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Historical reference
The passage of the Russian-Chinese border was established by numerous legal acts - the Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689, the Burinsky and Kyakhtinsky Treaties of 1727, the Aigun Treaty of 1858, the Beijing Treaty of 1860, the Treaty Act of 1911.
In accordance with generally accepted practice, boundaries on rivers are drawn along the main fairway. However, taking advantage of the weakness of pre-revolutionary China, the tsarist government of Russia managed to draw the border on the Ussuri River along the water's edge along the Chinese coast. Thus, the entire river and the islands on it turned out to be Russian.
This obvious injustice persisted after the October Revolution of 1917 and the formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, but did not in any way affect Soviet-Chinese relations. And only at the end of the 50s, when disagreements arose between the leadership of the CPSU and the CPC, the situation on the border began to constantly escalate.
The Soviet leadership was sympathetic to the Chinese desire to draw a new border along the rivers and was even ready to transfer a number of lands to the PRC. However, this readiness disappeared as soon as the ideological and then interstate conflict flared up. Further deterioration of relations between the two countries ultimately led to open armed confrontation on Damansky Island.
At the end of the 60s, Damansky Island territorially belonged to the Pozharsky district of Primorsky Krai, bordering the Chinese province of Heilongjiang. The distance of the island from the Soviet coast was about 500 m, from the Chinese coast - about 300 m. From south to north, Damansky stretches 1500 - 1800 m, and its width reaches 600 -700 m.
These figures are quite approximate, since the size of the island greatly depends on the time of year. For example, in the spring and during summer floods the island is flooded with the waters of the Ussuri, and it is almost hidden from view, and in winter Damansky rises among the frozen river. Therefore, this island does not represent any economic or military-strategic value.
The events of March 2 and 15, 1969 on Damansky Island were preceded by numerous Chinese provocations for the unauthorized seizure of Soviet islands on the Ussuri River (starting in 1965). At the same time, Soviet border guards always strictly adhered to the established line of behavior: provocateurs were expelled from Soviet territory, and weapons were not used by the border guards.
On the night of March 1-2, 1969, about 300 Chinese troops crossed to Damansky and lay down on the higher western shore of the island among bushes and trees. They didn’t tear up the trenches, they just lay down in the snow, laying down mats.
The equipment of the border violators was fully consistent with the weather conditions and consisted of the following: a hat with earflaps, which differs from a similar Soviet earflap by the presence of two valves on the left and right - to better capture sounds; a quilted jacket and the same quilted pants; insulated lace-up boots; cotton uniform and warm underwear, thick socks; military style mittens - thumb and index finger separately, other fingers together.
The Chinese military personnel were armed with AK-47 assault rifles, as well as SKS carbines. The commanders have TT pistols. All weapons are Chinese-made, manufactured under Soviet licenses.
The perpetrators were wearing white camouflage robes, and they wrapped their weapons in the same camouflage fabric. The cleaning rod was filled with paraffin to prevent it from rattling.
There were no documents or personal items in the Chinese's pockets.
The Chinese extended telephone communications to their shore and lay in the snow until the morning.
To support the intruders, positions of recoilless rifles, heavy machine guns and mortars were equipped on the Chinese coast. Here the infantry with a total number of 200-300 people was waiting in the wings.
On the night of March 2, two border guards were constantly at the Soviet observation post, but they did not notice or hear anything - neither lights nor any sounds. The movement of the Chinese to their positions was well organized and took place completely secretly.
At about 9.00 o'clock a border patrol consisting of three people passed through the island; the squad did not find the Chinese. The violators also did not unmask themselves.
At approximately 10.40, the Nizhne-Mikhailovka outpost received a report from the observation post that a group of armed people of up to 30 people was moving from the Chinese border post of Gunsy in the direction of Damansky.
The head of the outpost, senior lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov, called his subordinates to the gun, after which he called the operational duty officer of the border detachment.
The personnel loaded into three vehicles - GAZ-69 (7 people led by Strelnikov), BTR-60PB (approximately 13 people, senior - Sergeant V. Rabovich) and GAZ-63 (12 border guards in total, led by Junior Sergeant Yu. Babansky ).
The GAZ-63, in which Yu. Babansky advanced with his group, had a weak engine, so on the way to the island they were 15 minutes behind the main group.
Having arrived at the place, the commander's gas car and armored personnel carrier stopped at the southern tip of the island. Having dismounted, the border guards moved in the direction of the intruders in two groups: the first was led across the ice by the head of the outpost himself, and Rabovich’s group followed a parallel course directly along the island.
Together with Strelnikov there was a photographer from the political department of the border detachment, Private Nikolai Petrov, who filmed what was happening with a movie camera, as well as a Zorki-4 camera.
Approaching the provocateurs (at about 11.10), I. Strelnikov protested about the violation of the border and demanded that the Chinese military personnel leave the territory of the USSR. One of the Chinese answered something loudly, then two pistol shots were heard. The first line parted, and the second opened sudden machine-gun fire on Strelnikov’s group.
Strelnikov’s group and the head of the outpost himself died immediately. The Chinese ran up and snatched the movie camera from Petrov’s hands, but did not notice the camera: the soldier fell on top of it, covering it with a sheepskin coat.
The ambush on Damansky also opened fire - on Rabovich's group. Rabovich managed to shout “For battle,” but this did not solve anything: several border guards were killed and wounded, the survivors found themselves in the middle of a frozen lake in full view of the Chinese.
Some of the Chinese got up from their “beds” and went on an attack on a handful of Soviet border guards. They accepted an unequal battle and shot back to the last.
It was at this moment that Y. Babansky’s group arrived. Having taken a position at some distance behind their dying comrades, the border guards met the advancing Chinese with machine gun fire.
The raiders reached the positions of Rabovich’s group and here they finished off several wounded border guards with machine gun fire and cold steel (bayonets, knives).
The only one who survived, literally by miracle, was Private Gennady Serebrov. He told about the last minutes of his friends’ lives.
There were fewer and fewer fighters left in Babansky’s group, and ammunition was running out. The junior sergeant decided to retreat to the parking lot, but at that moment Chinese artillery covered both vehicles. The car drivers took refuge in an armored personnel carrier left by Strelnikov and tried to enter the island. They failed because the bank was too steep and high. After several unsuccessful attempts to overcome the rise, the armored personnel carrier retreated to shelter on the Soviet coast. At this time, the reserve of the neighboring outpost, led by Vitaly Bubenin, arrived in time.
Senior Lieutenant V. Bubenin commanded the neighboring outpost of Sopki Kulebyakina, located 17-18 km north of Damansky. Having received a telephone message on the morning of March 2 about shooting on the island, Bubenin put about twenty soldiers in an armored personnel carrier and hurried to the rescue of his neighbors.
At about 11.30 the armored personnel carrier reached Damansky and entered one of the ice-covered channels. Hearing heavy shooting, the border guards got out of the car and turned in a chain in the direction of the shots coming. Almost immediately they encountered a group of Chinese, and a battle ensued.
The violators (all the same ones, in the “beds”) noticed Bubenin and transferred the fire to his group. The senior lieutenant was wounded and shell-shocked, but did not lose control of the battle.
Leaving in place a group of soldiers led by junior sergeant V. Kanygin, Bubenin and 4 border guards loaded into an armored personnel carrier and moved around the island, going to the rear of the Chinese ambush. Bubenin himself stood at the heavy machine gun, and his subordinates fired through the loopholes on both flanks.
Despite their multiple superiority in manpower, the Chinese found themselves in an extremely unpleasant situation: they were fired upon by groups of Babansky and Kanygin from the island, and from the rear by a maneuvering armored personnel carrier. But Bubenin’s vehicle also suffered: fire from the Chinese coast on the armored personnel carrier damaged the sight, and the hydraulic system could no longer maintain the required tire pressure. The head of the outpost himself received a new wound and concussion.
Bubenin managed to get around the island and take refuge on the river bank. Having reported the situation to the detachment by phone and then transferring to Strelnikov’s armored personnel carrier, the senior lieutenant again went out to the channel. But now he drove the car directly along the island along the Chinese ambush.
The culmination of the battle came at the moment when Bubenin destroyed the Chinese command post. After this, the violators began to leave their positions, taking with them the dead and wounded. The Chinese threw mats, telephones, stores, and several small arms at the site of the “beds.” Used individual dressing bags were also found there in large quantities (in almost half of the beds).
Having fired the ammunition, Bubenin’s armored personnel carrier retreated to the ice between the island and the Soviet coast. They stopped to take on board two wounded, but at that moment the car was hit.
Closer to 12.00, a helicopter with the command of the Iman border detachment landed near the island. The head of the detachment, Colonel D.V. Leonov remained on the shore, and the head of the political department, Lieutenant Colonel A.D. Konstantinov, organized a search for the wounded and dead directly on Damansky.
Somewhat later, reinforcements from neighboring outposts arrived at the scene. This is how the first military clash on Damansky ended on March 2, 1969.
After the events of March 2, reinforced squads (at least 10 border guards, armed with group weapons) constantly went to Damansky.
In the rear, at a distance of several kilometers from Damansky, a motorized rifle division of the Soviet Army (artillery, Grad multiple rocket launchers) was deployed.
The Chinese side was also accumulating forces for the next offensive. Near the island on Chinese territory, the 24th Infantry Regiment of the National Liberation Army of China (PLA), numbering about 5,000 (five thousand troops), was preparing for combat.
At about 15.00 hours on March 14, 1969, the Iman border detachment received an order from a higher authority: to remove Soviet border guards from the island (the logic of this order is not clear, just as the person who gave this order is unknown).
The border guards retreated from Damansky, and a revival immediately began on the Chinese side. Chinese military personnel in small groups of 10-15 people began to rush to the island, others began to take up combat positions opposite the island, on the Chinese shore of the Ussuri.
In response to these actions, Soviet border guards in 8 armored personnel carriers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel E. Yanshin deployed into battle formation and began to move towards Damansky Island. The Chinese immediately retreated from the island to their shores.
After 00.00 on March 15, a detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Yanshin, consisting of 60 border guards in 4 armored personnel carriers, entered the island.
The detachment settled down on the island in four groups, at a distance of about 100 meters from each other, and dug trenches for prone shooting. The groups were commanded by officers L. Mankovsky, N. Popov, V. Solovyov, A. Klyga. Armored personnel carriers constantly moved around the island, changing firing positions.
At about 9.00 on March 15, a loudspeaker installation started working on the Chinese side. Soviet border guards were called upon to leave “Chinese” territory, renounce “revisionism,” etc.
On the Soviet shore they also turned on a loudspeaker. The broadcast was conducted in Chinese and in rather simple words: “Remember before it’s too late, before you are the sons of those who liberated China from the Japanese invaders.”
After some time, there was silence on both sides, and closer to 10.00, Chinese artillery and mortars (from 60 to 90 barrels) began shelling the island. At the same time, 3 companies of Chinese infantry went on the attack.
A fierce battle began, which lasted about an hour. By 11.00, the defenders began to run out of ammunition, and then Yanshin delivered them from the Soviet shore in an armored personnel carrier.
Colonel Leonov reported to his superiors about the enemy's superior forces and the need to use artillery, but to no avail.
At about 12.00 the first armored personnel carrier was hit, and twenty minutes later the second. Nevertheless, Yanshin’s detachment steadfastly held its position even in the face of the threat of encirclement.
Moving back, the Chinese began to group on their shore opposite the southern tip of the island. Between 400 and 500 soldiers clearly intended to attack the rear of the Soviet border guards.
The situation was aggravated by the fact that communication between Yanshin and Leonov was lost: the antennas on the armored personnel carriers were cut off by machine-gun fire.
In order to thwart the enemy's plan, the grenade launcher crew of I. Kobets opened accurate fire from its shore. This was not enough under the current conditions, and then Colonel Leonov decided to carry out a raid on three tanks. A tank company was promised to Leonov on March 13, but 9 vehicles arrived only at the height of the battle.
Leonov took his place in the lead vehicle, and three T-62s moved towards the southern tip of Damansky.
Approximately at the place where Strelnikov died, the command tank was hit by the Chinese with a shot from an RPG. Leonov and some crew members were injured. Having left the tank, we headed to our shore. Here Colonel Leonov was hit by a bullet - right in the heart.
The border guards continued to fight in scattered groups and did not allow the Chinese to reach the western coast of the island. The situation was heating up, the island could be lost. At this time, a decision was made to use artillery and introduce motorized rifles into battle.
At 17.00 hours, the Grad installation division launched a fire strike at places where Chinese manpower and equipment were concentrated and at their firing positions. At the same time, the cannon artillery regiment opened fire on the identified targets.
The raid turned out to be extremely accurate: the shells destroyed Chinese reserves, mortars, stacks of shells, etc.
The artillery fired for 10 minutes, and at 17.10 motorized riflemen and border guards went on the attack under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Smirnov and Lieutenant Colonel Konstantinov. The armored personnel carriers entered the channel, after which the fighters dismounted and turned towards the rampart along the western bank.
The enemy began a hasty retreat from the island. Damansky was liberated, but at about 19.00 some Chinese firing points came to life. Perhaps at this moment it was necessary to launch another artillery strike, but the command considered this inappropriate.
The Chinese tried to recapture Damansky, but three of their attempts ended in failure. After this, the Soviet soldiers retreated to their shore, and the enemy took no further hostile actions.
Epilogue (Russian version)
On October 20, 1969, negotiations between the heads of government of the USSR and the PRC were held in Beijing. The result of these negotiations: it was possible to reach an agreement on the need to carry out demarcation measures on sections of the Soviet-Chinese border. As a result: during the demarcation of the border between the USSR and China in 1991, Damansky Island was transferred to the PRC. Now he has a different name - Zhenbao-dao.
One of the common points of view in Russia is that the point is not who Damansky ultimately went to, but what the circumstances were at a particular historical moment in time. If the island had then been given to the Chinese, this would, in turn, have created a precedent and would have encouraged the then Chinese leadership to make further territorial claims to the USSR.
According to many Russian citizens, in 1969, on the Ussuri River, for the first time since the Great Patriotic War, real aggression was repelled, with the goal of seizing foreign territories and resolving specific political issues.
Ryabushkin Dmitry Sergeevich
www.damanski-zhenbao.ru
Photo - http://lifecontrary.ru/?p=35
Damansky Island, which sparked a border armed conflict, occupies 0.75 square meters in area. km. From south to north it stretches for 1500 - 1800 m, and its width reaches 600 - 700 m. These figures are quite approximate, since the size of the island greatly depends on the time of year. In the spring, Damansky Island is flooded with the waters of the Ussuri River and it is almost hidden from view, and in winter the island rises like a dark mountain on the icy surface of the river.
From the Soviet coast to the island it is about 500 m, from the Chinese coast - about 300 m. In accordance with generally accepted practice, borders on rivers are drawn along the main fairway. However, taking advantage of the weakness of pre-revolutionary China, the tsarist government of Russia was able to draw the border on the Ussuri River in a completely different way - along the water's edge along the Chinese coast. Thus, the entire river and the islands on it turned out to be Russian.
Disputed Island
This obvious injustice persisted after the October Revolution of 1917 and the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, but did not affect Sino-Soviet relations for some time. And only at the end of the 50s, when ideological differences arose between the Khrushchev leadership of the CPSU and the CPC, the situation on the border gradually began to worsen. Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders have repeatedly expressed the view that the development of Sino-Soviet relations presupposes a solution to the border problem. The “decision” meant the transfer of certain territories to China, including islands on the Ussuri River. The Soviet leadership was sympathetic to the Chinese desire to draw a new border along the rivers and was even ready to transfer a number of lands to the PRC. However, this readiness disappeared as soon as the ideological and then interstate conflict flared up. Further deterioration of relations between the two countries eventually led to open armed confrontation on Damansky.
Disagreements between the USSR and China began in 1956, when Mao condemned Moscow for suppressing unrest in Poland and Hungary. Khrushchev was extremely upset. He considered China a Soviet “creation” that should live and develop under the strict control of the Kremlin. The mentality of the Chinese, who historically dominated East Asia, suggested a different, more equal approach to solving international (especially Asian) problems. In 1960, the crisis intensified even more when the USSR suddenly recalled its specialists from China, who had helped it develop the economy and the Armed Forces. The completion of the process of severing bilateral ties was the refusal of the Chinese communists to participate in the XXIII Congress of the CPSU, which was announced on March 22, 1966. After the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Chinese authorities declared that the USSR had embarked on the path of “socialist revanchism.”
The provocative actions of the Chinese at the border have intensified. From 1964 to 1968, in the Red Banner Pacific border district alone, the Chinese organized more than 6 thousand provocations involving about 26 thousand people. Anti-Sovietism became the basis of the CPC's foreign policy.
By this time, the “cultural revolution” (1966–1969) was already in full swing in China. In China, the Great Helmsman carried out public executions of “saboteurs” who were slowing down “Chairman Mao’s great economic policy of the Great Leap Forward.” But an external enemy was also needed, to whom larger mistakes could be attributed.
KHRUSHCHEV GOT STUPID
In accordance with generally accepted practice, boundaries on rivers are drawn along the main fairway (thalweg). However, taking advantage of the weakness of pre-revolutionary China, the tsarist government of Russia managed to draw a border on the Ussuri River along the Chinese coast. Without the knowledge of the Russian authorities, the Chinese could not engage in either fishing or shipping.
After the October Revolution, the new Russian government declared all “tsarist” treaties with China “predatory and unequal.” The Bolsheviks thought more about the world revolution, which would sweep away all borders, and least of all about state benefit. At that time, the USSR actively assisted China, which was waging a war of national liberation with Japan, and the issue of disputed territories was not considered important. In 1951, Beijing signed an agreement with Moscow, according to which it recognized the existing border with the USSR, and also agreed to the control of Soviet border guards over the Ussuri and Amur rivers.
Without exaggeration, relations between peoples were fraternal. Residents of the border strip visited each other and engaged in barter trade. Soviet and Chinese border guards celebrated the holidays of May 1 and November 7 together. And only when disagreements arose between the leadership of the CPSU and the CPC, the situation on the border began to escalate - the question of revising the borders arose.
During the 1964 consultations, it became clear that Mao was demanding that Moscow recognize the border treaties as “unequal,” as Vladimir Lenin had done. The next step should be the transfer of 1.5 million square meters to China. km of “previously occupied lands”. “For us, such a formulation of the issue was unacceptable,” writes Professor Yuri Gelenovich, who took part in negotiations with the Chinese in 1964, 1969 and 1979. True, the head of the Chinese state, Liu Shaoqi, proposed starting negotiations without preconditions and basing the delimitation in river areas on the principle of drawing the border line along the fairway of navigable rivers. Nikita Khrushchev accepted Liu Shaoqi's proposal. But with one caveat - we can only talk about islands adjacent to the Chinese coast.
The stumbling block that did not allow the continuation of negotiations on water boundaries in 1964 was the Kazakevich channel near Khabarovsk. Khrushchev became stubborn, and the transfer of the disputed territories, including Damansky, did not take place.
Damansky Island with an area of about 0.74 square meters. km territorially belonged to the Pozharsky district of Primorsky Krai. From the island to Khabarovsk – 230 km. The distance of the island from the Soviet coast is about 500 m, from the Chinese coast – about 70–300. From south to north, Damansky stretches for 1500–1800 m, its width reaches 600–700 m. It does not represent any economic or military-strategic value.
According to some sources, Damansky Island was formed on the Ussuri River only in 1915, after river water eroded the bridge with the Chinese shore. According to Chinese historians, the island as such appeared only in the summer of 1968 as a result of a flood, when a small piece of land was cut off from Chinese territory.
FISTS AND BUTTS
In winter, when the ice on the Ussuri became strong, the Chinese went out into the middle of the river, “armed” with portraits of Mao, Lenin and Stalin, demonstrating where, in their opinion, the border should be.
From a report to the headquarters of the Red Banner Far Eastern District: “On January 23, 1969, at 11.15, armed Chinese military personnel began to bypass Damansky Island. When asked to leave the territory, the violators began shouting, waving quotation books and fists. After some time they attacked our border guards..."
A. Skornyak, a direct participant in the events, recalls: “The hand-to-hand combat was brutal. The Chinese used shovels, iron rods, and sticks. Our guys fought back with the butts of their machine guns. Miraculously, there were no casualties. Despite the numerical superiority of the attackers, the border guards put them to flight. After this incident, clashes occurred on the ice every day. They always ended in fights. By the end of February, at the Nizhne-Mikhailovka outpost there was not a single fighter “with a whole face”: “lanterns” under the eyes, broken noses, but a fighting mood. Every day there is such a “spectacle”. And the commanders are ahead. The head of the outpost, senior lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov, and his political officer, Nikolai Buinevich, were healthy men. Many Chinese noses and jaws were twisted with rifle butts and fists. The Red Guards were afraid of them like hell and everyone shouted: “We will kill you first!”
The commander of the Iman border detachment, Colonel Democrat Leonov, constantly reported that at any moment the conflict could escalate into war. Moscow responded as in 1941: “Do not give in to provocations, resolve all issues peacefully!” And this means - with fists and butts. The border guards put on sheepskin coats and felt boots, took machine guns with one magazine (for a minute of battle) and went onto the ice. To boost morale, the Chinese were given a quotation book with the sayings of the Great Helmsman and a bottle of hanja (Chinese vodka). After taking the “doping,” the Chinese rushed hand-to-hand. Once, during a brawl, they managed to stun and drag two of our border guards into their territory. Then they were executed.
On February 19, the Chinese General Staff approved a plan codenamed “Retribution.” It said, in particular: “... if Soviet soldiers open fire on the Chinese side with small arms, respond with warning shots, and if the warning does not have the desired effect, give a “resolute rebuff in self-defense.”
Tension in the Damansky area increased gradually. At first, Chinese citizens simply went to the island. Then they started coming out with posters. Then sticks, knives, carbines and machine guns appeared... For the time being, communication between the Chinese and Soviet border guards was relatively peaceful, but in accordance with the inexorable logic of events, it quickly developed into verbal skirmishes and hand-to-hand brawls. The most fierce battle took place on January 22, 1969, as a result of which Soviet border guards recaptured several carbines from the Chinese. Upon inspection of the weapon, it turned out that the cartridges were already in the chambers. Soviet commanders clearly understood how tense the situation was and therefore constantly called on their subordinates to be especially vigilant. Preventive measures were taken - for example, the staff of each border post was increased to 50 people. Nevertheless, the events of March 2 were a complete surprise for the Soviet side. On the night of March 1-2, 1969, about 300 soldiers of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) crossed to Damansky and lay down on the western coast of the island.
The Chinese were armed with AK-47 assault rifles, as well as SKS carbines. The commanders had TT pistols. All Chinese weapons were made according to Soviet models. There were no documents or personal items in the Chinese's pockets. But everyone has a Mao quote book. To support the units that landed on Damansky, positions of recoilless rifles, heavy machine guns and mortars were equipped on the Chinese coast. Here the Chinese infantry with a total number of 200-300 people was waiting in the wings. At about 9.00 am, a Soviet border patrol passed through the island, but did not find the invading Chinese. An hour and a half later, at the Soviet post, observers noticed the movement of a group of armed people (up to 30 people) in the direction of Damansky and immediately reported this by telephone to the Nizhne-Mikhailovka outpost, located 12 km south of the island. Head of the outpost st. Lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov raised his subordinates to the gun. In three groups, in three vehicles - GAZ-69 (8 people), BTR-60PB (13 people) and GAZ-63 (12 people), Soviet border guards arrived at the scene.
Having dismounted, they moved towards the Chinese in two groups: the first was led across the ice by the head of the outpost, Senior Lieutenant Strelnikov, the second by Sergeant V. Rabovich. The third group, led by St. Sergeant Yu. Babansky, driving a GAZ-63 car, fell behind and arrived at the scene 15 minutes later. Approaching the Chinese, I. Strelnikov protested about the violation of the border and demanded that the Chinese military personnel leave the territory of the USSR. In response, the first line of Chinese parted, and the second opened sudden machine-gun fire on Strelnikov’s group. Strelnikov’s group and the head of the outpost himself died immediately. Some of the attackers got up from their “beds” and rushed to attack a handful of Soviet soldiers from the second group, commanded by Yu. Rabovich. They took the fight and fired back literally to the last bullet. When the attackers reached the positions of Rabovich’s group, they finished off the wounded Soviet border guards with point-blank shots and cold steel. This shameful fact for the People's Liberation Army of China is evidenced by the documents of the Soviet medical commission. The only one who literally miraculously survived was Private G. Serebrov. Having regained consciousness in the hospital, he spoke about the last minutes of his friends’ lives. It was at this moment that the third group of border guards arrived in time under the command of Yu. Babansky.
Taking a position some distance behind their dying comrades, the border guards met the advancing Chinese with machine gun fire. The battle was unequal, there were fewer and fewer fighters left in the group, and ammunition quickly ran out. Fortunately, border guards from the neighboring Kulebyakina Sopka outpost, located 17-18 km north of Damansky, came to the aid of Babansky’s group, commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Bubenin. Having received a telephone message on the morning of March 2 about what was happening on the island, Bubenin put more than twenty soldiers in the armored personnel carrier and hastened to the rescue of the neighbors. At about 11.30 the armored personnel carrier reached Damansky. The border guards disembarked from the car and almost immediately encountered a large group of Chinese. A fight ensued. During the battle, Senior Lieutenant Bubenin was wounded and shell-shocked, but did not lose control of the battle. Leaving several soldiers at the site, led by junior sergeant V. Kanygin, he and four soldiers loaded into an armored personnel carrier and moved around the island, going behind the Chinese. The culmination of the battle came at the moment when Bubenin managed to destroy the Chinese command post. After this, the border violators began to leave their positions, taking with them the dead and wounded. This is how the first battle on Damansky ended. In the battle on March 2, 1969, the Soviet side lost 31 people killed - this is exactly the figure that was given at a press conference at the USSR Foreign Ministry on March 7, 1969. As for the Chinese losses, they are not reliably known, since the PLA General Staff has not yet made this information public. The Soviet border guards themselves estimated the total enemy losses at 100-150 soldiers and commanders.
After the battle on March 2, 1969, reinforced squads of Soviet border guards constantly came to Damansky - numbering at least 10 people, with a sufficient amount of ammunition. Sappers carried out mining on the island in case of an attack by Chinese infantry. In the rear, at a distance of several kilometers from Damansky, the 135th motorized rifle division of the Far Eastern Military District was deployed - infantry, tanks, artillery, Grad multiple rocket launchers. The 199th Verkhne-Udinsky Regiment of this division took a direct part in further events.
The Chinese were also accumulating forces for the next offensive: in the area of the island, the 24th Infantry Regiment of the People's Liberation Army of China, which consisted of up to 5,000 soldiers and commanders, was preparing for battle! On March 15, noticing the revival on the Chinese side, a detachment of Soviet border guards consisting of 45 people in 4 armored personnel carriers entered the island. Another 80 border guards concentrated on the shore, ready to support their comrades. At about 9.00 on March 15, a loudspeaker installation started working on the Chinese side. A clear female voice in clear Russian called on the Soviet border guards to leave “Chinese territory”, abandon “revisionism”, etc. On the Soviet shore they also turned on a loudspeaker.
The broadcast was conducted in Chinese and in rather simple words: come to your senses before it’s too late, before you are the sons of those who liberated China from the Japanese invaders. After some time, there was silence on both sides, and closer to 10.00, Chinese artillery and mortars (from 60 to 90 barrels) began shelling the island. At the same time, 3 companies of Chinese infantry (each with 100-150 people) went on the attack. The battle on the island was focal in nature: scattered groups of border guards continued to repel attacks by the Chinese, who significantly outnumbered the defenders. According to eyewitnesses, the course of the battle resembled a pendulum: each side pressed back the enemy as reserves approached. At the same time, however, the ratio in manpower was always approximately 10:1 in favor of the Chinese. At about 15.00 an order was received to leave the island. After this, the arriving Soviet reserves tried to carry out several counterattacks in order to expel the border violators, but they were unsuccessful: the Chinese thoroughly fortified themselves on the island and met the attackers with heavy fire.
Only at this point was it decided to use artillery, since there was a real threat of the complete capture of Damansky by the Chinese. The order to attack the Chinese coast was given by the first deputy. Commander of the Far Eastern Military District, Lieutenant General P.M. Plotnikov. At 17.00, a separate rocket division of BM-21 "Grad" installations under the command of M.T. Vashchenko launched a fire strike on Chinese concentration areas and their firing positions.
This is how the then top-secret 40-barreled Grad, capable of releasing all the ammunition in 20 seconds, was used for the first time. After 10 minutes of the artillery attack, there was nothing left of the Chinese division. A significant part of the Chinese soldiers in Damansky and adjacent territory were destroyed by a firestorm (according to Chinese data, more than 6 thousand). There was immediately a buzz in the foreign press that the Russians had used an unknown secret weapon, either lasers, or flamethrowers, or who knows what. (And the hunt began for God knows what, which was crowned with success in the distant south of Africa 6 years later. But that’s another story...)
At the same time, a cannon artillery regiment equipped with 122 mm howitzers opened fire on identified targets. The artillery fired for 10 minutes. The raid turned out to be extremely accurate: the shells destroyed Chinese reserves, mortars, stacks of shells, etc. Radio interception data indicated hundreds of dead PLA soldiers. At 17.10, motorized riflemen (2 companies and 3 tanks) and border guards in 4 armored personnel carriers went on the attack. After a stubborn battle, the Chinese began to retreat from the island. Then they tried to recapture Damansky, but three of their attacks ended in complete failure. After this, the Soviet soldiers retreated to their shores, and the Chinese made no further attempts to take possession of the island.
The Chinese kept harassing fire on the island for another half hour until they completely subsided. According to some estimates, they could have lost at least 700 people from the Grad attack. The provocateurs did not dare to continue. There is also information that 50 Chinese soldiers and officers were shot for cowardice.
The next day, the first deputy chairman of the USSR KGB, Colonel General Nikolai Zakharov, arrived at Damansky. He personally crawled the entire island (length 1500–1800, width 500–600 m, area 0.74 sq. km), studied all the circumstances of the unprecedented battle. After this, Zakharov told Bubenin: “Son, I went through the Civil War, the Great Patriotic War, the fight against the OUN in Ukraine. I saw everything. But I haven’t seen anything like this!”
And General Babansky said that the most remarkable episode in the hour and a half battle was associated with the actions of junior sergeant Vasily Kanygin and the cook of the outpost, Private Nikolai Puzyrev. They managed to destroy the largest number of Chinese soldiers (later they calculated - almost a platoon). Moreover, when they ran out of cartridges, Puzyrev crawled up to the killed enemies and took away their ammunition (each attacker had six magazines for his machine gun, while the Soviet border guards had two), which allowed this pair of heroes to continue the battle...
The head of the outpost, Bubenin himself, at some point in the brutal firefight, sat on an armored personnel carrier equipped with KPVT and PKT turret machine guns, and, according to him, killed an entire infantry company of PLA soldiers who were moving to the island in order to reinforce the violators already fighting. Using machine guns, the senior lieutenant suppressed firing points and crushed the Chinese with his wheels. When the armored personnel carrier was hit, he moved to another and continued to kill enemy soldiers until this vehicle was hit by an armor-piercing shell. As Bubenin recalled, after the first shell shock at the beginning of the skirmish, “I fought the entire subsequent battle in the subconscious, being in some other world.” The officer's army sheepskin coat was torn into shreds on the back by enemy bullets.
By the way, such fully armored BTR-60PB were used in combat for the first time. The lessons of the conflict were taken into account as it developed. Already on March 15, PLA soldiers went into battle armed with a significant number of hand grenade launchers. For in order to suppress a new provocation, not two armored personnel carriers were pulled up to Damansky, but 11, four of which operated directly on the island, and 7 were in reserve.
This may indeed seem incredible, “obviously exaggerated,” but the facts are that after the end of the battle, 248 corpses of PLA soldiers and officers were collected on the island (and then handed over to the Chinese side).
The generals, both Bubenin and Babansky, are still modest. In a conversation with me three years ago, not one of them claimed a figure for Chinese losses greater than that officially recognized, although it is clear that the Chinese managed to drag dozens of those killed to their territory. In addition, the border guards successfully suppressed enemy firing points found on the Chinese bank of the Ussuri. So the losses of the attackers could well have been 350–400 people.
It is significant that the Chinese themselves have not yet declassified the figures for losses on March 2, 1969, which look truly murderous against the backdrop of the damage suffered by the Soviet “green caps” - 31 people. It is only known that in Baoqing County there is a memorial cemetery where the ashes of 68 Chinese soldiers who did not return alive from Damansky on March 2 and 15 rest. Of these, five were awarded the title of Hero of the People's Republic of China. Obviously, there are other burials.
In just two battles (the second Chinese attack occurred on March 15), 52 Soviet border guards were killed, including four officers, including the head of the Imansky (now Dalnerechensky) border detachment, Colonel Democrat Leonov. He, along with Strelnikov, Bubenin and Babansky, was awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously). 94 people were wounded, including 9 officers (Bubenin was shell-shocked, and then wounded). In addition, seven motorized riflemen who participated in supporting the “green caps” in the second battle laid down their lives.
According to the memoirs of General Babansky, regular violations of the border by the Chinese without the use of weapons “became a standard situation for us. And when the battle began, we felt that we didn’t have enough ammunition, there were no reserves, and the supply of ammunition was not guaranteed.” Babansky also claims that the Chinese construction of a road to the border, which they explained as the development of the area for agricultural purposes, “we took at face value.” The observed movement of Chinese troops, explained by the exercises, was perceived in the same way. Although observation was carried out at night, “our observers did not see anything: we had only one night vision device, and even that allowed us to see something at a distance of no more than 50–70 meters.” Further more. On March 2, army exercises were held at the training grounds for all troops stationed in the area. A significant part of the border guard officers were also involved in them; only one officer remained at the outposts. One gets the impression that, unlike the Soviet military, the Chinese intelligence was carried out well. “Before the reinforcements reached us, they had to return to their place of permanent deployment to bring the equipment into combat readiness,” Babansky also said. “Therefore, the arrival of the reserve took longer than expected. The estimated time would have been enough for us; we already held out for an hour and a half. And when the army men reached their lines, deployed forces and means, almost everything on the island was already over.”
America saved China from the nuclear wrath of the Soviet Union
In the late 1960s, America saved China from the nuclear wrath of the Soviet Union: this is stated in a series of articles published in Beijing in the supplement to the official publication of the CCP, the journal Historical Reference, Le Figaro reports. The conflict, which began in March 1969 with a series of clashes on the Soviet-Chinese border, led to the mobilization of troops, the newspaper writes. According to the publication, the USSR warned its allies in Eastern Europe about a planned nuclear strike. On August 20, the Soviet ambassador in Washington warned Kissinger and demanded that the United States remain neutral, but the White House deliberately leaked it, and on August 28, information about Soviet plans appeared in the Washington Post. In September and October, tensions reached a fever pitch and the Chinese population was ordered to dig shelters.
The article goes on to say that Nixon, who considered the USSR the main threat, did not need a too weak China. In addition, he feared the consequences of nuclear explosions for 250 thousand American soldiers in Asia. On October 15, Kissinger warned the Soviet ambassador that the United States would not stand by if attacked and would respond by attacking 130 Soviet cities. Five days later, Moscow canceled all plans for a nuclear strike, and negotiations began in Beijing: the crisis was over, the newspaper writes.
According to the Chinese publication, Washington’s actions were partly “revenge” for the events of five years ago, when the USSR refused to join efforts to prevent China from developing nuclear weapons, saying that the Chinese nuclear program did not pose a threat. On October 16, 1964, Beijing successfully conducted its first nuclear test. The magazine recounts three more occasions when China was threatened with nuclear attack, this time by the United States: during the Korean War, as well as during the conflict between mainland China and Taiwan in March 1955 and August 1958.
“Researcher Liu Chenshan, who describes the Nixon episode, does not specify on what archival sources he is based. He admits that other experts disagree with his statements. The publication of his article in an official publication suggests that he had access to serious sources, and his article was reread several times,” the publication writes in conclusion.
Political settlement of the conflict
On September 11, 1969, negotiations between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin and the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Zhou Enlai took place at Beijing airport. The meeting lasted three and a half hours. The main result of the discussion was an agreement to stop hostile actions on the Soviet-Chinese border and to stop troops at the lines they occupied at the time of the negotiations. It must be said that the formulation “the parties remain where they were before” was proposed by Zhou Enlai, and Kosygin immediately agreed with it. And it was at this moment that Damansky Island became de facto Chinese. The fact is that after the end of the fighting, the ice began to melt and therefore the border guards’ access to Damansky turned out to be difficult. We decided to provide fire cover for the island. From now on, any attempt by the Chinese to land on Damansky was stopped by sniper and machine-gun fire.
On September 10, 1969, border guards received an order to stop firing. Immediately after this, the Chinese came to the island and settled there. On the same day, a similar story occurred on Kirkinsky Island, located 3 km north of Damansky. Thus, on the day of the Beijing negotiations on September 11, the Chinese were already on the islands of Damansky and Kirkinsky. A.N. Kosygin’s agreement with the wording “the parties remain where they were until now” meant the actual surrender of the islands to China. Apparently, the order to cease fire on September 10 was given in order to create a favorable background for the start of negotiations. The Soviet leaders knew very well that the Chinese would land on Damansky, and they deliberately went for it. Obviously, the Kremlin decided that sooner or later, a new border would have to be drawn along the fairways of the Amur and Ussuri. And if so, then there is no point in holding on to the islands, which will go to the Chinese anyway. Soon after the completion of the negotiations, A.N. Kosygin and Zhou Enlai exchanged letters. In them they agreed to begin work on preparing a non-aggression pact.
While Mao Zedong was alive, negotiations on border issues did not produce results. He died in 1976. Four years later, the “gang of four” led by the widow of the “helmsman” was dispersed. In the 80s, relations between our countries were normalized. In 1991 and 1994, the parties managed to define the border along its entire length, with the exception of the islands near Khabarovsk. Damansky Island was officially transferred to China in 1991. In 2004, it was possible to conclude an agreement regarding the islands near Khabarovsk and on the Argun River. Today, the Russian-Chinese border has been established along its entire length - about 4.3 thousand kilometers.
ETERNAL MEMORY TO THE FALLEN HEROES OF THE BORDER! GLORY TO THE VETERANS OF 1969!
The original article is on the website InfoGlaz.rf Link to the article from which this copy was made -
The rapid rapprochement between Russia and China involuntarily brings to mind the events of 45 years ago on Damansky Island: in 15 days of armed confrontation over a piece of land measuring 1 km2 on the Ussuri River separating the two countries, 58 Soviet border guards, including 4 officers, were killed. Then, in March 1969, only a madman could dream of a “turn to the East” and “contracts of the century” with the Chinese.
The song “Red Guards Walk and Wander Near the City of Beijing” Vladimir Vysotsky - always a visionary talent! - wrote in 1966. “...We’ve sat for a while, And now we’ll make some hooligans - Something’s quiet, really,” Mao and Liao Bian thought, “What else can you do to counteract the World atmosphere: Here we’ll show the big fig to the USA and the USSR!” In addition to the verb “counterpupit”, which has become an integral part of the vocabulary of our first person, this couplet is also notable for the mention of a certain “Liao Bian”, who, of course, is none other than Marshal Lin Biao, at that time the Minister of Defense of the PRC and the right hand Chairman Mao. By 1969, a major “Maoist fig” for the Soviet Union had finally matured.
"Special weapon number 1"
However, there is a version that Lin Biao was the only person in the PRC synclite who opposed the secret directive of the CPC Central Committee of January 25, 1969 on military operations with three companies near Damansky Island “in response to Soviet provocations.” By “provocations,” Chinese propaganda meant the reluctance of Soviet border guards to allow Chinese Red Guards into Soviet territory, which was then this tiny island on the Ussuri and which China considered its own. Using weapons was strictly prohibited, violators were restrained with the help of “special weapon number 1”, a spear with a long handle, and “belly tactics” - they closed the rank and with their whole body pressed against the fanatics with Mao quote books and portraits of the leader in their hands, pushing them back one meter at a time where they came from. There were other methods, which one of the participants in those events speaks about in Elena Masyuk’s interesting documentary “The Hieroglyph of Friendship”: they took off their pants, turned their bare butts towards Mao’s portraits - and the Red Guards retreated in horror... During January-February, both on Damansky and on Kirkinsky - this is another island on Ussuri - Soviet and Chinese border guards more than once met in hand-to-hand combat, however, there were no casualties. But then events took a very serious turn.
On the night of March 1-2, a company of Chinese soldiers in full combat gear crossed to Damansky and secured a foothold on its western bank. At the alarm, 32 Soviet border guards went to the scene of the event, including the head of the 2nd border post “Nizhne-Mikhailovskaya” of the 57th Iman border detachment, senior lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov. He protested to the Chinese and was shot at point-blank range along with 6 of his comrades. Having accepted an unequal battle, the border group covering Strelnikov, led by Sergeant Rabovich, was almost completely killed - 11 out of 12 people. In total, during the battles with the Chinese on March 2, 31 Soviet border guards were killed and 14 were injured. In an unconscious state, Corporal Pavel Akulov was captured by the Chinese and then brutally tortured. In 2001, photographs of Soviet soldiers killed at Damansky from the archives of the KGB of the USSR were declassified - the photographs testified to the abuse of the dead by the Chinese.
Everything was decided by "Grad"
A question that often arose among contemporaries of those events and later: why at the decisive moment Damansky, despite the aggressive attitude of the Chinese, was guarded as usual (there is a version that not only our intelligence warned about the inevitability of a conflict on the island of the Kremlin through secret channels , but also Lin Biao personally, which Mao allegedly later found out about); why did reinforcements arrive after the first losses, finally, why even on March 15, when fresh units of the Chinese army (24th Infantry Regiment, 2 thousand soldiers) entered the battle on Damansky after a massive shelling of Soviet positions (24th Infantry Regiment, 2 thousand soldiers), when in a supernova Soviet tank destroyed by the Chinese T-62, the head of the Iman border detachment, Colonel Leonov, was killed - why was the ban of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on the entry of troops of the Far Eastern Military District into the Damansky area not lifted?
When the commander of the district, Colonel-General Oleg Losik, gave the command on the 15th to deploy the 135th Motorized Rifle Division in the battle area and iron out Chinese positions using the then-secret BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems, he actually acted at his own peril and risk. The “hail” that fell on the heads of the Chinese - and the main part of the enemy’s material and technical resources and manpower was destroyed in one gulp - discouraged them from continuing the war for Damansky: Beijing did not yet have such weapons. According to Russian data, the final Chinese losses ranged from 300 to 700 people killed, but Chinese sources still do not provide exact figures.
By the way, in August 1969, the Chinese again decided to test the strength of the Soviet borders: they landed 80 of their special forces in the area of Lake Zhalanashkol in Kazakhstan. But then they were met fully armed: as a result of a 65-minute battle, the group lost 21 people and was forced to retreat. But this episode, undoubtedly victorious for the USSR, went almost unnoticed. Whereas Damansky, as the personification of our army’s readiness to repel Maoist China, was talked about in the USSR for a long time, although the question of why our soldiers actually shed their blood there arose very soon.
What did they fight for...
On September 11, 1969, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Alexey Kosygin, and the head of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Zhou Enlai, at negotiations at Beijing airport - Kosygin was returning from the funeral of Ho Chi Minh - discussed the situation around Damansky and agreed: the parties, in order to avoid escalation of the conflict and to maintain the truce, should remain employed for this moment positions. Most likely, Beijing knew in advance that Moscow was ready for such a compromise - before the start of negotiations, Chinese soldiers landed on Damansky. And so they remained in their “occupied positions”...
In 1991, as a result of the signing of the Soviet-Chinese agreement on border demarcation, Damansky was officially transferred to China. Today there is no island with that name on the map - there is Zheng-Bao-Dao (“Precious Island” - translated from Chinese), on which Chinese border guards take the oath at the new obelisk to their fallen heroes. But the lessons of those events are not only in changing the name. And it’s not even that Russia, to please China, has elevated a purely advisory principle of international law to an absolute one: taking into account the fact that the border supposedly must necessarily pass through the middle of the fairway of border rivers, hundreds of hectares of land have already been transferred to China, including cedar forests in Primorsky and Khabarovsk Territories. The border, “island” dossier perfectly illustrates how patient, persistent and resourceful the Chinese dragon is in pursuing its own interests.
Yes, since 1969 too much water has flowed under the bridge in Ussuri and Amur. Yes, China and Russia have changed a lot since then. Yes, Putin and Xi Jinping are sitting next to each other at the Victory Parade on May 9 and will most likely be sitting next to each other at a similar parade in Beijing in September. But the fact is that both “Pu” and Xi with their large-scale intentions are mere mortals. And the dragon, according to legend, lives a very long time. He is practically immortal.
21-05-2015, 20:05
😆Tired of serious articles? Cheer yourself up
45 years ago, a conflict began on the Soviet-Chinese border. During the clashes, 58 Soviet soldiers and officers were killed. However, at the cost of their lives, the big war was stopped.
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Damansky (Zhenbaodao)- a small uninhabited island on the Ussuri River. The length is about 1500-1700 m, the width is about 500 m. The island was 47 m from the Chinese coast and 120 m from the Soviet coast. However, in accordance with the Beijing Treaty of 1860 and the map of 1861, the border line between the two states did not run along the fairway, but along the Chinese bank of the Ussuri. Thus, the island itself was an integral part of Soviet territory.
In the spring of 1969, the CPC Central Committee began preparations for the IX CPC Congress. In this regard, the Chinese leadership was very interested in a “victorious” conflict on the Soviet-Chinese border. Firstly, striking the USSR could unite the people under the banner of the “great helmsman”. Secondly, a border conflict would confirm the correctness of Mao’s course of turning China into a military camp and training for war. In addition, the incident guaranteed the generals solid representation in the country's leadership and expanded powers of the military.
In mid-1968, the Chinese military leadership studied the option of striking in the Suifenhe area. Here, the main posts of the Soviet border guards were located near the territory of the PRC and it seemed easy to capture them. To solve this problem, units of the 16th Field Army were sent to Suifenhe. However, ultimately the choice fell on Damansky Island. According to Li Danhui, an employee of the Research Institute of Modern China of the Academy of Social Sciences of the People's Republic of China, the Damansky area was not chosen by chance. On the one hand, as a result of the border negotiations in 1964, this island had allegedly already ceded to China, and, therefore, the reaction of the Soviet side should not have been too violent. On the other hand, since 1947, Damansky was under the control of the Soviet army, and, therefore, the effect of carrying out an action on this section of the border would be greater than in the area of \u200b\u200bother islands. In addition, the Chinese side took into account that the Soviet Union had not yet created a sufficiently reliable base in the place chosen for the attack, which is necessary for conducting offensive operations, and, therefore, would not be able to launch a large-scale retaliatory strike. 
On January 25, 1969, a group of officers from the Shenyang Military District completed the development of a combat plan (codenamed "Retribution"). To implement it, it was planned to use approximately three infantry companies and a number of military units secretly located on Damansky Island. On February 19, the plan, code-named “Retribution,” was approved by the General Staff, agreed with the Foreign Ministry, and then approved by the CPC Central Committee and personally by Mao Zedong.
By order of the PLA General Staff, the border outposts in the Damansky area were assigned at least one reinforced platoon, transformed into 2-3 patrol groups. The success of the action had to be ensured by the element of surprise. After completing the task, a quick withdrawal of all forces to pre-prepared positions was envisaged.
Moreover, special attention was paid to the importance of capturing evidence from the enemy of his guilt in aggression - samples of Soviet weapons, photographic documents, etc.
Further events unfolded as follows.
On the night of March 1-2, 1969, a large number of Chinese troops secretly concentrated on their shores of the island. It was later determined that it was a regular PLA battalion, numbering more than 500 people, five companies strong, supported by two mortar and one artillery batteries. They were armed with recoilless rifles, large-caliber and heavy machine guns, and hand grenade launchers. The battalion was equipped and armed according to wartime standards. Subsequently, information appeared that he had undergone six months of special training to conduct combat operations on the border. That same night, with the help of three infantry companies numbering about 300 people, he entered the island and took up defense along the line of the natural rampart. All Chinese soldiers were dressed in camouflage suits, and their weapons were adjusted so that they did not make any unnecessary sound (ramrods were filled with paraffin, bayonets were wrapped in paper so as not to shine, etc.).
The positions of two 82-mm batteries and artillery (45-mm guns), as well as heavy machine guns, were located so that it was possible to fire at Soviet equipment and personnel with direct fire. The mortar batteries, as an analysis of the combat operations later showed, had clear firing coordinates. On the island itself, the battalion's fire system was organized so that it was possible to conduct barrage fire from all fire weapons to a depth of 200 to 300 meters, along the entire front of the battalion.
On March 2, at 10.20 (local time), information was received from Soviet observation posts about the advance of two groups of military personnel, consisting of 18 and 12 people, from the Chinese border post "Gunsi". They pointedly headed towards the Soviet border. The head of the Nizhne-Mikhailovka outpost, senior lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov, having received permission to expel the Chinese, with a group of border guards in an BTR-60PB (No. 04) and two cars, moved towards the violators. The commanders of the neighboring outposts, V. Bubenin and Shorokhov, were also informed about the incident. The head of the Kulebyakiny Sopki outpost, senior lieutenant V. Bubenin, was ordered to provide insurance for Strelnikov’s group. It should be said that, despite the fact that the Chinese have been bringing up military units in their closest border area for a week, and before that they have been improving the routes to the border for a long time, no measures have been taken to strengthen outposts or military surveillance by the command of the Pacific Border District was. Moreover, on the day of the Chinese invasion, the Nizhne-Mikhailovka outpost was only half staffed. On the day of the events, instead of three officers on staff, there was only one at the outpost - senior lieutenant I. Strelnikov. There were slightly more personnel at the Kulebyakiny Sopki outpost.
At 10.40, senior lieutenant I. Strelnikov arrived at the scene of the violation, ordered his subordinates to dismount, take the machine guns “on the belt” and turn around in a chain. The border guards split into two groups. The main commander was Strelnikov. The second group of 13 people was led by Junior Sergeant Rabovich. They covered Strelnikov’s group from the shore. Having approached the Chinese about twenty meters, Strelnikov said something to them, then raised his hand and pointed towards the Chinese coast. 
The head of the outpost is senior lieutenant I. Strelnikov.
Private Nikolai Petrov, standing behind him, took photographs and films, recording the fact of border violations and the procedure for expelling violators. He took a few shots with the FED Zorki-4 camera, and then raised the movie camera. At this moment, one of the Chinese sharply waved his hand.
THE LATEST PHOTOS TAKEN BY PHOTOCHRONIKER PRIVATE N. PETROV. IN A MINUTE THE CHINESE WILL OPEN FIRE AND PETROV WILL BE KILLED.
The first line of Chinese parted, and the soldiers standing in the second line opened machine-gun fire on the Soviet border guards. Shooting was carried out at point-blank range from 1-2 meters. The commander of the outpost, senior lieutenant I. Strelnikov, the detective of the special department of the 57th border detachment, senior lieutenant N. Buinevich, N. Petrov, I. Vetrich, A. Ionin, V. Izotov, A. Shestakov, died on the spot. At the same time, fire was opened on Rabovich’s group from the side of the island. It was fired from machine guns, machine guns and grenade launchers. Several border guards were killed immediately, the rest scattered and returned fire. However, being practically in open space, they were very soon completely destroyed. After this, the Chinese began to finish off the wounded with bayonets and knives. Some had their eyes gouged out. Of the two groups of our border guards, only one survived - Private Gennady Serebrov. He received bullet wounds in his right hand, leg and lower back, and a “control” blow with a bayonet, but survived. Later, Serebrov, who had lost consciousness, was carried out by border guard sailors from a brigade of patrol boats who arrived to help the Novo-Mikhailovka outpost.
By this time, a group of junior sergeant Yu. Babansky had arrived at the battlefield, lagging behind Strelnikov (the group was delayed on the way due to a technical malfunction of the vehicle). The border guards dispersed and opened fire on the Chinese lying on the island. In response, PLA soldiers opened fire with machine guns, machine guns and mortars. Mortar fire was concentrated on armored personnel carriers and vehicles standing on the ice. As a result, one of the cars, GAZ-69, was destroyed, the other GAZ-66 was severely damaged. A few minutes later, the crew of armored personnel carrier No. 4 came to Babansky’s rescue. Using fire from the turret machine guns, he suppressed the enemy’s firing points, which made it possible for the five surviving border guards of Babansky’s group to escape from the fire. 
10-15 minutes after the start of the battle, a man group from the 1st border outpost “Kulebyakiny Sopki” under the command of Senior Lieutenant V. Bubenin approached the battlefield.
“Having landed from an armored personnel carrier, under the cover of the eastern shore,” recalls V. Bubenin, “we turned into a chain and jumped out onto the island. This is about 300 meters from the place where the tragedy had just occurred. But we didn’t know about it yet. there were 23 people. In battle formation, we began to move in the direction of the dying fire. When we went deeper about 50 meters, we saw that a platoon of Chinese soldiers was attacking us from the rampart. They ran towards us, shouted and fired. The distance between us was from 150 to 200 meters ". It was quickly shrinking. I not only heard the shooting, but also clearly saw flames flying out of the barrels. I understood that a battle had begun, but I also hoped that it was not true. I hoped that they were using blanks to scare them."
With a decisive attack, the Chinese were driven back behind the embankment on the island. Despite the wound, Bubenin, leading the survivors, went around the island in an armored personnel carrier and suddenly attacked the Chinese from the rear.
“A dense mass of Chinese,” writes V. Bubenin, “jumped from the steep bank and rushed to the island through the channel. The distance to them was up to 200 meters. I opened fire with both machine guns to kill. Our appearance in their rear turned out to be so unexpectedly, the running crowd suddenly slowed down and stopped, as if they had stumbled upon a concrete wall. They were completely at a loss. They didn’t even fire at first. The distance between us was quickly closing. Submachine gunners also joined in the shooting. The Chinese fell as if cut down, many turned and rushed to their shore. They climbed onto it, but, overwhelmed, slid down. The Chinese opened fire on their own, trying to return them to the battle. Everything was mixed up in this heap, combative, seething. Those who were turned around began to make their way to the island in groups. At some point they were so close that we shot them point-blank, hit them with their sides and crushed them with our wheels."
Despite the death of many border guards, the second wounding of V. Bubenin and the damage to the armored personnel carrier, the battle continued. Having transferred to an armored personnel carrier of the 2nd outpost, Bubenin struck the Chinese in the flank. As a result of the unexpected attack, the battalion command post and a large number of enemy personnel were destroyed.
Sergeant Ivan Larechkin, privates Pyotr Plekhanov, Kuzma Kalashnikov, Sergei Rudakov, Nikolai Smelov fought in the center of the battle formation. On the right flank, junior sergeant Alexey Pavlov led the battle. In his department were: Corporal Viktor Korzhukov, privates Alexey Zmeev, Alexey Syrtsev, Vladimir Izotov, Islamgali Nasretdinov, Ivan Vetrich, Alexander Ionin, Vladimir Legotin, Pyotr Velichko and others.
By 2 p.m. the island had completely come under the control of Soviet border guards.
According to official data, in just over two hours, Soviet border guards killed up to 248 Chinese soldiers and officers on the island alone, not counting the channel. During the battle on March 2, 31 Soviet border guards were killed. About 20 border guards were injured of varying degrees of severity, and Corporal Pavel Akulov was captured. After severe torture, he was shot. In April, his mutilated body was dropped from a Chinese helicopter onto Soviet territory. There were 28 bayonet wounds on the body of the Soviet border guard. Eyewitnesses recall that almost all the hair on his head was torn out, and those scraps that remained were completely gray. 
Dead Soviet border guards
The Chinese attack on Soviet border guards alarmed the Soviet political and military leadership. On March 2, 1969, the USSR government sent a note to the PRC government, in which it sharply condemned the Chinese provocation. It stated, in particular: “The Soviet government reserves the right to take decisive measures to suppress provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border and warns the government of the People's Republic of China that full responsibility for the possible consequences of adventurist policies aimed at aggravating the situation on the border between China and the Soviet Union, lies with the government of the People's Republic of China." However, the Chinese side ignored the statement of the Soviet government.
In order to prevent possible repeated provocations, several reinforced motorized maneuver groups from the reserve of the Pacific Border District (two motorized rifle companies with two tank platoons and a battery of 120-mm mortars) were transferred to the area of the Nizhne-Mikhailovka and Kulebyakiny Sopki outposts. The 57th border detachment, which included these outposts, was allocated an additional flight of Mi-4 helicopters from the Ussuri border squadron. On the night of March 12, units of the 135th motorized rifle division of the Far Eastern Military District (commander - General Nesov) arrived in the area of recent fighting: 199th motorized rifle regiment, artillery regiment, 152nd separate tank battalion, 131st separate reconnaissance battalion and rocket BM-21 "Grad" division. The operational group created by the head of the troops of the Pacific Border District, headed by the deputy chief of the district troops, Colonel G. Sechkin, was also located here.
Simultaneously with the strengthening of the border, reconnaissance activities were intensified. According to intelligence data, including aviation and space intelligence, the Chinese have concentrated large forces in the area of Damansky Island - mainly infantry and artillery units. At a depth of up to 20 kilometers, they created warehouses, control centers and other structures. On March 7, a concentration of up to an infantry regiment of the PLA with reinforcements was revealed in the Daman and Kirkinsky directions. 10-15 kilometers from the border, reconnaissance discovered up to 10 batteries of large-caliber artillery. By March 15, a battalion of Chinese had been identified in the Guber direction, a regiment with attached tanks in the Iman direction, up to two infantry battalions in the Panteleimon direction, and up to a battalion in the Pavlovo-Fedorov direction. In total, the Chinese concentrated a motorized infantry division with reinforcements near the border.
During these days, the Chinese also carried out intensive reconnaissance, even using aviation for this purpose. The Soviet side did not interfere with this, hoping that, having seen the real strength of the Soviet side, they would stop provocative actions. That did not happen.
On March 12, a meeting of representatives of the Soviet and Chinese border troops took place. During this meeting, an officer of the Chinese border post Hutou, referring to the instructions of Mao Zedong, expressed a threat to use armed force against the Soviet border guards guarding Damansky Island.
On March 14 at 11.15, Soviet observation posts noticed the advance of a group of Chinese military personnel towards Damansky Island. She was cut off from the border by machine gun fire and was forced to return to the Chinese coast.
At 17.30 two Chinese groups of 10-15 people entered the island. They installed four machine guns and other weapons at firing positions. At 18.45 we took up our starting positions directly on the shore from it.
To preempt the attack, by 6.00 on March 15, a reinforced maneuver group of the border detachment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel E. Yanshin (45 people with grenade launchers) on 4 BTR-60PBs was deployed to the island. To support the group, a reserve of 80 people was concentrated on the shore (the school of non-commissioned officers of the 69th border detachment of the Pacific Border District) on seven armored personnel carriers with LNG and heavy machine guns. 
At 10.05 the Chinese began to capture the island. The path for the attackers was cleared by the fire of about three mortar batteries, from three directions. The shelling was carried out on all suspicious areas of the island and river where Soviet border guards could be hiding.
Yanshin's group entered the battle.
“...in the command vehicle there was a continuous roar, fumes, gunpowder smoke,” recalls Yanshin. “I saw Sulzhenko (he was firing from the machine guns of the armored personnel carrier) take off his fur coat, then his pea coat, unbutton the collar of his tunic with one hand... I see the guy jumped up and kicked the seat and while standing pours fire.
Without looking back, he reaches out his hand for a new can. Loader Kruglov only manages to load the tapes. They work in silence, understanding each other with one gesture. “Don’t get excited,” I shout, “save your ammo!” I show him goals. And the enemy, under cover of fire, again went on the attack. A new wave is rolling towards the shaft. Due to continuous fire, explosions of mines and shells, neighboring armored personnel carriers are not visible. I command in plain text: “I’m going on a counterattack, cover Mankovsky and Klyga with fire from the rear.” My driver Smelov rushed the car forward through the fire curtain. It deftly maneuvers among the craters, creating conditions for us to shoot accurately. Then the machine gun fell silent. Sulzhenko was confused for a moment. Reloads, presses the electric trigger - only a single shot follows. And the Chinese are running up. Sulzhenko opened the cover of the machine gun and fixed the problem. The machine guns started working. I command Smelov: “Forward!” We repulsed another attack..."
Having lost several people killed and three armored personnel carriers, Yanshin was forced to retreat to our shore. However, at 14.40, having replaced personnel and damaged armored personnel carriers, replenishing ammunition, he again attacked the enemy and knocked them out of their occupied positions. Having brought up reserves, the Chinese concentrated massive mortar, artillery and machine-gun fire on the group. As a result, one armored personnel carrier was shot down. 7 people died immediately. A few minutes later the second armored personnel carrier caught fire. Senior Lieutenant L. Mankovsky, covering the retreat of his subordinates with machine gun fire, remained in the car and burned out. An armored personnel carrier, commanded by Lieutenant A. Klyga, was also surrounded. Only half an hour later, the border guards, having “groped” for a weak area of the enemy positions, broke through the encirclement and united with their own.
While the battle was going on on the island, nine T-62 tanks approached the command post. According to some reports, by mistake. The border command decided to take advantage of the opportunity and repeat the successful raid of V. Bubenin, carried out on March 2. The group of three tanks was led by the head of the Iman border detachment, Colonel D. Leonov.
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However, the attack failed - this time the Chinese side was ready for a similar development of events. When Soviet tanks approached the Chinese coast, heavy artillery and mortar fire was opened on them. The lead vehicle was almost immediately hit and lost speed. The Chinese concentrated all their fire on her. The remaining tanks of the platoon retreated to the Soviet shore. The crew trying to get out of the damaged tank was shot with small arms. Colonel D. Leonov also died, having received a fatal wound to the heart.
Damansky Island - a view from the Chinese side.
Two other tanks still managed to break through to the island and take up defense there. This allowed the Soviet soldiers to hold out on Damansky for another 2 hours. Finally, having shot all the ammunition and not receiving reinforcements, they left Damansky.
The failure of the counterattack and the loss of the newest T-62 combat vehicle with secret equipment finally convinced the Soviet command that the forces brought into the battle were not enough to defeat the Chinese side, which was very seriously prepared.
Captured T-62 tank in the PLA museum. Beijing.
Despite the heavy losses among the border guards, Moscow was still wary of introducing regular army units into battle. The Center's position is obvious. While the border guards were fighting, everything boiled down to a border conflict, albeit with the use of weapons. The involvement of regular units of the armed forces turned the clash into an armed conflict or a small war. The latter, given the mood of the Chinese leadership, could result in a full-scale one – and between two nuclear powers.
The political situation was apparently clear to everyone. However, in a situation where border guards were dying nearby, and army units were in the role of passive observers, the indecisiveness of the country's leadership caused disagreement and natural indignation.
“The army men sat down on our communication line, and I heard how the regiment commanders criticized their superiors for their indecision,” recalls the head of the political department of the Iman detachment, Lieutenant Colonel A.D. Konstantinov. “They were eager to go into battle, but were tied hand and foot by all sorts of directives.” .
When a report came from the battlefield about two damaged armored personnel carriers of Yanshin’s group, the deputy chief of staff of the Grodekovsky detachment, Major P. Kosinov, on his personal initiative, moved to the rescue in one armored personnel carrier. Approaching the damaged vehicles, he covered their crews with the side of his armored personnel carrier. The crews were removed from the fire. However, during the retreat, his armored personnel carrier was hit. While leaving the burning car as the last one, Major Kosinov was wounded in both legs. After some time, the unconscious officer was pulled out of the battle and, considered dead, was placed in the barn where the dead lay. Fortunately, the dead were examined by a border guard doctor. He determined from the pupils that Kosinov was alive and ordered the wounded man to be evacuated by helicopter to Khabarovsk.
Moscow remained silent, and the commander of the Far Eastern Military District, Lieutenant General O. Losik, made the sole decision to help the border guards. The commander of the 135th MRD was given the order to suppress enemy personnel with artillery fire, and then attack with the forces of the 2nd battalion of the 199th motorized rifle regiment and motorized maneuver groups of the 57th border detachment.
At approximately 17.10, an artillery regiment and a division of Grad installations of the 135th MSD, as well as mortar batteries (Lieutenant Colonel D. Krupeinikov) opened fire. It lasted for 10 minutes. The strikes were carried out to a depth of 20 kilometers across Chinese territory (according to other sources, the shelling area was 10 kilometers along the front and 7 kilometers in depth). As a result of this strike, the enemy's reserves, ammunition supply points, warehouses, etc. were destroyed. His troops advancing to the Soviet border suffered heavy damage. In total, 1,700 shells from mortars and the Grad multiple launch rocket system were fired at the Daman and Chinese coasts. At the same time, 5 tanks, 12 armored personnel carriers, the 4th and 5th motorized rifle companies of the 2nd battalion of the 199th regiment (commander - Lieutenant Colonel A. Smirnov) and one motorized group of border guards moved into the attack. The Chinese put up stubborn resistance, but were soon driven off the island.
In the battle on March 15, 1969, 21 border guards and 7 motorized riflemen (soldiers of the Soviet army) were killed and 42 border guards were wounded. Chinese losses amounted to about 600 people. In total, as a result of the fighting on Damansky, Soviet troops lost 58 people. Chinese - about 1000. In addition, 50 Chinese soldiers and officers were shot for cowardice. The number of wounded on the Soviet side, according to official data, was 94 people, on the Chinese side - several hundred.
At the end of hostilities, 150 border guards received government awards. Including five were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (Colonel D.V. Leonov - posthumously, senior lieutenant I.I. Strelnikov - posthumously, senior lieutenant V. Bubenin, junior sergeant Yu.V. Babansky, commander of the machine gun squad of the 199th motorized rifle regiment junior sergeant V.V. Orekhov), 3 people were awarded the Order of Lenin (Colonel A.D. Konstantinov, Sergeant V. Kanygin, Lieutenant Colonel E. Yanshin), 10 people were awarded the Order of the Red Banner, 31 - the Order of the Red Star, 10 - the Order of Glory III degree, 63 - the medal "For Courage", 31 - the medal "For Military Merit".
Participant in the conflict on Damansky Island Vitaly Bubenin: “You don’t need to remember this every day, but you shouldn’t forget either”...
In China, the events at Damansky were proclaimed a victory for Chinese weapons. Ten Chinese military personnel became Heroes of China.
In the official interpretation of Beijing, the events at Damansky looked like this:
“On March 2, 1969, a group of Soviet border troops numbering 70 people with two armored personnel carriers, one truck and one passenger vehicle invaded our island of Zhenbaodao in Hulin County, Heilongjiang Province, destroyed our patrol and then destroyed many of our border guards with fire. This forced our soldiers to take action self-defense.
On March 15, the Soviet Union, ignoring repeated warnings from the Chinese government, launched an offensive against us with 20 tanks, 30 armored personnel carriers and 200 infantry, with air support from its aircraft.
The soldiers and militias who bravely defended the island for 9 hours withstood three enemy attacks. On March 17, the enemy, using several tanks, tractors and infantry, tried to pull out a tank that had previously been knocked out by our troops. Hurricane response artillery fire from our artillery destroyed part of the enemy forces, the survivors retreated."
After the end of the armed conflict in the Damansky area, a motorized rifle battalion, a separate tank battalion and a BM-21 Grad rocket division of the 135th motorized rifle division remained in combat positions. By April, one motorized rifle battalion remained in the defense area, which soon also left for its permanent location. All approaches to Damansky from the Chinese side were mined.
At this time, the Soviet government took steps to resolve the situation through political means.
On March 15, the leadership of the USSR sent a statement to the Chinese side, which issued a sharp warning about the inadmissibility of armed border conflicts. It noted, in particular, that “if further attempts are made to violate the inviolability of Soviet territory, then the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all its peoples will resolutely defend it and give a crushing rebuff to such violations.”
On March 29, the Soviet government again issued a statement in which it spoke in favor of resuming negotiations on border issues that had been interrupted in 1964 and invited the Chinese government to refrain from actions on the border that could cause complications. The Chinese side left these statements unanswered. Moreover, on March 15, Mao Zedong, at a meeting of the Cultural Revolution Group, raised the issue of current events and called for urgent preparations for war. Lin Biao, in his report to the 9th Congress of the CPC (April 1969), accused the Soviet side of organizing “continuous armed incursions into the territory of the PRC.” There, the course towards “continuous revolution” and preparations for war was confirmed.
Nevertheless, on April 11, 1969, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR sent a note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, in which it proposed to resume consultations between plenipotentiary representatives of the USSR and the PRC, expressing their readiness to begin them at any time convenient for the PRC.
On April 14, in response to a note from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chinese side stated that proposals regarding the settlement of the situation on the border were “being studied and a response will be given to them.”
During the “study of proposals,” armed border clashes and provocations continued.
On April 23, 1969, a group of 25-30 Chinese violated the USSR border and reached Soviet island No. 262 on the Amur River, located near the village of Kalinovka. At the same time, a group of Chinese military personnel concentrated on the Chinese bank of the Amur.
On May 2, 1969, another border incident occurred in the area of the small village of Dulaty in Kazakhstan. This time, Soviet border guards were prepared for a Chinese invasion. Even earlier, to repel possible provocations, the Makanchinsky border detachment was significantly strengthened. By May 1, 1969, it had 14 outposts of 50 people each (and the Dulaty border outpost - 70 people) and a maneuver group (182 people) on 17 armored personnel carriers. In addition, a separate tank battalion of the district was concentrated in the detachment’s area (the village of Makanchi), and according to the plan of interaction with army formations - a motorized rifle and tank company, a mortar platoon of a support detachment from the 215th motorized rifle regiment (the village of Vakhty) and a battalion from the 369th 1st motorized rifle regiment (Druzhba station). Border security was carried out by surveillance from towers, patrols on cars and checking the control strip. The main merit of such operational readiness of the Soviet units belonged to the head of the troops of the Eastern Border District, Lieutenant General M.K. Merkulov. He not only took measures to strengthen the Dulatin direction with his reserves, but also achieved the same measures from the command of the Turkestan Military District.
Subsequent events developed as follows. On the morning of May 2, a border patrol noticed a flock of sheep crossing the border. Arriving at the scene, Soviet border guards discovered a group of Chinese military personnel numbering about 60 people. To prevent an obvious conflict, the Soviet border detachment was reinforced with three reserve groups from nearby outposts, a company of the 369th motorized rifle regiment with a platoon of tanks and two maneuver groups. The actions of the Soviet border guards were ready to be supported by the fighter-bombers of the air regiment based in Ucharal, as well as the motorized rifle and artillery regiments, two jet and two mortar divisions concentrated in the nearest areas.
To coordinate actions, a district operational group was formed, headed by the chief of staff, Major General Kolodyazhny, located at the Dulaty outpost. A forward command post headed by Major General G.N. was also located here. Kutkikh.
At 16.30, Soviet border guards began to “squeeze” the enemy, who also received significant reinforcements, from the territory of the USSR. The Chinese were forced to retreat without a fight. The situation was finally resolved diplomatically by May 18, 1969.
On June 10, near the Tasta River in the Semipalatinsk region, a group of Chinese military personnel invaded the territory of the USSR 400 meters and opened machine-gun fire on Soviet border guards. Return fire was opened on the intruders, after which the Chinese returned to their territory.
On July 8 of the same year, a group of armed Chinese, violating the border, took refuge on the Soviet part of Goldinsky Island on the Amur River and fired machine guns at Soviet rivermen who arrived on the island to repair navigation signs. The attackers also used grenade launchers and hand grenades. As a result, one riverman was killed and three were wounded.
Armed clashes continued in the area of Damansky Island. According to V. Bubenin, in the subsequent summer months after the incident, Soviet border guards were forced to use weapons more than 300 times to counter Chinese provocations. For example, it is known that in mid-June 1969, an “experimental” multiple launch rocket system of the “Grad” type, which arrived from Baikonur (combat crew of military unit 44245, commander - Major A.A. Shumilin), visited the Damansky area. The combat crew included, in addition to military personnel, specialists involved in supporting space programs. Among them were: Yu.K. Razumovsky is the technical manager of the lunar complex, Papazyan is the technical manager of the rocket-technical complex, A. Tashu is the commander of the Vega guidance complex, L. Kuchma, the future president of Ukraine, at that time an employee of the testing department, Kozlov is a telemetry specialist, I. A. Soldatova – test engineer and others. The “experiment” was controlled by a high-ranking state commission, which included, in particular, the commander of the missile forces Kamanin.
Perhaps the strike of Major A.A. Shumilin was demonstrative, with the aim of stimulating the Chinese side to begin peaceful negotiations to resolve the contradictions that had arisen. In any case, on September 11, 1969, during confidential negotiations between the head of the Soviet government A. Kosygin and the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Zhou Enlai, in Beijing, an agreement was reached to begin official negotiations on border issues, which took place on October 20, 1969.
However, even a month before the meeting of representatives of the Soviet and Chinese governments, another large-scale armed provocation occurred on the Soviet-Chinese border, which claimed dozens of lives.
Soviet-Chinese border conflict on Damansky Island - armed clashes between the USSR and the PRC on March 2 and 15, 1969 in the area of Damansky Island (Chinese. 珍宝 , Zhenbao - “Precious”) on the Ussuri River 230 km south of Khabarovsk and 35 km west of the regional center Luchegorsk (46°29′08″s. w. 133°50′ 40″ V. d. (G) (O)). The largest Soviet-Chinese armed conflict in the modern history of Russia and China.
Background and causes of the conflict
After the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, a provision emerged that borders between states should, as a rule (but not necessarily), run along the middle of the main channel of the river. But it also provided for exceptions, such as drawing a border along one of the banks, when such a border was formed historically - by treaty, or if one side colonized the second bank before the other began to colonize it. In addition, international treaties and agreements do not have retroactive effect. However, in the late 1950s, when the PRC, seeking to increase its international influence, entered into conflict with Taiwan (1958) and participated in the border war with India (1962), the Chinese used the new border regulations as a reason to revise the Soviet Chinese border. The leadership of the USSR was ready to do this; in 1964, a consultation was held on border issues, but it ended without results. Due to ideological differences during the Cultural Revolution in China and after the Prague Spring of 1968, when the PRC authorities declared that the USSR had taken the path of “socialist imperialism,” relations became particularly strained. The island issue was presented to the Chinese side as a symbol of Soviet revisionism and social-imperialism.
Damansky Island, which was part of the Pozharsky district of Primorsky Krai, is located on the Chinese side of the main channel of the Ussuri. Its dimensions are 1500–1800 m from north to south and 600–700 m from west to east (area about 0.74 km²). During flood periods, the island is completely hidden under water. However, there are several brick buildings on the island. And water meadows are a valuable natural resource.
Since the early 1960s, the situation in the island area has been heating up. According to statements from the Soviet side, groups of civilians and military personnel began to systematically violate the border regime and enter Soviet territory, from where they were expelled each time by border guards without the use of weapons. At first, at the direction of the Chinese authorities, peasants entered the territory of the USSR and demonstratively engaged in economic activities there: mowing and grazing livestock, declaring that they were on Chinese territory. The number of such provocations increased sharply: in 1960 there were 100, in 1962 - more than 5,000. Then Red Guards began to carry out attacks on border patrols. Such events numbered in the thousands, each of them involving up to several hundred people. On January 4, 1969, a Chinese provocation was carried out on Kirkinsky Island (Qiliqindao) with the participation of 500 people.
Hero of the Soviet Union Yuri Babansky, who served at the border outpost during the year of the conflict, recalled: “... in February he unexpectedly received an appointment to the post of commander of the outpost department, the head of which was Senior Lieutenant Strelnikov. I arrive at the outpost, and there is no one there except the cook. “Everyone,” he says, “is on the shore, fighting with the Chinese.” Of course, I have a machine gun on my shoulder - and to Ussuri. And there really is a fight. Chinese border guards crossed the Ussuri on the ice and invaded our territory. So Strelnikov raised the outpost “at gunpoint.” Our guys were taller and healthier. But the Chinese are not born with bast - they are dexterous, evasive; They don’t climb on their fists, they try in every possible way to dodge our blows. By the time everyone was thrashed, an hour and a half had passed. But without a single shot. Only in the face. Even then I thought: “A cheerful outpost.”
According to the Chinese version of events, Soviet border guards themselves “arranged” provocations and beat up Chinese citizens engaged in economic activities where they always did. During the Kirkinsky incident, Soviet border guards used armored personnel carriers to dislodge civilians, and on February 7, 1969, they fired several single machine gun shots in the direction of the Chinese border detachment.
However, it was repeatedly noted that none of these clashes, no matter whose fault it occurred, could result in a serious armed conflict without the approval of the authorities. The assertion that the events around Damansky Island on March 2 and 15 were the result of an action carefully planned by the Chinese side is now the most widespread; including directly or indirectly recognized by many Chinese historians. For example, Li Danhui writes that in 1968-1969 the response to “Soviet provocations” was limited by the directives of the CPC Central Committee; only on January 25, 1969, it was allowed to plan “response military actions” near Damansky Island with the forces of three companies. On February 19, the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China agreed to this. There is a version according to which the leadership of the USSR was aware in advance through Marshal Lin Biao of the upcoming Chinese action, which resulted in a conflict.
In a US State Department intelligence bulletin dated July 13, 1969: “Chinese propaganda emphasized the need for internal unity and encouraged the population to prepare for war. It can be considered that the incidents were staged solely to strengthen domestic politics.”
Former KGB resident in China Yu. I. Drozdov argued that intelligence promptly (even under Khrushchev) and very fully warned the Soviet leadership about the impending armed provocation in the Damansky area.
Chronology of events
On the night of March 1-2, 1969, about 77 Chinese troops in winter camouflage, armed with SKS carbines and (partially) Kalashnikov assault rifles, crossed to Damansky and lay down on the higher western shore of the island.
The group remained unnoticed until 10:20, when the 2nd outpost “Nizhne-Mikhailovka” of the 57th Iman border detachment received a report from the observation post that a group of armed people of up to 30 people was moving in the direction of Damansky. 32 Soviet border guards, including the head of the outpost, Senior Lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov, went to the scene of events in GAZ-69 and GAZ-63 vehicles and one BTR-60PB (No. 04). At 10:40 they arrived at the southern tip of the island. The border guards under the command of Strelnikov were divided into two groups. The first group, under the command of Strelnikov, headed towards a group of Chinese military personnel standing on the ice southwest of the island. The second group, under the command of Sergeant Vladimir Rabovich, was supposed to cover Strelnikov’s group from the southern coast of the island, cutting off a group of Chinese military personnel (about 20 people) heading deeper into the island.
At about 10:45 Strelnikov protested about the border violation and demanded that the Chinese military personnel leave the territory of the USSR. One of the Chinese servicemen raised his hand up, which served as a signal for the Chinese side to open fire on the groups of Strelnikov and Rabovich. The moment the armed provocation began was captured on film by military photojournalist Private Nikolai Petrov. At this point, Rabovich’s group came to an ambush on the shore of the island, and small arms fire was opened on the border guards. Strelnikov and the border guards who followed him (7 people) died, the bodies of the border guards were severely mutilated by the Chinese military personnel, and in the short-lived battle, the squad of border guards under the command of Sergeant Rabovich (11 people) was almost completely killed - private Gennady Serebrov and Corporal Pavel Akulov survived, later captured in an unconscious state. Akulov's body, with numerous signs of torture, was handed over to the Soviet side on April 17, 1969.
Having received a report of shooting on the island, the head of the neighboring 1st outpost “Kulebyakiny Sopki”, senior lieutenant Vitaly Bubenin, went to the BTR-60PB (No. 01) and GAZ-69 with 23 soldiers to help. Upon arrival at the island at 11:30, Bubenin took up defense together with Babansky’s group and 2 armored personnel carriers. The firefight lasted about 30 minutes, the Chinese began shelling the border guards' combat formations with mortars. During the battle, the heavy machine gun on Bubenin’s armored personnel carrier failed, as a result of which it was necessary to return to its original position to replace it. After that, he decided to send his armored personnel carrier to the rear of the Chinese, skirting the northern tip of the island on the ice, going out along the Ussuri channel to the Chinese infantry company moving towards the island, and began firing at it, destroying the company on the ice. But soon the armored personnel carrier was hit, and Bubenin decided to go out with his soldiers to the Soviet coast. Having reached the armored personnel carrier No. 04 of the deceased Strelnikov and transferred to it, Bubenin’s group moved along the Chinese positions and destroyed their command post, but the armored personnel carrier was hit while trying to pick up the wounded. The Chinese continued to attack the combat positions of the Soviet border guards near the island. Residents of the village of Nizhnemikhailovka and servicemen of the automobile battalion of military unit 12370 assisted the border guards in evacuating the wounded and transporting ammunition.
Junior Sergeant Yuri Babansky took command of the surviving border guards, whose squad managed to covertly disperse around the island due to a delay in moving from the outpost and, together with the crew of the armored personnel carrier, took up fire.
“After 20 minutes of battle,” Babansky recalled, “out of 12 guys, eight remained alive, and after another 15, five. Of course, it was still possible to retreat, return to the outpost, and wait for reinforcements from the detachment. But we were seized with such fierce anger at these bastards that in those moments we wanted only one thing - to kill as many of them as possible. For the guys, for ourselves, for this inch that no one needs, but still our land.”
Around 13:00 the Chinese began to retreat.
In the battle on March 2, 31 Soviet border guards were killed and 14 were injured. The losses of the Chinese side (according to the assessment of the USSR KGB commission chaired by Colonel General N.S. Zakharov) amounted to 39 people killed.
At about 13:20, a helicopter arrived at Damansky with the command of the Iman border detachment and its chief, Colonel D.V. Leonov, and reinforcements from neighboring outposts, the reserves of the Pacific and Far Eastern border districts were involved. Reinforced squads of border guards were deployed to Damansky, and the 135th Motorized Rifle Division of the Soviet Army with artillery and installations of the BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket system was deployed in the rear. On the Chinese side, the 24th Infantry Regiment, numbering 5 thousand people, was preparing for combat.
On March 4, the Chinese newspapers People's Daily and Jiefangjun Bao (解放军报) published an editorial “Down with the New Tsars!”, blaming the incident on the Soviet troops, who, according to the author of the article, “were driven by a clique of renegade revisionists, brazenly invaded Zhenbaodao Island on the Wusulijiang River in Heilongjiang Province of our country, opened rifle and cannon fire on the border guards of the People's Liberation Army of China, killing and wounding many of them.” On the same day, the Soviet newspaper Pravda published an article “Shame on the provocateurs!” According to the author of the article, “an armed Chinese detachment crossed the Soviet state border and headed towards Damansky Island. Fire was suddenly opened on the Soviet border guards guarding this area from the Chinese side. There are dead and wounded."
On March 7, the Chinese Embassy in Moscow was picketed. Demonstrators also threw ink bottles at the building.
On March 14 at 15:00 an order was received to remove border guard units from the island. Immediately after the withdrawal of the Soviet border guards, Chinese soldiers began to occupy the island. In response to this, 8 armored personnel carriers under the command of the head of the motorized maneuver group of the 57th border detachment, Lieutenant Colonel E. I. Yanshin, moved in battle formation towards Damansky. The Chinese retreated to their shore.
At 20:00 on March 14, the border guards received an order to occupy the island. That same night, Yanshin’s group of 60 people in 4 armored personnel carriers dug in there. On the morning of March 15, after broadcasting from both sides through loudspeakers, at 10:00 from 30 to 60 Chinese artillery and mortars began shelling Soviet positions, and 3 companies of Chinese infantry went on the offensive. A fight ensued.
Between 400 and 500 Chinese soldiers took up positions near the southern part of the island and prepared to move behind Yangshin's rear. Two armored personnel carriers of his group were hit, and communication was damaged. Four T-62 tanks under the command of the head of the 57th border detachment, Colonel D. V. Leonov, attacked the Chinese at the southern tip of the island, but Leonov’s tank was hit (according to different versions, by a shot from an RPG-2 grenade launcher or was blown up by an anti-tank mine), and he Leonov was killed by a Chinese sniper while trying to leave a burning car. The situation was aggravated by the fact that Leonov did not know the island and, as a result, Soviet tanks came too close to the Chinese positions, but at the cost of losses they did not allow the Chinese to reach the island.
Two hours later, having used up their ammunition, the Soviet border guards were nevertheless forced to withdraw from the island. It became clear that the forces brought into the battle were not enough, and the Chinese significantly outnumbered the border guard detachments. At 17:00, in a critical situation, in violation of the instructions of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee not to introduce Soviet troops into the conflict, by order of the commander of the Far Eastern Military District, Colonel General O. A. Losik, fire was opened from the then secret multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) ) "Grad". The shells destroyed most of the material and technical resources of the Chinese group and military, including reinforcements, mortars, and stacks of shells. At 17:10, motorized riflemen of the 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the 199th motorized rifle regiment and border guards under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Smirnov and Lieutenant Colonel Konstantinov went on the attack in order to finally suppress the resistance of the Chinese troops. The Chinese began to retreat from their occupied positions. At about 19:00 several firing points came to life, after which three new attacks were launched, but they were repulsed.
Soviet troops again retreated to their shores, and the Chinese side no longer took large-scale hostile actions on this section of the state border.
The direct leadership of the units of the Soviet Army that took part in this conflict was carried out by the first deputy commander of the Far Eastern Military District, Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General P. M. Plotnikov
Settlement and aftermath
In total, during the clashes, Soviet troops lost 58 people killed or died from wounds (including 4 officers), 94 people were wounded (including 9 officers). The irretrievable losses of the Chinese side are still classified information and, according to various estimates, range from 100 to 300 people. In Baoqing County there is a memorial cemetery where the remains of 68 Chinese soldiers who died on March 2 and 15, 1969 are located. Information received from a Chinese defector suggests that other burials exist.
For their heroism, five servicemen received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: Colonel D.V. Leonov (posthumously), Senior Lieutenant I. Strelnikov (posthumously), Junior Sergeant V. Orekhov (posthumously), Senior Lieutenant V. Bubenin, Junior Sergeant Yu. Babansky . Many border guards and military personnel of the Soviet Army were awarded state awards: 3 - Orders of Lenin, 10 - Orders of the Red Banner, 31 - Orders of the Red Star, 10 - Orders of Glory III degree, 63 - medals "For Courage", 31 - medals "For Military Merit" .
Soviet soldiers were unable to return the damaged T-62, tail number 545, due to constant Chinese shelling. An attempt to destroy it with mortars was unsuccessful, and the tank fell through the ice. Subsequently, the Chinese were able to pull it to their shores, and now it stands in the Beijing military museum.
After the ice melted, the Soviet border guards' exit to Damansky turned out to be difficult, and Chinese attempts to seize it had to be thwarted by sniper and machine-gun fire. On September 10, 1969, a ceasefire was ordered, apparently to create a favorable background for the negotiations that began the next day at Beijing airport. Immediately, the islands of Damansky and Kirkinsky were occupied by Chinese armed forces.
On September 11 in Beijing, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin, who was returning from the funeral of Ho Chi Minh, and Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Zhou Enlai agreed to stop hostile actions and that the troops would remain in their occupied positions. In fact, this meant the transfer of Damansky to China.
On October 20, 1969, new negotiations between the heads of government of the USSR and the PRC were held, and an agreement was reached on the need to revise the Soviet-Chinese border. Then a series of negotiations were held in Beijing and Moscow, and in 1991, Damansky Island finally went to the PRC (de facto it was transferred to China at the end of 1969).
In 2001, photographs of the discovered bodies of Soviet soldiers from the archives of the KGB of the USSR, indicating facts of abuse by the Chinese side, were declassified, the materials were transferred to the museum of the city of Dalnerechensk.
Literature
Bubenin Vitaly. Bloody snow of Damansky. Events of 1966–1969 - M.; Zhukovsky: Border; Kuchkovo field, 2004. - 192 p. - ISBN 5-86090-086-4.
Lavrenov S. Ya., Popov I. M. Soviet-Chinese split // Soviet Union in local wars and conflicts. - M.: Astrel, 2003. - P. 336-369. - 778 p. - (Military History Library). - 5 thousand, copies. - ISBN 5–271–05709–7.
Musalov Andrey. Damansky and Zhalanashkol. Soviet-Chinese armed conflict of 1969. - M.: Eksprint, 2005. - ISBN 5-94038-072-7.
Dzerzhintsy. Compiled by A. Sadykov. Publishing house "Kazakhstan". Alma-Ata, 1975
Morozov V. Damansky - 1969 (Russian) // magazine “Equipment and weapons yesterday, today, tomorrow.” - 2015. - No. 1. - P. 7-14.