Who served on submarine 469. Underwater position beyond the equator

In the United States of America, on May 26, 1958, at the Electric Boat shipyard (General Dynamics company) in Groton (Connecticut), the world's first specialized anti-submarine nuclear submarine SSN-597 "Tullibi", optimized to combat USSR missile submarines, was laid down. She entered service with the US Navy on November 9, 1960. In 1962-1967, 14 more powerful and advanced Thresher “underwater hunters” were accepted into the American fleet. These single-hull, single-shaft submarines, with a displacement of 3750/4470 tons, developed an underwater speed of about 30 knots, and a maximum diving depth of up to 250 meters. The distinctive features of the “killers” (as American sailors nicknamed anti-submarine nuclear submarines) were heavy-duty hydroacoustic equipment, relatively low noise and relatively moderate torpedo armament (but quite sufficient to solve anti-submarine tasks), consisting of 4 torpedo tubes of 533 caliber mm, placed in the middle part of the vessel at an angle to the centerline plane.

USS Tullibee (SSN-597) is a US Navy submarine, the smallest of the American nuclear submarines (length 83.2 m, displacement 2300 tons). Named after the tallibee, a freshwater salmonid fish native to central and northern North America. Initially, the boat's crew consisted of 7 officers and 60 sailors; by the time it was withdrawn from the fleet, it reached 13 officers and 100 sailors.

If the first generation domestic torpedo submarines (Project 627, 627A and 645) were built to destroy enemy surface ships, then in the 2nd half of the 1950s it became obvious that the USSR also needed nuclear submarines with an “anti-submarine bias” that could destroy missile missiles. submarines of the “potential enemy” in a position of probable use, ensure the deployment of their SSBNs (countering surface and underwater forces that operate on anti-submarine lines) and protect transports and ships from enemy submarines. Of course, the traditional tasks for torpedo submarines were not removed from destroying enemy surface ships (mainly aircraft carriers), carrying out mine laying, operating on communications, and the like.

Work to study the appearance of second-generation nuclear submarines in the USSR began in the late 1950s. In accordance with the Government Decree, on August 28, 1958, the development of a unified steam generating unit began for new nuclear-powered ships. Around the same time, a competition for designs for second-generation submarines was announced, in which leading design teams specializing in underwater shipbuilding - TsKB-18, SKB-112 Sudoproekt and SKB-143 - participated. The largest tech. the Leningrad SKB-143 had the groundwork, which, on the basis of its own earlier initiative studies (1956-1958), carried out under the leadership of Petrov, prepared technical equipment. proposal for missile (project 639) and torpedo (project 671) boats.

The distinctive features of these projects were improved hydrodynamics, which was developed with the involvement of specialists from the Moscow branch of TsAGI, the use of three-phase alternating current, a single-shaft layout and an increased diameter of the durable hull, ensuring the transverse placement of 2 new, compact nuclear reactors, which were unified for second-generation nuclear-powered ships .

Based on the results of the competition, SKB-143 received the task of designing a Project 671 torpedo nuclear submarine (code “Ruff”) with a normal displacement of 2 thousand tons and a working diving depth of up to 300 meters. A distinctive feature of the new nuclear-powered ship was to be high-power hydroacoustics (for the first time, the parameters of the sonar were specifically specified in the terms of the competition).

If the first generation nuclear submarines used a direct current electrical system (this was quite logical for diesel-electric submarines, where batteries were the main source of energy while moving underwater), then on the second generation nuclear submarines they decided to switch to three-phase alternating current. On November 3, 1959, the technical specifications for the new nuclear-powered ship were approved; a preliminary design was completed in March 1960, and a technical design was completed in December.

The Project 671 nuclear submarine was created under the leadership of chief designer Chernyshev (he had previously taken part in the creation of Project 617, 627, 639 and 645 submarines). Based on the fact that the main purpose of the new submarine was the destruction of American SSBNs in the combat patrol areas of these vessels (that is, not under the ice of the Arctic, but in “clean water”), the customer, under pressure from the developer, abandoned the requirement to ensure surface unsinkability when filled any of the submarine's compartments.

On the new submarine, as on the first generation nuclear-powered ships, they decided to use a two-reactor power plant, which fully met the reliability requirements. We created a compact steam-producing installation with high specific indicators, which were almost twice as high as the corresponding parameters of previous power plants.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Gorshkov, “as an exception,” agreed to use one propeller shaft on the Project 671 submarine. This made it possible to reduce noise and displacement. The transition to a single-shaft design ensured higher underwater speeds compared to foreign analogues.

The use of a single-shaft design made it possible to place a turbo-gear unit, both autonomous turbogenerators and all related equipment in one compartment. This ensured a reduction in the relative length of the submarine's hull. The so-called Admiralty coefficient, which characterized the efficiency of using the power of the ship’s power plant, was approximately twice as high as that of the Project 627 nuclear-powered ship and was actually equal to that of the American Skipjack-class nuclear submarine. To create a durable body, it was decided to use AK-29 steel. This made it possible to increase the maximum diving depth.

Unlike the first generation nuclear submarines, it was decided to equip the new ship with autonomous turbogenerators (rather than mounted on the main turbo-gear unit), which increased the reliability of the electrical power system.

The torpedo tubes, according to the initial design studies, were planned to be shifted to the center of the vessel, as on American Thresher-class nuclear submarines, positioning them at an angle to the centerline of the nuclear-powered ship. However, it later became clear that with such an arrangement, the speed of the submarine at the time of torpedo fire should not exceed 11 knots (this was unacceptable for tactical reasons: unlike the American-made Thresher-class nuclear submarines, the Soviet submarine was intended to destroy not only submarines, but also large enemy surface ships). In addition, when using the “American” layout, the work of loading torpedoes was seriously complicated, and replenishing ammunition at sea became completely impossible. As a result, on the Project 671 nuclear submarine, torpedo tubes were installed above the sonar antenna in the bow of the ship.

In 1960, the Leningrad Admiralty Plant began preparing for the construction of a series of new torpedo nuclear submarines. The act of acceptance into the Navy of the Soviet Union of the lead boat of Project 671 - K-38 (the submarine received the serial number “600”) - was signed on November 5, 1967 by the chairman of the government commission, Hero of the Soviet Union Shchedrin. 14 nuclear-powered ships of this type were produced in Leningrad. Three submarines (K-314, -454 and -469) were completed according to the modified design. The main difference between these ships was that they were equipped not only with traditional torpedoes, but also with the Vyuga missile-torpedo system, which was put into service on August 4, 1969. The missile-torpedo ensured the destruction of coastal, surface and underwater targets at ranges from 10 to 40 thousand m with a nuclear charge. For launch, standard 533-mm torpedo tubes were used from a depth of up to 60 meters.

Construction of the K-314 submarine at LAO (order 610). The felling fence is located under the “tent”. 1972

Before launching, the Project 671 submarine is disguised as a surface ship

Under no circumstances should the enemy know that nuclear submarines are being built in Leningrad. And therefore - the most thorough disguise!

Production of the Project 671 nuclear submarine: K-38 was laid down on 04/12/63, launched on 07/28/66 and entered service on 11/05/67; K-369 was laid down on 01/31/64, launched on 12/22/67 and entered service on 11/06/68; K-147 was laid down on 09/16/64, launched on 06/17/68, and entered service on 12/25/68; K-53 was laid down on 12/16/64, launched on 03/15/69, and entered service on 09/30/69; K-306 was laid down on 03/20/68, launched on 06/04/69, and entered service on 12/04/69; K-323 “50 Years of the USSR” was laid down on 07/05/68, launched on 03/14/70, and entered service on 10/29/70; K-370 was laid down on 04/19/69, launched on 06/26/70, and entered service on 12/04/70; K-438 was laid down on 06/13/69, launched on 03/23/71, and entered service on 10/15/71; K-367 was laid down on 04/14/70, launched on 07/02/71, and entered service on 12/05/71; K-314 was laid down on 09/05/70, launched on 03/28/72, and entered service on 11/06/72; K-398 was laid down on 04/22/71, launched on 08/02/72, and entered service on 12/15/72; K-454 was laid down on 08/16/72, launched on 05/05/73, and entered service on 09/30/73; K-462 was laid down on 07/03/72, launched on 09/01/73, and entered service on 12/30/73; K-469 was laid down on 09/05/73, launched on 06/10/74, and entered service on 09/30/74; K-481 was laid down on 09.27.73, launched on 09.08.74, and entered service on 12.27.74.

The double-hull submarine, which had a characteristic “limousine” fencing for retractable devices, had a durable hull made of high-strength AK-29 sheet steel 35 millimeters thick. Internal flat bulkheads had to withstand pressure up to 10 kgf/cm2. The submarine's hull was divided into 7 waterproof compartments:
The first is battery, torpedo and residential;
The second is provision and auxiliary mechanisms, the central post;
The third is reactor;
The fourth is turbine (autonomous turbine units were located in it);
The fifth is electrical, used to house auxiliary mechanisms (the sanitary unit was located in it);
The sixth is a diesel generator, residential;
The seventh is the helmsman (the galley and rowing electric motors are located here).

The lightweight hull structure, horizontal and vertical tails, and the nose of the superstructure were made of low-magnetic steel. The fencing of the retractable wheelhouse devices, the aft and middle parts of the superstructure were made of aluminum alloy, and the rudders and the large radome of the main landing gear antenna were made of titanium alloys. The Project 671 submarine (as well as further modifications of the submarine) was characterized by careful finishing of the contours of the outer hull.

The ballast tanks had a kingston (and not scupper, as on previous Soviet submarines of post-war projects) design.

The ship was equipped with an air purification and air conditioning system, fluorescent lighting, a more convenient (compared to first-generation nuclear submarines) layout of cockpits and cabins, and modern sanitary equipment.

PLA pr.671 in a flooded transport and lifting dock. Leningrad, 1970

Withdrawal of submarine project 671 from TPD-4 (project 1753) in the North

Head submarine pr.671 K-38 at sea

The main power plant of the nuclear submarine of the 671st project (rated power was 31 thousand hp) included two OK-300 steam generating units (the thermal power of the VM-4 water-water reactor was 72 mW and 4 PG-4T steam generators), for each side autonomous . The recharge cycle of the reactor core is eight years.

Compared to the first generation reactors, the layout of the second generation nuclear power plants has changed significantly. The reactor has become more “dense” and compact. We implemented a “pipe in pipe” scheme and “attached” the primary circuit pumps to the steam generators. The number of large diameter pipelines that connected the main elements of the installation (volume compensators, primary circuit filter, etc.) has been reduced. Almost all primary circuit pipelines (large and small diameter) were located in uninhabited premises and covered with biological protection. Instrumentation and automation systems for a nuclear power plant have changed significantly. The number of remotely controlled fittings (gates, valves, dampers, etc.) has increased.

The steam turbine installation included the main turbo-gear unit GTZA-615 and two autonomous OK-2 turbogenerators (the latter provided the generation of alternating current 50 Hz, 380 V, included a turbine and a generator whose power was 2 thousand kW).

The backup means of propulsion were two PG-137 DC electric motors (each with a power of 275 hp). Each electric motor drove a two-bladed propeller with a small diameter. There were two batteries and two diesel generators (400 V, 50 Hz, 200 kW). All main devices and mechanisms had remote and automated control.

When designing the Project 671 nuclear submarine, some attention was paid to reducing the noise of the vessel. In particular, a hydroacoustic rubber coating was used for the lightweight hull, and the number of scuppers was reduced. The submarine's acoustic signature has decreased by about five times compared to first-generation ships.

The submarine was equipped with the Sigma all-latitude navigation complex and the MT-70 television system for monitoring ice and general conditions, which, under favorable conditions, was capable of providing species information at a depth of up to 50 meters.

But the main information device of the vessel was the MGK-300 Rubin hydroacoustic complex, developed by the Morfizpribor Central Research Institute (headed by chief designer N.N. Sviridov). The maximum target detection range is about 50-60 thousand meters. It consisted of a bow low-frequency hydroacoustic emitter, a high-frequency antenna of the MG-509 Radian hydroacoustic mine detection system, located in the front part of the fence of the retractable wheelhouse devices, hydroacoustic signaling, underwater communication station, as well as other elements. “Ruby” provided all-round visibility, range measuring by echolocation, independent automatic determination of target heading angles and its tracking, as well as detection of enemy hydroacoustic active weapons.

Fragments of the K-38 submarine – head project 671

After 1976, during modernization, on most Project 671 submarines the GAK Rubin was replaced by the more advanced Rubicon complex, which has an infrasonic emitter with a maximum detection range of more than 200 thousand m. On some ships, the MG-509 was also replaced by a more modern MG -519.

Retractable devices - a PZNS-10 periscope, an MRP-10 radio identification system antenna with a transponder, an "Albatross" radar complex, a "Zavesa" direction finder, "Iva" and "Anis" or VAN-M radio communication antennas, as well as an RKP. There were sockets for removable antennas, which were installed when solving specific problems.

A navigation system was installed on board the submarine, which provided dead reckoning and course guidance.

The ship is armed with six 533 mm torpedo tubes, capable of firing at a depth of up to 250 meters.

The torpedo complex was located in the upper third of the first compartment. Torpedo tubes were placed horizontally in two rows. In the centerline of the submarine, above the first row of torpedo tubes, there was a torpedo-loading hatch. Everything happened remotely: the torpedoes were placed in the compartment, moved along it, loaded into devices, and lowered onto racks using hydraulic drives.

The torpedo firing control was provided by the Brest-671 fire control system.

The ammunition load consisted of 18 mines and torpedoes (53-65k, SET-65, PMR-1, TEST-71, R-1). Loading options were selected depending on the problem being solved. Mine laying could be carried out at speeds of up to 6 knots.

Technical characteristics of the Project 671 nuclear submarine:
Maximum length – 92.5 m;
Maximum width – 10.6 m;
Normal displacement – 4250 m3;
Total displacement – 6085 m3;
Buoyancy reserve – 32.1%
Maximum diving depth – 400 m;
Working immersion depth – 320 m;
Maximum underwater speed – 33.5 knots;
Surface speed - 11.5 knots;
Autonomy – 60 days;
Crew – 76 people.

The Soviet submarine, in comparison with the most modern analogue of the United States - the nuclear submarine SSN 637 Sturgeon (the lead ship of the series entered service on March 3, 1967) had a greater underwater speed (American - 29, Soviet - 33.5 knots), comparable ammunition load and greater immersion depth. At the same time, the American nuclear submarine was less noisy and had more advanced sonar equipment, providing better search capabilities. Soviet submariners believed that “if the detection range of an American boat is 100 km, then ours is only 10.” Probably, this statement was exaggerated, but the problems of secrecy, as well as increasing the detection range of enemy ships on Project 671 submarines, could not be fully resolved.

K-38, the lead ship of Project 671, was accepted into the Northern Fleet. The first commander of the submarine was captain of the second rank Chernov. During testing, the new nuclear submarine reached a maximum short-term underwater speed of 34.5 knots, thus becoming the fastest submarine in the world (for that time). Until 1974, the Northern Fleet received 11 more nuclear-powered ships of the same type, which were initially based in Zapadnaya Litsa Bay. From 1981 to 1983 they were relocated to Gremikha. In the West, these ships were codenamed Victor (later Victor-1).

Very photogenic, elegant “Victors” had a rather eventful biography. These submarines were found in almost all oceans and seas where the Soviet fleet carried out combat service. At the same time, nuclear submarines demonstrated fairly high combat and search capabilities. For example, in the Mediterranean Sea, “autonomy” lasted not 60 prescribed days, but almost 90. There is a known case when the navigator of a K-367 made the following entry in the log: “they determined the ship’s position by releasing the anchor on the aircraft carrier Nimitz, moored in the port of Naples . At the same time, the nuclear submarine did not enter Italian territorial waters, but was tracking the US Navy ship.”

In 1979, with another deterioration in American-Soviet relations, the nuclear submarines K-481 and K-38 carried out combat service in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, about 50 US Navy vessels were located there. The conditions for swimming were extremely difficult (at the surface the water temperature reached 40°). Campaign participant Shportko (commander K-481) wrote in his memoirs that in the power compartments of ships the air heated up to 70 degrees, and in residential ones - up to 50. Air conditioners had to work at full power, but the equipment (which was designed for use in northern latitudes) could not cope: refrigeration units began to function normally only at a depth of 60 meters, where the water temperature was about 15 degrees.

Each boat had two replaceable crews, who were located on the Berezina floating base, which stood near the island of Socotra or in the Gulf of Aden. The duration of the campaign was about six months and, overall, it was very successful. A.N. Shportko believed that Soviet nuclear submarines in the Persian Gulf operated quite secretly: if the American naval forces were able to briefly detect Soviet ships, they could not correctly classify them and organize pursuit. Subsequently, intelligence data confirmed these conclusions. At the same time, tracking of US Navy ships was carried out at the range of using missile, torpedo and missile weapons: if they received the appropriate order, they would be sent to the bottom with almost 100% probability.

Submarines K-38 and K-323 made an autonomous under-ice voyage to the Arctic in September-October 1971. In January 1974, a unique transition from the Northern to the Pacific Fleet began (lasting 107 days) of two nuclear-powered ships of projects 670 and 671 under the command of captains of the second rank Khaitarov and Gontarev. The route passed through the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans. After the ships passed the Faroe-Icelandic anti-submarine line, they moved in a tactical group (one ship at a depth of 150 meters, the other - 100 meters). This was actually the first experience of such a long duration of nuclear submarines as part of a tactical group.

On March 10-25, the submarines called at the Somali port of Berbera, where the crews of the ships received a short rest. On March 29, while on combat duty, the nuclear submarine had short-term contact with surface anti-submarine ships of the US Navy. We managed to break away from them by going to a considerable depth. After completing combat service in a given area of the Indian Ocean, on April 13, the submarines on the surface headed for the Strait of Malacca, led by the support ship Bashkiria.

The seawater temperature during the transition reached 28 degrees. Air conditioning systems could not cope with maintaining the required microclimate: in the compartments of the boats, the air temperature rose to 70 degrees with a relative humidity of 90%. The detachment of Soviet ships was almost continuously monitored by the Lockheed P-3 Orion base patrol aircraft of the American Navy, which were based on Diego Garcia Atoll.

American “guardianship” in the Strait of Malacca (the ships entered the strait on April 17) became denser: patrol aircraft were joined by a large number of anti-submarine helicopters. On April 20, one of the Rubin GAS units caught fire on board the Project 671 submarine. The cause was high humidity. But the fire was quickly extinguished by the efforts of the crew. On April 25, the ships passed through the strait zone and went into depth, breaking away from observation. On May 6, the nuclear-powered icebreaker Gontareva entered Avachinskaya Bay. The second nuclear-powered submarine joined her the next day.

In January 1976, the strategic missile submarine cruiser K-171, and the nuclear submarine K-469, which performed security functions, made the transition from the Northern to the Pacific fleet. The ships crossed the Atlantic Ocean at a distance of 18 cables. The Drake Passage was passed at various depths. Constant communication was maintained via ZPS. After crossing the equator, the ships separated and arrived in Kamchatka in March, each taking its own route. In 80 days, the submarines covered 21,754 miles, while K-469 only rose to periscope depth once during the entire journey (in the Antarctic region).

PLA K-147 pr.671

PLA K-147 pr.671, modernized in 1984 with the installation of a wake detection system (SOKS). In 1985, using this system, the boat guided an American SSBN for 6 days

SSN K-306 Project 671, which collided underwater with an American SSN. Polyarny, water area SRZ-10, 1975

The submarine K-147, equipped with the latest and unparalleled system for tracking nuclear submarines along the wake, from May 29 to July 1, 1985, under the command of captain of the second rank Nikitin, participated in the exercises of the submarine forces of the Northern Fleet "Aport", during which carried out continuous six-day tracking of the US Navy's Simon Bolivar SSBN, using non-acoustic and acoustic means.

In March 1984, a very dramatic incident occurred with the K-314 submarine under the command of Captain First Rank Evseenko. Carrying out, together with the Vladivostok BOD, monitoring the US Navy strike group consisting of the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and 7 escort ships that were maneuvering in the Sea of Japan, on March 21, the Soviet submarine, when surfacing to clarify the surface situation, tore through the bottom of the aircraft carrier for 40 meters . As a result, the maneuvers of the American Navy were curtailed and the Kitty Hawk, losing fuel oil through a hole, went to the Japanese dock. At the same time, the Soviet nuclear-powered ship, which had lost its propeller, was towed to Chazhma Bay. It was renovated there.

This event caused a negative resonance in the American press. Journalists who specialized in naval topics noted the weakness of the AUG security. This is what allowed the submarines of the “potential enemy” to surface directly under the keel of the aircraft carrier. On March 14, 1989, the first boat of Project 671, K-314, which was part of the TF, was decommissioned. In 93-96, the remaining nuclear submarines of this type left the fleet. However, the dismantling of the ships was delayed. Today, most of the ships are laid up, awaiting their fate for years.

Photos used: http://www.atrinaflot.narod.ru

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1973 September 5
Laid on the slipway of the LAO in Leningrad according to the project 671B(was it being completed?). Was part of the 39th BrSPL LenVMB;

1974 July
Transferred via inland water systems to Severodvinsk to undergo acceptance tests. Became part of the 203rd(?) OBrRPL BelVMB;

1974 November 15
Temporarily included in the KSF. Became part of the 3rd DiPL of the 1st FPL KSF based at Bolshaya Lopatkina Bay (Zapadnaya Litsa);

1975
Took part in the Ocean-75 exercises with the 173rd crew on board (commander - Capt. 1st Rank V.E. Sokolov);

1976 January - March
At the beginning of the year, it carried out jointly with the SSBN K-171 transoceanic inter-naval transition (commander - cap. 1st r. Urezchenko V.S., senior on board - ZK 3rd DiPL capt. 1st r. Sokolov V.E.) through the Drake Strait from Zapadnaya Litsa Bay (Zaozersk) to Krasheninnikov Bay (Vilyuchinsk). Senior Transition Rear Admiral V.K. Korobov The ships sailed across the Atlantic Ocean at a distance of only 18 cables from each other. We passed the Drake Passage at various depths, constantly maintaining contact via the ZPS. After crossing the equator, the boats separated and proceeded to Kamchatka (where they arrived in March), each along its own route. Over the course of 80 days, 21,754 miles were covered, and during the entire transition K-469 Only once (in the Antarctic region) did it surface to periscope depth. 05/25/1976 Rear Admiral V.K. Korobov, senior on the submarine K-469 cap.1r. Sokolov V.E. and commander of the warhead-5 engineer-cap. 2r. Petrov I.D. awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union;

1976 March 3
Transferred to the KTOF. Became part of the 45th DiPL of the 2nd FPL KTOF based at Krasheninnikov Bay (Vilyuchinsk);

1976 July 16
Carried out a search for a foreign submarine in the Philippine Sea. At 02:23 a.m. the submarine felt a strong impact on an underwater obstacle. The submariners believed that there had been a collision with a foreign nuclear submarine. But upon returning to base, a diving inspection determined that the boat had hit a coral reef. Noise analysis led to the conclusion that the direction finding was the nuclear-powered ship's own noise reflected from the coral reef. Later, hydrographic vessels of the USSR Navy discovered in this area an uncharted bank with a depth of 79 meters;

1976 July 31 - 1978 November 30
She underwent a medium repair at the Zvezda plant in the village. Big Stone of Primorsky Krai. During the repair, the crew was subordinated to the 72nd OBrSRPL KTOF;

1976 November 12
Awarded the pennant of the USSR Ministry of Defense "For courage and military valor";

1979
Completed BS tasks. Carried out tracking of the aircraft carrier Ranger;

1983
Has undergone renovation. Core overload;

1983
Transferred to the 26th DiPL of the 4th FPL KTOF based at Pavlovsky Bay (Fokino village). According to other sources - in 1985;

1988
Completed BS tasks with the submarine crew K-454(commander - Shcherbatyuk G.M.?);

1989
Completed BS tasks with the 89th crew (commander - Bondar N.M.);

1993 June 30
Excluded from the fleet's combat strength, transferred to ARVI for dismantling and disposal, and in Pavlovsky Bay (Fokino) laid up as part of the 26th DiPL (from 01.05.2000 - 127th DnPL or 8th OBrRPL, from 01.07 .2002 - 287th ODnRPL) 4th FlPL (from 01.08.1994 - 3rd EskPL, from 01.11.1996 - PrFlRS) Pacific Fleet. During her time in the Navy she committed 14(?) BS;

November 2005
The procedure for financing the dismantling of nuclear submarines using funds from the Government of Japan has been determined;

2006
She was laid up in Pavlovsky Bay. Transferred for disposal to the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "DVZ "Zvezda" (Bolshoi Kamen);

2006 July 26 - August 24
SNF was unloaded at the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "DVZ "Zvezda" (Bolshoy Kamen);

2006 September
Funding for disposal has been received. As part of the Japanese-Russian program for the dismantling of nuclear submarines, in addition to Japan, Australia and South Korea participated in the financing;

2006 September - 2008 November
Disposed of at the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "DVZ "Zvezda" (Bolshoy Kamen). A three-section unit with a rector compartment was delivered to Razboinik Bay.

PLAT - Project 671 "Ruff"

On May 26, 1958 in the United States, at the Electric Boat shipyard (General Dynamics) in Groton (Connecticut), the world's first specialized anti-submarine nuclear submarine SSN-597 "Tullibi", optimized to combat Soviet missile submarines.

On November 9, 1960, she entered service with the US Navy. In 1962-1967 The American fleet was replenished with 14 significantly more advanced and powerful “underwater hunters” of the Thresher type. These single-hull, single-shaft submarines with a displacement of 3,750/4,470 tons developed a full underwater speed of about 30 knots and could dive to a depth of up to 250 m. The distinctive features of the “killers” (as the anti-submarine nuclear submarines were nicknamed by American sailors) were relatively low noise, heavy-duty sonar equipment and relatively moderate ( However, the torpedo armament, consisting of four 533-mm torpedo tubes, located in the middle part of the hull at an angle to the longitudinal axis, is quite sufficient for solving anti-submarine tasks.

If domestic first-generation nuclear-powered torpedo ships (projects 627, 627A and 645) were created to combat enemy surface ships, then in the second half of the 50s. it became obvious that the Soviet Union also needed nuclear submarines with an “anti-submarine bias”, capable of combating missile submarines of the “potential enemy” in positions where they are likely to use weapons, ensuring the deployment of their own SSBNs (countering underwater and surface forces operating on anti-submarine lines), and also protect ships and transports from enemy submarines. Of course, the traditional tasks for torpedo submarines of combating enemy surface ships (primarily aircraft carriers), operating on communications, carrying out mine laying, etc. were not removed.

Work on studying the appearance of second-generation nuclear-powered ships began in the USSR in the late 50s. On August 28, 1958, in accordance with a government decree, the design of a unified steam generating plant began for new nuclear submarines. Around the same time, a competition for designs for 2nd generation boats was announced, in which the country's leading design teams specializing in underwater shipbuilding - SKB-143, TsKB-18 and SKB-112 "Sudoproject" - took part. The Leningrad SKB-143 had the greatest technical potential, which, based on its earlier (1956-1958) initiative work carried out under the leadership of A. B. Petrov, prepared technical proposals for torpedo (project 671) and missile (project 639) boats .

The distinctive features of these projects were improved hydrodynamics, developed with the involvement of specialists from the Moscow branch of TsAGI, a single-shaft layout, the use of three-phase alternating current, as well as an increased diameter of the pressure vessel, which ensured the transverse placement of two new, more compact nuclear reactors unified for second-generation nuclear submarines.

As a result of the competition, SKB-143 received the task of designing a nuclear torpedo submarine of the 671st project (code "Ruff") with a normal displacement of 2000 tons and an operating depth of at least 300 m. A distinctive feature of the new ship was to be powerful hydroacoustics (in conditions competition, for the first time the size of the GAS was specifically stipulated).

If the first generation nuclear submarines used a direct current electrical system (which was logical for diesel-electric submarines, where batteries were the main source of energy when moving underwater), then on the second generation nuclear submarines it was decided to switch to three-phase alternating current.

The tactical and technical specifications for the new nuclear-powered submarine were approved on November 3, 1959; preliminary designs were completed in March 1960, and technical designs were completed in December of the same year. The creation of the Project 671 nuclear submarine was carried out under the leadership of chief designer G.N. Chernyshev (he had previously participated in the design of boats of Projects 617, 627, 639 and 645). Based on the fact that the new submarine was intended primarily to destroy American SSBNs in their combat patrol areas (i.e., in “clear water” and not under the ice of the Arctic), the customer, under increased pressure from the developer, considered it possible to refuse requirements to ensure surface unsinkability when filling any of the boat’s compartments with water.

As on the 1st generation nuclear-powered ships, it was decided to use a two-reactor power plant on the new boat, which fully satisfies the reliability requirements. A compact steam generating plant was created with high specific performance, almost twice as high as the corresponding parameters of previous power plants.

“As an exception,” the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S.G. Gorshkov agreed to use one propeller shaft in Project 671, which made it possible to reduce displacement and noise. By switching to a single-shaft design, an improvement in the ship's propulsion qualities by approximately 30% was achieved, and also (using more powerful domestic energy) ensured that underwater speeds were significantly higher than those of foreign analogues.

The implementation of a single-shaft design made it possible to place the main turbo-gear unit and both autonomous turbogenerators with all associated equipment in one compartment. This ensured a reduction in the relative length of the boat's hull. As a result, with a larger displacement, the wetted surfaces of the nuclear-powered submarines of projects 627 and 671 turned out to be approximately equal. The Admiralty coefficient, which characterizes the efficiency of using the power of a ship's power plant, exceeded the similar indicator of the Project 627 nuclear submarine by approximately two times and was actually equal to the coefficient of the American Skipjack-class nuclear submarines.

In the design of the durable hull, it was decided to use new AK-29 steel, which made it possible to increase the immersion depth.

Unlike the first generation nuclear submarines, it was decided to equip the new ship with autonomous (rather than mounted on GTZ) turbogenerators, which increased the reliability of the electrical power system.

When creating the Project 671 boat, great importance was attached to the development of underwater detection and target designation means, and the development of navigation equipment and weapons.

According to the initial design studies, it was planned to move the torpedo tubes to the center of the ship, as on the American Thresher-class nuclear submarines, placing them at an angle near the centerline of the nuclear submarine. However, it later became clear that with such an arrangement, the speed of the submarine at the time of torpedo firing should not have exceeded 11 knots (which turned out to be unacceptable for tactical reasons: unlike the American Thresher-class nuclear submarines, the Soviet submarine was intended to combat not only submarines , but also large enemy surface ships). In addition, with the “American” layout, torpedo loading operations were seriously complicated, and it became completely impossible to replenish ammunition at sea. As a result, it was decided to install the torpedo tubes on the Project 671 nuclear submarine in the bow of the ship, above the sonar antenna.

In 1960, the Leningrad Admiralty Plant began preparing the construction of a series of new nuclear-powered torpedo ships. The act of acceptance into the USSR Navy of the lead boat of the 671st project - K-30 (serial number "600") - was signed by the chairman of the government commission, Hero of the Soviet Union G. I. Shchedrin on November 5, 1967. Subsequently, 14 more were built in Leningrad Nuclear submarines of this type.

Three ships (K-314, K-454 and K-469), intended for the Pacific Fleet, were completed according to the modified project 671B. The difference was that, in addition to traditional torpedoes, they were equipped with the Vyuga missile-torpedo system, which was put into service on August 4, 1969. The missile-torpedo ensured the destruction of underwater, surface and coastal targets with a nuclear charge at ranges of 10 - 40 km. It was launched from standard 533-mm torpedo tubes from a depth of 50 - 60 m.

Number Bookmark Descent Introduction K-38 04/12/63 07/28/66 11/05/67 K-369 01/31/64 12/22/67 11/06/68 K-147 09/16/64 06/17/68 12/25/68 K-53 12/16/64 03/15/69 09/30. 69 K- 306 03/20/68 06/04/69 12/04/69 K-323 "50 years of the USSR" 07/05/68 03/14/70 10/29/70 K-370 04/19/69 06/26/70 12/04/70 K-438 06/13/69 03/23/71 10/15/71 K-367 04/14/70 07/02/71 12/05/71 K -314 05.09. 0 5.09.73 10.06 .74 09/30/74 K-481 09/27/73 09/08/74 12/27/74

The double-hull submarine with a characteristic “limousine” fencing of retractable devices had a durable hull made of high-strength AK-29 steel, the thickness of the sheets of which reached 35 mm. Internal flat bulkheads were designed for a pressure of 10 kgf/cm.

- 1st torpedo, battery and residential;
- 2nd central post, provision and auxiliary mechanisms;
- 3rd reactor;
- 4th turbine (it also houses autonomous turbine units);
- 5th electrical and auxiliary mechanisms (it also contained a sanitary unit);
- 6th residential and diesel generator;
- 7th helmsman (the rowing electric motors and galley are also located here).

The structure of the light hull, the bow of the superstructure, and the vertical and horizontal tail were made of low-magnetic steel. The fencing of the retractable wheelhouse devices, as well as the middle and aft parts of the superstructure, were made of aluminum alloy, and the large radome of the hydroacoustic complex antenna and rudders were made of titanium alloys. The Project 671 boat (as well as its further modifications) was characterized by careful finishing of the contours of the outer hull. The ballast tanks had a kingston (and not scupper, as on all previous Soviet submarines of post-war projects) design.

The ship received an air conditioning and air purification system, fluorescent lighting, as well as a more convenient (compared to 1st generation nuclear-powered ships) layout of cabins and cockpits, and modern sanitary equipment.

The main power plant of the APL-671 project (which had a rated power of 31,000 hp) included two OK-300 steam generating units (a VM-4 water-cooled reactor with a thermal power of 72 mW and four PG-4T steam generators), autonomous for each sides. The reactor core was to be recharged on a cycle of eight years.

Compared to the first generation reactors, the layout of the second generation nuclear power plants was significantly changed. Although it remained a loop, the spatial distribution and volumes of the primary circuit were significantly reduced (i.e., the reactor became more compact and “dense”). The “pipe in pipe” scheme was implemented, and the primary circuit pumps were “hung” onto the steam generators.

The number of large diameter pipelines connecting the main elements of the installation (1st circuit filter, volume compensators, etc.) has been reduced. Almost all primary circuit pipelines (small and large diameter) were placed in uninhabited premises and covered with biological protection. The systems of instrumentation and automation of nuclear power plants have changed significantly. The share of remotely controlled valves (valves, gate valves, dampers, etc.) has increased.

The steam turbine installation consisted of a main turbo-gear unit GTZA-615 and two autonomous OK-2 turbogenerators (the latter provided the generation of alternating current 380 V, 50 Hz and included a turbine and generator with a power of 2000 kW).

As a backup means of propulsion, two PG-137 DC electric motors (2 x 275 hp) were used, each of which drove its own two-bladed small-diameter propeller. There were two batteries (112 cells each with a capacity of 8000 A/h), as well as two diesel generators (200 kW, 400 V, 50 Hz). All main mechanisms and devices had automated and remote control.

When creating the Project 671 nuclear submarine, some (albeit insufficient) attention was paid to noise reduction issues. In particular, a hydroacoustic rubber coating of the light hull was used, and the number of scuppers was reduced. As a result, the acoustic visibility of the boat compared to the 1st generation nuclear-powered ships decreased approximately five times.

The submarine was equipped with the Sigma all-latitude navigation system. There was a television system for monitoring general and ice conditions MT-70, capable, under favorable conditions, of providing species information at a depth of up to 50 m.

However, the main information means of the ship was the MGK-300 Rubin hydroacoustic complex, developed by the Morfizpribor Central Research Institute under the leadership of chief designer N. N. Sviridov and having a maximum target detection range of about 50 -60 km. It included a low-frequency nasal hydroacoustic emitter, a high-frequency mine-detecting sonar antenna MG-509 "Radian" in front of the fencing of the retractable wheelhouse devices, an underwater sound communication station, hydroacoustic alarm and a number of other elements. "Rubin" provided all-round visibility, independent automatic tracking and determination of target heading angles, ranging by echolocation, as well as detection of active enemy sonar systems.

After 1976, during modernization, on most boats of the 671st project of the Rubin State Joint Stock Company, a more advanced Rubicon complex with an infrasonic emitter was noticed, having a maximum detection range of more than 200 km. On a number of ships, the MG-509 was also replaced by the more modern MG-519.

Retractable devices included a PZNS-10 periscope, an MRP-10 radio identification system antenna with a transponder, an Albatross radar complex, VAN-M or Anis and Iva radio communication antennas, a Zavesa direction finder, as well as an RDP device. There were sockets for a number of removable antennas installed to solve specific problems. A navigation system was installed on board the submarine, providing course guidance and dead reckoning.

The ship's armament consisted of six 533-mm torpedo tubes, capable of firing at depths of up to 250 m.

The torpedo complex occupied the upper third of the first compartment. The torpedo tubes were located in two horizontal rows. In the center plane of the ship, above the first row of tubes, there was a horizontal torpedo-loading hatch. At the bow end in front of the hatch there was a horizontal tray covered with shields, into which a torpedo was lowered by crane and loaded into the submarine. This design made it possible to radically shorten and simplify the process of loading ammunition, without requiring special physical effort or complex and dangerous operations from the team. Everything was done remotely: torpedoes were pulled into the compartment, moved around it, loaded into devices and lowered onto racks using hydraulic drives.

The torpedo firing control was provided by the Brest-671 control system.

The ammunition load included 18 torpedoes or up to 36 mines (12 of them in TA). Mine laying could be carried out at speeds of up to 6 knots.

Characteristics of the Project 671 nuclear submarine Maximum length 92.5 m Maximum width 10.6 m Average draft 7.1 m Displacement: normal 4250 m 3 total 6085 m 3 Buoyancy reserve 32.1% Maximum diving depth 400 m Operating diving depth 320 m Full underwater speed 33, 5 knots Surface speed 11.5 knots Endurance 60 days. Crew 76 people.

Compared to the most modern American analogue - the nuclear submarine SSN 637 Sturgeon (the lead ship of the series entered service on March 3, 1967), the Soviet submarine had a higher underwater speed (29 and 33.5 knots, respectively), and a slightly greater diving depth and commensurate ammunition.

At the same time, the American nuclear submarine had less noise and more advanced hydroacoustic equipment, which provided it with better search capabilities. There was an opinion among Soviet submariners that “if an American boat has a detection range of 100 km, then ours has only 10 km.” This was probably an exaggeration, but the problems of stealth and increasing the detection range of the enemy on Project 670 boats were never fully resolved.

The lead ship of the 671st project - K-38 - became part of the Northern Fleet. Its first commander was Captain 1st Rank E.D. Chernov. During testing, the new nuclear-powered submarine developed a short-term maximum underwater speed of more than 34.5 knots, becoming (at the moment) the fastest submarine in the world. Until 1974, the Northern Fleet was replenished with 11 more nuclear submarines of the same type, which were permanently based in Gremikha. In the West, these ships received the code name Victor (hereinafter referred to as Victor 1).

Elegant, highly photogenic "Victors" had a bright, eventful biography. They could be found in virtually all seas and oceans where the Soviet fleet carried out combat service. At the same time, the nuclear submarines demonstrated fairly high search and combat capabilities. In particular, the “autonomy” in the Mediterranean Sea continued for almost 90 days instead of the required 60. There is a known case when the navigator of the K-367 wrote in the log: “They determined the ship’s location by releasing the anchor on the aircraft carrier Nimitz (which moored in the port of Naples). At the same time, the nuclear submarine did not enter the territorial waters of Italy, but was tracking the American ship.

In 1979, during another aggravation of Soviet-American relations, the nuclear submarines K-38 and K-481 carried out combat service in the Persian Gulf, where at that time there were up to 50 US Navy ships. The voyage took place in extremely difficult conditions (the water temperature at the surface reached 40 degrees). According to the recollections of campaign participant A. N. Shportko (commander of K-481), in the power compartments of the boats the air heated up to 60 - 70 degrees, and in living quarters - up to 40 - 50 degrees. The air conditioners worked at full capacity, but the equipment (designed for use primarily in northern latitudes) could not cope: the refrigeration machines began to work normally only at a depth of 60 m, where the temperature of the sea water dropped to 10 -15 degrees.

The boats had two replaceable crews, located on the Berezina floating base, located in the Gulf of Aden or off the island of Socotra. The campaign lasted six months and was overall very successful. According to A. N. Shportko, Soviet nuclear submarines operated in the Persian Gulf very secretly: even if the US Navy detected them for a short time, they could not correctly classify them, much less organize prosecution. Subsequently, these conclusions were confirmed by intelligence data. At the same time, tracking of American ships was carried out at the range of use of missile and missile-torpedo weapons: if the corresponding order had been received, they would have been sent to the bottom with a probability close to 100%.

In September - October 1971, K-38 and K-323 made an autonomous under-ice expedition to the Arctic. In January 1974, a unique 107-day transition of two nuclear-powered ships of the 670th and 671st projects began under the command of captains 2nd rank V.D. Khaitarov and V.P. Gontarev from the Northern to the Pacific Fleet. The route passed along the Atlantic (to the Cape of Good Hope), the Indian and Pacific oceans.

After passing the Faroe-Icelandic anti-submarine line, the boats moved in a tactical group (one ship was at a depth of 100 m, and the other - 150 m). Periodically, they exchanged call signs via UZPS, being at a distance of stable sound-underwater communication from each other. In fact, this was the first experience of a nuclear submarine following such a long period as part of a tactical group.

On March 10 - 25, the boat called at the port of Berbera (Somalia), where their crews received a short rest. On March 29, while on combat duty, they had a short-term contract with American surface anti-submarine ships and broke away from them, going to greater depths. On April 13, after completing combat service in specified areas of the Indian Ocean, the boats on the surface, led by the support vessel Bashkiria, headed for the Strait of Malacca.

During the transition, the temperature of the sea water reached 28 degrees. The air conditioning systems were unable to maintain the required microclimate: the relative humidity in the boat compartments was 90%, and the air temperature rose to 70 degrees. The detachment of Soviet ships was monitored almost continuously by American base patrols by Lockheed P-3 Orion aircraft based on Diego Garcia Atoll. In the Strait of Malacca, where the ships entered on April 17, American “guardianship” became even tighter: the Orions were joined by numerous anti-submarine helicopters. On April 20, one of the Rubin GAS units caught fire on board the Project 671 nuclear submarine due to high humidity. However, through the efforts of the crew, the fire was quickly extinguished. On April 25, the ships passed through the strait zone and, breaking away from observation, went into the depths. May 6 nuclear submarine V.P. Gontareva entered Avacha Bay. On May 7, a second nuclear-powered icebreaker joined her. In January 1976, the strategic missile submarine cruiser K-171, as well as the nuclear submarine K-469, which performed security functions, made another transition from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific Fleet. The ships sailed across the Atlantic Ocean at a distance of only 18 cables from each other. We passed the Drake Passage at different depths, constantly maintaining communication via the UPS. After crossing the equator, the boats separated and proceeded to Kamchatka (where they arrived in March), each along its own route. Over the course of 80 days, 21,754 miles were covered, and during the entire journey, K-469 surfaced to periscope depth only once (in the Antarctic region).

K-147, equipped with the latest, unparalleled system for tracking enemy nuclear submarines along the wake, May 29 - July 1, 1985, under the command of Captain 2nd Rank V.V. Nikitin, took part in the exercises of the submarine forces of the Northern Fleet "Aport", during which she performed six-day continuous tracking of the American SSBN Simon Bolivar (Lafayette class), using acoustic and non-acoustic means.

A very dramatic incident occurred with K-314 (commander - Captain 1st Rank A. M. Evseenko) in March 1984. Carrying out joint monitoring with the Vladivostok BOD, an American strike group consisting of the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and seven escort ships, which was maneuvering in the Sea of Japan, on March 21, a Soviet boat, while surfacing to clarify the surface situation, pierced the bottom of an American aircraft carrier with its stern for almost 40 m. As a result, the US Navy maneuvers were curtailed and the Kitty Hawk, losing fuel oil through the hole, “crawled” into Japanese dock, and the Soviet nuclear-powered ship, which had lost its propeller, proceeded in tow to Chazhma Bay, where it also began repairs.

This event caused a sharply negative resonance in the American press. Journalists specializing in naval topics noted the weakness of the AUG security, which allowed the boats of the “potential enemy” to surface directly under the keel of the aircraft carriers.

Time takes its toll. On March 14, 1989, the first boat of the 671st project, K-314, which was part of the Pacific Fleet, was decommissioned. In 1993-1996. The rest of the nuclear submarines of this type also left the fleet. However, the disposal of the honored ships was delayed. Currently, most of them are in the dumps, waiting for years for their fate.

If the first generation domestic torpedo submarines (Project 627, 627A and 645) were built to destroy enemy surface ships, then in the 2nd half of the 1950s it became obvious that the USSR also needed nuclear submarines with an “anti-submarine bias” that could destroy missile missiles. submarines of the “potential enemy” in the position of probable use of weapons, ensure the deployment of their SSBNs (countering surface and underwater forces that operate on anti-submarine lines) and protect transports and ships from enemy submarines. Of course, the traditional tasks for torpedo submarines were not removed from destroying enemy surface ships (mainly aircraft carriers), carrying out mine laying, operating on communications, and the like.

Construction of the K-314 submarine at LAO (order 610). The felling fence is located under the “tent”. 1972

Before launching, the Project 671 submarine is disguised as a surface ship

Under no circumstances should the enemy know that nuclear submarines are being built in Leningrad. And therefore - the most thorough disguise!

The ballast tanks had a kingston (and not scupper, as on previous Soviet submarines of post-war projects) design.

PLA pr.671 in a flooded transport and lifting dock. Leningrad, 1970

Withdrawal of submarine project 671 from TPD-4 (project 1753) in the North

Head submarine pr.671 K-38 at sea

A navigation system was installed on board the submarine, which provided dead reckoning and course guidance.

The ship is armed with six 533 mm torpedo tubes, capable of firing at a depth of up to 250 meters.

The torpedo firing control was provided by the Brest-671 fire control system.

Technical characteristics of the Project 671 nuclear submarine:
Maximum length – 92.5 m;
Maximum width – 10.6 m;
Normal displacement – 4250 m3;
Total displacement – 6085 m3;
Buoyancy reserve – 32.1%
Maximum diving depth – 400 m;
Working immersion depth – 320 m;
Maximum underwater speed – 33.5 knots;
Surface speed - 11.5 knots;
Autonomy – 60 days;
Crew – 76 people.

PLA K-147 pr.671

PLA K-147 pr.671, modernized in 1984 with the installation of a wake detection system (SOKS). In 1985, using this system, the boat guided an American SSBN for 6 days

SSN K-306 Project 671, which collided underwater with an American SSN. Polyarny, water area SRZ-10, 1975

I won’t say for a long time what time it was. I would call it the peak of the arms race. But it was then that we reached parity with the Americans. But previously they were lagging behind! Especially regarding naval strategic nuclear forces. Only by the 70s we managed to create Project 667-A nuclear submarines, which had a completely new D-5 missile system for us, and these were 16 R-27 ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a range of 2500 km. It is no coincidence that such nuclear-powered ships were first called strategic missile submarines. This seemed to emphasize their importance. For comparison: already at the end of 1960 (remember!) the American nuclear submarine George Washington with 16 Polaris A-1 SLBMs with a range of 2200 km went out on its first combat patrol in the Norwegian Sea. It took almost ten years to close the gap in naval strategic weapons. But due to the insufficient range of missiles to carry out combat patrols, Project 667-A SSBNs were forced to overcome NATO anti-submarine lines when moving to the American coast. This means we needed a naval intercontinental missile.

And soon we made a kind of breakthrough - the Project 667-B submarine (the head hull joined the Northern Fleet in 1972). D-9 complex with R-29 missiles (8-9 thousand kilometers range). What did this mean strategically? The boats could hit targets with their weapons either from their own shore or from anywhere in the World Ocean, even, as they say, without coming into contact with the anti-submarine forces of the opposing side. The first such ship, when I was a division commander, flew to Severodvinsk. By the way, the commander of the lead SSBN of project 667-B V.P. Frolov (for the first time in the USSR - a ship commander) was awarded the rank of rear admiral. You understand how important these SSBNs were then attached to the defense system. We studied the capabilities of these ships a lot. For example, we carried out experimental firing of ICBMs from the pier, and a number of other research works.

As for the features of the 1976 campaign, we must keep in mind the following. Project 667-B boats have already served in combat. And, as is known, there were many transitions of nuclear-powered ships from the Northern to the Pacific Fleet. This is the first transition of the Project 667-B SSBN. And not along the northern route. As I believe, Commander-in-Chief Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov and the Main Headquarters of the Navy wanted to know the combat capabilities of these missile carriers and the D-9 complex when sailing in the Southern Hemisphere. And since we were going to go through the Atlantic Ocean, the Drake Passage, and then the Pacific Ocean, then a better option for such a test could hardly have been found. And further. On such a long voyage, far from the traditional areas of responsibility of the Soviet Navy, of course, the SSBNs need protection. In this case, a torpedo nuclear submarine of Project 671 (commander - Captain 2nd Rank V.S. Urezchenko).

Vadim Konstantinovich KOROBOV
Photo archive "VPK"

Vadim Konstantinovich KOROBOV began his service as a cabin boy of the Northern Fleet in 1943. After graduating from the VVMU named after M.V. Frunze served on the submarines of the Northern Fleet. He commanded the diesel submarines S-146 and B-67, and participated in testing the first ballistic and cruise missiles. After graduating from the Naval Academy, he was appointed commander of the nuclear submarine K-33. He commanded a division of submarine missile carriers and a flotilla of submarines. He made a number of trips to the North Pole region. He was chief of staff of the Northern Fleet, then transferred to Moscow to the post of admiral inspector. He retired to the reserves with the rank of admiral. Died in 1998

As far as I know, theoretical research on tactical groups of submarines in both the USSR and the USA was carried out back in the 50s. But it was on the example of K-171 and K-469 that real methods of such joint navigation of nuclear-powered ships were tested for the first time. So that for a month, one and a half or more (but at a distance within the direct audibility of the boats by acoustics!), the torpedo nuclear submarine provides continuous security, and, on occasion, defense of the missile carrier from enemy anti-submarine forces. Why was the Project 671 boat chosen as a torpedo “bodyguard”? This is a second-generation nuclear-powered ship, relatively new at that time. With good weapons and detection means. Immersion depth - up to 500 meters. The senior on board of Urezchenko was Captain 1st Rank Valentin Evgenievich Sokolov, by virtue of his position as deputy division commander from the neighboring 1st nuclear submarine flotilla. Then I knew that he was a good anti-submarine submariner, I knew that he had to solve problems of close protection of SSBNs, but, however, this happened during combat training. That is two to three hours. What about on a long hike? This is what our group had to find out. The first deputy head of the political department of the Northern Fleet, Rear Admiral Yuri Ivanovich Padorin, was appointed our detachment's political officer. To be honest, I can’t answer for sure why I was appointed squad leader. At first, another admiral was planned. Two weeks before combat service, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov sent an encrypted message: Korobov should be appointed commander of the detachment. Maybe because it was I who prepared Lomov’s boat for the transoceanic crossing. Or maybe the reasons are that before his appointment as chief of staff of the flotilla, he commanded a missile carrier division of Project 667-B.

The hike began on January 4, 1976. After 80 days, they surfaced off the coast of Kamchatka. Characteristically, there were no breakdowns. Project 667-B (I can answer unequivocally here) is quite perfect. Including those with good habitability. There are all conditions for the crew to maintain the required shape; we worked out a lot in the gym. And now about the state of technology, which is probably of interest to everyone. The material part worked properly. I only remember one case when I had to worry. In the 9th, turbine compartment (and they were already approaching the Drake Passage), a “fistula” formed on a non-disconnectable section of the seawater pipeline. At first, the outboard water broke through as a barely noticeable trickle, and then a “trickle” formed as big as two fingers. At a depth of 150 meters, an alarm bell, you know!

The commander of the ship, Lomov, and the commander of the warhead-5, Taptunov, proposed several options for sealing the “fistula”. I approved the option without surfacing or under the periscope. Depth 40 meters, speed, however, was reduced to 6-8 knots. Yuri Ivanovich Taptunov and I went to the turbine compartment: I couldn’t sit in the central post. Of course, not only Taptunov and I were in the compartment, but all the holdmen too: This is their department. But I realized without any reports that, most likely, the “fistula” was formed due to internal corrosion of the metal. And then, as expected, they “inflated” the compartment, equalizing the pressure in the compartment with the outboard pressure. Closed up!

By the way, the actions of our “bodyguard” at that moment were normal for a tactical group. Before the “operation”, I contacted Sokolov, the senior officer on board the torpedo submarine, via sound-underwater communication. This boat was below us, walking in a circle at a depth of 100 meters and using acoustics to check whether there was a danger to the SSBN. In a word, this episode confirmed that combat patrolling of SSBNs in remote areas of the World Ocean to protect nuclear-powered torpedo-carrying ships is real. But it is so hard. Requires detailed preliminary study. For example, the acoustic structures of the oceans are more complex than we previously imagined. It happened that Urezchenko’s boat disappeared from earshot when, in principle, this should not have happened. Then she appeared. But who showed up? K-469 or anti-submarine nuclear submarine of another state? Naturally, identification takes place. And all this together affects the secrecy of navigation.

Developments in combat control of missile weapons have also appeared. After all, before that we only fired or conducted combat exercises at the D-9 complex in the Northern Hemisphere. Moscow was very interested in our campaign. On April 4 we arrived in Kamchatka. And two or three days later a call from the Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy, Fleet Admiral N.D. Sergeev: “The Commander-in-Chief is waiting for you, I’m sending a plane.” Padorin and I flew. We were in Moscow on Sunday, and on Monday Gorshkov received us. My report lasted an hour and a half. As I was convinced then, this idea belonged to the commander-in-chief - to use nuclear-powered torpedo ships to protect not only the patrol areas of our strategic missile carriers, but also the close protection of individual SSBNs going on combat patrols. In addition, judging by the questions asked to me, Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov tried to test, using the experience of our detachment, the capabilities of transoceanic maneuver by strategic missile carriers in the event of a threat of a global military conflict. And, probably, the commander-in-chief was trying to identify some promising areas for submarine cruisers to perform combat duty in the southern latitudes. Although this task, of course, already existed for subsequent generations. It seemed to me that the commander in chief was very interested in the work of acoustics. At the end of the conversation, Sergei Georgievich said: “I agree with you. It is necessary to dramatically improve the acoustic equipment of boats. Otherwise, you will not achieve effective close protection of SSBNs from torpedo nuclear submarines.”

The day before, Padorin, who worked in the Central Committee of the Party before his appointment to the Northern Fleet, told me that, most likely, the Secretary of the Central Committee Ustinov would also call us. Therefore, I asked the commander-in-chief how to report to Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov, who was, after all, a candidate member of the Politburo. “As they reported to me, so to the secretary of the Central Committee,” advised Sergei Georgievich. And that day Padorin and I went to the Central Committee, where industry representatives gathered. Ustinov, after making comments on the operation of equipment and weapons, immediately gave instructions to someone present:

Literally two weeks later, Defense Minister Marshal A.A. dies. Grechko, Ustinov becomes minister. If, already as the Minister of Defense, my report somehow helped him to get to know the fleet more deeply, then in this sense the campaign of K-171 and K-469 can be considered useful for the Navy.