“The life and death of one person means nothing,” Yamamoto responded to Isoroku in response to warnings about impending assassination attempts on him. There were several years left before the war; a stream of threats against Vice Admiral Yamamoto came not from distant America, but from Japanese nationalists, who had great weight in decision-making and demanded new conquests.
Last photo of Admiral Yamamoto
Yamamoto Isoroku, the son of an impoverished samurai, was born on April 4, 1884. At the Japanese Naval Academy, he was seventh in his class. After enlisting in the navy, Yamamoto took part in the Russo-Japanese War. During the Battle of Tsushima, the future admiral had two fingers torn off by an explosion.
In 1914, Yamamoto received the rank of lieutenant and entered the Naval Staff College in Tokyo. Two years later, he goes to study in the USA, where he studies economics at Harvard University. While in America, he developed a keen interest in military aviation.
After returning to Japan, Yamamoto Isoroku becomes second-in-command of the new Kasumigaura Air Corps (1923–25), but is soon sent to Washington. There he received the post of naval attaché at the Japanese Embassy (1925–27). In 1930, Yamamoto, with the rank of rear admiral, took part in the London Conference on Naval Disarmament.
The militarism of Japanese society at that time was steadily increasing. Yamamoto was one of the few officers to publicly express his disapproval of Japanese foreign policy. He condemned the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the subsequent war with China. In December 1937, Yamamoto apologized to the US ambassador after the Japanese army attacked the American warship Panei, anchored near Nanjing. The official position was that the soldiers did not notice the American flag fluttering over the gunboat, but in essence this was another reckless step by the Japanese towards the disaster that World War II became for them.
Yamamoto was also against signing the Tripartite Pact of 1940, because he feared that an alliance with Nazi Germany could lead to war with the United States. He realized that the American economy was many times superior to the Japanese. Japan was not prepared for a long armed conflict that would deplete its already scarce internal resources. America, on the contrary, could increase its military power over time.
The admiral's fears came true. In the early months of 1941, Yamamoto was tasked with planning an attack on the United States. Being completely devoted to the emperor, like the entire Japanese military leadership of that time, he developed a plan for a swift attack, for which he paid the price a year and a half later. Even then, the admiral understood: the Japanese fleet could wage an offensive for six months, but would lose if the war dragged on.
Yamamoto shortly before the Russo-Japanese War, 1905
Yamamoto authored the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor, which started the war between Japan and the United States. The main advantage of the attacking side was surprise. On the morning of December 7, 414 aircraft took off from six Japanese aircraft carriers towards Hawaii. They attacked American airfields on the island of Oahu and ships that were at that time in Pearl Harbor. As a result of the operation, the Japanese sank 4 American battleships and 2 destroyers, destroyed 188 aircraft, inflicted heavy damage on four more battleships, and killed more than two thousand American soldiers. The US Pacific Fleet was temporarily neutralized, allowing Japan to quickly conquer most of Southeast Asia.
Yamamoto then organized the invasion of the Solomon Islands and New Guinea. He also carried out raids on British colonies such as Ceylon. In the summer of 1942, Yamamoto decided to try to capture the US military base on Midway Island. He believed that the Japanese armed forces could repeat the success of Pearl Harbor. However, these plans were not destined to come true: American intelligence cracked the code of Japanese radio transmissions and informed Admiral Chester Nimitz about the impending attack. As a result, Japan suffered a crushing defeat: the fleet lost 4 aircraft carriers with 248 aircraft, one cruiser and 2,500 people killed. In August 1942, American troops landed on Guadalcanal. The Japanese attempts to recapture the island were unsuccessful; the defeat in the naval battle on November 12–14 made this clear.
By the beginning of 1943, the Japanese fleet was significantly exhausted by the battles, and morale was rapidly declining. To encourage the soldiers, Admiral Yamamoto decided to conduct a personal inspection of Japanese military units located on the Shortland and Bougainville Islands in the South Pacific.
The American command wanted to take revenge on Admiral Yamamoto for the attack on Pearl Harbor, which forced the United States to enter World War II ahead of schedule. Yamamoto's Pacific Inspection was a good chance for this. On April 14, 1943, as part of Operation Magic, American intelligence intercepted and deciphered a radiogram detailing his travel plan.
Yamamoto planned to depart from Rabaul at 6:00 and land on Bougainville Island at 8:00. At 8:40 he arrived by ship at Shortland, then at 9:45 on the same ship he returned to Balala at 10:30. From there at 11:00 he took off on a Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" bomber and arrived at Buin (Kahili) airfield at 11:10. At 14:00 he flew back from Buin and arrived in Rabaul at 15:40.
The secret plan for the American Operation Revenge included an attack on Yamamoto's bomber. To carry it out, 18 Lockheed P-38G Lightning fighters from the 339th Fighter Squadron of the 13th US Air Force were allocated. They had to fly 700 kilometers over the sea, reaching their target from the nearest American base. This is the longest interception mission of World War II carried out by coastal aircraft.
The fateful day has arrived. At 6:00 a.m. on April 18, two Japanese G4M Betty bombers took off from Vunakanau Airfield near Rabaul and flew a short distance to Lakunai Airfield to pick up passengers, which included Admiral Yamamoto and his staff. At 6:10 a.m., as planned, they took off, accompanied by six A6M Zero fighters from the 204th Aviation Group. The formation set off towards Bougainville strictly on schedule.
Meanwhile, American P-38G Lightnings took off from Cucum Airport on Guadalcanal. To overcome such a long journey, additional fuel tanks were installed on them. They spotted a Japanese formation in the south of Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville. The P-38Gs split up to take care of the escort Zeros while the attack group attacked the mission's main target - two bombers, one of which contained Yamamoto.
At a distance of about one and a half kilometers, P-38G fighters were spotted by a Japanese formation. Yamamoto's bomber made a defensive maneuver, diving to a low altitude. It was followed by a second G4M. The Betty, carrying Admiral Yamamoto, was hit around 8:00 a.m. and crashed into the jungle near the village of Aku in southern Bougainville. The attack was carried out by two P-38G fighters, flown by Captain Thomas Lanphier and Lieutenant Rex Barber. Subsequent studies attributed the fatal shot to Barber. The second G4M bomber was attacked from behind by three fighters and crashed into the sea off Moyla Point.
Painting "The Death of Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto" by Sergeant Vaughn A. Bass
The nearest Japanese post was at Aku. From there, Lieutenant Hamasuna saw smoke from the crash. At first he thought it was an American airplane that had crashed. Later, in order to identify the body of the deceased admiral, a patrol of the Japanese fleet was sent to the crash site. Yamamoto's body was taken to the former Australian outpost of Buin, and an autopsy was performed on April 20. Most published reports indicate that he died in his seat, having been shot twice in the back. However, there was another medical report, according to which Yamamoto had no visible wounds other than a cut above his eye. This gave rise to a lot of speculation that the admiral could have survived the crash, but died only a few hours later. The cause, according to this version, could have been damage to internal organs or shock.
Yamamoto plane crash site, April 1943.
After the autopsy, Yamamoto's body was cremated along with his uniform and buried on Buina. Some of his ashes were sent to Japan. He was first transported aboard the G4M1 "Betty" to Truk Island, where he was loaded onto the battleship Musashi, which departed for Tokyo on May 3, 1943. By this time, the news of the death of Yamamoto Isoroku was officially communicated to the Japanese press in the softened wording "died in action" aboard". On June 5, an honorary state funeral for the admiral took place in Tokyo. He was posthumously awarded the rank of Admiral of the Fleet and awarded the Order of the Chrysanthemum, first class. Yamamoto's remains were buried in the Tama Cemetery, a small part of which was given to his wife and rests in their family shrine in the city of Nagaoka.
Yamamoto's ashes are lowered from the battleship Musashi, May 23, 1943.
Throughout the war, the United States did not report news of the attack on Yamamoto's plane, so as not to thereby reveal the fact that Japanese codes had been broken. At first, the murder of Yamamoto was attributed to the pilot Thomas Lanphier. Landing first, he immediately claimed that he had single-handedly shot down Yamamoto's plane. Without waiting for a post-mission briefing or interviewing other pilots, the victory was credited to him. The US Air Force has never officially denied this.
State funeral for Yamamoto, June 5, 1943
During the post-war investigation, it was revealed that Rex Barber, in his P-38G "Miss Virginia", was the only pilot to shoot down Yamamoto's G4M "Betty". This was the result of a lengthy controversy that spawned several review boards of the United States Air Force and the "Yamamoto Mission Association" dedicated to studying the Revenge mission. This version has a number of compelling evidence, including the testimony of the only surviving Zero pilot and an examination of the bomber wreckage. Lanphier himself claimed in a letter written to General Condon that Yamamoto's downed bomber fell into the sea.
Lieutenant Rex Barber
The crash site is located in the jungle near Moyla Point, a few kilometers from the Panguna-Buin road, near the village of Aku. Today, the wreckage is strictly protected from theft and taking away for souvenirs. Since the 1960s Japanese delegations visited the crash site and installed a plaque on the admiral's seat. In the 1970s The fuselage door, part of the wing, Yamamoto's seat and one of the plane's control wheels were moved from the crash site to a memorial museum.
Yamamoto's grave
Graduate of the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy, the US Naval War College and Harvard University (1919-1921).
Yamamoto held several important positions in the navy of the Empire of Japan, and carried out a number of changes and updates in it, especially in the development of naval aviation. He was commander-in-chief during the first, quite successful for Japan, years of the war in the Pacific Ocean, and led such battles as Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway. He died during an inspection flight to front-line positions in the Solomon Islands when his plane was shot down by American Lockheed P-38 Lightning fighters. His death dealt a huge blow to the morale of Japanese troops during World War II.
Family roots
Preparing for war, 1920-1930s
Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto
Politically, Yamamoto was a supporter of peaceful resolution of all conflicts. He was absolutely opposed to war with the United States, a position that resulted from his studies at Harvard, his service as an assistant admiral, and his service as a naval attaché (twice) in Washington. He was promoted to the rank of captain in 1923, and in 1924, when he turned 40, he changed his specialization from naval artillery to naval aviation. The first ship under his command was the cruiser Isuzu in 1923, and the next was the aircraft carrier Akagi. Yamamoto was a great supporter of naval aviation, and, with the rank of vice admiral, served as chief of the aeronautics department before accepting the post of commander of the First Carrier Division.
He took part in the second London Naval Conference in 1930, with the rank of rear admiral, and already with the rank of vice admiral at the 1934 London Naval Conference. The Japanese government believed that a career military specialist was required to accompany diplomats during discussions of arms reductions. Yamamoto did not personally support the 1931 invasion of Manchuria, the subsequent war with China (1937), or the Berlin Pact (1940) with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. As Under Secretary of the Navy, he apologized to United States Ambassador Joseph C. Grew. Joseph C. Grew) for the bombing of the gunboat "Panaeus" (eng. USS Panay) in December 1937. All these actions made him a target of the war militarists.
Yamamoto was against the construction of the battleships Yamato and Musashi; from his point of view, this was not the smartest use of financial and technical resources.
Yamamoto carried out a number of upgrades in the naval aviation of the Empire of Japan. Although known for his work with aircraft carriers, primarily Pearl Harbor and Midway, Yamamoto's even greater contributions were to the development of coastal aviation, especially the development of the G3M and G4M medium bombers. His demands for greater flight range and the ability to arm aircraft with torpedoes arose due to Japanese plans to destroy the American fleet during its movement across the Pacific Ocean. As a result, the required flight range for the bombers was achieved, however, there were still no long-range escort fighters. Bombers were light, and with tanks full of fuel, they were especially defenseless against enemy fire. For these qualities, the Americans nicknamed the G4M “Flying Lighter.” The Flying Cigarette Lighter). Death will overtake Yamamoto in one of these same planes.
The long-range capability of the G3M and G4M raised the challenge for the development of long-range fighters. This partly influenced the development requirements of the A6M Zero, which was valued for its range and maneuverability. Both qualities were gained by its lightweight design and easy flammability - disadvantages that complemented the A6M's high losses in the developing war.
Fleet Admiral Yamamoto, US file photo
Japan moved ever closer to war in 1940, and Yamamoto pushed for both strategic and tactical innovations, often with mixed results. Influenced by young and talented officers such as Minoru Genda, Yamamoto authorized the reorganization of the Japanese carrier force into the First Air Fleet, a fist that included six of Japan's largest aircraft carriers. This innovation provided a powerful strike force, but also concentrated aircraft carriers into one compact target - two sides of the same coin that performed equally well during the war. Yamamoto led a formation similar in organization to the First Air Fleet, the coastal 11th Air Force, which later neutralized American air power in the Philippines and sank the British Z Force using G3M and G4M bombers.
In January 1941, Yamamoto went even further and proposed a radical revision of Japanese naval strategy. For two decades, the General Headquarters of the Navy of the Empire of Japan followed in the footsteps of the doctrine of Captain Alfred Maan. Japan planned a battle using light ground formations, submarines and coastal aircraft that would wear out the American fleet while transporting the latter across the Pacific Ocean, after which the Japanese fleet would enter the final “Decisive Battle” in the northern region of the Philippine Sea (between the Ryukyu Islands and Marians), with battleships entering into a traditional firefight.
Yamamoto correctly pointed out that this plan did not work even during Japanese exercises, and at the same time, realizing the scope of American military potential, he proposed to solve the American question by delivering an early strike, thereby reducing the opposing enemy forces, and then engaging in a “decisive battle" as an attacking party, instead of conducting defensive actions. Yamamoto hoped (but probably did not believe) that the Americans would not suffer such a terrible blow so early in the war, and that they would want to end the conflict diplomatically. In fact, the message that officially severed diplomatic relations with the United States was delivered late, and as he thought, the Americans were filled with a desire for revenge and had no intention of negotiating. Yamamoto's thoughts on this topic, years later, were dramatically conveyed in the monologue "On the Sleeping Giant", attributed to him in the film Tora! Torah! Torah! "
The Navy headquarters refused to cooperate with Yamamoto, and in order to achieve his goal, he was forced to submit his resignation, playing on his popularity in the fleet. Admiral Osami Nagano and the rest of his staff eventually caved under his pressure, but so far only agreed to carry out the attack on Pearl Harbor. The element of surprise has a long tradition in warfare at the start of many wars, and Japan decided to use this tactical move - if successful, the attack would give them six months to seize the resources of the Dutch East Indies, without the intervention of the American fleet.
The First Air Force began preparations for the raid on Pearl Harbor, solving many technical shortcomings along the way, including launching torpedoes in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor and producing armor-piercing bombs by machining shells from naval guns. .
Attack on Pearl Harbor, December 1941
As Yamamoto had planned, the First Air Fleet, consisting of six aircraft carriers with about 400 aircraft on board, opened hostilities against the United States on December 7, 1941, sending about 350 aircraft against Pearl Harbor in two waves. This attack was successful, as it accomplished all its combat objectives: sinking at least four American battleships and preventing the US Navy from interfering with Japan's southwest offensive for at least six months.
As a result of the attack, 5 American battleships were sunk, 3 were damaged, 11 other ships - cruisers, destroyers and auxiliary vessels were either sunk or seriously damaged. Japanese losses amounted to 29 aircraft shot down, and more than 111 with varying degrees of damage. Most of the damaged aircraft were dive and torpedo bombers - because of this, the Japanese did not have enough firepower to develop the attack further. The commander of the First Air Fleet, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, ordered a retreat. Yamamoto later harshly criticized Nagumo's decision because he failed to exploit the situation to locate and destroy American aircraft carriers that were out of port or to continue bombing strategic targets on the island of Oahu. Nagumo could find out nothing about the location of American aircraft carriers; in this situation, if he sent his planes to search for them, he risked being discovered and attacked by American forces before his pilots returned. Its bombers did not carry the necessary combat payload to attack repair docks and shipbuilding workshops, or even fuel storage facilities, the destruction of which could cause much greater losses than bombing the ships themselves. In any case, after two waves of attack, there was no longer enough daylight to send and return another wave of aircraft, and Nagumo's escorting destroyers did not have enough fuel for a long drift. Much of what Yamamoto dreamed of doing did not happen, but it must be noted that Nagumo was in no way punished for his retreat, which was also a healthy part of the original plan and the right decision at the time.
On a political level, the attack was a complete failure for Japan, arousing American anger and desire for revenge for the "cowardly attack." But as a matter of course, Japan started all its modern wars this way, and everyone expected it to do it again - just not at Pearl Harbor. The shock of an attack in an unexpected place, with such huge losses, and playing “not according to the rules”, without an official declaration of war (due to the poor work of the Japanese embassy, the note about the declaration of war was transmitted after the start of the attack), literally inflamed public opinion in America - to take revenge without mercy. In mid-1941, Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe asked Yamamoto what he thought about the outcome of a possible war with the United States, Yamamoto's answer is widely known: If the order comes to fight
This prediction came true as Japan easily captured territories and islands in the first six months of the war, and then suffered a huge defeat at the Battle of Midway on June 4-7, 1942, a battle that tilted the scales in the Pacific towards the United States, and allowed America to launch offensive operations against Japan in Guadalcanal.
From a strategic point of view, the attack was a success - American forces were unable to intervene in the conquest of the Dutch East Indies for six months, but not from Yamamoto's point of view, he considered the attack pointless. The US Navy abandoned all plans for a trans-Pacific attack on the Philippines on the eve of the war in 1935 (following the development of War Plan Orange). War Plan Orange)). In 1937, the US Navy became even more convinced that mobilizing wartime naval personnel alone would take at least six months, and the incredible amount of remaining equipment needed to cross the Pacific simply did not exist and would take another two years to produce after the war began. . In 1940, the Commander-in-Chief of Naval Operations, American Admiral Harold Stark (eng. Harold Stark) wrote "Plan Dog" (eng. Plan Dog), who relied on a defensive war in the Pacific theater while the United States concentrated resources against Germany, and assigned Admiral Husband Kimmel's Pacific Fleet. Husband Kimmel), simply to keep the Japanese out of the eastern part of the ocean, away from communications with Australia.
And only as a tactical operation did this attack achieve complete victory, successfully completing its tasks, with the loss of only 29 aircraft and five dwarf submarines
Six months of victories. December 1941 - May 1942
Having achieved the neutralization of the majority of the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto's Combined Fleet deployed to execute the larger Japanese Strategic Plan developed by the Imperial Japanese Army and the Naval General Staff. The First Air Fleet continued to circle the Pacific, striking American, Australian, Dutch and British bases, from Wake Island to Australia to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) in the Indian Ocean. The 11th Air Force managed to strike the planes of the American 5th Air Force in the Philippines while they were still at the airfields, literally within hours after Pearl Harbor, and then, on the high seas, sank the British formation Z (battleship Prince Welsh "and the battle cruiser "Repulse").
Under the command of Yamamoto's talented subordinates, Vice Admirals Jisaburo Ozawa, Nobutake Kondō, and Ibō Takahashi, the Japanese swept away the remnants of American, British, Dutch, and Australian naval forces in the Dutch East Indies, with amphibious landings and several naval battles that culminated in the Battle of Java Sea February 27, 1942. After occupying the Dutch East Indies, and reducing American positions in the Philippines to small pockets of resistance on the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor Island, the Japanese captured the "Southern Resource Zone" with its oil and rubber.
Having achieved its initial objectives with surprising speed and ease (and also fighting an ill-prepared enemy), Japan paused to consider its next move. Since neither Britain nor America were willing to negotiate, the Japanese began to think about how to strengthen and hold their new territories, and also how to conquer or knock out one or more opponents from the war.
Various plans were developed for this stage, including a push west to India, south to Australia, and east to the United States. Yamamoto took an active part in the discussion of this issue, supporting different plans at different times, with different enthusiasm and for different purposes, including his own.
Some plans were quite grandiose, such as the occupation of India or Australia, or the seizure of the Hawaiian Islands. But they were all rejected because the army could not provide enough troops from China for the first two plans, and transportation means for the second two. (The means of transport were divided and held tenaciously between the navy and the air force.) Instead, the Imperial General Staff supported the army's push into Burma, in the hope of linking up with Indian nationalists and starting a revolution there against the British government, attacking New Guinea and the Solomon Islands to cut the sea routes communications between Australia and the United States. Yamamoto insisted on a "Decisive Battle" to finish off the remnants of the American fleet, but the more conservative officers of the Navy General Staff did not want to take risks.
In the middle of discussing plans, Doolittle's air raid Dolittle Raid) struck Tokyo and the surrounding areas, showing staff officers the capabilities of American aircraft carriers, and the soundness of Yamamoto's plan. The General Staff agreed to Yamamoto's Midway Operation, in keeping with the plan to seize positions in the Aleutian Islands, which would become the first of the operations against the Australian-American lines of communication.
Yamamoto began quickly developing plans for Midway and the Aleutians and at the same time formed a force under the command of Rear Admiral Takeo Takagi, including the Fifth Carrier Division (the new large aircraft carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku), to support the capture of the islands of Tulagi and Guadalcanal, which were needed for naval and air bridgeheads, as well as the city of Port Moresby on the southern coast of Papua New Guinea, for a bridgehead towards Australia.
The operation to capture Port Moresby turned out completely differently than planned. Although the islands of Tulagi and Guadalcanal were taken, the fleet en route to Port Moresby was forced to withdraw after Takagi encountered American aircraft carriers, and entered the Battle of the Coral Sea in early May. The Japanese sank the American aircraft carrier Lexington. Lexington), in exchange for a smaller aircraft carrier, but the Shokaku was damaged to such an extent that it needed dock repairs. American anti-aircraft fire and fighters, as well as Japanese operational failures, noticeably battered the dive bombers and torpedo planes on the Shokaku and Zuikaku. These losses left Zuikaku inactive until new aircraft arrived and pilots were trained.
Battle of Midway. June 1942
Yamamoto's plan for Operation Midway was a continuation of his efforts to neutralize the US Pacific Fleet long enough to strengthen the Japanese perimeter defenses on the Pacific island chain.
It had long been believed that Japan intended to lure American forces - and perhaps even aircraft carriers - north of Pearl Harbor, and to achieve this, the Fifth Fleet (two light aircraft carriers, five cruisers, 13 destroyers and four transports) was sent against Aleutov, with the task of attacking Holland Harbor and the island of Unalaska, as well as capturing the outlying islands of Kiska and Attu. But modern researchers of Japanese documents have discovered that this adventure was the idea of the naval general staff alone, and that Yamamoto agreed to carry out this operation only if his Midway operation was approved.
The Japanese plan was that while the Fifth Fleet advanced into the Aleutians, the First Fast Force (4 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers and 12 destroyers) would attack Midway Island and destroy all enemy aircraft located there. When aviation was neutralized, the Second Fleet (1 light aircraft carrier, 2 battleships, 10 cruisers, 21 destroyers, and 11 transporters) was supposed to land an assault force of 5,000 soldiers and drive the US Marines from the atoll.
It was expected that after the capture of Midway, American aircraft carriers would turn into a prepared trap in the west, where the First Fast Group would engage in battle and defeat the enemy. After this, the First Fleet (1 light aircraft carrier, 7 battleships, 3 cruisers and 13 destroyers), in cooperation with elements of the Second Fleet, will have to clear this sector of the remnants of enemy forces and complete the defeat of the US Pacific Fleet.
To prevent any surprises, Yamamoto decided to perform two surgeries to be on the safe side. The first was an aerial reconnaissance mission (Operation K) to Pearl Harbor to ensure that American aircraft carriers were there. The second was a picket line of submarines to spot the movement of enemy carriers towards Midway Island in time, and thus allow the First Fast Group, and the First and Second Fleets to group to attack them. But it turned out that the first operation was canceled, and the second began late, and the aircraft carriers were missed.
The preparation of the plan was very fast and full of compromises, but as a result, the plan was well thought out, organized, and carried out at the most convenient moment for Japan. Against four aircraft carriers, two light aircraft carriers, 11 battleships, 16 cruisers and 46 destroyers that were supposed to participate in the battle, the Americans were able to field only three aircraft carriers, eight cruisers and 15 destroyers. The superiority in strength was simply enormous, only in terms of the number of aircraft and submarines the sides were equal. Despite all the problems with the layout, it looked like Yamamoto was holding all the cards.
But a terrible disaster awaited Yamamoto, the nightmare of any commander when the enemy learns about the plans of an operation before its execution - American signalmen managed to decipher the Japanese military code D (JN-25 in the USA). As a result, American Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Fleet, managed to evade both of Yamamoto's backup measures, and managed to position his smaller force to carry out a devastating ambush for the Japanese. According to Nimitz's calculations, three aircraft carriers, plus aircraft on Midway Island, gave him enough strength to destroy Nagumo's First Fast Attack Group.
War after the Battle of Midway
The film Midway was made in 1976. Depicting the battle that turned the tide of the Pacific War, it stars Toshiro Mifune as Yamamoto. He is shown planning an attack on the atoll and seeing his plans fall apart and four aircraft carriers go down on July 4-6, 1942. Unlike Thor! Torah! Tora!”, all the Japanese characters in this film speak English.
In 2001, the film Pearl Harbor, produced by Jerry Bruckheimer, was shot, mainly centered on the love triangle of American characters. Several times it shows the Japanese planning an attack on Pearl Harbor. In the role of Yamamoto is actor Iwamatsu Mako, nominated for an Oscar, star of the film Highlander: The Last Dimension. One of Yamamoto's quotes from this film: "A wise man will always find a way not to start a war."
In 2011, a film was made dedicated to the admiral - Commander of the United Fleet Yamamoto Isoroku (Japanese) Rengo: Kantai Shirei Cho: Kan Yamamoto Isoroku)
Sources
Literature
- Agawa, Hiroyuki; Bester, John (trans.). The Reluctant Admiral. New York: Kodansha, 1979. ISBN 4-7700-2539-4. A definitive biography of Yamamoto in English.
- Hiroyuki Agawa Admiral Yamamoto. The path of the samurai who defeated Pearl Harbor Publishing house - Tsentrpoligraf Year of publication - 2003 ISBN - 5-9524-0195-3
- Davis, Donald A. Lightning Strike: The Secret Mission to Kill Admiral Yamamoto and Avenge Pearl Harbor. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2005. ISBN 0-312-30906-6.
- Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1978. ISBN 0-87021-097-1.
- Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1997. ISBN 0-87021-192-7.
- Glines, Carroll V. Attack on Yamamoto(1st edition). New York: Crown, 1990. ISBN 0-517-57728-3.
- Hoyt, Edwin P. Yamamoto: The Man Who Planned Pearl Harbor. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990. ISBN 1-58574-428-X.
- Lundstrom, John B. The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1984. ISBN 0-87021-189-7.
- Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991. ISBN 0-87021-759-3.
- Peattie, Mark R. Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-1941. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2002. ISBN 1-55750-432-6.
- Prados, John. Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2001. ISBN 1-55750-431-8.
- Ugaki, Matome; Chihaya, Masataka (trans.). Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941-45. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991. ISBN 0-8229-5462-1.
- Gordienko A. N. Commanders of the Second World War. T. 1., Mn., 1997. ISBN 985-437-268-5
Links
- Biography of Yamamoto From Spartacus Educational (English)
- World War II Database: Biography of Isoroku Yamamoto
- World War II Database: Death of Yamamoto
- Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Japanese Navy US Naval Historical Center
- Pacific Wrecks. The place where the bomber with Yamamoto on board fell (English)
- Great Pacific War
- Assassination of Yamamoto in 1943 (Japanese)
- Death of Yamamoto Documentary footage.
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Historical films are made in different ways. Some directors strive to squeeze as many events as possible into the allotted screen time; then the movie turns into a semi-documentary chronicle, and the acting work fades into the background. Others seek to look at events through the eyes of historical figures, and in this case the actors already move forward, beginning to play a more significant role. Still others want to reveal the image of a specific historical figure, here both the main and supporting actors get a chance to show themselves in all their glory, and, as a rule, only a few, or even one, event is taken as the basis for the plot. It happens that these three options can be combined, paying attention to both events and people, then a truly high-quality and spectacular historical picture is obtained, but there are relatively few of these in the treasury of world cinema. There are also historical costume films, where the main emphasis is on the picture: costumes, interiors, architecture The creators of such films usually adhere to historical authenticity very conditionally; good acting work happens here, but not often. This is the kind of historical glamor of strong average entertainment with a good director, but with a not very good one, respectively.
In addition, the specific country where the historical film is being filmed plays an important role, and, of course, the specific historical era that the authors are going to tell about.
Today, I am less familiar with Japanese historical cinema than I would like, so, probably, I did not notice any important details and nuances that were appreciated or, conversely, criticized by the audience of the Land of the Rising Sun and those who were simply in the subject. But even under these conditions, Seiji Maruyama's film deserved high marks from me. His film well conveys the very atmosphere of that largely defining moment for the country and the consequences that the decisions of the rulers had. Hamlet’s question on a global-political scale: “To join or not to join the Second World War?” turns into sharp disputes and polar opinions for the country.
The main character of the film, the legendary Admiral Yamamomto, wonderfully played by Toshiro Mifuno, also suffers from conflicting feelings. This is a man devoted to his country, who, nevertheless, as an experienced, wise and far-sighted person, knows how to see not only the immediate, but the long-term perspective, to correlate the current capabilities and potential of the Empire with the likely consequences of certain decisions. But jingoism often brushes aside such warnings; for it, only the here and now matters. The admiral is stingy with the outward manifestation of emotions, but Mifuno stunningly convincingly conveys Yamamomto’s experiences: love for his country and the willingness to give his life for it, disappointment and pain from the short-sightedness and recklessness of some of the country’s leaders and a number of high and low military ranks around him. But the biggest impression left in this extraordinary person is the successfully conveyed feeling of hopelessness about what is most likely to happen, and that he is unable to prevent it. No one will wring their hands and tear out their hair, but so much can be read in the look, leisurely movements and words of the admiral! Mifuno played a good role and I would like to sincerely thank him for not thanking him. The moments in the film were also very good; in a matter of hours, and sometimes even minutes, the admiral has to make decisions that are fateful for thousands and even millions. The burden of responsibility that hangs on a person at this moment, and the intense work of his thoughts, it seems, can literally be felt, the actor plays so well here.
The rest did not spoil the film with their participation either. Despite the fact that they all kept in the shadow of Mifuno, to whom the authors gave complete carte blanche, several characters stuck in the memory. Among them are the characters of Yuzo Kayama, Toshio Kurosawa, Daisuke Kato and especially Masao Shimizu. Their performances produced original, expressive characters.
The atmosphere itself, the mood of those years, is well conveyed in “Admiral Yamamoto”, about which, after looking at the picture, you can form a holistic impression.
The special effects from almost 50 years ago, in particular the battle scenes, from today’s point of view only cause a smile, but then, I think, they looked very decent, and this is not at all the main thing for Maruyama, the main thing is that he managed to show a very famous historical figure - Admiral Yamamomto, at the same time, not only demonstrating his authority and the love that he enjoyed among his subordinates, but also not avoiding the sharp corners of his dramatic history.
Composer Masaru Sato also deserved a high score for his work, as his music successfully matched both the overall mood of the film and its individual moments.
A bright, truthful picture of the era with a story about the legendary Japanese admiral and excellent acting.
Born on April 4, 1884, Isoroku Yamamoto's hometown was Nagaoka, located in Niigata Prefecture. The future admiral came from the family of a poor samurai. Since childhood, the boy dreamed of serving on a ship and, having matured, entered the Isoroku Yamamoto Academy and received his education in 1904, when the Russo-Japanese War began.
Start of service
At the beginning of the armed confrontation, the sailor ended up on the armored cruiser Nissin, which took part in the Battle of Tsushima. In that battle, on May 28, 1905, the Japanese defeated the 2nd squadron of the Pacific Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Zinovy Rozhdestvensky. A significant number of Russian ships were sunk. It was that battle that became the culmination of the war. For Isoroku Yamamoto, the victory came at a high price. He was injured, losing his middle and index fingers.
Continuation of military career
Despite the injury, Yamamoto’s service not only continued, but increased. He entered the Naval War College, which trained the cadres of the high command of the fleet. The officer graduated at the age of 30, and at the age of 32 (in 1916) he became a lieutenant commander. But Isoroku Yamamoto did not stop there. In 1919-1921 He received his education abroad, attending the American Harvard University.
Yamamoto served twice as a naval attaché in Washington. Life in the New World affected his political views. At that time, the military man established himself as a supporter of the peaceful resolution of any world conflicts and a strong opponent of the war against the United States. In 1923 he was promoted to captain.
New challenges
At the age of 40, the future Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto became interested in naval aviation, preferring it to his previous specialization in naval artillery. First, he tried his hand at commanding the cruiser Isuzu, and then the aircraft carrier Akagi. Seeing the future of the army and navy, he also headed the aeronautics department.
During the break between the two world wars, Japan, along with other influential powers, tried to follow a course of disarmament. In order to develop general measures in this area, maritime conferences were convened in London twice (in 1930 and 1934). Yamamoto, who became a vice admiral, participated in them as a career military man accompanying Japanese diplomats.
Despite these pacifist gestures, the government in Tokyo gradually worsened the situation in the Far East. In 1931, Manchuria was invaded, in 1937, war with China began, and in 1940, Japan signed an alliance pact with Germany and Italy. Isoroku Yamamoto, whose photographs then began to often appear in the Western press, consistently opposed the militaristic decisions of his authorities. Supporters of the war (of which there were significantly more) harshly criticized the vice admiral.
Appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet
In 1940, Isoroku Yamamoto, whose quotes from speeches in the fleet were passed from mouth to mouth, received the rank of admiral and became commander-in-chief of the United Fleet. At the same time, the military man continued to receive threats from Japanese nationalists, who considered him a traitor to the interests of his homeland. In 1941, a militarist became prime minister. It seemed that Yamamoto’s career was in the balance. The Admiral was perhaps Tojo's main hardware opponent.
However, despite everything, Yamamoto managed to maintain his ranks and position. His widespread popularity among his subordinates affected him (both officers and sailors treated him with boundless respect). In addition, the admiral had a personal friendship with Emperor Hirohito. Finally, Isoroku Yamamoto, whose quotations from theoretical works became the bible for the entire fleet, was one of the most competent people in the entire armed forces. Having a Western education and unique work experience, only he could consistently carry out the ongoing reform of Japan's naval armada.
Conflict with the militarists
The Tojo government that came to power began preparing a war against the United States of America. Yamamoto was skeptical about a possible conflict with the United States. He believed that it would not be enough for Japan to defeat the enemy in the Pacific by capturing the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii and other islands. The war with America was supposed to end only after Washington's surrender. The admiral did not believe that Japan had enough resources for such a forced march and, as subsequent developments showed, he was right.
Nevertheless, while remaining in his position as commander-in-chief of the fleet, Yamamoto took part in the preparations for the imminent campaign. With his direct participation, preparations were underway for the attack on Pearl Harbor. The admiral opposed Kantai Kessen, a strategic doctrine according to which Japan was supposed to fight the war with the United States in a defensive position. Yamamoto, on the contrary, believed that his country had only one opportunity to defeat the States - to shock the American public with a lightning offensive and force politicians to immediately sign peace.
Preparing for war
Since the attack on Pearl Harbor was carried out using aircraft, special attention should have been paid to the development of aviation. This is what Isoroku Yamamoto did. The film "Attack on Pearl Harbor" clearly demonstrates his contribution to the success of that operation. The admiral also took care of aviation operating in coastal operations. Under his patronage, the development of the G3M bomber and G4M torpedo bomber was carried out. These models were distinguished by an increased flight range, which gave the Japanese command an additional significant advantage. The Americans called the G4M a “flying lighter.”
Yamamoto Isoroku, whose biography was largely connected with aircraft, raised the task of creating a new long-range fighter. It was the A6M Zero model, which received a significantly lightweight design. The admiral initiated the reorganization of aviation and the formation of a new First Air Fleet. It was this formation that took part in the attack on Pearl Harbor. In preparing the operation, Yamamoto hoped for the element of surprise. A surprise attack would give the Japanese a few more months of freedom in the Pacific until the American fleet arrived.
Pearl Harbor
On December 7, 1941, 6 Japanese aircraft carriers, carrying about 400 aircraft, approached Pearl Harbor. An attack followed, as a result of which 4 battleships and another 11 large ships of another type were sunk. Many auxiliary and secondary vessels were also destroyed. The Japanese lost only 29 crews.
Although the successful attack was planned by the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet, Isoroku Yamamoto, it was carried out by Chuichi Nagumo. It was this vice admiral, fearing too many losses, who ordered the planes to retreat. Yamamoto criticized this decision. He accused Nagumo of failing to complete important tasks: bombing the American military infrastructure on the island of Oahu and destroying enemy aircraft carriers that were absent in the harbor. The vice admiral, however, was not punished in any way. The country's authorities were pleased with the result of the unexpected raid.
Continuation of the campaign
After the events in Hawaii, the Japanese military continued to implement the empire's strategic plan. Further battles were led by Jisaburo Ozawa, Ibo Takahashi and Nobutake Kondo. They were all subordinates of Isoroku Yamamoto. The short biography of this military leader is an example of a naval commander who had to carry out a task of incredible scale.
The Japanese made it their goal to subjugate all the Pacific islands. Yamamoto developed a plan in which the navy and air force would destroy numerous British and Dutch bases. The main battles took place over the East Indies (modern Indonesia) that belonged to the Netherlands.
First of all, the Japanese occupied the north of the Malay Archipelago. Then in February 1942 came the Battle of the Java Sea. The Japanese fleet defeated the combined fleet of the United States, the Netherlands, Australia and England. This success allowed the complete occupation of the Dutch East Indies. A little later, American resistance in the Philippines was localized.
Debates about the future
The successes of Japanese weapons did not embarrass the Allies. Neither Great Britain nor the United States were going to agree to peace. Tokyo took a break in order to decide in which direction to move next. Most military leaders advocated an offensive in Burma and access through it to India, where, with the help of local nationalists, they planned to overthrow the British metropolis. Admiral Yamamoto, however, had the opposite opinion. He proposed attacking the remaining American positions in the Pacific Islands.
The 2011 film “Isoroku Yamamoto” (another title is “The Attack on Pearl Harbor”) clearly shows what an unyielding character the admiral had. So this time he did not give up his point of view. During one of the discussions, Tokyo headquarters was bombed by American aircraft. This incident forced the Japanese command to reconsider their plans. Soon, Yamamoto's idea of attacking Midway Island formed the basis of the strategy for the new stage of the war. The admiral was appointed commander-in-chief in the upcoming operation.
Midway operation
According to Yamamoto's plan, the Japanese fleet was to be divided into two parts. He was going to send one group to the shores of Alaska to distract the Americans, and the second to attack Midway Atoll. The operation was carefully prepared. It seemed that the admiral had thought of all the details. If everything had gone according to his plan, the Japanese would have gained a significant superiority in forces at the decisive moment and defeated the Americans piecemeal.
However, the events on the eve of the Battle of Midway dashed all Yamamoto’s hopes. American intelligence was able to decipher the secret Japanese code used to transmit secret data. The success of cryptographers gave the enemy a colossal advantage.
When the Battle of Midway began on June 4, 1942, American ships unexpectedly evaded all Japanese attacks and organized their own ambush. In the decisive battle, 248 aircraft and 4 aircraft carriers of Yamamoto were destroyed. Although the Japanese pilots took off, they were able to sink only one enemy ship (Yorktown). The admiral, realizing that the battle was lost, ordered the remaining forces to retreat.
Lessons from defeat
The failure of the Midway operation was the turning point of the entire war in the Pacific. The Japanese lost their best equipment and manpower. The combined fleet lost the initiative and since then has fought only defensive battles. At home, the admiral was subject to widespread criticism.
Was Isoroku Yamamoto's fault for the defeat? Book after book on this topic is being published today both in Japan and in other countries. Supporters and defenders of the military believe that his plan was no worse than the plans for similar operations among the Axis opponents. The main reason for the defeat of the Japanese was the luck of the Americans, who read the secret code and learned the plans of the United Fleet.
Battles of the Solomon Islands
In the second half of 1942, the war in the Pacific moved to New Guinea and Although Japan still had quite a few resources, they smoldered day after day. Yamamoto, having lost much of his reputation, took charge of minor operations. In August, he personally led the battle near the eastern Solomon Islands, and in November - the battle for the island of Guadalcanal.
In both cases, the Americans and their allies were victorious. The Japanese suffered defeats primarily due to the army's inability to operate effectively on the shores of the islands. Heavy losses decimated the ranks of destroyers, torpedo and dive bombers. In February 1943, Japan lost control of Guadalcanal. A series of battles in the Solomon Islands remained with the Americans.
Death
Despite defeat after defeat, the admiral did not give up. He continued to inspect troops and boost fleet morale. On the eve of one of these trips, the Americans again intercepted a secret message that contained detailed data about Yamamoto’s route. The discovery was reported to the White House. President Roosevelt demanded the elimination of the Japanese military leader.
On the morning of April 18, Yamamoto took off from Rabaul, a port on the island of New Britain. His plane had to travel almost 500 kilometers. On the way, the admiral's bomber was attacked by the Americans who staged a well-planned ambush. Yamamoto's plane crashed over one of the Solomon Islands.
After some time, a Japanese rescue squad arrived there. The admiral's body was found in the jungle - during the fall he was thrown out of the fuselage. The naval commander was cremated and buried in Tokyo. Posthumously he received the rank of Marshal, the Order of the Chrysanthemum, and also the German Order. During the war, the figure of Yamamoto became truly legendary. All of Japan was shocked by his death, and the country's leadership recognized the death of a national hero only a month after the American operation.
An interesting excerpt from the biography of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (author Hiroyuki Agawa), about
Admiral's attitude to unconventional methods of determining the abilities of naval pilots
aviation...
Brief background: in the mid-1930s, Japanese naval aviation was harassed
problem of high accident rate. It was believed that at least part of the problem was caused by
an inadequate system for selecting candidates for naval pilots. And then one day the head of the education department
Department of Aeronautics under Yamamoto, Captain 1st Rank Onishi Takijiro (later -
"father" of kamikaze squadrons) called Kuwabara, deputy commander of the Kasumigaura Air Corps,
giving him unusual information...
"...Various investigations have been carried out into the causes of accidents; one of the sensitive problems is
how to evaluate potential crew members. Before admission, cadets and reserve cadets carefully
screened, subjected to tests of learning ability and physical fitness; after
their compliance with the tasks to be solved was strictly checked; even so many
after the first six months or so they turned out to be inadequate. It wouldn't matter much
if expelling them from courses did not entail unnecessary waste of money and shame for those expelled. But on
practice, even before their removal, accidents occurred many times due to their fault. One or two
times precious lives were lost, and the destruction of expensive aircraft equipment imposed
further burdens on the already limited budget.
Experts from the Department of Psychology of the Tokyo Imperial University were invited to conduct the tests.
university. Those selected for this purpose were initially found in perfect order, but later they were often not
lived up to expectations. Experimental psychology seemed to be of little help in determining
the necessary capabilities, and the main problem of aviation was still identifying the appropriate
pilot candidates. Head of the Education Department of the Aeronautics Department under Yamamoto, Captain of the 1st
rank Onishi Takijiro (loyal supporter of Yamamoto; by the end of the war gained fame as "father"
suicide squadrons - kamikazes; an ardent apologist for war to the last soldier) once called
Kuwabara, deputy commander of the Kasumigaura Air Corps. Here's the gist of what he said:
“At my father-in-law’s school, the headmaster of Juntendo High School, there are quite a few graduates
an unusual young man named Mizuno. He studied history at university and his diploma
the work concerned ancient methods of divination. As a child he was interested in palmistry and
physiognomy. Having read once in the newspapers that naval aviation had recently lost many aircraft,
he stated: this is because the Navy uses incorrect methods for selecting pilots. "Inclined to
fantasies,” I thought. But then I met him personally, and he told me: find out if a person is fit
You can become a pilot by palm or face, but recruiting pilots in batches is wrong.
Personally, I don’t think that the Navy recruits pilots in batches, but nevertheless I asked if it could be
he himself determines the suitability of this or that. "Oh yeah!" - he answered absolutely confidently.
I will send him to you in Kasumigaura with a letter of recommendation - why don’t you listen to this
person, at least for fun, and not give him the opportunity to read the pattern of papillary lines on
the palms of your people.
Kuwabara, ready to grasp at any straw, agreed to meet with the young man,
and on the appointed day, Mizuno Yoshito presented himself in the building, having with him a letter of recommendation
Onishi's letter. It was lunchtime, and there was a constant stream of people in flight suits coming from the airfield.
Kuwabara suggested inviting instructors after lunch - about one hundred and twenty people: let
Mizuno will try his methods on them, dividing them into three categories - their suitability for any
work or for flights. He promised to have at hand a list of all instructors with notes about their
qualifications acquired over a long period of time.
Everyone has gathered; Mizuno stared at each one in turn for five or six seconds, and then
assigned a category - A, B or C. When Kuwabara and his assistant compared these ranks with marks,
put on the list, then, to their amazement, they discovered that the ranks and marks coincided in 86
percentage of cases. That day, all the cadets were gathered and subjected to the same procedure; this time
compliance was 87 percent. Kuwabara and the others were stunned: this young man,
clearly not connected with the world of aviation, in five or six seconds he made conclusions that corresponded more
than in 80 percent of cases, conclusions made by themselves months, or even years after
the cadet's arrival at the unit. We intended to have fun, but it turned out that we had to accept everything
seriously.
Having learned that Mizuno still has not found a job and is free to come and go as he pleases
as he pleased, the base leaders left him in Kasumigaura overnight to talk
with the officers. One officer, named Nanamoto, was worried about what to do with his upcoming marriage;
asked Mizuno to look at the palms of this officer.
— You apparently don’t have a clear decision about marriage, right? - Mizuno turned to him.
- You need to finally settle on the first option.
The "first option" - the girl Nanamoto is engaged to - contradicted the other:
the family forced a bride on him for material gain.
Mizuno also announced that he believed war would break out within a year or so.
Kuwabara objected: even if the war starts, it won’t be so soon; everything happened in the summer of 1936,
that is, a year before the “China Incident” broke out. Then, when Mizuno's prediction
came true, Kuwabara asked what led him to such an idea.
“In childhood, when I first became interested in palmistry and physiognomy,” Mizuno answered, “I
I noticed that many were walking along the streets of Tokyo with the stamp of death on their faces. This is not normal, I thought
me, - I didn’t notice this in Osaka. And then the great Kanto earthquake happened, and I understood everything.
It’s the same now: I can’t take my eyes off many women on the streets of Tokyo - you can see from their faces
that in a year or two they will become widows. So I came to the conclusion that this time it was not due to natural
they will lose their husbands in the cataclysm.
A well-known fact: at the beginning of the “Chinese incident” the 101st division - the majority in it were
natives of Tokyo - suffered heavy losses in the battles near Shanghai.
As soon as Mizuno left, Kuwabara called Onishi.
“You know,” he began, “there is something hidden from view in him.” I would like to think if it is possible somehow
use his methods when forming crews; I would like him to go deeper with this
got busy. How to hire him, say, for the position of adviser at the aeronautics department,
to facilitate his access to naval aviation units?
Onishi obviously had no objections, since he himself took the initiative; Kuwabara directed
report addressed to the command of the Kasumigaura air corps: as proven by cases of manifestation of innate
common sense and acupuncture, ancient and clearly unscientific methods do not necessarily have to be discarded
from accounts; immediately cited the opinion of statistical experts - a coincidence in 60 percent of cases
and more should be considered a sign of reliability.
Now Onishi had to introduce the report to others and convince them of the reasonableness of the accumulated
recommendations. I introduced him to the personnel bureau and the maritime affairs bureau and tried to persuade him
management accepted Mizuno to work as an adviser, but was met with skeptical grins everywhere.
“Listen, don’t you really think that the navy...,” they whispered around, “I want to say—
physiognomy...
Kuwabara attributed his failure to the narrow "rationalism" of the relevant individuals in the two naval bureaus.
To the Bureau of Maritime Affairs, all this looked like proof that aviation had finally lost
reason. When it became obvious that nothing was working, Kuwabara asked Onishi if he had spoken
he's with Yamamoto. No, I didn’t say: together we went to see Yamamoto for a reception. At first, asking him not to
laugh, began to tell the story with Mizuno in detail and turned to Yamamoto for help in
appointing this person as an adviser. Yamamoto smiled as he listened to them, and when they finished, he said:
- It's clear. I'll talk to him myself, but let him come alone.
We agreed to bring Mizuno here; then on the phone while Yamamoto was talking for his part
with different departments of the personnel bureau and the maritime affairs bureau and with the aeronautics department,
about twenty different people were gathered in the office. When Mizuno arrived, the first thing he asked was
Yamamoto - what, in his eyes, is palmistry and physiognomy.
He answered - as Kuwabara had already explained in the Kasumigaura Air Corps - that these are applied branches
statistics. Popular folk beliefs, such as the Japanese belief that people with
long, rabbit-like ears, attentive and soft in nature, or that square chin
means this and that, are based, in essence, on empirical statistical observations. These
beliefs are not necessarily true in every case, but it’s not fifty-fifty either. Also
intuition gives precision to individual observations.
“Well, okay,” Yamamoto nodded. — Twenty people have gathered here. Can you tell who
Are any of them pilots?
Mizuno carefully looked at each person's face in turn. Finally he pointed to one:
- It's you, isn't it? - and then to another: - And you too. These two were named Hoshi Kazuo and Miwa Yoshitake,
both among the best fighter pilots that naval aviation could boast of at that time.
Hoshi and Miwa smiled modestly under the surprised looks of the others.
- That's it, no more? - Yamamoto hurried.
“That’s all,” Mizuno replied.
Here is another one of those present, captain second rank Taguchi from the naval general staff,
said: “I’m a pilot too!”
Mizuno took his hand and examined it carefully.
- You may be a pilot, but not a very good one.
Everyone started looking at each other again, then there was laughter. Wu Taguchi, a graduate of the Maritime College
General Staff, naval pilot, excellent brains, but too slow of a reaction for a pilot.
He happened to damage the plane during landing; he was recently transferred to the naval general headquarters with
warning: if it doesn’t gather all the attention, it will eventually break into pieces.
Several more demonstrations of Mizuno's mysterious abilities followed. Subjected to research
palms of captain 1st rank Kida Tatsuhiko.
-Have you taken someone else's name for yourself? - Mizuno asked.
Kida did not want to answer, but under pressure he admitted with sad delight that he really
Foster-son.
Finally Yamamoto decided that the time had come, and the assembly decided to accept without further fuss
Mizuno to work. Soon after this, he was officially appointed as an adviser to the department.
aeronautics. His duty in this capacity is to be present at all cadet inspections
and reserve cadet in the Kasumigaura Air Corps and study their palms and faces.
The Navy began using Mizuno's methods in combination with routine written and physical checks;
The most promising of all candidates was considered to be the one who received good grades in these two
exams and a “go-ahead” from Mizuno. Therefore, it is not entirely correct to say (as in some places during
war) that the Naval Air Corps was governed by prejudice.
As a result, Mizuno's busyness exceeded all limits. During the war he received help
two assistants and he had to travel so much to air units that they began to prepare in advance
mimeographed fingerprints. In total, he is said to have analyzed
over 230 thousand people.
In 1941, in the presence of Kuwabara Torao, who trusted him completely, Mizuno predicted
that the war will begin this year.
- Well, how will it end? - Kuwabara asked.
“Everything will go well at first,” Mizuno answered, “but then I can’t say.”
- Why?
“I don’t like looking into the faces of people from the General Staff: I see them hurrying along the corridors.”
with documents. I'm worried about their future.
Four years later, in July 1945, Kuwabara - then a vice admiral assigned to the ministry
military supplies,” Mizuno asked how he thought the war would develop further.
“It will all be over by the end of next month.”
Puzzled, Kuwabara asked why he thought that.
— I recently visited several kamikaze pilot bases and noticed: very few young
officers and civilians have signs of death on their faces. I took this as a signal that war was coming
end.
Later in the war, Mizuno worked as an adviser to the Ministry of Justice at Chofu Convict Prison.
studying the physiognomy of criminals; long before that he was kicked out by order
superiors; He now works as a consultant for Komatsu Store in Tokyo's Ginza district, giving
advice on recruitment and placement of personnel.
It seems that Mizuno noted the names of everyone who fits the profession of an aviator, but is susceptible
accidents, and kept this list in his safe. According to him, two thirds of them
That's how they died.
It is impossible to say to what extent Mizuno's methods corresponded to pure applied statistics,
or included elements of parapsychology, or even contained elements of hypnosis or some kind of deception.
Yes, this is not so important for us. What’s interesting is the attitude towards Mizuno Yamamoto. With one
On the other hand, it testified that he cares about the condition of his subordinates; on the other hand, it reflected him
a tendency to almost intuitively believe (or at least not ignore) what comes out
beyond the limits accepted in science and logic. "