Treaty of Portsmouth between Russia and Japan
Portsmouth
The treaty summed up the results of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, which Russia lost. Signed on the Russian side S.Yu. Witte. The Portsmouth Peace Treaty sharply worsened Russia's position in the Far East. But the main requirements were not reflected in the agreement Japan, which she had previously agreed with England and USA: payment of a huge indemnity, cession of Sakhalin, transfer to Japan of Russian warships stationed in neutral ports, and limitation of Russian naval forces in the Far East. Head of the Russian delegation S. Yu. Witte resolutely refused to fulfill all these demands, but then, on instructions from St. Petersburg, agreed to transfer half of Sakhalin to the Japanese. The public around the world praised the agreement as a diplomatic victory for Russia. Witte received the title of count, and the head of the Japanese delegation, Japanese Foreign Minister I. Komura, was removed from his post and subjected to persecution. In fact, the agreement reflected not only the defeat of Russia, but also the extremely difficult situation of the victorious country, which had exhausted its human and financial resources. A significant role was played by the refusal of England and the United States to further support Japan, since they did not want it to become excessively strong. In addition to Witte and Komura, the agreement was signed by the Russian ambassador to the United States, Baron R. R. Rosen, and the Japanese envoy to the United States, K. Takahira.
E.v. the All-Russian Emperor, on the one hand, and H.V. The Emperor of Japan, on the other hand, being inspired by the desire to restore the enjoyment of the benefits of peace for their countries and peoples, decided to conclude a peace treaty and appointed their representatives for this purpose, namely:
e.v. the All-Russian Emperor - his Highness Mr. Sergei Witte, his Secretary of State and Chairman of the Committee of Ministers of the Russian Empire, and his Highness Baron Roman Rosen... his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America; e.v. Emperor of Japan - His Excellency Baron Komura Yutaro, Yusammi... his Minister of Foreign Affairs, and his Excellency Mr. Takahira Kogoro, Yusammi... his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States of America, which, in the exchange of their powers, found in due form, the following articles decreed.
Peace and friendship will henceforth exist between Their Majesties the Emperor of All Russia and the Emperor of Japan, as well as between their states and mutual subjects.
The Russian Imperial Government, recognizing Japan's predominant political, military and economic interests in Korea, undertakes not to interfere with or interfere with those measures of leadership, patronage and supervision that the Imperial Japanese Government might consider necessary to take in Korea.
It is agreed that Russian subjects in Korea will enjoy exactly the same position as subjects of other foreign states, namely, that they will be placed in the same conditions as subjects of the most favored country. It has also been established that, in order to avoid any cause for misunderstanding, both high contracting parties will refrain from taking any military measures on the Russian-Korean border that could threaten the security of Russian or Korean territory.
Article III
Russia and Japan mutually undertake:
1) evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, with the exception of the territory covered by the lease of the Liaodong Peninsula, in accordance with the provisions of additional Article I attached to this agreement, and
2) return to the exclusive control of China completely and in its entirety all parts of Manchuria that are currently occupied by Russian or Japanese troops or that are under their supervision, with the exception of the above-mentioned territory.
The Russian Imperial Government declares that it does not have in Manchuria any land advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions that could affect the sovereign rights of China or that are incompatible with the principle of equality.
Russia and Japan mutually undertake not to put any obstacles to the general measures that apply equally to all peoples and which China could take in the form of developing trade and industry in Manchuria.
The Imperial Russian Government cedes to the Imperial Japanese Government, with the consent of the Chinese Government, the lease of Port Arthur, Talien and adjacent territories and territorial waters, as well as all rights, benefits and concessions connected with or forming part of this lease, and cedes likewise to the Imperial Japanese to the Government of all public works and properties within the territory covered by the above-mentioned lease...
Both high contracting parties mutually undertake to reach the agreement of the Chinese government mentioned in the above resolution.
The Imperial Japanese Government assures for its part that the property rights of Russian subjects in the above-mentioned territory will be fully respected.
The Russian Imperial Government undertakes to cede to the Imperial Japanese Government, without compensation, with the consent of the Chinese Government, the railway between Chang-chun (Kuan-chen-tzu) and Port Arthur and all its branches with all the rights, privileges and property belonging to it in this locality, as well as all coal mines in the said locality belonging to the said railroad or being worked for its benefit.
Both high contracting parties mutually undertake to reach the agreement of the Chinese government mentioned in the above resolution.
Article VII
Russia and Japan undertake to operate the railways belonging to them in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes, and in no way for strategic purposes.
It has been established that this restriction does not apply to railways in the territory covered by the lease of the Liaodong Peninsula.
Article VIII
The Imperial Governments of Russia and Japan, in order to encourage and facilitate relations and trade, will conclude, as soon as possible, a separate convention to determine the conditions of service of connected railway lines in Manchuria.
The Russian imperial government cedes to the imperial Japanese government the eternal and full possession of the southern part of the island of Sakhalin and all the islands adjacent to the latter, as well as all public buildings and property located there. The fiftieth parallel of northern latitude is taken as the limit of the ceded territory. The exact boundary line of this territory will be determined in accordance with the provisions of Additional Article II appended to this treaty.
Russia and Japan mutually agree not to erect any fortifications or similar military structures in their possessions on the island of Sakhalin and on the adjacent islands. They also mutually undertake not to take any military measures that could interfere with free navigation in the La Perouse and Tatar Straits.
Russian subjects, residents of the territory ceded to Japan, are allowed to sell their real estate and retire to their own country, but if they choose to remain within the ceded territory, they will be retained and protected to the full extent of their industrial activities and property rights, subject to subordination to the Japanese laws and jurisdiction. Japan will be quite free to deprive the territory of all inhabitants who do not have political or administrative legal capacity, or to evict them from this territory. It undertakes, however, to fully ensure for these residents their property rights.
Russia undertakes to enter into an agreement with Japan in the form of granting Japanese subjects fishing rights along the shores of Russian possessions in the Seas of Japan, Okhotsk and Bering. It was agreed that such an obligation would not affect the rights already owned by Russian or foreign subjects in these parts.
Article XII
Since the treaty on trade and navigation between Russia and Japan was abolished by the war, the imperial governments of Russia and Japan undertake to adopt a system of reciprocity as the basis for their commercial relations, pending the conclusion of a new treaty on trade and navigation on the basis of the treaty in force before the present war. most favored nation basis, including import and export tariffs, customs rituals, transit and tonnage fees, as well as conditions for the admission and stay of agents, subjects and ships of one state within another.
Article XIII
As soon as possible after the entry into force of this treaty, all prisoners of war will be mutually returned. The Russian and Japanese imperial governments will each appoint a special commissar for their part, who will take the prisoners into their care. All prisoners in the power of one of the governments will be handed over to the commissioner of the other government or his representative duly authorized to do so, who will receive them also at such convenient ports of the transferring state, which will be indicated in advance by the latter to the commissioner of the receiving state.
The Russian and Japanese governments will present to each other, as soon as possible after the transfer of prisoners is completed, a documented account of the direct expenses incurred by each of them for the care and maintenance of prisoners from the day of captivity or surrender until the day of death or return. Russia undertakes to reimburse Japan, as soon as possible after the exchange of these accounts, as established above, the difference between the actual amount of expenses thus incurred by Japan and the actual amount of expenses equally incurred by Russia.
Article XIV
This treaty will be ratified by Their Majesties the Emperor of All Russia and the Emperor of Japan. Such ratification, as soon as possible and in any case no later than fifty days from the date of signing the treaty, will be mutually communicated to the Russian and Japanese imperial governments through the ambassador of the United States of America in St. Petersburg and the French envoy in Tokyo, and with On the day of the last of such notifications, this agreement will enter into full force in all its parts.
A formal exchange of ratifications will follow in Washington as soon as possible.
This agreement will be signed in two copies in French and English. Both texts are completely similar; but in case of disagreement in interpretation, the French text will be binding.
In witness whereof, the mutual representatives have signed this peace treaty and have affixed their seals to it.
Made in Portsmouth (New Hampshire) on the twenty-third of August (fifth of September) one thousand nine hundred and five, which corresponds to the fifth day of the ninth month of the thirty-eighth year of Meiji.
Signed:
Yutaro Komura,
Sergei Witte,
K. Takahira,
Collection of treaties between Russia and other states. 1856–1917.-S. 337–342
After the Russian defeats, the United States government concluded that the time for peace was approaching. Then the President of the United States on June 8, 1905 made a proposal for peace negotiations between Russia and Japan, offering his mediation.
The Russian government willingly took advantage of Roosevelt's offer, as it needed peace to strengthen the fight against the unfolding revolution. In Tokyo, Roosevelt's proposal was also accepted.
In August 1905, Russian-Japanese peace negotiations began in the seaside resort town of Portsmouth (USA).
With the support of the United States and England, the Japanese delegation made enormous demands in Portsmouth.
Tsar Nicholas II appointed Witte as the Russian chief commissioner. At the peace conference, the Russian delegation accepted Japanese demands regarding South Manchuria and Korea. The Russian government expressed its readiness to recognize them as spheres of exclusive influence of Japan.
However, heated debate erupted on two issues. The Japanese intended to receive Sakhalin Island and an indemnity of 1 billion 200 million yen. "
Witte flatly refused to talk about any indemnity. President Roosevelt supported Russia. He threatened the Japanese that if they insisted and the war resumed, the United States would change its attitude towards the warring parties.
For this reason, and most importantly, thanks to the firmness of Russian diplomacy, the Japanese yielded. As one Japanese diplomat wrote in his memoirs, Japan was dealing with a country that throughout its history had never paid indemnities.
Witte also refused to cede Sakhalin. The Japanese government was faced with the question of whether to continue the war to capture this island? Intense political consultations began in Japan. It was decided that Japan was so exhausted that it could no longer fight. In the presence of the emperor, a decision was made to abandon Sakhalin. This happened on August 27, 1905.
Meanwhile, a few days earlier, trying to end the war as quickly as possible, Roosevelt sent a telegram to the Tsar in which he advised him to cede Sakhalin to Japan. On August 23, Nicholas II received the American envoy and told him that, as a last resort, he agreed to give up the southern half of the island. The Russian Tsar was ready for any peace, just to free his hands to suppress internal unrest.
By chance, the king's statement became known to the Japanese. They found out about it immediately after they decided to abandon Sakhalin. The Japanese government immediately changed its decision. True, the Minister of the Navy stated that if the information about the king’s consent is incorrect, the official who conveyed it will have to commit hara-kiri. “However,” the minister lamented, “this will not return Japan to the opportunity to conclude a much-needed peace.”
The head of the Japanese delegation to Portsmouth was sent instructions to demand the southern part of Sakhalin. Witte gave in, following the king's orders: the Japanese received part of the island south of the 50th parallel north latitude. This episode demonstrates the extent to which Japan was exhausted by the war.
It was clear to the Tokyo government that it was impossible to continue the war. A military observer such as the Chief of the German General Staff, Count Schlieffen, who carefully studied the experience of the war, came to the same conclusion.
Russia, according to Schlieffen, could easily continue the war. Her resources were barely touched, and she could field, if not a new fleet, then a new army. Schlieffen
believed that despite a number of defeats inflicted on it, Russia was able to achieve success if it only had to better mobilize the country’s forces.
But the regime that existed at that time was not up to the task. “It was not the Japanese who defeated Russia, not the Russian army, but our order,” Witte wrote in his memoirs.
In addition to the cession of the southern part of Sakhalin Island, the Tsar agreed to pay the cost of keeping Russian prisoners of war in Japan.
On September 5, 1905, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was signed. According to it, Russia recognized Korea as a sphere of Japanese influence. A Japanese protectorate was actually established over Korea. Article 2 of the Treaty of Portsmouth stated: “The Russian Imperial Government, recognizing the predominant political, military and economic interests of Japan in Korea, undertakes not to interfere with those measures of leadership, patronage and supervision that the Imperial Japanese Government might consider necessary to take in Korea.”
According to Article 5, Russia ceded to Japan the lease rights to the Liaodong Peninsula with Port Arthur and Dalny, and according to Article 6 - the South Manchurian Railway from Port Arthur to Huanchenzi Station, somewhat south of Harbin. Thus, Southern Manchuria turned out to be Japan's sphere of influence.
Russia ceded the southern part of Sakhalin to Japan. According to Article 12, Japan imposed on Russia the conclusion of a fishing convention: “Russia undertakes to enter into an agreement with Japan in the form of granting Japanese subjects fishing rights along the shores of Russian possessions in the Seas of Japan, Okhotsk and Bering. It has been established that such an obligation will not affect the rights already owned by Russian or foreign subjects in these parts.”
Article 7 of the Treaty of Portsmouth stated: “Russia and Japan undertake to operate the railways belonging to them in Manchuria solely for commercial and industrial purposes, and in no way for strategic purposes.”
Russia's defeat in the war with Japan had a serious impact on the balance of power of the imperialist powers not only in the Far East, but also in Europe.
The Treaty of Portsmouth is an agreement between the Russian Empire and Japan to cease hostilities. It was this treaty that put an end to the senseless and destructive Russo-Japanese War, which lasted from 1904 to 1905. This significant event happened on August 23, 1905 in Portsmouth, an American town, through the mediation of the US government. The agreement was signed by both parties. Because of him, Russia lost the right to lease the Liaodong Peninsula and terminated the alliance treaty with China, which provided for a military alliance between these states against Japan.
Reasons for the start of the Russian-Japanese War
Japan was a closed country for a long time, but in the second half of the 19th century it suddenly began to liberate itself, opened up to foreigners, and its citizens began to actively visit European states. Progress was clearly visible. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Japan had created a powerful fleet and army - this was helped by foreign experience, which the Japanese adopted in Europe.
It needed to expand its territory, which is why it began military aggression aimed at nearby countries. Japan's first victim was China: the aggressor managed to capture several islands, but this was clearly not enough. The state had its eyes on the lands of Manchuria and Korea. Of course, the Russian Empire could not tolerate such impudence, because the country had its own plans for these territories, building railways in Korea. In 1903, Japan and Russia held repeated negotiations, hoping to resolve the conflict peacefully, but all in vain. Having failed to agree on the division of the land, the Japanese side unexpectedly started a war by attacking the empire.
The role of England and the USA in the war
In fact, Japan did not decide to attack Russia on its own. She was pushed to this by the USA and England, because they were the ones who provided financial support to the country. If it were not for the complicity of these states, then Japan would not have been able to defeat it, because at that time it did not represent an independent force. The Portsmouth Peace might never have been concluded if it had not been for the decision of the sponsors to stop fighting.
After Tsushima, England realized that Japan had strengthened even too well, so it significantly reduced the cost of the war. The United States supported the aggressor in every possible way, and even forbade France and Germany to defend the Russian Empire, threatening them with violence. The president had his own insidious plan - to exhaust both sides of the conflict with prolonged military actions. But he did not plan for the unexpected strengthening of Japan and the defeat of the Russians. The conclusion of the Portsmouth Peace would hardly have taken place without American mediation. Roosevelt worked hard to reconcile the two warring sides.
Unsuccessful attempts to make peace
Having lost the financial support of the United States and England, Japan noticeably weakened economically. Despite significant military achievements in the war with Russia, the country, under pressure from former sponsors, began to lean towards making peace. Japan made several attempts to reconcile with the enemy. The Japanese first started talking about reconciliation in 1904, when the Russians were invited to conclude an agreement in Great Britain. The negotiations did not take place: Japan demanded that the Russian Empire admit that it had initiated the cessation of hostilities.
In 1905, France acted as a mediator between the warring countries. The war affected the interests of many European states, so they wanted it to end as quickly as possible. France at that time was not in the best situation, a crisis was brewing, so it offered its help to Japan and took upon itself to mediate peace. This time the aggressor demanded that the Russian Empire pay a capitulation indemnity, but Russian diplomats flatly refused such conditions.
US mediation
After the Japanese demanded a ransom of 1,200 million yen from Russia and, in addition, the island of Sakhalin, the American government unexpectedly sided with the empire. Roosevelt threatened Japan with the withdrawal of all support. Perhaps the terms of the Portsmouth Peace would have been different if not for US intervention. on the one hand, he tried to influence the Russian Empire, unobtrusively giving advice to the tsar, and on the other, he put pressure on the Japanese, forcing them to think about the deplorable state of the country's economy.
Peace terms put forward by Japan
The aggressor wanted to make the most of the war. That is why Japan wanted to maintain its influence in Korea and Southern Manchuria, take the entire island of Sakhalin and receive a ransom of 1,200 million yen. Of course, such conditions were unfavorable for the Russian Empire, so the signing of the Portsmouth Peace was postponed indefinitely. Witte, the representative of Russia, flatly refused to pay the indemnity and the concession of Sakhalin.
Concessions to Japan
As Ishii later admitted in his memoirs, their country was dealing with Russia, which never paid anyone anything. The firmness of Russian diplomacy and the deprivation of sponsors' support brought the Japanese to a standstill. The Portsmouth peace was on the verge of collapse; it met at a meeting that lasted the whole day. They were deciding whether to continue the war for Sakhalin. On August 27, 1905, it was decided to abandon the island and not demand indemnity. The state was so exhausted that it was not possible to continue hostilities.
Russian gaffe
Meanwhile, the US President sent a telephone message to the Russian Tsar in which he advised him to give up Sakhalin Island. The Russian Empire wanted peace because the government needed to suppress the brewing revolution. However, the king agreed to cede only the southern part of the island. The Portsmouth Peace Treaty could have been signed on other terms, because the Japanese had already decided to abandon their encroachments on Sakhalin. On August 27, immediately after the end of the meeting, the tsar’s decision became known. The Japanese government, of course, did not miss the chance to seize new territory. True, the Japanese took a risk, because if the information had turned out to be incorrect, then peace would not have been concluded again. The official who handed it over would have to commit hara-kiri to himself in case of failure.
Eventually the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed in 1905. The Russian ambassador gave in to Japan's demands, as the Tsar ordered him to do. As a result, the Tokyo government gained a sphere of influence in Korea and received lease rights to the South Manchurian Railway, as well as the southern part of Sakhalin. True, Japan did not have the right to fortify the island.
What did the Portsmouth Peace bring for both sides of the conflict?
The date of signing the peace treaty was supposed to be the last point in the conflict and the start of raising the economy from ruins. Unfortunately, neither Russia nor Japan benefited from the Russo-Japanese War. All this was a pointless waste of time and money. The Japanese perceived the signing of the peace treaty as a personal insult, humiliation, and the country was virtually ruined. A revolution was already brewing in the Russian Empire, and losing the war was the last straw of popular anger. At the beginning of the twentieth century, not the best times came for both states. A revolution has begun in Russia...
08/23/1905 (09/05). – Portsmouth Peace Treaty between Russia and Japan, according to which South Sakhalin and adjacent islands were transferred to the latter
The Truths and Lies of the Portsmouth Peace
Russia initially rejected negotiations, hoping for a turnaround in the course of hostilities. However, after and especially after (May 14-15, 1905), the Russian government, concerned about the expanding revolutionary movement, accepted the mediation proposal of US President Theodore Roosevelt on May 25 (June 7) to organize peace negotiations, made at the request of the Japanese government. Tsar Nicholas II agreed to this, believing that inner peace in such a tense time is more important than victory.
Played a major role in making this decision S.Yu. Witte, who repeated to the Tsar in unison with the liberal press that the war was lost and “the burden of peace conditions will be proportional to the duration of hostilities.”
Meanwhile, by the indicated time, the ratio of opposing forces in the land theater of war was in favor of the Russian army in a ratio of approximately 2:1. In addition, the Japanese, having moved deeper into the north of Manchuria, themselves became victims of the undeveloped rear infrastructure, which had been a headache for the Russian command since the beginning of the war. The Japanese army, which had suffered heavy losses, began to experience an acute shortage of people.
In the Russian troops, according to the testimony of a lieutenant colonel of the General Staff at that time, the chief of staff of one of the cavalry detachments in Manchuria, “news of the efforts ... of few courageous figures to conclude peace as quickly as possible” were received without enthusiasm, since “by the time of the conclusion of peace, Russian troops on the Sypingai positions... were located... echeloned in depth, having more than half of its strength in the general and army reserves, which protected against accidents and promised greater active capabilities... The flanks of the army were reliably covered... The army replenished and rejuvenated its composition and was significantly strengthened technically - howitzers batteries, machine guns... field railroad trains, wireless telegraphy, etc. Communication with Russia was no longer maintained by 3 pairs of trains, as at the beginning of the war, but by 12 pairs. Finally, the spirit of the Manchu armies was not broken, and trains of reinforcements came to us from Russia in a cheerful and cheerful mood. The Japanese army... had 32% fewer fighters. The country was exhausted. Among the prisoners there were old people and children. The former upsurge was no longer observed in it... What would await us if we went on the offensive from the Sypingai positions?.. Victory! Russia was by no means defeated. The army could continue to fight. But... St. Petersburg is “tired” of the war more than the army...”
Unfortunately, it was the “war-tired” head of government S.Yu. Witte was appointed head of the Russian negotiating delegation in Portsmouth and was received by Sovereign Nicholas II on June 30. The Emperor said that “he sincerely wishes the negotiations to reach a peaceful solution, but he cannot allow even a single penny of indemnity, not a single inch of land was ceded ».
“Russia is not asking Japan to end the war; “It is not at all put under the difficult necessity of concluding peace at any cost,” the secret instructions said. – The Sovereign Emperor’s consent to Roosevelt’s proposal was caused solely by... feelings of philanthropy, an ardent desire... to end the bloody feud, promoting the establishment of universal peace, so necessary for the well-being and further prosperity of the Fatherland and the people entrusted to Him by God... But, on the other hand, no matter what the military and the technical difficulties for continuing the war on such a remote outskirts of ours, no matter how heavy the sacrifices that the people will be forced to make in the fight against a stubborn enemy, Russia will still not think for a single minute about the inevitable need to raise arms again if Japan there will be conditions affecting its honor and dignity as a Great Power...”
Witte then did everything possible to misinform the Emperor about the progress of the negotiations and convince him to make concessions to Japanese-American (Jewish) blackmail.
The peace conference began on August 9 (22). Japan, with the encouragement of the United States (Schiff), demanded recognition of “freedom of action” in Korea (effectively turning it into a Japanese colony), the withdrawal of Russian troops from Manchuria and the establishment of the “open door” principle there, the transfer of the Liaodong Peninsula and the South Manchurian Railway to it (SMZhD), paying a huge indemnity, annexing all of Sakhalin to Japan, limiting Russian naval forces in the Far East with the extradition to Japan of Russian ships interned in neutral ports, providing the Japanese with fishing grounds in Russian waters.
The Russian delegation, initially following the instructions of the Sovereign and declaring that the war had not yet ended and that there were neither winners nor losers at the conference, rejected all Japanese demands, with the exception of recognition of its influence in Korea without violating Korean sovereignty. Frightened by the possible continuation of the war, Japan immediately abandoned most of its demands. However, instead of consolidating and developing his success, Witte immediately ceded to Japan: Dalny, the South Moscow Railway from Port Arthur to Changchun, as well as all the coal mines belonging to this road for its supply; the southern part of Sakhalin (up to the 50th parallel) with the adjacent islands, however, without erecting any fortifications there. Witte also agreed to the conclusion of an unfavorable fishing convention.
Both sides pledged to simultaneously withdraw all their troops from Manchuria; not to interfere with freedom of navigation in the La Perouse and Tatar straits; operate the railways belonging to them in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes. The agreement provided for the establishment of trade relations between Russia and Japan and the procedure for the exchange of prisoners of war. But all this was a self-evident result of the conclusion of peace.
The Portsmouth Peace Treaty seriously worsened Russia's position in the Far East. At the same time, the liberal press in Russia emphasized that the peace conditions were much closer to the Russian program than to the Japanese one; supposedly, in connection with this, the head of the Japanese delegation, Japanese Foreign Minister I. Komura, was removed from his post. But these were crafty assessments that justified the liberal Witte (who was married to a Jewish woman). During the negotiations to preserve Sakhalin, it was enough for him to simply point out the financial impossibility for Japan to continue the war, the build-up of our forces in Manchuria, the behind-the-scenes enemies of Russia who initiated this war and financed the “Russian revolution”... He did not do this.
For the purposes of Witte’s entire policy (in the spirit: the worse the better), it is significant that a month later it was he, pushing this as “the only measure capable of stopping the revolution,” who became the author and initiator of the liberal about the State Duma - an elected legislative body that had the ability to influence government decisions. And although the government was still appointed by the Sovereign and could take the initiative to terminate the activities of the Duma, “if emergency circumstances necessitate such an extent,” nevertheless, the de facto monarchy turned into a constitutional one, and the “public” received the political freedoms that had been sought for decades liberals and bourgeoisie (including freedom of trade unions and political parties). They took advantage of these freedoms solely to destroy the state.
After the end of the war, on January 21, 1906, by the highest order of Emperor Nicholas II, silver, bronze and copper medals were established “In memory of the Japanese War of 1904-1905.” on the combined Alexander-St. George (in honor of saints and) ribbon. On the front side was depicted the “all-seeing eye” of Providence, surrounded by a radiant radiance emanating from it; Below, in a circle, the years of the war are indicated. On the reverse side of the medal there is a straight, horizontal inscription across the entire field: “May the Lord exalt you in due time.” This combat award was given to war veterans from general to private who took part in one or more battles against the Japanese on land or at sea. Those who received shell shocks and wounds wore a medal with a bow made from the same ribbon on which the medal itself was worn.
In 1925, when establishing diplomatic relations with Japan, the Bolshevik government recognized the Portsmouth Peace Treaty and implemented it. Japan violated the treaty by occupying Manchuria in 1931, depriving the USSR of the opportunity to normally exploit it, and building fortifications on Sakhalin and on the Korean border. So the USSR thereby also had the formal right to violate the treaty and try to return all the territories previously lost by Russia, including the Kuril Islands. The USSR received such a promise from its Western allies in exchange for entering the war against Japan.
After Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty became invalid. Southern Sakhalin, as well as the Kuril Islands, were returned to the Soviet Union.
I was interested in all this
No, well, I learned this at school, but where can I find out the opinion of a Christian point of view on all this?
I agree that the war was not lost. but the fact that Russia lost was indicative of the rottenness of the ruling class, because there was never a military leader who could take command and win
It's a pity that the authors get it wrong. A hundred years earlier, the Orthodox monarchy had won the war against the super-enemy - France. And anti-Semites cannot get to the bottom of the Jews’ “guilt” in the surrender of Moscow to Napoleon. Then the Orthodox monarchy - also without the participation of Jews - sells Alaska. Then the question is: why should Jews contribute to Russia’s loss of southern Sakhalin to Japan, if the “profit” of certain Jews mentioned by the authors is a trifle, and Japan was not under the influence of the Zionists? The experience of losses back in the Crimean War did not teach the Russian emperors anything - it is necessary to develop the infrastructure for waging wars. Even Tolstoy L.N. It was clear that the negative role of the sovereigns and priests as participants in the Crimean War. The main enemy of Russia over the past 12 centuries is Russia itself, which does not want to live according to the laws of society and the state. And anti-Semites have long since destroyed Russia!
M M M M M M M, how interested))))
The Portsmouth Peace Treaty is one of the most controversial diplomatic acts of pre-revolutionary Russia. Some considered it an important document that stopped the senseless bloodshed, while others are confident that it was a shameful agreement that lowered the authority of the monarchy and provoked the growth of revolutionary sentiments. Contemporaries and some historians considered the Peace of Portsmouth to be the last link in a series of betrayals and defeats that marked it.
War with Japan
Since the end of the 19th century, there has been persistent Russian expansion in northern China. The imperial interests of St. Petersburg collided with the same interests of Japan. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, both empires sought to expand their spheres of influence into Manchuria and Korea. At the same time, Russia managed to gain a foothold on the Liaodong Peninsula (in the Port Arthur fortress), and Japan - on the Korean Peninsula. In 1903, Tokyo approached St. Petersburg with a proposal to divide spheres of influence. At the proposal of the Japanese government, Russia was supposed to renounce claims to Korea, and the Land of the Rising Sun - from claims to Manchuria.
Petersburg refused such an amicable division. In response to Russia's refusal, the Japanese fleet in February 1904, without declaring war, attacked a squadron of the Russian Pacific Fleet in the Port Arthur roadstead. Thus began the bloody Russo-Japanese War. It is characteristic that no hostilities took place either in Russia or in Japan. The main battles took place in China and off the Chinese and Korean coasts. In less than two years, the Russian army and navy suffered several heavy defeats: at Mukden on land, at Tsushima in the Sea of Japan and at Port Arthur on the Liaodong Peninsula.
Preconditions for concluding peace
Heavy defeats in Russia provoked panic in the army. At the same time, the rear of the empire weakened: in January 1905 it began in St. Petersburg, and soon revolutionary uprisings spread to all major cities of the empire. At the same time, Japanese industry was exhausting its capabilities. The Tokyo General Staff realized that the series of victories could be interrupted due to a lack of weapons, finances and manpower. During 1905, Japanese Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi approached him several times with requests for negotiations, but was invariably refused. Only in the summer did the tsar give the go-ahead for negotiations through the mediation of American diplomats. The peace treaty was concluded in Portsmouth on August 25 (September 5), 1905.
Terms of the peace treaty
By concluding an agreement with Japan, the Russian Empire renounced any interests in Korea and Southern Manchuria and the rights to lease the Liaodong Peninsula. In turn, Japan recognized Russia's exclusive interests in northern Manchuria and Harbin. The treaty also limited the size of the Pacific squadron and gave Japanese fishermen the right to fish in close proximity to the Russian coast. Russia came out of the war without the obligation to pay indemnity to the Japanese government. The most significant were reputational and territorial losses. Russia ceded the southern part of Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands to Japan.
Consequences of the Peace of Portsmouth
From an economic point of view, the war brought fewer losses to Russia than to Japan. The conclusion of a peace treaty allowed the empire's security forces to focus on suppressing the revolution. On the other hand, the crushing defeat that small Japan inflicted on huge Russia greatly damaged the authority of the army and government. In the end, a blow was dealt to the economy: the famous financier, who signed the Portsmouth Peace Treaty and was nicknamed Polosakhalinsky for this, lost all his posts a year later, which prevented him from completing the fiscal reform.