Soviet propaganda during World War II was called the “third front.” She suppressed her enemies, inspired the soldiers of the Red Army and praised her allies. She was flexible and often changed course, adapting to military conditions and foreign policy.
Political and literary propaganda
The need for propaganda in pre-war and wartime became immediately obvious - the Red Army needed to mobilize more and more forces, involving the population, counteract enemy propaganda in the occupied territories, stimulate patriotism among partisans, and even influence the enemy army with propaganda methods.
Famous Soviet posters and leaflets, radio broadcasts and the broadcast of recordings in enemy trenches became popular means of propaganda. Propaganda raised the morale of the Soviet people and forced them to fight more courageously.
During the Battle of Stalingrad, the Red Army used revolutionary methods of psychological pressure on the enemy. From the loudspeakers installed at the front line, favorite hits of German music were heard, which were interrupted by messages about the victories of the Red Army in sections of the Stalingrad Front. But the most effective means was the monotonous beat of the metronome, which was interrupted after 7 beats by a comment in German: “Every 7 seconds one German soldier dies at the front.” At the end of a series of 10-20 “timer reports,” a tango sounded from the loudspeakers.
The decision to organize propaganda was made in the first days of the Great Patriotic War. The formation of images involved in propaganda was carried out by the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Department for Work with Enemy Troops of the Red Army.
Already on June 24, 1941, the Sovinformburo became responsible for propaganda on radio and in the press. In addition to military-political propaganda, there was also literary propaganda: the group that was created specifically to conduct propaganda and cover the combat life of Soviet soldiers included such famous writers as K.M. Simonov, N.A. Tikhonov, A.N. Tolstoy, A.A. Fadeev, K.A. Fedin, M.A. Sholokhov, I.G. Ehrenburg and many others. German anti-fascists also collaborated with them - F. Wolf, W. Bredel.
Soviet authors were read abroad: for example, Ehrenburg’s articles were distributed in 1,600 newspapers in the United States, and Leonov’s letter to “An Unknown American Friend” was listened to by 10 million overseas radio listeners. “All literature is becoming defensive,” said V. Vishnevsky.
The responsibility of writers was enormous - they had to not only show the qualities of the Soviet army and cultivate patriotism, but also use different approaches to influence different audiences. For example, Ehrenburg believed that “different arguments were required for the Red Army soldiers and the neutral Swedes.”
In addition to the exaltation of the Red Army, the Soviet people and the Allied forces, propaganda was also supposed to expose German troops, expose Germany's internal contradictions, and demonstrate the inhumanity of its attacks.
The USSR possessed the entire arsenal of methods of ideological struggle. Acting in the enemy’s camp, our propagandists did not use excessive communist rhetoric, did not denounce the church before the German population, and did not take up arms against the peasants.
Propaganda was mainly directed against Hitler and the NSDAP, and contrasts between the Fuhrer and the people were used.
The German command monitored Soviet propaganda and saw that it was perfectly differentiated: “it speaks in folk, soldier and specific local expressions, appeals to primary human feelings, such as fear of death, fear of battle and danger, longing for wife and child, jealousy, homesickness. All this is opposed to the transition to the side of the Red Army...”
Political propaganda knew no limits: Soviet propaganda directed at the enemy not only denounced the injustice of the war, but also appealed to the vast lands of Russia, the cold weather, and the superiority of the Allied forces. Rumors were spread at the front, targeting all layers of society - peasants, workers, women, youth, and intelligentsia. However, the propaganda also had common elements - the image of the fascist enemy.
Image of the enemy
The image of the enemy at all times and in all countries is formed approximately the same way - it is necessary to separate the world of good, kind people who fight exclusively for the good, and the world of “non-humans” who are not sorry to kill in the name of future peace on earth.
If the National Socialist (and not fascist) bodies of Germany used the term “subhuman,” then in the USSR the word “fascist” became such a common bogeyman.
Ilya Erenburg outlined the task of propaganda in this way: “We must tirelessly see before us the image of a Hitlerite: this is the target at which we must shoot without missing, this is the personification of what we hate. Our duty is to incite hatred of evil and strengthen the thirst for the beautiful, the good, the just.”
The word “fascist” instantly became synonymous with an inhuman monster who kills everyone and everything in the name of evil. The fascists were portrayed as soulless and cold murderers, barbarians and rapists, perverts and slave owners.
If the courage and strength of the Soviet fighters were extolled, the forces of Germany's allies were contemptuously criticized: “In the Donbass, the Italians are surrendering - they don’t need leaflets, they are driven crazy by the smell of our camp kitchens.”
Soviet people were portrayed as kind and peace-loving in non-war times, but during the war they instantly managed to become heroes, destroying heavily armed professional fascist killers with their bare fists. And, importantly, the Nazis and Krauts were not killed - they were only destroyed.
The well-oiled machine of Soviet propaganda was quite flexible: for example, the very image of the enemy changed several times. If from 1933 to the beginning of World War II a discourse was formed between the images of the innocent German people and the insidious Nazi government, then in May 1941 the anti-fascist connotations were eliminated.
Of course, after June 22 they returned and the propaganda was launched with renewed vigor. Another cardinal turn noted by the German propaganda organs was the mobilization of spiritual reserves in 1942-1944.
It was at that time that Stalin began to encourage previously condemned communist values: traditionalism, nationality, churchism.
In 1943, Stalin allowed the election of a new Moscow Patriarch, and the church became another patriotic propaganda tool. It was at that time that patriotism began to be combined with pan-Slavic themes and motives of helping fellow Slavs. “By changing the political and ideological line and the slogan “Expel the German occupiers from your native land and save the Fatherland!” Stalin achieved success,” wrote the Germans.
USSR about allies
The military propaganda of the Soviet Union did not forget about the allied countries, relations with which were not always the most idyllic. First of all, the allies appeared in propaganda materials as friends of the Soviet people, cheerful and selfless fighters. The material support provided by the allied forces of the USSR was also praised: American stew, powdered eggs and British pilots in Murmansk. Polevoy wrote about the Allied forces: “Russians, British, Americans, this is a mountain. He who tries to break a mountain with his head breaks his head...”
Propaganda was also carried out among the population of the allied countries: Soviet delegations were given instructions on how to form a positive image of the USSR, how to convince the allies of the need to open a Second Front, etc.
Soviet realities were often compared with American ones: “The battle for the Volga is the battle for the Mississippi. Have you done everything to protect your native, your wonderful river, American,” Fedin wrote.
The motive of cosmopolitanism and all-conquering friendship of peoples was predominant in allied propaganda aimed at the USA, England and France, while at home these terms were not always given the same role. Despite the fact that immediately after World War II, the old anti-Western cliches in Soviet propaganda revived again, posters were drawn and songs were composed: for example, the jazz song “James Kennedy” told about the heroic British in the Arctic.
So, friends, today there will be another post from your favorite series - about Soviet propaganda in children's magazines and books. In previous posts in the series, we looked at examples of Soviet propaganda - for example, how children were brainwashed, and how children were taught to love from very early childhood - all these were examples of relatively recent examples of propaganda that many of you still saw at school.
What is most interesting is that the main cultural pillars of Soviet propaganda were formed already in the first Soviet years - almost immediately after the Bolsheviks came to power as a result of the 1917 coup. In fact, for the entire next 70 years of the existence of the USSR, Soviet propaganda traveled along the same rails that were laid back in the twenties, and today we will clearly see this by looking at how it all began.
So, in today’s post, we look at the first Soviet propaganda books for children that were published in the twenties. Be sure to go under the cut, and add as a friend Do not forget)
How it all started.
To begin with, as usual, a little historical background. In the process, the Bolsheviks come to power - and this happens in a very unobvious, rather random and certainly not popularly supported way. Moreover, the Bolsheviks themselves understood this - they knew well that they did not have any “popular support”, and began to invest gigantic funds in mass propaganda to convince the people that the “revolution” was predetermined from above, and the Red Bolsheviks were the only force who should be in power.
Then everything happened according to the same scenario that plays out in many other closed totalitarian regimes - independent media were destroyed, people were cut off from sources of information and analytics from other countries, all dissenters were silenced or killed. In parallel with this, mass military hysteria was intensified - the Bolsheviks constantly depicted before the people some terrible monsters of world threats, against which they urgently needed to arm themselves, although they armed themselves to a greater extent to maintain their own power.
It was in the first Soviet years that the main cliches of Soviet propaganda were developed, which were instilled in early childhood - Lenin is the king and god, the whole world wishes us harm, there are enemies all around, we need to strengthen our defenses and not ask unnecessary questions.
Cult of the Leader.
The cult, but continues to be forever alive, appeared almost immediately after Lenin’s death in 1924 - then subscribers of many state publications were given a postcard “Lenin in the coffin” as a valuable prize.
It was in the twenties that the praise of Lenin acquired the characteristics of a religious cult. At first, the children were told about the bad life before the coming of the Messiah. By the way, pay attention to the style of illustrations in this book - they copy pre-revolutionary popular prints. The rest of the books will be in a different style, purely Soviet.
In general, at first the peasants lived poorly, and then He came and saved everyone. And in the book Lenin died not from syphilis, but from overwork - like a real Messiah. He suffered for the people and died because of it:
Part of the myth about Lenin was also the myth about the “revolution” - it, too, was already fully formed in the twenties. The children were not told that everything happened by chance, but were told fairy tales that Lenin had been preparing the Revolution for a long time, had been thinking about it for many years and had planned everything well. Grandpa can't be wrong!
And for some reason, the fairy tale was repeated everywhere that Kerensky ran away from the Winter Palace in a woman’s dress - in fact, he left the Winter Palace by car and even refused to go in a car with the flag of the US Embassy (which he was asked to do for safety), but went in the next car.
Ghosts of war.
Soon after the Bolsheviks came to power, the ideological pumping of children with “eternal war” began - children were constantly told that the whole world wanted to conquer us and incited hatred of “enemy countries”. The “enemy countries” were mainly those in which the Bolsheviks were not in power - and in the books there were constantly cries that it was high time to go liberate them.
Purely Soviet things about an invisible hand that controls someone (the so-called “delirium of influence”) also appeared in the twenties. If, in response to fair criticism of corrupt officials, you hear cries of “State Department! How much do the Pindos pay you?” - then this is all from the same place, from Soviet books of the twenties.
In order for the enemy not to capture us and so that you do not become a toy, a colonial Parsley in the hands of the English masters, you need to constantly gather in masses and go in parades. Let's start with just flags:
Then it will be possible to put on a uniform - not military yet, but the main thing is that it should be the same for everyone. In the camp, you, a pioneer, will be taught to march in formation, stand up at the bugle, and swim at the whistle.
And then, a little later, instead of a flag and a bugle, they will give you a rifle. The main thing is not to ask unnecessary questions.
The illusion of well-being.
In addition to the eternal war, another eternal theme appeared in Soviet propaganda of the 1920s - creating the illusion of prosperity by showing all sorts of factories, construction sites, dams and steamships, and later moved to Space. They could also draw a train of tanks going beyond the horizon - and no one asked questions about how this all relates to my personal standard of living.
All these things were noticed by Andrei Platonov in his terrible dystopia “The Pit” - which is more terrible than Orwell’s “1984” and which was banned in the USSR. The people in this story lived in barracks, slept in coffins, toiled and died at the construction sites of something Great.
Propaganda books of the 1920s constantly talk about factories, machine tools and ships, Everyone is running somewhere, doing something, as Platonov wrote - "public benefit was constantly being pumped up all around" . I also really liked the drawing of the “new Soviet village”, reminiscent of a Gulag camp behind a wire fence:
At the same time, there is one important point in the propaganda of the 1920s - it was not particularly hidden that all these factories, machine tools and ships were needed to build up military strength in order to go. Many books of this kind were published, which talked about Soviet military equipment and its capabilities:
From matches and acorns.
Well, okay - you ask, there must be at least something else that was in children's books besides all this? Yes it was. Firstly, the children were told “new Soviet fairy tales” about how a boy and a girl named May and Barrikada, Bebelina Oktyabrina, flew to make a revolution in backward countries. This wonderful poem begins with the lines “One citizen had children listed on his work card.”
Secondly, children were weaned from celebrating “bourgeois holidays,” like the vile New Year, which brings with it only drunkenness, truancy and illness. Did not know? Skates and skis are much closer to us!
And thirdly, children were taught to make their own toys from matches, acorns and corks.
Afterword.
In general, as you can see, the main “cultural memes” of Soviet propaganda - such as the personality cult of Lenin, the myth of the October Revolution, the illusion of prosperity with stories about factories, dams and the first place in the world in cast iron - all this was far from new and appeared back in the twenties. Around the beginning of the eighties, these myths fizzled out and became rotten, and then the USSR ended.
Write in the comments what you think about this.
What do you think about Soviet propaganda in general? Was it effective?
“... seeing they do not see, and hearing they do not hear, and they do not understand; and the prophecy of Isaiah is fulfilled over them, which says: You will hear with your ears and will not understand, and you will look with your eyes and will not see.”
(Gospel of Matthew 13:13,14)
As already noted, an important role in the training of propaganda personnel was assigned to the universities of Marxism-Leninism, which were under the direct jurisdiction of the department of agitation and propaganda under the OK CPSU. Thus, in 1986, a branch of such a university was opened at the Penza State Pedagogical Institute named after. V.G. Belinsky. There were also branches in regional centers, the cities of Kuznetsk, Zarechny and at the VEM plant. The course of study was designed for two years. Total number of listeners in 1987-1988 - 1600 people. 1,138 people graduated. 730 people were transferred to the 2nd year. 870 people were newly admitted. However, the names of the courses studied: “The problem of accelerating the socio-economic development of the country”, “Lenin’s teaching on communist morality”, “Mastery of public speaking” were least of all designed to prepare people for fundamental changes in Soviet society. Studying the history of the CPSU and scientific atheism could not prepare them for the reforms necessary for the transition to a market economy, and therefore, in the future, the majority of all these people turned out to be socially disoriented.
It was on such slogans that our agitation for socialism was based. Yes, something didn’t work very well! In any case, in Penza, if anyone bought shoes from our Kuznetsk factory, it was only for work. But they wore Yugoslav boots for 40 rubles with pleasure, although they had to be obtained.
At the same time, on the one hand, lecturers, agitators, propagandists, political informants were trained for work in the field, on the other hand, lecturers of the regional committee of the CPSU (teachers from the city’s universities and party workers who graduated from the High School) prepared lecture texts for them, collected and processed significant amounts of information, those. direct management of communications was carried out, even in a very limited form.
Specifically, the House of Political Education under the OK CPSU was responsible for ideological work with the population in each region. For example, only in the plan of events of the DPP (“House of Political Education” - we had such “houses” in those years - V.Sh.) in Penza from January 6 to 11, 1986 included: classes at the University of Marxism-Leninism, seminar of propagandists of schools of the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, classes of schools of ideological activists, meeting of the party and economic activists of the regional Public Catering Department. From February 10 to 15 of the same year, the work plan was just as intense: internship for the manager. offices of political education of party committees, a seminar for propagandists of schools of scientific communism in Penza, Day of Political Books and Posters; classes at the school of ideological activists of the Leninsky district. At the same time, in the office of political education, an exhibition was opened from the work experience of propagandists studying the works of V.I. Lenin.
A desk book for any Soviet agitator-propagandist. Armed, so to speak, with the right angle of view...
According to data from 1987–1988, there were 13,540 students. Of these, 17 propagandists, 12 speakers, 22 lecturers, 33 political informants, 73 agitators were trained.
It turns out that through the system of political agitation and propaganda in the city of Penza alone in the 80s. Tens of thousands of people passed through, from whom they raised people devoted to the cause of Marxism-Leninism and “fiery fighters.” At the same time, a secret report on the work of the party commission under the Kamensky city committee of the CPSU for 1986 indicated that violations of party discipline continued to occur. The most common violations of labor discipline were negligence and abuse of official position. The immoral behavior of many communists was expressed in drunkenness, theft, embezzlement, criminal offenses, loss and damage to party cards, separation from the party organization, which resulted in the expulsion of 20 people. This was the situation at the “dawn” of perestroika, and then the number of dropped out and expelled communists began to increase. That is, on the one hand, the party trained cadres of agitators and propagandists, on the other, life confidently took its toll. It became increasingly difficult for people to live with double morality, when they said one thing in words, thought another, and had to do something completely opposite. We can conclude that it was only thanks to such a massive processing of public opinion and the lack of real opportunities to obtain information from countries with developed economies that the party leadership in our country lasted for such a long period of time.
Naturally, all the personnel trained in the system of Marxist-Leninist education, on the direct instructions of the regional, city and district committees of the CPSU, were used to conduct rallies, conversations, lectures and political information in work collectives, educational institutions and at the place of residence of the population based on materials received from the CPSU Central Committee and developed locally.
The propaganda and agitation departments of the OK CPSU in the regions also acted as receivers of information based on feedback from the media. Usually, after the publication of an article in the newspaper, the bureau of the regional committee of the CPSU gathered, where it was discussed, after which there was a standard note that the criticism was recognized as correct, and those responsible would be punished. It was often stated that “specific measures have been outlined to correct shortcomings.” But these measures themselves were not always indicated.
Thus, in the materials of the Samara OK CPSU one can find a number of similar responses to newspaper publications sent by the OK CPSU to the editorial offices of the newspapers that criticized them. In response to the article “We don’t like your work,” which was published in the newspaper “Soviet Russia” on May 6, 1986, the question was raised about the low quality of Cascade televisions produced by the Ekran association. The article was considered by the party committee of the enterprise and the bureau of the Kuibyshev OK CPSU. The newspaper's criticism was considered correct. For serious omissions, the chief engineer, controller, head of TV production, head of the production department, and deputy director for social issues were severely punished. To eliminate the identified deficiencies, with the participation of work collectives, a set of organizational and technical measures has been developed aimed at significantly increasing the operational reliability of televisions. For these purposes, their production was temporarily stopped.
At the same time, it must be emphasized that a very significant volume of cases under the jurisdiction of the Penza, Saratov and Samara regional committees of the CPSU (and one can argue that in other regions too) was considered classified information and was carried out through secret office work with the stamp “secret” and “top secret.” Thus, in information marked “secret” dated January 10, 1985 “On the work of party, secular, trade union bodies of the region to implement the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee “On serious shortcomings and distortions in the development of collective horticultural and vegetable farming farms” it was indicated that the total number of such partnerships on the territory of the Penza region there are 267. In them, 226 violations were noted. Cases of unauthorized seizure of land - 70. Excesses in construction - 61. Illegally built garages - 4, bathhouses - 6.
It seems obvious that it was precisely the negative aspects in the activities of these partnerships that should have been made known to the general public, but then people would have to explain why nomenclature workers had the right to a two-story dacha, but ordinary citizens did not.
At the same time, from documents from the late 90s. one can see a complete lack of understanding of what is happening among workers of party organizations. For example, in the document of the Samara OK CPSU “On the socio-economic and political situation in the region” (1990) it was stated that “... confusion in the minds and panic moods are largely provoked by the implantation of an atmosphere of social mistrust and suspicion in society. ..”, and that... a barrier... to one-sided views... should be increased responsibility of journalists, heads of editorial teams, and the introduction of representatives of the public, party, Soviet and Komsomol activists to the editorial boards.”
It is significant that the number of written appeals from workers to party bodies from 1985 to 1991 was constantly growing. This type of work is under the jurisdiction of the general departments of the OK CPSU. Many citizens were received personally by the secretaries of the relevant departments. All letters had to be considered within a strictly established time frame. However, this rule was usually never followed, most often due to their large number of appeals. For example, in 1988, the Penza OK CPSU personally received 865 people and considered 2,632 letters. The largest share of such requests accounted for requests for the provision, distribution and repair of housing, public services, comments on the work of management personnel, court authorities, the prosecutor's office, the police and landscaping.
In the Samara region, for example, in 1985 alone, the OK CPSU received 4,227 letters, of which 73 percent were sent for consideration to various committees of the OK CPSU and other organizations. During the same year, 225 issues related to working with letters were considered.
Letters from citizens and issues of working with them were discussed at 115 meetings of local executive committees, 188 sessions of village councils, 30 sessions of people's deputies. The CPSU OK certificate “On the work of committees to implement the instructions of the XXVI Congress of the CPSU “On improving work with letters” emphasized that all letters were considered within a strictly established time frame. However, during their initial consideration, decisions were not always made in the interests of citizens, as evidenced by 700 repeated appeals on the same issues.
The largest number of letters concerned the housing issue, including abuse of official position. For example, in one of the letters it was reported that the head of the department for accounting and distribution of living space of the Togliatti City Executive Committee V.I. made an illegal three-time exchange of her apartment, as a result of which she left her daughter a 3-room apartment for a family of 2 people, while she herself moved to a cottage with a garden plot. These facts were confirmed by an audit, Fetisova was expelled from the party and fired from her job.
But even when in the Samara region in 1990 - the first half of 1991 there was a sharp reduction in the flow of letters, the deadlines for their consideration continued to be grossly violated. As a result, despite all the decisions, the work with citizens’ appeals has not improved!
By the way, what were the Soviets of Working People's Deputies, the direct bodies of state power, doing at that time? We'll tell you about this next time!
To be continued…
Archival sources:
1. OFOPO GAPO. F. 148. On. 1. D. No. 7177. P. 30.
2. OFOPO GAPO. F. 148. On. 1. D. No. 7094. From 25.
3. OFOPO GAPO. F.P. 148. On. 1. D. No. 77176. P. 219.
4. OFOPO GAPO. F.P. 148. Op. 1.D.Zh7031. P. 166.
5. CDNI (Central House of Scientific Information) F. 594. Op. 49. No. 161. S. 1.
6. OFOPO GAPO. F.P. 148, On. 1, D. No. 6902, S. 42.
7. GASPI F. 656, On. 189, no. 208. P. 31.
8. OFOPO GAPO. F. 148. Op. 1.D.No.6898. P. 156.
9. GAS PI F. 656, Op. 195, D. No. 564. P. 17.
10. OFOPO GALO. F. 148. On. 1. D. No. 7228. P. 23.
11. GASPI F. 656, Op. 189, D. No. 201. P. 31.
12. Ibid. P. 31.
SECTION 3. CLASSICS OF POLITICAL LINGUISTICS
Lasswell G.D.
New Haven, USA Translation by S. S. Chistovoy STRATEGY OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA
UDC 81’371 GSNTI
Annotation. This article presents an analysis of Soviet propaganda, its strategies, goals and stages of implementation. Numerous inconsistencies that are observed in the history of Soviet propaganda are explained in terms of the strategic goals set by Soviet leaders.
Key words: Soviet propaganda, strategy.
New Haven, the USA Translated by S. S. Chistova THE STRATEGY OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA
16.21.27 VAK code 10.02.19
Abstract. This article deals with the subject of Soviet propaganda, its strategies, aims and stages of implementation. The inconsistencies which are abundant in the history of Soviet propaganda are explained from the point of view of the strategic aims set by the Soviet lead-
Key words: soviet propaganda, strategy.
Information about the translator: Sofya Serna Chistova, teacher of the Department of English Philology
Place of work: Nizhny Tagil State Social and Pedagogical Academy.
Contact information: 622004, Sverdlovsk region. Email: [email protected]
About the translator: Chistova Sophia Sergeevna, lecturer of the chair of English philology.
Place of employment: Nizhny Tagil State Social and Pedagogical Academy.
Nizhny Tagil, st. Kyiv, 179, apt. 162.
It is well known that the Soviet propaganda system is very inconsistent both in synchrony and diachrony. At first, Soviet leaders emphasized the idea of world revolution and the inevitable victory of communism over capitalism. Suddenly, at the Genoa Conference, Chicherin announced “peaceful cooperation between two social systems in a given historical period,” and thus the tossing between interaction and violent confrontation continues to this day. For a long time, Soviet leaders called the world's socialist and liberal parties "social-fascist" until the threat of Nazi Germany emerged. And then the idea of a “united front against war and fascism” came to the fore, but this did not last long: when the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed, Stalin toasted the Fuhrer’s health. As the German offensive began, anti-Western slogans died down and Stalin shocked the public by mentioning God favorably. When hostilities ended, a new era of separatism and hatred began. Now the United States has received the honorary title of world evil, taking the place previously held by the fascists and the “Anglo-French plutocracies.”
However, there are examples of consistent actions in Soviet propaganda. Many of the key symbols and slogans of the legacy of Marxism survive to this day.
Is there any explanation for such zigzags of Soviet propaganda? In my opinion, they are united by one strategic goal: to maximize Soviet power in the person of individuals and groups within the country and abroad. Propaganda is a general political tool along with diplomacy, economics and the army. Political propaganda is a means of manipulating mass communication for the purpose of gaining power. Ultimately, its goal is to save the material costs of power, and more specifically, to save the material costs of world domination.
What will happen if this strategic goal is fully achieved? There will be no world war. It is even very doubtful that local confrontations of the Korean type will occur. Nation after nation would fall into the Soviet orbit through intimidation, division and attention-suppression. The US will pursue policies that will weaken its political, economic and social structures, and will peacefully fall into second place on the world stage. The complete success of Soviet propagandists will reduce the material costs that a world war or a series of local confrontations, as well as mass preparations for military action, would entail.
Even partial achievement of such success will significantly reduce the material costs of establishing Soviet dominance. What shortens the war without impeding success saves Russian resources.
Needless to say, the use of propaganda as a tool of power is not a distinctive feature of the Soviet ruling class. All ruling classes of large-scale communities turn to propaganda. However, in the case of the USSR, there are certain features that set it apart from the rest. The contrast becomes especially striking when compared with the United States. Soviet leaders run a cohesive, hypercentralized, military-police state, while American leaders are scattered throughout government, business, education, and other relatively independent structures. The Soviet elite is power-oriented and always calculates opportunities to strengthen power in the country and abroad. In the United States, power elements are less inclined to view power as a dominant value, because they are more interested in issues of capital, status and other values.
The top leadership of the USSR governs on the basis of theory and traditions, which determine the prominent role of propaganda in the implementation of policy. Of course, everyone understands that the seizure of power in 1917 was prepared by years of activity in which each member of the revolutionary party had to direct all his efforts to propaganda.
However, it would be a mistake to assume that the Soviet elite placed great importance on propaganda out of respect for the human mind or the role of ideas in history (An analysis of the prospects for the development of the Soviet elite by Nathan Leites (in press)). It would be more correct to say that it is in the traditions of the Soviet ruling class to not take into account both ideas and the human mind, because The Soviet propaganda strategy takes a very pessimistic view of humanity's ability to enlighten itself through peaceful persuasion.
Think for a moment about the theoretical framework within which advocacy begins. Distrust of everything “ideological” can easily be explained by the emphasis on the priority of “material” factors in history. This moment from the legacy of Marxism was distorted in a special way by the main leaders of Russian socialism. Lenin was well aware that he was in the minority. His understanding of revolutionary activity reflected the helplessness he felt in the face of the task of winning over the masses of the people through peaceful persuasion. In the ideology of Russian workers and peasants, he saw the imprint of the material power of the old ruling class. The slowness, stubbornness and stupidity of the Russian masses, which Lenin sometimes complained about, were ideological factors in history. But these giant icebergs were shaped by “material” forces at the disposal of the older elite.
And how was it necessary to “destroy and melt” these ideological remnants? Not through persuasion, Lenin concluded, but only through rapid and radical material transformations. However, what role does propaganda play in this? (For the propaganda theory used by Soviet leaders, see Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia).
There is no need to assume that Lenin solved the problem of the interaction of material and ideological factors without contradictions and in accordance with scientific principles. Revolutionary leaders developed strategies and tactics that continue to influence Russian leaders. The creation of a propaganda structure is a largely material activity in the sense that it depends on the control of instruments of production such as printing presses capable of printing magazines, pamphlets and books; it also depends on the work involved in processing and distributing the product. It is also material in the sense that it makes it possible to concentrate on the masses who are in an unfavorable financial situation and are therefore very receptive to programs aimed at improving their situation. The number of such “receptive” people depends on the intensity of the contradictions prevailing in a given time and place. With proper use of material means of communication, a very small set of material factors can change the ideas of an ever-increasing multitude. Eventually, individuals who control growing material resources can seize power and begin to control a vastly expanded range of means to transform mass ideology on a large scale.
Once exposed to new ideological perspectives, the working class can ensure that they remain intact by using available material means of communication. This is the origin of the provisions that appeared in Article 125 of the 1936 Constitution on freedom of speech. This article states that the human right to freedom of speech is guaranteed by the transfer to workers and labor organizations of printing equipment, paper supplies, publishing houses, streets, means of communication and other material conditions necessary for the implementation of this right.
A constant indictment against the capitalist world is that the masses are being misled by the press, which is said to be under the control of a plutocracy. Obviously, the assumption is that whoever controls the material means of communication can instill into the minds of the passive masses images that protect material relations, existing or prospective. Thus, propaganda is understood as
a cheap activity through which the receptivity created by material contradictions can become politically effective.
The disdain for the method of persuasion on the part of the Soviet elite becomes obvious in the dogmatic finality with which it treated the ultimate goal of policy. The elite has a rigid, non-negotiable concept of the future, in which people are united by freedom, and not by necessity (F. Engels). The Soviet interpretation of this theory is that those people who strive for this goal can interfere with the freedom of other people until there remain no material contradictions capable of giving rise to ideas hostile to such a free society. The entire threat that could come through communication channels from foreign elites to the Soviet audience is destroyed. The Soviet "elite" does not hesitate to use any material means that they have to protect the Soviet people from such "subversive" influence.
The leaders of Soviet propaganda do not ignore the moods and hopes of their present or future audiences. But this does not happen for the sake of cooperation with the goal of coming to an agreement through free debate on the goals, main directions of policy and the highest leadership of the state. On the contrary, the surveillance of the people is a one-way process, where deviation from the intended course is only a tactical problem of finding economic means to prevent such deviations. At times, Lenin was harshly frank, expressing his contempt for the thoughts and feelings of the masses when they differed from what he intended. As with other tyrannies of our time, today's leaders of the Russian military-police state understand that such frankness is a source of weakness. Therefore, Stalin’s followers are now congratulating themselves on creating “the most ideal democracy” on earth, in which the will of the people is expressed more fully than anywhere else. Thus the mystical concept of democracy is revived, in which tyranny pretends to “intuit”, without the aid of representative bodies, the deepest sentiments of the people.
All issues of creating a state based on the principles of freedom come down to tactical expediency. Elementary consideration for the opinions and feelings of others is unnecessary or, worse, an act of complicity with the cumulative errors imprinted on the human mind by the previous ruling class. Honesty has no value as an expression of morality: that which contributes to the achievement of the ultimate goal is morality of a higher order.
The main task of the propaganda strategy is the correct synchronization of its actions with the emergence of certain dangers and opportunities in certain circumstances in order to strengthen the power position of the Soviet elite. It is possible to trace the dominant strategies of attack and defense in Soviet propaganda, many of the most important features of which can be seen in Lenin's preparations for the seizure of power in Russia. If we return to the years of the deepest crisis of the revolutionary movement (after the collapse in 1905), we see that Lenin's first priority was to form primary revolutionary centers capable of further expansion. Lenin and his followers devoted man-hours to propaganda work. They were often able to find new members through direct personal propaganda, often preceded by the release of printed propaganda.
When the number of primary revolutionary centers became sufficient to significantly influence power processes in trade unions, political parties and the State Duma, Lenin faced a second task. It was necessary to find allies without losing their independence. Although allies outside or within the socialist movement posed a danger to the growing ambitions of Lenin (or his supporters), in their absence there was a threat of complete destruction by enemy elements whose strength was potentially enormous. Lenin's propaganda strategy was to maintain distrust of the Allies while either lulling the latter's attention, directing their attention to a common enemy, or fomenting internal divisions. Propaganda has many means to lull an ally's attention. For example, a direct statement of mutual friendship and minimizing the number of manifestations of hostility and the commission of actions that could disturb the ally. The propaganda goal of directing attention to a common enemy is quite understandable, but the tactics of provoking internal divisions are very complex. Obviously, an ally cannot be weakened to such an extent that he becomes useless in the fight against a common enemy. But tensions within the ranks of an ally may weaken his attention and thus distract him from the alarming activities of a group of Lenin supporters. The splitting strategy sets the stage for cooperation with smaller factions in destroying or taking control of an ally in the future.
The third stage is the seizure of power, and at this stage a slightly different task arises for propaganda, which is to demoralize potential opposition and gain support by suggesting that further
neck resistance or non-cooperation is useless and immoral.
At any time, groups of Lenin supporters may find it necessary to take a defensive position, which largely consists of masking all hostile intentions towards an ally and doubling down on attempts to prevent the emergence or destroy hostile associations by lulling attention, instilling fear of a common enemy and provoking internal divisions .
Thus, the strategic role of propaganda as a means of reducing material costs for expanding power and protecting it (as Lenin’s followers did, and then Stalin’s followers) is realized in the following stages:
The first stage: the creation of primary revolutionary centers in which people wholly devoted to communist ideas form a cohesive permanent team to carry out a common cause.
Second stage: cooperation with allies in branches of power accessible to revolutionary centers, which by that time become strong enough to act as “parties”, “unions”, etc. The propaganda goal at this stage is to maintain a sense of a special mission (within the party or in-group) while at the same time encouraging certain relationships among potential enemies (including allies). These attitudes include a sense of calm towards the party; diverting hostile attention and directing it towards a common enemy; the spread of internal discord.
Third stage: seizure of power, in which propaganda demoralizes the opposition and those who refused to cooperate; spreading fear or confidence in the inevitable victory of the party and in the hopelessness and immorality of further resistance or non-cooperation (The seizure of power in Russia was only the first step in the spread of the communist movement, although the most decisive. In relation to the world situation, the Soviet elite is in the first or second stage. The third stage was implemented gradually in neighboring states. On internal changes in Russia after 1917 [see Cambridge 1950]).
Think for a moment about the application of these strategic principles for seizing power in Russia's neighbors (modern satellite countries). The first task of propaganda in Hungary and Czechoslovakia was to gain sufficient support to begin to play a significant role in the day-to-day government of the country, both locally and nationally. This task was accomplished through infiltration into trade unions and private associations. The second task arose -
la when the party became strong enough to join coalitions and work with allies at every level of government (including attempts to penetrate ministries responsible for public order and public relations). The third stage began with the seizure and consolidation of power as a result of a coup d'etat (within the “framework of the law”). It was in the second stage that the greatest variety in the work of Soviet propaganda was required, since it was necessary to balance the often contradictory tasks of maintaining a sense of accomplishment of a special task, calm on the part of potential enemies (including allies), distraction and directing attention to a common enemy and inciting internal disagreements. This was a period in which such illusions were useful that Soviet policy had finally "calmed down" to peaceful coexistence and a return to sincere cooperation. The third stage is characterized by less subtlety of politics and more ruthlessness, because includes terror, often closely associated with acts of violence [See. Duchacek 1950: 345-72; The February Coup in Czechoslovakia 1950: 511-32; Stephen 1950: 2054].
Considering the picture of the world as a whole, we can say that Soviet propaganda at the first stage (penetration into a new state) is most useful from a high degree of theorizing. At this stage, the function of propaganda is to create a core of professional revolutionaries to skillfully direct subsequent activities. Let us ask ourselves why Kremlin propagandists continue to repeat so many of the old theoretical tenets of Marxism? Obviously, the answer is that most of the theoretical positions have proven effective in appealing to the disaffected in different countries, both in the centers of modern industrialism and among peoples long exposed to Western economic expansion. It has long been known that the disintegration of ancient alliances, religious creeds and philosophical traditions was a sign and then a contributing factor to the vast transformations that humanity is experiencing in a given historical period. It has long been known that Marxist theory provided a secular replacement for the universality of purpose, universal worldview, and boundless faith in destiny that was part of earlier systems. It has long been known, without a doubt, that Marxism and liberalism were closely related ideologies in their attacks on the structures of class society and their insistence on the need for social renewal to realize the principle of respect for human dignity in theory and practice.
Some theoretical provisions taken out by the Russian elite from the historical
Marxism seem quite plausible to millions of modern people experiencing material and ideological difficulties (note that now I am talking about plausibility, not about right or wrong).
Remember the well-known thesis that in a capitalist type of economy there is a tendency towards monopoly. Can we deny the plausibility of this in, say, the United States, where monopoly has been a source of grievance for many years?
Recall the thesis that capitalism periodically creates crises of mass unemployment. In the light of “panics”, “crises” and “depressions”, can we brush this aside as implausible?
Next, consider the fact that protest movements in capitalist societies arise among people who are not large property owners. This is quite plausible in light of the vitality that movements for “working class”, “socialism” and other political symbols show.
Also consider that in parliamentary states, large property owners often take undemocratic courses of action if they feel seriously threatened by protest movements. Is this implausible in light of the assistance provided to the regimes of Mussolini, Hitler and Franco by large industrialists and landowners?
Also consider that imperialism is the result of capitalism's struggle to control raw materials and markets. Obviously, this becomes plausible if we take into account the struggle for colonies, which expanded the territories of such imperial countries as England, France, Germany and Belgium, and put the United States in the place of Spain in the Caribbean and the Philippines.
Also remember that imperialist feuds provoke wars between empires. In this case, an example is the feuds between England and Germany before 1914 and the German struggle for “new territories” in the recent past.
Finally, consider the recent revision of the “imperialism and war” thesis. I am referring to the concept of capitalist encirclement of the "homeland of socialism", the build-up of weapons and military presence as a means of preparing an attack on the USSR, especially in the hope of channeling the discontent of the unemployed towards an external enemy in the context of collapsing capitalism. Isn't it true that capitalist countries have been increasing their spending on armaments?
These theoretical positions occupy an important place in the strategic balance of Soviet propaganda appeals. New party members continue to be recruited through seminars on the study of the works of Marx, En-
Gels, Lenin, Stalin and other acceptable figures in the canonical list. It has been proven more than once that these seminars are very effective tools of Soviet power. Let me remind you that when the Canadian government uncovered a spy organization, the trail led to seminars organized as recruiting points for intelligent people with high intelligence. When the teachings of Marx-Lenin-Stalin are ignored by the advanced educational system of any country or are rejected with noticeable prejudice by teachers who obviously understand nothing about this subject, it begins to arouse curiosity, which can be satisfied privately and in one or another to a different extent, illegal seminars. At these intellectual "illegal parties" doctrine is expounded in detail in a sanctimonious atmosphere free from criticism and comparison. The seminars are an important example of the tactical principle that increasing effective influence in an indifferent or hostile society is possible by increasing the volume of literature and man hours in propaganda work (the step from private study of forbidden theory to espionage and sabotage is quite easy for many).
It should be noted that Soviet propaganda achieved its greatest success in developing countries. This is a good example of choosing audiences where material or ideological factors create tension. These actions are extremely important at all stages of the process of seizing power, but they have the greatest resonance in the first and second stages. The Soviet elite quickly recognized the potential role of "former colonial victims of imperialism", especially since many of the former colonial states were in Asia, in close proximity to Russia. The new non-communist elite in these countries is relatively weak, while the old elite has largely discredited itself. Nationalist sentiments can be turned against the former “oppressors” and directly towards peaceful cooperation with the USSR. The resentment of the former colonies is further fueled by invoking painful memories of the humiliations they were subjected to at the hands of the “white imperialists.” Traditional socialist literature has long fabricated a connection between racial prejudice and capitalism, which lies in the desire of capitalists to divide workers along racial lines into white and black, white and yellow, etc. and differentiate wages accordingly. Having “seized” on these splits in the social structure of the non-Russian world, the strategy of Soviet propaganda was the identification of imperialism and racial
discrimination with capitalism. In this regard, the main target became the most powerful capitalist state - the USA, and from this arose a distorted image of America - with blacks hanged from lampposts, lynched by pathetic gangs of sharecroppers and unemployed people, provoked by ruthless agents of the plutocracy, whose purpose is to keep the workers in a state of hatred and hostility (For the full picture [see Frederick 1950]).
The conspiratorial traditions of pre-revolutionary times left their mark on the channels, content and tactical-strategic relationship between propaganda and general policy. Look from this point of view at the method of double organization, which consists, along with the existence of an open propaganda channel, of a secret, closed channel. This technology can be used in different ways, such as when one channel is called "state" and another is called "party". If the work of the top is stopped for reasons of rationality, the base is kept in working order (as, for example, when the Comintern was publicly dissolved in 1943). A secret channel may be a group whose task is to control organizations that are formally independent of the party. This creates a huge network of “decoy organizations” that are used by the party to penetrate every community - the army, police, diplomatic service, business, trade unions, cooperatives, schools, publishing houses, television and radio, cinema, etc. There is a place here for housewives who hate high prices, for mothers who hate war, and for humanitarians of all stripes. Through these networks of organizations, a huge number of special conditions are created for brainwashing and for expanding the base of propaganda material available to the USSR. This technology is curiously similar to the means by which, in a capitalist economy, a series of small joint stock companies exercise control over gigantic networks of private corporations. This similarity lies in the use of figureheads - "puppets" - a name rarely used in the language of Soviet propaganda, although common in the West.
Double control was a suitable method for the conspiratorial Lenin, who used a small group of his followers to continue his cause, regardless of the formal prohibitions of his party. A striking example of this activity is the creation of a secret organization whose task was to collect money through robbery, counterfeiting money, defrauding rich ladies, and so on.
lee. Even today, Russian propaganda continues to use this double conspiracy scheme, which allows it to carry out activities of the most unprincipled nature.
Summing up the analysis of the strategy of Soviet propaganda, it is necessary to note once again that its main strategic goal is to save material costs for the protection and expansion of Soviet power inside and outside the state. This propaganda, from the point of view of the Soviet government, is a struggle for the minds of people, in the sense that it is a struggle for control over the material means through which it is believed that the formation of people's minds occurs. Therefore, the goal of Soviet propaganda is not to persuade the majority of people in a given country by peaceful means as a prelude to seizing power. Rather, the task is in relation to a minority, which must remain an ideological minority until it manages to obtain the material means to achieve consensus. At the early stage of penetration into a new community, the main task of propaganda is to help in the formation of primary centers, which in the following stages will take on a leadership role. Once they are strong enough to pursue a coalition strategy, the goal becomes maintaining separatism, reinforced by propaganda, to prevent the formation or destroy potentially stronger coalitions. Stimulating calm, diverting attention to a common enemy, provoking a split between potential enemies (including temporary allies) are the directions of the strategy to be executed. At the stage of seizing power, the propaganda strategy becomes demoralization, which is carried out in conjunction with terror tactics, as a means of instilling in everyone the “inevitable” victory of Soviet power and the hopelessness, even immorality, of resistance or non-cooperation. With a goal of world domination that is taken for granted, the Kremlin elite does not limit itself to any moral principles regarding the choice of message, channel or audience. Soviet propagandists and their agents have no qualms about lying and distorting facts because they are insensitive to calls for the preservation of human dignity. For them there is no concept of human dignity in any other sense than the dignity of a free individual’s contribution to the victory of the state by serving the present and future power of the Kremlin elite.
© Chistova S. S. (translation), 2009
Omsk State University
Department of modern national history.
Course work
Topic: Internal political propaganda in the USSR 1935-1939:
Materials from the newspaper "Pravda" in socio-psychological
aspect of the problem.
Completed by: Romanenko T.L.
Scientific director
Ph.D. ALISOV D.A.
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .3
Propaganda and newspaper. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Party and propaganda. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
Socio-psychological
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36
List of used sources and literature. . . 39
Introduction.
Russian history has always been of interest to any sane person, and even more so to a researcher. The people and the state, religion and society at all times, be it early history or modern times, are so interesting that the choice of a period for study presents a significant difficulty, since in each of them interesting facts and trends can be observed. I wanted to dwell on the history of the Soviet period. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, a society striving for perfection is always interesting, and Russian is one of such societies. It is the special path that Russia took to achieve this goal, which is a mystery that an entire army of scientists is trying to uncover, that attracts my attention. It is also strong because, as a patriot of my Motherland, I am concerned about its further development, and for the future it is simply necessary to have a past as rich as possible in events and incidents. It is necessary to find and carefully analyze those mistakes that should not be made again.
A suitable time period for knowledge and awareness is the so-called period of “Stalinist totalitarianism,” which grew up on the absolutely humanistic idea of building a better society, but which became a symbol of the most brutal centralized terrorist system in history with a gigantic and extremely extensive network of camps and general burial grounds. Millions of innocent people died in a huge concentration camp called the Soviet Union.
Why did the idea of communist construction, which is still one of the greatest ideas of humanity, give rise to such a cruel system? And why was this very system able to survive for many years? Historical science still does not have an answer to these questions, but research is ongoing and will continue for a long time.
This work will not attempt to answer both of these questions in full, but will describe as clearly as possible the mechanism that maintained the balance and stability of the totalitarian state in the thirties. The reason for choosing the period 1937 - 1939 is that, obviously, these years are the apogee of the development of the Stalinist system of terror in the Soviet state. This is the peak of the development of not only totalitarian-type statehood, but also the extreme degree of development of Soviet society of the twenties and fifties. The people who made up Russian society at that time and who wholeheartedly believed in a bright communist future, on the one hand; were subjected to no less selfless persecution and repression from the opposite side. This paradox is also visible in the example of the economic development of the USSR, which was driven by millions of prisoners who worked in the most difficult jobs, but at the same time, one should not deny the fact of the existence of extreme enthusiasm among the masses, ready to move mountains for their own Motherland.
And in order to understand this paradox, it is necessary to turn to one of the most mysterious aspects of public life in that period - to ideology.
“Ideology is a system of views and ideas in which people’s attitudes to reality and to each other, social problems and conflicts are recognized and assessed, and also contains goals (programs) of social activity aimed at consolidating or changing (developing) these social relations, “This is the interpretation of ideology given by the philosophical encyclopedic dictionary. But we are more interested in the formulations of the authors who developed this topic. All of them, as a rule, agree that “... ideology is such a systematized reflection of social existence that reflects the interests of a certain class...” (1) - as V. Ivanov writes about this, and the Soviet researcher 70 's V.A. Yadov supports him, saying that: “Ideology is a system of views and ideas of a certain class or social group.”(2)
This was the opinion of scientists regarding ideology in the 60-70s, but even in 1991 V. Kolevatov and A. Noskov do not contradict them, declaring: “Ideology is ALWAYS limited by the horizon of interests of a given social community... It can and does contain an objective expression (and reflection) of the interests of a social group, class, professional class, etc. "(3) As we can see, in each of these definitions, formulated in different years, there is an indication of the class basis of ideology, which cannot be denied. This is what we will pay attention to, since for us, society as a whole is of particular interest, and therefore the classes of which it consists.
"Social classes - refers to V.I. Lenin's short political dictionary of the 1978 edition - "large groups of people, distinguished by their place in... the system of social production... - and also -... by their role in the social organization labor, and, consequently, in terms of the size of the share of social wealth that they have." This is obvious and there is no need to argue; it is no less obvious that a socialist society presupposes the presence of only three classes "organically merged into a single Soviet people", and not at all includes the class of exploiters. In the Soviet Union, the situation was completely
not according to this scheme, although socialism was nevertheless declared in the late 30s. In fact, there was a layer of exploiters of the working people who called themselves “Soviet power.” “Stalin’s power, by its social-class nature, was the power of the state-party bureaucracy,” (4) writes A.P. Butenko, and it must be added that this very bureaucracy constituted a significant army of people engaged in completely nominal work, which in a healthy state it's hard to imagine. At the same time, a huge percentage of the population worked in the camps receiving an insignificant part of the product produced. The bulk of the national income went to maintaining a luxurious standard of living
those in power, as well as to maintain the stability and sustainability of the existing situation.
Thus, we can talk about a stratum, and even a whole class, which, without a doubt, has its own ideology: its own interests and ideas. But at the same time, this ideology in no way coincided with the ideology of the masses who still dreamed of a communist society. It is simply difficult to believe that communism can be built on the bones of citizens, but this is precisely the policy that the Soviet government pursued in the 20-50s. And here there is a need to create and disseminate a mass ideology that is as suitable as possible for Soviet citizens. This was not a problem because there was a great idea that had been in development for many, many years. But the idea was developed by humanists of the Middle Ages, who were not at all inclined to violence, and the people might simply not understand government policy, which is why methods were needed to hide the true state of affairs.
Stalin easily succeeded because he could control the excellent system of propaganda and agitation created by the first generation of Bolsheviks. They understood quite well that “...information is not something independent, does not represent something absolute,” says G. Klaus, “but has an informational character only in relation to the system that perceives the information.”(5) But at the same time At the same time, “... Informing other systems is only a special form of control,” (6) since “... Information is the side of reflection used for control, an ordered change,” (7) - as N.I. writes. Zhukov. Cybernetics also agree with this, having come to the conclusion that “...Information is needed to ensure control, therefore the concepts of information and control are correlative.”(8)
French researcher Paul Linebadger wrote: “... Information becomes propaganda if the person publishing it pursues any goals,” (9) - and we have already talked about the goals of the Stalinist regime. But now it is necessary to imagine: what results should be obtained by informing a society that is absolutely closed to any alternative information. On top of that, there are many more methods and techniques of propaganda and agitation that can be used to enhance impact. These methods and methods of propaganda, as well as the degree of its impact, are the subject of research in this work.
1) Ivanov V. Ideology: character and patterns of development. -M.: Politizdat, 1977.-P.25.
2) Yadov V.A. Ideology as a form of spiritual activity of society. -L.: Lenizdat, 1961.-P.234.
3) Kolevatov V., Noskov A. Ideology: eliminating misunderstandings or developing new approaches? // Communist. 1991. N4. P.43.
4) Butenko A.P. Where we are coming from and where we are going: A philosopher’s view of the history of Soviet society.L.: Lenizdat, 1990.-P.155.
5) Quoted from: Vlasov Yu.M. Propaganda behind the façade of news. -M.: Moscow State University Publishing House, 1976.-P.23.
6) Ibid: p.26.
9) Ibid: p.27.
Chapter 1. Propaganda and the newspaper.
In order for an ideology (any ideology) to exist, the support of millions of people is necessary, means and mechanisms are needed to disseminate ideological formulas to the people. Sokovnin writes about it this way: “Certain ideas, in order to exist in the form of an ideology, must be perceived by many people. They must spread among people.” (1) This is where information enters the arena. First of all, “... no information is possible without a specific goal. Anyone who thinks to inform without a specific goal and considers a relationship of this nature possible has already proclaimed a goal,” reports F. Fatorello (2), and it is difficult to disagree with this . In relation to propaganda, this may mean that even the most neutral information has some purpose,
but, in the words of P. Lianbuger, “... Information becomes propaganda if the person publishing it pursues any goals.” (3) This means that any information is propaganda. Let’s try to test this hypothesis using already materials Soviet researchers.
V.I. Brovik and I.V. Popovich write: “...Information characterizes a specific act of reflection from the perspective of its content, without taking into account the peculiarities of it as a specific process. If all types of matter have the property of reflection, then the properties of information are inherent in matter only such a level of its organization at which management processes arise."(4) This can only mean that a person receiving information serves as an object of management, regardless of its qualitative, substantive characteristics, but in this case management processes arise in social information - and also in mathematical and natural science theories. (5) But the difference between social and natural science theories still exists, it is in the identity of social and semantic information. “Semantic information is social in nature, since it arises in the process of communication between people and reflects facts, events, phenomena...” (6) In turn, mathematical and other information are more likely to correlate with the statistical aspect of logical information (7), which formally separates them from the social sphere. From this we can conclude about the identity of semantic and political information, which is one of the types of social information.
Thus, political information exists only if there is a semantic element in the information, but if the information contains only numbers, it loses its social, and therefore political, aspects.
A few words must be said about the basic principles of political information." Conventionally, the principles of political information can be divided into two groups. The first of them consists of principles that primarily determine the nature of the content of information, its direction. These are scientific character, partisanship, comprehensiveness of information, its connection with life. .. The second group is formed by the principles that determine the choice of means, forms, methods of information, its organizational and methodological aspects. These are, first of all, efficiency, differentiation, popularity, clarity of information, etc. "(8) In addition, I would like to highlight "... Continuity is the most important principle of political information. It requires such a construction of information material in which the subsequent is based on the previous and at the same time prepares the perception of the future."(9)
Now let's turn to the principles of operation of political information. In general terms, “... the process of political information is the unity of two counter flows of information: top-down and bottom-up.” (10) The impact on public opinion is what is the first of the flows - “... occurs , firstly, through the direct and immediate influence of political information on public opinion; secondly, through indirect influence on those phenomena and facts of consciousness, the psyche of people that contribute to the process of forming public opinion as a socio-psychological phenomenon (needs, interests, attitudes, value orientations, etc.)."(11) The second flow, coming from below, works on the principle of feedback - after receiving information, the recipient begins to have some emotions, responses coming to the informant.
P.M. Yakobson describes it this way: "... when the propaganda influence has managed to deeply touch the feelings of the individual, the perceived content becomes not only a subject of reflection, but also a source of excitement or mood, a motivating force for new desires and aspirations." (12 ) These are the basic principles of the work of political information, and as you know, “...The significance of informational work is...that without it the ideological process cannot even begin, it is unthinkable without it.”(13) But also.” ..Political information is an integral part and basis of mass propaganda work...", and therefore propaganda, without which ideology cannot exist.
“Ideology, with the help of propaganda, appeals to the masses, trying to present the policy of the ruling class as expedient and justified, having the status of theoretical, scientifically based, ideological justification,” writes Gurevich in his work. (14), and V.F. Pravotorov, in confirmation this thought, says that “... propaganda is the activity of disseminating the ideology and policies of certain classes, parties and states among the masses.” (15) With all this, it is necessary to add to the words of these authors that despite the seemingly passive role of propaganda , acting as a toolkit of ideology, propaganda is in fact an independent element in the overall structure of the ideological system.
Of course, propaganda cannot do without ideas, but on the other hand, ideology, especially in the conditions of the twentieth century, cannot do without propaganda.
Of course, there is a broader meaning of the term “propaganda”, covering all its possible relationships. “In the broadest sense, propaganda means a special type of social activity, the main function of which is to disseminate political, philosophical, scientific, technical knowledge, artistic values and other information in order to form certain views, ideas and emotional states, and influence people’s behavior. "(16) If we consider propaganda from this angle, then the fact that any object, form or image has propaganda capabilities becomes undeniable; this is worth paying attention to since in the future we will have to turn to the semantic structure of the newspaper: words, photographs, drawings. For now, let us again pay attention to the term “propaganda” itself.
“The word “propaganda” is a historically conditioned form of political and ideological activity, which is used by various classes, parties and states to purposefully disseminate their ideas, views and values in order to influence worldviews, social orientation and behavior of individuals and social communities,”( 17) - writes Gurevich. He considers it necessary for a comprehensive disclosure of the content of propaganda as a theoretical concept to present the points of view of various authors, and we will follow him, since without this some uncertainty may arise when working with the term itself.
At first glance at the various definitions of propaganda given by bourgeois researchers, it may seem that they are absolutely identical. In the most general terms, propaganda is considered as organized persuasion, an appeal to the consciousness of an individual, and the dissemination of certain ideas and concepts. It is this side of the process that is recorded in the decoding of the term, which is proposed by American sociologists Robert T. Holt and Robert W. de Velde. They write: “All definitions of propaganda emphasize that it is an attempt to influence behavior by influencing, with the help of mass media, the nature of the mass audience’s comprehension of the meaning and meaning of the world around them.” (18) One cannot but agree with this point of view, but with On the other hand, one can see in their words an orientation not towards political propaganda, but towards propaganda in its purely pragmatic plane. For these researchers, propaganda appears to be vulgar, everyday and practical. We are more interested in the political and psychological aspects.
American sociology attempts to reveal the nature of propaganda by identifying its differences with other types of social activity. Kris E. and Leites N. emphasize that “education, unlike propaganda, disseminates the results of knowledge, i.e. such ideas that are not contradictory in nature are equally evaluated by different groups of people. If some ideas, including those of social content , cause different attitudes among certain segments of the population, one can still assume that this is already the sphere of propaganda." (19) It would be worth paying attention to these words; there is one controversial issue that I would like to resolve. The problem is that American sociologists apparently never studied in Soviet schools, especially in the 30s, and never experienced the weight of propaganda on a school desk or in a classroom. In a society where mathematics is class-based, even ideas that are not controversial can have a propaganda flavor. Continuing this
Let's turn the discussion to the opinion of another specialist. Lasswell H. defines propaganda as an attempt to influence the attitudes of a large number of people on controversial issues. According to the American political scientist, neutral dissemination of views is not propaganda. The same point of view is shared by Davies I. However, it is legitimate to raise the question of what distribution of views can be considered neutral in order to feel the abstractness of such an approach.(20)
French researchers Haratonic P.L. and Moran T.P. understand propaganda not as the dissemination of a specific “orthodoxy,” but as a set of certain structures, abstract symbols that influence human perception, thinking and behavior. In other words, propaganda comes down to a symbolic reflection of the world. There is no doubt that the media use developed symbols. However, this does not mean at all that propaganda is generally devoid of ideological and theoretical content, writes Gurevich.(21)
Of course, these definitions capture certain facets of the propaganda process, but at the same time they contain a specific tendency: to disguise the political goals of propaganda, to reduce it to abstract education, communication or an act of symbolization. At the same time, propaganda is often understood so broadly that it includes virtually all public life. Thus, the English historian Thomson O., polemicizing with Lasswell, offers the following definition: “Propaganda includes any means of introducing and transmitting images, ideas or information that influence human behavior, taken from its active or passive side. This includes almost all aspects of art and communication."(22) Thus, foreign experts are characterized by two main points of view: firstly, the idea of propaganda as influencing the attitude of a large number of people on "controversial issues" propaganda is the dissemination of neutral views, the second position is to present propaganda in the form of any means of introducing and transmitting information that influences human behavior.
But the most acceptable definition, from my point of view, is the formula of V. Sokovnin, who wrote in 1968: “... One of the forms of communication that specifically serves to disseminate ideological views is propaganda.” (23) Without any doubt, propaganda is it is a form of communication, and we find confirmation in the work of another Soviet researcher. B.P. Bazylev writes: "...One of the main functions of propaganda is to provide ideological and socio-psychological influence, which involves communication in a specialized form of social interaction between those who create propaganda texts and those who perceive them."( 24) Let us take this statement on faith and subsequently try to trace this communication using the example of Pravda.
Of course, the question arises - why is printing the object of our research? The answer is that printed propaganda was the most effective means of propaganda in the 1930s. After recognizing the inconsistency of the circle and individual methods in 1939, the Central Committee, represented by Comrade. Stalin recommended "...to focus the party's attention on propaganda in the press and the organization of a lecture system of propaganda..." (25) These two types of propaganda became the main ones for many years, but preference was always given to printed propaganda, since it had a purely psychological advantage . According to the observations of psychologists, a person is able to carefully read 25 thousand words under normal conditions, but listen to only 9 thousand. (26) This predetermined the dominant position of the press in the matter of propaganda. In addition, the method of printed propaganda makes it possible to use the technique of neutral information, which gives excellent results. These are the main criteria for choosing a print as an object of study, and
Now it is necessary to resolve another important terminological problem - the problem of the relationship between propaganda and agitation in the press.
This point is well developed in the work of V.A. Shandra, who distinguishes between the concepts of propaganda and agitation. He writes: "...propaganda is characterized by an emphasis on education, with the goal of equipping the working people with a system of political knowledge..." Agitation, "...Bases primarily on explanation. Agitation also contains an element of education, but it does not determine its essence. "(27) In addition, the author draws attention to the fact that "... the subject of printed party propaganda is current aspects of social theories and socio-historical practice." (28) And agitation "... provides an ideological solution to immediate, tactical tasks party and the people."(29) Thus, we can talk about the division of propaganda and agitation according to the nature of the tasks: propaganda is in charge of strategy in the dissemination of ideology, agitation is in charge of tactics. But what else is there in the Soviet press of the 30s? We will try to figure this out in Chapter III.
1) Sokovnin V. Human communication and ideology./ Ideology and social psychology. - Frunze, 1968.-P.97.
2) Quote. by: Vlasov Yu.M. Propaganda behind the façade of news. -M.: Moscow State University Publishing House, 1976.-P.22.
3) Ibid., p.27.
4) Quote. from: Political information. Some questions of theory and practice.-M.: Mysl, 1974.-P.9.
5) Ibid., p.10.
6) Political information.-M.: Politizdat, 1973.-P.10.
7) Ibid., p.9.
8) Political information. Some questions of theory and practice.-M.: Mysl, 1974.-P.40.
9) Ibid., p.66.
10) Ibid., p.24.
11) Ibid.
12) Jacobson P.M. Emotional factor in propaganda influence./ Problems of social psychology and propaganda.-M.: Politizdat, 1971.-P.63.
13) Political information. Some questions of theory and practice.-M.: Mysl, 1974.-P.18.
14) Gurevich P.S. Propaganda in the ideological struggle.-M.: Higher School, 1987.-P.110-111.
15) Pravotorov V.F. Propaganda.//Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary.-M.: Politizdat, 1983.P.539.
16) Ibid.
17) Gurevich P.S. Propaganda in the ideological struggle.-M.: Higher School, 1987.-P.100.
18) Ibid., p.101.
19) Ibid.
20) Ibid., p.102.
21) Ibid.
22) Ibid.
23) Sokovnin V. Human communication and ideology. / Ideology and psychology. - Frunze.: Ilim, 1968.-P.97.
24) Bazylev B.P. On the specifics of the use of words in the system of bourgeois propaganda./ Language and style of bourgeois propaganda.-M.: Moscow State University Publishing House, 1988.-P.49.
25) Quote. from: Bolshevik Press.-M.: Politizdat, 1940.- P.359.
26) See Problems of social psychology and propaganda.-M: Politizdat, 1971.
27) Shandra V.A. Newspaper, propaganda, life: questions of theory and methodology.-M.: Mysl, 1982.-P.29
28) Ibid., p.25.
29) Ibid., p.30.
Chapter II. Party and propaganda.
During its reign, the Stalinist government, well remembering Lenin’s words that “...It is not enough to call oneself a “vanguard,” an advanced detachment, one must also act in such a way that all other detachments see and are forced to admit,
that we are moving ahead,” (1) - thoroughly dealt with the problem of propaganda and agitation, since the stability of the positions of the administrative-command system significantly depended on what the “other detachments” would see and whether they would recognize the movement forward.
Without propaganda influence on the masses, it is difficult to keep a gigantic colossus with a completely paradoxical management structure and contradictory socio-economic policies in a stable position, but with its use this is not so difficult, since “... Propaganda influence creates situations in which the existing need is satisfied providing people with information that affects their interests and values and helps them identify connections between themselves and social reality,” (2) - testifies N.L. Eliva. And this suits the regime perfectly, since information, as we have already said, was completely under the control of the state and can affect the interests of people, using them for their own purposes.
I.V. Stalin at the XVIII Congress in 1939 noted: “There is another area of party work, very important and very responsible, through which the strengthening of the party and its leading bodies was carried out during the reporting period - this is party propaganda and agitation, oral and printed, work on educating party members and party cadres in the spirit of Marxism - Leninism."(3) These words were a directive to action for all levels of government. The “important and very responsible” work noted by the leader was to be carried out in all areas of domestic policy, be it education, production or the social sphere. At the same time, it is necessary to act in a truly Leninist way - “... to propagandize, and organize, and agitate in the most accessible, most understandable, most clear and lively way...” (4)
But in order to carry out the work most effectively, it is necessary to create a system of truly mass propaganda, which “... addresses not only a person’s life beliefs, his views and ideas. It also takes into account the whole gamut of human feelings and experiences in all the richness of their unique specific and at the same time typical manifestations. The behavior of one person, an agent of a group or a representative of a particular class cannot be described through the characteristics of those ideas, the bearer of which is a given person. People have certain interests and needs, expectations and ideals, moods and experiences, illusions and aspirations. The inner world of a person is complex. A person not only cognizes, she experiences, analyzes, develops a life position. These processes can only be understood on the basis of studying psychological mechanisms. Without taking them into account, propaganda and counter-propaganda lose not only their targeting, but also their inherent they are multi-layered, concrete,” (5) - in the words of Gurevich. True, Stalin’s propaganda hardly cared about the experiences of Soviet citizens, but regarding the moods, expectations, illusions and aspirations, one can say with almost one hundred percent certainty that they were under constant surveillance.
Observations of the behavior of the people, carried out in the basements of the NKVD, by special officers at industrial enterprises and in the army, and by informers at their place of residence, made it possible to identify psychological attitudes, stereotypes and general psychological readiness for propaganda influence. But we will talk about this below, but for now we will return to the relationship between propaganda and the state.
Everything that is necessary for mass propaganda is difficult to achieve without a powerful central body engaged in propaganda and agitation work. Centralization and unification into a single structure of previously created institutions such as the Institute of Mass Correspondence Education and political departments at enterprises occurred in 1939, when the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation was created under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.
In a report on March 18, 1939, A.A. Zhdanov said: “In order to successfully manage the work of Marxist-Leninist propaganda in the party and the state, in order to successfully solve the problems of eliminating the theoretical and political lag of party cadres, the Central Committee must have a powerful propaganda and agitation apparatus in the form of the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation, concentrating all the work on printed and oral propaganda and agitation."(6)
It was supposed, according to Stalin: “...to concentrate the work of party propaganda and agitation in one place and to unite the departments of propaganda and agitation and press departments in a single Directorate...with the organization of the corresponding department of propaganda and agitation within each republic, regional and regional party organization." (7) This measure was supposed to solve the main task of party propaganda, which "... is to help our cadres in all branches of work master the Marxist-Leninist science of the laws of social development." (8) The science of laws development of society, at the same time, underwent radical changes and now bore little resemblance to true Leninist science. But no one noticed this anymore, since the same propaganda that brought science to the cadres also influenced the members of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), who were supposed to disseminate it (science) to the masses. Even directives from the highest ranks in power structures directed downwards turned into a kind of method of propaganda influence, because the information supplied to them was undeniable and absolutely correct. Those who doubted it were quickly convinced of its correctness, using very practical methods, such as arrests, torture, convictions and executions. There was, however, a mild measure - exclusion from the party, which, however, led to the same thing.
In the end, for the top of a totalitarian regime, even with well-organized propaganda work among the masses, a special danger is posed by a layer of small managers who very much want to become larger managers. But Stalin managed to stop these tendencies using an excellent means - terror. The small and middle management layers were subjected to purges from time to time, which, however, sometimes affected senior officials as well as ordinary party members. This was a necessary preventative insurance, and today we can speak quite confidently about the high effectiveness of such measures, since it is possible to compare the reign of Stalin, who remained at the helm for three decades, and the period of power of Nikita Khrushchev, who was removed from his post.
One way or another, the party, like "... socialist propaganda, is implementing a comprehensive program of political education of the masses, designed to develop their social consciousness and intensify their historical activity." (9) Political education, simultaneously with the development of public consciousness and the intensification of historical activity, creates a unique " mass culture”, which has most of the signs of the phenomenon that Soviet political scientists of the 70s discovered in the West. Psychoses based on this very “culture” can also be found in the USSR. True, “mass culture, Soviet-style, is distinguished by greater abstraction, the absence of the everyday element, we were building communism and there was no time to think about ourselves, but it also “... exploits the psychological mechanisms of people, their needs for the hallucinatory embodiment of their dreams, for the realization of retribution for the collapse of your own illusions. But the real spring of this pseudo-culture lies in a completely different plane - in the desire to hide the glaring contradictions between official ideology and reality," (10) - in the words of Gurevich.
It was the desire to hide the glaring contradictions between ideology and reality that led to the use of the most effective means of creating “mass culture.” Therefore, in order to achieve a given goal as quickly as possible, the media and propaganda are increasingly used, the main feature of which is comprehensiveness (11). "The media and propaganda have no equal in the scale of coverage and as a feedback channel." (12) Lenin understood this perfectly well, writing “... A newspaper can and should be the ideological leader of the party, develop theoretical truths, tactical positions, general organizational ideas, general tasks of the entire party at one time or another.” (13) Without any doubt, in addition There is a need for other types of printed propaganda, but it was the press that should have become the leader among the media in propagandizing the population, since it is the most effective and efficient means. The mere fact that a person in a normal state is able to read 25 thousand words, but listen to only 9 thousand, speaks volumes. And on top of everything else, the practically unlimited possibilities of influence, both temporal and spatial, have led to the widespread distribution of printed materials. As A.A. Zhdanov reported at the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on March 18, 1939: “...Printed propaganda, which is of decisive importance in the organization of propaganda work, is expanding.”(14)
L.M. Kaganovich, speaking on September 14, 1938 in the newspaper "Gudok", said: "... There should be more system and uniformity in the distribution of materials on the pages of newspapers. Otherwise, it may turn out like a flux - secondary, insignificant issues are received in the newspaper there is an excessive amount of space, and important ones, on the contrary, remain in the shadows. To avoid this, certain sections should be introduced in newspapers in which one could find articles and notes that interest him in the usual place."(15) What a touching concern for the reader, nothing less than Comrade Kaganovich has some kind of interest in newspaper information, in placing it on the pages (we will talk about this a little later). Yes, there are also tips on informing: “... The newspaper should highlight the main issue and hit one point until positive results are obtained,” (16) he says, revealing the remarkable abilities of the propagandist. In 1982, V.A. Shandra will define one of the properties of propaganda as what the People’s Commissar said in 1938: “...The effectiveness and efficiency of propaganda is largely determined by the relevance of its content.” (17) But this is not the only factor in increasing the impact after propaganda noticed Kaganovich. “Questions need to be posed more sharply. And the point here is not in the quantity of facts, but in the quality. Naked facts say little. We need to explain the essence of the matter, establish the connection between the chain of events, analyze the situation, and draw practical conclusions,” he says.
Thus we could see some significant aspects of the problem. The regime’s interest in mass propaganda and the direct participation of senior officials in this process are evident, and the process of centralization in the structures of propaganda and agitation is also clearly visible.
1) Lenin V.I. What to do? / PSS.T.6.p.83-84.
2) Eliva N.L. Study of thinking in Soviet psychology.-M.: Nauka, 1966.-p.40.
3) Stalin I.V. Report at the XVIII Congress on the work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, March 10, 1939/ Bolshevik Press.-M.: Politizdat, 1940.-p.358.
4) Lenin V.I. / PSS.T.41.p.95.
5) Gurevich P.S. Propaganda in the ideological struggle.-M: Higher School, 1987.-p.234.
6) Quote. from: Bolshevik press.-M.: Politizdat, 1940.-p.361.
7) Stalin I.V. Decree. cit., p.359.
9) Gurevich P.S. Decree. cit., p.235.
10) Ibid: p.252.
11) Mass media and propaganda.-M.: Politizdat, 1984.-p.65.
12) Ibid: p.66.
13) Lenin V.I. Letter to a friend about our organizational tasks./ PSS.T.7.p.8.
14) Quote. from: Bolshevik press.-M.: Politizdat, 1940.-p.361.
15) Ibid: p.355.
16) Ibid.
17) Shandra V.A. Newspaper, propaganda, life: questions of theory and methodology.-M.: Mysl, 1982.-p.18.
18) Quote. from: Bolshevik press. - M.: Politizdat, 1940. - p. 356.
Chapter III. Socio-psychological
Before talking about the content of "Pravda" and the effect of this content on mass consciousness, it is necessary to talk about general points that influence the effectiveness of ideological influence. It (efficiency) “...is determined to a decisive extent by a skillful combination of theoretical and organizational activities, propaganda and agitation,” (1) says V.A. Shandra in this regard. That is why, when developing methods of influencing any ideology that has the slightest self-respect, it is necessary to take into account some important points. And first of all, attention should be paid to a person who “... as an object of propaganda influence,” in the words of Afanasyev, “represents a complex set (system) of qualities that embody the features of the social environment, as well as the specific environment that surrounds him (his "microenvironment"), the specificity of his historical experience, hereditary inclinations, and this person is characterized by a certain degree of activity, selectivity in relation to the general and specific environment, to the requirements and principles of social ideology." (2) Such a complex definition, developed in 1975, Lenin, who, without any doubt, had an excellent understanding of propaganda, expressed it briefly and clearly: “...millions of people will never listen to the advice of the party if this advice does not coincide with what the experience of their own lives teaches them.”(3)
Thus, any propaganda that “... aims to form the views of people, their worldview, beliefs and encourage them to certain practical actions based on these views and beliefs...” (4), and especially propaganda on which fate depends ideology, simply must appeal to individuals. In the works of Soviet researchers, this mechanism is well described in relation to the system of bourgeois propaganda. Gurevich speaks about this as follows: "...Manipulative propaganda is literally obsessed with the mania of personification. It offers the audience numerous options that allow them to identify themselves with the images of successful people, supermen, outsiders, avengers. A person’s deep inner attraction to the awareness of his own “I” is, in fact, replaced affairs, a fictitious, illusory self-identification."(5) For Gurevich, this very manipulative propaganda seems to be “Western” propaganda, bourgeois and anti-Soviet, but if you carefully follow, you will notice a significant similarity in the principles and methods of work of both Western and Soviet political structures information, which are actually manipulators. Let's try to make sure of this. And let's start with the example already given - the method of personification.
In Soviet propaganda of the 1930s it was used in a rather paradoxical form. On the one hand, the regime preached the theory of an absolutely equal society, where every person has exactly the same rights as anyone else, but on the other hand, there was a clear division in society into friends and foes. But there is nothing strange in this paradox if we remember the main characteristics of propaganda and agitation and their main difference: the first provides strategic objectives, the second is in charge of tactics. So propaganda articles about the Stakhanov movement appear on the pages of Pravda, describing the exploits of ordinary workers who, as a rule, worked in mines and factories from childhood, then fought with the whites and, finally, work for the good of the Soviet Motherland. A huge mass among the peasantry and workers perceives these materials and a backlash occurs, which, as we remember, serves as the second stream in the process of political information. Using the personification method starts a chain reaction of propaganda. The newspaper editor receives letters from readers. These materials exclude the practice of falsification, since, from the point of view of propaganda, they are perfect; they contain a clearly expressed focus on various social groups and a theme expressing the interests of these groups (half a century later, Shandra would write: “... along with theoretical and propaganda materials that are designed for a mass audience, the newspaper can and SHOULD publish texts addressed to certain special groups that are as consonant as possible with their interests and needs." (6)) But the most important characteristics of these materials for propaganda are sincerity and, at the same time, loyalty and even, as a rule, love for the regime. An example of what has been said is a selection of letters in Pravda dated January 1, 1937 under the general heading “My happiest day in 1936.” (7) The semantic content of the texts of these letters indicates the newspaper’s desire to create a strong attitude that represents “ ...a link formed in the system of interaction of an individual with the outside world, an interaction that begins with the influence of the outside world on an individual, a subject."(8) Resorting to the simplest techniques: such as "...The use in speech of several synonyms from one synonymous series - which - helps to strengthen the meaning of what was said, to “intensify” the main semantic connotation of this series...” (9) (“prosperous”, “luck”, “success”, “full of happiness”, “happily”, “happy” " and finally "the happiest"; up to 3% of words from this series), the use of cliched linguistic means ("beloved Motherland", "people's democracy", "the best state", "communist party", etc. ), leads to the emergence of an attitude among readers of these materials, aimed at perceiving Soviet reality in a positive light. And according to Sherkovin - “...In accordance with the acquired attitudes, people react positively or negatively to everything that in one way or another concerns them or somehow affects their interests, their conscious or unconscious drives, their values.” (10) Exactly Therefore, there is such an obvious focus on creating a clear and constant attitude towards perceived reality as the most perfect option. The same trend can be seen in relation to culture and art. As an example, and a very vivid one, I would like to cite the artist’s words, which wandered through the pages of the press for a long time. “...I deeply believe in the great art of our days,” wrote A.A. Deineika. “Beautiful art of our time... Who will not be captivated by our days? Who will remain indifferent to them? Bright impulses, titanic scope of the proletariat - the sun is colorful I want to scatter a thousand semi-precious stones and capture this heroic struggle of the proletarian masses."(11) The same materials are published on the pages of Pravda, sometimes bringing this process to the point of absurdity. For example, for the centenary of Pushkin, the newspaper contains materials dedicated to this event (12), and among them are articles and notes dedicated to the Soviet state, and in these materials a close connection can be seen between Pushkin’s poetry and Stalin’s art. The idea appears that Alexander Sergeevich, without any doubt, would have become a laureate of the Stalin Prize. The texts are written using clichés with a strong degree of expressiveness ("bright impulses", "titanic scope", "heroic struggle", "protest of the poet", "reaction of tsarism", etc.), using syntactic means of reinforcement (interrogative sentences, use dash), which undoubtedly should have affected the emergence of a clear attitude and even a stereotype. Stereotypes will be discussed below.
“Stereotypes,” writes V.L. Artemov, “are a representation or image that captures a particular phenomenon as a whole, immediately, without particulars or details.” (13) Stereotypes have a special mechanism of action - “...To awaken A stereotype requires touching upon an attitude, which is an individual’s predisposition, based on existing experience, to perceive social information, taking into account certain social positions, which is expressed in the system of value orientations of the subject.”(14)
“A stereotype, like any mental formation, includes the unity of two interacting principles - knowledge and relationships, of which one or the other acts as predominant.” (15) But this does not always happen. In the manipulative propaganda of the Stalinist regime, knowledge is in a state of subordination to relation, since the state had a monopoly on information. But there is a pattern - “... the two-pronged structure of a stereotype (attitude plus knowledge) makes the attitude inversely dependent on the knowledge of the subject. The higher the education, awareness and consciousness of a person, the better he understands whose interests the propaganda material corresponds to.” (16) How about that? What is the situation with increasing education and awareness on the pages of Pravda?
To begin with, let us turn to newspaper materials devoted to foreign policy reviews. In 1937, the attention of the whole world was, of course, devoted to the events in Spain, the fighting was widely reflected in the pages of the press around the world, and Pravda was no exception. About 17% of the materials related to foreign news, and from 5 to 10% in each issue, with the exception of special ones, was devoted to “Spanish” reports, reports, and messages. The Soviet Union had a clearly expressed interest in the Spanish War, since this country could subsequently enter the still small community of socialist states. Therefore, it was necessary to help the “comrades in struggle”, for which detachments of “volunteers” were sent to Spain. There was no shortage of volunteers, especially among NKVD officers. And at this time, the process of propaganda is in full swing in the Soviet press, the main task of which is to create a stereotype that would be expressed in the full support of the masses for the government's policies.
Methods such as neutral propaganda help in this work (facts and events appear in the newspaper, reports of which were received from neutral sources), the method of dramatizing facts (expressed in the use of semantic means to give facts and events a more expressive color), and also widely Commenting on messages is common. These techniques allow you to manipulate facts to please the informant, and this is possible due to the specific nature of the fact. This was also noticed by Gorky, who wrote very figuratively that “... A fact is not the whole truth, it is only raw material from which the real truth must be melted and extracted. You cannot fry the chicken with the feathers,” he continues, “. ..you need to learn to pluck out the insignificant plumage of a fact, you need to be able to extract meaning from a fact." (17) "... A fact of reality is a completed or incomplete process of interaction of things, objects, systems, and the process is contradictory, since it simultaneously contains a moment of variability and a moment of stability."(18) Because of this contradiction, it becomes possible for facts to influence public consciousness. And you won’t even have to change anything in the arrangement of factual data, which “... in each case will be absolutely correct. You can vouch for their reliability under oath. But it is the interpretation of these data, as well as the fact itself as a whole, that makes them propaganda. "(19)