Within the framework of the social structure, there is a constant movement of both individuals and groups - from one stratum to another, as well as within the same execution. Social mobility manifests itself when individuals and groups move from one social status to another. In sociology we distinguish:
vertical social mobility - moving from one stratum to another. There is a distinction between upward social mobility (for example, an associate professor became a professor or head of a department) and downward social mobility (an associate professor became a xist or a scavenger);
horizontal social mobility - a transition from one social group to another, but within the same stratum (for example, a transition from one family to another, of the same social status, or relocation from one place of residence to another without changing one’s social status , as: associate professor of Lvov University becomes associate professor of Dnepropetrovsk University.
They also distinguish between individual and group social mobility (group mobility is usually a consequence of serious social changes, such as revolutions or economic transformation, foreign interventions or changes in political regimes, etc.). An example of group social mobility could be the decline in the social status of a professional group of teachers who at one time
took a lot high positions in our society, or the decline in the status of a political party that, due to defeat in elections or as a result of a revolution, has lost real power. According to the figurative expression. S. Sorokin, the case of downward individual social mobility is reminiscent of a person falling from a ship, and a group case is reminiscent of a ship that sank with all the people on board.
In a society that develops stably, without shocks, it is not group movements that predominate, but individual vertical movements, that is, it is not political, professional, class or ethnic groups that rise and fall in the social hierarchy. individuals. In modern society, individual mobility is very high. Processes of industrialization, then a reduction in the proportion of unskilled workers, an increase in the need for white-collar managers and businessmen, which prompted people to change their social status. However, even in the most traditional society there were no insurmountable barriers between strata.
Pitirim. Sorokin described the unique channels of vertical mobility that function in every society, no matter how closed it may be. He believed that between strata there are always peculiar “elevators”, in which individuals travel up and down, such as, for example, a cyclade, a yak:
Army.
Pitirim. Sorokin researched that out of 92 Roman emperors, 36 achieved this, starting from the lowest ranks, from 66 Byzantine emperors - 12. Cromwell,. Washington,. The Budyonnies are examples of outstanding social advances through military careers.
Church
Pitirim. Sorokin, having studied the biographies of 144 popes, discovered that 28 of them came from the lower strata, and 27 from the middle strata. Dad. Gregory VII was the son of a carpenter, a. Gebbon, Archbishop. Rhine, was a former slave. At the same time, the church was a serious channel of downward mobility: heretics, pagans, enemies of the church, among whom were owners and nobles, became bankrupt and were exterminated.
School, education.
Biographies are a well-known example here. Taras. Shevchenko. Mikhail. Lomonosov.
Own.
Sorokin established that not all, but only some professions contribute to the accumulation of wealth. In 29% of cases, this allows the manufacturer to do the job, for 21% - for bankers and stockbrokers, for 12% - for merchants, which is right, at the right time. Sorokin, many new professions and activities characteristic of modern post-industrial society did not yet exist.
MILITARY THOUGHT No. 5/1993, pp. 12-19
Army and political power
ColonelV.M.RODACHIN ,
Candidate of Philosophy
QUESTION about the relationship between the army and political power touches upon one of the fundamental problems of state policy, the solution of which determines the nature of development and stability of the socio-political system, power relations and society as a whole. The process of democratic development in Russia and other sovereign states of the former USSR has made all aspects of the relationship between the armed forces and political power extremely relevant.
The army as a guarantor of the stability of political power. Most often, the concept of “army” includes an organized military force maintained by a country for defensive or defensive purposes. offensive war. It really serves as a kind of “instrument of war,” intended for conducting armed struggle, although today it is increasingly focused on preventing it. In addition, the army is a specific political institution, despite the fact that the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces in its actions proceeds from the requirement to depoliticize the army, which is not a contradiction. “The decrees of the President of Russia on the departition and depoliticization of the Armed Forces will be strictly implemented,” emphasized the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Army General P.S. Grachev. - Those who cannot live without politics, let them engage in it. But first he must resign from the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces.”
The concept of “politicization” in relation to the army reflects a certain state of it, characterized by the following features!: independent political activity; involvement in politics as an object of struggle between political forces; adherence to any one ideological and political doctrine, party (or an internal split in the army into rival ideological and political groups, factions); a combination of professional service with various types of political activity among military personnel. The demand for depoliticization of the army means the exclusion of these phenomena from the life of the troops. An extreme view of depoliticization, as the complete isolation of the army from politics, indicates a lack of understanding of its nature, functional purpose, control mechanism, and military practice. Of course, the army cannot be identified with a political institution, since, unlike actual political institutions, it is not directly related to political activity and is not an independent subject of politics participating in the struggle for power and the formation of state policy. At the same time, as an element of state organization and political system In society, the army is a political institution that performs important political functions in public and international life.
The main one is related to the foreign policy of the state, since it is in this area that the main purpose of the army is realized - to be a guarantor of reliable military security and national interests countries. Of much greater interest is the internal function of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, through which their purpose as an element of state organization and political power is revealed. Today, it has become obvious that the army should not interfere in internal political processes, even on the orders of the authorities and in the interests of the state. However, only 27% of surveyed participants in the All-Army Officers' Meeting, held on January 17, 1992, ruled out the legality of exercising the internal functions of the armed forces of the CIS countries. This was due to the fact that the political leadership of the Soviet Union repeatedly used the army in areas of political tension and interethnic conflicts, which caused a negative attitude from the public. Nevertheless, 63% of the officers surveyed were convinced of the need for an internal function for the army. Official developments and scientific works have appeared that explore its content both in general terms and in relation to the United Armed Forces of the CIS and the RF Armed Forces.
It is appropriate to recall that Aristotle, N. Machiavelli, and other thinkers wrote that the army has always been an instrument of “maintaining power against those who disobey” its will, “the basis of power in all states.” It should be borne in mind that the army does not necessarily carry out its internal function through direct military violence. This option is allowed only in the most extreme cases, when all other methods have not given the desired results. As a rule, the internal function manifests itself indirectly in the form of the presence of the army in a given territory, its control of key objects, the unshakability of its positions in a particular conflict situation that destabilizes the socio-political situation, and the threat of the use of force.
The internal functions of the army can be ensured different ways and serve the interests of various socio-political forces. Therefore, when manifesting the same function, for example, “serve as a support for power and be a guarantor of the political stability of society,” it can perform “progressive” or “reactionary,” “conservative” or “democratic,” “nationalist,” “national-patriotic” , “internationalist” and other political roles. Numerous examples of internal political struggle in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Tajikistan and other sovereign states convince us of the ambiguity political role national armed formations focusing on various socio-political forces.
The main content of the internal function of the Armed Forces consists of supporting the constitutional system, the political power legally elected by the people, preventing mass, and especially armed, anti-constitutional actions of political forces in opposition to the authorities, as well as spontaneous conflicts and clashes that destabilize the social situation. By implementing it, the army is called upon to exercise a democratic political role, to act as a peacekeeping force separating the conflicting parties.
Traditions, the type of political regime that has developed, the degree of its freedom in relations with the authorities, etc. have a significant influence on the content of the army’s functions and the nature of the tasks it performs. The power of traditions in relations between the army and the authorities has always been great. Over the past centuries, some states have developed and encouraged the tradition of subordinating military leadership to civilian authorities. In the USA, for example, in the entire history not a single general has sent troops to White House. Any attempts to disobey the authorities or disagree with the policies pursued by the president or Congress ended with the immediate dismissal of the military leaders who dared to do so. This happened to General D. MacArthur during the Korean War and to the hero of the Gulf War, General N. Schwarzkopf. The tradition of subordinating the army to political power has historically developed in Italy. The armed forces practically did not participate in either the establishment or the overthrow of Mussolini's militaristic regime. Before the revolution, Russia also had strong traditions of obedience among military personnel, inspired by the ideas of faithful service to the autocracy and the Fatherland. During the Soviet period, the basis for the relationship between the authorities and the socialist army was the principle of the latter’s unconditional subordination to the institutions of power controlled and directed by the party. Even Stalin's massive repressions against command cadres did not cause protest and resistance to the authorities.
In a number of other countries, the opposite trend has developed. The Spanish military, for example, always showed a certain independence from the authorities and sought to impose the necessary decisions on it. Resisting government efforts to establish tight control over the armed forces, they have repeatedly threatened democracy with conspiracies. And in February 1981, parliamentarians and the cabinet of ministers were held hostage for some time. The tradition of distancing the army from civilian power and political independence has developed especially clearly in most countries of the “third world”, which lack a developed economic, social base, and political system. In these states, the army is the most organized and powerful military and political force, capable of imposing its will on the government or replacing it.
One of the most important factors Determination of the relationship between the army and political power is the type of political regime. At totalitarian regime Three models of their relationships are known. The first is “party-totalitarian” (Stalinist regime of power). Political domination is exercised monopoly by the leadership of the ruling party (civil party nomenklatura). The army becomes the most important and completely subordinate, controlled object of party power. The second is “paramilitary-totalitarian” (Hitler’s regime). Political power is in the hands of the ruling party elite, which constitutes either organic component political power, or the most powerful and influential force of pressure on it. The army is both the central object of political power and its partial subject. The third model is “military-totalitarian” or “stratocratic” (from the Greek “stratos” - army). In it, the army pushes aside the political party and exercises sole (monopoly) political leadership. Under this regime, the usual authorities are abolished or replaced by the military. For example, the regime of the Brazilian “gorillas”, established in March 1964, declared in the Institutional Act No. 1 of the Supreme Revolutionary Command that “ victorious revolution legitimizes itself as a constituent power.” On this basis, the president, 6 state governors, 46 members of the Chamber of Deputies, and 4,500 employees of federal institutions were removed from power. In all models, the army served as the most important support of totalitarian power and was the guarantor of the order established by it. Since its goal was to ensure complete and universal control of power over all aspects of state, public and even private life, the political role of the armed forces could not but be exclusively reactionary - gendarmerie and repressive-militaristic.
The authoritarian regime of power includes the following models: “civil-authoritarian”, “semi-military-authoritarian” and “military-authoritarian”. The army in them occupies the position of an object completely subordinate to authoritarian power. Despite the external similarity of the models of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes of power, the political role of the army has significant differences. An authoritarian regime, while representing strong state power, does not extend its influence to all spheres of public and private life. It allows a certain freedom for political institutions, including political parties and some public organizations. The principle of separation of powers does not actually apply, even if there are formal structures of legislative, executive and judicial power. It is concentrated in the hands of a monarch, dictator or small authoritarian group.
The political role of the army is not always reactionary. It can also be patriotic, peacemaking (deterring class clashes, civil war), consolidating social forces and strengthening the integrity of the state. If an authoritarian regime is a transitional form from dictatorship to democracy, the political role of the army has a clear democratic orientation. Almost always successful economic and political modernization was provided with the support of the army (Spain, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea). She helped the authoritarian government, aimed at reforms, launch a fight against corruption and the machinations of officials, mobilize all the country's resources, carry out market reforms and forcefully suppress the protests of those sections that tried to hinder them. This is how the authoritarian-military regime of Park Chung Hee, which established itself in February 1961 in South Korea, acted. As a result, the foundations of the country's current prosperity were laid, although its political system is not yet fully democratic.
In a democracy (democratic regime), there is a special model of effective civilian control over the armed forces, based on the unconditional recognition by the military of the supremacy of civilian political power. It is not unified and has many options for practical implementation. This takes into account national specifics, applied mechanisms of civilian control, etc. The extreme version of civilian control involves the complete removal of the army leadership from direct access to the highest political leadership, especially the president, and military personnel from any participation in politics, which can result in alienation army from power and the virtual lack of control over the actions of military leaders. In this situation, the civil rights of military personnel are infringed upon, or even completely ignored.
The “American” version of civilian control is as follows. Firstly, Congress is given the right to discuss and approve the military budget, demand a report from senior military officials on the situation in the army, issue charters and instructions regulating the actions of the troops; secondly, the civilian Ministry of Defense, where the minister and his deputies are civilians, exercises direct military-political control of the troops; thirdly, the political rights and freedoms of military personnel are limited by significant legal prohibitions.
The “German” version of civilian control differs primarily in that, in addition to the legislative rights of the parliament, a special institution of the Bundestag Commissioner for Defense is established “to protect fundamental rights and as an auxiliary body of the Bundestag in the exercise of parliamentary control.” He is elected by parliament for a period of 5 years and is subordinate only to it, having great powers. In addition, the Minister of Defense is a civilian, while his deputies and other army leaders are military. The political leadership's trust in them comes from the desire not to undermine the effectiveness of military command. Finally, military personnel are considered "citizens in uniform." They are guaranteed equal rights, including joining political parties (it is prohibited to act in the interests of the party in the service), participation in political events outside of work. Campaigning, political speeches, distribution of printed materials, and combining service with parliamentary activities are not allowed.
The desire to create effective civilian control over the Armed Forces was also expressed by the Russian political leadership. So far, only its outlines have been outlined: parliamentary control, which provides, according to the Law of the Russian Federation “On Defense”, the right of the Supreme Council of Russia to adopt military doctrine, approval of the military budget, determination of the structure and size of the Armed Forces, consent to the appointment of the highest military command, the decision to use the armed forces for abroad; separation of government bodies and functions related to the civilian Ministry of Defense and the General Staff; departition of the Russian army; a legislative ban on her interference in politics. It will take a lot of time before the mechanism of civil control is debugged in all details, and most importantly, it works effectively.
This control will contribute to the army's political role or, as the Italian constitution says, "to be consistent with the democratic spirit of the Republic." This will find its real expression in supporting the government legally elected by the people, protecting, as Article 8 of the Spanish Constitution states, the constitutional system and order, and ensuring the stability of the socio-political situation. It should be emphasized that the stabilizing role of the army is not limited to a forceful reaction to actions that threaten society from the inside, fraught with “much, senseless blood.” It ensures the stability of society by its non-participation in political struggle, the absence of party sympathies and antipathies, the inability to use it for political and other purposes, the firmness and consistency of its political positions, focused on supporting the law, state principles, legislative and governmental power.
However, it should be recognized that the army does not always manage to play a stabilizing, as well as democratic role. In a number of cases, she independently intervenes in politics and becomes an active subject of power relations.
Military coups and political activity of the army. In countries where mass consciousness An opinion was formed about the “need for a strong hand”; the army entered the political arena, identifying its power with the strength of political power. This especially applies to developing countries. There have been over 550 military coups in Latin America over the past 150 years. Bolivia alone withstood 180 military coups from 1825 to 1964. Military dictatorships long time ruled in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile.
In February 1992, they tried unsuccessfully to take power in Venezuela. The military demonstrated its influence during the political crisis in Peru, where on April 5, 1992, President A. Fujimori dissolved parliament, put a group of its leaders under arrest and suspended some articles of the constitution. The army's strong support for the president's actions allowed him to control the situation and decisively implement his program to overcome the “constitutional impasse.”
In Asia, the military is an active participant in political struggle. According to G. Kennedy, during the period from 1945 to 1972, 42 military coups took place there. And in the future, their activity in this part of the world did not decrease: coups in the Philippines, Fiji (1987), Burma (1988), Thailand (1991). In a number of countries - Sri Lanka, Burma, Pakistan, South Korea - the army is a powerful political force, and the highest military officials integral part government. In Iraq, after the military coup (1978), one of the most repressive regimes of Saddam Hussein remains.
Africa also remains a stable zone for military coups. From 1948 to 1985, 68 heads of state and government were removed from power. The military seized power in Nigeria and Liberia (1985), Lesotho and Uganda (1986), Togo and Somalia (1991). In January 1992, under pressure from the military, Algerian President Bendjedit was forced to resign by signing a decree dissolving parliament. In May of that year, the armed forces overthrew Sierra Leonean President Joseph Momoh.
The military also demonstrated quite high activity in the political life of some European countries. For example, in Greece over the past 50 years there have been 11 military coups. There have been 52 military coups in Spain since 1814, including the last two attempts (in 1978 and 1981) under democratic rule. The Portuguese armed forces played decisive role in the April “carnation revolution” in 1974, which put an end to the fascist regime. The French army challenged the government in 1958 and 1961. In Poland, in an environment of growing political crisis, President W. Jaruzelski, with the help of the army, implemented the regime state of emergency. The role of the force trying to preserve the integrity of the federal statehood in Yugoslavia and suppress the separatist movements was assumed by the Yugoslav People's Army. Many political leaders and publicists regarded the events of August 19-21, 1991 in the former Soviet Union as a military putsch. However, an objective and comprehensive analysis shows that, firstly, this was precisely an attempt at a coup d’etat, in which government and party structures became the main organizers. Secondly, only part of the senior command and political leadership, drawn into the plans of the conspiracy, sought to use the army as a strike force. The findings of the commission of inquiry into the participation of the Armed Forces in the coup d'état and the parliamentary hearings in the Supreme Soviet of Russia, held on February 18, 1992, confirmed that the army was predominantly on the side of the domocracy. “The army did not go against its people,” Air Marshal E. Shaposhnikov noted in the report of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the CIS, “did not raise weapons against them, the composure of the majority of generals, officers, army and navy personnel, their balanced assessments of the events unfolding in the country did not allowed the August coup to have an unpredictable result.”
Awareness of the inadmissibility of military participation in politics by force was reflected in the tendency to gradually remove them from the political struggle, which was noted at the Madrid conference of political scientists in 1990. However, it is premature to declare it “dominant in the 20th century” and to assert that in Europe this process “ended long ago”, and in “Latin America it is approaching a complete and irreversible end.” As for Europe, it is not limited only western part, where since the beginning of the 80s there have really been no attempts at military coups or other forms of army intervention in the struggle for power. With the collapse of totalitarian structures and the rise of democratic and national movements In the countries of Eastern Europe and states located on the European part of the territory of the former USSR, the likelihood of military intervention in power relations has increased. It has already become a reality in Yugoslavia, partly in Poland and Romania. In countries Latin America The frequency of military coups has decreased markedly. But there are no serious grounds for concluding that in the future they will be completely excluded. To do this, the causes that give rise to them must be eradicated.
The likelihood of direct military intervention in politics increases significantly in an environment of deepening social and international instability, especially when governments, other power structures lose control over the development of events and find themselves unable to take and implement effective measures. It has long been observed that military personnel almost always support a well-functioning civilian government. And vice versa, one of sustainable factors pushing them to prepare and carry out coups is a weak, incompetent government. Therefore, it is impossible to give an absolute guarantee that even the most stable countries of Western Europe today will be able in the future to avoid a period of destabilization of social or international life that could provoke a military coup.
According to the conclusions of leading Western political scientists, for example J. Lepingwell from the University of Illinois, such situations most often arise in so-called systemic conflicts that pose a threat to the fundamental interests of society, national security, sovereignty and integrity of the state, the constitutional order and public order. Traditionally, the army acts as a guarantor of socio-political stability and integrity of the state. Defending security interests, it considers itself a force responsible for preventing civil strife, preventing chaos, anarchy, and the collapse of the country. Its motto is “Politics belongs to the parties, but the Fatherland belongs to the army.” A detailed study by T. Horowitz, dedicated to identifying the reasons for the involvement of the Sri Lankan officer corps in the preparation and execution of military coups, shows the influence of precisely these factors causing systemic conflicts. Their effect is taking place and, moreover, is intensifying in Russia and the CIS. The main causes of concern are the further decline of the economy, the deepening of inflationary processes, multiple increases in prices, and the threat of mass unemployment. Economic instability is complemented by worsening political contradictions and interethnic conflicts. In Russia, an intense struggle continues around the problems of government, the adoption of a new Constitution, the distribution of power between legislative and executive bodies, the center and the constituent entities of the Federation. After the proclamation of the sovereignty of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Tuva, and Chechnya, the danger of Russian disintegration remains. There has been a tendency for a number of states to lose interest in strengthening the Commonwealth. Agreement about collective security signed by representatives of only six states - Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Bishkek, unfortunately, did not become the birthplace of the new confederation.
This development of events is not only painfully perceived by many military personnel, especially personnel, but also significantly affects their interests. All this could become a powerful incentive for the army to intervene in politics, which a certain part of the public is looking forward to. A telephone survey of public opinion leaders at the end of March 1992 showed that 10% of them were confident that the military would replace the Democratic team. A strong provoking factor here is the difficult social situation of military personnel and members of their families, the oppressive atmosphere of the growing split, discrimination based on nationality, and the increasing incidence of unpunished attacks on soldiers and officers, the sad result of which is the death of many of them. The authorities' insufficient attention to the army's increasingly complex problems also contributes to its politicization. More than once, resolutions of officer meetings have expressed something unprecedented for the army. public structures a requirement for the governments of the CIS states to take into account the interests of military personnel. The tension potential accumulating in the Armed Forces may eventually reach a critical mass.
Seeing the army as the “savior of the state and the nation,” many ordinary people and some theorists take as a model the results of the coup of the Chilean junta in 1973. And if until recently the name of General Augusto Pinochet was a symbol of reaction and dictatorship for everyone, now it takes on the exact opposite meaning and is associated with the success of social reforms and the dynamism of the Chilean economy. Of course, this experience is indicative, but in many ways unique. During the 16 years of the established regime, the military junta managed not only to overcome the state of crisis and instability in which society was located, but also to create the necessary prerequisites for its further development through the privatization of almost all production (with the exception of the copper mining industry and air transport), external debts, healthcare, education, as well as - for the first time in world practice - social security.
And yet, stratocracy in any form, according to the conclusion of most political scientists, is ineffective as a form government and the regime of power. First of all, because governing the state is ultimately not the job of the army. For this you need specialized knowledge and skills. Moreover, the more developed a society is, the less acceptable a command style of management is. Tightening discipline, responsibility, and other measures of “restoring order” that the army is capable of implementing can only give a short-term effect, since they will not eliminate the root causes of the social crisis. The military regime established as a result of the coup, according to S. Feiner, will not be able to secure sufficiently broad and strong support in society necessary for carrying out reforms. It is impossible to achieve civil consent through military methods. They also do not stimulate the labor activity of citizens. The absolutization of power by the military turns against the army itself. “As soon as the military in a certain state has lost its political virginity,” writes W. Gutteridge, “military discipline falls and the professional tradition of recognizing the authority of power dissipates.”
Based on the above, the following conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the army is not only a military, but also a political institution of society, an important instrument of state policy, a guarantor of security, integrity and stability of the political system and society as a whole. By its nature, its political role can be negative. It is impossible to achieve complete depoliticization of the armed forces. The division of the army is acceptable and necessary. Secondly, the relationship between the army and political power is complex and contradictory, determined by many factors. Depending on specific circumstances, there may be different “models” of the relationship between the army and the government. The model of civilian control over the armed forces meets the requirements of civilization and democracy. Thirdly, in conditions of socio-political instability and the development of crisis processes, the army is capable of entering the political arena as an independent political force, including preparing and carrying out military coups and establishing a stratocracy - direct military rule. Fourthly, military coups are an unacceptable form of resolving socio-political crises in modern conditions. The state and society must do everything to keep the army from directly interfering in politics.
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Currently, problems of the relationship between the army and politics are perhaps the most popular area in military and political science. This is confirmed by the ongoing numerous discussions of social scientists, military and political figures on this issue. All of them, without exception, note that due to various subjective and objective reasons these relationships were not always built and developed in the same vector direction.
History knows many examples when the interests of the army and the state diverged, and then these relations came into conflict and even confrontation, plunging society into a state of crisis, and the state was deprived of stability and even sovereignty. An example of this is the Roman Empire, where the army, often dissatisfied with its position, overthrew dictators, consuls and even emperors, clearing the way for new Caesars, Caligulas and Pompeys.
The relationship between the army and politics increased immeasurably in the 17th-19th centuries - during the era of the formation of national states. Russia, where the guard played a key role in the succession to the throne, did not remain aloof from this process. It was thanks to the military that the reign of Peter I and Empress Elizabeth Petrovna, Catherine the Great and Alexander I became possible. Military despotism was a characteristic phenomenon for most ancient states, the feudal monarchies of Europe and the empires of the East.
The enormous influence of the army on the political life of society was at one time pointed out by N. Machiavelli, Peter I, A. Jomini, F. Engels, K. Clausewitz, K. Marx, V. Lenin, M. Frunze and other politicians and military men.
Problems of relations between the army and politics in modern era excited the minds of prominent scientists, military, and political figures: C. de Gaulle, G. Moltke, C. Moskos, A. Svechin, S. Tyushkevich, V. Serebrennikov, M. Gareeva, A. Kokoshin, H. Ortega y Gasset etc. All of them, both in the past and in the present, noted that the army in the centuries-old history of mankind has always been a constant, indispensable and active participant in political life, acting as the main support and strength of the state in the implementation of its domestic and foreign policy. In addition, as K. Marx once noted, the army not only provided support to one or another political force in the struggle for power, but also repeatedly took it into its own hands, sometimes determining long years the fate of peoples and states.
The role of the army in the life of states has increased even more under the conditions of the development of capitalism and its highest stage - imperialism. It increasingly began to act as a striking force for imperialist states in international relations. In particular, the militaristic circles of Germany, Austria-Hungary and other states first plunged the people into the abyss of the First World War, and then the revanchist forces led by Germany unleashed the most bloody and destructive aggression against the peoples of Europe and the USSR. The defeat of the aggressive forces of German imperialism and Japanese militarism in World War II by the states of the anti-Hitler coalition radically changed the face of the planet. This was expressed in the victory of people's democratic revolutions in a number of Eastern European countries and Asia, in the growth of the national liberation movement in colonial and dependent countries, which ultimately influenced the balance of political forces in the world and led to the split of the world into two opposing ones. socio-political systems.
These processes caused a surge in militaristic and revanchist sentiments among the military and politicians of Western Europe and the United States and, as a result, led to military confrontation, the outbreak of an arms race, which eventually grew into a “Cold War” between capitalism and socialism.
During these years, in the countries of Western Europe and the United States, the militaristic rhetoric of politicians and military men began to be heard again, who, as before, sought to determine the nature of international politics from a position of strength.
Military activity in Western Europe and the United States was no exception. She was echoed by the political leaders of the socialist camp and, first of all, the Soviet Union and China. The first violin was played by the military in the young independent states, which acted as key links in national liberation movements, turning out for the most part to be the only cohesive force capable of implementing or supporting revolutionary democratic transformations.
At the beginning of the third millennium, the relationship between the army and politics acquired a qualitatively different state.
Gone are the days when the military elite could almost single-handedly solve the problems of power: in the state, determine or change its internal policy, choose a strategy social development, influence the nature and content of interstate relations.
Civilian leaders replaced the military in many states, and the army from an active means of politics turned into its object, and the military in the new conditions was assigned the role of executors of the political will of those dominant in society social groups. Time has left its mark on the army itself. Firstly, it ceased to be a caste group and turned into a serious socio-political force. Secondly, the army today is a large, active, united and disciplined team. Thirdly, the armed forces, and primarily their command staff, currently represent significant intellectual potential, which, under certain conditions, can have a significant impact on the social and political life of a modern state.
Understanding this perfectly well, government officials, representatives of political parties and organizations are constantly “flirting” with the military elite, trying to gain their support, while pursuing their own specific corporate goals. In turn, the senior command staff, or the so-called military elite, has turned into a powerful lobbying corporate group, which has a strong influence on the political authorities on such important issues as the military budget, military orders and the allocation of other resources for the maintenance of the army and support for the military-industrial complex . The leading role in these processes is played by retired military men, many of whom become deputies of legislative bodies, members of governments, serving on the boards of directors of large companies and various foundations, and influence national governments and international military-political structures. An example of this is the activities of former military personnel in the United States, Western European countries and other countries, including the Russian Federation, where senior officers of the army and other law enforcement agencies, after completing military service, under the patronage of the political leadership, find themselves in the chairs of ministers, governors, and presidential representatives in federal districts and other government and business structures, which provides them with ample opportunities to influence management decisions in the interests of the military, military-industrial complex and financial and industrial groups associated with the army.
It is well known that the army is the most organized mobile and powerful force, possessing the largest arsenal of technical and human resources. In terms of strength, no other social institution of the state can compete with it. Thanks to its power and influence, the army is able to subjugate other institutions of the state, give a decisive advantage to the party it supports, and the military can dominate civil power. These qualities of the army in the 19th century. pointed out F. Engels, who wrote that if the army is against certain political forces, then no class will be able to carry out a revolution, that it will not win until the army takes its side. Lenin and the Bolsheviks in Russia learned this well when, during the First World War, they first ideologically disintegrated the army, and in October 1917 managed to attract it to their side, and this, as we know, largely ensured the success of the revolution.
A similar situation occurred in the 70s. The last century was taken advantage of by the democratic forces of Portugal, which, relying on the revolutionary-minded part of the military led by General Gomes, overthrew the reactionary regime in their country. In the 90s The Russian army has proven itself to be an active supporter of the reorientation of the political and socio-economic development of the country; with its support, social transformations were carried out, the old government was destroyed and the new government was strengthened in Russia.
IN different periods development of society and the state, the army often manifests itself as a relatively independent and active means of politics. These qualities of the armed forces have repeatedly manifested themselves in the transitional stages of life in various countries, at the junction of eras, and during periods of acute socio-political crises. In such a situation, military rule usually replaces civil administration. At the same time, the army acts as the main subject of politics. The latter is manifested in the growing influence of people in uniform on the formation of domestic and foreign policy, in the rapprochement of the army with political groups whose interests and goals coincide with the desires of the military elite. This is how the army behaved in the 60-70s. XX century in Greece, South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, Chile and other countries.
To date, the scientific community has formed mainly two diametrically opposed points of view on the place and role of the army as a means and object of policy. One of them is based on the primacy of the military as the main means of resolving territorial, national, social and other disagreements. The other is based on the opinion that in modern conditions the army should be neutral and therefore the military should be excluded from participation in politics. This point of view was once expressed by Western political scientists J. Doorn, H. Baldwin, D. Schlosser and others.4 The positions of these researchers, in our opinion, are at least controversial, because as the practice of recent decades shows, their conclusions in a number of cases do not find practical confirmation. Events in Yugoslavia, Transcaucasia, Moldova, the confrontation between the Kurds and the government in Turkey, Basque separatism in Spain, the Kosovo problem in Serbia and other conflicts were stopped or frozen largely thanks to the armed forces. In our opinion, the army, along with other means, in the near future will continue to remain a guarantor of stability and peace in explosive regions of the planet. And this is confirmed today numerous facts, when the army, by virtue of its position, keeps its finger on the political pulse of the country. Recent events in Pakistan, Malaysia, Turkey, Venezuela and other countries indicate that the military is not only closely monitoring developments political situation in society, but also actively influence it. In particular, in May 2007, during the election campaign in Turkey, the army unequivocally stated through the mouth of the chief General Staff country that the military, being the guarantor of the existence of a secular state, will not allow its Islamization.
More than once, various political forces, pursuing rapprochement or alliance with the army, pursued their corporate interests and goals. As a rule, this is done through various programs, special appeals to military personnel, proclamation of projects to strengthen and improve the armed forces, and improve their social status. Particularly close attention to the army from various political forces is manifested in periods of political crises and maturing social tension. In such a situation, the army, critically assessing the current situation, itself takes the initiative and eliminates destructive forces from the political arena and takes full responsibility for the fate of the country into its own hands. For example, in Chile, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines, the military held power for a long time, in other cases the army held power until readiness warring parties create a stable government on a compromise basis, to which she transferred control of the state. In more than 30 countries, the military directly or indirectly took part in acute intrastate social, ethnic and territorial conflicts5.
In the struggle for power, various political groups are clearly aware that the army, under certain conditions, may turn out to be an insurmountable obstacle to their path to this goal. Then they deliberately undermine the foundations of the army, try to discredit it in the eyes of public opinion and thereby remove it from the political process associated with seizing power. For this purpose, a variety of techniques and technologies are used: the use of the military as a police force to suppress protests by the masses; eliminating politicians who are in opposition to the government, carrying out terrorist actions against the most popular public and statesmen. A classic example of such actions was the recent murder of the leader People's Party Pakistan B. Bhutto.
Thus, a wedge is deliberately driven between the army and the people, which makes society unstable and the process of seizing power more accessible. Such methods are most typical for developing countries, although some examples can be cited from the recent history of European states.
Another form of relationship between the army and politics emerged in the world after the Second World War. This is the widespread use of the armed forces of nation states as a kind of “commodity” in interstate relations. Military contingents, by decision of the political leadership, are introduced into the territory of other sovereign states and are used there to fight internal opposition, illegal armed groups, to support the ruling political regimes, as well as to realize the national interests of those states on whose behalf they are used as force.
An example of such a relationship between the army and politics is the actions of the United States in South Korea, the Philippines, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. Similar policies in the 60-70s. carried out by the Soviet Union, sending its military contingents to Egypt, Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and other countries.
The most important indicator of the relationship between the army and politics is its participation in the socio-political life of the country as citizens. In some states (for example, the USA), the military is partially or completely removed from the political sphere of society. They are prohibited from being members of political parties, organizations, participating in elections or election campaigns, or engaging in politics while on active military service. In other countries, the army is an indispensable participant in political life. Thus, in Germany, Russia and other countries, military personnel take an active part in the electoral process; they are allowed to create public organizations and be members of them, if this does not contradict current legislation. In particular, in Russian Law about “On the status of military personnel”, Article 7 states that military personnel have the right, during off-duty hours, to participate in rallies, meetings, street marches, demonstrations, picketing that do not pursue political goals and are not prohibited by government authorities; and Article 9 of the same law states that military personnel may be members of public associations who do not pursue political goals, and participate in their activities without being in the performance of military service duties.
At the turn of the millennium, the nature of the relationship between the army and politics in international affairs changed dramatically. This is due to the fact that the picture of the world has become qualitatively different: it has become multipolar; potential global military threats have disappeared; power in the majority modern states concentrated in the hands of democratic forces, at the same time new problems such as international terrorism appeared. This forced many states to reconsider certain provisions of their military doctrines and make significant adjustments to them, according to which their main task at the moment is not the defeat of a potential enemy in the face of confrontation between the main actors of world politics, but the prevention of the outbreak of military confrontation and the elimination of local armed conflicts.
At the same time, the foreign policy of states has become more balanced and open, in other words, it has ceased to be acutely conflict-ridden. This is largely the result of the principles of new political thinking that emerged in the late 80s. XX century the basis of the consensual policy of states in international relations and the activities of organizations such as the UN, OSCE and regional political and legal structures. However, this in no way means that today the influence of the army on the content and nature of interstate relations has been reduced to nothing. Despite the fact that many international problems and contradictions in modern world are not explosive in nature, however, the presence of the military is always visible in the process of solving them. Events in the world indicate this recent years when unblocking local conflicts and international problems through negotiations did not give the desired result and the military force of individual states or their coalitions came into play. Ethnic conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in Lebanon, the anti-Iraqi military operation Desert Storm, military actions of NATO coalition forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, the surge of international terrorism in various regions of the world - all this is clear evidence that the elimination of conflict situations by non-military means is often ineffective. This has been clearly confirmed by recent events in the post-Soviet space and, in particular, Georgia’s military actions in South Ossetia.
A new area of activity of the armed forces in the post-war period was their participation in such a difficult, dangerous, but very important mission for the fate of the world and the progress of peacekeeping activities. It dates back to 1948, when the UN carried out its first peacekeeping operation. Over a nearly 60-year period, the UN conducted 48 peacekeeping operations in various countries, in which more than 750 thousand military personnel and civilian police officers from 110 countries took part8.
Soviet peacekeepers first took part in a UN operation in 1973, when a group of military observers arrived in Egypt to ensure the conditions of a truce between Egypt and Israel. Since then, first Soviet and then Russian “blue helmets” have constantly participated in peacekeeping operations in various regions of the globe. The actions of peacekeeping forces more often occur in countries whose leaders, due to their political and military ambitions, do not always realize the danger of armed conflicts being unleashed that are ready to escalate into large-scale military actions. In such cases, peacekeeping forces mandated by the UN or other international organization take all necessary measures, including the use of force, to stop the armed confrontation between the conflicting parties and stop hostilities. For the most part, peacekeeping forces operate in hot spots on a temporary basis, although the duration of their missions sometimes stretches for years. An example of such activity is the presence of international peacekeeping forces in the territories of Angola, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Cyprus, the Middle East, the Balkans, Asia and other parts of the world. The presence of peacekeeping forces in conflict zones helps ensure peace and stability in the region. It is thanks to the actions of the “blue helmets” that it is possible to stop mass bloodshed and thereby save thousands of lives, preserve material and cultural values, stop genocide against individual peoples, and return hundreds of thousands of refugees to their places of permanent residence.
Today, many states, despite the global trend aimed at the demilitarization of society, continue to believe that a strong, well-equipped and trained army serves as the best business card states. Apparently, for this purpose, the Japanese government and the ruling liberal democratic party in early May 2007 submitted to parliament a proposal to change those articles of the Constitution that are this moment ban the country rising sun have a full-fledged army. This, according to Japanese politicians, does not correspond to the status great power and limits Japan’s ability to more actively influence the development of political processes in the world. Clearly aware that the army is one of the most reasoned instruments of policy, most countries increase their military budgets year after year, thereby pumping up the muscles of their armed forces. And this is despite the fact that the world community and peace-loving forces are opposed to the growing militarization on the planet, against the creation of new types of conventional weapons, which in their combat characteristics are approaching, and some of their types in some cases are superior to, weapons of mass destruction. However, the positions of these forces do not find a response from governments, and there is practically no decrease in the levels of military potential of states, and the agreements concluded in this direction are not implemented.
Proof of this policy is the actions of the United States and its NATO partners, which, having signed the Conventional Arms Reduction Treaty, do not comply with its provisions.
army political international
One more important example The participation of the military in politics became the Partnership for Peace movement. This is a new form of military-political cooperation with NATO, in which more than 20 states participate, including Russia. Its main goal is to solve complex international problems on the basis of developing joint actions to ensure global security and the fight against international terrorism.
Thus, in modern public consciousness, as in political science, there is now a strong belief that the army, as a means of politics, still has the most important role in implementing domestic policy states and resolving conflicting international problems that humanity is currently facing.
The army is an instrument of politics; it cannot be outside the political process, which has a constant direct and indirect influence on it. As long as there is instability in society, as long as there is a threat of territorial disintegration, the army will be a state instrument for preserving the integrity of the country. The army and politics are inextricably linked. The peculiarities of the previous type of political system include the fact that during the Soviet period of Russian history, the Armed Forces did not play a noticeable domestic political role. The party leadership, which had a monopoly on power, ensured political stability and regulation of society through a numerous ideological apparatus, as well as state security agencies. The army itself was controlled by these systems. In such conditions, the leading party nomenklatura did not need to use the army as an instrument of internal politics.
Army units were involved in solving internal political problems extremely rarely (for example, in 1962 in Novocherkassk), when the situation, due to an oversight of local authorities, got out of control and people’s discontent took the form of open action. But these were exceptional cases of a local and episodic nature. In general, the Armed Forces fulfilled external function, being an instrument of foreign policy of the state and the only ruling party. The internal function of the army remained, so to speak, “in potency.”
In the second half of the 80s, in the context of an aggravated crisis in the system of managing society, the army was gradually involved in the internal political process. Military units began to be used by party and state authorities to counter the political opposition. The forms of military participation in those events were different: limited military operations (Baku in 1990 and Vilnius in 1991), the use of army units without the use of firearms (Tbilisi in 1989), the introduction of military personnel into the city for psychological influence on the opposition (congress people's deputies Russia in March 1991 in Moscow)].
The steady downward trend in the share of military personnel in society has led to the fact that there are more than three times fewer of them than before the Second World War. In the early 90s, the tendency to reduce the absolute number of military personnel in almost all states intensified. But the role of the military in the life of society (on a global, regional and national scale) has always been many times higher than theirs specific gravity. After all, the military still holds the greatest power in its hands, with the help of which it is possible not only to force the entire society to a certain behavior, but also to destroy life itself on the planet. The role of the military is especially great in states that are or have been over-militarized, where the socio-political situation is unstable, where citizens pin their hopes for improving order on the army.
According to the magazine " Sociological research"For 1995, in Russia the army had the highest rating in relation to the elements of the political system. 35-38% of the population trusted her. For comparison, here are the data on trust in the elements of the political system: the president and parliament - about 20%, the government - 14%, the court - 14%, the police - 14%, political parties - 5%, trade unions - 16%, leaders enterprises - 15%. At the same time, only 3% of respondents believe that they are “completely satisfied” with the current political system of Russia, and 88% are in favor of its radical change. It is also important to note that trust and respect for the military in most democratic countries is higher than in Russia, reaching 85-95%. At its core, the army is part of the state, which bears its generic qualities. It is an organized body of people maintained by the state for the purposes of offensive and defensive war. Understanding the essence of such a phenomenon as “army” is possible through consideration of its main features.
The most important of them is considered to be the organic belonging of the army to the state as a political institution. This feature allows us to draw two methodological conclusions: the existence of the army is historical in nature; understanding and explanation of the essence of a particular army can be achieved by considering it through the prism of the essence, character and orientation of the state that created it, a certain political system. The army cannot be identified with a political institution, since, unlike actual political institutions, it is not directly related to political activity and is not an independent subject of politics participating in the struggle for power and the formation of state policy.
The main feature that distinguishes the army not only from the bulk of government bodies, but also from somewhat related (also possessing weapons) security institutions (Ministry of Internal Affairs, FSB, etc.) is the ability to wage war and solve strategic problems. It is known that war is one of the most important social phenomena. Being a continuation of the policy of the ruling regime, it requires them to mobilize all forces and means to achieve victory over the enemy, in some cases threatening the very existence of the state. Consequently, the army, as the main subject of warfare, occupies an exceptional position in society and requires constant care and attention *.
The general logic of the change in the position and role of the army in the system of political power speaks of its steady death as a subject of power (source, creator, main carrier, etc.), a decrease in its role as a subjective-instrumental factor of power (determining who should be in power, who and when to remove from it, etc.), the predominance of instrumental-subjective and especially purely instrumental significance in relation to power. The ever more complete exit of the army (meaning its top) from the depths of power and transformation into a nearby instrument is transforming its role in nationally important matters: in ensuring the security of power (socio-economic, political, spiritual-moral, informational and other factors); in the formation of a political course, adoption of state, including military-political decisions, forms of defending their corporate interests; in the implementation of politics, the management of public affairs, and political activity in general.
The trend of “subjectivization” of the army in Russia will occur as a result of objective social processes that require the participation of the army as a guarantor of the stability of society. Urgent from the point of view of establishing a democratic rule of law is to solve several important problems, one of which will be the following: how to resist the transformation of the army from an instrument of state policy into a policy instrument of the ruling party in a multi-party environment?
The parliamentary system requires regular changes of government. political structure as a result of free expression of will in elections. The constant change of leadership naturally brings changes to current policies. But these course fluctuations, often of a opportunistic nature, should not affect the combat effectiveness of the army, which is called upon to defend the interests of the state and the entire society, which are more permanent than those of the ruling party. It is unacceptable for the ruling party to acquire special rights to influence military personnel. The apparatus of the party that wins the elections should not assume the function of direct control of the Armed Forces. Much in resolving this issue depends on how quickly a democratic model of relations between the state and political parties can be established. It is impossible to completely protect the army from the influence of parties. But it would be more expedient to regulate this influence legislatively, taking into account the interests of both maintaining the combat capability of the army and the functioning of the democratic political system. The optimal way for a political party to influence the army should apparently be its victory in elections, which opens up the opportunity for politicians forming the government to achieve transformation of their military program from the party to the state through its approval by the majority of deputies *.
In the course of building a legal democratic state, a correct understanding by the political authorities of the role of the army in the development and implementation of a political course, the development of political directions (including military-political), and in the management of state affairs is of great importance. To the extent that the military maintains political neutrality, limiting itself to the performance of its direct duties, there are grounds to talk about the consolidation of the rule of law, as well as the fact that there are important prerequisites and “operational space” for the functioning of civil society. Where the duality of “the rule of law - civil society” has become stable, the functions of the army ideally come down to protecting the borders and territory of the state from external threats, maintaining its equipment and personnel skills at the required level. At the same time, the armed forces are under the complete control of the highest government leadership, carry out all its orders, without claiming an independent political role, and, as a rule, are not involved in resolving conflicts between individual branches of government, within them, between the ruling party and the opposition, between the central and local administrative authorities. The specific relationship between the system of political power and the army in the internal life of states is very complex. There are a number characteristic types relationship between the army and political power:
1) the army plays only an instrumental role, being completely in the hands of political power, being the latter’s obedient weapon;
2) the army, performing mainly the functions of an instrument of state power, has a certain degree of independence up to the point of becoming one of the centers of state power, capable of influencing the main bearers of this power, acting under certain conditions independently or together with the entire military-industrial complex , including, in addition to the army, the military economy, defense science, as well as paramilitary public organizations and movements (associations of veterans, voluntary assistance to the army and navy, etc.);
3) political power is deprived of the army, for example, as happened with the totalitarian regimes of Ceausescu (Romania), Zhivkov (Bulgaria), Honecker (former GDR), etc., when, when popular uprisings unfold, the military remains neutral, refuses to carry out the orders of dictators or take the side of the people;
4) the army participates in the struggle for power, the rise of new forces to power;
5) the military takes power into their own hands and establishes military rule. The nature of the interaction between political power and the army depends on the nature of the social and state system, the political regime, the specific socio-economic and political situation, the strength of the legal order, and the effectiveness of the entire system of instruments of power.
To keep the army out of the natural, in a democracy, struggle for political leadership, an effective system of civilian control over this social institution is necessary. The problem of civil control, as a result of its development, is transformed into the problem of civil control as a form of regulation of military-civil relations in a rule of law state, receives an independent applied meaning (scientific discussion about the ruling elite) and this problem is also considered as one of the aspects of the modern theory of military-civil relations] .
The army in the system of political power of a rule-of-law state must be guided by conceptual and methodological approaches to the problem of civilian control and, first of all, by the theory of consent, and secondly by the theory of separation. The theory of consent considers the forms of interaction between the state and civil society, taking into account the national and cultural conditions of specific states and considering civilian control as Civil-Military relations is a historically established system of interaction and mutual influence of the civilian qualities of a military organization and the military qualities of civil society, functioning in the interests of military security society, state and individual one of the forms of regulation of military-civil relations in a transitional political regime *. This theory is preferable for states with transitional political regimes, since it does not require a specific form of government, a network of institutions or a specific decision-making process. Consent usually occurs in the context of an active form, established by law, by decree or based on deep-rooted historical and cultural values. Internal military intervention can be avoided through cooperation with the political elite and the population.
Separation theory considers civilian control over the army as a form of regulation of civil-military relations of the rule of law state through a certain institutional mechanism (this theory was developed by Harvard University professor Samuel Philips Huntington and reflected in the book “The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations,” published published in 1957). The theory of separation provides the most general idea of the boundary between the civilian and military spheres; attention is paid to such principles of civilian control as: 1) severe restrictions on political activity or depoliticization; 2) clear separation of jurisdiction between civilian and military institutions or democratization; 3) differentiation of “responsibilities” between the “law enforcement agencies” of the state or professionalization.
The main thing in guiding these theories should be the legal mechanism for their implementation, which will ensure such a state and target functions of the army that would not run counter to the interests of the entire society. Of no small importance, in our opinion, will be the moral “self-limiter” in the minds of each of the Russian military personnel, which is one of the most reliable guarantees of the army preserving its constitutional purpose. This requires targeted information and educational work to form consciousness not only as a “man with a gun,” but also as a citizen of his country. High level legal and political culture, civic consciousness will not allow that in the conditions social instability the army was captured by extremist ideas.
For a deeper understanding of the army of a rule-of-law state, the army in the system of political power of a rule-of-law state, in our opinion, it is necessary to once again focus on the aspect that there were and are different interpretations of the very concept of “rule of law state,” and in this regard, the situation army in the system of political power can have different shades. Thus, in the history of Germany in the 19th and 20th centuries there was not a single political system that did not assign the status of a “rule of law state.” Both the German state of the time of Bismarck and Weimar Republic, and the fascist regime of Hitler. Nowadays, the Basic Law of Germany (Article 28, Part 1) confirms commitment to the basic principles of a social and legal state.
In modern conditions, the ideas of creating a rule of law state have become actualized in the countries of the former “socialist camp”. The Soviet experience is most revealing here. To avoid mistakes and deviations from the doctrine of the rule of law, it is necessary to create a regulatory framework that satisfies the interests of the majority. It should be noted that we have constantly declared the principle: “Everything in the name of man, everything for the good of man.” At the same time, we have to admit that we have always lacked something to implement it.
The official ideology proclaimed the construction of a nation-wide state. True, this largely remains at the declaration level. However, the legal prerequisites for the struggle for the establishment of a state of the people and for the people were nevertheless created *.
The army of a truly democratic legal state cannot suffer from “political blindness”; its personnel are called upon to ensure the security of the state and society. This presupposes an appropriate level of her political and legal knowledge, achieved by day-to-day explanation of government policy, Russian legislation, and Russian national interests.
In a rule of law state, high social status and respect for the military never turned into a cult. In the United States, after the failure of the Vietnam War, a powerful wave of criticism of the army arose. Numerous scientific studies and publications, television and radio broadcasts, and works of art were dedicated to her. But american army didn't get any worse. Having reacted soberly to criticism, she enthusiastically responded to the reform proposed by scientists, acquired a new quality, returning the veneration and love of the Americans.
On the contrary, in the former USSR the military was beyond criticism, which caused great harm to the Armed Forces, the people and the state. Unfortunately, experience has taught us little. And today there are calls not to raise the issue of shortcomings in the army.
In the late 80s and early 90s, when in the former USSR the military increasingly began to be used in political struggle, profound shifts occurred in the mass consciousness. In May 1990, for the first time in the country, a postal survey of the adult urban population was conducted: about 70% spoke out against the use of the army within the country, adhering to the principle “the army is out of politics.” Almost 30% believed that the army cannot be outside of politics, it must be used under certain circumstances (to protect the Constitution, ensure the security and rights of citizens). A repeated survey (in the spring of 1992) showed some changes: about 55% were against the use of the army within the country, about 35% were in favor (10% were undecided on the answer) 1. In democratic states, they better understood the danger of the participation of the military in the formation of a general and military politicians gradually closed this possibility. The main thing in governing the state and maintaining power here is the authority of the law, political culture, and civil discipline.
Western political scientists have constantly considered the role of the army in the political decision-making process. Thus, the American scientist M. Yanovitz identified three functions of the military in the system of political power: representative, advisory and executive. The possibility for the military to exert influence on the process of formation of state policy is provided by advisory and executive functions. The scientist believes that the military leadership should have the right to express its position and bring the government to its side, like other government agencies. From the point of view of some leaders, the danger lies in the fact that, firstly, the military differs from civilians in their strong corporate spirit, and secondly, and this is the most important thing, the military always has weapons at its disposal, which must be “watched with a jealous eye.”
What is specific about the political role of the army? It is no secret that at a certain stage of development of any society, the army acts as a special apparatus in the hands of economically and politically ruling class to protect, strengthen and expand its dominance, fight against internal opponents and external enemies. Having emerged as an organized armed force, it was immediately opposed to a large part of society and began to be used by a smaller part of it to oppress and enslave the working masses and people. It is precisely the presence in the hands of a minority that powerful force, like an army, allowed him to dominate the majority and achieve his goals in domestic and foreign policy. However, the subsequent development and change of the very object of study (society), the gradual elimination of relations of domination and subordination in politics and the achievement of consensus on the main issues of public life, the desire to establish ideally mutually beneficial cooperation between different political forces dictated the need to begin searching for ways to place the army under the control of the entire society and limit (and in the future eliminate) the possibility of using it by any communities to achieve their narrow group goals. This is done, first of all, in the process of implementing the principle of separation of powers and creating a system of “checks and balances” between the executive and legislative branches, which do not allow each of them individually to take the “reins of power” of the armed forces into their own hands. In democratic countries, while maintaining centralism in the command of the armed forces, a division of powers and prerogatives of heads of state and government, executive and legislative powers in relation to the military sphere has long been introduced. It is known that the executive power in a presidential republic is less tied to the interests of specific groups of voters and, receiving from them only a “mandate of trust”, more attention focuses on solving national problems, the main ones among which are: preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, protecting it from the enemy. Consequently, the need to maintain defense capability at the proper level, constant concern for strengthening the army are not just the constitutional responsibility of all officials, the executive branch and, first of all, the president, but are also gradually turning into a pattern of its functioning, since this task is delegated to it by society * . A new military ideology is already needed, not to mention a radical restructuring of combat training, troop organization, and so on. The natural change in military ideology requires a new conceptual apparatus.
The existence of an army in a multipolar world will significantly expand the range of its functions. Actions will be added as part of multifunctional forces, participation in peacekeeping actions, restoration work after natural Disasters. New paradigm The development of modern Armed Forces will undoubtedly first of all manifest itself in the tendency to weaken the legitimacy of military conscription, the transition from mass armed forces to personnel, professional formations. Hence the blurring of the lines between the reserve and the active, actually operating component of the army. However, the inevitable consequence of these processes is that the weakening of the relationship between the army and political power in Russian conditions can result in painful manifestations of the connection with the mental characteristics of Russia. Unlike Western armies Where relationships have always been based on legal norms - an agreement between the state and a soldier (most often hiring the latter), in the Russian military society from time immemorial the law of morality, the idea of artelism, and the principle: “For one’s friend” have been in effect. The long-term guardianship of society over the army, the significant militarization of the consciousness of the population, the special role of military service in the destinies of many millions of people - these are far from full list factors that must be taken into account in military construction].
Russia needs a new, truly democratic, legal, popular political system, and determining the place, role, and functions of the army in the system of political power is of no small importance. The position and role of the army in the system of political power can be reflected through a number of criteria inherent in the rule of law: the establishment of democracy, parliamentarism and true democracy; overcoming militaristic tendencies, preventing and eliminating armed conflicts and wars, violence against society and people, the army performing only an instrumental role and the inadmissibility of turning it into a political subject; political, economic, spiritual, moral, scientific and technical development, ensuring reliable security of the individual, society and state.
We need a renewed system of moral ideals and values. Conventionally, they can be divided into three spheres: state (protection of the social-democratic system, economic, political, social, spiritual interests of the people, their life, freedom and independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country and its allies, loyalty to the Constitution and the Law); democratic (respect for the dignity of the individual, the equality of all before the Law, the inalienable right to social equality, the implementation of social and legal protection citizens of Russia living in the country and abroad); moral and ethnic (love for the Motherland, one’s people, respect for the sovereignty of other peoples, national identity, loyalty to the oath, civil and military duty, respect for the honor and dignity of a citizen-warrior, defender of the Motherland; following one’s own conscience, friendship and military camaraderie, respect for elders by rank and age, admiration for a woman, respect for one’s own national culture, respect for the customs and traditions of ancestors, national history, etc.)
All of the above leads to the conclusion that the main direction should be a change in the internal political role of the army during the period of reconstruction of the administrative-command system and the formation of the rule of law. The use of the army by the political regime against the people and the creation of mechanisms allowing the use of the army within the country (if such a need nevertheless arises) should be carried out only in strict accordance with the Constitution, in the interests of the majority of citizens, with the complete exclusion of the possibility of its independent action to seize power. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation can arrive at the political science model outlined in general terms through an evolutionary, relatively stable state, and active reform; intra-army social explosion; participation in local civil conflict small and medium intensity; a series of regional and interethnic conflicts; local, focal civil war.
The only possible path that will bring the greatest effect is path one; all others will slow down the development of the army for many decades, leaving Russia without force cover. However, the formation of an army will also be practically impossible without a reasonable reorganization of the military-industrial complex. If, according to experts, by 2005 only 5-7% of Russia's weapons will meet the requirements of the time, then who will need an army equipped with decrepit weapons?
There is another significant destabilizing factor that sharply worsens the starting position of the new army. This is the destruction of the infrastructure of a former mighty military organism. A hasty winding down of air defense forces, past and future losses in the fleets, and weakening of the Strategic Missile Forces could be very costly for the Russian state. Its Armed Forces, which are to be built, will end up on a loose, spreading foundation. The breakdown of the once strong connection between the army and political institutions gave rise to the latter’s indifferent attitude towards ensuring its own security. If this continues, Russia will not find peace in this century.
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Orthodoxy in Russia. The Church and the Russian Army
The establishment of Orthodoxy in the Russian state began with the “baptism of Rus'”, carried out in 988. prince of Kyiv Vladimir. In the first centuries of its existence, the Russian Orthodox Church was completely dependent in religious terms on Byzantium and was headed by Byzantine metropolitans. Only in 1448 did it gain autocephaly, and from 1589 it began to be headed by the Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus'.
In order to strengthen the position of the church within the country and increase its international prestige in the 17th century. Patriarch Nikon would have carried out a church reform that concerned mainly the ordinary side of religious life. It was the reason for the split of the Russian Orthodox Church and the emergence of a movement known as the “Old Believers,” which rejected church innovations.
Subsequently, due to the fact that the patriarchal authorities did not support the reform activities of Peter I. the management of the church was transformed, and it itself was turned into an integral part of the state apparatus Russian Empire. Since 1721, the place of the patriarch was taken by the Holy Government Synod, headed by a government official - the chief prosecutor. In August 1917, the first (after the replacement of the patriarch by the Synod) General Council of the Russian Orthodox Church was convened, which restored the patriarchate, electing Tikhon (Belyavin) as the head of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Church and Patriarch Tikhon did not accept the social transformations of 1017. The Patriarch anathematized Soviet power. A confrontation between the Government and the Church developed.
In order to preserve the church, part of the clergy came up with the idea of “renewing” Orthodoxy, which provided for the recognition of the Soviet state, the modernization of all aspects of church life; Tikhon and his supporters over time also switched to a position of loyalty to Soviet power. His successor was Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky). Later becoming patriarch, he consolidated the new orientation of the church. In 1948, the Second Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church took place, completing the process of reorganization of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Council elected Alexy (Simansky) Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus'.
Many provisions of a dogmatic nature have undergone very thorough adjustments. It is recognized, for example, that it is possible to formulate in a new way both the Christian dogmas themselves and the conclusions from them. In particular, it was no longer stated that suffering was a necessary condition for the "attainment of heavenly bliss." The clergy stopped actively promoting the idea of “leaving the world.”
Labor was no longer viewed as “God’s punishment”; social, scientific, technical and cultural progress. The traditional interpretation of a number of provisions of the Bible has been revised. Gradually the ancestral cult and the entire traditional way of church life are being modernized. The Third Local Council took place in 1971. It oriented the Orthodox Church toward further modernization of all aspects of religious ideology, toward intensifying its activities to strengthen its positions and expand contacts with other Christian churches and associations. Pimen was elected Patriarch.
Currently, the Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus' is Alexy II. The primary unit of the Russian Orthodox Church is the community Eer:, Toishch:; (coming). Blamed executive body consisting of lay people. The clergy, hired by the executive body to satisfy the religious needs of parishioners, do not have the right to interfere in administrative and economic activities, limiting themselves to performing divine services. The costs of maintaining the church and its staff are paid through voluntary donations from believers, the sale of candles and other religious items, and income from services (baptisms, funerals, weddings, etc. These same funds support the entire church apparatus. The parishes are united into districts ( deaneries), and the latter, in turn, in dioceses, territorially coinciding with regions, territories, and sometimes republics. Dioceses are headed by bishops: bishops, archbishops or metropolitans. Diocesan bishops are subordinate to the patriarch - the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, elected by the Council.
Under the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church there is a Holy Synod, consisting of permanent and temporary members. The clergy are trained in theological seminaries and academies. The Russian Orthodox Church also has monasteries at its disposal: both male and female. The Russian Orthodox Church publishes the monthly “Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate”, the annual “Theological Works” and a number of other magazines. The Bible is published New Testament, prayer books, church calendars, collections of sermons and other literature for religious and liturgical purposes.
In religion, over the course of thousands of years of development, methods have been developed for synthetically influencing the human psyche, based on the artistic perception of the world, which significantly enhances the emotional impact of religious preaching.
State reform in Russia is taking place in extremely difficult and contradictory conditions. The socio-economic and political crisis, the international military-political situation has become extremely tense. In the current situation, one of the most important tasks of strengthening the state power of the country is the creation of an effective system of patriotic education based on the traditions of faithful service to one’s Fatherland. It is impossible to solve this problem without knowledge of the history and spiritual and religious traditions of the state, without taking into account the characteristics of various categories of people and the situation in the region and in the country as a whole. A factor that has a significant influence on the situation in the team (employees) is the religious factor. Moreover, with the increasing extremity of the situation, its role increases, and if we take into account that there is a tendency for believers to increase with each call to military service that among young people aged 16-17 there is a high percentage of believers (up to 35%)3 and that political, ethnic and other conflicts acquire a religious overtones, the religious factor acquires special significance.
Another problem arises in Lately The current issue is the problem of religious extremism and intolerance. The spread of non-traditional religions and sects that are anti-social and anti-state in nature requires the leader to be ready for qualified actions based on knowledge of the characteristics of these religions and existing legislation.
Since the emergence of the army, the central core of its moral and psychological readiness has been one or another religious belief. The Russian Armed Forces were no exception. Before and after the campaigns, sacrifices were made to the gods and ritual actions were performed. And with the baptism of Rus' in 988 by Prince Vladimir, a close connection was established between the army and the Orthodox Church, which blessed the troops and guided them in all wars. Before the appearance of regular regiments under Peter I, clergy took part in campaigns. Each squad had its own patron icon. The role of religion was determined by the fact that it, in fact, was the only means of education, development of spiritual strength and strengthening the moral and psychological potential of the army. An important role in increasing the importance and influence of the church was played by the fact that the Russian army was opposed by troops of states that had other official religions. At critical moments in Russian history, religion has always been a centralizing principle that unites the nation. Sergius of Radonezh blessed Dmitry Donskoy for a feat of arms to liberate Rus'. During the period of troubles, Patriarch Hermogenes of Moscow and All Rus' was irreconcilable with the compromisers with the Polish invaders. In oral sermons and letters sent from Moscow, he called on the people to stand up for the Faith and Fatherland and died unbroken in the dungeons of the interventionists. In 1612, troops under the command of Prince Dmitry Pozharsky liberated Moscow. At the head of the troops they carried the icon of the Kazan Mother of God. It is no coincidence that the holiday of the icon of the Kazan Mother of God is so significant for all the peoples of Russia. It is a symbol of perseverance and loyalty to one’s Fatherland and liberation from foreign yoke.
Peter I, forming a regular army and carrying out large-scale reforms, borrowed a lot from foreign experience, but entrusted the matter of spiritual education to the Orthodox Church. The main forms of activity of the clergy in the armed forces were defined in separate chapters of the regulations of the Russian army and navy, which were called: “On the Clergy.” Under Emperor Paul I, a special department of military clergy was created, headed by a field chief priest. Since 1890, the management of churches and the Orthodox clergy of the army and navy has been entrusted to the Protopresbyter. High military spirit and steadfastness of Russian troops in the wars of the 18th and 19th centuries. were provided by a system of spiritual and patriotic education, in which both clergy and the officer corps took part. This was most fully reflected in the Suvorov school of training and education, which was permeated with the ideas of the sanctity of military duty to defend the Fatherland, devotion to the Banner and loyalty to the oath.
Suvorov, being a deeply religious believer, considered faith in God to be the basis of a soldier’s spiritual fortitude, while he himself set an example to his subordinates in observing Orthodox rituals. Temples and cathedrals assigned to the military department played a major role in the patriotic education of the defenders of the Fatherland. They kept military banners, guns and armor of military commanders, and heroically died warriors were immortalized. Educational work was not limited to liturgical activities, which included the consecration of banners and blessing of instruments, the organization of prayers, holding liturgies and prayer services, holding processions and sermons. It was supported by painstaking work with the parish activists, individual work, conducting literature classes, collecting and summarizing information about the state of mind of the troops, pastoral conversations, charitable activities and other events.
One of the most important traditions in spiritual and moral education was the example of courage and fearlessness of clergy on the battlefield. For their heroism during World War I, more than 1,200 priests were awarded Russian state awards. In Russia, more than 4,500 clergy laid down their heads and were maimed on the fields of World War I.
In the Russian army, the Orthodox Church occupied a dominant position, but there were representatives of other faiths. Among the generals and colonels on the eve of World War I, 85% were Orthodox, and the rest considered themselves Muslims, Lutherans, and Armenian-Gregorians. Among the lower ranks, 75% were Orthodox, 2% were Muslims, 9% were Catholics, 1.5% were Lutherans.
Traditionally, Orthodoxy has maintained a tolerant (tolerant) attitude towards representatives of other faiths. This was enshrined in the charter of 1893, which stated: “Infidels of Christian denominations perform public prayers according to the rules of their faith with the permission of the commander in the place appointed by them and, if possible, simultaneously with Orthodox worship.” In the governing documents of the protopresbyter of the military and naval clergy, it was emphasized that: “The clergy laboring on the battlefield has the opportunity to confirm the faith and rightness of the Orthodox Church not by the word of denunciation of other believers, but by the deed of Christian selfless service to both the Orthodox and the heterodox, remembering that the latter also shed blood for the Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland."
The tolerant attitude towards other religions changed sharply in relation to sects and religious associations opposed to serving the Fatherland. Military priests were required to “take all possible measures to suppress sectarianism in the troops and have unrelenting care to limit Orthodox soldiers from this harmful propaganda.”
The split in society that occurred in 1917 was also reflected in the processes of organizing patriotic and military education. The overwhelming majority of the clergy became in opposition to the new government. And along with the persecution of clergy, the accumulated experience of spiritual, moral and psychological influence on military personnel was consigned to oblivion. It turned out to be in demand only during the Great Patriotic War. From the first days of the war, the Russian Orthodox Church took a patriotic position and remained faithful to the duty of serving its people. The spiritual and religious traditions of the Russian army began to be used more fully after I. Stalin’s meeting with the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1943. Without overestimating the role of representatives of different faiths in the fight against the common enemy, it should be said that they made a feasible contribution to supporting the high morale of the soldiers and home front workers. The clergy consoled people in grief, encouraged them to believe in victory over the enemy, collected funds for the construction of military equipment, and patronized hospitals. Thus, historical experience indicates that the Russian Orthodox Church and military clergy made a significant contribution to the spiritual and moral education of soldiers. Together with the commanders, the clergy strengthened spiritual and religious traditions in the army, fostered patriotism, selflessness, loyalty to the oath, faith in a just cause and readiness for self-sacrifice in the name of victory over the enemy.
Considering the problem of interaction between the command and religious associations in the matter of military and patriotic education in modern conditions, it should immediately be noted that it is built strictly in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Art. 14, 19, 28, 29, 30, 59., Laws of the Russian Federation “On freedom of conscience and on religious associations”, “On the status of military personnel”^ also in accordance with the provisions. reflected in the joint Statement of Cooperation signed by the General Director of FAPSI and the Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus', subsequent instructions from the Personnel Department and educational work. The organization of this activity should be based on the fact that currently there are about 20 religious confessions and denominations, as well as more than a dozen different sects, operating in Russia. The largest religious associations on the territory of Russia are the Russian Orthodox Church, Muslims and Evangelical Christians - Baptists.
The Russian Orthodox Church is the largest Orthodox Church in the world. In modern conditions, after 1988, there has been an increase in the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church and an intensification of its activities. The number of baptisms has tripled, the number of weddings has increased ninefold, thousands of new parishes have been opened, hundreds of churches have been restored or built, the number of monasteries has increased more than 10 times, the number of citizens identifying themselves with Orthodoxy is about 46 percent.
The second largest religious denomination in Russia is Islam. There are two Spiritual Administrations of Muslims on the territory of the Russian Federation, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the European Part of Russia and Siberia (Ufa), covering all groups of Tatars and Bashkirs; Muslim Spiritual Administration North Caucasus(Makhachkala) unites the peoples of Dagestan, Chechens, Ingush, Karachais, Balkars, Kabardians, Circassians, Circassians and Abazas. There are about 15 million Muslims in Russia. Accurate accounting is difficult due to the fact that the concept of Muslim is often understood as belonging to a people whose traditional religion was Islam and whose entire way of life is based on remaining faithful to the traditions and customs of their people. In total, more than 2,500 Muslim religious associations are registered in the Russian Federation.
The Church of Evangelical Christian Baptists is the largest denomination among Protestant churches in Russia, with over 500 thousand adult members united in 387 religious societies. The intensification of the ECB's activities is associated with significant financial assistance from foreign communities, which makes it possible to hold mass evangelical meetings in stadiums and concert halls, distribute free literature, and conduct television and radio propaganda of their ideas. The above mentioned religious associations have a positive attitude towards military service, willingly make contact with the command and government authorities in the matter of military, moral and patriotic education.
A completely different matter is sects and “non-traditional cults, which in the overwhelming majority are anti-social and anti-state in nature. Having different names and differing rituals, the essence of these associations is one thing - to completely subjugate a person and use him in the interests of leaders.
The following cults are most active in Russia: the Church of Christ, the Society for Krishna Consciousness, the Church of Unification, the Church of Scientology (Dianetics), satanic, spiritualist groups and others. What they have in common is conspiracy and mimicry of various socially beneficial and health organizations that promise to normalize weight, provide peace of mind and solve all your problems at once. In fact, by recruiting followers and creating a base for functioning in Russia, they actively collect economic, political and other types of information in the interests of foreign centers. It is no coincidence that the greatest activity of these cults is observed in areas where defense enterprises, research institutes and closed facilities operate. That is why carrying out preventive work to prevent employees and their family members from becoming involved in the activities of these cults or working with those already involved should be considered as a fight for the safety of the unit or facility.
In this activity invaluable benefits Cooperation with the Russian Orthodox Church can bring benefits, since it has accumulated extensive experience in exposing evil sects. She constantly studies the situation in this area and can always give advice and provide effective assistance when faced with the activities of a particular sect.
Cooperation with the Russian Orthodox Church, based on an agreement between the General Director of FAPSI and the Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus', has many facets. This includes social protection of employees, military personnel and members of their families, the development of charity, caring for veterans, the wounded and sick, maintaining the burial places of fallen defenders of the Fatherland in proper condition, assistance from clergy in fulfilling religious needs, strengthening moral and psychological stability in a combat situation and extreme situations, in the prevention of suicides and hazing.
Speeches by clergy at ceremonial meetings, during the taking of the oath and other events with parting words and blessings of soldiers for conscientious military service have become traditional. Individual commanders and superiors practice drawing up plans for cooperation with dioceses, in which, by decision of the Patriarch, a clergyman is appointed who is responsible for the spiritual care of soldiers and law enforcement officers. This is done in order not to invite a clergyman from case to case and not from holiday to holiday, but on a planned basis to exchange information about ongoing processes, to adjust ongoing educational activities, making them more emotionally rich and interesting. The experience of clergy speaking to the leaders of the UCP on the topic “Church and the Army in Russia: historical experience and facets of cooperation” is positive.
Bibliography
To prepare this work, materials from the site http://www.filreferats.ru were used