As a result of the Tsushima massacre, the Russian squadron lost more than 5 thousand sailors. Twenty-seven warships were sunk, surrendered, and also interned. The Japanese flotilla also suffered considerable losses, but they turned out to be much smaller. The Battle of Tsushima is the largest defeat of the Russian fleet ever
previous story in its formation and functioning. And although the Russian navigators showed enormous heroism, dedication and courage in the Tsushima battle, the battle took place in difficult conditions against a well-prepared and numerically superior enemy, inappropriate management of the highest command, as well as underdevelopment in weapons and technical support were the reasons that led to such a disappointing outcome. In the Tsushima battle there was failure Russian autocracy with the entire military department, but in no case the heroism and devotion of a Russian person.
Almost no military events took place in the land theater after Mukden. Both warring parties by this time were exhausted both morally and financially. This was especially true among the Japanese. In the Russian army, too, after several defeats due to incorrect coordination, noticeable destruction and an increase in anti-government sentiment began not only among ordinary sailors, but also among officers. The real futility of this war, waged far from the borders of Russia, on foreign soil, became more and more clearly visualized.
In Japan, the futility of the planned “event” was realized much earlier. Back in the summer of 1904, even before the defeat in the battle for Port Arthur,
capital of Japan, anticipating the threat of approaching crises, both military and financial, and, most frighteningly, in political sphere, secretly began to probe the soil necessary for the formation of the world. Through side diplomatic channels, Russian Minister Witte was invited to meet with representatives of the opposing side at any European resort and attempt to arrange peace negotiations. Despite the fact that the Japanese victory at Tsushima only further strengthened the fighting spirit of chauvinism in the country, the Japanese leadership began to clearly see that the policy it was pursuing had reached a dead end. And she not only “stumbled upon”, but also began to offend the political guidelines of strong patrons who, throughout the entire period of hostilities, provided the Japanese side with important help, military materials.
At the end of the Tsushima battle, the Japanese government turned to the United States asking for help on the path to peace. The Russian autocracy, frightened by the impending revolution and general dissatisfaction in the state with the results of the company, agreed to sit down at the negotiating table. The negotiations took place in the American town of Portsmouth. 5.09. 1905 The so-called Portsmouth Peace Treaty was concluded between Russia and Japan. According to the contract Russian leadership conceded to the Japanese state the southern tip of Sakhalin Island and refused claims to lease the Kwantung Peninsula with Port Arthur and the South Manchurian Railway. In addition, the Russian leadership was forced to recognize Japan's personal interests in Korea. The signing of such an agreement did not bring victorious laurels to the Russian state and did not increase its importance throughout the world.
If we judge such a confrontation between the parties from the point of view of tactics and military strategy during the conduct of hostilities, then it can be noted that the war visualized the fact that by that period important changes had appeared in this direction in martial art, which were not taken into account in a timely manner by either the tsarist government or the military departments.
The implementation of combat operations in a theater of combat operations so far from the center showed a significantly increased role assigned to the rear.
Military experience has shown that the number of armies that were involved in hostilities has increased significantly. The width of the front of military operations also increased. In battle, the semantic purpose of a fire attack has increased. Especially machine guns, as a mobile weapon of fire influence on the infantry. Artillery has learned to influence the opposing side from hidden positions, the importance of guns, etc., has grown, capable of crushing the enemy’s strategic fortifications with its shells.
The war now required not only the army to dig in, digging trenches, but also the construction of difficult engineering positions, which required serious mechanization of the army and the creation of fairly large engineering departments.
During the fighting, the infantry abandoned the closed formation and began to use a loose formation, adapting to the surrounding terrain.
IN naval battle Fast ships and destroyers began to play a serious role. The tactics and strategy of naval combat have also undergone significant changes.
The instability of the military-economic reserve of autocratic Russia, the backwardness of both the army and navy from the leading military technologies of the time, the mediocrity and inadequate training of the high command - these are the main reasons for Japan's victory in the war.
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The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 is considered one of the largest confrontations. The reasons for this will be discussed in the article. As a result of the conflict, guns from battleships, long-range artillery, and destroyers were used.
The essence of this war was which of the two warring empires would dominate the Far East. Emperor Nicholas II of Russia considered it his primary task to strengthen the influence of his power in East Asia. At the same time, Emperor Meiji of Japan sought to obtain full control over Korea. War became inevitable.
Prerequisites for the conflict
It is clear that the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905 (the reasons are related to Far East) did not start immediately. She had her own reasons.
Russia has advanced in Central Asia to the border with Afghanistan and Persia, which affected the interests of Great Britain. Unable to expand in this direction, the empire switched to the East. There was China, which, due to complete exhaustion in the Opium Wars, was forced to transfer part of its territory to Russia. So she gained control of Primorye (the territory of modern Vladivostok), the Kuril Islands, and partly the island of Sakhalin. To connect distant borders it was created Trans-Siberian Railway, which is along the line railway provided communication between Chelyabinsk and Vladivostok. In addition to the railway, Russia planned to trade along the ice-free Yellow Sea through Port Arthur.
Japan was undergoing its own transformations at the same time. Having come to power, Emperor Meiji stopped the policy of self-isolation and began modernizing the state. All his reforms were so successful that a quarter of a century after they began, the empire was able to seriously think about military expansion to other states. Its first targets were China and Korea. Japan's victory over China allowed it to gain rights to Korea, the island of Taiwan and other lands in 1895.
A conflict was brewing between the two strong empires for dominance in East Asia. The result was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The causes of the conflict are worth considering in more detail.
Main causes of war
It was extremely important for both powers to show their combat achievements, so the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905 unfolded. The reasons for this confrontation lie not only in claims to the territory of China, but also in the internal political situations that had developed by this time in both empires. A successful campaign in war not only provides the winner with economic benefits, but also increases its status on the world stage and silences opponents of the existing government. What did both states count on in this conflict? What were the main causes of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905? The table below reveals the answers to these questions.
It was precisely because both powers sought an armed solution to the conflict that all diplomatic negotiations did not bring results.
Balance of forces on land
The causes of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 were both economic and political. On Eastern front The 23rd artillery brigade was sent from Russia. As for the numerical advantage of the armies, the leadership belonged to Russia. However, in the East the army was limited to 150 thousand people. Moreover, they were scattered over a vast territory.
- Vladivostok - 45,000 people.
- Manchuria - 28,000 people.
- Port Arthur - 22,000 people.
- Security of the CER - 35,000 people.
- Artillery, engineering troops - up to 8000 people.
The biggest problem for the Russian army was its remoteness from the European part. Communication was carried out by telegraph, and delivery was carried out by the CER line. However, a limited amount of cargo could be transported by rail. In addition, the leadership did not have accurate maps of the area, which negatively affected the course of the war.
Japan before the war had an army of 375 thousand people. They studied the area well, had enough accurate maps. The army was modernized by English specialists, and the soldiers were loyal to their emperor to death.
Relationships of forces on water
In addition to land, battles also took place on water. The Japanese fleet was led by Admiral Heihachiro Togo. His task was to block the enemy squadron near Port Arthur. In another sea (Japanese) the squadron of the Country rising sun opposed the Vladivostok group of cruisers.
Understanding the reasons for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the Meiji power thoroughly prepared for battles on the water. The most important ships of its United Fleet were produced in England, France, Germany and were significantly superior to Russian ships.
Main events of the war
When in February 1904 Japanese forces began to be transported to Korea, the Russian command did not attach any importance to this, although they understood the reasons for the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905.
Briefly about the main events.
- 09.02.1904. Historical battle cruiser "Varyag" against the Japanese squadron near Chemulpo.
- 27.02.1904. The Japanese fleet attacked Russian Port Arthur without declaring war. The Japanese used torpedoes for the first time and disabled 90% of the Pacific Fleet.
- April 1904. A clash of armies on land, which showed Russia's unpreparedness for war (inconsistency of uniform, lack of military maps, inability to fencing). Due to the presence of white tunics among Russian officers, Japanese soldiers they were easily identified and killed.
- May 1904. Capture of the port of Dalny by the Japanese.
- August 1904. Successful Russian defense of Port Arthur.
- January 1905. Surrender of Port Arthur by Stessel.
- May 1905. Sea battle near Tsushima, destroyed the Russian squadron (one ship returned to Vladivostok), while not a single Japanese ship was damaged.
- July 1905. Invasion Japanese troops to Sakhalin.
Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905, the reasons for which were of an economic nature, led to the exhaustion of both powers. Japan began to look for ways to resolve the conflict. She resorted to the help of Great Britain and the USA.
Battle of Chemulpo
The famous battle took place on 02/09/1904 off the coast of Korea (the city of Chemulpo). The two Russian ships were commanded by Captain Vsevolod Rudnev. These were the cruiser "Varyag" and the boat "Koreets". The Japanese squadron under the command of Sotokichi Uriu consisted of 2 battleships, 4 cruisers, 8 destroyers. They blocked Russian ships and forced them into battle.
In the morning, in clear weather, the “Varyag” and the “Koreyets” weighed anchor and tried to leave the bay. Music played for them in honor of leaving the port, but after only five minutes the alarm sounded on deck. The battle flag went up.
The Japanese did not expect such actions and hoped to destroy the Russian ships in the port. The enemy squadron hastily raised its anchors, battle flags and began to prepare for battle. The battle began with a shot from the Asama. Then there was a battle using armor-piercing and high-explosive shells on both sides.
In unequal forces, the Varyag was badly damaged, and Rudnev decided to turn back to the anchorage. There, the Japanese could not continue shelling due to the danger of damaging the ships of other states.
Having lowered the anchor, the Varyag crew began to examine the condition of the ship. Rudnev, meanwhile, went for permission to destroy the cruiser and transfer its crew to neutral ships. Not all officers supported Rudnev’s decision, but two hours later the team was evacuated. They decided to sink the Varyag by opening its floodgates. The bodies of the dead sailors were left on the cruiser.
It was decided to blow up the Korean boat, having evacuated the crew first. All things were left on the ship, and secret documents were burned.
The sailors were received by French, English and Italian ships. After carrying out all the necessary procedures, they were delivered to Odessa and Sevastopol, from where they were disbanded into the fleet. According to the agreement, they could not continue to participate in the Russian-Japanese conflict, therefore, Pacific Fleet they were not allowed.
Results of the war
Japan agreed to sign the peace treaty with the complete surrender of Russia, in which the revolution had already begun. According to the Portsmoon Peace Treaty (08/23/1905), Russia was obliged to fulfill the following points:
- Give up claims to Manchuria.
- Give up the Kuril Islands and half of Sakhalin Island in favor of Japan.
- Recognize Japan's right to Korea.
- Transfer to Japan the right to lease Port Arthur.
- Pay Japan an indemnity for the “maintenance of prisoners.”
In addition, defeat in the war meant for Russia Negative consequences V economically. Stagnation began in some industries, as their lending from foreign banks decreased. Life in the country has become significantly more expensive. Industrialists insisted on a speedy conclusion of peace.
Even those countries that initially supported Japan (Great Britain and the USA) realized how difficult the situation in Russia was. The war had to be stopped in order to direct all forces to fight the revolution, which the world states equally feared.
Began mass movements among workers and military personnel. A striking example is the mutiny on the battleship Potemkin.
The causes and results of the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905 are clear. It remains to be seen what the losses were in human equivalent. Russia lost 270 thousand, of which 50 thousand were killed. Japan lost the same number of soldiers, but more than 80 thousand were killed.
Value judgments
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the causes of which were economic and political in nature, showed serious problems inside Russian Empire. He also wrote about this. The war revealed problems in the army, its weapons, command, as well as mistakes in diplomacy.
Japan was not entirely satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations. The state has lost too much in the fight against the European enemy. She expected to get more territory, however, the United States did not support her in this. Discontent began to brew within the country, and Japan continued on the path of militarization.
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the causes of which were considered, brought many military tricks:
- use of spotlights;
- use of wire fences under high voltage current;
- field kitchen;
- radio telegraphy made it possible for the first time to control ships from a distance;
- switching to petroleum fuel, which produces no smoke and makes ships less visible;
- the appearance of minelayer ships, which began to be produced with the proliferation of mine weapons;
- flamethrowers.
One of heroic battles war with Japan is the battle of the cruiser "Varyag" at Chemulpo (1904). Together with the ship "Korean" they resisted the whole squadron enemy. The battle was obviously lost, but the sailors still made an attempt to break through. It turned out to be unsuccessful, and in order not to surrender, the crew led by Rudnev sank their ship. For their courage and heroism they were praised by Nicholas II. The Japanese were so impressed by the character and resilience of Rudnev and his sailors that in 1907 they awarded him the Order of the Rising Sun. The captain of the sunken cruiser accepted the award, but never wore it.
There is a version according to which Stoessel surrendered Port Arthur to the Japanese for a reward. It is no longer possible to verify how true this version is. Be that as it may, because of his action, the campaign was doomed to failure. For this, the general was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in the fortress, but he was pardoned a year after his imprisonment. He was stripped of all titles and awards, leaving him with a pension.
Among many modern Russian historians, nurtured, in turn, by Soviet historians, there is an opinion that the Russo-Japanese War is the most shamefully lost of the wars that the Russians have ever fought, and it was lost because of the bad qualities of the Russian soldier and officer. This is wrong. Let us give several examples depicting the incomparable fighting qualities of Russian soldiers and sailors.
On April 23, 1904, a team of Russian border guards consisting of 50 people, led by Lieutenant Sirotko, armed only with rifles, put up long-term resistance to an enemy twenty times superior to it, and this in an unfortified position!
October 17, 1904 lieutenant of the 25th East Siberian rifle regiment Topsasha, together with a company of Russian sailors, knocked the Japanese out of the trenches with a bayonet attack, hiding the enemy had a colossal superiority in strength. This feat aroused amazement even among the seasoned Japanese general Nogi, who reported it to the Japanese emperor.
Along with Russian sailors and soldiers, Port Arthur and their wives selflessly defended. One of these heroines was the female rifleman of the 13th regiment Kharitina Korotkevich. She and her husband, also a rifleman of the 13th regiment, took active part in several battles and was killed in September 1904.
It is no coincidence that during the assault on Port Arthur, Japanese soldiers sometimes disobeyed entire regiments, refusing to storm the fortress, and this despite the chauvinistic frenzy that engulfed many Japanese soldiers at that time.
Quite a lot heavy losses The Japanese were also inflicted by Russian sailors, who sank many enemy military transports. Some of them were captured by Russian cruisers in a safe condition and with valuable military cargo. But especially many Japanese ships died in 1904 from Russian mines near Port Arthur.
So, on May 2, Russian sailors sank two of the largest Japanese armadillo"Hatsuse" and "Yashima" and blew up the third battleship "Fuji". Moreover, on the same day in the turmoil Japanese cruiser The Noshino collided with the Japanese warship Kassuga and sank.
On May 4, Russian sailors sank the Japanese destroyer Akatsuki, on May 5 - the Japanese gunboat Oshima, etc., etc.
The following facts especially clearly testify to the amazing courage and heroism of Russian sailors.
On January 27, 1904, Japanese Admiral Uriu invited the commanders of the Russian cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Koreets to surrender, but they refused, despite the overwhelming superiority of the enemy forces. Not wanting to endanger the crew of foreign ships anchored in the same port of Chemulpo, the commanders of the Russian ships gave the order to go out to the open sea.
And here, on the open sea, arousing the admiration of the crews of foreign ships in the roadstead, the fearless Russian sailors showed extraordinary strength of resistance in an attempt to break through the close formation of the enemy squadron under fire and escape to Port Arthur. During this battle, the sailors of the battleship "Varyag" tried in every possible way to cover the sailors of the gunboat "Koreets" from enemy fire.
Despite the terrible damage on the ship (several guns on the Varyag were knocked out, both wheelhouses were knocked down, one of the chimneys was demolished, and a fire broke out in several places), the Russian sailors continued to energetically, calmly and fearlessly fight against the entire Japanese squadron. With well-aimed attacks, they disabled the flagship of the Japanese squadron, Assama, and the cruiser, Chiodo. And only severe damage to the steering apparatus forced the commander of the Russian cruiser to stop the battle. Having waited for the gunboat Koreets to approach, the Varyag headed to the harbor in order to repair the damage and rush into battle again.
The Japanese squadron, consisting of one battleship, five armored cruisers and eight destroyers, did not dare to pursue the daredevils. Russian ships entered the harbor without hindrance amid stormy greetings from foreign crews who were delighted with the truly unsurpassed heroism of the Russian sailors. Convinced of the impossibility of repairing the ships, and not wanting them to fall to the enemy, the Russians blew up gunboat"Korean" and sank the cruiser "Varyag".
In March 1904, the Russian destroyer Steregushchy, riddled with enemy shells and blazing in flames, alone fought against an entire Japanese squadron. Due to the explosion of the boiler, the destroyer Steregushchy lost the ability to move, but despite this, several surviving sailors heroically continued to fight a terrible unequal battle, maintaining fire with one remaining gun. Midshipman Kudrevich was sending the last shells from the remaining one bow gun.
But now it’s out of order. There was almost no one left from the team. Signalman Kruzhkov, seriously wounded and weakened from loss of blood, before his death, straining last strength, sank the signal books into the sea so that they would not fall into the hands of the enemy. Anticipating their victory, the Japanese rushed to the Guardian, trying to take possession of it and deliver it as a trophy to Tokyo. But at that moment, when the Japanese began to take the Guardian into tow, they noticed that two Russian sailors were going down the hatch. The Japanese rushed after them, but the hatch was firmly battened down and did not give in to any effort.
The Japanese had to hastily flee from the "Guardian" without having a good meal. Two Russian sailors, sacrificing their lives, sank their warship so as not to surrender it to the enemies. If the Japanese had not managed to cut the towing rope, their destroyer would also have gone down.
On March 30, 1904, the crew of the Russian destroyer “Strashny” courageously and steadfastly fought off six Japanese destroyers and two cruisers.
Here are excerpts from the description of this battle.
“Six enemy destroyers and two twin-tube cruisers are approaching the shore, which began to shower the “Terrible” with volleys.
Having opened fire from his weak artillery, the commander gave the most full speed forward... Everything was on the enemy’s side - numbers, strength, and a big move.
The enemy was catching up, showering us with shells.
The hit shell tore apart the commander, Captain 2nd Rank Yurasavsky, and killed all the servants at the bow artillery. The shells quickly destroyed the destroyer and filled the deck with wounded and dead.
But the machine continued to work. The destroyer has not yet lost its vitality- he was leaving. The hope of salvation still glimmered in everyone’s heart. The servants supported the gunfire.
Lieutenant Maleev, who took command of the destroyer, energetically gives orders, gives instructions, cheerfully encourages. He is everywhere: sometimes at the stern, sometimes at the bow. Life and the thirst for life are in full swing within him, the illusory hope of help and salvation makes him forget, not feel that there is death all around, that the enemy’s fire is intensifying, that the sea is boiling, as if in a cauldron, from falling and exploding shells. Midshipman Akinfiev falls, hit in the side... Howling, crackling, whistling of shells. Moans, screams, pleas and curses of the wounded and dying.
Lieutenant Maleev, seizing an opportune moment, sends a mine from the stern apparatus to the cruiser, overtaking the destroyer. The goal has been achieved.
The cruiser tilted and immediately fell behind. Another cruiser and two destroyers approached him. The situation has changed significantly. Only four destroyers destroy the Scary. Inspired by hope and admonished by his commander, miner Cherepanov rushes to the second apparatus, but as soon as he grabbed the lowering handle, the mine was torn apart by a shell that had hit it. The results are terrible!
Mechanical engineer Dmitriev was torn in half, everyone standing nearby was scattered; the car stopped. The Japanese also stopped and shot at the destroyer at a distance of 35 fathoms... A new shell creates an underwater hole. The last 47 mm cannon was knocked out. The destroyer dies. Lieutenant Maleev, making sure that there was no salvation, that the minutes of the “Terrible” were numbered, raised the head of his comrade-in-arms, mechanic Dmitriev, said goodbye and, kissing him, with the words: “Farewell, dear comrade!”, cheerfully addressed the team:
We'd rather die, but not give up!
Running up to a five-barreled mitrailleuse, which he himself had removed from a Japanese fireship, he opened rapid fire on the enemy.
Maleev gave his life dearly!
Mitrailleuse fire smashed the bridge of one destroyer and tore apart the funnel of another. The enemy, embittered by such tenacity, finished off the heroes with volleys. ...Maleev's cap was knocked off, he was wounded in the temple... he fell.
“Terrible” with piles of corpses and writhing in agony, covered in blood, quickly sank. Suddenly the Japanese stopped firing and began to retreat. From the side of Liaoteshan, Bayan came to the rescue.
The sailors of the Russian fleet and the soldiers of the Russian army who died in this war deserve eternal glory!
Truth and myths about the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905.
Japan and Russia were incomparable neither in human potential - the difference was almost threefold, nor in the capabilities of the armed forces - the Japanese themselves feared that the angry “bear” could, if mobilized, field a three-million-strong army.
The thesis, familiar from Soviet times, that the conflict with the samurai was lost due to the rottenness of tsarism, the “general backwardness of Russia” completely coincides with the conclusions that are contained in many Western publications. Their essence boils down to a simple thing - they say, “corrupt tsarism could not effectively wage war.” Our views and Western historians coincide infrequently, what is the reason for such a unity of opinions?
Almost all researchers agree that the Japanese were helped to win by hard work, self-sacrifice, patriotism, high combat training of soldiers, skill of military leaders, exceptional discipline - the praise can be continued indefinitely. Let's try to figure it all out.
To what extent were the officers and soldiers of the Land of the Rising Sun ready to sacrifice themselves, as they now like to claim? How much did their fighting spirit exceed the patriotism of our soldiers and sailors? After all, the Russians are credited with a tendency to revolt not only in the rear - this is about the battleship Potemkin, but even at the front - let us remember the description of a small riot on the battleship Orel before the Battle of Tsushima. How sharply this contrasts with the description of the life of Japanese sailors, which became public thanks to the pen of French journalists: crew members of a Japanese armored cruiser in free time weaved woolen socks for their army colleagues!
In order to dot all the i's, let's turn to Japanese sources. It's about O feature films created in the Land of the Rising Sun itself. And not for the purpose of instilling pacifist feelings among the emperor’s subjects, but, as they say, as an example for descendants.
Talking about the life of ordinary sailors on the flagship ship of the Japanese squadron "Mikasa", the filmmakers show all its ins and outs - mass fights, theft, disobedience to orders, hazing.
There is also an element unfamiliar to us: foremen lend money to sailors at a high interest rate. The Russian army and navy, thank God, have never known such a “bouquet” of violations. So it’s clear why, despite external discipline, the crew of the Mikasa rebelled immediately after arriving from England in 1902.
Now - about readiness for self-sacrifice. In our country, as indeed in the majority of the world, it is completely ingrained misrepresentation about all Japanese as kamikaze pilots. It is also necessary to take into account the following: the courage of the Japanese was blown away by the wind as soon as they began to suffer failures in battle. As historians recall, in 1904, after several unsuccessful attempts assault on Port Arthur, right on the front line, refused to obey the orders of the 8th infantry regiment, and many Japanese officers were going to desert, flee to Shanghai for fear of death.
Another argument in favor of the exceptionalism of the Japanese is as follows: they acted exceptionally competently in battle, due to which they won. Let us even remember the famous poem of those times: “In Manchuria, Kuroki in practice gives Kuropatkin lessons in tactics.” This quality supposedly allowed the Japanese to gain the upper hand. In fact, this is just a diligently fanned myth. What kind of literacy can we talk about when the Russian fortifications in Port Arthur were stormed head-on through well-targeted terrain several times? And the same Admiral Heihachiro Togo, proclaimed almost a military genius of that war, was never able to explain to his admirers why in August 1904 he did not attack the Russian squadron, which had huddled together after the failure of the flagship “Tsarevich”. Another question: why suddenly initial stage During the Battle of Tsushima, he exposed his flagship ship to the concentrated fire of the most powerful Russian ships, almost dying himself?
The actions of our enemies were not particularly distinguished by the coherence of the various units.
As testified by the Englishman, captain of the first rank William Pakinham, who was seconded to the squadron of Admiral Togo, after the end of the first day of Tsushima, when the Japanese gave the order to attack the remnants of the Second Pacific squadron with their destroyers, one of them, avoiding a collision with a ship of another formation that suddenly emerged from the darkness , made a sharp turn and overturned. Those who say that the root of all the fantastic victories of the Japanese is the exceptional luck of the admiral are probably right.
We were in some ways inferior to the Japanese in the design of artillery systems, but the Japanese were also not good at everything: their Arisaka rifle was noticeably inferior to the Russian rifle of Sergei Mosin in a number of important characteristics. The samurai simply cannot compete with the best Russian cavalry in the world, and, most importantly, our opponents could not compete in physical strength with our warriors.
Okay, but what helped the Japanese win? I think a whole complex of factors - both subjective and objective - made themselves felt. One of the main ones is the extremely careful handling of military secrets by the Japanese; our rivals were able to classify even the death of two of the six battleships they had. What can we say about smaller destroyers - they went to the bottom “in batches”, but the Japanese stubbornly denied everything, and after a while they commissioned a similar ship, that is, the same ship under the same name. The world and Russian public believed, and this is how the myth of the invincibility of enemies was born. Naturally, all this affected the mood among our military. The Japanese obtained all the information about our losses, troop movements and the appointment of new commanders from Russian newspapers.
Our gendarmerie, which was then entrusted with the function of counterintelligence, simply could not cope with the new conditions for it - many of its employees were simply unable to distinguish a Japanese from a Chinese.
Things got to the point that in the summer of 1904, as is clear from front-line reports from the Niva magazine, the strictest order was issued to shoot all Asians who appeared at the combat positions of our troops.
Let’s not discount the underestimation of the enemy: at first, the tsar did not want to transfer a single formation from the European part of Russia, and the second Pacific squadron began to be equipped for the journey only after the death of Admiral Stepan Makarov.
Another reason is the peculiarity of the Russian spirit. After all, we are accustomed to waging war with the expectation of gradually gathering forces for a subsequent crushing blow to the enemy. Example - Patriotic War 1812, when we retreated to Moscow, and the Great Patriotic War. As they say, Russians harness slowly, but drive quickly. So in those years, statements were heard like “The Japanese will inevitably be defeated, if not at Luoyang, then at Mukden, not at Mukden, then at Harbin, not at Harbin, then at Chita.” History has not given us this chance.
But there was also lack of will Russian diplomacy. The department at Pevchesky was unable to use the fact of the attack on Port Arthur without declaring war to isolate Tokyo internationally.
Diplomats were also unable to resolve the issue of allowing powerful battleships through the Turkish-controlled straits. Black Sea Fleet. Instead, the foreign policy department preferred to make up horror stories about a possible war with England, Afghanistan and Turkey if our ships passed through.
Evil tongues then accused Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamzdorf of weakness of character, seeing the reason in his non-traditional sexual orientation...
The main reason was the initially wrong decision to locate the main naval base in Port Arthur. This is more than nine hundred kilometers from the Korea Strait, which was and still is a hub for ship routes between Russia, China, Korea, Japan and other countries South-East Asia. It was not for nothing that the sailors did not like this city, calling it a “hole.” Therefore, the naval command, in order to sweeten the pill, formally considered the entire Pacific Fleet... the Pacific squadron Baltic Fleet. The situation of the main base was aggravated by the fact that it was connected to the metropolis by a thin “thread” of the railway, the final part of which ran through Manchuria, a territory that then had an incomprehensible status - it seemed that it was not Chinese, but not completely Russian. But naval strategists persisted - we need an ice-free harbor on Pacific Ocean, period.
The most realistic position on this issue, oddly enough, was taken by the then Minister of War, General Alexei Kuropatkin. At the very end of 1903, he sent a note to the authorities, in which, in particular, he wrote that Port Arthur, “being away from our natural defensive line running along the coast Sea of Japan, and being at a distance from it from 600 to 1000 miles, it cannot serve as a support for our maritime operations along this coast, leaving it completely open to enemy attack; in particular, the entire southeastern coast of Korea with the Japanese outpost of Fuzan existing here remains open to unpunished capture, and, being located at a distance of 600 to 1200 miles from the northern ports of our main enemy - Japan, our fleet in Port Arthur would be completely deprived of the opportunity to prevent and even threaten the advance of the Japanese fleet towards the Korean or our coast. This base doesn't even cover west coast Korea and the approaches to Seoul, for it is located 350 km before the entrance to the Yellow Sea, that is, in front of the front of the enemy offensive, which will also be firmly based on all the ports of the southern and southwestern coast of Korea. Finally, being 1080 miles from our main base - Vladivostok, Port Arthur remains completely cut off from it, because the line of communication, on the one hand, has no intermediate strong points, on the other hand, along its entire length it is susceptible to attack by the Japanese fleet.”
The war that then broke out completely confirmed his fears.
Moreover, in his note A. Kuropatkin went much further - he proposed leaving not only Port Arthur, but also the whole of Southern Manchuria, citing arguments - we may simply not have enough forces to simultaneously defend Port Arthur and conduct large-scale military operations with the Japanese in Manchuria and Korea. Anticipating possible objections, the general argued that industrial enterprises there are not too many in these parts, and therefore the costs of possible departure will not be too great. In total, he gives more than a dozen arguments in favor of our leaving Southern Manchuria.
Well-versed in all the intricacies of the functioning of the state machine, A. Kuropatkin was well aware that his innovative plan had little chance of being implemented. That's why he sent it out like a fan, in the hope of at least gaining support somewhere. But everyone remained silent.
And so the war begins. Kuropatkin is appointed to the post of commander of the Manchurian army. And then strange things begin to happen - the Russian army suffers humiliating defeats one after another, and, as it seems to an outside observer, completely empty space. For example, near Luoyang, we retreated before the panicked Japanese, who were preparing to retreat, and simply gave up victory. Almost the same thing happened at Mukden at the beginning of 1905: Kuropatkin refused to bring Russian reserves into battle at a critical moment for the Japanese, for which he was publicly insulted by another Russian military leader. Doesn't this speak of Kuropatkin's stubborn, fatal desire to nevertheless implement his plan to abandon Southern Manchuria? After all, that’s what ultimately happened. It turns out that the commander expected that even in the event of defeat he would remain in the highest echelons of power - which is what happened.
Finally, one more frequently asked question: could Russia continue the war after the Battle of Tsushima? The same Vladimir Linevich, appointed to the post of commander of the Russian army after the removal of Kuropatkin, later stated that he could defeat the Japanese. He is echoed in his memories and future leader White movement in the south of Russia Anton Denikin, saying that we could put the squeeze on the Japanese. But these are the opinions of generals who do not have a very good understanding of the role of the fleet.
It should be understood: after the defeat of the Russian squadron, the Japanese controlled the sea. This meant that they could easily and quickly land troops wherever they pleased - for example, they were already testing the waters for an invasion of Kamchatka.
We were unable to do anything in response - we were only able to concentrate troops at the end points of our railways.
Of course, the Russo-Japanese War, despite claims that all the facts about it are known, remains so far not fully studied. To more or less clarify the situation, work is needed in both Russian and Japanese, Chinese and Korean archives. And this is not a task for one generation of researchers.
One thing is clear - assurances of invincibility Japanese army and the genius of its military leaders is simply a myth.
Large-scale fighting The Russo-Japanese War began on January 26, 1904 with the treacherous attack of Japanese destroyers on external roadstead Port Arthur to the Russian squadron.
The Japanese torpedoed and temporarily disabled the best Russian battleships Tsesarevich and Retvizan, as well as the cruiser Pallada. Measures to protect ships in the outer roadstead turned out to be clearly insufficient. It must be admitted that none of the Russian ships received fatal damage, and after an artillery battle on the morning of January 27, the Japanese fleet was forced to retreat. The moral factor played a fatal role - Japanese fleet managed to seize the initiative. In the following days, our squadron began to suffer ridiculous and unjustified losses due to poor interaction and control. So, just two days after the start of the war, the minelayer "Yenisei" and the cruiser "Boyarin" were killed by their own mines.
The war was going on with with varying success and was marked by the heroism of Russian sailors and soldiers, who amazed even the enemy with their fighting spirit. Like, for example, Private Vasily Ryabov, who was detained by the Japanese during a reconnaissance mission. Dressed as a Chinese peasant and wearing a wig with a pigtail, Ryabov ran into a Japanese patrol behind enemy lines. The interrogation did not break Ryabov, he kept the military secret and, being sentenced to death, behaved with dignity. Everything happened strictly according to the ritual. They shot from rifles from fifteen paces. The Japanese were delighted with the Russian's courageous behavior and considered it their duty to bring this to the attention of his superiors.
A note from a Japanese officer sounds like a presentation for an award: “Our army cannot help but express our sincere wishes respected army, so that the latter educates more such truly wonderful warriors worthy of full respect.”
The peace treaty, signed on August 23, 1905, is still a very controversial document, some historians consider it big mistake Russian diplomacy. Not the last negative role Lieutenant General Anatoly Stessel played a role in resolving the negotiation issue. In literature he is often called the commandant of the fortress, although this is not so. Stessel was the head of the Kwantung fortified region; after the abolition of the latter in June 1904, he, contrary to orders, remained in Port Arthur. He did not show himself as a military leader, sending reports with exaggerated data about Russian losses and the number of Japanese troops.
Stoessel is also known for a number of very shady financial affairs in the besieged fortress. On January 2, 1905, contrary to the opinion of the military council, he began negotiations with the Japanese on the surrender of Port Arthur. After the war under pressure public opinion came to trial and was sentenced to 10 years in prison, but six months later he was released by decision of the emperor and hurried to go abroad.