Relations between the USSR and the Chinese communists have never been smooth and even. Even in the 40s, when the military power of Mao Zedong’s forces depended on the amount of assistance from the USSR, his supporters did not stop fighting the “Cominternists” - those who were considered conduits of Moscow’s influence. When, after the surrender of Japan, the CCP waged a life-and-death war against the Kuomintang, Stalin did not believe in its victory. He tried to instill in the leadership of the Communist Party the idea of “two Chinas,” i.e., the creation of communist and Kuomintang states on its territory, as had already happened in Germany, and then in Korea and Vietnam.
In addition, Stalin strongly doubted Mao’s loyalty to the ideas of Marxism. But, as you know, the winners are not judged. After the establishment of the CPC's power over all of China (1949), this doubt did not completely disappear, but faded into the background. The period of “eternal friendship” began between the USSR and the PRC.
On February 14, 1950, China and the USSR concluded the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and mutual assistance between China and the USSR. This treaty is dedicated to the formation of an alliance between China and the USSR. At that time, Chinese diplomacy leaned in one direction - towards the USSR. at that time, the conclusion of the Treaty on a Military-Political Alliance by China and the USSR, on the one hand, played a key role in the field of security and state building of New China, on the other hand, due to blindly copying the development model of the USSR, we later experienced many difficulties during the state construction. In 1950, due to the large difference in state power, the USSR treated China as a younger brother. In this regard, in essence, the Treaty on Friendly Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the PRC and the USSR is an unequal treaty.
In fact, close relations between the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic led by Mao Zedong were established earlier - when the USSR provided assistance to the Chinese Communist Party in the struggle for power. So the signing of the agreement itself simply stated the state of affairs and was timed to coincide with Mao Zedong’s visit to Moscow.
The “eternal friendship” lasted only ten years. During this time, China received enormous economic assistance. The Soviet Union provided him with favorable loans, built over 300 large factories, and fully equipped them; More than half of China's trade was with the USSR. In 1954 Soviet side transferred to the PRC Port Arthur and Dalny, returned after the victory over Japan, as well as the famous Chinese Eastern Railway (CER).
However, after the death of Stalin and the beginning of de-Stalinization in the USSR in 1956, relations between the countries became greatly complicated. The fact is that Mao began to try on the clothes of the leader of the world revolution. Chinese leaders, first in a narrow circle and then in the press, began to call on the USSR to pursue a tough policy towards the West, not to hesitate in the face of the threat of an armed conflict with it and even a world war.
The Soviet leaders did not remain in debt, emphasizing the failure of the notorious “Great Leap Forward” into socialism in China (in 1960-1961, as Western newspapers wrote, 6-7 million people died there from hunger). Although both sides loudly declared that the differences between friends were insignificant (the Chinese put it this way: “A little dispute and a big unity”), both in the Soviet Union and in China many understood that the old friendship had come to an end.
N. S. Khrushchev’s speech at a closed meeting of the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956) was perceived sharply negatively by Mao Zedong. The PRC also has a negative attitude towards the new foreign policy course of the USSR - towards breaking out of isolation and establishing business relations with Western countries, known as the course towards “peaceful coexistence of the two systems”. The PRC accuses the Soviet leadership of revisionism and concessions to the West.
In 1960, an event occurred that meant an open gap. Nikita Khrushchev, irritated by increased criticism of him from the Chinese, gave instructions to recall all technical specialists from China within three days. The Chinese plants and factories that stopped for this reason marked the beginning of a new stage in Soviet-Chinese relations - the 20th anniversary of open hostility between communist states.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), the PRC supported the idea of armed confrontation between the USSR and the USA and was dissatisfied with the peaceful resolution of the crisis.
In 1962, the USSR supported India in the war with China.
In 1963, the PRC and the USSR exchanged letters in which they expressed their ideological positions and thus formally acknowledged the existence of differences.
The USSR and China turned from best friends into main enemies. “Comradely criticism” gave way to accusing each other of all mortal sins. Even US intervention in Vietnamese affairs did not bring the former allies closer together. China, which helped the communist government of North Vietnam with weapons, did not, however, allow the transportation of Soviet weapons. military equipment through its territory. When the Cultural Revolution began in China (1966-1976), anti-Soviet sentiment, supported by Mao, reached its peak. Children and women had already been evacuated from the USSR Embassy, where death-threatening demonstrations and rallies did not stop even at night. For some time it seemed that things would come to a breakdown in relations between the countries.
China also presented its claims to part of the territory of the USSR. These claims, which extended to the Far East and southern Siberia, were clearly frivolous, but the Chinese were right about one thing. The border between states was drawn in the last century, when China was a weak state dependent on the great powers. Therefore, in many areas it was carried out not along the water surface of the river, as is customary in international relations, but along the Chinese bank. The flow of the border river Ussuri is so stormy that sometimes it changes its course, breaking off entire pieces of land from Chinese territory. The resulting islands were already considered Soviet territory. While relations between the countries were friendly, these issues could be resolved, but when they deteriorated, border problems became the reason for numerous clashes (there were about 2 thousand in 1967 alone).
The most famous of the conflicts on the Soviet-Chinese border were the events on Damansky Island (1969), which cost dozens of lives and involved quite significant military forces. The hostility reached such proportions that the population was instilled with the idea of preparing for a possible war.
In China, this was expressed in the massive construction of bomb shelters, the creation of food warehouses, and large purchases of weapons in the West; in the USSR - in the accelerated construction of defense structures on the Soviet-Chinese border (the previous ones were blown up by order of Khrushchev during the period of “eternal friendship”), the formation of new military formations in Eastern Siberia and in the Far East, a sharp increase in defense spending. Actually, the construction of the famous BAM was also directly related to the Chinese threat.
The friendship treaty, however, was not terminated, since neither side attached serious importance to diplomatic etiquette. In 1979, the PRC fought with Vietnam, and the USSR took the side of Vietnam, although it had treaties of friendship and assistance with both countries
Only after Mao's death were the Soviet Union and China able to move very slowly towards each other. The senseless confrontation led to the fact that in the 80s. countries had to start political, trade, cultural ties almost from scratch
On October 7, 1966, amid political disagreements between Maoist China and the Soviet Union, all Chinese students were expelled from the USSR. In general, China was an ally of the USSR, and there were no fundamental or large-scale conflicts between the countries, but some outbreaks of tension were still observed. We decided to recall the five most acute conflicts between the USSR and China.
This is what historians call the diplomatic conflict between the PRC and the USSR, which began in the late 1950s. The peak of the conflict occurred in 1969, while the end of the conflict is considered to be the end of the 1980s. The conflict was accompanied by a split in the international communist movement. Criticism of Stalin in Khrushchev’s report at the end of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the new Soviet course on economic development under the policy of “peaceful coexistence” with capitalist countries displeased Mao Zedong as contradicting the idea of the “Leninist sword” and the entire communist ideology. Khrushchev's policies were called revisionist, and its supporters in the CCP (Liu Shaoqi and others) were repressed during the Cultural Revolution.
The “Great War of Ideas between China and the USSR” (as the conflict was called in the PRC) was started by Mao Zedong in order to strengthen his power in the PRC. During the conflict, the Chinese demanded that the USSR transfer Mongolia to China, demanded permission to create an atomic bomb, “lost territories” and more.
Border conflict on Damansky Island
On March 2 and 15, 1969, in the area of Damansky Island on the Ussuri River, 230 km south of Khabarovsk and 35 km west of the regional center of Luchegorsk, the largest Soviet-Chinese armed clashes took place. Moreover, they were the largest in the modern history of Russia and China.
After the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, a provision emerged that borders between states should, as a rule (but not necessarily), run through the middle of the main channel of the river. But it also provided for exceptions.
The Chinese used the new border regulations as a reason to reconsider Soviet-Chinese border. The USSR leadership was ready to do this: in 1964, a consultation was held on border issues, but it ended without results. Due to ideological differences during the “cultural revolution” in China and after the Prague Spring of 1968, when the PRC authorities declared that the USSR had taken the path of “socialist imperialism,” relations became particularly strained.
Damansky Island, which was part of the Pozharsky district of Primorsky Krai, is located on the Chinese side of the main channel of the Ussuri. Since the early 1960s, the situation in the island area has been heating up. According to statements from the Soviet side, groups of civilians and military personnel began to systematically violate the border regime and enter Soviet territory, from where they were expelled each time by border guards without the use of weapons. At first, peasants entered the territory of the USSR at the direction of the Chinese authorities and demonstratively engaged in economic activities there. The number of such provocations increased sharply: in 1960 there were 100, in 1962 - more than 5,000. Then Red Guards began to attack border patrols.
On October 20, 1969, new negotiations were held between the heads of government of the USSR and the PRC, and the parties managed to reach an agreement on the need to revise the Soviet-Chinese border. But only in 1991 Damansky finally went to the PRC.
Total during clashes Soviet troops We lost 58 people killed or died from wounds (including 4 officers), 94 people were wounded (including 9 officers). The losses of the Chinese side are still classified information and, according to various estimates, range from 500-1000 to 1500 and even 3 thousand people.
Border conflict near Lake Zhalanashkol
This battle is part of the “Daman conflict”; it took place on August 13, 1969 between Soviet border guards and Chinese soldiers who violated the USSR border. As a result, the violators were pushed out of Soviet territory. In China this border conflict known as the Terekta incident, named after the river flowing from the Chinese county of Yumin towards Lake Zhalanashkol.
Conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway
The conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) occurred in 1929 after the ruler of Manchuria, Zhang Xueliang, seized control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was a joint Soviet-Chinese enterprise. During subsequent hostilities, the Red Army defeated the enemy. The Khabarovsk Protocol, signed on December 22, ended the conflict and restored the status of the road that existed before the clashes.
Vietnam-China military conflict
The last serious crisis between China and the USSR occurred in 1979, when the PRC (Chinese army) attacked Vietnam. According to Taiwanese writer Long Yingtai, this act was largely related to the internal political struggle in the Communist Party of China. The then leader of the People's Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping, needed to strengthen his position in the party, and he tried to achieve this with the help of a “small victorious campaign.”
Already from the first days of the war, Soviet specialists, located both in Vietnam and in neighboring countries, began combat activities together with the Vietnamese. In addition to them, reinforcements began to arrive from the USSR. An air bridge between the USSR and Vietnam was established.
The USSR expelled the Chinese embassy from Moscow, and sent its personnel not by plane, but by rail. In fact, after the Ural ridge all the way to the border with China and Mongolia, they could see columns of tanks heading east. Naturally, such preparations did not go unnoticed, and Chinese troops were forced to leave Vietnam and return to their original positions.
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Damansky Island. 1969
Russia's relations with China - two great world powers - are under constant and direct impact main trends in the development of regional and global international relations.
However, it should be noted that relations between China and Russia have long history. This paper proposes to consider the period from 1917-1927.
The problem of Soviet-Chinese relations in the period 1917-1927. covered by many historians. Thus, the famous sinologist, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences S. L. Tikhvinsky, using materials from the biography of the outstanding political and statesman of China Zhou Enlai, recreates the history of the country in the first half of the 20th century.
The works of Sladkovsky M.I., corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and one of the largest Soviet sinologists, highlight the key problems of the development of Chinese society in the 20th century: the ideological origins and essence of Maoism; the economy of the People's Republic of China and prospects for its development; international course regarding China, etc.
The books by G. N. Sevostyanov explore the policies of Japan, the USA, England, France, Germany, and Italy in the Far East on the eve of the Second World War. Much attention is paid to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the struggle of the Chinese people against Japanese aggression. The author provides material that clearly shows how, as Japanese armed aggression expanded in the Far East, inter-imperialist contradictions in Asia intensified, the balance of power changed, and crises in international relations deepened and grew. His works used big number archival materials and documents revealing secret negotiations and secret diplomacy of capitalist states before the Second World War. Based on extensive statistical data and official interstate treaties and agreements, individual stages in relations between two neighboring countries are characterized, trade and other types of economic relations between them are analyzed.
In the work of A.M. Ledovsky, against the backdrop of the difficult events that unfolded in China at the final stage of the war against Japan and in the first post-war years, two diametrically opposed foreign policy courses towards China - the Soviet Union and the United States - are analyzed. The effective opposition of Soviet diplomacy to American plans to penetrate Manchuria, the dismemberment of China, and attempts to unleash a direct military intervention in order to defeat the democratic forces led by the CCP and turn China into a semi-colony of the United States.
The monograph by Professor Yu. M. Galenovich tells about the life and work of Jiang Zhongzhen, known in our country as Chiang Kai-shek, one of the leaders of China in the 20th century, the successor of the father of the founder of the Chinese Republic Sun Yat-sen, the leader of China during the Second World War, the head of the party Kuomintang of China.
The monograph by Professor A. M. Dubinsky examines Soviet-Chinese relations during the period when the Chinese people were subjected to aggression from Japan. Based on fresh and interesting material, the book shows the USSR's assistance to China in the fight against the aggressor, reveals the significance of the decisive victories of the Soviet Armed Forces on the Soviet-German and Soviet-Japanese fronts and their influence on the outcome of the just struggle of the Chinese people for freedom and independence.
So, the purpose of this work is to study Soviet-Chinese relations in the period from 1917 to 1927.
The work has the following tasks:
· consider the role of the USSR in Chinese liberation movement;
· consider diplomatic and consular agreements between the USSR and China;
· consider trade and economic cooperation between the USSR and the provinces of China.
1. ROLE OF THE USSR IN THE CHINESE LIBERATION MOVEMENT
The collapse of the 2nd International prompted the Bolsheviks, led by V.I. Lenin, to raise the question of creating a 3rd International. This was already mentioned in the manifesto of the Central Committee of the RSDLP, published on November 1, 1914, “War and Russian Social Democracy.” The Bolsheviks launched a struggle to unite left-wing groups in the Social Democratic parties.
But the Comintern was created after the October Revolution of 1917. During this period, the process of formation of communist parties began in a number of countries. In 1918, communist parties arose in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland, the Netherlands, etc. Communist groups and circles arose in 1918-19. in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Italy, France, Denmark, Great Britain, USA, Canada, Brazil, Korea, Austria, the Union of South Africa, China and other countries.
In January 1919, a meeting of representatives of the Communist Party was held in Moscow Soviet Russia, Hungary, Poland, Austria, Latvia, Finland, etc. The meeting discussed the issue of convening international congress representatives of revolutionary parties, appealed to 39 revolutionary parties, groups and movements in the countries of Europe, Asia, America, and Austria with an appeal to take part in the work of the founding congress of the new international.
One of the primary tasks of the Comintern in China, as in other countries of the East, was to establish contacts with revolutionary-minded progressive figures in the country and provide them with the necessary ideological, theoretical, organizational and material assistance in the struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people.
In the conditions of civil war and foreign intervention in Siberia and the Far East, there were difficulties in establishing contacts between the bodies of the RCP (b) and the Comintern with the progressive forces of China. Therefore, on behalf of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and the Executive Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, work to establish connections was carried out by the communists of Siberia and the Far East. It was they who helped Chinese citizens create clubs (in Vladivostok - "May Day Club"), newspapers ("Gongzhenzhulu" - In Khabarovsk). In the summer of 1920, the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) created a Section in Irkutsk Eastern peoples, on the basis of which the Far Eastern Secretariat of the CI for work with China and other Far Eastern countries was subsequently organized.
The creation of communist circles marked the beginning of the organized communist movement in China. The main directions in the work of communist organizations in 1920-1921. were the dissemination of the ideas of communism, the preparation of the founding congress of the CPC.
Another area of activity of communist circles was the formation of the Socialist Youth League. The first union was created in Shanghai on August 22, 1920 and consisted of eight people. Following Shanghai, socialist youth unions arose in Beijing, Wuchang, Tianjin, and in November 1920 the Socialist Youth League of China was officially established. Judging by the charters of local organizations and other documents, the members of the union called the study of socialism and the struggle for the restructuring of society on socialist principles their main tasks. At one of the meetings of the Wuchang Youth Union, the task was set: “To study socialism - the most suitable teaching for the present time, capable of leading humanity on the path of progress,” it was proposed to “gradually apply in practice the theories studied by the union if an opportunity presents itself,” in particular, “address as equals with servants, whether at school or at home." Members of other youth union organizations actively participated in the publication and distribution of socialist literature. In addition, the selection and preparation of young people to study in Soviet Russia was carried out. In 1921, Liu Shaoqi, Pu Shiqi, Li Qihan and others went to Moscow to study.
In 1920-21 supporters of Marxism in China came to the conclusion that Marxism is international in nature and is quite applicable in the conditions of Chinese reality. According to propagandists of Marxist teaching, despite economic backwardness and the weak development of capitalist relations, China, with the support of Soviet Russia and the international communist movement, will be able to make the transition to a socialist society, and to accelerate such a transition it is necessary to carry out a social revolution that will create political conditions for carrying out socialist transformations . The Chinese Communist Party took shape organizationally at its First Congress in 1921. In preparation for the congress, a preliminary conference was held in March 1921, which developed a temporary program and a declaration of goals and principles. The conference participants formulated their tasks in the following way: "Our task is to organize and centralize power class struggle so that it becomes ever stronger and more powerful in its attack on capitalism. All this can be achieved through propaganda among workers, peasants, soldiers, office workers and students, through the establishment of industrial unions of workers, with common centers, as well as the creation of a single political party of the revolutionary proletariat, namely the party of communists."
The CPC began its activities in the context of aggravated contradictions in Chinese society and increased expansion of Western powers in China. Just at this time, in contrast to the Washington Conference, where China failed, the Comintern convened a congress of the peoples of the Far East, which was held in Moscow and Leningrad from January 21 to February 2, 1922. The congress was attended by 131 delegates with a casting vote and 17 with an advisory vote - these are representatives of China, Korea, Japan, India, Indonesia, Mongolia. The discussion that took place at this congress was of great importance for the subsequent activities of the CPC - a discussion about the attitude towards the national revolutionary movement and the role of communists in this movement. The congress adopted the following resolution on this issue: “Having familiarized itself with the decisions of the CI congresses on national and colonial issues, the congress declares its full solidarity with them, especially notes the need for a correct understanding of the relationship between national revolutionary movements and the struggle of the working people for their social liberation, considering, that only in alliance with the international proletariat will the working masses of the Far East enslaved by the militarism be able to achieve their national and social liberation, welcomes the revolutionary awakening of the proletarians of Japan, China, and Korea, seeing this as the key to a successful struggle.” 28
Already at the beginning of 1922, the CPC was informed about the position of the Comintern on the national-colonial issue and received recommendations arising from these decisions from V.I. Lenin.
While assisting in the organization of the CPC, the Comintern from the very beginning actively sought to establish contacts with the Kuomintang. This policy was also consistent with the steps of interstate relations with the Cantonese government of Sun Yat-sen. The very first mission of the Comintern, headed by G.N. Voitinsky, who arrived in China in 1920, came into direct contact with Sun Yat-sen. But the leaders of the CPC reacted sharply negatively to the proposal of the CI representatives for an alliance with the Kuomintang.
However, at the end of April - beginning of May 1922, the issue of cooperation with Sun Yat-sen and the KMT was again discussed at a meeting of the leaders of the CPC, Socialist Youth and the All-China Secretariat of Trade Unions, convened by the representative of the Executive Committee of the KIM S.A. Dalin in Canton in connection with the preparation of the first congresses of the SCMK (Socialist Youth League of China) and trade unions. However, due to disagreements, the meeting was unable to develop a common point of view and decided to continue the discussion on the issue of cooperation with the KMT.
First stage interaction (1919 - 1924) - was characterized by the programmatic and organizational formation of the Kuomintang (KMT) as a “party of action.”
The Kuomintang Party (Nationalist Party of China) was born in August 1912 in Guangdong Province. At its origins stood one of the founders of modern China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Initially, it had a social democratic orientation, and its task was to overthrow the ruling Qing dynasty and create the Chinese Republic. The party won a majority in the National Assembly, which was dissolved in 1913, after which it was subjected to a series of repressions. The nationalists were forced into exile in Japan.
A few years later, in 1918, Sun Yat-sen formed an alternative government in Guangzhou in the south of the country. In 1921, the Kuomintang, without waiting for help from the West, decided to turn to the USSR, which was trying to unite the Kuomintang and the CPC into a single Leninist-type party under the auspices of the Comintern. One of the then nationalist leaders, Chiang Kai-shek, goes to Moscow for party studies.
In 1924, Sun Yat-sen proclaimed the three principles of the people: nationalism, democracy and people's well-being. In 1926, after the death of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek took the helm of the party and equipped a military expedition against the military government entrenched in Beijing. In 1928, Kuomintang troops take Beijing, and the party begins to rebuild China according to its principles. By this time, a final split had emerged in the Kuomintang's relations with the communists, leading to civil war.
The idea of creating a United Front, which belonged to the Comintern, was positively received by the Kuomintang, but without mentioning the special role of the communists and reliance on the worker-peasant masses. The Kuomintang included broad sections of the population, including the propertied masses, in the scope of its revolutionary tactics and social policy, as was openly stated at the first congress of the Kuomintang. It is worth noting that the Comintern recommended that the Kuomintang build a united front policy primarily on an anti-imperialist basis; in the Kuomintang’s program documents, problems of the country’s internal development, the creation and strengthening of statehood became an important unifying motive. That is, we can say that the position of the Kuomintang regarding the “policy of unity of action of revolutionary forces” was not limited only to anti-imperialist interests and went far beyond the boundaries of cooperation between the KMT and the CPC. Namely, the Kuomintang’s ideas about the united front policy found concrete embodiment both in the policy of cooperation with the communists and in the creation of the United Union of Peasants, Workers, Traders and Students, proclaimed by the second plenum of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang of the second convocation (May 15 - 22, 1926) and authorized June 28, 1926 by the National Government. Also, without any serious amendments, Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang accepted the principles of organizational building of the party along the lines of the RCP(b). The adoption by the First Congress of a similar charter had great importance to transform the Kuomintang into a “party of action” with a clear structure and organization.
The idea is radical agrarian reform, which was then developed by the Comintern into the policy of agrarian revolution, turned out to be one of the main ideas that predetermined the opposition between the Comintern and Kuomintang models of the Chinese revolution.
The very interaction between the CI and the KMT took place against the background of the models of the Chinese revolution that were constantly being formed both in the Kuomintang and in the Comintern during 1919 - 1924.
At the same time, the Comintern gradually formed ideas about a model of revolution different from the Kuomintang, with its ideas of a military expedition against the northern militarists and the subordinate role of the mass movement. New approaches included the active intervention of the communist movement in the formation political theory And revolutionary practice Kuomintang. The concept of revolution was developed in the form of a mass upsurge from below, by the forces of the masses, according to the scheme of the October Revolution of 1917. Part of this model was the course to reorient the Kuomintang with the aim of turning it into a party that would reflect the interests of workers and peasants. This course was developed in the advisory and directive documents of the ECCI, closed to the Kuomintang, mainly in the Eastern Department of the Comintern. They were addressed to the CPC, its congresses and plenums of the CPC Central Committee, their implementation was supposed to be carried out through the activities of representatives of the Comintern in China and communists who join the Kuomintang.
One of the most active developers was the representative of the Comintern in China G.I. Voitinsky. Illusions in the Comintern about the possibility of changing the Kuomintang’s conceptual approaches to national revolution was strengthened by the representative of the Comintern in the Kuomintang, M.M. Borodin, who gave the Kuomintang and its program guidelines not entirely adequate characteristics.
It is worth saying that the cooperation of the Kuomintang with the CPC was carried out mainly in the form of the communists joining the Kuomintang. It was initially viewed by Sun Yat-sen not as equal cooperation between the two parties, which the communists sought, but from the point of view of the leadership positions of the Kuomintang and “the admission of communists into the Kuomintang.”
Option for the development of the national revolutionary movement, which was developed during 1925 - early 1926. The Chinese Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b)/VKP(b) was closely associated with the interests of the foreign policy of the USSR, and differed from the Kuomintang in its ideas about the national revolution. In close cooperation with the Central Committee of the RCP (b), and from April 1925 - with the Chinese Commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), a model for the development of the national revolutionary movement was developed, relying on large military-political groups in Central and Northern China loyal to the USSR. In this situation, the Kuomintang was assigned a passive role due to its still insufficient military power and due to the Kuomintang’s disagreement with this scenario for the development of the revolution. Although the Kuomintang was given specific place in this arrangement political forces, but it was not decisive. But still, the Soviet side continued to provide material and financial assistance to the Kuomintang, assistance with weapons, military and technical advisers. Another characteristic of the northern version of the Chinese policy of the RCP(b)/VKP(b) was the desire to unite within the boundaries of the plan various streams of the revolutionary movement, which were not closely connected with each other in real life Keywords: Feng Yuxiang's national armies, the military revolution of the KMT, the mass movement, the policies of the CCP. From the beginning of 1926, as the position of Feng Yuxiang weakened and the influence of the KMT expanded in China, the CPSU (b) increasingly moved away from the position of the northern version, moving closer to the approaches of the ECCI to the KMT and to the national revolution.
It is worth noting that the policy of the Comintern of this period was not consistent and clear, since the Comintern was simultaneously developing a policy aimed at preparing the conditions for organizing a popular upsurge “from below” and its impact on the program and policy of the Kuomintang, on the degeneration of the Kuomintang “from within”, and on the conquest of leading positions in the party and army by the communists and left-wing Kuomintang members, who were credited with unusual pro-worker and pro-peasant sentiments.
The lack of an institutionalized structure for direct contacts between the Kuomintang and the Comintern prevented the achievement of the necessary awareness of both the Kuomintang about the policies of the Comintern, and the Comintern about the policies of the Kuomintang. A particularly huge role was played by Soviet representatives, who did not fully understand the situation and made not entirely well-thought-out decisions. It is worth saying that Moscow’s position on the issue of relations with Chiang Kai-shek was very cautious after a conflict arose in the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and the National Government after part of it moved from Canton to Wuhan. In mid-March 1927, under pressure from the CPC and M.M. Borodin, at the Third Plenum of the second convocation of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, decisions were made that limited the sole power of Chiang Kai-shek in the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and in its Military Council, which was in accordance with Moscow's directives. But immediately after the plenum of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, on the initiative of M.M. Borodin, the head of the Wuhan government, Tan Yankai, signed a secret order for the arrest of Chiang Kai-shek, which they failed to carry out. This decision contradicted Moscow’s position regarding Chiang Kai-shek; Moscow was not even informed about this rash decision. In accepting it, M.M. Borodin made an erroneous miscalculation in assessing the balance of forces that supported Wuhan and Chiang Kai-shek.
The policy of the Comintern and the RCP(b)/VKP(b) in China, with all its pros and cons, was an integral part of the national revolutionary movement of China. It is connected with the political history of China and is its component. The long period of cooperation (1920-1927) and its effectiveness testify to the historical relationship between the national revolutionary movement in China and the international communist movement in the 20s of the 20th century. The origins of China's future development lie in the experience of the national revolutionary movement of the 20s, to the development of which the Soviet Union and the Comintern made a significant contribution.
In conclusion, it is worth noting that the CI occupied a leading position in the organization of the national revolutionary movement in China. It was with his help that connections were established with progressive figures in Chinese society, and the CPC Party was subsequently formed; relations with Sun Yat-sen and the KMT party were established.
The correspondence and negotiations that Sun Yat-sen conducted in Shanghai with representatives of the RSFSR in China A.A. Ioffe since August 1922 were of great importance for the evolution of the KMT policy. During the negotiations with A.A. Ioffe, Sun Yat-sen informed him about plans for the reorganization of the KMT, the army, and the preparation of the Northern Expedition, but noted that he did not have enough funds and there were no specialists capable of organizing a combat-ready army, so he would like to receive financial support from the RSFSR help and advisors.
During the period of organizational formation of the United Front (at the end of 1923 - beginning of 1924), it was created “from above”, through the political blocking of two parties - the KMT and the CPC. Initially, the United Front included only a small part of the urban population in those places where the Kuomintang and Communists were most active (in Shanghai, Beijing, Canton), as well as a small part of the workers, who by the time the EF was created were organized into trade unions by the Communists, and not could play an independent role. At first the peasantry was not included in the EF.
In organizational terms, the EF was initially formed as an “internal bloc” of the Kuomintang and Communists. The admission of the Communists into the KMT organizationally consolidated the temporary tactical blocking of the two political parties, and thereby laid the foundation for the EF. But neither the Communists nor the Kuomintang considered the KMT organizational form EF. There was no formal agreement between the two parties on unity of action, official relations between their governing bodies were limited to occasional mutual exchanges, public messages and emissaries to resolve all kinds of claims and contradictions, and the functions of a link between them were performed by the adviser and instructor for the reorganization of the KMT M.M. .Borodin and representatives of CI. Through M.M. Borodin, communication between the KMT and CI and the Soviet government was carried out; Neither the KMT nor the CCP had official representation in Moscow.
The CPC agreed to an alliance with the KMT only on the terms of partnership, which excluded one form or another of communists joining the KMT. The KMT rejected both an equal partnership with the CCP and the admission of the CCP into the KMT as an independent faction.
The result of difficult negotiations on the form and conditions of the EF, in which the CI, CPC and KMT participated, was the adoption of a compromise decision on the individual entry of communists into the KMT while maintaining the ideological, political and organizational independence of both the CPC and the KMT. This decision presupposed a certain convergence of the political guidelines of both parties on the basis mutual concessions, development of a common political platform of the EF. In practice, this meant a reorganization of the KMT, rapprochement with the USSR and CI in the international arena. The CPC recognized the leading role of the KMT in the national revolutionary movement, and communists who joined the KMT accepted the obligation to submit to its party discipline.
The form of the “internal bloc” developed with the participation of the CI, in which the KMT with the participation of the communists turned into the organizational basis of the EF while both parties retained their ideological, political and organizational independence, should, according to the CI, meet the goals of the Chinese Revolution.
The KMT, by accepting communists into its ranks, emerged from its previous state of political isolation and opened the way to cooperation with Soviet Russia and to the creation of its own armed forces. Communists, working within the KMT, gained access to the masses. The task of the CI was to help unite the efforts of the CCP and the KMT, because None of the parties alone was able to start a revolution.
2. ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONS between the USSR and CHINA
Diplomatic and consular relations were established on May 31, 1924 by an agreement on general principles for resolving issues (appendix). Treaties of the tsarist government affecting the sovereign rights and interests of China were declared liquidated. The parties pledged not to enter into agreements that would harm the interests of the USSR or China; do not conduct propaganda against each other; do not allow the activities of organizations fighting against the governments of the USSR or China on their territory.
The USSR renounced Russian concessions in China and the right of extraterritoriality, and also confirmed the recognition of Outer Mongolia as part of China. (From the point of view of the real situation in Mongolia, this did not change anything; the people's government of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party remained in power and in 1924, after the death of Bogdo-Gogen, officially proclaimed the formation of the Mongolian People's Republic.)
In accordance with the agreement, the USSR and China pledged not to allow hostile activities from their territories against each other. The CER was recognized as joint property and a “purely commercial enterprise.” The USSR also refused the Russian share of the “Boxer indemnity” and annulled the treaties between Tsarist Russia and other powers regarding China.
At the same time, in 1924, negotiations began in Beijing between the Japanese and Soviet ambassadors in China on the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations. On January 20, 1925, a Soviet-Japanese convention on the basic principles of relations was signed in the Chinese capital. The USSR and Japan agreed to establish diplomatic relations and assumed obligations regarding non-interference in each other's internal affairs and the provision of most favored nation treatment in trade. The parties confirmed their obligations under the Russian-Japanese Portsmouth Peace Treaty of 1905. But in a special declaration in connection with the signing of the convention, the Soviet side declared that the USSR government renounced political responsibility for the conclusion of this treaty by the government of Imperial Russia. Soviet-Japanese economic relations and the problem of Russian debts were supposed to be discussed at a special conference.
The Treaty of Portsmouth, which remained in force under the Soviet-Japanese convention of 1925, recognized Northern Manchuria as a Russian sphere of influence, although this contradicted the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1924 in the part where Russia renounced the treaties of Tsarist Russia with other powers regarding China. The legal ambiguity of the situation allowed, in principle, the Soviet Union to further build its policy in Manchuria rather in the spirit of Japan’s recognition of special Russian interests in this zone, as was stipulated in Treaty of Portsmouth, than in the spirit of renouncing the privileges inherited from Tsarist Russia, as stated in the Sino-Soviet agreement. Taking into account the actual non-control of Manchuria by China and its gradual transition to Japanese rule, Soviet-Japanese agreements became decisive for the policy of the USSR in this part of China. In this situation, Northern Manchuria began to be viewed in Moscow as the most suitable site for constructing a “revolutionary bridgehead” to strengthen revolutionary influence in China, which was on the verge of new internal political upheavals. Quickly mastering the former Russian positions in the Far East, not bound by the Washington agreements and guided by the ideological guidelines of the Comintern, the Soviet Union sought not to strengthen regional stability, but to extend the sphere of influence of revolutionary tendencies to China.
3. TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION OF THE USSR WITH THE PROVINCES OF CHINA
The normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations in 1924 had a very positive impact on the dynamics of the development of comprehensive and, above all, economic relations between the Soviet Union and the province of Xinjiang. The extremely acute need of Soviet industry for Xinjiang raw materials forced the diplomatic and foreign trade departments to act very energetically and assertively. G.V. Chicherin demanded from his employees: “99% of the experts in the Xinjiang economy should be in Turkestan...”. Trade with Xinjiang at that time was carried out by several organizations of the Soviet Union, the largest of which were the All-Russian Society "Wool", the All-Union Textile Syndicate, the Oil Syndicate, Sugar Trust and some others. Despite whole line difficulties of an objective and subjective nature that stood in the way of the development of economic ties between neighboring parties, these ties developed quite dynamically. If in 1923/1924 the value of imports from Xinjiang was estimated at 2198 thousand rubles, and exports from the Soviet Union at 413 thousand rubles, then in 1924/1925 these figures were 4357 and 2683 thousand rubles, respectively. Moreover, by 1926/1927, the total amount of exports was almost equal to the amount of imports, reaching 49.9%, which in itself was an indicator economic growth Soviet country. To facilitate trade between neighboring parties, fairs have been widely used since the early 1920s. The largest of them were Kuyanda (in the Semipalatinsk region), Karakarinskaya (in the Semirechensk region) and Nizhny Novgorod. But smaller scale ones were also carried out, designed to serve the interests of individual regions. Moreover, Xinjiang merchants, especially representatives of indigenous peoples, Soviet authorities provided significant benefits. Already at the end of 1923 G.V. Chicherin telegraphed the commissioner of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Chuguchak - Fesenko: "... The Nizhny Novgorod Fair and the Eastern Chamber provided a number of benefits to Chinese merchants. Major deals have been concluded, so we expect that the Chinese authorities will not interfere with Russian-Chinese trade." On July 10, 1924, another telegram signed by Chicherin was sent to the Soviet consulates in Xinjiang. It gave permission "... to issue visas, according to the conclusion of the authorized People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, to merchants, exclusively to natives, going to the Tyumen fair, opening on July 18...". In September 1925, having replaced Fesenko in Chuguchak, the new USSR Consul Puchkov reported to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs: "In order to develop the Chara Fair, which opened on October 1, the consulate proposed to the Gubvnutorg, the Gubvet Administration to remove the veterinary supervision in Bakhty and move the quarantine of livestock to the fair area. The widely notified Chinese merchants kicked out border more than 30 thousand sheep, three thousand cattle..." At the same time, the NKID issued to the Soviet consuls Western China permission to issue visas to Muslims "... both women and men, where photographic cards can be replaced by impressions of the left thumb." Moreover, the telegram emphasized that “... this benefit does not apply to Europeans and Chinese officials.” During this period, horse, sheepskin and goat skins, goat down, sheep and camel wool, furs, raw silk, cotton, tea, tobacco, horses, cattle, sheep, goats, and dried fruits were supplied to the Soviet market in large quantities during this period. The quantity and volume of goods supplied by Xinjiang merchants to Russian trade fairs were sometimes so great that serious problems arose with their delivery to the fair area. Thus, the Soviet consul in Gulja Vazanov reported in September 1925 to Moscow: “In Dzharkent there are about 5,000 pounds of Musabaev’s wool, which goes to Nizhny Novgorod fair. The Sovtorgoflot agency in Dzharkent is not able to transfer it due to lack of funds. Take urgent action." In turn, Xinjiang merchants purchased from Soviet trade organizations cotton fabrics, threads, iron and cast iron products, dishes, sugar, matches, petroleum products, etc. The growth of trade turnover can be characterized by the fact that in 1926 it reached level in 1913, and exceeded it by 63.2% in 1929. The import of large quantities of raw materials from Xinjiang made it possible to accelerate the resolution of two important tasks for the USSR: to speed up the restoration of light industry and to increase the country's overall trade turnover. At the same time, "Export of raw materials had great importance for the economy of Xinjiang, "contributing in turn to an increase in its internal trade turnover, necessary for the rise of agriculture and the creation of an independent national industry. The labor migration of thousands of farmers, which resumed in the first half of the 20s, began to play a certain role in improving the financial situation of the population of Xinjiang for seasonal work in the Central Asian Soviet republics.. True, compared to the pre-revolutionary period, their number decreased, but nevertheless amounted to about 10,000 people. They could export part of the earnings received in foreign currency, part in goods, which was of great importance in the conditions of the still low saturation of the Xinjiang market. However, along with obvious successes, from the mid-20s, aspects began to appear in trade and economic relations between Xinjiang and the Soviet Union that not only hampered the development of these relations, but could in the future have a very negative impact on their prospects.
In conditions post-war period trade between the Soviet Union and Xinjiang was based mainly on the principle of commodity exchange or barter. In exchange for various types of raw materials supplied by Xinjiang merchants and firms, Soviet trade organizations imported industrial products and products that were not produced in Xinjiang itself to the province. Financial compensation for the raw materials supplied by the Chinese side, despite persistent requests from Chinese merchants, was not produced, and if it was produced, it was in amounts not exceeding 25% of the total cost of the goods. At the same time, the range of goods supplied by the Soviet side often did not take into account the needs of the population of Xinjiang, and the goods themselves were sometimes very Low quality. British Colonel Schomberg, who studied the political and economic situation in Xinjiang in the second half of the 20s, wrote in a letter to the British Consul in Kashgar: “The Soviet government has bought in Xinjiang over the past six years a huge amount of cattle, horses, sheep, sheep wool, leather , skins, dried fruits, felts, carpets, cheese, raw silk, furs and sheep guts, which it transports (excluding cattle and sheep) directly to Germany and England for propaganda purposes, to show foreign governments that it has an abundance of raw materials in Russia for sale... Agents of the Soviet government buy up these goods, but pay for them only 20% in cash and 80% in Russian goods of various types: iron, kerosene, colored calicoes, old and new plows, samovars, copper boilers... . For all these goods, Soviet agents charge high prices from Sartov merchants... Xinjiang markets are overstocked with the above-mentioned Soviet goods, Sartov merchants must sell them at a loss of 30-40% just to get cash. The Mohammedans... are fed up with the rotten, cheap rubbish that the Soviet government is selling them."
The British colonel's remarks regarding the state of affairs in the field of Soviet-Xinjiang trade were, of course, a subjective assessment, but nevertheless they were in many ways close to the truth. The dissatisfaction of Xinjiang merchants with the disparity of prices in trade and the disregard of their interests began to especially manifest itself in the late 20s and early 30s. This discontent was expressed in a variety of forms and began to really affect the entire complex of Soviet-Xinjiang relations. In 1928, the Commissioner of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Central Asia, Solovyov, and the Commissioner of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade in Central Asia, Kleiner, in a joint note addressed to the Deputy Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Karakhan, noted with alarm that the Xinjiang merchants had decided to create “... a single Joint-Stock Company, which sets itself the goal of monopolizing trade with the Soviet Union in its hands and intends, through a series of combined administrative and economic measures, to remove Soviet organizations from direct contact with the Xinjiang market..." The deputy people's commissars, referring in their note to the fact that this step of the Xinjiang merchants "... comes primarily from political motives," at the same time were forced to frankly declare: "Unfortunately , tendencies of a general political nature are reinforced and sharpened by a number of very specific mistakes of our organizations, increasing the discontent of local merchants." In an information letter to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the USSR consul-trade agent in the Ili district of Xinjiang Kolosov and the secretary-economist of the USSR trade agency in this district - Vetyukov report , that a monopoly on fur trade was introduced in the Ili district in 1930. Merchants from Eastern China. “Under this condition,” Soviet diplomats note, “the need to fulfill the set pace requires maximum precision and accuracy in carrying out economic tasks undertaken by individual economic organizations. However, we have a lot of cases that provide sufficient material to verify our sloppiness, negligence, irresponsibility, bordering on sabotage "The letter of the trade agency dated August 22, 1930, No. 1309, indicates over 75 claims from 18 Chinese companies. These claims relate to operations in 1926-1927." The letter also reported that Soviet transport organizations unreasonably inflate prices for transporting goods to Xinjiang, which makes trade with the Soviet Union unprofitable for Xinjiang merchants, because “...transportation turns out to be more expensive than the goods themselves. The cost of freight from Iliysk-Khorgos is 3 rubles. 50 per pood, while the price of a pood of kerosene ex-Alma-Ata is 1 ruble 60 kopecks." In the “Information Economic Bulletin” No. 4-5 for 1930, published by the All-Union Eastern Chamber of Commerce, it was emphasized that Xinjiang “... has a demand for new types of goods, namely: the installation of a power station in Ghulja and, in connection with this, the import of fittings, steam mill, water-lifting machines, as well as for export goods: watches, cameras, gramophones (victrono), etc. However, Soviet trade organizations, due to a number of objective and subjective reasons, could not ensure the supply of the required goods in the required quantity and assortment.” The state of affairs described in the VVTP bulletin was the norm rather than the exception. There were very frequent cases when Xinjiang merchants waited for years for payment for goods already delivered and in the end were forced to take completely illicit products of the Soviet handicraft industry as payment.
The need to revise the principles of economic cooperation with Xinjiang became an urgent and very pressing problem for the Soviet leadership. Understanding that political stability in this region and to a large extent depends on its solution economic well-being country, pushed the Soviet side to vigorous action. On March 30 of the year, Karakhan, in a letter to the Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Trade Ozersky, emphasized: “The defects in our trade and political work in Xinjiang are one of the main reasons for acute discontent not only on the part of the Chinese authorities and the Chinese merchants, but also significant sections of the Muslim merchants and provide an opportunity for the Chinese authorities to accuse us of ruining Xinjiang and that our trade regime provides unilateral benefits to the USSR to the detriment of the national economy of Xinjiang." Among the most negative aspects in Soviet-Xinjiang trade, Karakhan names the following:
"a) The narrowly practical approach of USSR economic organizations to Soviet-Xinjiang trade relations, which consists in constructing work only from the point of view of extracting maximum commercial profits;
b) Wrong trade policy and, in particular, price policy;
c) Overstocking of the Xinjiang market with excess stocks of manufactured goods; goods are imported regardless of demand and without taking into account market needs;
d) Parallelism and unhealthy competition between individual economic bodies of the USSR;
e) The system of forced assortment when covering the raw materials purchased from the Xinjiang merchants, carried out both on the territory of the Union and on the territory of Xinjiang, causes the import and accumulation in Xinjiang of goods that are completely unsold on the market and causes strong discontent among the merchants;
f) The net balance system, which has completely eliminated monetary payments from trade turnover, deprives the merchants trading with us and the Chinese administration of the foreign exchange funds they need both for the purchase of specific Chinese goods and for accumulation.
g) Prohibition of transit through the territory of the Union of specific Chinese goods from East China and back, leading to the fact that these goods still go by horse-drawn route to the East, which contributes to the development of ties between Xinjiang and the East, depriving the Union of foreign exchange earnings and, finally, irritating the merchants and the administration is against us." It also pointed out a number of other reasons that negatively influenced the state of affairs in Soviet-Xinjiang trade.
Karakhan proposed in his letter a whole range of measures that, in his opinion, could correct the situation. In particular, he insisted that a transition be made to foreign currency payments for supplied goods, and that price policy promote the development of those sectors of the Xinjiang economy that are a replenishment and continuation of the union economy. His letter also proposed to abolish forced assortment when selling export goods to the Xinjiang merchants, and to decisively eliminate from trade turnover all kinds of unnecessary formalities that hinder this trade turnover. In addition, the proposals of the Deputy Commissioner for Foreign Affairs included measures that were supposed to promote the development of the national economy of Xinjiang and help improve the system of relations between the parties. As a result of an active exchange of views between the heads of various commissariats and departments of the USSR, the issue of trade with Xinjiang and the difficulties that arose in connection with this was brought to a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The Politburo's decision on April 10, 1931 included an extensive plan to improve the state of affairs in trade with Xinjiang. The main provisions were built on the above proposals by L.M. Karakhan and were included, to one degree or another, in the “Agreement on Economic Relations between the Xinjiang Provincial Government and the USSR” concluded on October 1, 1931. However, with all the activity Soviet leaders and their, presumably, sincere desire, the correction of the current situation was extremely slow. On October 20, 1931, noting the unsatisfactory state of affairs in trade with Xinjiang, L. M. Karakhan was forced to send a special letter to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. M. Molotov. In this letter, he noted, in particular: “The Politburo, by its resolution of April 10, 1931, on issues of Soviet-Xinjiang trade in order to eliminate the disgraces that had occurred with the supply of goods to the Xinjiang market (untimely receipt of goods, formation of large debts, import of slow-moving goods and widespread application of the practice of forced assortment), proposed that the Supreme Economic Council and the People's Commissariat for Supply of goods reserve goods within the limits of the annual and quarterly plans, ensuring uninterrupted supply to Xinjiang. Meanwhile... the industry decisively refused to produce further shipments of textiles and sugars planned for the fourth quarter, having completed the latter for textiles at 38.5% and for sugars - 7.1%, which means essentially a failure of the export plan for Xinjiang, in which textiles and sugars account for 75-80% of all exports." The situation in trade with Xinjiang after the decision adopted by the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks not only did not improve, but in a number of districts of the province it became even worse. The Consul General of the USSR in Kashgar, Tkachev, reported with great concern on April 16, 1932 to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade: “The situation of our trade activity here is unsatisfactory. The reason is that we are not working well, which causes fair discontent on the part of the merchants. Recently, in connection with the conclusion of a trade agreement agreement, this dissatisfaction develops into a political plane. In the fight against the implementation of the agreement, our shortcomings are being intensively used, and as you know, there are quite a few of them." Further, the consul lists almost the same problems in the work of Soviet trade organizations that were mentioned in the Politburo resolution, and he defines them even more harshly and frankly. Tkachev emphasizes: “We cannot continue to tolerate such a situation when imported exports are unsatisfactory either quantitatively or qualitatively, and on top of that they are sent without documents. We cannot continue to tolerate such a situation when merchants wait for 3-4 years for exports, having in their hands only transport receipts that they received for imports delivered to us at our fairs.” The work to implement the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated April 10, 1931 was assessed very negatively, based on the above and other facts, and after almost 2 years from the moment of its adoption - in 1933. In January of this year, a special meeting was held in the Second Eastern Department of the NKID with the participation of all interested departments, at which the implementation of the government decision of April 10, 1931 was checked and controversial issues with the Chinese." The meeting participants stated that many points of the resolution were partially implemented, and some of them, such as the point on the abolition of forced assortment, were not implemented at all. The point recommending providing loans to Xinjiang for the development of engineering exports was also not implemented. In in the minutes of the meeting it was written that “Not a single Chinese order accepted by us has yet been fulfilled.” The very unsatisfactory situation with the implementation of the Politburo resolution was further aggravated by the fact that from 1931 to 1934 Xinjiang was experiencing another socio-political crisis. peoples who fought against the Chinese colonialists for their independence in these years, and the very ambiguous position of the Soviet leadership in relation to this uprising, made it difficult to implement this resolution.The complexity of the situation and the lack of positive results forced the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to return in August 1933 to the issue of trade with Xinjiang again. The Politburo decided this time “...to carry out a special inspection of the activities of our trade, financial and other organizations in Xinjiang from the point of view of verifying their implementation of Politburo decisions of April 10, 1931 and establishing normal relations with the local merchants and administration.” It was also decided to carefully check the personnel of all Soviet institutions and strengthen these institutions with responsible and reliable people, and to develop the economic work of the USSR economic agencies in Xinjiang, provide them with material resources. However, this resolution, for the most part, remained on paper until 1935. Thus, the attempts of the Soviet government to develop and implement the principles of a new economic policy in relation to Xinjiang, due to a number of objective and subjective reasons, were not fully implemented either in the late 20s or early 30s. This was done, but already in a modified form and on a qualitatively new basis, only after 1934, when in Xinjiang, during the uprising of Muslim peoples, a government came to power and took active steps to develop economic and political cooperation with the Soviet Union.
CONCLUSION
After 1917, China began to be considered by the new rulers of Russia as part of a general course to search for allies in the fight against Western imperialism. In accordance with this policy, national anti-Western movements in colonies and semi-colonies were considered by Moscow as natural allies, and through the Comintern it provided them with all possible assistance. In China, the main target of assistance was the Kuomintang, although debates about how much to rely on the Kuomintang and how much on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and which of these forces could become more useful for Soviet interests were debated within the Comintern itself and in the Soviet leadership were carried out constantly. Subsequently, the Chinese question became one of the main ones in the struggle of the Stalinist majority of the Central Committee with the “left opposition.” The example of China has been actively used in discussions around the concept of the “Asian mode of production”.
The beginning of relations between Soviet Russia and the Republic of China was made during the visit of the Chinese military-diplomatic mission under the leadership of General Zhang Xilin, which arrived in Moscow on September 5, 1920 - with the purpose of “conducting negotiations on behalf of the Government Republic of China"Although the delegation's stay was short-lived and Zhang Silin's powers were not clearly defined, the leadership of Soviet Russia tried to take advantage of the mission's arrival to establish friendly relations with Beijing. On September 27, 1920, Zhang Silin was presented with a note from the government of the RSFSR outlining the principles proposed by the Council of People's Commissars and NKID as the basis for the future Soviet-Chinese treaty. But literally the next day, the Beijing government, which was strongly influenced by the Western powers, apparently, at their request, recalled Zhang Xilin's mission. Only in February 1921 did the Chinese side give a response to the Russian note of September 27 1920 and agreed to begin direct negotiations with the government of the Russian Republic.In a response note dated March 10, 1921, the NKID immediately proposed to begin negotiations in Beijing.
From the very first days, the Chinese government began to use tactics to delay negotiations. Constant delays, postponements, and direct disruptions of agreements on the part of Beijing are generally characteristic of Soviet-Chinese negotiations both at this initial stage and in the future.
The cooperation of Sun Yat-sen's party with the Comintern and Moscow had both positive and negative consequences for each of the parties. For the Kuomintang, the positive result of the interaction is obvious. The Kuomintang, which managed to use the help of the Comintern, the CPC, Soviet state V different areas party and state building, managed to reorganize into a “party of action” and unify China according to the main provisions of its program. The break with the communists turned out to be disastrous for the Kuomintang itself. Having lost the support of the Comintern and the Chinese Communists, the Kuomintang lost experienced assistants in the field of party and state building, and lost its social orientation in its policies.
A completely different type of cooperation characterizes the relationship between the Comintern and the CPC. The Chinese communists, like Sun Yat-sen, were determined to follow the path of Soviet Russia, but their understanding of how to follow this path was different. Recognizing Marxism-Leninism as a teaching capable of illuminating the right path to the renewal of China on the principles of social justice, democracy and universal equality, progressive representatives of the Chinese intelligentsia, with the support of the Comintern, founded the CPC. Until the end of 1925, the party consisted practically of separate cells; The total number of members was also small: during the First Congress there were about 50, the Second (1922) - 120, the Third (1923) - 230, the IV (1925) - about 900, with the majority being representatives of the intelligentsia. The development in China of a revolutionary concept corresponding to the general strategy and tactics of the world communist movement was a long process, and the assistance of the Comintern played a large role in solving this task. The Communist International oriented the CPC towards the creation of a mass proletarian party of the Bolshevik type, capable of leading the national liberation movement in the country. This assistance of the Comintern was expressed in revolutions, councils, provision of material resources, in the training of leading personnel at the Communist University of the Peoples of the East and other educational institutions, as well as in the persistent and political work of its representatives in China. But it is worth noting that the Comintern was still not able to completely control the activities of the CCP. The CPC was able to gain limited political autonomy in relation to the Comintern, although the ECCI (Executive Committee of the CI) enjoyed authority in matters of strategy. The conditions that favored the preservation of autonomy were Moscow's poor awareness of the real development of the revolution in China and its remoteness from the scene of events. As a result, the CCP should have more often relied on its own assessments of tactical situations. The directives of the Communist International came very late or did not arrive at all, and autonomy was also facilitated by the vague nature of many decisions of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the CI. Fundamental disagreements in the interpretation of Comintern tactics that took place among Comintern representatives in China also had a great influence on Communist Party leaders; this circumstance allowed the Chinese Communists to maneuver, while at the same time accepting their own guidelines. Thus, the Comintern did not completely control the activities of the CCP.
Also important role In the national revolutionary movement, the unique relationship between the two parties that formed the united national revolutionary front (KMT and CPC) plays a role. The cooperation of these parties became a powerful accelerator of the revolutionary movement, but it itself was not strong or sustainable. The ultimate goals of both parties were different, their ideas about the nature of their union and the place that each of these parties should occupy in this union were different. Cooperation was complicated by contradictions, which either smoothed out or intensified, and never disappeared. The initiative in the formation of the United Front was taken by the Comintern and Moscow. According to the Soviet state, the internal party cooperation of the CPC with the Kuomintang was subordinated to one goal - to achieve the “communization” of the Kuomintang by ousting from leadership positions, and then expelling representatives of the bourgeoisie from this party, after which the communists had to subordinate their petty-bourgeois allies in the Kuomintang to their influence in order to establish the hegemony of the proletariat in China, not directly through the CPC, but through the workers' and peasants' Kuomintang. This concept, in its essence, was purely bureaucratic, based on desk calculations. Meanwhile, this policy could not be effective in China. The Kuomintang in 1925–1927 was a revolutionary party whose anti-communist military faction was popular not only among the officer corps, but also among sections of Chinese society. Thus, it was impossible to simply oust the members of this group from their own political organization. The CPC found itself hostage to Moscow's policies. On the one hand, the obligation to maintain intra-party cooperation with the Kuomintang led to the fact that the question of the price of such cooperation itself weakened. On the other hand, being in the Kuomintang, the CCP could not successfully fight for hegemony: any step in this direction, any attempt to organize a crime could provoke conflicts with a stronger partner, which relied on its own armed forces; such a clash could lead to a split in the KMT or the expulsion of the communists from the Kuomintang. Thus, the CCP doomed itself to constant defection to its allies, regardless of what directives it received from Moscow. It was impossible to carry out the instructions on the communization of the Kuomintang without risking breaking the United Front. Leaving the Kuomintang meant the impossibility of transforming this party into a workers' and peasants' party. Moscow and the Comintern found themselves at an impasse; they were forced to be content with the anti-imperialism of the Kuomintang until the moment when, at the end of June 1927, the policy of the Comintern collapsed.
Thus, the assistance of the Comintern in the national revolutionary movement was both positive and negative character. The Comintern assisted in training Chinese military personnel from among the Kuomintang and communists in the Soviet Union and Guangzhou, reforming the Kuomintang army and building its national revolutionary army with the help of Soviet military advisers and instructors. The Soviet Union delivered virtually unpaid military-technical equipment and weapons to the Kuomintang and the National Army, armed workers' squads and peasant unions to a limited extent, etc. It was with the help of the Comintern that the CPC was organized and the Kuomintang was reorganized, and the United Front was created. But with all its help, the Comintern did not understand the specifics of the Chinese movement, because the theory and politics of the Comintern were formed under strong impact stereotypes of the Russian and world revolution and in conditions of insufficient awareness of the Comintern and Moscow about the national revolution of China as a whole. One of the reasons for poor awareness was the political reality of the 20s, which was characterized by a complex interweaving and interaction of various social and political forces and movements, which nutrient medium to develop alternative theories and policy directions. In those years it was difficult to determine the promising direction of the revolutionary movement. Also, do not forget about the internal party struggle in Soviet Russia itself.
In leading positions in the Comintern there were such individuals as Bukharin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, who had their own approaches to the national revolutionary movement in China, and Stalin skillfully maneuvered, exposing his opponents, without taking into account the real state of affairs in China. Therefore, the policy of the Comintern was contradictory and ill-thought out.
But still, history shows that the policy of the Comintern, the CPSU (b) in China, with all its pros and cons, was an integral part of the national revolutionary movement in China. It is connected with many threads political history China is its component. The duration of the period of cooperation (1920-1927) and its effectiveness testified to the historical relationship between the national revolutionary movement in China and the international communist movement in the 1920s. XX century.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Pantsov A.V. The secret history of Soviet-Chinese relations: The Bolsheviks and the whale. revolution (1919-1927). - M.: Ant-Hyde, 2001. - 454 p.
Agreement on general principles for resolving issues between the USSR and the Republic of China dated May 31, 1924.
(Extract)
Article I.
Immediately after the signing of this Agreement, normal diplomatic and consular relations between both Contracting Parties are restored.
The Government of the Republic of China agrees to take the necessary measures to transfer to the Government USSR mission premises and consular buildings that previously belonged to the tsarist government.
Article III.
The Governments of both Contracting Parties agree to annul, at the conference provided for in the preceding article, all conventions, treaties, agreements, protocols, contracts, etc., concluded between the Government of China and the Tsarist Government, and to replace them with new treaties, agreements, etc. on the basis of equality, reciprocity and justice and in the spirit of the declarations of the Soviet government in 1919 and 1920.
Article IV.
The Government of the USSR, in accordance with its policy and with the declarations of 1919 and 1920, declares all treaties, agreements, etc., affecting the sovereign rights or interests of China, concluded between the former tsarist government and any third party, to be destroyed and of no force. party or parties.
The Governments of both Contracting Parties declare that in the future neither of them will enter into any treaties or agreements that could prejudice the sovereign rights or interests of either of the two Contracting Parties.
Article V.
The Government of the USSR recognizes that Outer Mongolia is integral part Republic of China and respects Chinese sovereignty there.
The Government of the USSR declares that as soon as questions regarding the withdrawal of all USSR troops from Outer Mongolia, namely the deadline for the withdrawal of these troops and the measures to be taken in the interests of border security, will be agreed upon at the conference specified in Article 2 of this Agreement , it will carry out the complete withdrawal of all USSR troops from Outer Mongolia.
Article VI.
The governments of both Contracting Parties mutually pledge not to allow within their territories, by their affiliation, the existence or activities of any organizations or groups whose task is to fight through violent actions against the governments of any of the Contracting Parties.
The Governments of both Contracting Parties further undertake not to produce propaganda directed against the political and social system any of the Contracting Parties.
APPENDIX 2
Speech by Chiang Kai-shek on Soviet-Chinese relations, delivered to the Kuomintang Central Committee on July 15, 1929.
The first object of the policy of the national government is to remove the ties that bind China, and to win certain rights and privileges which are ours. The interests of the Third International collide with the interests of the Kuomintang. The interests of our party collide with the interests of every power pursuing imperialist goals.
But our program for the abolition of unequal treaties will be carried out with reasonable and proper procedure. We have a definite program, as opposed to the communists, who rob and kill, a course of action that cannot be acceptable anywhere in the world. modern world.
There are many unresolved problems between China and Russia that are now awaiting resolution. Regarding the CER, the Soviet government has repeatedly stated its intention to transfer this road to China, but in fact it only sought to consolidate its position on it. "Red" imperialism is therefore more dangerous than "white" imperialism, since the existence of the former is more difficult to establish.
There is nothing unusual in our desire to return the CER. Russia has stated its desire to return this road to China. If the Soviet government respects the sovereignty of China and agrees to conclude an agreement with us on the basis of absolute equality and reciprocity, we are ready to resume diplomatic relations with the Soviet government.
In addition to the CER, there are many other important Chinese-Russian issues that need to be resolved between the two governments. Issues regarding Outer Mongolia and communist propaganda are subject to immediate discussion. We want, however, to take the CER first before moving on to other issues.
Any imperialist power that tries to hinder the development of the Kuomintang revolutionary movement must fail. You can't achieve much with speeches and slogans. Unequal treaties will never be abolished by the use of military force. Our main strength lies in rebuilding the country. If we want foreign powers to respect our rights, we must establish a strong and efficient central government and establish peace and prosperity throughout the country. The moment of our salvation has arrived, and all loyal supporters of the Kuomintang must actively promote the unity and prosperity of China.
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After Stalin's death, prominent Soviet political figures began to debunk the personality cult of the deceased leader. In addition, a warming of relations between the USSR and the capitalist countries of the West was brewing. This displeased Mao Zedong and caused a deterioration in Soviet-Chinese relations.
Relations between the USSR and the PRC
During the Stalin era, relations between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union were the most friendly. The revolutionary-minded USSR helped China become independent and socialist. Union instructors taught the Chinese military how to conduct combat and guerrilla warfare. Weapons, ammunition and other equipment were supplied to the PRC.
These were the largest countries of “victorious socialism”. The policies of the two leaders were similar, as were their views on power. Joseph Stalin used repression and murder as political leverage. The period of his rule is considered the bloodiest in Russian history: mass purges carried out by security officers from the NKVD, the absence of an opposition not controlled by Stalin. It was a terrible time when it was impossible for more than three people to gather together and have their own political position.
Mao Zedong was distinguished by cunning; he resolved all issues with blood and murder. There was also no significant opposition in his country. The party line bent despite common sense, which led to colossal economic losses and hunger. Mao found a replacement for Stalinist repressions, it had the name " Cultural Revolution".
Communist Brotherhood
They were extremely outraged by the friendly relations between the two countries. The prospect of a war with a multimillion-dollar China and the USSR loomed clearly. Western media ironically called the union of countries the “red-yellow threat.” In fact, the Chinese military was nothing serious. Mao himself, in the event of war, suggested that the Soviets retreat to Central Asia, where the Chinese would get involved in the war.
The early 1950s were the peak of relations between the two countries. Mutual integration and trust, united Political Views- this is the basis of friendship between the two peoples. However, in terms of future relations, everything was not so smooth.
The languages, as well as the culture of the two countries, were different. What meant one thing in Russian, translated into Chinese meant something completely different. This is what happened with the phrase “brotherly relations.” For a Russian person, this is synonymous with equality between people. However, in the Chinese understanding of the phrase we are talking about two brothers: the elder (USSR) and the younger (China).
Soviet politicians actively interfered in the development program of the PRC. The Union wanted to lead China along its course of socialist development, which caused fair indignation among Mao and his party brethren.
Mao Zedong's visit to Moscow
The Chinese leader flew to the capital of the USSR in December 1949 and stayed there until February 1950. In Moscow, Mao wanted to achieve the signing of profitable economic and political agreements. Mao was greeted in a solemn atmosphere by Soviet diplomats. Everyone in the USSR rejoiced at the arrival of the leader of a friendly country; the residents of Moscow zealously welcomed his motorcade.
Despite the warm welcome in the city, he was greeted rather dryly in the Kremlin. For a long time, Mao waited for a meeting with the Soviet leader and other party leaders were not allowed to approach him. Not accustomed to long waits, Mao decides to fly back, but does not do so.
The meeting did take place, but it was dry. Gromyko noted that the leaders of the two countries failed to establish warm relations. Despite this, the documents Mao needed were signed.
Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress made a speech designed to debunk Stalin’s cult of personality. At the party congress it was decided to improve relations with capitalist countries. This caused the violent indignation of Mao Zedong, since it directly contradicted the ideology of communism, which became one of the reasons for the Soviet-Chinese conflict.
But this is only a political background; there were other, no less significant reasons. China wanted to see itself as a powerful player in the arena of world politics. He demanded respect from the USSR and the return of previously lost territories.
Mao wanted to strengthen his authority in the party. Starting the Sino-Soviet conflict, the years of which occurred at the end of the 1950s, China wanted to show the world communist community that it was no worse than the USSR and they had their own unique ideas. Historians identify four main points that became the causes of the Soviet-Chinese conflict:
- China's desire to return its territories and gain Mongolia.
- Equality between China and the USSR.
- Solution of the atomic issue.
- Contradictions on many issues.
The relationship between Khrushchev and Zedong
The Chinese leader had no sympathy for Nikita Sergeevich. And he had his own subjective reasons for this, often quite absurd. When Stalin acted as leader, Mao was tolerant of the role younger brother. However, Zedong was not happy with this state of affairs. He believed that since Nikita Sergeevich was younger than him, it meant he was less experienced and could not be his older brother.
Criticism of Stalin posed a threat to Mao's own cult of personality. Chinese propagandists did a great job making him a local deity. Even the anthem contained the following lines:
The east is red, the sun is rising, Mao Zedong was born in China...
Mao himself assessed Stalin's activities more positively than negatively. The specific character of Nikita Sergeevich prevented the building of friendly relations. Khrushchev was hasty in his actions and overly straightforward, which differs from the Easterners’ idea of a good person. In one speech, Khrushchev allowed himself to insult Mao Zedong personally, which also led to the Soviet-Chinese split.
Contradictions between the USSR and China
The Union advocated the peaceful regulation of issues between countries; no one wanted war, although everyone was preparing for it. Moscow sought to eliminate the possibility of nuclear war. Beijing, on the contrary, wanted revolutionary victory. Mao believed that half of all humanity was a small sacrifice for the sake of common good. Their death is not critical, because the other half remains - the ideal communists.
In his memoirs, Nikita Sergeevich recalls how he proposed dissolving NATO and the Warsaw Pact at the same time. Mao categorically rejected the idea and suggested, if necessary, to retreat to the Ural Mountains. Khrushchev understood perfectly well that the Chinese leader knew nothing about military affairs, and called all his statements “baby talk.”
Zedong could not possibly ask for USSR neutrality in relation to the Sino-Indian conflict, which took place from 1959 to 1962. For three years, Soviet leaders tried to persuade Beijing not to be in a hurry to keep India on a non-aligned position. Mao did not like this request, and he accused Moscow of trying to provoke a military conflict.
A million Chinese in Siberia
Without thinking twice, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev made a proposal to place about one million workers in Siberia. Such a request naturally outraged Zedong; he considered it an insult to millions of Chinese citizens. By the time of the agreement to send the workers, Khrushchev decides to cancel everything. The Soviet leader was afraid that with this state of affairs the Chinese would seize Siberia without declaring war.
Deterioration of interstate relations
With the onset of the 60s, political and ideological disputes between China and the USSR did not subside. Beijing newspapers published an article that exposed the foreign policy of the Union and criticized the CPSU.
In response, Moscow recalled political advisers and specialists of a narrow profile, which was an unpleasant surprise for the CPC leadership. Comprehensive assistance from the Union almost completely ceased. As soon as Khrushchev's ardor died down, the Soviet side decided to return specialists to China. However, the Chinese flatly refused to take them back.
First provocations
From the beginning of 1960, the Chinese authorities began to provoke Soviet border guards into conflict. Ordinary citizens repeatedly violated the integrity of the borders, and single military personnel crossed the border. There were also cases of mass crossing of the border by separate groups of military personnel. In general, Beijing made every effort to provoke the Soviet border guards and create a Sino-Soviet split.
It is worth noting that our border defenders had the intelligence and restraint not to open fire on the intruders. The peak of Chinese impudence was in 1962; more than 5 thousand various types of border violations were officially registered. And this is only the declared data, and no one knows how many times Soviet border guards were too lazy to document provocations.
Eight, under the control of 200 Chinese and covered by the military, plowed Soviet land. This incident probably made the border guards laugh a lot, but despite this, they set up a barrier. Chinese military forces, along with tractors, tried to break through it, shouting, swearing and swearing.
Moscow incident
Repeatedly, Chinese citizens provoked the Soviets into fights and swearing. A whole rally took place near the Chinese embassy, criticizing the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.
The Chinese provocateurs inflicted a real insult on the mausoleum of V. I. Lenin. In sacred for all Soviet communists there the Chinese staged a stampede. Applying physical strength, they pushed other visitors away from the entrance to the mausoleum. At the same time, they swore loudly and chanted anti-Soviet slogans.
But they did not achieve the desired effect; they did not reach the point of assault on the part of the citizens of the Union. Law enforcement intervened in the matter, and the Chinese were quickly taken away "arm's length."
If on the streets of Moscow the Chinese provocateurs were not allowed to turn around, then in their homeland they tried with their usual diligence. Day and night, rallies and gatherings were held around the Soviet embassy. The protesters shouted slogans aimed at They threatened to deal with the integrity of the country of victorious socialism and overthrow the current regime. In addition to the above, the Chinese wanted to deal with politicians THE USSR. Their portraits were burned with wild screams, and burning garbage was thrown onto the embassy territory.
It got to the point that participants in anti-Soviet rallies entered the inviolable territory of the embassy. They climbed onto the roofs and from there bombarded the outer courtyard of the embassy with propaganda leaflets. The Beijing authorities did not try to help the Soviet embassy in its state of siege. Instead, they sent a telegram to Moscow, asking them to stay in the embassy and not leave it. Otherwise, they are not responsible for the safety of Soviet citizens.
9th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party
In April 1969, at the next party meeting, it was decided to formalize anti-Soviet activities. China began preparing for and at the same time for war. Military groups were built up on the borders with the USSR. The total number of Chinese military personnel numbered more than 400 thousand people. Chinese workers built roads, shelters and airfields. At that time, the course towards a Soviet-Chinese split was finally established.
Damansky Island
Soviet and Chinese troops clashed en masse for the first time on a small desert island Damansk. A full-scale conflict was preceded by long and careful preparations. Chinese propaganda called the border zone with the Soviet Union the first line of defense. Military forces were gathered there, fortified posts and dug trenches.
The border conflict occurred in 1969. However, before this, the Chinese carried out small attacks, literally teasing the Soviet military. The PRC military tried to test the defenses on Kirkinsky Island. The actions took place from December 1967 to January 1968.
For sabotage actions against Soviet border guards and equipment, the Chinese were specially brought in on trucks. They repeatedly crossed the border line on the ice, thereby invading the island. In response to requests to leave Soviet territory, Chinese provocateurs used brute force and cursed.
The Chinese authorities were well aware of the provocative actions. Moreover, they also coordinated them. Armed with crowbars, the disguised Chinese military again crossed the Soviet border. In groups of several people, acting in harmony according to a pre-conceived plan, they drove the Soviet military out of their own territory.
The equipment also suffered; Chinese comrades crowded around Soviet armored personnel carriers with military personnel. They blocked their path, broke headlights and windows with crowbars, and punctured tires. Iron armor was doused with caustic chemicals, and drivers were tried to be blinded with special dust.
Such incidents helped the Chinese military practice tactics for a future conflict on Damansky Island, which the Chinese called Zhenbaodao. According to the agreement concluded between Moscow and Beijing, the border line was designated along the Chinese bank of the Ussuri. The island was closer to the Chinese coast, it was 47 meters away, while from the Soviet coast it was about 130 meters. However, it still belonged to the USSR.
USSR strengthens borders
During the friendship of the two countries, when no one thought about the conflict, the island was freely visited by Chinese collective farmers. Cattle were grazed on it, grass was cut and hay was dried. The idyll did not last long; the Soviet military soon noticed that military facilities were being created on the Chinese side. Propaganda turned residents of nearby villages against the USSR, and a real spy mania began.
The Soviet command took retaliatory measures. Armored personnel carriers were pulled up to the border, and border guard posts were supplied with heavy machine guns and other rapid-fire weapons. Separate units of the Red Army were redeployed from the central regions closer to the Asian border. Preparations for the Sino-Soviet conflict were kept in the strictest confidence. And ordinary citizens of the USSR still believed that the two countries were brothers forever.
Damansky Island was not considered important by Soviet commanders, so its protection was limited to surveillance and occasional patrols.
China's preparation
The Chinese military command completed the offensive plan on January 25, 1969. Direct guidance military operation was assigned to Wang Zeiliang. He located his command post at the Gunsa observation post.
The main objective of the special operation was to provoke Soviet military personnel into an open armed conflict. Beijing wanted to prove the aggressive aspirations of the USSR. To do this, it was necessary to seize their military property, equipment and ammunition. As well as photographic documents designed to prove the militarized intentions of the Union against the PRC.
If the Soviet border guards used weapons, the Chinese had every right to fight back. Beijing's provocateurs wanted to obtain evidence of shooting from the Soviet border in any way. If the defending side left their trenches and began to advance, then by any means necessary they were supposed to take someone prisoner. In this situation, the Chinese had a big ace up their sleeve. It didn’t cost the specialists anything to force the Soviet military to admit to allegedly preparing an attack on the PRC.
The Chinese side took into account the specifics of the Russians. On weekends it is difficult to coordinate the actions of troops, and on holidays the task becomes three times more difficult. This is what the Chinese commanders counted on. Maslenitsa, a traditional Russian holiday, was celebrated on January 23. Commanders border detachments They were probably celebrating a celebration, which means they weren’t at the service. The Chinese military is no stranger to cunning; they also took into account the technical component.
The Soviet border guards did not have the opportunity to conduct surveillance at night, since they did not have any devices that would allow them to see in the dark. Therefore, detection of the gathering Chinese military forces was impossible. And it was on the weekend that aviation did not fly around the border of the two countries.
Climax of the conflict
On the night of January 23, 1969, the Chinese military crossed the border of the USSR. Under the cover of night, they penetrated to Damansky Island, where they dug in, burying themselves in the snow. It was extremely difficult to notice them; during the night their tracks were covered with snow. In the morning, their penetration was discovered and reported to the command. At that time, it was believed that there were only 30 violators, when in fact there were about 300 of them. Lieutenant Strelnikov, along with 30 Red Army soldiers, advanced to the Chinese positions.
Their plan was to encircle the Chinese military and then oust them from the island. It is worth noting that none of the Soviet military expected an armed conflict. Senior Lieutenant Strelnikov and a group of 5 people moved straight to the Chinese positions. He walked deliberately, with a protest and a cultural request to leave Damansky Island.
The Chinese military shot the Soviet delegates almost point-blank. In response, another flanking group opened mortar fire on the Chinese positions. A perimeter defense was immediately established and reinforcements were called in.
A neighbor came to the rescue border post led by Lieutenant V. Bubenin. They managed to outflank the Chinese from the rear and force them to capitulate to their territory. The battle continued until evening. As a result, 31 people on the Soviet side were killed, 14 were wounded and one was missing.
According to eyewitnesses, the missing person was Komsomol organizer Pavel Akulov. The Chinese took his corpse with them. Later, his corpse was dropped from a Chinese military helicopter. The Chinese left more than 20 knife holes on Akulov’s body; it looked more like a sieve than a human body.
A special commission arrived at the scene of the armed clash. Her task was to document what happened. Chinese camouflage cloaks, spent cartridges and even vodka were found on the island.
Second wave
Apparently, the last clash was a rehearsal on the Chinese side to test the Soviet defenses. Small skirmishes continued until March 15, when the Chinese attempted to drive the Soviet military off the island.
Under the cover of long-range artillery and mortars, large forces of the PRC military launched an attack in a chain. This method ensures relatively small losses from enemy machine-gun fire. A massive Chinese offensive forced the Soviet military to retreat from the island. The outpost held out until evening without any visible support. This was explained by political confusion in Moscow.
The fact is that all important decisions were made in the capital of the USSR, but no instructions regarding the Soviet-Chinese conflict came to Damansky Island.
The command on the spot decided to use the division's artillery and Grad installations. Thus, the Soviet military told the Chinese that they were ready for any provocations. A massive strike from long-range guns and rocket launchers threw the Chinese off balance, thanks to which the border guards, together with a motorized rifle battalion, were able to knock the Chinese off the island and regain a foothold on it.
Chinese assessment of events
Final goal Chinese propagandists has been achieved. The Soviet Union fell for provocations, entering into fierce battles with the PRC military. Losses on the Chinese side amounted to 600 killed, and the Soviet border guards lost 58 people. Beijing authorities gave their assessment of the events.
In their opinion, it was the Soviet side that provoked the conflict. Their point of view has not changed to this day. Soviet military personnel numbering 70 people with trucks and armored personnel carriers crossed the border and occupied the Chinese island of Zhenbaodao, which is part of Hulin County. Then they took measures to destroy the brave Chinese warriors, but they resisted them. The Chinese authorities repeatedly warned the USSR not to start hostilities and stop provocations. However, on March 15, Soviet troops launched an offensive. Using tanks, aircraft, artillery and infantry, they managed to push back the Chinese military and capture the island. This was the history of Soviet-Chinese relations in the middle of the last century.
On June 22, 1960, relations between the Soviet Union and China were officially broken. The reason for this was the exchange of insults between the leaders of the leading eastern powers. The great helmsman Mao Zedong called Nikita Khrushchev a “modern revisionist” and a “goulash communist” guilty of the “restoration of capitalism” in the USSR. He declared that "imperialism and reaction are paper tigers" and demanded that Soviet leader use the full power of their country to support “wars of national liberation” in the “third world” countries and exert greater political and military pressure on the United States. In response, Khrushchev called Mao an “adventurer” who did not take into account the reality of nuclear confrontation. Thus came the end of the great Soviet-Chinese friendship.
Of course, everything did not happen in an instant. Considering himself a person who can now “further develop Marxism” (as Lenin and Stalin did), Mao Zedong in 1958 began the “Great Leap Forward” - the accelerated construction of communism through the creation of “people's communes”. Soviet “Marxists” and the CPSU press began indirectly criticizing the “departure from Marxism,” which was perceived very sharply by Mao Zedong. And the Chinese leaders considered the refusal of the Soviet Union to China in October 1957 to help China master the production of atomic weapons: On June 20, 1959, the USSR “made it clear” that it would not transfer the relevant materials to China.
From March to September 1959, a conflict flared up between the PRC and India over events in Tibet. Since 1950, Chinese troops entered there and a strict communist government was established there, which was unfavorable to the Buddhist monasteries of monks and their practices. On March 17, 1959, a Buddhist uprising broke out in Tibet, which was brutally suppressed by the communist authorities. The Dalai Lama fled to India. Nehru accused the PRC of violating the Indo-China agreement on Tibet. Armed clashes began on the Sino-Indian border. In this critical situation, the USSR decisively took the side of India. Moreover, on September 12, 1959, the USSR concluded an agreement with India, according to which it provided India with a loan of 1.5 billion rubles for the implementation of five Indian five-year plans. The PRC has never received such a large sum from the USSR.
By that time, certain changes had been made in the leadership of the PRC - supporters of the USSR, who approved the change in its foreign policy course from an attack on capitalism to peaceful coexistence, were replaced by supporters of an irreconcilable struggle against the United States and world imperialism. And Khrushchev, just during the period of the PRC’s preparations for the great revolutionary holiday - the 10th anniversary of the PRC, was in Washington and “admired US President Eisenhower,” the chairman of world imperialism! And he dared to be late for the big Chinese revolutionary holiday!
In addition, Khrushchev brought with him a new Soviet ambassador to the PRC, Stepan Chervonenko, to replace the former Soviet ambassador Pavel Yudin. Yudin was an “important person” - a Moscow academician, and Chervonenko was for Mao Zedong a simple peripheral party official who had never been an ambassador anywhere. This was another “disrespect” by Khrushchev towards the “great Mao”.
And when Khrushchev, stepping off the plane and with his arms outstretched, moved towards Mao Zedong (who personally met Khrushchev, as was established by the protocol) to hug the Chinese leader, he... came across Mao’s outstretched fist. The hug did not take place. Mao Zedong's hostile gesture eloquently indicated that the break between the PRC and the USSR had actually already taken place. Although the television cameras did not catch this gesture. And the world has not yet officially learned about the breakup.
Only in May 1989, after numerous twists and turns, Moscow and Beijing normalized relations. This happened during Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to China.
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