year was no less than 314 thousand people.
General figures. So, during the 10 years of the war, at least three million people passed through Afghanistan, of which 800 thousand took part in the hostilities. Our total losses amounted to at least 460 thousand people, of which 50 thousand were killed, 180 thousand wounded, including 100 thousand seriously wounded by mines, 1000 missing, 230 thousand patients with hepatitis, jaundice, and typhoid fever.
It turns out that in official data the terrible figures are underestimated by about 10 times.