Ships of the Russian fleet - participants in the Russo-Japanese War. There is probably no more disappointing defeat in Russian history.
1st rank cruiser "Askold"
Laid down in 1898 in Kiel (Germany). Shipyard - "Germany" (Deutschland). Launched in 1900. Entered service in 1902. In 1903 he went to the Far East. One of the most actively operating ships. In July 1904, he took part in an unsuccessful breakthrough to Vladivostok. Together with the cruiser Novik (later sunk in Korsakov Bay on Sakhalin), he managed to escape the encirclement. Unlike Novik, Askold went to the nearest port - Shanghai, where he was interned until the end of the war. After the end of the Russo-Japanese War, he became part of the Siberian Flotilla and was stationed in Vladivostok. During WWII he participated in various military operations together with Allied ships against the squadron of Admiral Spee. After that, he went to the Mediterranean Sea, participated in the Dardanelles operation (a joint operation of allied land and naval forces against the Ottoman Empire, the goal of which was a breakthrough to Constantinople, ended in the failure of the coalition forces despite the numerical advantage over the Ottomans). After which he went to Toulon, where he was undergoing repairs (spring 1916 - summer 1917). From Toulon the cruiser went to Murmansk, where it became part of the Arctic Ocean fleet. In 1918, in the Kola Bay, it was captured by the British and became part of the British fleet under the name "Glory IV". In 1922 it was bought by Soviet Russia. Due to the unsatisfactory condition of the hull and mechanisms, it was decided to sell the cruiser for scrap. Also in 1922, "Askold" was dismantled for metal in Hamburg.
During the Dardanelles operation, Askold fought alongside the British cruiser HMS Talbot - the same one that the Varyag team switched to.
before launching
hull "Askold" (left) in the water
at the outfitting wall - installation of the bow pipe, 1901
the cruiser has almost taken on its final form, winter 1901
drydocking in the Blom & Foss floating dock, Hamburg, 1901
sea trials, 1901
additional installation of the navigation bridge, autumn 1901, Kiel, Germany
acceptance tests. Since the cruiser has not yet been enlisted in the navy, there is a state (tricolor) flag on the flagpole, and not a naval (Andreevsky) flag
in the Kiel Canal, 1902
Great Kronstadt raid, 1902
already part of the Baltic Fleet, 1902
Dalian Bay, 1903
Port Arthur, 1904. The cruiser has already been repainted in the standard combat paint of the Pacific formations of those years - dark olive
on a combat course, 1904
during the Dardanelles operation, 1915
in Toulon, 1916
as part of the Arctic Ocean flotilla, 1917
note from the magazine "Niva", 1915
drawing and axonometric projection, "Modelist-Constructor" magazine. An axonometric view of anti-mine networks shows them in combat position
"Askold" during service on the Baltic Sea, modern drawing
livery of the cruiser "Askold" during service in the Pacific Ocean
livery of the cruiser "Askold" during combat operations in the Mediterranean Sea
Laid down at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg on September 5, 1899, launched on July 21, 1901 and commissioned on June 20, 1904. Before moving to Libau and further to the Far East, it was equipped with a Guards crew.
In the Battle of Tsushima he led a column of Russian ships. Having received heavy damage to the bow, it gave way to the lead ship of the Borodino EBR. Due to the loss of speed, he found himself under fire from the armored cruisers Nissin and Kassuga. A fire broke out on board. Water entering through the holes worsened the situation and at 18:50 on May 14, 1905, the ship capsized and sank. The entire crew died. In the same year, he was formally excluded from the lists of the fleet.
Before leaving for Port Arthur, Captain 1st Rank, crew commander of the EBR "Emperor Alexander III" Nikolai Mikhailovich Bukhvostov said 2:
You wish us victory. Needless to say, how much we wish for her. But there will be no victory! I'm afraid that we will lose half the squadron along the way, and if this does not happen, then the Japanese will defeat us: they have a more serviceable fleet and they are real sailors. I guarantee one thing - we will all die, but we will not give up.
The squadron reached the Tsushima Strait without losses, and died there. But the honor remained untarnished. N. M. Bukhvostov and his crew died all together. Your coffin is an armadillo. Your grave is the cold depths of the ocean. And your faithful sailors' family is your centuries-old guard... 1
squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III"
before launching, 1901
during outfitting work at the Baltic Shipyard
transition from St. Petersburg to Kronstadt
in the dry dock of Kronstadt, 1903
at the Kronstadt roadstead, 1904
August 1904
on the Revel roadstead, September 1904
view of the starboard side, a crane with a steam boat is given away
at one of the stops during the transition to the Far East, from left to right - EDB "Navarin", EDB "Emperor Alexander III", "Borodino"
The armored cruiser "Rurik" is the last ship of its class with full sail weapons in the Russian Navy
The last Russian cruiser with full sails. Development of the project "Memory of Azov". The subsequent ships - "Russia" and "Gromoboy" - became the development of this project (initially it was planned to build them according to the same project as the "Rurik"). The main task is to conduct combat operations and raiding operations on British and German communications. The peculiarity of the ship was that when loading additional coal reserves, it could travel from St. Petersburg to the nearest Far Eastern bases for additional coal loading at a 10-knot speed.
Construction began at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg in September 1889. Officially laid down in May 1890. Launched October 22, 1892. Entered service in October 1895. Transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Far East to the 1st Pacific Squadron,
arrived in Nagasaki on April 9, 1896. He was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. In the battle on August 1, 1904 near Fr. Ulsan was flooded by the crew as a result of the damage received. Of the 796 crew members, 139 were killed and 229 were injured.
on a voyage, view of the deck from the top of the foremast
painting the side in preparation for the show 
on a hike
"Rurik" in black paint
"Rurik" in Nagasaki, 1896
in the eastern basin of Port Arthur
in the dock of Vladivostok 
Port Arthur
cruiser on a voyage, Far East
the cruiser's stem - the decoration of the bow is clearly visible - the legacy of the "nose figures" of sailing ships
squadron battleship "Sevastopol"
Laid down on March 22, 1892. Launched May 25, 1895. Entered service on July 15, 1900. Participated in the battle in the Yellow Sea. On December 20, 1904, on the eve of the surrender of Port Arthur, it was scuttled by its crew. The last ship of the Poltava class.
near Galerny Island before being transferred for completion to Kronstadt, 1898
"Sevastopol" and "Petropavlovsk" in Vladivostok, 1901
on the right (near the wall) is the Sevastopol EDB. A crane carries a faulty 12-inch gun from the Tsesarevich, Port Arthur, 1904
EDB "Sevastopol" on the march
"Sevastopol", "Poltava" and "Petropavlovsk" near the wall of the eastern basin of Port Arthur, 1901-1903
ventilation deflector torn by a shell, 1904
in Port Arthur. Ahead - stern to the photographer - "Tsesarevich", in the distance in the background - "Askold"
in Port Arthur, campaign of 1904, on the right is the stern of the Sokol-class destroyer, on the left is the stern of the Novik
after being hit by a Japanese torpedo in White Wolf Bay, December 1904
sailors leave for the land front. after this, the Sevastopol EDB will be sunk in the internal roadstead of Port Arthur on the eve of the surrender of the fortress
Squadron battleship "Sevastopol", color postcard
Armored cruiser of rank II "Boyarin"
Laid down at Burmeister og Wein, Copenhagen, Denmark in early 1900. The official laying took place on September 24, 1900. On May 26, 1901 it was launched.
Entered service in October 1902. On October 27, 1902, the cruiser left Kronstadt and on May 10, 1903, arrived in Port Arthur.
It was blown up by a Russian mine near the port of Dalniy on January 29, 1904 (6 people died). The team abandoned the ship, which remained afloat for another two days and only sank after a repeated explosion at a minefield.
still under the Danish flag, sea trials, 1902
1902 - St. Andrew's flag is already on the flagpole. Before moving to Kronstadt.
"Boyarin" in the Far East, 1903 
in the Denmark Strait, 1903
in Toulon
Port Arthur, 1904
Armored cruiser II rank "Boyarin", photo postcard
1 - these are stanzas from the poem "In Memory of Admiral Makarov". Its author is S. LOBANOVSKY, a cadet of the Vladimir Kyiv Cadet Corps, graduated in 1910. It is completely engraved on the pedestal of the monument to Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov in Kronstadt. But these drains are a memory to all those who remained with their crew, with their ship, until the last. Such as N. M. Bukhvostov, S. O. Makarov and many others...
Sleep, northern knight, sleep, honest Father,
Taken untimely by death, -
Not laurels of victory - crown of thorns
You accepted with a fearless squad.
Your coffin is an armadillo, your grave
Cold depths of the ocean
And faithful sailors' family
Your age-old protection.
Shared laurels, from now on with you
They also share eternal peace.
The jealous sea will not betray the land
A hero who loved the sea -
In a deep grave, in a mysterious darkness
Cherishing him and peace.
And the wind will sing a dirge over him,
Hurricanes will cry with rain
And the shroud will be spread with a thick cover
There are thick fogs over the sea;
And the clouds, frowning, the last fireworks
The thunder will be given to him with a roar.
Let me remind you that Admiral Makarov died along with the Petropavlovsk nuclear submarine, which was blown up by a mine in Vladivostok. The Russian battle painter Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin (author of the paintings “The Apotheosis of War”, “Before the Attack at Plevna”, “Napoleon on the Borodino Heights”, “Skobelev at Plevna”, etc.) also died along with the ship.
2 - who regularly follows the TV project "Living History" of the TV channel "Channel 5 - St. Petersburg", could have heard this quote in one of the parts of the film about the Russian fleet "Yablochko". True, Sergei Shnurov shortened it - he removed the words regarding the loss of ships during the voyage.
Ships of the Russian fleet - participants in the Russo-Japanese War. There is probably no more disappointing defeat in Russian history.
But it was precisely the defeat in this war that finally “blown the brains” of the Russian court and the command of the army and navy. In 10 years, Russia will get involved in a new bloodbath - the First World War. And this will be the end of the empire.
The launch of the new ship took place in the presence of the august family. On the same day, another ship was launched, which was to play a huge role in the history of our country and in the life of Nicholas II - on May 11, 1900, the Aurora was launched - the last of three cruisers of the Diana type and the only domestic one a ship that has survived, albeit in a thoroughly rebuilt form, to this day.
the crew leaves the sunken battleship
it is possible that in the photo there is a boat under the command of midshipman S.N. Vasilev, who subsequently broke through to the port of Chifoo
sunken Pobeda
The ship was launched in 1900 and scuttled in Port Arthur on the night of September 19-20, 1904. Subsequently, it was raised by the Japanese, restored and put into operation under the name "Suo" (according to other sources, "Suvo"). Withdrawn from the combat core of the fleet in 1922. It is believed that in the same year it was dismantled for metal. According to other sources, it was used as a block until 1946.
Cruiser I rank "Aurora"
The fate of this ship is more than intricate - launched in 1900, the Aurora is the only ship of those years that has survived to this day. At least - the only one in Russia. Until recently, it was listed as part of the combat core of the Baltic Fleet. The ship became famous for the fact that on October 25, 1917, it fired a blank salvo towards the Winter Palace, which became the signal for the assault on it and the signal of the onset of an entire era in the history of Russia. Coincidence or irony of fate - the ship was launched in the presence of the last Russian emperor and became the last ship of the imperial Russian fleet that has survived to this day.
The 1st rank cruiser "Aurora" is permanently moored on Petrovskaya Embankment. Saint Petersburg
1984, the ship is being repaired. It will take its place at Petrovskaya Embankment only in 1987
Oranienbaum, 1944. "Aurora" sat on the ground after numerous bombings
in the Kronstadt dock, 1922
"Aurora" under repair at the Franco-Russian plant in St. Petersburg, 1917
"Aurora" during the First World War, Baltic Sea
on the roadstead of Manila, 1905
"Aurora" during sea trials, 1903
hull of the Aurora after launching, May 11, 1900
1st rank cruiser "Diana"
built in 1896. The 1st rank cruiser "Diana" became the first in a series of three ships of the same type, which received names from Greek and Roman mythology - Diana (Roman goddess of vegetation), Aurora (Greek goddess of the dawn), Pallas (foster sister of Athena, who was killed by Athena back in childhood, although this could have meant Athena herself Pallas). In 1922, the ship was sold to Germany and in 1925 dismantled for metal. Then he was excluded from the RKKF lists.
on the Small Kronstadt roadstead
under Japanese artillery fire, Port Arthur, 1904
"Diana" in Algeria, 1909-1910
in the dock
1st rank cruiser "Pallada"
The second of three Diana-class cruisers. Built in 1899. On December 8, 1904, she was sunk during shelling by siege artillery. In 1905, she was raised by the Japanese, restored and included in the Japanese fleet. Since 1920 - converted into a minelayer. On May 27, 1924, she was sunk during a demonstration bombing in honor of the anniversary of the Battle of Tsushima.
the cruiser "Pallada" under Japanese artillery fire. On the starboard side is the Pobeda EDB.
sunken "Pallada" in the harbor of Port Arthur, 1904
cruiser "Pallada" (in the background) and steamer "Izhora"
Squadron battleship "Poltava"
Construction began in 1892, commissioned in 1900. EBR "Poltava" became the lead ship of a series of three slightly different battleships. One of the three was the Petropavlovsk EDB, which was blown up by a mine at the very beginning of the Russo-Japanese War. Admiral S. O. Makarov died along with the ship.
Poltava sank in Port Arthur in 1904 after being shelled by Japanese siege artillery. Raised by the Japanese in 1905, restored and commissioned as the coastal defense battleship Tango. In 1915 it was bought out by the Russian Admiralty and re-enlisted in the Russian fleet under the name "Chesma". In March 1918, the ship was captured by the British and used as a floating prison. When leaving Arkhangelsk, the interventionists abandoned the ship (1920). In 1921 it was enlisted in the White Sea Fleet and scrapped in 1924.
in the dock of Kronstadt, 1900
"Poltava" and "Sevastopol" at the outfitting wall
"Poltava" after entry into service
sunken Poltava, Port Arthur, 1904
in a Japanese dock, 1905
Battleship "Tango", 1909-1910
already under the name "Chesma", Vladivostok, 1916
as part of the White Sea Flotilla, 1921
Squadron battleship "Emperor Nicholas I"
Entered service in 1891. In 1893, he crossed the Atlantic and took part in celebrations marking the 400th anniversary of the discovery of America. From 1893 to 1898 - service in the Mediterranean Sea. Under the command of P.P. Andreev, he participated in the Cretan peacekeeping operation. In 1898, under the command of S. O. Makarov, he moved to Vladivostok. In 1902 he returned to the Baltic. In 1904 - back to the Far East. After the battle on May 15, 1905, it was surrendered to the Japanese by order of Admiral Nebogatov. In the Japanese Navy it was put into combat service under the name "Iki". Sunk as a target in 19185 during firing training.
launching, 1889
at the dock, 1895
after the Battle of Tsushima
restoration work, already under the name "Iki"
"Iki" after entry into service
Armored cruiser 1st rank "Svetlana"
built in Le Havre. commissioned in 1898. Sunk during the Battle of Tsushima. In honor of the ship, the name "Svetlana" was given to a light cruiser laid down at the RBVZ in 1913. The second "Svetlana" after the revolution was renamed "Profintern", since 1925 - "Red Crimea". The ship was sunk in the 60s while testing missile weapons.
on the roadstead with raised flags
on a hike
The photo was probably taken near the outfitting wall
Armored cruiser "Russia"
Launched in 1895, commissioned in 1897. Represents a further development of "Rurik". In August 1904, in the battle of Ulsan Island, it was seriously damaged, returned to Vladivostok and during 1904-1905 was used as a floating fort in Novik Bay. In 1906 he came to Kronstadt, where major repairs took place from 1906 to 1909. In 1909 he was enlisted in the first reserve detachment, and in 1911 - in the cruiser detachment of the Baltic Fleet, transferred to Helsingfors. In 1917 he transferred to Kronshdatdt (Ice Campaign). Since 1918 - under conservation. In 1922, it was decommissioned and taken to Germany for scrapping. While being towed in a strong storm, she was washed up on the Develsey bank, in December 1922 she was refloated and taken to Kiel for dismantling. The twist of fate lies in the fact that during tests in 1897, the cruiser left Kronstadt in a strong storm and was thrown aground near the island.
cruiser hull after launching
in the dock after the Kronstadt incident
in dock during major repairs 1906-1909
cruiser on the move
after the battle near Ulsan Island
cruiser in Helsingfors
Squadron battleship "Eagle"
Launched in 1902. Commissioned in 1904. In the Battle of Tsushima, he received 76 hits, but remained afloat. He joined the detachment of Admiral Nebogatov and was captured on May 10, 1905. Joined the Japanese fleet under the name "Iwami". Destroyed during firing in 1924.
launching
Kronstadt raid, 1904
on the roadstead of Revel before leaving for the Far East
loading coal on the high seas
after battle
"sieve" sides
at the port of Maizuru
"Iwami" after entry into service
Battle in the Yellow Sea(Japanese: 黄海海戦 Kōkai kaisen) - the first major naval battle of the Russo-Japanese War. It occurred during the attempt of the 1st Pacific Squadron to break out from besieged Port Arthur to Vladivostok. Despite the fact that both sides did not suffer any losses in ships, the Russian squadron was unable to complete its task and was forced to return. After this battle, the 1st Pacific Squadron was virtually inactive, allowing the Japanese Combined Fleet to provide unhindered supplies to the troops besieging Port Arthur. Ultimately, this led to the capture of the fortress by Japanese troops.
Total information
In 1898, Russia concluded a convention with China, according to which Port Arthur was transferred to Russia for a period of 25 years. The Russian naval forces received at their disposal an ice-free base on the coast of the Yellow Sea. Port Arthur becomes the main naval base of the Russian military fleet in the Pacific Ocean. At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese command sets the priority task of destroying the Russian naval forces based in Port Arthur. The operation to capture the fortress was necessary for the Japanese fleet.
| Official work of the German General Staff The siege of Port Arthur was necessary; the Japanese could complete their operations on land only by having supremacy at sea. It was for this reason that the Russian fleet in East Asia had to be destroyed, and since most of it had taken refuge from the Japanese attack ... in the harbor of Port Arthur, the fortress had to be attacked from land. The Japanese fleet had to wait for the arrival of the Baltic squadron, and for Japan it was a vital issue to create for itself ... favorable conditions for a future naval battle with the Russian 2nd Pacific squadron, that is, to take Port Arthur first. |
On April 22 (May 5), 1904, the Japanese 2nd Army of General Oku landed in Bidzywo, and Port Arthur was soon cut off from land communications with the Manchurian Army. On May 13 (26), Japanese troops broke through the Russian defenses on the Jinzhou Isthmus (the narrowest point of the Liaodong Peninsula) and by May 19 (June 1) occupied the port of Dalniy, in which the 3rd Army of General Nogi, intended for operations against Port Arthur, was concentrated. . On July 13-15 (26-28), the 3rd Army, after heavy fighting, broke through the last fortified Russian positions on the Green Mountains and reached the closest approaches to the fortress.
On July 17 (30), Japanese troops found themselves within range of the main caliber guns of Russian battleships. The ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron opened fire on the enemy directly from the harbor. The actual siege of Port Arthur began. On July 25 (August 7), a Japanese battery of 120-mm naval guns mounted on wheeled siege gun carriages opened fire on the city and harbor for the first time. The battery fired in short bursts of 7-8 rounds. The first shells landed on the main street of the Old Town. Soon the Japanese artillerymen shifted their fire to the harbor, and several shells exploded not far from the flagship Tsarevich. But there was only one hit: the shell destroyed the radio room. The telegraph operator who was in it died, and the squadron commander, Rear Admiral Vitgeft, was easily wounded in the leg by shrapnel. Over the next two days, shelling of Russian ships in the harbor was repeated, and many of them received numerous, although minor, damage. The most dangerous of them was an underwater hole caused by a 120-mm shell hitting the bow of the battleship Retvizan on July 27 (August 9) at about 12.10. The damage was quickly repaired, and soon the battleship was ready for battle. The next day, the Russian squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft left Port Arthur to try to break through to Vladivostok.
The commander of the Japanese combined fleet, Admiral Togo Heihachiro, was confident that the siege of Port Arthur and the shelling of the harbor that had begun would force the Russian squadron to go to sea, and in advance he strengthened surveillance of the raid. In addition, he relocated his main forces from the Elliot Islands closer to Port Arthur - to Rowan Island.
Characteristics of the parties involved
Ships of the 1st squadron of the Pacific Fleet, making a breakthrough to Vladivostok
The goal of the 1st Pacific Squadron is to redeploy ships from Port Arthur to Vladivostok, maintain forces to link up with the 2nd Pacific Squadron for the subsequent destruction of the Japanese fleet and interrupt the enemy’s sea communications from Japan to Korea and Manchuria. When preparing the squadron to break through the Japanese blockade of Port Arthur, the ships were equipped with personnel and ammunition. A certain amount of medium artillery (10 - 152 mm and 12 - 75 mm guns) was removed and installed on the fortress for its defense.
Compound:
Vitgeft V.G.
Japanese Combined Fleet
At 8.50 the signal was raised on the flagship "Tsesarevich": "Prepare for battle", and at 9.00: "The fleet is informed that the Emperor has ordered to go to Vladivostok."
At 10.30 the minesweeper convoy was released to Port Arthur under the protection of gunboats and a second detachment of destroyers.
The squadron marched in the following order: ahead was the cruiser Novik, followed in the wake column by the battleships Tsesarevich (flag of Rear Admiral Vitgeft), Retvizan, Pobeda, Peresvet (flag of the junior flagship of Prince P.P. Ukhtomsky ), "Sevastopol" and "Poltava", followed by the cruisers "Askold" (the flag of the head of the cruiser detachment, Rear Admiral N.K. Reitzenstein), "Pallada" and "Diana". The first detachment of destroyers was abeam the flagship battleship. At first, the squadron moved at 8 knots. Soon, problems with the steering gear arose on the Tsarevich, and the battleship was out of commission for some time. After a few minutes, the problems were corrected, and the squadron continued to move.
At 10.00 the order was given to increase speed to 10 knots. The stroke was increased gradually in order to determine the strength of sealing the hole in the bow of the battleship Retvizan.
At about 11.30, the main forces of the Japanese fleet appeared on the horizon to the east of the squadron. The cruiser Novik took its place in the squad of cruisers.
Japanese fleet before the battle
Armadillo IJN Mikasa
As of the morning of July 28 (August 10), the deployment of the Japanese fleet was as follows. There were armadillos in the Round Island area IJN Mikasa , IJN Asahi , Fuji And IJN Shikishima, as well as an armored cruiser IJN Asama. Armored cruiser IJN Yakumo and cruisers IJN Kasagi , IJN Takasago And IJN Chitose were located 15 miles south of Liaoteshan. Cruisers IJN Akashi , IJN Suma And IJN Akitsushima were near the islet of Encounter Rock. Old cruisers IJN Hashidate And IJN Matsushima stood in Sikau Bay near Port Arthur. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd detachments of destroyers carried out a blockade of the Port Arthur raid. Armadillo IJN Chen Yuan, armored cruisers IJN Kasuga And IJN Nisshin were near Port Arthur. Cruisers IJN Itsukushima And IJN Izumi- near the Elliot Islands. 4th destroyer detachment and cruiser IJN Chiyoda stood in Dalny.
A detachment of armored cruisers under the command of Vice Admiral Kamimura was in the Korea Strait with orders to prevent Vladivostok cruisers from entering the Yellow Sea.
Progress of the battle
First phase of the battle
By 12.00 the situation was as follows. The Russian squadron was sailing in a wake column heading southeast 25 o. The main forces of the Japanese fleet (1st combat detachment) consisting of battleships IJN Mikasa , IJN Asahi , Fuji And IJN Shikishima and armored cruisers IJN Kasuga And IJN Nisshin were heading southwest to cross the course of the Russian squadron. The 3rd combat detachment of Admiral Dev walked to the right of the Russian squadron on a course almost parallel to it. The 5th and 6th combat detachments were located to the left of the Russian squadron at a very great distance.
At 12.20, to prevent head coverage, the Russian squadron changed course 4 points to the left, that is, almost on a counter course with the enemy. Just at this moment the armored cruiser IJN Nisshin opened fire from a distance of about 80 cables. Soon he was joined by the rest of the ships of the 1st combat detachment.
The commander of the 3rd combat detachment, Admiral Deva, seeing that the battle had begun, turned his ships successively 16 points to bypass and attack the Russian squadron from the rear.
Soon after turning from the flagship battleship Tsesarevich, directly ahead, objects were found floating in the water, reminiscent in appearance of mines, which could have been laid by Japanese destroyers that had previously been on the course of the Russian ships. The battleship immediately warned the squadron about this with whistles and semaphore. As a result of maneuvering to avoid these mines, the ships had to change courses several times in one direction or another, which made it very difficult to open and return fire. At about 12.45, for a second attempt to enter the head of the Russian squadron, Admiral Togo turned the ships of the 1st combat detachment “all of a sudden” 8 points to the left. After walking like this for some time, perhaps in order to increase the distance, the Japanese ships made another similar turn and set off on the opposite course.
Other ships of the squadron were also damaged. "Retvizan" received 12 hits. One of the shells pierced the starboard side of the bow in the area of the conductor's wardroom. Since the hole was located just above the waterline, it was heavily overwhelmed by water while moving. The rest of the damage was not so significant.
The battleship Poltava, slightly behind the squadron, opened fire first. Behind him, the rest of the squadron's ships entered the battle, concentrating their fire on the flagship of the Japanese fleet. IJN Mikasa immediately received several direct hits (mainly from the battleship Poltava) and was forced to turn aside. But, having recovered from the blow, he soon returned to his previous course.
The Japanese ships also concentrated fire on the flagship Tsesarevich, trying to disable it and disrupt control of the squadron. Trying to get out from under enemy fire, and also in order to improve conditions for firing his ships and prevent the enemy from engulfing the head of the squadron, Vitgeft turned two points to the left and increased the speed to 15 knots. However, the battleships Sevastopol and Poltava could not move at such speed and began to lag behind. As a result, the speed had to be reduced again. At about 17.05, a 12-inch shell from one of the Japanese battleships hit the middle of the Tsarevich's foremast. As a result of the explosion, all the officers of Vitgeft's headquarters who were on the open lower bridge were killed or seriously injured. Vitgeft himself was torn to pieces. In order not to cause confusion on the ships of the squadron in the midst of the battle, the commander of the Tsarevich, Captain 1st Rank Ivanov, took command of the squadron.
Second phase of the battle in the Yellow Sea
At 17.45 another large-caliber shell exploded near the conning tower of the Tsesarevich. The shell fragments flew into the very wide viewing slots of the conning tower, killing and wounding everyone in it. The ship's commander was seriously wounded. The fire control devices and steering gear were damaged.
The Tsarevich lost control and began to describe the circulation, but there was no one to raise the signal that the ship was out of order. The commanders of the ships following the Tsarevich first began to repeat the flagship’s maneuver, believing that it was maneuvering to set a new course. But after the Tsesarevich, having described the circulation, cut through the squadron's formation, it became clear that it had lost control. But by that time the formation of the Russian squadron had broken down, and the Japanese ships had increased their fire.
At this moment, the commander of the battleship "Retvizan", captain 1st rank E.N. Shchensnovich ordered to turn towards the enemy in order to ram one of his ships. Seeing the battleship approaching them at full speed, the Japanese ships concentrated their fire on it. The high speed of the Retvizan helped it avoid many hits - the Japanese gunners simply did not have time to rearrange the sights, and the shells fell behind the stern of the battleship.
Commander of the battleship "Retvizan" E.N. Shchensnovich
This is how the editor of the Portarthur newspaper “New Region”, who was on board the hospital ship “Mongolia”, following the squadron, describes this moment.
But when there were no more than 17 cables left to the enemy (about 3.1 km), a stray fragment of an exploding shell flew into the Retvizan’s conning tower, wounding the commander. E.N. Shchensnovich briefly lost control of the ship. Having come to his senses and seeing that the Japanese ships had left the danger zone, and none of the Russian ships followed his example, Shchensnovich ordered to turn back.
The desperate maneuver of the Retvizan allowed the commanders of other Russian ships to level the formation. On the Tsesarevich, the senior officer of the ship, Captain 2nd Rank Shumov, took command. Having difficulty restoring control of the ship, he raised the signal that the admiral was transferring command to the junior flagship, Rear Admiral P.P. Ukhtomsky. Ukhtomsky, who was on the Peresvet, raised the signal for the squadron to “follow me.” But since both topmasts were knocked down on the Peresvet, the signal had to be hung on the wings of the bridge.
After some time, having difficulty making out the signal, the remaining battleships entered the wake of the Peresvet, and P.P. Ukhtomsky led the squadron back to Port Arthur. "Retvizan", not noticing Ukhtomsky's signal to slow down, soon overtook the squadron.
Admiral Togo turned his squadron to the north, blocking the path to the open sea, but, since his ships were also heavily damaged, he did not pursue the Russian squadron.
Breakthrough of "Askold" and "Novik"
After the battleships turned back towards Port Arthur, the cruisers followed suit. By this time, the 5th and 6th detachments of the Japanese fleet came closer. The head of the cruiser detachment, Rear Admiral Reizenstein, decides to make a breakthrough. This decision was supported by the Askold commander and other officers who were nearby in the conning tower.
Having raised the signal “Cruisers follow me,” the cruiser “Askold” increased its speed. The rest of the squadron's cruisers followed his example. At 18.50 "Askold" headed straight for the armored cruiser IJN Asama, opening fire on him. According to the logbook, soon IJN Asama a fire broke out and he turned away.
Having assessed the situation, Reitzenstein decides to break through in a southwestern direction past the cruisers of the 3rd combat detachment of the Japanese fleet. Having overtaken their battleships on the starboard side, the detachment of cruisers turned left, to cross their course. But only the cruiser Novik was able to follow Askold. "Diana" and "Pallada" immediately fell behind, unable to develop the required speed.
After some hesitation, the Japanese ships rushed to intercept the Russian cruisers. Separated from the 1st combat detachment IJN Yakumo, firing at "Askold", which became the final IJN Nisshin also transferred the fire to him. To the left and behind, the cruisers of the 3rd combat detachment fired at the breaking through ships and set off in pursuit.
Breakthrough of the cruisers "Askold" and "Novik"
Firing on both sides, showered with shells, the cruisers developed the maximum possible speed. The Japanese ships concentrated their fire on the lead Askold. Columns of water from exploding shells rose around the cruiser, showering the ship with a hail of fragments. But high speed and maneuvering allowed the Askold to survive the crossfire. But the hits could not be avoided. Soon it was reported to the conning tower that water was flowing into the left aft engine room, and then into the right coal pit of the second stoker. While below they were fighting against the influx of water, above they were extinguishing fires arising from hits here and there. The number of killed and wounded increased every minute, and the sailors of the fire division had to stand up to the guns, replacing those who were out of action. But still, the cruiser managed to maintain the maximum rate of fire and speed. At a critical moment in the battle, when an armored cruiser rushed to cut off the Russian cruisers IJN Yakumo, the Askold cars developed 132 revolutions - more than in tests.
Cruiser "Askold"
"Novik", following "Askold", at that time fired at the cruisers of the 3rd and 5th combat detachments. Four Japanese destroyers came out to attack the cruisers, but all the torpedoes they fired missed, and the destroyers themselves were driven away by fire. By 19.40, the Russian cruisers managed to break through, and by 20.20 they ceased fire on the Askold, as the Japanese ships became invisible in the growing darkness. The damage to the cruiser turned out to be quite significant. Only 4 152 mm guns remained in serviceable condition. At night we managed to restore another one. Gun No. 10, although in good working order, could not fire, since the shell that exploded under it destroyed the reinforcements and the deck. 75-mm cartridges, which were lying in gazebos on the elevator rails of the battery deck in the officer's compartment, exploded when they were hit by shrapnel. Both rangefinder stations were out of order due to electrical wires broken in many places, and 10 combat dials were broken.
Cruiser "Novik"
A large shell hit the upper part of the fifth chimney, which caused a flame to blaze from the ashpits in the fifth stoker during the battle, and the compartment was filled with smoke. However, traction was quickly restored due to excess pressure. The fragments flying through the armor grille pierced the casing and several water-heating tubes of boiler No. 8. Minor steaming occurred, but the boiler was left in operation for the duration of the battle. The three middle pipes of the cruiser, which escaped hits, were heavily damaged by shrapnel.
Head of the cruiser detachment, Rear Admiral N.K. Reitzenstein
The Askold had four small underwater holes on the starboard side and two on the left. In addition, there were several surface holes. Crew losses were 11 killed and 48 wounded.
Since the main attention was attracted by the lead Askold, the Novik received only three surface holes, apparently inflicted by the cruisers of the 3rd combat detachment. Crew losses were 2 killed and one wounded. In the evening after the battle on Novik, interruptions in the operation of refrigerators began. At about 23.00, the salinity of the boiler water on the cruiser increased, and Novik was forced to slow down to inspect the refrigerators. The signal was sent to ask the Askold to slow down, but the flagship apparently did not understand it, and soon the Novik fell behind. During the night, the damage in the refrigerators was repaired, but the pipes in the boilers began to burst.
The next morning, the cruiser Askold could also reach a speed of no more than 15 knots, therefore, considering that the ship in this condition could not take the fight, Reitzenstein decided to call at Shanghai to repair the damage, and then go to Vladivostok.
On July 30, "Askold" dropped anchor at the mouth of the Vuzung River. A few days later an order was received from St. Petersburg to disarm the ship.
The day after the battle, the cruiser Novik entered the port of Qingdao to replenish coal supplies. After this, the commander of the cruiser M.F. von Schultz decided to lead the cruiser to Vladivostok around Japan. On August 7, the cruiser entered the roadstead of the village of Korsakovsky post on the island. Sakhalin to replenish coal reserves, at the exit from which it was intercepted by the IJN cruiser Tsushima. During the ensuing battle, the Novik received serious damage, forcing it to return to the Korsakov post, where it was scuttled by the crew.
Diana's departure
Despite the fact that “Diana”, due to its slow speed, lagged behind “Askold” and “Novik”, its commander, Captain 2nd Rank Prince A.A. Lieven still decided to follow the order of his commander and go for a breakthrough. He considered that this could only be done at night, since the low speed of the ship would not allow him to break away from the enemy.
With the onset of darkness at about 20.00, "Diana" crossed the course of the squadron and the floor to the east, to where the main forces of the Japanese fleet had just been. The cruiser was followed by the destroyer Grozovoy. 10 minutes after the turn, four Japanese destroyers came out from the bow corners towards the Russian ships. They dodged the fired torpedoes with a sharp turn, exposing the stern.
Cruiser "Diana"
Since the commander of the Diana was a miner by profession, he knew that it was very difficult to detect and attack a ship sailing without lights at night. Therefore, they avoided attacks by maneuvering, trying not to open fire. When destroyers appeared from the bow corners, they turned towards them, threatening them with a ram; when they appeared from the stern corners, they were transferred behind the stern. During one of the attacks, at about 22.15, the cruiser almost rammed one of the Japanese destroyers. The attacks stopped soon after.
All night the cruiser was moving at full speed, fearing persecution. In the morning, a meeting took place with the cruiser Novik, to which Grozovoy was sent for negotiations. Having found out Novik's intention to go to Qingdao, but fearing that Japanese ships would block it there, Lieven headed south. "Grozovoy", whose boilers and refrigerators were leaking, left with "Novik" for Qingdao.
Captain "Diana" A.A. Liven
A.A. Lieven was going to cross the Yellow Sea, and at night pass the Korean Strait at full speed, and then go to Vladivostok by economic speed. But the increased consumption of coal due to its low quality, as well as the unsuccessful design of the coal pits (from the reserve pits located above the engine room, coal could not be supplied directly to the fireboxes - it was required to be reloaded manually through the upper deck) did not allow this intention to be realized.
Having refueled at the French bases of Kwan Chau Van and Haifang, “Diana” reached French Saigon on August 8 (21), where A.A. Lieven intended to repair the damage. The cruiser received two direct hits and a lot of damage from shrapnel. Crew losses were 5 killed and 20 wounded. On August 21 (September 3) “Diana” was interned.
"Tsesarevich"
After the battle, “Tsesarevich” was the last one in the squadron, but soon, due to a drop in thrust in the boilers due to a badly damaged stern pipe, it began to lag behind. Having finally left the squadron in the dark, having taken command, Shumov turned south, deciding to go to Vladivostok. At about 23.00, the commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank Ivanov, who had come to his senses, took command. At night, the battleship was attacked by several destroyers, which were successfully repulsed.
In the morning, having assessed the damage to the ship, Ivanov decided to call at the port of Qingdao to repair the damage. But on August 2 (15), the battleship was interned at the request of the German authorities.
In the second phase of the battle, the Tsarevich received more hits from enemy shells than in the first. The biggest troubles were caused by two successive hits of 12-inch shells on the foremast and conning tower, which first disabled the squadron headquarters and then the ship’s command. In addition, the steering gear, engine telegraph and all speaking pipes were disabled, and telephone communication remained with only one of the engine rooms.
In addition, a large shell hit the bow turret (without damage); another shell pierced the bunk nets and damaged the hull structures and the steam launch; another one - he smashed a bakery. Two shells hit the stern tube, and medium-caliber shells also hit the deck in the bow and the porthole located in front of the left bow turret of the 152 mm guns. After the Tsarevich was out of action, two more shells hit the poop deck.
Losses on the Tsesarevich during the battle amounted to 12 killed and 42 wounded.
Russian squadron after the battle
At night after the battle, the Russian squadron, returning to Port Arthur, was attacked by Japanese destroyers. However, none of the torpedoes they fired hit the target. In the morning, the battleships Retvizan, Peresvet, Pobeda, Sevastopol, Poltava, the cruiser Pallada, three destroyers and the hospital ship Mongolia returned to Port Arthur.
The Russo-Japanese War is one of the darkest chapters in the Russian Navy. This is probably why it still attracts the attention of military historians and simply people interested in the military history of Russia. Yes, it included not only victories, but also the almost complete defeat of the Russian Pacific and Baltic fleets by the Japanese Imperial Fleet, a clear confirmation of this. This topic is interesting because never before has the Russian Imperial Navy been so modern, huge, strong and powerful. On paper. After the events of that war, the Russian navy revived such ocean power only once - in the 70-80s of the 20th century. So why did this happen? Why did the very modest Japanese fleet manage to completely defeat its superior Russian fleet without significant losses? Although “on paper” it should have turned out exactly the opposite? These questions will be discussed in this article. The reader is waiting for a lot of bare figures and facts. Without any fairy tales about “outdated and weak battleships”, “short firing range”, “large armoring area of Japanese ships” and other, other, other beautiful fairy tales. That allegedly they did not allow such “geniuses of naval thought” as Z.P. Rozhestvensky and V.K. Vitgeft to defeat the Japanese fleet under the command of Admiral Togo. Who was to blame for this - the technology or the people who were entrusted with this technology? The military always first of all blames what they consider unsuitable military equipment for their failures. The people who created this technology, on the contrary, point to the unprofessionalism and unsuitability of the military. This is how it has always been, and this is how it will continue to be. Let us analyze all this with dispassionate mathematical precision.
Fleet compositions
Before moving on to listing the military equipment that was at the disposal of the Russian and Japanese admirals, I consider it necessary to explain to the reader the general quality level of the fleets and classes of warships of that period. In that era when artillery was the god of war, all types of naval weapon systems could be counted on one hand:
- Classic artillery guns various calibers and purposes. At that time, they had already reached a fully mature level of development and in their design were not much different from modern artillery systems, although they were less powerful.
- Torpedoes. At that time, this type of weapon was just beginning to develop. Torpedoes of that period were much inferior to modern ones in terms of launch range and lethality.
- Mines. At that time, this type of sea was already a fully developed and effective means of combating enemy ships.
- Aviation. It was in its infancy at that time. Actually, it can be called aviation with great stretch, because... it was just balloons that were used only for reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment over long distances.
In accordance with this, the classes of warships were distributed:
1. The main striking force of the fleet of that period were battleships. During their evolution, battleships had many different subclasses: battery battleship, barbette battleship, turret battleship, I-class battleship, II-class battleship, coastal defense battleship, squadron battleship (aka pre-dreadnought), dreadnought, super-dreadnought and finally, battleship. All of them were the most armed and protected ships of their time. During the period described, squadron battleships, II-class battleships and coastal defense battleships were in service. These ships had a displacement from 4,000 tons to 16,000 tons, carried heavy armor and powerful universal artillery and mine-torpedo weapons. At the same time, they could reach a speed of 14-18 knots. The more modern ships of this class were in the fleet, the more formidable the fleet was.
2. Also to the main striking force of the fleet can be attributed armored cruisers. Ships with a displacement of about 8000-10000 tons, also have good protection, although not as powerful as that of battleships. The artillery armament was also weaker, but such ships could reach a speed of 18-22 knots. The presence of armored cruisers in the squadron expanded its operational capabilities. It was the battleships and armored cruisers who had the main task of fighting enemy warships and supporting troops with fire in coastal operations.
3. Auxiliary tasks of reconnaissance, patrol, interception, combat against small enemy ships and its transport and landing fleet fell on armored cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks. These are ships with a displacement of 4000-6000 tons, had light armor and artillery armament from medium and small caliber guns. But they could reach a speed of 20-25 knots and had a long cruising range. An example - the famous 1st rank cruiser Aurora gives a good idea of this type of warship.
4. For night torpedo attacks, the final finishing off of damaged enemy ships and the feasible performance of some of the functions of armored cruisers, the fleets had destroyers, Further destroyers, basic destroyers(destroyers), further torpedo boats And submarines. Destroyers are small ships that do not carry even a shadow of armor. They were armed with one or two torpedo tubes and several small guns. They reached speeds of 25-30 knots and could operate together with squadrons in the near sea zone. Torpedo boats and submarines of that period, due to their imperfections, were weapons of the near coastal zone.
The 1st rank cruiser "Aurora" took a direct part in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The 123-meter-long ship is still in decent technical condition, although it is no longer underway.
5. Also in the fleets of that time there could be balloon carriers, minelayers And transport ships. Balloon carriers, the predecessors of aircraft carriers, were designed to host reconnaissance balloons and were equipped with hangars for storing them. Minelayers were used to lay mines. The artillery armament of these ships consisted of several small cannons. Transport ships were used to transport troops, weapons or other goods. They could have several small guns or no weapons at all. Their sizes could vary widely.
After a brief excursion into the characteristics of warships during the Russo-Japanese War, we will move on to comparing the forces of both sides.
Russian Imperial Fleet (RIF). Despite all the vacillation and bureaucracy, by the beginning of the war with Japan he was a formidable force. Since there is no way to list the entire combat personnel with all auxiliary ships and support vessels in the format of this article, we will dwell in detail only on the main striking force of the fleet:
Table 1
Alexander-II | ||
Nikolai-I | Squadron battleship. Old. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Navarin | Squadron battleship. Old. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Sisoy the Great | ||
Sevastopol | ||
Poltava | Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Petropavlovsk | Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Admiral Ushakov | ||
Admiral Sevyanin | Coastal defense battleship. New. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Admiral Apraksin | Coastal defense battleship. New. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Table 1Oslyabya | Squadron battleship. New. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Peresvet | Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Victory | Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Retvizan | ||
Tsesarevich | Squadron battleship. Newest. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Prince Suvorov | ||
Alexander-III | Squadron battleship. Newest. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Borodino | Squadron battleship. Newest. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Eagle | Squadron battleship. Newest. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Rus | Balloon carrier. Newest. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Catherine-II | ||
Sinop | Squadron battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Chesma | Squadron battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
St. George the Victorious | Squadron battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Twelve Apostles | II-class battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Three Saints | Squadron battleship. New. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Rostislav | II-class battleship. New. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Prince Potemkin-Tavrichesky | ||
Panteleimon | Squadron battleship. Newest. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Admiral Nakhimov | Armored cruiser. Old. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Rurik | Armored cruiser. Old. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Memory of Azov | Armored cruiser. Old. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Russia | ||
Thunderbolt | Armored cruiser. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Accordion | Armored cruiser. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Pallas | Armored cruiser. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Admiral Makarov | Armored cruiser. New. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Peter the Great | Artillery training ship. Old 1st class battleship. Baltic Fleet. |
The main striking power of the Russian fleet lay precisely in these 38 ships. In total they had 88 guns of 305mm caliber, 26 guns of 254mm caliber, 8 – 229mm and 28 guns of 203mm caliber. Smaller-caliber guns even then belonged to medium-caliber artillery, although they retained important combat significance at that stage of the development of science and technology. In addition to these ships, the fleet included a large number of powerful cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks, both new and ancient, many destroyers, minelayers, gunboats, transports, four multi-purpose submarines "Dolphin", "Forel", "Sturgeon" and "Som" and other ships. Subsequently, submarines (submarines) became one of the main classes of warships of the fleet.
The squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" is one of the most powerful battleships of its time. Its power can be felt literally in its appearance - even today it looks quite modern. The ship was built using the latest technology and had all the features of a modern battleship of the 2nd World War: a high side of an optimal, seaworthy shape, developed tower-like superstructures for placing observation posts and elements of the control system at the maximum possible height. Modern artillery in twin tower gun mounts was located high, was fully mechanized and had large aiming angles. The very complex, multi-row differentiated armor was very powerful. The ship could see far on the horizon and could operate effectively and conduct targeted fire in any weather. Displacement of this floating tank: 13105 tons. The enemy was waiting for 68 guns of various calibers, 4 torpedo tubes, 20 mines and 4 7.62mm Maxim machine guns. All the weapons that were then in the Russian fleet were installed on it. The control system of this ship was also first-class.
The total total number of warships of all classes and ages in service with the Russian Navy at the start of the war with Japan is difficult to estimate, but according to rough estimates, it was about ~300 ships of various classes. To destroy such a large armored force, even today it would require the involvement of very serious naval missile-carrying and aviation forces. Any of those battleships is not a cardboard-plastic Sheffield and it will not burn and sink after being hit by a single Exocet anti-ship missile. It would also not be a strong exaggeration to say that that fleet was more powerful than, say, the Patriotic Navy of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War10. For a predominantly agricultural country like Tsarist Russia, creating such a large ocean-going fleet was a real achievement. The flagship of the Russian Pacific Fleet was the newest squadron battleship "Tsesarevich". The strike core of the Baltic Fleet were four Borodino-class battleships. Already during the war, the fleet was replenished with the fifth battleship of this type, Slava.
"Eagle" is one of the ships of the "Borodino" series. It was an improved model of the “Tsarevich”. The outlines of its hull are somewhat reminiscent of the hulls of today's URO frigates built using Stealth technology. It differed from the prototype in a new hull 121 meters long, improved armor, an improved design of a number of components and assemblies, and a slightly modified composition of auxiliary weapons. Displacement: 13516 tons. Like the prototype, at the time of construction it was considered one of the most powerful and advanced warships of its time.
Imperial Japanese Navy(IJN). After the defeat of the Chinese fleet at the Battle of Yalu, the Japanese fleet began to rapidly increase its combat capabilities. When building its fleet, Japan relied on British assistance. The resources of the Japanese economy were enough to create a group of six squadron battleships with similar characteristics and six armored cruisers. In addition, they had two more old I-class battleships: “Chin-Yen” and “Fuso”, of which “Chin-Yen” was captured from the Chinese. Since the number of attack warships was small, some of the large-caliber guns were placed on light armored cruisers such as Matsushima and Takasago, which were poorly suited for this purpose. The list of warships of the Japanese fleet that carried more or less large calibers on board is as follows:
table 2
Mikasa | Squadron battleship. Newest. Japanese fleet. |
|
Shikishima | ||
Asahi | Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Hatsuse | Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Fuji | Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Yashima | Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Chin-Yen | 1st class battleship. Old. Japanese fleet. |
|
Fuso | Casemate battleship. Old. Japanese fleet. |
|
Asama | ||
Tokiwa | Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Azuma | Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Yakumo | Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Izumo | Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Iwate | Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Matsushima | ||
Itsukushima | Cruiser of the 1st rank. Old. Japanese fleet. |
|
Hashidate | Cruiser of the 1st rank. Old. Japanese fleet. |
|
Takasago | ||
Chitose | Cruiser of the 1st rank. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Kasagi | Cruiser of the 1st rank. New. Japanese fleet. |
Thus, the Japanese fleet, along with battleships and light cruisers that were absolutely unsuitable for confrontation, could oppose the might of the Russian fleet: 3 guns of 320mm caliber, 28 of 305mm caliber, 4 – 240mm guns and 30 – 203mm guns. A simple mathematical calculation shows that in terms of heavy weapons, the potential of the Japanese fleet was at least three times inferior to the Russian one. Of the 20 ships, no more than 12, that is, 60%, could be considered modern and truly suitable for a general battle. The characteristics of the others did not leave them any decent chance of survival under fire even from the old Russian squadron battleships. Of the 38 Russian attack ships, 35, that is, 92%, could be considered to one degree or another suitable for a general battle. The flagship of the Imperial Japanese Navy was the battleship Mikasa.
Squadron battleship "Mikasa". Its design was traditional for ships of this class of that period. Structurally, it repeated the British models: low side, low superstructures, mostly citadel armor, turret gun mounts of only the main caliber. Relatively low-powered medium-caliber guns were located in on-board casemate installations low above the water. The ship was more optimized for combat on flat water rather than for movement. At the same time, the large size of its body made all its characteristics very decent. Its displacement is 15352 tons. The closest analogue to this ship in the Russian Navy is the squadron battleship Retvizan.
The entire Japanese fleet consisted of about 100 warships of various classes, but unlike the Russian fleet, all these 100 ships were concentrated like a fist in one theater of operations. Of the ~300 warships of the Russian fleet, about 100 took direct part in the war with Japan, that is, about 30%. Already during the war, the Japanese fleet was replenished with two Italian-built armored cruisers: Nissin and Kassuga.
Results: Without delving at this stage into all the nuances of manning ships, their maintenance and repair, combat training of personnel, choosing commanders and assessing their professional suitability, but simply laconically noting that “at some stage something went wrong” , we can say that all this gigantic armored power of the Russian fleet was lost in the most mediocre way. Moreover, without any serious damage to the enemy. Data on the losses of the Japanese fleet are shown in Table 3. They only cause a bitter smile.
Table 3
Losses of the Japanese fleet in the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Battleships (ESB) Light cruisersI-rank (KRL) Light cruisersII-rank (KRL) Gunboats (KL) Destroyers (DES) Troop transports (TR) Torpedo boats (TK) |
Total 24 combat and auxiliary ships. Of these, 13 ships were sunk by mines (54%), 6 ships by artillery (25%), 0 ships by torpedoes (0%), and 1 ship by the combined action of artillery and torpedoes (<1%) и от навигационных происшествий потери составили 4 корабля (17%). Затоплено и брошено экипажами в результате полученных повреждений 0 кораблей (0%). Сдано в плен так же 0 кораблей (0%). Тот факт, что более половины всех безвозвратно потерянных Японией кораблей флота было уничтожено минами – оружием по своему характеру пассивно - оборонительно типа, говорит о крайней пассивности и бездействии ударного Российского флота в период БД на море. Все боевые действия на море свелись к двум крупным сражениям, нескольким приличным боям и локальным боестолкновениям отдельных крупных кораблей и легких сил. Такое ощущение, что даже в бою, наши корабли воевали как будто из под палки, нехотя, без инициативно и всячески стараясь уклониться от сражения. В дальнейшем этому будет приведено не одно подтверждение, как будут и рассмотрены все случае отдельных «вспышек» прояснения сознания и боевого духа. Такая тактика наших высших адмиралов привела к потерям, с которыми можно ознакомиться в таблице 4.
Table 4
Losses of the Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Battleships (ESB)
Coastal defense battleships (BRBO)
Armored cruisers (ARC)
Armored cruisersI-th rank (KRL)
CruisersII-rank (KRL)
Gunboats (KL)
Minelayers (MZ)
Destroyers (DES)
Troop transports (VT) and auxiliary ships.
Torpedo boats (TK)
|
The total losses of the Russian Imperial Navy exceeded the losses of the US Navy during the four years of the Pacific War of 1941-1945. Sad list of 64 lost ships distributed as follows: 20 ships (31%) were sunk by artillery fire, the Japanese did not manage to sink a single Russian ship with torpedoes alone - 0 (0%), the combined action of artillery and torpedoes destroyed 3 ships (5%), 6 were killed by mines ships (9%). Abandoned/sunk/exploded by their crews as a result of damage from artillery fire/torpedoes/mines/simply hopelessness and not knowing what to do: 27 ships (42%!), 5 ships were captured by the enemy (8%), lost as a result of navigational damage 3 ships (5%). The most direct and most important responsibility for these gigantic losses, in addition to the tsarist regime itself, lies with very specific people. These are admirals: Z.P. Rozhestvensky, V.K. Vitgeft, O.V. Stark. It was in their hands that all the power and the right to make all the fateful decisions that were made or not made were concentrated. As for Admiral N.I. Nebogatov, he can be blamed for a lack of courage/will/spirit, but he cannot be blamed for lack of professionalism or lack of knowledge of his business. Admiral S.O. Makarov generally proved himself to be a competent and active leader, who knew his business perfectly and was confident in his weapon. Admiral O.A. Enquist may have been a good specialist in his field, but for one reason or another he was unable to prove himself. We will consider the contribution to increasing the combat effectiveness of the fleet of some of these people below.
Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov is one of the outstanding Russian admirals. Born in 1848. He died in 1904 on board the battleship Petropavlovsk (he was the flagship of the 1st Pacific Squadron during the repair of the Tsesarevich). The cause of death from one single mine was a fatal accident and shortcomings in the defense of Petropavlovsk. It was booked primarily as a citadel, similar to the British and Japanese EDBs. When a mine exploded in the bow of the ship, a sequential detonation of the torpedo ammunition occurred, then the barrage mines stored in the bow, and finally, the entire ammunition of the 1st main caliber gun mount. The 56-year-old admiral had little chance of escape in such a situation (his place was not far from the epicenter of the last explosion). Under the command of this man, the Russian fleet had every chance of successfully defeating the enemy. A fatal coincidence of circumstances put an end to this scenario.
However, many modern post-Soviet researchers of that war very often turn that situation upside down. His “Holiness,” “Adjutant General” Z.P. Rozhestvensky simply cannot be guilty of anything. It’s all the fault of the outdated and, in their opinion, worthless equipment, as well as the illiterate crews of these “floating galoshes” who know nothing about war. To justify this position, many myths were invented, designed to “shift the needle” of blame for the shameful defeat on civilian specialists, factories, MTC, anyone, but not officers. We will try to consider these myths below. So:
Half-myth No. 1: Overload of Russian battleships. Because of this, they say, they died “so quickly.” Here it is necessary to understand the difference. Civilian specialists create military equipment and carry out current/medium/overhaul repairs, while military specialists operate it, fight with it, and carry out various maintenance. It is necessary to distinguish between construction and operational overload of ships. Construction overload is the fault of civilians. Operational overload is the fault of the military. Regarding construction overload. At that time, this phenomenon was widespread and therefore it could even be called “normal.” Indeed, the Borodino-class battleships were designed to have a displacement of 13,516 tons, but in reality they contained 14,150 tons of iron. Construction overload amounted to 634 tons. But the level of engineering calculations of that period simply did not allow us to calculate all the loads absolutely accurately. The construction overload of the Japanese battleship "Mikasa" was even greater - 785 tons, and yet none of the Japanese military complained about the deterioration of stability or other performance characteristics of the "Mikasa". Operational overload – exceeding the ship's carrying capacity. During the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, all battleships were so filled with coal, water, provisions and other supplies that the displacement of Borodino-class battleships, according to engineer V.P. Kostenko, reached 17,000 tons! What fighting qualities are there with such a “weight”! No measures were taken to correct the situation even before the battle, as a result of which the displacement of the Borodino-class attack ships before the Battle of Tsushima was unacceptably large - 15,275 tons. The proposal of the "Eagle" officers to prepare the ships for battle before the general battle, coupled with their radical unloading, was rejected for idiotic reasons: "The "Eagle" officers love to play war too much." This is the fault of the military, namely Z.P. Rozhestvensky.
Myth No. 2: Low speed of Russian ships. This myth has a simple explanation. Speed is needed for active actions. Those who do not take any active actions do not need speed. The Japanese used the speed of their ships, which is called “to the fullest.” The Russians used it only when their ships, for one reason or another (usually damage), were deprived of the “guardianship” of the commander (and it was too late) and just to escape, and not to overtake. In addition, the maximum speed of a ship depends not only on its passport data, but also on its specific technical condition, and on the combat damage it received. The maximum squadron speed of the Japanese squadron was 15 knots, at most 15.5 knots and was limited by the speed of its slowest ship - EBRB 1 "Fuji" (for technical reasons it could not develop more than 15.5 knots). The squadron speed of the 1st Pacific Squadron was 14.5-15 knots. The EBR "Sevastopol" did not produce more than 15kt due to a bent propeller blade. The squadron speed of the 2nd Pacific Squadron has not been tested in practice, but theoretically it could have been about 15-15.5 knots because there was no ship in the squadron slower than 15.5 kts (“Nikolai-I” - 15.5 kts, “Navarin” - 15.8 kts, “Sisoy the Great” - 15.6 kts, 2nd type BRBO “Ushakov” all issued 16 kts). During the night attempt to break away from the enemy, the old battleship Nikolai-I under the flag of N.I. Nebogatov, the heavily damaged Orel, the Sevyanin and Apraksin ballistic missile carriers, as well as the II-rank cruiser Izumrud easily supported speed 13-14kt. Conclusion: The squadron speed of Russian attack ships, if at all, was lower than the Japanese, it was not by much. The fact that Z.P. Rozhestvensky trudged along in battle at a speed of 9 knots (only 17 km/h - slower than a river pleasure boat), dragging transports behind him, is his fault, not the low speed capabilities of his warships.
Myth No. 3. Russian ships were inferior in range to Japanese ones. There were figures about the Japanese firing range at 82 cables and even 100(!) cables. The myth is explained in the same way as speed. The Japanese fought actively and used the capabilities of their artillery 100%. Of course, there could be no talk of any targeted shooting at such gigantic distances for that time. But the Japanese did sometimes shoot at long distances. Domestic ships almost always only fired back and stopped firing as soon as the enemy stopped firing. All without initiative and sluggishly (more detailed descriptions of this will be given below). In order to shoot at long distances, three conditions must be met:
1. Artillery must have the technical ability to fire at such distances, in other words, be sufficiently long-range. Civilian specialists are responsible for this.
2. The fire control system of warships must provide a sufficiently high probability of hitting a target at long distances. Civilian specialists are also responsible for this.
3. Artillerymen of all levels must have proper training and practice in organizing and conducting shooting at such distances. Have good command of the military equipment entrusted to them and be able to handle it correctly. The military is already responsible for this.
Unfortunately, it was the military that turned out to be the “weak link” here. Regarding technical issues. Only one Japanese ship could fire at 100 kbt - the Italian-built armored cruiser Kassuga. And only from one single 254mm cannon. Its 203mm cannon, like its twin brother the Nissin, fired at 87kbt. As for the new Japanese battleships, their main caliber artillery was of two types. The 305mm/L42.5 EBR guns “Fuji” and “Yashima” at a maximum angle of +13.5° could fire at a maximum of 77 kbt. The slightly more powerful 305mm/L42.5 guns of Mikasa, Asahi, Hatsuse and Shikishima had a lower maximum elevation angle - +12.5° and fired at maximum 74kbt. Maximum firing range of 203mm main caliber guns of Japanese armored cruisers such as Asama, Yakumo, etc. was only 60-65kbt, which was approximately at the level of modern 152mm medium-caliber gun mounts on Russian ships. Russian experts paid, perhaps, the greatest attention after the German fleet to the issue of ensuring at least the technical ability to fire at the maximum possible distances. The elevation angle of the main caliber guns of Russian battleships was +15°, +25° and even +35°. The squadron battleship Pobeda was considered the longest-range in the entire Russian fleet. It was equipped with more modern 254mm/L45 guns, which differed from the previous 10-inch guns in increased weight, strength and barrel rigidity. As a result, its 225-kilogram main-caliber projectiles, with an initial speed increased to 777 m/s, flew at 113 kbt. The 254mm guns of the other two ships of this series, “Oslyab” and “Peresvet,” as well as the ballistic missile launcher “Admiral Apraksin,” fired at 91 kbt. All “12-inch” battleships with 305mm/L40 guns fired at 80kbt at an angle of +15°. BRBO "Ushakov" and "Sevyanin" fired at 63 kbt. The firing range of the old squadron battleships was shorter: the Navarin had 54 kbt, the Nikolai-I had 51 kbt for 229mm/L35 and 49 kbt for 305mm/L30 guns.
As for the fire control system, its 4x optics and rangefinders with a base of 1200 mm even then made it possible to conduct more or less effective fire at a distance of up to ~60 kbt (10-12 km). Russian battleships of new and latest types received the latest fire control system “mod.1899”. Its structure can be judged from the description of the squadron battleship "Eagle":
SUAO mod.1899. The set of instruments was first presented at an exhibition in Paris in 1899 and was installed on many RIF battleships. It was the prototype of modern central guidance systems. The basis of the system was two sighting posts (VP) - one per side.
Pancratic, optical, monocular devices of these posts - central aiming sights (VCN) had a variable magnification factor - 3x-4x. The search for the target and pointing the weapon at it was carried out by the VP operator. When pointing the VCN at a target, the elevation angle of the target relative to the center plane of the ship was determined on a scale, and the tracking system associated with it automatically set this angle with an arrow in the receiving instruments of the main 8 turret guns and batteries of the ship’s 75 mm guns. After this, the gunners-operators (commanders) carried out horizontal aiming of their installations until the angle of rotation of the gun was aligned with the elevation angle of the target (the so-called “arrow alignment” principle) and the target fell into the field of view of the gun optical sights. Optical, pancratic, monocular sights of the Perepelkin system had a variable magnification factor - 3x-4x and a field of view angle changing in accordance with it - 6 - 8 degrees. To illuminate the target in the dark, six combat searchlights with a mirror diameter of 750 mm were used. The next step was to determine the distance to the target. For this purpose, there were two rangefinder stations in the conning tower - one per side. They were equipped with horizontal base rangefinders “Barr and Studd” with a base of 1200 mm.
The rangefinder measured the distance and, using the rangefinder key, the data was automatically entered into the receiving devices of the conning tower, central post, 8 main turret guns and batteries of 75 mm guns. To monitor the correctness of data transmission, there was a feedback system with a control rangefinder dial, the readings of which were compared with those entered into the receiving devices. Sighting posts and rangefinder stations were located inside the conning tower on the right and left sides (a pair on each side), which is why the Eagle's conning tower had an oval shape in the transverse direction from the center plane of the ship. A set of instruments and a magnetic compass in the conning tower showed the senior artillery officer his own course and speed, direction and strength of the wind. He determined the course and speed of the target approximately “by eye.” Having data on his own speed and course, direction and strength of wind, deviation, type of target, elevation angle of the target and distance to it, estimating the approximate speed and course of the target - the senior artillery officer, using firing tables, made the necessary calculations manually (on paper) and calculated the necessary corrections for the leads for VN and GN. I also chose the type of gun and the type of shells needed to hit a given target. After this, the senior artillery officer transmitted guidance data to the control unit, from which he intended to hit the target. For this purpose, in the conning tower and the central post there was a set of master indicator devices, which transmitted data through 47 cable cores to receiving devices in the AC and 75 mm batteries. The entire system operated at voltage Uр=23V through a 105/23V transformer. In the case of centralized fire control, they transmitted data on vertical and horizontal guidance angles and the type of projectiles used. After receiving the necessary data, the gunners-operators of the selected guns installed the guns at specified angles (corrected the initial installation according to the VCN) and loaded them with the selected type of ammunition. After performing this operation, the senior artillery officer, who was in the conning tower at the moment when the inclinometer showed “0”, positioned the handle of the fire indicator device in the sector corresponding to the selected fire mode “Shot”, “Attack” or “Short alarm”, in accordance with which The guns opened fire. This centralized fire control mode was the most effective. In the event of the failure of the senior artillery officer or the impossibility for any other reason to carry out centralized fire control, all 305 mm, 152 mm artillery guns and a battery of 75 mm guns switched to group (plutong) or single fire. In this case, the instruments transmitted data about their course, their speed, the direction and strength of the wind, the elevation angle of the target, and the distance to it, but all calculations were made by the commander of the gun or battery. This fire mode was less effective. In the event of complete destruction of fire control devices, conning tower personnel and data transmission circuits, all guns switched to independent fire. In this case, the choice of target and targeting it was carried out by calculating a specific gun using only a gun optical sight, which sharply limited its effectiveness and range. The torpedo tubes were aimed using ring sights with the same tracking system as the VP for onboard 381mm torpedo tubes or by turning the entire hull of the vessel for the bow and stern 381mm torpedo tubes. This fire control system ensured high efficiency in the use of naval artillery and torpedoes against various targets and made it possible to simultaneously “drive” two targets - one from each side. However, it should be noted that the officers and gunners of the Russian squadron battleships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron have poorly mastered this system. For external communications, the ship had a Slyabi-Arco radio station. It was located in the radio room on the first tier of the bow superstructure and provided communications at a distance of 180-200 km.
The third point remains. Exercises and combat training. In this aspect, the Russian fleet certainly lagged behind the Japanese. The Japanese regularly conducted exercises and practiced shooting. Since the new fire control devices were then too complex for ordinary sailors to understand their operation (much less integrate them into a system), fire control and fire control methods were developed, if not the most ideal, but at least the most effective from the point of view of those specific conditions. shooting. One of them is the so-called. "the art of massive fire." Its essence is that without any use of the fire control system (measuring the distance only once), they begin to shoot extremely actively with medium and small caliber artillery. After this, they wait for the target to be covered. All fire adjustments are carried out not by changing the input data and adjusting the fire of the guns themselves, but by directly changing the position of the group of ships (closer - further to the target). Despite the enormous consumption of medium-caliber shells, such tactics bore fruit at that time. Moreover, the Japanese targets (that is, our ships) contributed in the best possible way to its success. At the same time, this method of “massive fire” was never used by anyone again. Perhaps due to the fact that the enemies were no longer so stupid. As for our artillerymen, they worked according to instructions. And they tried to master the work of the control system. Not everyone succeeded. If the lower ranks of the artillery were somehow still able to master their subject, then almost no effort was made to this by the higher ranks. As for the firing range, the command of the 1st Pacific Squadron, although belatedly, realized the role of new, powerful and long-range guns, as well as a modern fire control system. And it seems that we began to develop measures adequate to the current situation. But time was already hopelessly lost. The command of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was still blissfully unaware of the combat capabilities of enemy and own ships. All those criminally rare practice shootings were carried out at a distance of no further than 20 kbt. Thus, the gunners of the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the battle with the Japanese without any long-range shooting practice at all. The exception is the 3rd Pacific Squadron of Admiral N.I. Nebogatov (joined the 2nd Pacific Squadron). Admiral Nebogatov proved himself to be a good specialist in artillery. He trained his gunners well to fire from the widest possible ranges. As luck would have it, Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov’s squadron consisted only of outdated or small ships. However, despite the fact that the battleship Nikolai-I was essentially the oldest and weakest battleship of the Russian Pacific Fleet, its fire turned out to be almost the most effective! The old ship, still firing charges of black powder, achieved hits at distances of up to 50 cables, i.e. at the maximum possible range for your artillery! In all likelihood, it was its 305mm and 229mm shells that caused heavy damage to the Japanese armored cruiser Asama, which had to withdraw from the battle. Thus, the cruiser “Varyag” was to some extent avenged. Unfortunately, this combat training did not affect the crews of the newest attack ships; otherwise, even with such a “brilliant” commander as Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, the Japanese could probably have been crushed by the power of the Borodintsev.
Semi myth #4. Bad shells on Russian ships. They allegedly did not penetrate armor well and practically did not explode. Russian "12-inch" battleships used 305mm armor-piercing and fragmentation shells of the 1887 model, weighing 331.7 kg. The “10-inch” ships had 254mm armor-piercing shells of the 1892 model, weighing 225.2 kg. Japanese battleships fired 305mm armor-piercing and high-explosive shells weighing 386kg. Let's start with armor-piercing ones. Their comparative characteristics are shown in Table 5.
Table 5
Artillery system | Projectile | Weight | Explosive charge | starting speed | Thickness of armor penetrated at point-blank range Kruppovskaya | Thickness of pierced armor with 60 kbt Kruppovskaya |
Russian 305mm/L40 | Armor-piercing | 331.7kg | 5.3 kg pyroxylin | 792m/s | 381mm/0 ° | 99mm/0 ° |
Japanese 305mm/L42.5 | Armor-piercing | 385.6kg | 11.9 kg picric acid | 762m/s | 368mm/0 ° | 104mm/0 ° |
Russian 254mm/L45 | Armor-piercing | 225.2kg | 8.3 kg pyroxylin | 693m/s | 343mm/0 ° | 84mm/0 ° |
As can be seen from Table 5, all shells are quite worth each other. What is surprising is that the 254mm shells of Russian ships, with almost half the kinetic energy compared to 305mm shells, were nevertheless almost as good as them in armor penetration. As for the armor penetration itself, Table 5 shows that the characteristics of both Russian and Japanese armor-piercing shells made them ineffective against the powerful armor of battleships at long distances. Their effective use against heavily armored targets was limited by distance<20-30 кабельтовых. На больших расстояниях шансов пробить защиту ЖВЧ любого броненосца практически не было. Эти данные подтвердила и реальная практика. Несмотря на все усилия русских и японских артиллеристов за время сражений так ни разу и не удалось пробить Крупповскую броневую плиту толще чем 152мм. Так же стоит отметить, что для 305мм/L35 орудий «Наварина» существовали и более тяжелые 305мм снаряды массой 455кг. Но они почему то не были включены в боекомплект этого корабля. Использование таких «чемоданов» в современных артустановках с орудиями 305мм/L40 у новых кораблей – вопрос требующий дальнейших исследований, так как доподлинно не известно, были ли приспособлены лотки МЗ 9 у новейших «Бородинцев» и «Цесаревича» к приему таких более длинных снарядов. Потому на расстояниях свыше 30 кабельтовых имело смысл переходить на осколочные и фугасные снаряды. Их сравнительные характеристики приведены в таблице 6.
Table 6
Artillery system | Projectile | Weight | Explosive charge | starting speed |
Russian 305mm/L40 | Fragmentation | 331.7kg | 15.6 kg pyroxylin | 792m/s |
Russian 305mm/L40 | High Explosive | 331.7kg | 25kg pyroxylin | 792m/s |
Japanese 305mm/L42.5 | High Explosive | 385.6kg | 48.5 kg picric acid | 762m/s |
At first glance, it seems that Japanese high-explosive shells are completely superior to Russian ones3. This is partly true. Especially if we add to our shells the humidity of pyroxylin increased from 10% to 30%. But not everything is so great. Firstly, the fuses on Japanese high-explosive shells were set to instantaneous action at the slightest touch. This led to a number of explosions of these shells directly in the barrels of the Japanese guns, which naturally led to the failure of these guns. Secondly, for any armored vehicle, it is the explosion inside its armored body that is most dangerous. Even a powerful high-explosive explosion from outside is not capable of causing serious damage, but will only spoil the “cosmetics”. Therefore, for combating armored targets, armor-piercing and semi-armor-piercing shells with delayed-action fuses are primarily good. Japanese NOT-shells were very effective against light cruisers, but it turned out to be extremely difficult to destroy the Borodinets, which were armored from head to toe, albeit overloaded, with them. The Japanese themselves understood this very well, which is why, along with landmines, they actively used armor-piercing shells against Russian battleships. Conclusion - the myth about the bad shells of Russian ships is, of course, not a myth in the full sense of the word - it is partly a fact. And the blame for this lies with civilian specialists, but its significance should not be exaggerated beyond measure either. The opponents’ shells were not so ideal either.
Myth #5. Small armor area of Russian ships. At that time, there were two main armoring schemes for heavy ships in the world: the English one, also known as the “all or nothing” scheme, and the French one, which was widespread. According to the first, the ship’s high-resistance cores are covered with the thickest possible armor, and all other parts of it either have weak protection or lack it at all. It was according to this scheme that the Japanese and many of our battleships were booked. However, in the design of the newest ships “Tsesarevich” and the “Borodino” series, domestic designers, taking the best of both schemes as a basis, brought the armor of these ships to perfection. The protection of the Tsarevich and the Borodino series turned out to be so powerful, so modern that, in principle, it corresponded to the battleships and large heavy cruisers of the Second World War. This provided reliable protection for these ships even from dreadnought “suitcases”. The battle between Slava and the powerful German dreadnoughts König and Kronprinz Wilhelm in 1917 clearly proved this. Despite receiving seven 305mm shells (each weighing 405.5 kg), three of which hit the underwater part of the hull below the waist, the battleship Slava did not receive serious damage. And if it weren’t for the watertight door that was not closed due to someone’s carelessness (and if it weren’t for the revolution), then we could have continued to fight. The armor scheme of the battleship "Eagle" is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 8
The most heavily protected area in the center of the ship at the waterline, approximately 60m long and about 0.8m high, has protection of: 194mm/0° + 40mm/30° + 40mm/0° = equivalent to 314mm Krupp armor4. This was more than enough to withstand any armor-piercing shells of the time. At the same time, all high-velocity units, artillery, torpedo tubes, as well as areas near the surface of the water were also protected by fairly powerful armor. And the total armor thickness of all armored decks ranged from 72mm, 91mm, 99mm, 127mm, 142mm, 145mm - not bad figures even for huge battleships of the Second World War. The protection of Japanese ships was much simpler and approximately corresponded to our battleships of the Poltava, Retvizan, Sisoy the Great, etc. projects. In addition, all Japanese battleships with the exception of the Mikasa were clad in Harvey armor. The projectile resistance of Harvey's armor correlates with Krupp's armor as 0.8 to 1, that is, Harvey's armor was inferior in projectile resistance to Krupp's (on new Russian ships) by 20%. Only the flagship Japanese battleship Mikasa had truly powerful armor. In addition, we should not forget that half of the Japanese attack ships were armored cruisers, the level of protection of which was even lower in comparison with squadron battleships.
Half-myth No. 6: Large sizes of sighting slits and embrasures in Russian ships. The width of the sighting slits on the battleship “Tsesarevich” and the “Borodino” series was a huge 380mm. This was a necessary measure because the designers placed in the conning tower all the elements of the control system of these ships, incl. DS, VP and ring sights of onboard torpedo tubes. To ensure normal visibility of all this optics, it was necessary to make slits of this width. The desire of the designers to place the entire control system under the armor of the conning tower can be explained. Firstly, the control system had not yet developed so much and the weight and size characteristics of its elements still made it possible to arrange them in the ballistic missile system - the most protected place in the upper part of the ship.
Secondly, the typical combat distances of that time: 30-60 kbt meant that in addition to rare single hits from large-caliber shells, the ship was simultaneously under a hail of small and medium caliber shells: 75mm, 76mm, 152mm. It is obvious that bulky and poorly protected control towers, sighting guidance posts and other elements of the control system, if they were openly located, would be destroyed by these seemingly harmless shells in the very first minutes of the battle. However, with regard to protection from shells, the conning towers of domestic ships were designed well.
They had a mushroom-shaped roof protruding beyond the side armor of the wheelhouse and anti-fragmentation visors. As a result, the penetration of shells into the conning tower was practically eliminated, which was confirmed in real combat practice. Despite the enormous number of hits suffered by Russian battleships, virtually no cases of shells penetrating into ballistic missiles have been recorded. However, the command staff nevertheless suffered greatly from shrapnel, while being inside the conning towers. But this is primarily due to the gigantic number of hits and the high characteristics of Japanese high-explosive fragmentation shells. But, as you know, everything is learned by comparison. The famous Soviet writer A.S. Novikov wrote in his novel “Tsushima”: “Inspection slits in Japanese ships were made in such a way that even a small fragment could not penetrate through them into the conning tower...” With all due respect to Alexey Silych, you need to understand that that he was not a specialist in the field of shipbuilding and could only evaluate the perfection of the design of the conning towers of Japanese ships purely visually. A photograph will help you estimate the size of the sighting slits of Japanese battleships. In addition, the Japanese would not be Japanese if they had not decided on a very original step from the point of view of straightforward European logic - the commanders of the Japanese attack ships, Vice Admiral Togo and Rear Admiral Kamimura, chose not to “get into” the conning towers of their ships at all! Admiral Togo spent the entire battle exposing his chest, covered with epaulettes and medals, to all the winds (and shells) on the upper navigation bridge of the Mikasa. That is, completely openly... By an evil coincidence, a Russian 305mm fragmentation shell that exploded right above the bridge killed and wounded everyone who was on it. Except…. EXCEPT…. Of course, Vice Admiral Heihachiro Togo. Admiral Kamimura also spent the entire battle on the combat top of the mainmast and also remained alive. The fact that both Japanese admirals survived and did not even receive serious injuries testifies only to the extreme luck that accompanied them and the evil fate that haunted Russian ships throughout this war. In addition, the very low characteristics of domestic fragmentation and high-explosive shells also had an impact.
The conning tower of the Japanese battleship Mikasa. View from the stern of the ship. It can be seen that the size of the sighting slits is also quite decent, although smaller than those of our ships. In addition, this cabin does not have “eyebrows” in the form of an overhanging mushroom-shaped roof, so penetration of shells falling at an angle is in principle possible. Admiral Togo stood two floors above throughout the battle...
As for the size of the embrasures... The dimensions of the embrasures in the turrets of the Japanese main battery gun mounts were smaller than those of the Russians, but the vertical pumping angle of their guns was also smaller, this should not be forgotten. In addition, the AU GK turrets of Russian battleships were streamlined and protected by 254mm thick Krupp armor, which made them invulnerable to any shells of that time at typical combat distances. The rotating parts of the Japanese main guns of the Fuji and Yashima EBR main guns were much more modestly armored - only 152mm and were potentially vulnerable to AP shells from Russian ships. The Japanese battleship Fuji, which ours actually penetrated through the 152mm armor of the 12” gun mount (thus confirming my logical conclusions), almost exploded because... After this, a fire started and the charges in the tower and supply pipe had already ignited. The fire miraculously “extinguished itself” with water from a broken pipeline, which we again attribute to the “conscience” of evil fate. But all this applies only to large (main) caliber artillery. The level of any type of protection for the 152mm turret gun mounts of the newest Russian battleships was two orders of magnitude higher than the protection of medium-caliber guns and their crews on Japanese ships. This photo doesn’t really need any comments, but still:
Battery deck of the Japanese battleship Mikasa. You don’t need to have a wild imagination to imagine what would happen to the crews of all these guns if even one more or less decent shell exploded here... Just meat. This design is no different from the technical solutions used in wooden battleships of the sailing era. The size of their “embrasures” also seems to hint... A good gate. On the Russian Borodino-class battleships, 75mm anti-mine guns were located in separate casemates with 76mm armor on their walls in a circle. There are many historians who are happy to criticize the 152mm twin turret guns of the newest Russian battleships. They somehow forgot that all the medium-caliber artillery of the battleship Oslyabya, which was located in the same casemate installations as on the Mikas, was completely destroyed just 20 minutes after the start of the battle.
The obvious conclusion is that the Japanese ships simply had good high-explosive fragmentation shells (with all their shortcomings), and not super invulnerable conning towers, ultra-small embrasures or anything else. And most importantly, the Japanese samurai fought, and did not weakly fight back like ours. There is a good phrase from the film “Antikiller”. In this case, of course, it is exaggerated, but it reflects the essence quite accurately: “Because they are at war, and we are at work...” Comparative characteristics of the most basic types of attack ships of the Russian and Japanese fleets are given in Table 7.
Table 7
TTX | Eagle | Poltava | Oslyabya | Mikasa | Fuji | Asama |
Type | EDB | EDB | EDB | EDB | EDB | KRB23 |
Displacement etc. |
13516 |
11500 |
12674 |
15352 |
12320 |
9900 |
Engine power hp |
15800 |
11255 |
15051 |
16000 |
14000 |
18200 |
Travel speed knots / km/h |
17,8 / 33 |
16,3 / 30,2 |
18,6 / 34,4 |
18,5 / 34,3 |
18,3 / 33,9 |
22,1 / 40,9 |
Large caliber artillery | Obukhov
| Obukhov
| Obukhov
| Amstrong
| Amstrong
| Amstrong
|
Muzzle energy MJ |
106,1 |
106,1 |
55 |
112,1 |
105,1 |
34,9 |
Drives
| A3
| A
| A
| A
| A
| A
|
Firing range kbt/km |
80/14,8 |
80/14,8 |
91/16,8 |
74/13,7 |
77/14,3 |
60/11,18 |
Thickness of pierced armor from 50 kbt normal mm |
129/0°
|
129/0°
|
109/0°
|
140/0°
|
n.d. |
56/0°
|
Fire rate
|
90 |
90 |
90 |
75 |
150 |
3011 |
Medium caliber artillery | Kane 6-2x152mm
| Kane
| Kane 11-152mm
| Amstrong 14-152mm
| Amstrong 10-152mm
| Amstrong 14-152mm
|
Muzzle energy MJ |
13,3 |
13,3 |
13,3 |
10,4 |
10,4 |
10,4 |
Drives
| A
| M-PA5
| M6
| M
| M
| M
|
Firing range kbt/km |
61/11,3 |
61/11,3 |
61/11,3 |
49/9,1 |
49/9,1 55/10,210 |
49/9,1 55/10,2 |
Thickness of pierced armor from 30 kbt normal mm |
43/0°
|
43/0°
|
43/0°
|
35/0°
|
35/0°
|
35/0°
|
Fire rate
|
12 |
10-12 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
Torpedo weapons |
4-381mm | 4-381mm
|
5-381mm |
4-457mm |
5-457mm |
5-457mm |
Torpedo launch range km
|
0,9 | 0,9
|
0,9 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
Rangefinder stations DS
| F2A/2
PC
| F2A/2
PC
| F2A/2
PC
| F2A/2
PC
| F2A/2
PC
| F2A/2
PC
|
Central aiming sights VCN | 2 pcs on sighting posts VP1 4 inside BR |
No |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Bearing guidance | Semi-automatic - central according to the VCN15 tracking system |
Local |
Local |
Local |
Local |
Local |
Range guidance | Local instrument | Local instrument | Local instrument | Local instrument |
Local |
Local |
Calculation of lead angles VN and GN | Manual
| Manual
| Manual
| Manual
| Manual
| Manual
|
Transfer of data of lead angles VN and GN to the control unit |
| For transmitting and receiving devices of the control system | For transmitting and receiving devices of the control system | |||
Transfer of DS and bearing data to the control unit | Machine. according to the tracking system VCN and auto. long range input in the SLA from DS16 |
| Machine. long range input In the MSA from DS | |||
Defense of the citadel and HDM mm | 194/0°+40/30°
|
368/0°=368
| 229/0°+51/30°
| 229/0°+76/45°
|
457/0°=457
| 178/0°+51/30°
|
End protection mm | 145/0°+40/30°
|
76/45°=107
|
83/30°=166
| 102/0°+51/45°
|
No |
89/0°=89
|
Deck protection mm
| 51+40=91
|
51
|
51
| 51
|
64
|
51
|
PTZ mm | 40/0°
| Double bottom | Double bottom | Double bottom | Double bottom | Double bottom |
Protection AU24 GK mm | 254 tower
| 254 tower
| 229 tower
| 254 tower
| 152
tower
| 152 tower
|
Protection AU SK mm | 152 tower
| 127 tower
|
- |
- |
- |
- |
Protection of the side and casemate guns mm | 51-76
| 75
| 102-127
| 152
| 102-152
| 127-152
|
Note:
|
||||||
Having analyzed all the myths and facts listed, we gradually come to the conclusion that the most shameful defeat in the entire history of the Russian Navy does not lie in the quality of military equipment or the incompetence of civilian specialists. Of course, they also had sins. The main ones are weak OFS 5 and weak torpedo weapons. Powerful, long-range 457mm torpedoes were carried on board only by battleships of the Poltava class.
The rest made do with more modest ones, 381mm caliber. But there is a difference - either approaching the “wounded animal” at 2-3 km, or at 900 meters. However, torpedoes are generally the strong point of the Japanese. They frightened the Americans quite a bit with their huge Long Lances (which did not help the Japanese in other respects). But torpedoes are not the main thing! So why did this happen? And who is to blame for this? The main responsibility for such a defeat lies with:
1. Admirals Z.P.Rozhestvensky, V.K.Vitgeft, O.V.Stark.
2. The evil fate that has been pursuing our fleet throughout this war.
Let's look at these two main causes of defeat. Point one. Were these three people really clinical idiots who, with their own hands, strangled all the foundations of combat training, operation and maintenance of the ships and vessels entrusted to them? They really strangled all the bases, but they still weren’t idiots. These were people of a kind of ability that were in demand in the then royal fleet. The fleet, whose leadership seriously believed that victory could only be achieved by demonstrating the latest weapons to the enemy, did not need warriors. And they needed business executives. So that the ships would clearly keep in formation, not be delayed, they would always shine with new paint, the borders on the shore were also painted and all the leaves on the ground were turned over with the bright side up for the visit of “His Majesty”. All three were perfectly suited to carrying out such activities. Well, it’s worth admitting that they could also solve the problem of logistics (moving long distances). Logistics, to some extent, became one of the reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Pacific Squadron. The Japanese fleet entered the battle fresh, rested and prepared. The Russian squadron, after six months of difficult voyage, immediately entered the battle. And the fact that the combat potential of the fleet decreases by N% for every 1000 km away from its home base has been known for quite some time.
As for the second point, we come to one of the most interesting questions of that war - what could we do then? The author of these lines had to read many “alternative” versions of the Battle of Tsushima. They all started with the same thing: “But if only - (Makarov was in command / the battleships were not overloaded / the shells exploded well / Your version), then OOO………” What followed, perhaps quite logical, but completely delusional from the historical perspective point of view of reasoning. Historical processes have enormous inertia and by changing just one fact of history, it is simply unrealistic to fundamentally change the entire subsequent chain of events. To do this, it is necessary to change all previous events and fateful decisions in historical retrospect many years BEFORE a significant date in order to change the very logical chain that precedes it. This simply does not make any sense, as is clear to any schoolchild. The most “tasty” alternative is obvious - Admiral Makarov did not die, but continued to command the 1st Pacific Squadron. But it is practically impossible to calculate what would be reliably in this case. Therefore, without going into details regarding the 1st Pacific squadron, which is inactive and operating in cooperation with the ground forces, we will dwell in detail on the 2nd squadron of Z.P. Rozhestvensky. What could she count on as she exhausted herself into the Tsushima Strait on the evening of May 13, 1905, when the ship's radio stations had already detected the presence of the enemy fleet over the horizon? So let’s try to calculate what the 2nd Pacific Squadron could have done if... No, no - don’t be alarmed. If only she had just been lucky in battle this time. And two. Rozhdestvensky, no - he would not have replaced himself with another, equally gifted figure, but would have simply fallen seriously ill and spent the entire battle in the ship's first-aid post, without interfering with anyone's fight. Calculations show that in this case it would have been impossible to win anyway. The maximum that the 2nd Pacific Squadron could hope for in this case was to reduce the game to a draw.
So. A virtual reality. Morning of May 14th. Admiral Felkersam died. Admiral Rozhdestvensky is in serious condition in his cabin. Admirals Nebogatov and Enquist do not know about this and therefore are not even a little worried. The squadron is commanded by someone on the battleship “Prince Suvorov”. And so:
“At the beginning of the sixth, our signalmen and midshipman Shcherbachev, armed with binoculars and telescopes, noticed a steamer on the right, quickly approaching us. Having approached forty cable lengths, he laid down on a course parallel to us. But he walked like this for only a few minutes and, turning to the right, disappeared into the morning darkness. It had a speed of at least sixteen knots. They could not identify him, but his behavior immediately aroused suspicion - undoubtedly, he was a Japanese intelligence officer. It would be necessary to immediately send two fast cruisers after him. Whether they sank it or not, they would at least clarify an extremely important question: are we discovered by the enemy or are we still in the dark? And in accordance with this, the line of conduct of the squadron should have been determined. But Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not take any measures against the mysterious ship.
"Vladimir Monomakh" remained intact. The enemy shells undershot or overshot, and only one of them hit him. Commander Popov was jubilant. When the senior artilleryman Nozikov approached him, he, trying to drown out the hubbub of the chickens that had not yet calmed down, spoke solemnly:
- But we cleverly butchered him! How asked the streaker! He rushed away from us at full speed.”
In place of the previously sunk cruiser Izumi, there was another similar cruiser. After he turned to the right and, having increased his speed, began to move away, already having a trim on the bow and serious damage, the cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh", squeezing out all 16-17 knots from his old worn-out vehicles, caught up with the damaged Japanese cruiser and finally finished it off. The forces are simply not equal, the Japanese had no chance and there was nothing to stand around stupidly watching as he ran away. 32nd place. The destroyers were also lucky:
“About eleven o’clock a second destroyer appeared ahead on the right, intending to cross the course of the Loud.” Kern ordered to develop the full speed. The rear destroyer began to lag behind, and the one on the right approached and opened fire. There was a battle ahead with unequal forces. It was necessary to decide on something daring to get out of a difficult situation. And Commander Kern went for it. The miner's specialty suggested to the commander that the time had come to discharge the two surviving mine vehicles on the enemy. They were located on the upper deck. By his order, both mines were prepared for firing. “Loud” made a sharp turn and rushed towards the enemy walking behind. As we later learned, it was a Shiranui fighter. Kern decided to blow it up and then conduct an artillery duel with another destroyer. The distance between Shiranui and Loud was quickly closing. The team realized that the decisive moment had arrived. The gunners increased their fire. But at these moments the main role was given to the miners, who stood ready at their devices. Suddenly, near them, with a flash of short lightning, smoke curled up like a whirlwind on a dusty road. Something heavy separated from the fire and smoke and flew overboard. Senior Officer Paskin was pushed by the air into the casing near the rear chimney. Having recovered, he rushed to the scene of the explosion. The miners Abramov and Telegin lay dead near the apparatus, and all that remained of the mine conductor Bezdenezhnykh was his cap, thrown to the railing post. Lieutenant Paskin assigned miners Tsepelev, Bogoryadtsev and Ryadzievsky to the devices. The enemy was already approaching the beam. The distance to it did not exceed two cables. From the bridge, the commander ordered to release the mine from apparatus No. 1. But it barely moved out and, touching the side with its tail, fell into the water like a log.
- She drowned, you vile one! – the sharp-eyed signalman Skorodumov screamed on the bridge and cursed loudly. The commander, who was closely monitoring the actions of the miners, clenched his fists and, either in response to him or to clarify for himself what had happened, muttered through his teeth: “The gunpowder did not ignite well - it was damp.” The second mine, fired in pursuit of the enemy, went correctly to the target. They were already waiting for an explosion, but she, having reached the surface of the sea almost to the very stern, suddenly turned to the side, thrown back by the seething currents from the propellers. In this attack, all the advantages were on the side of “Loud.”
“Gromky” was lucky and the torpedo turned out to be serviceable. The Japanese destroyer Shiranui quickly set sail for the Yasukuni Shrine.
“The enemy, obviously, shot his mines last night, and his vehicles were secured in a marching manner.”
The destroyer Gromky launched a second torpedo at the second Japanese destroyer, but it managed to dodge and an artillery duel began. The excellent training of Kern's crew left him no chance. The Japanese destroyer received fatal damage, lost speed and sank after some time. The destroyer "Gromky" showed the highest class, destroying two Japanese destroyers in a duel and safely reaching Vladivostok. 32nd and 33rd places are occupied by Japanese destroyers. A day earlier, the duel between the armored giants continued. The Oslyabya, Suvorov and Alexander III had already been lost (the last two were still afloat and were still firing). Later, the crew of the destroyer “Buiny” staged lynching, throwing Vice Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky overboard with the wording “Missing in action.” The commander of the destroyer N.N. Kolomeytsev did not support the idea, but treated the situation with understanding. Admiral Heihachiro Togo stood on the upper navigation bridge along with his entire staff. A Russian 305mm fragmentation shell hit the foremast at the level of people's heads and exploded. From everyone on the upper navigation bridge, including and Admiral Heihachiro Togo, only shapeless stumps remained. So in one second the Japanese squadron was completely beheaded. And although command quickly passed into the hands of Rear Admiral Kamimura, the actions of the Japanese began to smack of mild hysteria, which usually happened to them as soon as something began to go against their plan.
The effectiveness of the fire of the Japanese squadron immediately dropped so much that the battleship Borodino had enough of its remaining power and survivability to “drag” the battle until dusk. Admiral Kamimura gave the order to stop the pursuit. After the onset of silence, the battleship "Borodino", controlled only by sailors and having vehicles in full working order, without unnecessary complexes, increased its speed to the maximum possible 17-18 kts (it was of no use in battle anyway), heading N/O-23 °. The Eagle, which received the same amount, tried to keep up with him, but due to the armor plate on the bow at the waterline turned “against the grain,” the speed did not rise above 16.5 knots. The remaining ships with the flagship "Nicholas-I" trailed behind at a speed of about 14 knots. The cruiser "Emerald" walked with them in complete darkness without searchlights. The news of the death of Admiral Togo and his entire staff had a depressing effect on the Japanese sailors. The activity of the Japanese fleet dropped sharply while Tokyo decided what actions to take next. This hitch was enough for the battleships Borodino, Orel, Nikolai-I and BRBO Apraksin and Sevyanin to reach Vladivostok, where they were taken under the protection of the powerful armored cruisers Rossiya and Gromoboy " As a result, with the most favorable set of circumstances and maximum luck, the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron could additionally destroy the Japanese battleships Fuji and Chin-Yen, six assorted cruisers and two destroyers. At the same time, partly break through to Vladivostok, preserving such ships as “Borodino”, “Eagle”, “Nikolai-I”, “Apraksin”, “Sevyanin”, “Izumrud” and “Gromky”. Purely in terms of the number of ships sunk and destroyed, this is, of course, still a loss, but not so shameful, which promised peace on more favorable terms with the preservation of the Kuril Islands for Russia. Both admirals, Russian and Japanese, die in this virtual reality. Only a person who does not understand the essence of those deep-seated crisis processes that at that time had already engulfed all of Tsarist Russia could count on something more, for example, the complete defeat of the Japanese fleet at Tsushima. You might be lucky - once every 1000 years. The absurd death of S.O. Makarov showed that the war “didn’t work out” from the very beginning.
Lessons from war
Lesson #1. It is impossible to defeat the enemy with just the presence of even the most modern weapons. It is necessary to be able to use the entrusted military equipment and master all the techniques of its use perfectly. How are things going with combat training in our fleet today? I'd like to think it's better than 1904. Probably better.
Lesson #2. Military equipment is a very complex mechanism, even one broken screw of which can deprive or at least limit its functionality. In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, such “broken cogs” were over-moistened pyroxylin in the shells, low power of the OFS and overloading of ships beyond the norm with all sorts of nonsense. What is the technical condition of the ships and submarines of the modern Russian fleet? And how many “broken cogs” they have, despite the fact that they are immeasurably more complex than even the most modern ships of the Borodino type and there are significantly more “cogs” in them.
Lesson #3. The ships of that period (meaning battleships), unlike modern ones, had phenomenal strength and survivability with relatively compact sizes and forgave admirals and commanders such mistakes that no modern ship will ever forgive. In other words, with the same “command style” today, the defeat of the fleet will be an order of magnitude even more terrible and fleeting than what took place in the Battle of Tsushima. In order not to be unfounded, you can look at the photographs that explain everything.
Battleship "Eagle" (13516t, 121.2m) after the Battle of Tsushima. According to V.P. Kostenko, during the battle he received at least 300 hits. However, during an inspection of the ship in the Japanese dock, it turned out that the Eagle received 76 hits. Of these, 5 are 305mm shells (386kg), 2 are 254mm shells (226.5kg), 9 are 203mm shells (113.4kg), 39 are 152mm shells (45.4kg) and 21 are 76mm (~6kg). The total mass of steel that got into the ship is a hefty 5.3 tons. It contains explosives ranging from half a ton to a ton. The ship survived and retained about 10-15% of its original combat potential.
The British destroyer Sheffield (4350t, 125m) after a single hit by an AM-39 Exocet anti-ship missile weighing 655kg. The rocket did not explode. However, this cardboard and plastic boat completely burned out and sank. If the reader thinks that our Project 956E is much stronger, then he is deeply mistaken.
It is difficult to say how the construction of such ships that do not carry even a shadow of armor can be explained. They even have aluminum and magnesium body steel, which burns very well. Maybe speed? But speed in modern naval warfare is no longer the determining factor.
The battleship "Eagle" in a creatively redesigned version, with closed dynamic protection armor "Relikt", with six AK-130 mounts instead of 152mm, with added anti-ship missiles launched through 305mm main battery gun barrels, with AK-630 instead of 47mm guns, with radar, with TVP, with a gas turbine power plant (speed from 25 to 35kt), with operational-tactical missiles RK-55 "Granat" with nuclear warheads in new TA, with universal air defense systems and anti-aircraft defense systems it would be a terrible and universal weapon. Moreover, this very compact and powerful ship is not the giant battleship Yamato. These “Eagles” can be built in large numbers and in large numbers. At the same time, such a naval tank will be able to withstand a hit from 2-5 missiles of the P-700 complex, after which it will be restored at the factory. Expensive? How many Sheffields do you need to build so that they can withstand 76 hits? No less than 77. Armor, of course, will not save you from modern powerful anti-ship ammunition, but it gives the ship's hull the strength of a tank and prevents it from falling apart after being hit by just one missile. These are, perhaps, the main lessons for civilian shipbuilders and sailors from that long-ago war.
Notes:
1. EBR - squadron battleship.
2. BRBO - coastal defense battleship. It had the same architecture as the “big brothers”, but was 3-4 times smaller in displacement.
3. Given performance characteristics of Japanese high-explosive fragmentation shells of the new generation, which were first used in the Battle of Tsushima. High-explosive fragmentation shells of previous types, which were used by the Japanese in battles with the 1st Pacific Squadron and the Vladivostok cruiser detachment, had very mediocre power, at the level of Russian fragmentation shells. This became clear after an ineffective artillery strike carried out by Japanese armored cruisers on Vladivostok on March 6, 1904. 200 shells were fired. Result: one killed and three wounded on our side.
4. Data are given for “Suvorov”, “Eagle” and “Slava”. "Borodino" and "Alexander-III" had 203mm/0° + 40mm/30° + 40mm/0° = equivalent to 323mm Krupp armor normal.
5. OFS – high-explosive fragmentation projectile.
6. The novel “Tsushima” by A.S. Novikov-Priboy. Memories of Russian sailors about the Battle of Tsushima.
7. Among them, only one old Chinese “Chin-Yen” was an armadillo. The remaining three were light armored cruisers of the Matsushima class. Each of them carried one heavy and low-velocity 320mm cannon. Of course, these ships could not even withstand Russian cruisers of the 1st rank, not to mention battleships. However, in the battleship-less fishiness of the Japanese fleet, these were quite “lobsters” and therefore the Japanese were in no hurry to send them for scrapping. During the Battle of Tsushima, they were ordered to shoot at the shock Russian battleships from behind the backs of the Japanese armored detachments, which they did, but never hit anyone.
8. The diagram shows only the physical dimensions of the Eagle armor, without taking into account the angles of inclination of the armor plates.
9. MZ - loading mechanisms.
10. Taking into account the “semi-heavy” cruisers of Project 26 and 26-bis from the heavy artillery of the USSR Navy, as of June 22, 1941, there were only 36 305mm caliber guns (on the modernized Tsarist Marat-class battleships) and 40 B-1-P 180mm caliber guns (on cruisers of projects 26, 26-bis and the modernized "Red Caucasus"). At the same time, the inclusion of formally light cruisers of Project 26 and 26-bis in the list is a clear stretch “for the sake of numbers,” as is the case with the list of the Japanese fleet. That would not be completely embarrassing. As of June 22, 1941, the USSR Navy did not have any aircraft carriers.
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Noticed osh Y bku Select text and click Ctrl+Enter
Major General A.I. SOROKIN
In 1904, the armored cruisers Rurik, Rossiya, Gromoboy and Bogatyr, which were part of the Russian Pacific Fleet, were based in Vladivostok. According to the war plan, they were intended to divert part of the enemy’s armored fleet from Port Arthur and to operate on the Japan-Korea communication routes against Japanese military transport.
During the design and construction of the cruisers, they were designed for operations on ocean routes. In this regard, to increase their cruising range, they had relatively weak side armor and imperfect protection for deck artillery.
On the night of January 27, 1904, the commander of the cruiser detachment received an order from the governor to begin military operations and inflict the most sensitive blow possible and damage Japan's communications with Korea. The ships were in combat readiness and went to sea on the same day. During a five-day cruising they sank the steamer Nakanoura-Maru (1084 tons) and fired at one steamer. A storm broke out and forced the expedition to be interrupted. The ships became icy, and even the guns were covered with a thick crust of ice. After returning and a short stay at the cruiser base, they again went to sea to the Korean shores; but this campaign was also unsuccessful - apart from small coastal ships, the cruisers did not meet anyone. The actions taken, although ineffective, nevertheless alarmed the main headquarters of the Japanese, which decided to take retaliatory actions against Vladivostok. Admiral Kamimura with a squadron of five armored ships and two light cruisers went to the Russian shores and randomly bombarded Vladivostok.
Admiral Makarov, having taken command of the Pacific Fleet, set the main task for the detachment of cruisers: to prevent the transfer of enemy troops from Japan to Genzan (Korea) and other points.
The cruisers were able to go to sea only on April 10, after the death of Makarov. A day earlier, on April 9, Admiral Kamimura set out for action against Vladivostok and on the same day called at the Korean port of Genzan for coal and water. The Russians didn't know about this. There was a thick fog on the sea; The cruisers were moving at low speed. On the morning of April 12, the detachment approached Fr. Khalezova. The destroyer sent to Genzan sank the steamer Goyo-Maru, which was in the roadstead, after which the destroyer returned to the cruisers; from Fr. Khalezov’s detachment went north; During the day, the coaster "SHaginura-Maru" was sunk. Then the detachment went to the Sangar Strait. At 22 hours 20 minutes. met the enemy military transport “Kinshu Maru” and sank it. Having learned from the prisoners that Kamimura's squadron was at sea, the Russian cruisers headed to Vladivostok.
On May 30, the cruisers were sent to the eastern passage of the Korean Strait. After noon on June 1 they passed Fr. Dazhelet and the next day approached Fr. Tsushima, where the enemy’s main communication routes passed and where Admiral Kamimura’s maneuver base was located in Ozaki Bay. At about 8 o'clock in the morning, two transports appeared on the horizon: one of them, taking advantage of the low visibility at sea, disappeared, the second, the Izuma-Maru, was sunk by the Thunderbolt. Soon two more large military steamers appeared from the east, sailing unguarded. The Hitachi-Maru transport, which carried 1095 soldiers and officers of the reserve guards regiment, 120 crew members, 320 horses and 18 heavy 11-inch howitzers intended for shelling Port Arthur, was also sunk by the Thunderbolt. The second transport, Sado-Maru, had 1,350 soldiers and officers on board. After warning shots from the Rurik, he stopped. The Russians invited the Japanese officers to switch to a cruiser. The Japanese categorically refused. Panic began on the ship: the boats were lowered by the Japanese ineptly and turned over at the side, despite the complete absence of waves and wind. Time passed, Japanese cruisers could appear at the scene, and deliberately prolonged turmoil continued on the Sado-Maru. The commander of the cruiser detachment ordered the transport to be sunk; Two torpedoes fired at it hit the target, after which the cruisers, without waiting for the steamer to submerge, turned into the Sea of Japan. Kamimura was at the base at this time, having four armored and five light cruisers and eight destroyers. Notified by radio telegraph from the cruiser Tsushima, which was on patrol, about the appearance of Vladivostok cruisers, Kamimura went to sea, but all attempts to find the Russians were in vain. On the morning of June 3, he approached Fr. It even flies. Russian cruisers at that time were 150 miles to the northwest, inspecting the detained English steamer Allanton, which was sailing with smuggled cargo to Japan.
On June 6, the Russian cruisers, having successfully completed their campaign, returned to Zolotoy Rog Bay. Kamimura stopped searching and went to his base.
In the second half of June, the cruisers repeated the raid, but less successfully; Having met Kamimura's squadron in the Tsushima area, the Russians, not accepting the battle, retreated. During the voyage, several small steamships and schooners were destroyed and a ship, captured on the way from Japan to Korea with timber for the Fuzan-Seoul-Chemulpo road under construction, was brought to Vladivostok.
The raiding actions of Vladivostok cruisers in the Sea of Japan forced the enemy to send some of the transports with troops and cargo to Korea and Manchuria from their eastern ports through the Yellow Sea. In this regard, the commander of the detachment of Vladivostok cruisers on July 4 received Alekseev’s order to go to sea to operate on the communication routes of the eastern ports of Japan.
Having received coal and ammunition, “Russia”, “Gromoboy” and “Rurik” entered the Pacific Ocean through the Sangar Strait on July 7 and turned south. On the morning of July 9, the cruisers met the large English steamer Arabia; upon inspection it turned out that he was going to Yokohama with smuggled cargo; The ship was sent to Vladivostok. By midnight on July 10, the cruisers approached the entrance to Tokyo Bay; In the morning the Japanese shores appeared. Here the English steamer Knight Commender, sailing from Shanghai to Yokohama and Kobe with smuggled cargo, was met and examined. The steamship was sunk because there was no coal on it to reach Vladivostok. On the same day, several schooners, the German steamer Tea, which was traveling with smuggled cargo, were destroyed, and by the end of the day the English steamer Calchas was captured, which, after inspection, was sent to Vladivostok. In the evening, the cruisers turned north, since there was only coal left for the return trip.
The commander of the cruiser detachment decided to return to his base again through the Sangar Strait, despite the fact that Kamimura could meet him at the entrance to the Sea of Japan and further all the way to Vladivostok. But the Japanese admiral apparently decided that the Russians, having bypassed Japan from the south, would try to connect with the Port Arthur squadron. He was waiting for them at Cape Shantung in the Yellow Sea.
The fact of the appearance of Russian ships in the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of Japan, shook the whole world. Panic began in trading circles, the world stock exchange actively reacted to the cruisers’ voyage, freight rates increased sharply, some large shipping companies stopped voyages to Japan, etc.
On July 29, a telegram was received in Vladivostok from Admiral Alekseev (who did not yet know about the results of the naval battle on July 28) that the Port Arthur squadron had gone to sea and was fighting the enemy; the cruisers were to immediately enter the Korean Strait. The purpose of the detachment's campaign was to meet Vitgeft's squadron and provide assistance to him. The task for the cruisers was outlined in the instructions, which stated that Vitgeft's intentions were unknown, i.e. It is unclear whether he will go through the Tsushima Strait or around Japan, the exact time of his departure to sea is also unknown, so it is difficult to determine whether the meeting of the cruisers with the squadron will take place and when and where this may happen; if the meeting occurs, it will presumably be north of the Korea Strait. Cruisers were prohibited from entering south of the Fuzan parallel. Further, the instructions stated that if the cruisers meet Kamimura, they are obliged to retreat to Vladivostok, taking the Japanese with them: the cruisers should not be distracted by any other tasks.
On the morning of July 30, “Russia”, “Gromoboy” and “Rurik” went to sea. On the night of July 31, they sailed at a 12-knot speed in a wake column; during the day, they deployed to the front line at intervals of 30-50 units in order to cover as much space as possible with observation and not to disperse from the Port Arthur squadron. The commander of the detachment, according to his calculations, expected to meet Vitgeft in the middle of the day on July 31, approximately abeam about. It even flies. But his calculations did not come true. Having passed Dazhelet and reached the parallel of Fuzan in the early morning of August 1, the commander of the cruiser detachment, as he was ordered, decided to wait for the Port Arthur ships in this area.
Cruiser 1st rank "Russia" |
It's starting to get light. At 4:50 a.m. The signalmen on the Rossiya suddenly saw in the darkness the silhouettes of four ships sailing on a parallel course with the detachment. A few minutes later the cruisers Izuma, Tokiwa, Azuma and Iwate were identified. The enemy was about 8 miles to the north, therefore, the Russians were cut off from Vladivostok and the battle could not be avoided. Both sides began to maneuver. The Japanese, having superior strength, 3 knots more speed and better conditions for firing, sought to force a battle.
When the ships approached 60 rooms, the Japanese at about 5 o'clock. 20 minutes. opened fire. Topmast flags flew up on the Russian cruisers, and return fire was opened from the port guns of the Rossiya and Gromoboy. After the first salvos, strong explosions were heard on the Iwata and Azuma. The battle started well for the Russians. Later, it became known from Japanese reports that a heavy shell penetrated the Iwate battery, destroying three 152-mm and one 75-mm guns.
Soon enemy shells covered the Russian ships, and the dead and wounded appeared. At the fourteenth minute of the battle, a strong fire started on the Rurik, the cruiser was out of action, but not for long, the fire was quickly put out. At about 6 o'clock the light cruiser Napiva approached the Japanese. At this time, the Russian cruisers changed course and went northwest; Japanese ships, in turn, took a parallel course.
At 6 o'clock. 28 min. “Rurik,” who was leading the way, raised a signal: “The steering wheel is not working.” For the Russians, this was a serious blow, since the Rurik was the strongest in the detachment in terms of the strength of its broadside salvo. “Russia” and “Gromoboy” turned to help the stricken cruiser. They fought for about two hours to give the Rurik the opportunity to repair the damage, but in vain.
Due to the fact that it was impossible to help the damaged ship, but on the contrary, it was possible to lose two other cruisers, the commander of the cruiser detachment turned to Vladivostok, hoping that the Japanese would pursue him and leave the Rurik alone, whose crew, taking advantage of this, would repair the damage . Kamimura actually went after the Russian cruisers, but left the light cruisers Naniva and Takachilo in order to finish off the Rurik. “Russia” and “Gromoboi” went north; Kamimura pursued them, trying to push them to the Korean coast.
The battle ended unexpectedly; at 10 o'clock the enemy's lead cruiser turned sharply and ceased fire, followed by the remaining ships.
Kamimura refused to continue the pursuit due to casualties among personnel, lack of ammunition and damage to ships. The decision to end the battle was certainly influenced by the fact that he, knowing about the battle in the Yellow Sea and not having information about its results, had to be ready at any moment to rush to the aid of Togo or to engage in battle with the Russians who had broken through from Port Arthur ships.
At this time, “Rurik” continued to fight with two Japanese cruisers “Takachiho” and “Naniwa”, but gradually its fire weakened, and in the end the ship fell silent: all its guns were knocked out, almost all the gunners were killed or wounded. The cruiser commander, Captain 1st Rank Trusov, and senior officer Captain 2nd Rank Khlodovsky died from their wounds. Of the 22 officers, seven remained unharmed; Almost half of the entire crew was out of action.
When four Kamimura cruisers returning from pursuit approached the Rurik, Lieutenant Ivanov, who took command, fearing the ship would be captured, decided to blow it up. This proved impossible to accomplish; Some of the fender cords were lost during the battle, and the other part was located in the steering compartment, which was flooded with water. Then Ivanov ordered the kingstons to be opened.
Before the eyes of the enemy, “Rurik” slowly sank and disappeared under water at half past eleven o’clock. Obsolete and poorly armored, it fought for five hours. The behavior of his team was heroic.
Thus, on August 1, the battle in the Sea of Japan ended. According to the Japanese, there were 44 killed and 71 wounded on Kamimura's ships. According to other sources, on the Iwata alone, one shell killed 40 people and wounded 37. Kamimura’s flagship ship Izuma had up to 20 holes; the cruiser Azuma received 10 shells, Tokiwa received several shells, etc.
Assessing the actions of the Vladivostok cruisers; it must be said that they had a stronger enemy against them in the theater, but nevertheless inflicted some losses on its merchant fleet and diverted part of the armored cruisers of the enemy fleet from the main theater near Port Arthur. Cruisers, however, were not used for long-term and constant impact on the enemy’s communication routes, against the transport of troops, military materials and supplies. They were not prepared for this and acted without a clearly developed plan and without interaction with the Port Arthur squadron.