Lvov-Sandomierz offensive operation. Lviv-Sandomierz operation - Ural State Military History Museum

On July 13, 1944, the strategic offensive Lviv-Sandomierz operation began. It was the sixth Stalin's blow. The operation was carried out by troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in Western Ukraine. In addition, already during the operation itself, the 4th Ukrainian Front was formed for an offensive in the Carpathian direction.

The Red Army almost completely defeated Army Group “Northern Ukraine”: 32 enemy divisions (including the division of Ukrainian SS collaborators “Galicia”) lost 50-70% personnel, and 8 divisions were completely destroyed. Soviet troops completed the liberation of the entire territory of the Ukrainian SSR from the Nazis. The defeated enemy troops were thrown back beyond the San and Vistula rivers. In addition, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front crossed the Vistula River and created a powerful bridgehead in the area of ​​​​the city of Sandomierz. As a result, conditions were created for an offensive in the Silesian direction.


The operation was of strategic importance - the entire German front was split in two. Now the connection between the northern and southern parts of the Wehrmacht passed through Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which made it difficult for reserves to maneuver.

Conditions before surgery

As a result of successful offensive operations of the Soviet troops in the winter - spring of 1944, two huge protrusions were formed at the front: one north of Pripyat, it stood out in Soviet side, so-called The “Belarusian balcony”, the second one south of Pripyat, was facing the German side.

The “Belarusian balcony” was destroyed during the Belarusian offensive operation that began on June 23. Even before the completion of Operation Bagration, it was decided to complete the liberation of Ukrainian territory and begin fighting in South-Eastern Poland.

The southern salient was formed as part of the major Soviet successes during the Spring Offensive in Ukraine. Here the armies of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts wedged themselves deeply into the German defenses. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of I. S. Konev, after completing the offensive operations of the winter - spring of 1944, went on the defensive in the second half of April 1944. The front armies occupied a 440-kilometer area at the line west of Lutsk, east of Brody, west of Tarnopol, Chertkov, Kolomyia, Krasnoilsk. German troops were pressed against the Carpathians. Soviet troops covered Army Group Center from the southern direction, divided the enemy front, separating Army Group Northern Ukraine from Army Group Southern Ukraine. This seriously complicated the interaction, maneuver and transfer of German reserves. This ledge created profitable terms for the Red Army's attack on Lviv and Bucharest.

Having suffered a crushing defeat in the spring of 1944 precisely in the southern strategic direction, the German command expected a Soviet offensive in the south. Considering the deep penetration of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Lvov direction, the German command was waiting for the main blow here. In the opinion of the German military-political leadership, to the north, in Belarus, only auxiliary offensive operations of the enemy could be expected. Therefore, by the beginning of summer, the bulk of the Wehrmacht's mobile armored formations were concentrated south of Pripyat. Here the Germans held 18 tank divisions of the existing 23 divisions at Eastern Front. Directly in the defense sector of the 1st Ukrainian Front there were 10 enemy tank divisions.

The German command sought to hold Western Ukraine at all costs, in order to have a springboard for a possible counter-offensive and a cover area for South-Eastern Poland. The southeastern region of Poland had a large economic (Silesian industrial area) and military-strategic significance.

Assessing the military-strategic situation that had developed by the summer of 1944, Headquarters Supreme High Command decided to carry out a series of successive offensive operations. The first blow was delivered in Belarus, the second in Ukraine. As a result, they planned to liberate the remaining part of the Byelorussian SSR, part of the Lithuanian SSR, Western Ukraine and South-Eastern Poland. To do this, it was necessary to defeat the main forces of the German Army Group Center and Northern Ukraine.


Commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front I. S. Konev by position

Operation plan

In early June, Joseph Stalin invited Ivan Konev to present his ideas about a future offensive. The headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front conducted great job on planning the operation. Its goal was to dissect and destroy in parts the army group “Northern Ukraine”, liberate Western Ukraine and begin liberation from the occupiers of Poland.

The front command decided to launch two powerful strikes and break through the enemy’s defenses in two directions. The first strike was planned to be delivered from the Lutsk area along the Sokal - Rava-Russkaya - Yaroslav line. The second blow was delivered from the Tarnopol (Ternopil) area along the Lviv-Przemysl line. The offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in two directions made it possible to encircle and destroy the Lvov-Brod group, create a large gap in the German defense and capture the key enemy defense point - Lvov. Army Group “Northern Ukraine” was cut into two parts, one part was planned to be thrown back to the Polesie region, the other to the Carpathians. After this, the main forces of the front were supposed to reach the Vistula, having the opportunity to begin the liberation of Poland.

The shock group of the front in the Rava-Russian direction included: 3rd Guards Army, 13th Army, 1st Guards Tank Army, cavalry-mechanized group (1st Guards Cavalry Corps and 25th Tank Corps). From the air northern group The 1st Ukrainian Front was supported by four air corps of the 2nd air army. The strike group (14 rifle divisions, two tank, mechanized, cavalry corps, and 2 artillery breakthrough divisions) was supposed to strike in a 12-kilometer breakthrough section.

The front's attack group in the Lvov (southern) direction included: the 60th and 38th armies, the 3rd Guards Tank Army, the 4th Tank Army, a cavalry mechanized group (6th Guards Cavalry Corps and 31st Tank Corps ). From the air, the actions of the northern strike group were supported by five air corps of the 2nd Air Army. The southern strike group (15 rifle divisions, 4 tank, 2 mechanized, cavalry corps and 2 breakthrough artillery divisions) struck on a 14-kilometer front.

An auxiliary attack in the Galich direction was carried out by troops of the 1st Guards Army. The guards were supposed to use the success of the neighboring 38th Army and break through the enemy's defenses, advancing on Galich and Stanislav. The 1st Guards Army was supposed to seize a bridgehead on the western bank of the Dniester in the area north of Galich. This blow ensured the advance of the southern group of the front from the left flank and pinned down the enemy’s reserves. To solve this problem, a strike force was formed consisting of five rifle divisions and the 4th Guards Tank Corps.

The 18th Army and the left wing of the 1st Guards Army were given the task of firmly holding their occupied lines and being ready to strike in the Stanislav direction. The 5th Guards Army remained in the front reserve. At the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, she was transferred from the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The 47th Rifle Corps (from the 1st Guards Army) was also transferred to the front reserve.

On July 7, the front presented the operation plan to Headquarters. After careful study, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin approved the operation plan. The idea of ​​delivering two main attacks in the Russian and Lvov directions raised some doubts. However, Konev was able to convince Headquarters that the decision was correct. The Supreme Command headquarters made some changes to the operation plan. Tank armies and KMG were not to be used to break through enemy defenses, but to develop the first success. Tank forces followed in the second echelon and had to enter the battle after breaking through the enemy’s defenses. The cavalry-mechanized groups were supposed to launch an offensive on the second day of the operation, after the tank armies entered the battle. In addition, the Headquarters recommended giving feasible tasks to rifle formations on the first day of the operation, when the infantry was supposed to break into the German defenses. According to the SVGK, the level of tasks assigned to the rifle divisions was overestimated.


Soviet soldiers fight on the streets of Lvov

Strengths of the parties. Soviet Union

The 1st Ukrainian Front included:
- 3rd Guards Army under the command of General Vasily Nikolaevich Gordov;
- 13th Army under the command of Nikolai Pavlovich Pukhov;
- 60th Army under the command of Pavel Alekseevich Kurochkin;
- 38th Army under the command of Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko;
- 1st Guards Army under the command of Andrei Antonovich Grechko;
- 5th Guards Army under the command of Alexei Semenovich Zhadov;
- 18th Army under the command of Evgeniy Petrovich Zhuravlev;
- 1st Guards Tank Army under the command of Mikhail Efimovich Katukov;
- 3rd Guards Tank Army of Pavel Semenovich Rybalko;
- 4th Tank Army of Dmitry Danilovich Lelyushenko.

The front also included two cavalry-mechanized groups (25th and 31st tank corps under the command of F.G. Anikushkin and V.E. Grigoriev, 1st and 6th Guards Cavalry Corps of V.K. Baranov, S.V. Sokolov), and the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps. From the air, the front was supported by the 2nd Air Army under the command of S.A. Krasovsky and the 8th Air Army by V.N. Zhdanov.

The offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front was supported by partisan detachments. Significant partisan formations were relocated to the western regions of Ukraine and further to the southeastern regions of Poland. Before the start of the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front, they dealt strong blows to German communications on the Lviv-Warsaw and Rava-Russkaya-Yaroslav lines. They destroyed several large enemy garrisons and paralyzed traffic on the roads. The German command was forced to throw three divisions against the partisans, which facilitated the advance of the Red Army.

In addition, during the operation to liberate Lvov, the uprising started Polish Army Craiova (about 7 thousand bayonets). Polish command planned to occupy Lvov, form a Polish administration that would represent the Polish government before the command of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the Soviet government.

Already during the operation (July 30), the 4th Ukrainian Front was created. It was headed by I.E. Petrov. The 18th Army and the 1st Guards Army were included in the front from the 1st Ukrainian Front. The 4th Ukrainian Front received the task of attacking in the Carpathian direction.

The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front consisted of 84 divisions (74 rifle, 6 cavalry and 4 artillery divisions), 10 tank and mechanized corps (7 tank and 3 mechanized corps), 4 separate tank brigades, 18 separate tank and 24 self-propelled gun regiments. In total, the front consisted of 843 thousand people (together with the rear, about 1.2 million people), more than 16 thousand guns and mortars over 76 mm (according to other sources, about 14 thousand), 2.2 thousand tanks and Self-propelled guns (according to other sources, 1.6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns), about 2.8 thousand combat aircraft (according to other sources, 3,250 aircraft).


Soviet artillerymen cross the Dnieper in the Lvov direction under the cover of a smoke screen

Germany

The Red Army was opposed by Army Group “Northern Ukraine”. It consisted of 41 divisions (34 infantry, 5 tank, 1 motorized) and two infantry brigades. The German group consisted of more than 600 thousand soldiers and officers (with more than 900 thousand people in the rear), 900 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, 6.3 thousand guns and mortars, about 700 aircraft.

The army group was led by Joseph Harpe (Harpe). The army group consisted of the German 4th Panzer Army under Walter Nehring, Erhard Routh's 1st Panzer Army and the Hungarian 1st Army. Already during the battle, the Army Group “Northern Ukraine” included the 17th Army (the newly formed army, the 17th Army was destroyed in May 1944 in the Crimea and restored in Galicia and Southern Poland), the 24th Tank Corps, and also a number of infantry divisions from other directions, 2 tank divisions, a division of SS troops "Galicia" from Ukrainian traitors and several other individual units. The Army Group was supported from the air by the 4th air fleet.

The Germans, in anticipation of the Red Army's offensive, launched active engineering work and prepared a powerful defense. It was especially deeply echeloned in the Lviv direction. Three defense lines up to 40-50 km deep were prepared here. The first line of defense was 5-6 km deep. The second defense line was located 10-15 kilometers from the front edge. The third line of defense ran along the banks of the Western Bug and Rotten Lipa rivers. A number of cities, including Lviv, were turned into strong strongholds and prepared for all-round defense.

German military builders took advantage of the rugged nature of the terrain, forests, swamps and large rivers. The Western Bug, Dniester, San and Vistula were serious natural obstacles, reinforced by engineering structures. In general, the terrain in the offensive zone of the Soviet troops was varied. In the northern direction there is a plain replete with swamps; in the Lviv direction, in the center - hills, ravines with steep slopes and rivers; the southern direction is mountainous.

The German command had serious operational reserves. Two tank and infantry divisions were stationed southwest of Kovel, two tank and infantry divisions near Lvov, two tank and two infantry divisions near Stanislav (they were transferred to the north). Well-developed communications allowed the enemy to quickly maneuver their reserves.


Soviet officers inspect the German Marder III medium anti-tank self-propelled gun, which was knocked out on the outskirts of Lvov.


German medium tank Pz.Kpwf. IV Ausf. J, destroyed in Western Ukraine

Regrouping of troops

On the eve of the operation, a significant regrouping of forces was carried out, since the main forces of the front by this time were located on the left flank. The 1st and 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies needed to be transferred, and the 38th Army had to be brought up. It should be noted that the Germans knew about the concentration of Soviet troops in the Stanislav and Lviv directions (the left flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front). In the Lvov direction there was the most powerful and dense German defense. However, the attack on the Rava-Russian direction largely came as a surprise to the enemy. Here the German group was less strong. And the terrain was more convenient and accessible for the use of mobile armored formations.

In order to hide the preparation of the operation from the enemy, the Soviet command simulated the concentration of two tank armies and a tank corps on the left wing of the front. To do this, they used false transportation of armored vehicles along railways, simulated the unloading of tank units and their march to concentration areas before the offensive. There were active radio communications in these areas. To deceive the Germans, they built many models of tanks, vehicles, guns and other equipment.

The actual transfer of troops was carried out at night, with all possible precautions and camouflage measures. It was not possible to completely deceive the enemy, but the transfer of forces of the 1st Guards Tank Army to the area south of Lutsk and the 4th Tank Army to the Zbarazh area was kept secret.

Of the available 84 divisions, only 28 divisions were intended for defense and operations in auxiliary areas. The rest were located on the main directions. As a result, in breakthrough areas, one Soviet division accounted for 1.1 km. And without taking into account operational reserves. The Germans had one division defending a section of the front 10-15 km away.

Up to 90% of the available tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated in the directions of the main attacks. 349 tanks and self-propelled guns were allocated for direct support of rifle units. The combined arms armies that operated in the main directions had 14 armored vehicles per 1 km of the breakthrough area. Already during the offensive, it became clear that the infantry did not have enough direct support tanks. The situation was especially difficult in the Lvov direction, where the enemy had the most powerful defense. To support the rifle divisions, it was necessary to send part of the forces of the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank armies.

As a result of the increased regrouping of forces, Soviet command managed to create a huge superiority over the German troops in the breakthrough areas: almost 5 times in men (along the entire front the ratio was 1.2: 1 in favor of the Red Army), in guns and mortars - 6-7 times (along the entire front 2. 6: 1), in tanks and self-propelled guns - 3-4 times (along the entire front 2.3: 1).

Such a concentration of forces and means was necessary to break through the enemy’s strong defenses. The Soviet command took into account that the German defense was well developed, deeply echeloned, had a developed fire system, anti-tank defense and serious operational reserves. On other sectors of the front the balance of forces was approximately equal. In some areas of the defense of the 18th Army, which had a long line of responsibility, German troops even had an advantage in strength.

Played a major role in breaking through the German defenses soviet artillery. In addition to divisional and regimental artillery, the front included 4 breakthrough artillery divisions, 9 anti-aircraft divisions, 9 artillery-cannon brigades, howitzer artillery brigade, mortar brigade, 4 guards mortar brigades, 6 anti-tank fighter brigades, 4 howitzer, 36 anti-tank fighter, 19 mortar, 14 guards mortar and 17 anti-aircraft regiments. Up to two-thirds of this firepower was concentrated on the main directions of the offensive. In breakthrough areas, the density of guns and mortars reached 255 units per 1 km. Regimental, divisional, corps and army artillery groups were formed in the shock groups of the front. Particularly strong artillery groups were created in the Lvov direction. This impressive firepower was supposed to ensure a breakthrough of the enemy's defenses. In total, they planned to spend 1 hour 40 minutes on technical training.

To be continued…

Western Ukraine, South-Eastern Poland

Victory of the USSR. Destruction of the German-Hungarian group of troops. The liberation of the territories of Western Ukraine by the Red Army, the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Polish Silesia.

Opponents

Germany

Czechoslovakia

Commanders

I. S. Konev

I. E. Petrov

Strengths of the parties

1,200,000 people, 13,900 guns and mortars, 2,200 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,806 aircraft

900,000 people, 6,300 guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns, 700 aircraft

Irreversible: 65,001 people. Sanitary: 224,295 people

350,000 people. According to Soviet data, from July 13 to August 12, 140,000 killed, 32,360 prisoners, 1,941 tanks and 687 aircraft

(July 13 - August 29, 1944) - strategic military offensive operation of the USSR armed forces against troops Nazi Germany and Hungary during the Great Patriotic War with the goal of liberating Western Ukraine and occupying South-Eastern Poland. The operation is one of the so-called 10 Stalinist strikes.

Conditions before surgery

Before the start of the operation, the front line ran west of Kovel, Ternopil and Kolomyia. Southern regions Poland (including the Silesian industrial region) had great economic and strategic importance, so the German command sought to hold Western Ukraine by any means necessary and prevent Soviet troops from entering Poland in this area. The German command persistently strengthened and improved its defenses, creating three defensive lines in this area, of which only two were fully prepared by the start of the operation, forming a tactical defense zone.

By the beginning of the operation, the Soviet command managed to create the largest front-line formation ever created in previous operations. The command of the 1st Ukrainian Front decided to launch two strikes: in the Lvov and Rava-Russian directions, which made it possible to dissect the Northern Ukraine army group, encircle and destroy it in the Brody area. The operation was carried out simultaneously with the Belarusian operation and important role The interaction of the fronts also played a role.

Balance of power

USSR

  • 1st Ukrainian Front (commander I. S. Konev). It included the 13th Army, 18th Army, 38th Army and 60th Army, 1st Guards Army, 3rd Guards Army, 5th Guards Army, 4th Tank Army, 1st Guards Tank Army, 3rd Guards Tank Army, two cavalry-mechanized groups and the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps - a total of 80 rifle and cavalry divisions, 10 tank and mechanized corps and 4 separate tank brigades (1.2 million people, 13,900 guns and mortars, 2,200 tanks and self-propelled guns). Aviation support was provided by the 2nd Air Army, which had 2806 aircraft.
  • 4th Ukrainian Front (commander I.E. Petrov) - created on July 30, 1944 for an offensive in the Carpathian direction. The front includes the 18th Army and the 1st Guards Army from the 1st Ukrainian Front. The 8th Air Army was assigned for air support.
  • The Polish partisan formations, the Home Army, also provided little assistance to the Soviet troops in the battles for Lviv.

Germany and Hungary

  • Army Group “Northern Ukraine” (commander J. Harpe). It included the 1st German Tank Army, the 4th German Tank Army and the 1st Hungarian Army - in total by July 13, 42 divisions, of which 6 tank and motorized (900 thousand people, 6300 guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns). During the operation, the army group also included the additional 17th Army, the 24th Tank Corps, as well as 11 infantry divisions, 2 tank divisions, the SS Galicia division of Galician volunteers and several separate units from Germany. Aviation support was provided by the 4th Air Fleet, which had 700 aircraft.

Partisan actions

At the beginning of 1944, significant formations of Soviet partisans crossed into the western regions of Ukraine and further into the southeastern regions of Poland. By the end of April 1944, the total number of Soviet partisans in these areas amounted to 9 thousand people, united in 10 partisan associations and 53 detachments. Before the start of the operation, they disrupted the transport of German troops on the Lvov-Warsaw and Rava-Russkaya-Yaroslav lines for a month, defeated 13 large garrisons and repelled an attack in the Janow Forests, where three German divisions were thrown against them.

Encirclement and defeat of the German group in the Brody area

By the beginning of the transition of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the offensive, three defense lines were created in the sector of Army Group “Northern Ukraine”: the first was 4-6 km deep, the second was 10-15 kilometers from the front line, the third ran along the banks of the Western Bug rivers and Rotten Linden. The total depth of defense was 40-50 km. The German command assumed that in the event of an attack by the Red Army, it would withdraw its troops to the second line of defense in order to avoid losses during artillery preparation. The front command received information about the enemy's plan. Marshal I. S. Konev decided to break through the first zone without artillery preparation, and to use artillery and aviation to break through the second zone. On July 13, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive in the Rava-Russian and Lviv directions. Units of the 3rd Guards and 13th Soviet armies broke through the German tactical defenses and by July 15 advanced to a depth of 20 km. On July 16, a cavalry-mechanized group was introduced into the battle, and on the morning of July 17, the 1st Guards Tank Army. As a result of stubborn battles for the 2nd defensive zone, where the German 16th and 17th tank divisions were advanced from reserve, by the end of July 16, the entire tactical zone German defense was broken through to a depth of 15-30 km. On July 17, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front entered the territory of Polish Silesia.

In the Lvov direction the situation was more successful for the German troops. Having created an attack group of two tank divisions, German troops repulsed the advance of the Soviet 38th and 60th armies and, on the morning of July 15, carried out a counterattack with two tank divisions from the area of ​​​​Plugov, Zborov, thereby ousting Soviet troops for several kilometers. The Soviet command intensified air and artillery strikes in this direction and on July 16 brought the 3rd Guards Army and then the 4th Tank Army into battle.

Tank armies were introduced into a narrow corridor (4-6 km wide and 18 km long), formed by the attack of the 60th Army in the area of ​​Kotlov (northwest of Ternopil). The commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, General P. S. Rybalko, led his army into this corridor on July 16, and on July 17, the entire 4th Tank Army of General D. D. Lelyushenko passed through this passage. Bringing two tank armies into battle on such narrow strip with the simultaneous reflection of counterattacks is the only case in the history of Soviet operations of the Great Patriotic War.

By the end of July 18, the German defenses had been broken through in both directions to a depth of 50-80 km in a zone of up to 200 km. Soviet troops crossed the Western Bug and surrounded a group of up to eight divisions in the Brody area, including the 14th SS Grenadier Division "Galicia".

After the Soviet troops reached the approaches to Lvov, the front commander decided to concentrate his main efforts on the Lvov-Przemysl direction in order to complete the defeat of the opposing enemy group and capture the cities of Lvov and Przemysl. At the same time, efforts were made to quickly complete the destruction of the Brody group and speed up the development of the offensive in the Stanislav direction.

Troops of the 60th and 13th armies, with air support from the 2nd Air Army, fought intense battles to eliminate the group encircled in the Brody area. By July 22, the group was liquidated, about 30 thousand German soldiers were killed, and over 17 thousand were captured.

Simultaneously with the battles to destroy the Brody group of Germans, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front continued to develop an offensive to the west. By the end of July 23, the front troops reached the San, tank units crossed the river and captured bridgeheads north and south of Yaroslav. On July 23 in Lviv, the Home Army raised armed uprising against German troops. The attempt of the Soviet troops to capture Lvov on the move with tank armies ended unsuccessfully, as a result of which the command decided to take the city with the forces of the 60th and 38th armies, and the tank armies to bypass the city from the north and south. By July 27, Soviet troops, with the support of Polish partisans, occupied the cities of Lvov and Przemysl. In the Stanislav direction, units of the 1st Guards and 18th Army occupied Galich on July 24, and Stanislav on July 27.

By July 27, the first stage of the operation was completed. Army Group “Northern Ukraine” suffered heavy losses and was cut into two parts, between which a gap of up to 100 km formed.

To create a defense front on the Vistula, the German command began to transfer additional reserves here from other sectors of the front and from Germany. For operations in the Carpathian direction, the Soviet command created the 4th Ukrainian Front, which included the 18th Army, 1st Guards Army and 8th Air Army.

The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front continued their advance towards the Vistula without pause. The 1st Tank Army, having captured Yaroslavl on the night of July 27, began moving towards the Vistula on the night of July 28, having orders to reach the Vistula without getting involved in battles with the enemy within one day. river in the area of ​​Sandomierz and seize a bridgehead, the 3rd Guards Army advanced on a parallel course from Przemysl to the Baranów area. The movement of the tank armies was complicated by the lack of air support, since due to the high pace of advance, the airfields lagged significantly behind the forward units.

On July 29, the 3rd Guards Army and a cavalry-mechanized group defeated the enemy group in the Annopol area, reached the river, where they captured small bridgeheads, but were forced to retreat due to stubborn resistance from the Germans. The troops of the 1st Guards Tank and 13th armies acted more successfully, captured bridgeheads across the Vistula and began crossing the river. The width of the crossing area did not exceed 2 kilometers. Unique during the Patriotic War were the battles on the water, which were fought by the forward detachments that crossed the river with the retreating German troops. The German command planned to blow up numerous dams on the banks of the Vistula, but the rapid advance of Soviet units thwarted these plans (if the dams exploded, the numerous German troops remaining on the eastern bank of the river would not be able to evacuate). Already on July 30, 30- and 50-ton ferries were installed, on July 31, 2 more thirty-ton ferries were added to them, and in the evening the construction of a low-water bridge across the Vistula began, which went into operation on August 5. Attempts to impede the crossing of Soviet troops using floating sea mines were unsuccessful. Due to the lack of air cover, the transfer of Soviet troops was covered by a fifteen-kilometer smoke screen. By evening, the main forces of the 1st Guards Tank crossed to the bridgehead. Attempts by the approaching 17th German Army on July 31 to launch a counterattack in the direction of Maidan ended unsuccessfully. By the end of August 1, the Soviet bridgehead near Sandomierz was expanded. On August 3, the Germans reached the southern approaches to Baranów and again tried to launch a counterattack. To repel it, the Soviet command brought the front reserve into battle - the 5th Guards Army, which repelled the counterattack and by August 8 reached the Szydłów, Stopnica, Nowy Korchin line. Meanwhile, the troops of the 13th and 1st Guards Tank Armies, located on the bridgehead, resumed the offensive in order to complete the defeat of the main forces of the German 4th Tank Army, but they could not achieve great success. In general, by August 10, the front managed to expand the bridgehead to 60 km along the front and to 50 km in depth.

On the morning of August 11, German troops launched a counterattack in the direction of Staszow, Osiek, and by August 13 they managed to advance 8-10 km and capture the Szydłów area. However, their attempts to develop a strike in the direction of Baranów were unsuccessful. Having failed to achieve significant success in the Staszow area, the German command decided on August 13 to launch a counterattack in the direction of Stopnica, Polanets. Here the Germans first used their new heavy tanks, the Royal Tiger. The debut of the "Royal Tigers" was a fiasco - in the Ogledow-Mokre-Szydłów area the Germans were ambushed by the 53rd Guards tank brigade, where they lost 13 new tanks, of which three Soviet troops captured in good condition, and in the Khmelnik area, soldiers of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, as a result of a night battle, captured 16 tanks, of which 13 Soviet troops captured with full ammunition, completely serviceable, 3 with broken tracks. These vehicles were used to complete the 3rd battalion of the brigade. As a result, the commander of the German 501st separate heavy tank battalion, Major von Legat, was removed from his post. On August 14, the Soviet 3rd Guards and 13th armies launched an attack on Sandomierz and took the city the next day.

The German command made a new attempt to liquidate the Sandomierz bridgehead in the area of ​​the Lagow salient. The German command's plan was to encircle Soviet units in the Lagow area with attacks from two tank corps. After stubborn battles, German tank units managed to capture a mountain ridge northwest of Opatow and penetrate 6-7 km into the defenses of the 13th Army. As a result of retaliatory strikes by the 3 Soviet armies, part of the German forces (72nd, 291st infantry divisions, assault regiment, part of the 18th Artillery Division) was surrounded and destroyed. This ended the attempts of the German command to reset Soviet troops from the western bank of the Vistula in the Sandomierz region. The Soviet bridgehead was expanded to 120 km along the front and to 50 km in depth.

The troops of the left wing of the front, consisting of the 60th and 38th armies, tried to develop an offensive to the west, but they also did not achieve significant success. On August 23, the 60th Army, together with the troops of the 5th Guards Army, captured the city of Dębica. The 38th Army, securing the left flank of the front, reached the front of Glienik and Krosno. On August 29, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the defensive.

Simultaneously offensive actions In the Carpathian direction, troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front fought against the German-Hungarian troops. From August 1 to 19, the German-Hungarian command additionally introduced seven infantry divisions transferred here to the 1st Hungarian Army, having previously created strong defensive lines here that ran along the heights and river banks. The advance of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front was rather slow. On August 5, units of the 1st Guards Army occupied the city of Stryi, and the next day captured Drohobych. By August 15, front troops reached the Sanok-Krasnoilsk line and stopped the offensive there.

Results and consequences of the operation

As a result of the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, Soviet troops completed the liberation of the entire territory of the Ukrainian SSR within the 1941 borders from German occupation. During the operation, the strategic task of defeating Army Group “Northern Ukraine” was solved by the forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front alone. Soviet troops almost completely defeated Army Group “Northern Ukraine”, 32 divisions of German troops (including the division of Ukrainian SS collaborators “Galicia”) lost from 50 to 70 percent of their strength, and 8 divisions were completely destroyed. With the loss of Western Ukraine, the entire German front in the east was split in two. Now communication between the Northern and Southern German groups could be carried out in a roundabout way through Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which made it difficult for the reserves to maneuver. The crossing of the Vistula and the creation of a large Sandomierz bridgehead had great importance for the subsequent offensive of Soviet troops in the Silesian direction.

Before leaving the territory of Western Ukraine, German troops left some of their weapons to the units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army operating in the area. The UPA continued to fight Soviet power in this area for several more years. To fight the UPA and scattered German soldiers, the Soviet leadership sent a significant number of special forces. The Soviet leadership carried out quite harsh methods, exiling UPA fighters and people who collaborated with them to Siberia.

As a result of the rapid advance of the Red Army on Lviv, the retreating Wehrmacht troops did not have time to blow up many of the city’s monuments that they had mined.

From the point of view of military art, the Lvov-Sandomierz operation is characterized by its large scope, variety of combat operations and widespread use various forms operational maneuver.

The objective of Operation Storm was to occupy Lvov by the Polish armed forces before the entry of Soviet troops, in order to thus act as the master of the area and take the position of a partner who would be taken into account in conversations with representatives of the Soviet troops. By order of July 5, 1944, AK units in Lvov were assigned detailed tasks and places of concentration. The most numerous detachments of the Home Army were located in the city, which was divided into sections: Sredmieście, eastern, western, southern and northern.

As we retreat German units AK soldiers occupied the neighborhoods designated by them, took the most important objects under guard and blocked Ukrainian areas. Soldiers tied red and white ribbons, houses were decorated with Polish flags thanks to the enthusiasm of the Polish population, and hiding Germans were caught.

During the offensive of the Red Army, after the defeat of the Germans near Brody in Lviv on July 23, 1944, a military operation of the Polish underground Home Army began with the goal of occupying Lviv and Galicia and from these positions to negotiate on the organization Polish-Soviet border. It was called "Operation Storm".

During the Lvov-Sandomierz operation of the Red Army, the battles near Lvov were distinguished by extraordinary tenacity. The difficult geography of the area, swamps and constant rain created big problems Soviet troops. In addition, the Germans brought up three divisions from near Stanislav (Ivano-Frankivsk).

On July 13, 1944, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal Ivan Konev began the Lviv-Sandomierz operation. The 38th, 6th combined arms, 3rd Guards and 4th tank armies and the cavalry mechanized group of General S. Sokolov operated directly in the Lvov direction. Their military operations were supported by the 2nd Air Army of General S. Krasovsky, which had been carrying out a massive raid on Lviv since the spring. Since April 9, its planes from 20:30 pm to 2:00 am continuously bombed the Sknilov airfield, the main station, Podzamche and Persenkovki stations, dropped heavy bombs on residential areas of Gorodetskaya, Kopernik, Petra Mogila, Sapieha streets and the suburban villages of Zboiska, Krivchitsy, Kozelnikov, Sokolnikov - only 318 points. As a result, about a hundred residents were killed and 400 were injured. Brutal raids continued in May, June and July (almost daily).

The battle of Soviet troops for Lviv began with the battle of Brody. After the defeat of the Brody group, the tank armies of generals P. Rybalko and D. Lelyushenko, together with rifle units of the 38th and 60th armies, quickly launched an offensive to the west, and when they approached Lvov, they began to bypass it from the north and south. Threatened complete environment On July 23, the commander of the army group, General I. Harpe, gave the order to his army to leave the city and retreat towards Sambir. Before retreating, the Germans destroyed a number of facilities and communications and set fire to fuel depots. High columns of smoke rose above Lviv.


The plan for Operation Storm had a special section concerning Lvov. It provided for the first stage, when the front approached, to launch sabotage actions on enemy communications, but only outside Lvov within a radius of at least 10 km. Protests were allowed in areas populated by Ukrainians. During the German retreat from Lvov, it was recommended to conduct military operations only in the surrounding areas, primarily in the western and southern areas. It was forbidden to fight in the central part of the city. The plan required the elimination of Ukrainian actions aimed at capturing Lvov. After the entry of the Red Army troops, the Home Army was asked to represent the Polish government in Lviv.

On July 7, 1944, the commander of the Lvov district of the AK, Colonel Vladislav Filipkovsky, received the expected order from General Sosnkovsky to begin implementing the “Storm” plan: to capture Lvov at any cost, to create a Polish administration that would represent the Polish government before the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. To implement the “Storm” plan, V. Filipkovsky had about 7 thousand armed soldiers. The three-thousand-strong 5th Infantry Division, the 14th Lancer Regiment and several detachments of local volunteers operated directly in Lvov. In addition, outside Lvov, the so-called “forest departments” were ready for action - battle groups“East” (910 AK soldiers), “South” (150), “West” (550), “Xiang” (600) and “North” (150), which were supposed to paralyze the activities of transport communications.

From July 13, 1944, the 11th Guards Mortar Regiment of Rocket Artillery took part in the operation.

From July 22 to 24, the 3rd Guards Tank Army made a successful maneuver, with its main forces bypassing Lviv from the north and launching an attack on Lviv from the west. The city was surrounded and was taken two days later.

July 22, 1944 morning hours Lviv was attacked from the south-eastern side (Zelenaya Street) by the 29th Soviet motorized brigade from the 10th Corps of the 4th Tank Army. Due to the lack of infantry, which was needed in battles in the city, the help of Home Army units was very willingly accepted.

When the German occupation administration of the Galicia district, Gestapo and police institutions left the city on the night of July 23, AK units in the morning attacked the columns of the German 20th motorized and 101st mountain divisions of the Wehrmacht, which were retreating. During the battles, the Poles managed to capture the suburbs of Goloska, Pogulyanka, blocks in the areas of Kokhanovsky (now K. Levitsky) streets, where the headquarters of the uprising was located in house 23, Zelenaya, Yablonovsky (now Sh. Rustaveli), Bema (now Ya. Mudry) streets, K. Leshchinsky (now Mikhnovsky Brothers), as well as some city objects. The 14th Uhlan Regiment especially distinguished itself in battles, even capturing several German tanks.

On July 25, the troops of the front of Marshal I. Konev entered the battle for Lviv. The tankers of General D. Lelyushenko were the first to break into the city streets. On July 26, units of the 10th Guards Tank Ural volunteer corps entered Rynok Square and raised a red flag over the town hall. From Gorodok along Gorodotskaya and Yanovskaya (now T. Shevchenko) units of General P. Rybalko advanced, which defeated the rear units of the 101st German division in the Kleparovskaya area. From the area of ​​​​Dublyan and Vinnikov, the divisions of the 60th Army of General P. Kurochkin attacked the city. Units of the 38th Army occupied Znesenje and surrounded the Germans in the area of ​​the High Castle.

Units of the Red Army and the Home Army fought against the Germans together as allies. In close cooperation with AK members who knew the city well, the Soviet army captured the center of Lvov, the area of ​​the main station, the Citadel, on July 27. By the end of the day, the battles to liberate the city from the Germans ended victoriously. In the undoubtedly tendentious report of the commander of the 14th Lancer Regiment, Major "Drazha" (officer Yugoslav army, who fled from German captivity and joined the AK) wrote: “The city was occupied by Polish rebel departments, and Soviet armored units only helped them. All houses were visible only white and red flags. General Filipkovsky, the district commandant, in new uniforms, was with his headquarters on Kokhanovsky Street, 23. Colonel Chervinsky, the district commander, was the city commandant, and the AK police kept order.” It should be noted that his 14th regiment really fought hard, for which he received the gratitude of the Soviet command.

For two days, the streets of Lvov, together with the Red Army soldiers, were patrolled by Akov warriors with white and red armbands, and white and red flags were installed on many houses. Since July 26, the Polish flag has been flying at the town hall, and below, on the horns of the tower, there are four more: the flags of the USA, England, France and the USSR. The Polish government in London considered the implementation of Operation Storm in Lviv to be extremely successful. Its leader, Colonel V. Filipkovsky, was promoted to the rank of brigade general and, as part of a group of leading officers of the Lvov district, was awarded the Order of Virtuti Militari.

However, the period of peaceful coexistence between the troops of the Red Army and the Home Army, and then the Soviet government with Polish structures, quickly ended. On July 27, V. Filipkovsky established contacts with the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the next day he was summoned to an appointment with the NKVD representative, State Security Commissioner Grushka, where they unequivocally stated that Lvov - soviet city, and put forward demands: immediately remove the Polish flags in the city, stop patrolling, concentrate units in the barracks and lay down their arms. The Polish general signed the corresponding order to the military of the Lviv AK district and, at Grushka’s suggestion, on July 30 flew by plane to Zhitomir, where the headquarters of the commander of the Polish Army, General Rolya-Zhimierski, was supposedly located. In Zhitomir, he and the commanders of the Ternopil district - Colonel Studzinsky and the Lviv region - Colonel Chervinsky were arrested and ended up in one of the concentration camps in Siberia.

The next day, the command of the Lviv region and district, commanders of AK units and officials of the Polish administration were invited by Soviet authorities to a meeting at the district headquarters on the street. Kokhanovsky, 23. When the Poles gathered, the house was surrounded by NKVDists and all 32 participants in the meeting, including four women, were put in prison on the street. Lontsky. They were later sentenced to 10-20 years in prison. Was published on August 2 last order AK on the liquidation of the 3rd Lviv District, and the personnel of its units in Lviv were asked to join the Polish Army or be interned until the end of the war. The overwhelming majority of soldiers and officers refused and ended up in Soviet concentration camps. Some managed to go illegal, or flee for the San and join the AK units operating in Poland.

Already on the second day after the entry of Soviet troops into Lviv, an operational group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (Bolsheviks) headed by I. S. Grushetsky began its activities, which began the restoration of the city administration.

The new government first noted the military merits of the Soviet generals. By decree of the regional party committee of August 14, 1944, Marshal I. Konev, generals D. Lelyushenko and P. Kurochkin were presented with beautiful mansions. One of them belonged to Kamenyar’s son, Pyotr Franko, whom the NKVD killed in June 1941.

Based on Wikipedia materials

The offensive operation of the troops of the Southwestern Front during the war with bourgeois-landowner Poland was carried out on July 25 - August 20 with the goal of defeating the enemy’s Lviv group and capturing Lvov. By July 23, the troops of the Southwestern Front (commanders A.I. Egorov, member of the RVS I.V. Stalin, R.I. Berzin) as part of the 1st Cavalry, 12th and 14th armies inflicted a heavy defeat on the enemy in areas of Rivne, Dubno, Kamenets-Podolsky, Proskuriv. By this time, the troops of the Western Front had reached the Grodno-Slonim line and were successfully advancing towards the Vistula. The command of the Western Front mistakenly believed that the front was able to capture Warsaw alone. Agreeing with this opinion, Commander-in-Chief S.S. Kamenev ordered the Southwestern Front main blow apply not to Lublin, but to Lvov. In accordance with this decision, from the end of July Western and South- Western Front We attacked in different directions. The troops of the Southwestern Front had the following tasks: 1st Cavalry Army (4 cavalry and 3 rifle divisions) - by July 29 to capture Lvov, Rava-Russkaya and capture crossings on the San River; 14th Army - advance on Ternopil, Nikolaev; 12th Army - support the operation with an attack on Chelm, Lublin. By the beginning of the Lvov operation, the overall balance of forces of the parties was in favor of the enemy, who deployed a large group consisting of the 3rd, 2nd and 6th armies in front of the troops of the Southwestern Front.
At the beginning of the operation greatest success had the 1st Cavalry Army. By the end of July 26, it captured Brody, and on July 28 it reached the Styr River from Torgovitsa to Yasinov, threatening Lvov. Since the Cavalry posed the greatest danger, the Polish command sent the main forces of the 2nd Army against it, which launched a counterattack and pushed the Cavalry units to Ford. But develop it Polish troops could not, since on August 2 the troops of the Western Front captured Brest-Litovsk and the enemy began to withdraw the 2nd and part of the forces of the 6th Army for transfer to the Lublin region and Warsaw. While the Cavalry repelled the counterattack of superior enemy forces, the remaining armies of the Southwestern Front continued to advance to the west: the 12th Army crossed the Styr and Stokhod rivers, liberated Kovel on August 4 and approached the Western Bug; The 14th Army reached the Siret River and began crossing it.
On August 11, due to the fact that a gap had formed between the fronts and interaction was disrupted, Commander-in-Chief S.S. Kamenev ordered the troops of the Southwestern Front to temporarily stop the Lviv operation, redirecting the 12th and 1st Cavalry Armies to assist the Western Front. This met with objections from the command of the Southwestern Front, which on August 12 gave the order to the 1st Cavalry Army resume the attack on Lviv. In accordance with this order, on August 13, the 1st Cavalry went on the offensive and, after stubborn fighting, reoccupied Brody on August 14. On August 13, the Commander-in-Chief again ordered the Southwestern Front to stop the attack on Lvov and transfer the 12th and 1st Cavalry Armies to the Western Front. But the 1st Cavalry Army, having encountered strong enemy resistance on the Bug River, became involved in protracted battles and, in fact, only on August 20 was able to begin withdrawing troops from the battle, without ever capturing Lvov. The reasons for the failure of the 1st Cavalry Army were that it was weakened by the battles for Brody, and the terrain and the heavily fortified Lvov fortress area were not conducive to cavalry actions. The delay of the 1st Cavalry Army near Lvov prevented it from providing timely assistance to the Western Front, which negatively affected the outcome of the battles in the Warsaw direction (see Warsaw operation of 1920). With the departure of the Cavalry to the Western Front, the task of liberating Lvov was entrusted to the troops of the 14th Army. However, the 14th Army did not have the necessary forces and means for this. Its troops, under the blows of superior enemy forces, were forced to first go on the defensive and then retreat to the east. The Lvov operation remained unfinished, which was the result of an overestimation of one’s own forces and an underestimation of them by the enemy, as well as mistakes of the Soviet command in planning and directing the operations of the Southwestern and Western Fronts.
Literature: Lenin V.I. Political report of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) September 22 (IX All-Russian Conference RCP(b) September 22-25, 1920). - Full composition of writings. Ed. 5th. T.41; Lenin V.I. Speech at the Congress of Tannery Workers and Employees on October 2, 1920 - Ibid. T.41; Lenin V.I. Report on political activity Central Committee of the RCP(b) March 8. (X Congress of the RCP(b) March 8-10, 1921). - Right there. T.43; History of the CPSU. T.3. Book 2. M., 1968, pp. 473-514; History of the Civil War in the USSR. 1917-1922. T.5. M., 1960; Budennyi S.M. Distance traveled. Book 2. M., 1965; Tyulenev I.V. Soviet cavalry in battles for the Motherland. M., 1957; Kuzmin N.F. The collapse of the last campaign of the Entente. M., 1958; Egorov A.I. Lviv-Warsaw. 1920 M.-L., 1929.
I.M.Kravchenko

As a result sixth strike(in July - August) The Red Army drove the Germans back beyond the San and Vistula rivers with the liberation of Western Ukraine and consolidation on the bridgehead west of Sandomierz .

Lviv-Sandomierz operation.

On July 13, 1944, the strategic offensive Lviv-Sandomierz operation began. This was Stalin's sixth blow. The operation was carried out by troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in Western Ukraine. In addition, already during the operation itself, the 4th Ukrainian Front was formed for an offensive in the Carpathian direction.

The Red Army almost completely defeated Army Group “Northern Ukraine”: 32 enemy divisions (including the division of Ukrainian SS collaborators “Galicia”) lost 50-70% of their personnel, and 8 divisions were completely destroyed. Soviet troops completed the liberation of the entire territory of the Ukrainian SSR from the Nazis. The defeated enemy troops were thrown back beyond the San and Vistula rivers. In addition, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front crossed the Vistula River and created a powerful bridgehead in the area of ​​​​the city of Sandomierz. As a result, conditions were created for an offensive in the Silesian direction.

The operation was of strategic importance - the entire German front was split in two. Now the connection between the northern and southern parts of the Wehrmacht passed through Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which made it difficult for reserves to maneuver.

The situation before the operation.

As a result of successful offensive operations of the Soviet troops in the winter and spring of 1944, two huge protrusions were formed at the front: one north of Pripyat, it protruded towards the Soviet side, the so-called. The “Belarusian balcony”, the second one south of Pripyat, was facing the German side.

The “Belarusian balcony” was destroyed during the Belarusian offensive operation that began on June 23. Even before the completion of Operation Bagration, it was decided to complete the liberation of Ukrainian territory and begin military operations in South-Eastern Poland.

The southern salient was formed as part of the major Soviet successes during the Spring Offensive in Ukraine. Here the armies of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts wedged themselves deeply into the German defenses. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of I. S. Konev, after completing the offensive operations of the winter - spring of 1944, went on the defensive in the second half of April 1944. The front armies occupied a 440-kilometer sector on the line west of Lutsk, east of Brody, to the west are Tarnopol, Chertkov, Kolomyia, Krasnoilsk. German troops were pressed against the Carpathians. Soviet troops covered Army Group Center from the southern direction, divided the enemy front, separating Army Group Northern Ukraine from Army Group Southern Ukraine. This seriously complicated the interaction, maneuver and transfer of German reserves. This ledge created favorable conditions for the Red Army’s attack on Lviv and Bucharest.

Having suffered a crushing defeat in the spring of 1944 precisely in the southern strategic direction, the German command expected a Soviet offensive in the south. Considering the deep penetration of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Lvov direction, the German command was waiting for the main blow here. In the opinion of the German military-political leadership, to the north, in Belarus, only auxiliary offensive operations of the enemy could be expected. Therefore, by the beginning of summer, the bulk of the Wehrmacht's mobile armored formations were concentrated south of Pripyat. Here the Germans held 18 tank divisions out of the available 23 divisions on the Eastern Front. Directly in the defense sector of the 1st Ukrainian Front there were 10 enemy tank divisions.

The German command sought to hold Western Ukraine at all costs, in order to have a springboard for a possible counter-offensive and a cover area for South-Eastern Poland. The southeastern region of Poland had great economic (Silesian industrial region) and military-strategic importance.

Assessing the military-strategic situation that had developed by the summer of 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to conduct a series of successive offensive operations. The first blow was delivered in Belarus, the second in Ukraine. As a result, they planned to liberate the remaining part of the Byelorussian SSR, part of the Lithuanian SSR, Western Ukraine and South-Eastern Poland. To do this, it was necessary to defeat the main forces of the German Army Group Center and Northern Ukraine.

Commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front I. S. Konev by position

Operation plan.

In early June, Joseph Stalin invited Ivan Konev to present his ideas about a future offensive. The headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front did a lot of work planning the operation. Its goal was to dissect and destroy in parts the army group “Northern Ukraine”, liberate Western Ukraine and begin liberation from the occupiers of Poland.

The front command decided to launch two powerful strikes and break through the enemy’s defenses in two directions. The first strike was planned to be delivered from the Lutsk area along the Sokal - Rava-Russkaya - Yaroslav line. The second blow was delivered from the Tarnopol (Ternopil) area along the Lviv-Przemysl line. The offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in two directions made it possible to encircle and destroy the Lvov-Brod group, create a large gap in the German defense and capture the key enemy defense point - Lvov. Army Group “Northern Ukraine” was cut into two parts, one part was planned to be thrown back to the Polesie region, the other to the Carpathians. After this, the main forces of the front were supposed to reach the Vistula, having the opportunity to begin the liberation of Poland.

The shock group of the front in the Rava-Russian direction included: 3rd Guards Army, 13th Army, 1st Guards Tank Army, cavalry-mechanized group (1st Guards Cavalry Corps and 25th Tank Corps). From the air, the northern group of the 1st Ukrainian Front was supported by four aviation corps of the 2nd Air Army. The strike group (14 rifle divisions, two tank, mechanized, cavalry corps, and 2 artillery breakthrough divisions) was supposed to strike in a 12-kilometer breakthrough section.

The front's attack group in the Lvov (southern) direction included: the 60th and 38th armies, the 3rd Guards Tank Army, the 4th Tank Army, a cavalry mechanized group (6th Guards Cavalry Corps and 31st Tank Corps ). From the air, the actions of the northern strike group were supported by five air corps of the 2nd Air Army. The southern strike group (15 rifle divisions, 4 tank, 2 mechanized, cavalry corps and 2 breakthrough artillery divisions) struck on a 14-kilometer front.

An auxiliary attack in the Galich direction was carried out by troops of the 1st Guards Army. The guards were supposed to use the success of the neighboring 38th Army and break through the enemy's defenses, advancing on Galich and Stanislav. The 1st Guards Army was supposed to seize a bridgehead on the western bank of the Dniester in the area north of Galich. This blow ensured the advance of the southern group of the front from the left flank and pinned down the enemy’s reserves. To solve this problem, a strike force was formed consisting of five rifle divisions and the 4th Guards Tank Corps.

The 18th Army and the left wing of the 1st Guards Army were given the task of firmly holding their occupied lines and being ready to strike in the Stanislav direction. The 5th Guards Army remained in the front reserve. At the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, she was transferred from the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The 47th Rifle Corps (from the 1st Guards Army) was also transferred to the front reserve.

On July 7, the front presented the operation plan to Headquarters. After careful study, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin approved the operation plan. The idea of ​​delivering two main attacks in the Russian and Lvov directions raised some doubts. However, Konev was able to convince Headquarters that the decision was correct. The Supreme Command headquarters made some changes to the operation plan. Tank armies and KMG were not to be used to break through enemy defenses, but to develop the first success. Tank troops followed in the second echelon and were supposed to enter the battle after breaking through the enemy defenses. The cavalry-mechanized groups were supposed to launch an offensive on the second day of the operation, after the tank armies entered the battle. In addition, the Headquarters recommended giving feasible tasks to rifle formations on the first day of the operation, when the infantry was supposed to break into the German defenses. According to the SVGK, the level of tasks assigned to the rifle divisions was overestimated.

Soviet soldiers fight on the streets of Lvov

Strengths of the parties. Soviet Union.

The 1st Ukrainian Front included:

3rd Guards Army under the command of General Vasily Nikolaevich Gordov;
- 13th Army under the command of Nikolai Pavlovich Pukhov;
- 60th Army under the command of Pavel Alekseevich Kurochkin;
- 38th Army under the command of Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko;
- 1st Guards Army under the command of Andrei Antonovich Grechko;
- 5th Guards Army under the command of Alexei Semenovich Zhadov;
- 18th Army under the command of Evgeniy Petrovich Zhuravlev;
- 1st Guards Tank Army under the command of Mikhail Efimovich Katukov;
- 3rd Guards Tank Army of Pavel Semenovich Rybalko;
- 4th Tank Army of Dmitry Danilovich Lelyushenko.

The front also included two cavalry-mechanized groups (25th and 31st tank corps under the command of F.G. Anikushkin and V.E. Grigoriev, 1st and 6th Guards Cavalry Corps of V.K. Baranov, S.V. Sokolov), and the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps. From the air, the front was supported by the 2nd Air Army under the command of S.A. Krasovsky and the 8th Air Army by V.N. Zhdanov.

The offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front was supported by partisan detachments. Significant partisan formations were relocated to the western regions of Ukraine and further to the southeastern regions of Poland. Before the start of the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front, they dealt strong blows to German communications on the Lviv-Warsaw and Rava-Russkaya-Yaroslav lines. They destroyed several large enemy garrisons and paralyzed traffic on the roads. The German command was forced to throw three divisions against the partisans, which facilitated the advance of the Red Army.

In addition, during the operation to liberate Lvov, the Polish Home Army (about 7 thousand bayonets) raised an uprising. The Polish command planned to occupy Lviv and form a Polish administration, which would represent the Polish government before the command of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the Soviet government.

Already during the operation (July 30), the 4th Ukrainian Front was created. It was headed by I.E. Petrov. The 18th Army and the 1st Guards Army were included in the front from the 1st Ukrainian Front. The 4th Ukrainian Front received the task of attacking in the Carpathian direction.

The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front consisted of 84 divisions (74 rifle, 6 cavalry and 4 artillery divisions), 10 tank and mechanized corps (7 tank and 3 mechanized corps), 4 separate tank brigades, 18 separate tank and 24 self-propelled gun regiments. In total, the front consisted of 843 thousand people (together with the rear, about 1.2 million people), more than 16 thousand guns and mortars over 76 mm (according to other sources, about 14 thousand), 2.2 thousand tanks and Self-propelled guns (according to other sources, 1.6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns), about 2.8 thousand combat aircraft (according to other sources, 3,250 aircraft).

Soviet artillerymen cross the Dnieper in the Lvov direction under the cover of a smoke screen

Germany.

The Red Army was opposed by Army Group “Northern Ukraine”. It consisted of 41 divisions (34 infantry, 5 tank, 1 motorized) and two infantry brigades. The German group consisted of more than 600 thousand soldiers and officers (with more than 900 thousand people in the rear), 900 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, 6.3 thousand guns and mortars, about 700 aircraft.

The army group was led by Joseph Harpe (Harpe). The army group consisted of the German 4th Panzer Army under Walter Nehring, Erhard Routh's 1st Panzer Army and the Hungarian 1st Army. Already during the battle, the Army Group “Northern Ukraine” included the 17th Army (the newly formed army, the 17th Army was destroyed in May 1944 in the Crimea and restored in Galicia and Southern Poland), the 24th Tank Corps, and also a number of infantry divisions from other directions, 2 tank divisions, a division of SS troops "Galicia" from Ukrainian traitors and several other individual units. From the air, the army group was supported by the 4th Air Fleet.

The Germans, in anticipation of the Red Army's offensive, launched active engineering work and prepared a powerful defense. It was especially deeply echeloned in the Lviv direction. Three defense lines up to 40-50 km deep were prepared here. The first line of defense was 5-6 km deep. The second defense line was located 10-15 kilometers from the front edge. The third line of defense ran along the banks of the Western Bug and Rotten Lipa rivers. A number of cities, including Lviv, were turned into strong strongholds and prepared for all-round defense.

German military builders took advantage of the rugged nature of the terrain, forests, swamps and large rivers. The Western Bug, Dniester, San and Vistula were serious natural obstacles, reinforced by engineering structures. In general, the terrain in the offensive zone of the Soviet troops was varied. In the northern direction there is a plain replete with swamps; in the Lviv direction, in the center - hills, ravines with steep slopes and rivers; the southern direction is mountainous.

The German command had serious operational reserves. Two tank and infantry divisions were stationed southwest of Kovel, two tank and infantry divisions near Lvov, two tank and two infantry divisions near Stanislav (they were transferred to the north). Well-developed communications allowed the enemy to quickly maneuver their reserves.

Soviet officers inspect the German Marder III medium anti-tank self-propelled gun, which was knocked out on the outskirts of Lvov.

German medium tank Pz.Kpwf. IV Ausf. J, destroyed in Western Ukraine

Regrouping of troops.

On the eve of the operation, a significant regrouping of forces was carried out, since the main forces of the front by this time were located on the left flank. The 1st and 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies needed to be transferred, and the 38th Army had to be brought up. It should be noted that the Germans knew about the concentration of Soviet troops in the Stanislav and Lviv directions (the left flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front). In the Lvov direction there was the most powerful and dense German defense. However, the attack on the Rava-Russian direction largely came as a surprise to the enemy. Here the German group was less strong. And the terrain was more convenient and accessible for the use of mobile armored formations.

In order to hide the preparation of the operation from the enemy, the Soviet command simulated the concentration of two tank armies and a tank corps on the left wing of the front. To do this, they used false transportation of armored vehicles by rail, simulating the unloading of tank units and their march to concentration areas before the offensive. There were active radio communications in these areas. To deceive the Germans, they built many models of tanks, vehicles, guns and other weapons and equipment.

The actual transfer of troops was carried out at night, with all possible precautions and camouflage measures. It was not possible to completely deceive the enemy, but the transfer of forces of the 1st Guards Tank Army to the area south of Lutsk and the 4th Tank Army to the Zbarazh area was kept secret.

Of the available 84 divisions, only 28 divisions were intended for defense and operations in auxiliary areas. The rest were located on the main directions. As a result, in breakthrough areas, one Soviet division accounted for 1.1 km. And without taking into account operational reserves. The Germans had one division defending a section of the front 10-15 km away.

Up to 90% of the available tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated in the directions of the main attacks. 349 tanks and self-propelled guns were allocated for direct support of rifle units. The combined arms armies that operated in the main directions had 14 armored vehicles per 1 km of the breakthrough area. Already during the offensive, it became clear that the infantry did not have enough direct support tanks. The situation was especially difficult in the Lvov direction, where the enemy had the most powerful defense. To support the rifle divisions, it was necessary to send part of the forces of the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank armies.

As a result of the enhanced regrouping of forces, the Soviet command managed to create a huge superiority over the German troops in the breakthrough areas: in men by almost 5 times (along the entire front the ratio was 1.2: 1 in favor of the Red Army), in guns and mortars - by 6- 7 times (along the entire front 2.6: 1), in tanks and self-propelled guns - 3-4 times (along the entire front 2.3: 1).

Such a concentration of forces and means was necessary to break through the enemy’s strong defenses. The Soviet command took into account that the German defense was well developed, deeply echeloned, had a developed fire system, anti-tank defense and serious operational reserves. On other sectors of the front the balance of forces was approximately equal. In some areas of the defense of the 18th Army, which had a long line of responsibility, German troops even had an advantage in strength.

Soviet artillery played a major role in breaking through the German defenses. The front, in addition to divisional and regimental artillery, included 4 breakthrough artillery divisions, 9 anti-aircraft divisions, 9 artillery-cannon brigades, a howitzer artillery brigade, a mortar brigade, 4 guards mortar brigades, 6 anti-tank fighter brigades, 4 howitzer brigades, 36 anti-tank fighter brigades, 19 mortar, 14 guards mortar and 17 anti-aircraft regiments. Up to two-thirds of this firepower was concentrated on the main directions of the offensive. In breakthrough areas, the density of guns and mortars reached 255 units per 1 km. Regimental, divisional, corps and army artillery groups were formed in the shock groups of the front. Particularly strong artillery groups were created in the Lvov direction. This impressive firepower was supposed to ensure a breakthrough of the enemy's defenses. In total, they planned to spend 1 hour 40 minutes on technical training.

Destruction of the German group in the Brody area. Liberation of Lvov.

Offensive. Breakthrough of the German defense and encirclement of the enemy Brod group.

From the evening of July 12, 1944 forward battalions carried out reconnaissance in force. Intelligence established that in the Rava-Russian direction, the German command on the night of July 13, under the cover of rearguards, began to withdraw the main forces to the second line of defense. The command of the 1st Ukrainian Front decided to use the moment and, without conducting strong artillery preparation, go on the offensive with the main forces of the 3rd Guards and 13th armies. The offensive was supported by aviation.

The offensive of the Soviet troops developed successfully. However, the German troops offered fierce resistance, and it was not possible to crush the enemy during the retreat and break into the second line of defense on his shoulders. The German troops retreated to the second line of defense and put up fierce, well-organized resistance. Particularly stubborn fighting took place in the area of ​​​​the city of Gorokhov, which was turned by the Germans into a strong center of resistance. The German garrison repeatedly launched counterattacks. Only after the city was bypassed from both north and south did Soviet troops take Gorokhov. During the day, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced 8-15 kilometers.

In order to break through the enemy’s defenses in the second lane, it was necessary to bring up artillery and conduct artillery preparation. The second echelon of rifle corps was also brought into battle. The German command transferred reserves to the battle area - the 16th and 17th tank divisions. The Germans launched strong counterattacks. However, during stubborn battles, by the end of July 15, the entire tactical zone of German defense had been breached to a depth of 15 to 30 km. On the same day, a cavalry-mechanized group under the command of General V.K. was introduced to break into the operational depth. Baranova (KMG). On the morning of July 17, the Soviet command brought the 1st Guards Tank Army into battle under the command of Katukov. Successfully developing an offensive in the south- westward, towards Lvov, Soviet troops took settlements Kamenka-Strumilovskaya and Derevlyany.

On the same day, troops of the northern strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front crossed the Western Bug and entered Polish territory. On July 18, units of the 3rd Guards and 13th armies, using the success of the tank army and KMG, advanced 20-30 km. Thus, as a result of the offensive on July 13-18, the troops of the Rava-Russian strike group broke through the enemy’s defenses. The enemy's Lvov-Brod grouping was covered from the north and northwest.

In the Lviv direction, the offensive of the Soviet armies developed worse. July 13 advanced battalions of Lviv (southern) strike force front carried out reconnaissance in force. Intelligence established that the Germans continued to occupy positions with the main forces. Therefore, artillery preparation was carried out in in full- it lasted 1 hour 30 minutes. At the same time, aviation launched powerful bombing attacks on enemy positions and their rear areas. On July 14, the main forces of the 60th and 38th armies went on the offensive.

However, during a day of heavy fighting, Soviet troops were only able to advance 3-8 kilometers. In the Lviv direction, the Germans had a very strong defense, which relied on natural boundaries and a well-developed system engineering structures. The German command tried with all its might to contain the Soviet offensive. By the end of the first day of fighting and on the morning of July 15, all German tactical reserves were thrown into battle.

In the Koltov-Zboriv sector, operational reserves were thrown into battle - the German 1st and 8th Panzer Divisions, the 14th SS Volunteer Grenadier Division "Galicia" ("Galicia"). German troops tried to cut off the striking wedge of the 1st Ukrainian Front. SS Division "Galicia" with units of the 13th army corps attacked from the north, and the German 1st and 8th Panzer Divisions of the 1st Panzer Army attacked from the south. Particularly fierce battles took place in the offensive zone of the 38th Army, which was attacked by German tank divisions.

In some areas, German troops managed to push back units of the 38th Army by 2-4 km. To rectify the situation, the Soviet command ordered massive bombing and assault strikes against the German tank group. In addition, artillery groups began to concentrate in areas of the German counteroffensive.

As during Operation Bagration (Belarusian offensive operation) strikes Soviet aviation played a positive role. In the afternoon of July 15 alone, bombers and attack aircraft of the 2nd Air Army made about 2 thousand sorties. Soviet aviation and artillery strikes disorganized the German tank divisions. German troops suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment, and the strike capabilities of the tank divisions were sharply reduced by the end of the day. The German counterattack was successfully repelled.

On July 15, units of the 3rd Guards Tank Army under the command of Rybalko began moving to the forward positions. On the morning of July 16, the tank army was led into battle. By this time, units of the 60th Army had formed a narrow breakthrough corridor 4-6 km wide and up to 18 km deep. The decision was quite risky, the army was led into a narrow corridor, and it moved along one route in a continuous continuous column. However, the decision turned out to be correct. By the end of the day, the advanced detachments of Rybalko’s army reached the area northeast of Zolochev. It became possible to reach the enemy's Brod group from the south.

The German command, realizing the danger of the situation, began to concentrate large forces of infantry and tanks in order to eliminate the resulting breakthrough. On the morning of July 17, German troops launched a series of strong counterattacks in order to intercept communications and cut off the advanced units of the advancing Soviet group. In this tense situation on the front, Konev decided to bring the 4th Tank Army of General D. D. Lelyushenko into battle.

Lelyushenko’s army received the task of eliminating the threat from counterattacking enemy forces, expanding the resulting corridor and ensuring the advancement of mobile formations into the operational depth. The 4th Tank Army was supposed to enter the breakthrough from behind the left flank of the 3rd Guards Tank Army and quickly develop an offensive in the direction of Gorodok (30 kilometers west of Lvov). At the same time, Lelyushenko received the task not to get involved in a frontal battle for Lviv, but to bypass the powerful fortified area from the south. It was necessary to intercept enemy communications in the southern and southwestern directions.

It must be said that the introduction of two tank armies at once into a narrow breakthrough corridor while simultaneously repelling enemy counterattacks was unique in the history of the Great Patriotic War. The breakthrough of tank armies into operational space opened up wide opportunities for maneuver of troops, ensured high rates of attack and major successes. In addition, the front command brought into battle the 4th Guards Tank Corps under the command of General P. P. Poluboyarov and the 31st Tank Corps under the command of General V. E. Grigoriev (from the cavalry-mechanized group of the Lviv front strike group).

As a result of the offensive that began from July 13 to 18, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front broke through the enemy’s defenses on a front of 200 km and went deeper by 50-80 km. Soviet troops crossed the Western Bug and began liberation Polish territory. At the same time, the Brod group of the enemy was surrounded. On July 18, Baranov's cavalry-mechanized group of the front's northern shock group moved south of Kamenka-Strumilovskaya, and the 3rd Guards Tank Army of the front's southern group moved to the Derevlyany area. As a result, 8 German divisions (including the SS Galicia division) were surrounded. The Germans occupied a fairly large area.

Soviet infantry, supported by T-34 tanks, is fighting for one of the settlements in the Lviv direction

Elimination of the enemy's Brod group. Development of the offensive and liberation of Lvov.

The German command no longer had reserves that could stop or delay the advance of the Red Army or release the encircled troops. All nearby operational German reserves had been used and there were no other reserves nearby. Therefore, the surrounded divisions should not have hoped for outside help. In addition, the troops of the 1st and 3rd Guards Tank Armies and the cavalry mechanized group of General V.K. Baranov had already gone deep into the German rear. The remaining German troops were pinned down by the battle, and the German command was unable to maneuver its forces. All that remained was to try to escape from the “cauldron” on our own. German troops showed particular activity in the offensive sector of the 60th Army.

With continuous air strikes, artillery fire, and infantry attacks supported by tanks, the encircled enemy troops were disorganized and lost control. First, individual soldiers and detachments began to surrender, and then entire units. The German group was fragmented and destroyed by the end of July 22. More than 30 thousand Nazis were killed, 17 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were captured. Among the prisoners was the commander of the 13th Army Corps, General Gauffe, with his headquarters, and two division generals.

The defeat of the encircled enemy group was of great operational importance. Now the troops of the southern (Lvov) strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front could use all their forces to attack the Lvov fortified area.

German self-propelled gun "Hummel", destroyed by Soviet artillery near the city of Lvov in July 1944

Simultaneously with the liquidation of the Brodsky German group, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front continued their offensive. The offensive developed especially successfully in the offensive zone of the Rava-Russian strike group of the front. On July 19, the right wing of the front broke enemy resistance at the line of the Western Bug River. This improved the offensive capabilities of the center and left wing of the front. On July 20, the front command ordered the 1st Guards Tank Army under the command of Katukov to turn southwest, to Yaroslav and Przemysl, in order to reach the San River, cross it and thereby intercept the escape routes of the enemy Lvov group to the west. By the end of July 23, Soviet troops reached the San River, crossed the water barrier and captured a number of bridgeheads on the western bank.

In addition, part of the forces of the 13th Army from the Rava-Russian group of the front developed an attack on Lvov. The entry of one rifle corps of the 13th armies to the approaches to Lvov created an advantageous situation for final defeat Lvov group of the Wehrmacht.

The front command carried out another regrouping of troops. Due to the turn of the troops of the 1st Guards Tank Army to the southwest and some delay in the advance of the 13th Army, which could not advance at the pace of mobile formations, the cavalry mechanized group S.V. Sokolova from the Lvov shock group of the front (consisting of the 31st Tank Corps under the command of General V.E. Grigoriev and the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps under the command of General S.V. Sokolov) received the task of concentrating in the Rava-Russky area and striking in the direction to Frampol, with the aim of defeating enemy rear lines and facilitating the offensive rifle formations. With access to the Krasnik, Vilkolaz area, KMG Sokolova was supposed to interact with the formations of the 1st Belorussian Front, and then continue the offensive and seize a bridgehead on the Vistula.

Part of the transfer of KMG Sokolov to the northern direction was due to the fact that the cavalry-mechanized group of General V.K. Baranov, instead of a rapid breakthrough into the German rear, got involved in heavy fighting in the Zhovkva region. On July 20 and 21, the front command was forced to instruct General Baranov to bypass Zholkva and advance on Nemirov, Yaroslav, reach San and force it.

Commander of the 4th Guards Tank Corps, Lieutenant General Pavel Pavlovich Poluboyarov (1901-1984)

Liberation of Lvov. The ancient city was one of the important strategic objects of German defense on the Eastern Front and major center communications. Therefore, Lvov and its surroundings were turned by the Germans into a powerful fortified area. The terrain to the east and northeast of the city was favorable for defense. The Germans turned the nearby villages into strongholds with a developed system of engineering structures and barriers. Despite the defeat of the group in the Brod area, the Germans continued to resist stubbornly.

However, the weakness of the defense of Lvov was that the German command was already using the existing operational reserves in this direction. There were no fresh divisions that could strengthen the city's defenses. The enemy command could only use retreating troops and divisions transferred from the Stanislav direction.

By the end of July 18, the divisions of the 3rd Guards Tank and 13th armies were 20-30 km from Lvov. The 4th Tank Army reached the Olshanitsa area, 40 km from Lvov. In this situation of the front, Konev gave the commanders of the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank armies the order for outflanking maneuvers from the north, north-west and south on July 20 to capture Lvov.

However, on July 20 it was not possible to take Lviv. This was explained by objective and subjective reasons. The day before there had been heavy rains, and the tank armies were bogged down. The rear units also lagged far behind; tank formations were unable to receive fuel and ammunition on time. The artillery needed to break into German defenses and suppress enemy firing points also lagged behind. Command mistakes also played a role. The command of the 3rd Guards Tank Army made a mistake when studying the area in front of Lvov. Rybalko, wanting to take the city as quickly as possible, sent troops not bypassing the north of Lvov, but straight along the Krasnoe - Lvov road. The troops of the tank army ran into a significant peat bog and were forced to fight protracted battles on the outskirts of the city, trying to capture the passages to Lvov where the enemy had the strongest positions. As a result, the possibility of a rapid outflanking maneuver was not used, and the tank army began to conduct frontal battles on terrain inconvenient for armored vehicles.

The 4th Tank Army was also unable to complete its task. A significant part of the army was bogged down in battles with the enemy’s encircled Brodsk group. Another part of the tank army started fighting on the southwestern approaches to Lvov, but there was not enough strength to break the enemy’s resistance. This delay allowed the German command to strengthen the defense of Lvov. Three divisions were transferred from the Stanislav area to defend the city.

Thus, it became clear that Lvov could no longer be taken by tank armies alone. At the same time, the entry of tank armies to the approaches to Lvov seriously improved the position of the 1st Ukrainian Front on the left flank. The German command, fearing a turn of Soviet tank formations to the south and the formation of a second huge “cauldron” in the Stanislav area, began to withdraw the divisions of the 24th Tank and 59th Army Corps to the west. The troops of the left wing of the 38th and 1st Guards Armies, knocking down the enemy rearguards, began pursuit. At the same time, the commander of the 4th Tank Army, Lelyushenko, received instructions from part of the army’s forces to strike in the direction of Sambir in order to prevent the enemy’s Stanislav group from leaving across the San River.

At the same time, the issue of defeating the Lviv group and liberating Lvov was being resolved. Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army was supposed to solve the problem of bypassing the city from the north-west and west, Lelyushenko's 4th Tank Army - from the south. The 60th Army was supposed to strike from the east. The 38th Army was supposed to advance from Peremyshlyany to the southern outskirts of Lvov. A representative of the front command was sent to Rybalko and conveyed Konev’s order to set up a barrier against the enemy’s Lvov group and with the main forces to bypass the city. The tank army was supposed to reach the area of ​​Yavorov, Mostiska, Sudovaya Vishnya. It was planned to force the enemy Lvov group, under the threat of encirclement from the northwestern direction, to leave the Lvov area.

By the end of July 22, the main forces of Lelyushenko’s 4th Tank Army were fighting on southern outskirts Lvov, and its 10th Guards Tank made its way into the city itself. Moreover, the fighting was so stubborn that the Germans cut off the advanced corps from the main forces of the army, and it fought in a temporary environment. At this time, the 6th Guards Tank Corps of Rybalko’s army reached the Yavorov area, and the troops of the 60th Army rushed to the eastern outskirts of Lvov. On July 23, in connection with the advance of Soviet troops to Lviv, Polish partisans, the Home Army, rebelled. They captured the suburbs of Goloska, Pogulyanka, and blocks on several streets.

The German command, under the threat of encirclement of troops in the Lviv region, began to withdraw troops towards Sambir, to the southwest. At the same time, strong rearguards were formed, which continued to hold positions and cover the withdrawal of the rear units.

On July 24, the Soviet command, trying to cut off the enemy’s escape routes to Przemyshl and Sambir, turned two mobile front formations to the south. General Baranov's KMG received the task of going west of Przemysl, in the Krosno region, to seize crossings across the San River in the Dubetzko, Dynuv and Sanok sector. Strong detachments with tanks and artillery were to take up defensive positions facing the east, preventing German troops from crossing the San. In the western direction, KMG was supposed to occupy Jaslo with part of its forces in order to provide itself from this direction. The 1st Guards Tank Army received the task, after crossing the San River at Yaroslav, to strike south, towards Przemysl. The tank army was supposed to occupy the Dubetsky-Przemysl sector, with a front to the east and southeast, and establish contact with KMG Baranov. In the western direction, the 1st Guards Tank Army was supposed to occupy Przeworsk and Kanchuga.

On July 24-27 there were battles for Lviv. The German rearguards, relying on well-prepared fortifications and favorable terrain for defense, continued to hold back the advance of the Soviet troops. On July 26, units of the 60th Army took a number of enemy strongholds and broke through to eastern outskirts cities. Units of the 4th Guards Tank Corps of General P.P. Poluboyarov, advancing along the Miklashuv-Lvov highway, by the end of the day connected with the 10th Guards Tank Corps of the 4th Tank Army. It should be noted that Soviet troops sought to preserve the ancient city from brutal destruction, this somewhat restrained their offensive impulse.

Rybalko's army continued its offensive from the west and reached Gorodok. However, here the Germans organized a strong resistance center and the advance of the 3rd Guards Tank Army stalled. The tank units had to be reinforced with riflemen from the 13th Army in order to break the enemy’s defenses. At the same time, one tank corps of Rybalko’s army developed an offensive against Przemysl.

On the morning of July 27, Lvov was liberated from the Nazis. The remnants of the German garrison fled to the southwest. During the battle for the city, Soviet soldiers showed exceptional heroism. Thus, the crew of the T-34-76 “Guard” tank under the command of Lieutenant A.V. Dodonov, who was part of the 63rd Chelyabinsk Guards Volunteer Tank Brigade of the 10th Guards Ural Volunteer Tank Corps, performed an immortal feat. On July 23, the tank crew received an order to break through to the city center and hoist a red flag at the Lviv City Hall. Sergeant Major Alexander Porfiryevich Marchenko showed the way to the guard. He knew the city well.

A Soviet tank with troops on board broke through central square Lvov to the very entrance of the town hall. Marchenko and a group of fighters, using machine gun fire and grenades, suppressed the guards of the town hall and broke into the building. A red flag was raised over the town hall. However, the Germans quickly came to their senses and launched a counterattack. Marchenko was seriously wounded. While trying to evacuate, he was wounded a second time, and this wound became fatal. After the death of a comrade in arms, the tank crew and paratroopers fought for several more days surrounded by troops until their own troops arrived. They destroyed 8 enemy tanks (according to other sources - 5 tanks and self-propelled guns), 6 guns and about 100 enemy soldiers. The tank commander, Lieutenant A.V. Dodonov, died a heroic death. The seriously wounded mechanic-driver foreman F.P. Surkov and turret gunner I.I. Melnichenko were able to get out of the damaged tank. They were picked up local residents, and handed them over to the intelligence officers, who took Surkov and Melnichenko to the hospital.

On the same day, units of the 3rd and 1st Guards Tank Armies took the ancient fortress of Przemysl in a night assault. By the end of July 27, the troops of the 3rd Guards Army of General Gordov and the KMG of General Sokolov reached the line of Vilkolaz, Krasnik and Nisko. The 13th Army, the 1st and 3rd Guards Tank Armies and General Baranov's KMG fought along the line of Nisko, Sokolow, Przeworsk, Dynow, west of Dombromil. The San River was crossed on a wide front, and bridgeheads were captured. Troops of the 4th Tank, 60th, 38th armies pursued the enemy in the Carpathian direction.

The crew of the T-34-76 “Guard” tank (from left to right): tank commander A. V. Dodonov, gunner-radio operator A. P. Marchenko, loader N. I. Melnichenko, battalion commander P. V. Chirkov, driver mechanic F. P. Surkov

Monument at the grave of Alexander Marchenko on the Hill of Glory in Lviv

Results of the first stage of the operation.

Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front broke through the enemy's defenses, surrounded and destroyed the enemy's Brod grouping (8 divisions). On July 24, Soviet troops occupied Galich, and on July 27 they liberated Stanislav, Lvov and Przemysl. On the right flank of the front, Soviet troops liberated Rava-Russkaya, Vladimir-Volynsk, and began the liberation of Poland.

As a result, Army Group Northern Ukraine suffered a heavy defeat. The German army group was cut into two parts. A gap of 100 km opened between the German 4th and 1st Panzer armies. The divisions of the 4th Tank Army rolled back to the Vistula, trying to stop the advance of the Soviet troops. Formations of the 1st German Tank Army and the 1st Hungarian Army (about 20 infantry and 3 tank divisions) retreated to the Carpathians, since the escape routes to the west, through Przemysl, were cut off.

The German command, in order to eliminate the huge hole in the defense, was forced to urgently transfer troops from other sectors of the front and from Germany. In particular, they transferred the command of the 17th Army, the 23rd and 24th tank divisions from Army Group Southern Ukraine, the command of the 24th Tank Corps, two infantry divisions, etc. The Germans hoped to create a stable front on the Vistula .

A group of German prisoners. July 1944, near Lvov

Battle of the Vistula.

The development of the offensive of the Soviet troops.

After Sokolov’s cavalry-mechanized group entered the Krasnik area and the advancement of Gordov’s 3rd Guards Army to the same area, a favorable situation arose for the rapid advance of the troops of the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the Vistula and to the Sandomierz area.

The liberation of Lvov and Przemysl on July 27 created conditions for the troops of the left wing of the front to reach Drohobych and pursue the German 1st Tank Army and the 1st Hungarian Army in the Carpathian direction.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, taking into account the changes in the situation, by directives dated July 27, indicated that the main efforts of the 1st Ukrainian Front must be concentrated on the right flank to capture and hold a bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula River.

Soviet tanks in Lviv

Left flank. On July 27, the front command instructed the commander of the 1st Guards Army to advance with the main forces in the direction of Khodarov - Drohobych and reach the Turka - Skole line. In order to defeat the retreating Stanislav enemy group, the 4th Tank Army was tasked with a forced march to reach the Sambir area by the morning of July 28. Then capture Drohobych and Borislav in order to, in cooperation with the 1st Guards Army, defeat the German group and prevent it from retreating to the northwest, across the San River. However, due to the serious resistance of German troops on the Dniester and in the Drohobych area, the 4th Tank Army was unable to fully accomplish the task.

The German command organized a defense on the Dniester and carried out a series of counterattacks to contain the advance of Soviet troops and withdraw parts of the Lvov and Stanislav groups to the north-west. The Germans tried to withdraw the troops along the most convenient and advantageous route for them through Drohobych, Sambir and Sanok. The German troops, despite the defeats and retreat, fought stubbornly.

At the same time, the 1st Guards Army of General A.A. Grechko and the 18th Army of General E.P. Zhuravlev continued to pursue the enemy. On July 27, Stanislav was liberated from the Nazis. However, on July 28-30, enemy resistance increased. The German command, trying to stop the advance of the Soviet troops, organized a series of serious counterattacks against the troops of the left flank of the front. Thus, the troops of the 1st Guards Army fought fierce battles in the area of ​​​​the city of Kalash. On July 28, the Germans launched a series of counterattacks with up to two infantry regiments supported by 40 tanks. The Germans even achieved local success. They pushed back the troops of the 30th Rifle Corps and recaptured Kalash. However, on July 29, formations of the 1st Guards Army drove back the enemy and occupied the city. On July 30, Grechko's army occupied railway station Valley, intercepting the highway leading through the Carpathians to the Hungarian Plain.

From July 31 to August 4, there were fierce battles in the Dolina and Vygoda area. The German command organized a counterattack with five divisions, including the 8th German Panzer and 2nd Hungarian Panzer Divisions. German troops tried to regain control of the road that led across the Valley to the Hungarian Plain. However, after four days of fierce fighting, the German group was defeated and began to retreat to the west and southwest. On August 5, the 1st Guards Army captured the important communications hub of the city of Stryi.

At the end of July, when the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front were fighting in two divergent operational directions - Sandomierz-Breslav and Carpathian, it became obvious that it was necessary to create a separate department that would solve the problem of overcoming the Carpathians. Comfront Konev proposed Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin to create independent control for a group of troops advancing in the Carpathian direction. On August 4, General I.E. Petrov arrived. On August 5, by directive from the Headquarters, the 1st Guards and 18th armies became part of the 4th Ukrainian Front, which was supposed to operate in the Carpathian direction. On August 6, front troops took Drohobych.

From August 1 to August 19, the German-Hungarian command brought seven infantry divisions into battle in the Carpathian direction, strengthening the defense of the 1st Hungarian Army. The enemy's defensive line passed along serious natural boundaries. Therefore, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, which did not have serious mobile formations and were weakened in previous battles, advanced slowly.

In the center of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the troops of the 60th and 38th armies also did not achieve significant success. The armies were weakened in previous battles, and part of their forces and equipment were transferred to the right wing of the front, which fought heavy battles in the Sandomierz direction. Troops of the 60th Army occupied Dębica on August 23. The 38th Army reached the Krosno-Sanok line.

A salvo of Guards BM-13 Katyusha rocket launchers. Carpathian region, Western Ukraine

Fighting in the Sandomierz direction.

After the creation of the 4th Ukrainian Front, the 1st Ukrainian Front could concentrate its efforts on one operational direction, advancing on Sandomierz and begin the mission of liberating Poland. On July 28, the front command ordered the 3rd Guards Army to reach the Vistula, cross the river and occupy Sandomierz. Sokolov’s KMG was also supposed to advance in the offensive zone of the 3rd Guards Army.

By the morning of July 29, the 13th Army was supposed to reach the Vistula with its right wing from Sandomierz to the mouth of the Vistula and seize bridgeheads on the other bank. The left wing of the army received the task of taking the city of Rzeszow. The 1st Guards Tank Army received the task on the morning of July 29 to strike the Maidan-Baranów line, cross the Vistula on the move and seize a bridgehead on the right bank.

On July 29, the 3rd Guards Tank Army received instructions to advance with the main forces north of Rzeszow, Zhochow, Mielec, and in cooperation with the 13th Army and the 1st Guards Tank Army, to cross the Vistula in the Baranów sector, the mouth of the Wisłoka River and by the end of August 2 seize a bridgehead in the Staszow area.

Thus, the main forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front were sent to capture and expand the bridgehead in the Sandomierz area: three combined arms, two tank armies and a cavalry-mechanized group. They planned to transfer the main reserve of the front, the 5th Guards Army of General A.S., to the Sandomierz direction. Zhadova. The remaining troops of the front were to continue the offensive in the western and southwestern directions.

Gordov's 3rd Guards Army and Sokolov's KMG defeated enemy troops in the Annopol area and reached the Vistula. The advanced units were able to cross the Vistula and captured three small bridgeheads in the Annopol area. However, due to bad organization The transfer of troops and equipment was slow. Besides engineering troops suffered heavy losses, four ferry parks were lost. As a result, the Soviet troops failed to expand the bridgeheads. Moreover, the Germans quickly came to their senses and were able to push back the troops of the 3rd Guards Army to the eastern bank of the river.

The 1st Guards Tank and 13th armies acted more skillfully. The armies reached the Vistula on a wide front and began to cross the river with the help of military and improvised watercraft. Army and front-line parks were quickly withdrawn from the river, which accelerated the transfer of armored vehicles and artillery. On July 30, the 350th Infantry Division under the command of General G.I. Wekhina and the vanguard of the tank army crossed the river north of Baranów. By August 4, 4 rifle divisions had already been transferred to the western bank of the river. To speed up the process of crossing the water barrier, they decided to build a bridge. Polish patriot Jan Slawinski pointed out the place where, even before the war, Polish engineers planned to build a bridge. On August 5, the bridge began operating.

On August 1, the main forces of Katukov’s army began crossing. By the end of August 4, all formations of the 1st Guards Tank Army crossed to the right bank of the Vistula. During the crossing of the Vistula, as before in the battles for the Dniester, the 20th Guards Mechanized Brigade under the command of Colonel Amazasp Babajanyan especially distinguished itself. For his skillful leadership and courage, Babajanyan was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. On August 25, 1944, Babajanyan was appointed commander of the 11th Guards Tank Corps.

After this, formations of the 3rd Guards Tank Army began to cross the Vistula. But the crossing of the tank army was delayed, and it was unable to implement the tasks set at the beginning of the offensive. The army received an order from the front command to speed up the movement and expand the bridgehead. The 3rd Guards Tank Army crossed the river. Vistula south of Baranów and, expanding the bridgehead, advanced 20-25 kilometers on August 3. Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army made its way to the Staszow and Potsanow area.

The German command, wanting to stop the advance of the Soviet troops, prevent the expansion of the captured bridgehead, and trying to destroy the troops that had already made their way to the western bank of the Vistula, organized strong counterattacks from the front and flanks. Already on July 31, the troops of the 17th German Army tried to launch a counterattack in the direction of the Maidan in order to cut off the advanced Soviet detachments from the main forces. However, this offensive ended unsuccessfully. On August 2-3, German troops with up to one infantry division, supported by 40-50 tanks, launched a counterattack from the Mielec area in the direction of Baranów along the eastern bank of the Vistula. German troops tried to reach the rear of the 1st and 3rd Guards Tank and 13th armies and encircle the Soviet troops that had crossed to the western bank of the Vistula.

After repeated counterattacks, German troops were able to achieve some successes and reached the southern approaches to Baranów. However, as a result of fierce fighting, the troops of the 121st Guards rifle division The 13th armies, two brigades of the 3rd Guards Tank Army (69th and 70th mechanized brigades) and the 1st Guards Artillery Division pushed back the enemy. A particularly important role in repelling the counter-offensive of German troops was played by Soviet artillerymen, who in a number of areas had to place their guns on direct fire in order to repel the advance of enemy infantry.

However, it was obvious to the Soviet command that the Germans would continue counterattacks, trying at all costs to eliminate the Sandomierz bridgehead. The German command continued to transfer new divisions to the area north of Sandomierz and to the Mielec area. In the Mielec area, reconnaissance discovered units of the 17th Army, 23rd and 24th Tank Divisions (they arrived from Army Group Southern Ukraine), the 545th Infantry Division and two infantry brigades, which were transferred from Germany. Troops were also transferred to the Sandomierz area, where a fresh division and other units appeared. At the same time, the transfer of German troops to these areas continued in the future.

It must be taken into account that the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front fought hundreds of kilometers. Rifle and tank units needed to be replenished with manpower and equipment. Therefore, the command brought the front reserve into battle - Zhadov's 5th Guards Army. A fresh army was brought into the battle at the most critical moment. At this time, Soviet troops had to fight hard battles to retain and expand the Sandomierz bridgehead and repel enemy counterattacks.

With the introduction of a fresh army, the situation in the Sandmir direction changed in favor of the 1st Ukrainian Front. On August 4, the army dealt a powerful blow to the enemy’s Melets group. The German troops were crushed and driven back. 33rd Guards Rifle Corps under General N.F. Lebedenko liberated Mielec from the Nazis. Soviet troops crossed the Wisłoka River. Another part of Zhadov’s army crossed the Vistula in the Baranów area and reached the Szydłów-Stopnica line, forming the left wing of the bridgehead. The breakthrough of two rifle corps of the 5th Guards Army beyond the Vistula secured the left flank Sandomierz group 1st Ukrainian Front. By August 10, Soviet troops expanded the bridgehead to 60 kilometers along the front and to 50 kilometers in depth.

The German command continued to pull up and introduce fresh units into battle. Hard fights continued with the same intensity. On August 11, German troops launched a new counterattack from the Stopnica area in the direction of Staszow, Osiek. A German group of 4 tanks (1st, 3rd, 16th and 24th divisions) and one motorized division was able to advance 8-10 km by August 13th. However, the German troops failed to develop their first success. The 5th Guards Army, supported by formations of the 3rd Guards Tank and 13th Armies, withstood the enemy attack. In stubborn six-day battles, the German group lost its striking power and stopped its offensive.

I must say that big role Soviet artillery played a role in repelling German counterattacks. By August 9, 800 guns and mortars had been transferred to the bridgehead just to strengthen the anti-tank defense of the 5th Guards Army. The guns and mortars were mainly taken from the 60th and 38th armies. In addition, in the period from August 11 to 15, the 4th Tank Army of D. D. Lelyushenko was transferred to the bridgehead. The defense of the Sandomierz bridgehead was significantly strengthened. We must not forget about successful actions Soviet aviation. During August, aircraft of the 2nd Air Army carried out more than 17 thousand sorties. Soviet pilots conducted up to 300 air battles and destroyed about 200 German aircraft.

The 501st was defeated in these battles separate battalion heavy tanks. The Germans first used the new heavy tanks “Royal Tiger” (“Tiger 2”). However, an enemy attack was expected, and Soviet tank crews prepared a combined tank and artillery ambush. The 122-mm hull cannon of the 1931/37 model and the ISU-152 heavy self-propelled artillery mounts worked against the Germans. The Soviet 5th Guards Tank Brigade knocked out 13 enemy vehicles (according to German data - 11). During the fighting in the area of ​​​​the towns of Staszow and Szydlow, troops of the 6th Guards Tank Corps knocked out and captured 24 German tanks (including 12 “Royal Tigers”). Moreover, three vehicles were captured in good condition, their crews fled and did not blow up the tanks stuck in the mud. In addition, in the Khmilnik area, soldiers of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, during a night battle, captured 16 German tanks, 13 of them were fully operational, three vehicles with broken tracks. The vehicles replenished the brigade's tank fleet.

German troops launched another counterattack in the Laguva area. Here two German tank corps went on the offensive. The German command tried to cut off the Lagow ledge, surrounding the Soviet troops defending it. German troops, during stubborn battles, were able to wedge 6-7 km into the defenses of the 13th Army. However, as a result of the Soviet offensive, the German group was defeated. Part of the German group (formations of the 72nd, 291st infantry divisions, an assault regiment, part of the 18th artillery division) was surrounded and liquidated. This ended the attempts of the German command to defeat the Soviet troops on the Sandomierz bridgehead and throw them back across the Vistula.

Simultaneously with repelling German counterattacks, part of the Soviet group carried out an operation to defeat the German 42nd Army Corps. The German corps threatened the right wing of the Sandomierz front group. August 14 Soviet 3rd Guards, 13th, 1st Guards tank army went on the offensive. A powerful one and a half hour artillery barrage and air strikes helped break through the enemy’s defenses. On August 18, Soviet troops liberated the city of Sandomierz. The German group of 4 divisions was defeated. The Soviet bridgehead was increased to 120 km along the front and to 50-55 km in depth.

Further battles became protracted. The German command continued to transfer fresh divisions and various individual units. By the end of August, the Germans had more than doubled their force in the Sandomierz bridgehead area. Soviet armies lost their striking power, it was necessary to regroup forces, prepare troops for new attacks, and replenish units with people and equipment. On August 29, the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the defensive.

IS-2 at the Sandomierz bridgehead. Poland. August 1944

Results of the operation.

The Lviv-Sandomierz operation ended in complete victory for the Red Army. Soviet soldiers completed the liberation of the Ukrainian SSR within the borders of 1941. Lvov, Vladimir-Volynsk, Rava-Russkaya, Sandomir, Yaroslav, Przemysl, Stryi, Sambir, Stanislav and many other cities and towns were liberated. The liberation of Poland began.

The strategic task of defeating Army Group “Northern Ukraine” was solved. 32 enemy divisions were defeated, which lost most personnel and equipment (8 enemy divisions were completely destroyed in the Brod “cauldron”). Total losses German troops amounted to 350 thousand people. Between July 13 and August 12 alone, 140 thousand people were killed, and more than 32 thousand people were taken prisoner. Front troops captured huge trophies, including more than 2.2 thousand guns of various calibers, about 500 tanks, 10 thousand vehicles, up to 150 various warehouses, etc.

With the loss of Western Ukraine and the division of Army Group “Northern Ukraine” into two groups strategic front the enemy was cut in two. Troops now had to be transferred through the territory of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which worsened the maneuver of reserves and the defensive capabilities of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.

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