Radical transformation of the system international relations, the adoption of a new military doctrine, a reduction in the size of the Armed Forces, a focus on quality parameters in defense construction - these and many other factors dictate the need for military reform in Russia. Therefore, military reform became an imperative of socio-political practice in Russia after the end of "cold war". The need for military reform in the Russian Federation is due to geopolitical changes. It is geopolitical features that predetermine the significant scale of transformation that must be carried out in the context of large-scale socio-economic reforms.
The armed forces inherited by the Russian Federation from the USSR were created as a means of confrontation in « cold war» and in many respects do not meet the requirements for modern armed forces. The Russian army is not sufficiently prepared for local and ethnic conflicts; technical equipment Russian army, insufficient professionalism of soldiers and officers. One of the main problems of the Russian army has been insufficient funding "human resource", as well as ineffective mechanisms for social protection of military personnel. All of these problems and many others cannot be solved by gradually correcting the shortcomings inherent in the Russian army - to solve the numerous problems of the Russian armed forces, it is necessary to implement military reform as a comprehensive series of measures aimed at radically transforming the RF Armed Forces.
Military reform should not be identified with the reform of the Armed Forces, since the reform of the Armed Forces is considered as an integral part of the reform of the entire military development in the country. In this context, it is also worth noting some other problems accompanying the implementation of the military reform process in modern Russia, which, one way or another, require close study.
The crisis in the Russian army worsened in the late 1980s. By the end of the 80s. expenses for the military-industrial complex and the maintenance of a multimillion-dollar army aggravated the economic crisis. Underestimation of the factor of the Russian army's unpreparedness to repel threats to global, regional and national security has led to miscalculations in the military reform carried out in Russia. It should also be noted that all these factors create the prerequisites for the implementation of military reform in order to strengthen the combat capability of the Russian army.
As main negative factors, which predetermined the decline in combat readiness of the Soviet and then the Russian army, K. Tsirulis and V. Bazhanov indicate:
1. The irreconcilable contradiction of the corrupt caste with the rest of the officer mass;
2. Alienation between the generals, officers, sergeants and soldiers;
3. "Hazing", which created a tendency to criminalize the army and a system of ugly informal relationships;
4. Intensive development of equipment and weapons, which has exacerbated the contradiction between the need to increase the professionalism of personnel and outdated methods of combat training and its organization;
5. The decline in the prestige of military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation due to the involvement of military personnel of military specialties in economic work, which led to a decrease in combat readiness.
Unsatisfactory combat readiness is associated with a transition from the form of army organization inherent in the command-administrative system Soviet type to the form of organization of the army of a democratic state. However, events in the early 1990s prevented the rapid implementation of military reforms. In the 1990s. military reform was not implemented. The state policy of reducing military spending without reforming the Armed Forces led to the collapse of the army. The shortage of funding for the Armed Forces has led to the use of emergency reserves.
The military reform programs being developed had political significance, and military reform in practice meant theoretical, methodological, organizational and legal framework. However, the successful implementation of military reform in the late 1990s. were hampered by insufficient funding, shortage of funds and lack of political will to implement the planned measures. During the military reform from 1992 to 2001, which can be called, in the words of L. Pevenya "a decade of missed opportunities", its main tasks were not completed:
- high combat readiness of troops is not ensured;
- not developed effective measures on social security of military personnel.
The aspect of the gradual transition of the Russian army to a contract basis for staffing positions deserves special attention. In the context of military reform in Russia, this process can be seen as affecting not only the organization of the Russian army, but also influencing Russian society. This determines efficient use contract soldiers with the latest equipment and increasing the professionalism of military personnel and the Russian army as a whole. However, the initial cost of maintaining contract soldiers significantly exceeds the cost of conscript soldiers. The first experiments on the formation military units of contract soldiers were carried out in the early 1990s. The first unsuccessful experiment to transfer the army to a contract system of recruiting privates and non-commissioned officers in Russia began in 1992. The peak of the unsuccessful experiment occurred in the summer - autumn of 1993 - the experiment failed due to insufficient funding and the lack of a social benefits package for contract workers.
However, even now material remuneration and social benefits for contract workers are minimal. It can be assumed that, subject to the provision of favorable socio-economic conditions for a significant part of conscripts this type Service in the Armed Forces can become attractive and prestigious look civil service. Important role Positive advertising in the media can play a role in increasing motivation to serve under a contract. Support for the transition to a professional army is significantly higher among groups with higher social resources and the potential for their implementation.
The introduction of the alternative civil service (ACS) became important event in the socio-political life of the Russian Federation. Perhaps in the future the AGS Institute will be replenished with a large number of potential participants, the number of which can be measured in tens and hundreds of thousands. Jobs for those mobilized within the framework of the alternative civil service can be found in orphanages and homes, homes for the elderly, and people with disabilities. These jobs, as a rule, are characterized by relatively difficult working conditions and are not prestigious and unattractive for the majority of traditional workers, but the public demand for such work is increasing. Military reforms meet with support in Russian society, especially among those categories of conscripts and others community groups who receive social benefits or advantages as a result of the introduction of recruitment of the alternative civil service. The problem of assessing the socio-economic consequences of staffing the alternative civil service is difficult to predict long-term. It should be assumed that many social groups will benefit from these innovations. However, in existing form These transformations cannot solve the main problem of the Russian army - the plight of soldiers (called up for military service) and officers.
Social aspects of military reform of the Russian Armed Forces
IN post-reform Russia complex, contradictory and often unpredictable social processes have a significant impact not only on certain social groups Russian society, but also for military personnel and their families. Indeed, one of the main problems of the Russian army has been insufficient funding "human resource", ineffective mechanisms for social protection of soldiers and officers. All of these and many other problems cannot be solved by gradually correcting the shortcomings inherent in the Russian army. Therefore, to solve numerous social problems The Russian army needs to implement comprehensive measures, the purpose of which is to take targeted actions aimed at radically transforming the social protection system for Russian military personnel.
Low pay for military personnel and insufficient funding for the maintenance of the army have become one of the important problems requiring immediate solution. In this regard, economic measures of the Government have been adopted or planned to be adopted, the purpose of which is to replace the benefits of military personnel with monetary compensation. Calculated for 2002-2010. the State Housing Certificates program partially contributed to solving this problem. The functioning of the mortgage system for officers will solve the housing problem for many military personnel.
Having considered the main aspects of military reform and its impact social aspects on Russian society, we can come to the following conclusions:
1. Russia as great country, on which international security depends, must have a combat-ready army that meets the most modern requirements. The need to counter terrorist threats and repel the threats of potential aggressors obliges military personnel to constantly improve the military-technical equipment of the army.
2. In the modern Russian army, a very negative social climate has developed; cases "hazing". To increase public confidence in the army, hazing must be curbed. Frequent cases of violation of fundamental human rights in the army determine the negative attitude of many conscripts towards emergency service. Numerous illegal methods of evading military conscription are widespread.
3. Military reform, carried out in Russia for more than a century and a half, has become one of key events Russian socio-political life. It has a great influence on Russian society and affects the interests of many social groups and lobby.
4. The most pressing problem of military reform has a rational, feasible solution for the Russian economy and society. Since 2001, it has entered the accelerated implementation process. The successful implementation of the military reform of the RF Armed Forces will make it possible to move to a new system of recruiting troops without compromising the combat capabilities of military units, to ensure the necessary number of trained reserves, and to eliminate many aspects social tension in society, which is typical for current system appeal and ensure Russian society's support for reforms.
Work with personnel
Referring to authoritative studies of domestic experts in the field of military construction and military management, B.L. Belyakov highlights the problems of educating personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and also focuses his research interest on the substantive characteristics of their influence. He points out that the problems of modern military education are determined by such a factor as the disintegration of the previously relatively effective and established system of educational work in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including the strengthening of military discipline, with military personnel of various ethnic groups and nations, along with introducing a religious factor into the army environment.
Slow and protracted phased creation new system educational work that does not meet the main goals and objectives of the concept of transition to a unitary system of educational work in military collectives various genera troops of the Armed Forces. This slow process of transition to a unitary education system, in his opinion, also makes it difficult for more effective and coordinated work command and commanders of military formations, as well as the system of bureaucratic departments of educational work to unite and carry out educational work in multinational or multi-ethnic military collectives of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Moreover, the absence in the Armed Forces of a scientifically and conceptually based system and training program for humanities specialists (philologists, ethnologists and historians) specially trained to conduct socially oriented work (information, educational, etc.) with military personnel of various ethnic groups has a negative impact and nationalities inhabiting the Russian Federation.
In the 70s of the last century in the Soviet army there were no serious interethnic or interethnic conflicts, and in the system social relations the grandfather structure prevailed in army teams. Later, when solidarity in army collectives on a national, ethnic or compatriotic basis acquired a large-scale character, the compatriot-status system of social relations in many cases prevailed in army collectives over the traditional "grandfather's" and even destroy the latter. With the collapse of the USSR and the increased national homogeneity of the Russian army, the criminal system came to the fore.
In the modern Russian army, many commanders and their assistants in educational work need to work and act, mainly in extraordinary conditions and with some elements of innovation and even, under certain conditions, risk, to solve current problems and tasks of increased pedagogical complexity. At the same time, it is also necessary to take into account that some commanders have lost their previous ideological and moral values. traditional system educational work that developed in the Russian and Soviet armies, and new spiritual values in educational activities never formed. Failed search experiments national idea, ostentatious appeal to national and ethno-confessional sources, the decline in the standard of living of a significant number of the country's population led to social and legal vulnerability and uncertainty about the future among a significant number of military personnel. All these factors in a negative way influence pedagogical activity officers in the army to strengthen military discipline in military teams. It should also be noted that the solution to many of the above problems and challenges is possible by turning to theoretical, conceptual and practical methods sociological science and the involvement of professional sociologists in eliminating the consequences of these dysfunctional phenomena in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Along with this read:
Politics and military reform
Army reform
Military-technical cooperation with France
The first decade of the 21st century clearly demonstrated that “color revolutions”, new forms and methods of warfare, the so-called network or, require the state and military leadership of our country to rethink and a certain transformation of the theory and practice of building the Armed Forces, as well as their application in new conditions. Therefore, the need for reform is objective.
According to military researchers, transformations were carried out seven times in the history of our state military organization and the Armed Forces were reformed more than 15 times. And each time the reforms were a very complex, responsible and difficult process.
The state of the Armed Forces by 2008 was characterized by the following general indicators:
The share of formations and military units of permanent readiness: divisions - 25%, brigades - 57%, aviation regiments - 7%;
The number of military base camps is more than 20 thousand;
The number of Armed Forces is 1,134 thousand military personnel, including 350 thousand (31%), 140,000 warrant officers (12%), contract soldiers and sergeants - about 200 thousand (17%);
Equipping with modern weapons, military and special equipment - 3-5%;
stages and main content of the reform
All reforms in the Russian Army took place as a result of the country's major military defeats in the struggle for freedom and independence. Ivan the Terrible's military reforms late XVII- early 18th century were caused by the need to strengthen the Russian army in connection with the creation single state and protection from attacks by neighbors. Peter the Great creates a regular army and navy based on conscription. After powerful defeats from its northern neighbors, after the defeat of Russia from the Anglo-French-Turkish coalition in the Crimean War of 1853–1856. There is an urgent need for another military reform in the country. After the military defeat in Russian-Japanese war 1904–1905 the government of Nicholas II attempted to carry out another military reform (1905–1912), etc.
The main goal of the latest military reforms is the creation of highly equipped Armed Forces with the necessary military deterrence potential.
When planning the reform, the country's leadership took into account the difficult socio-economic situation in Russia, limited opportunities financing reform activities.
The entire reform was planned to be carried out over a period of 8–10 years, which is divided into 2 stages.
At the first stage (1997–2000), it was planned to move from five branches of the Armed Forces to four branches.
The implementation of this stage of reforms was met with strong approval Western states who saw their interests in this, NATO member countries that allocated money for disposal (destruction) Soviet systems defense and attack. In the period 1997–1998, the air force and air defense forces were combined. The ground forces were reformed, and the structures of the Navy were optimized. All this boiled down to the creation of a limited number of combat-ready formations and units, expanding the functions and sphere of influence of the remaining ones, staffed by people and equipped with modern equipment.
The first stage of military reform ended with the optimization of the entire structure of the Russian Armed Forces.
The second stage of the reform should bring the following results:
– transition to a three-type aircraft structure;
– creation of multifunctional new types of weapons for strategic, operational and tactical purposes;
– creation of scientific, technical and technological basis for the rearmament of the Russian Army;
– transformation of the Military Space Forces into an independent branch of the military.
As a result of the reform, the capabilities of the Armed Forces should increase to carry out the tasks of strategic deterrence, prevent and repel aggression against Russia and its allies, localize and neutralize local conflicts and wars, as well as implement Russia’s international obligations.
To solve these problems, the Russian Armed Forces must include:
– nuclear deterrent forces (SNF) – to hold nuclear powers from possible deployment nuclear war, as well as other states with powerful conventional weapons, from non-nuclear wars;
– non-nuclear deterrent forces to deter possible aggressor states from starting non-nuclear wars;
– mobile forces – for the speedy resolution of military conflicts;
– information forces – to counter a possible enemy in an information war.
These tasks must be solved by the already reformed branches of the Russian Armed Forces.
Every year the modernization of the Russian Armed Forces is gaining momentum. New types of weapons are being approved, the infrastructure of the army is being improved, and the professional excellence military personnel. So today's question is Rearmament reforms of the Russian Armed Forces 2018 still remains open.
In certain circles, doubts arise that the military reform program of 2008-2020 will be completed on time. In mind economic crisis and rapidly changing conditions in the country, it is very difficult to predict the outcome of the reform.
The problem of the need for such a reform was voiced shortly before 2008 and was presented only as one of the possible directions for future reformation. A set of measures, divided into several stages, is designed to change and improve the structure, strength and composition of a strategically important military organization for the country - the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Stages of rearmament:
- Stage I – took place from 2008 to 2011 inclusive.
- Stage II - began in 2012 and ended in 2015.
- Stage III – planned for the period from 2016 to 2020 inclusive.
Organizational and staffing maneuvers
At the first stage, organizational and staffing measures were carried out aimed at improving management, optimizing numbers and carrying out military education reform.
One of the main directions of the first stage of the reformation was the transition from a system consisting of four links (that is, “military district - army - division - regiment”) to a system including only three links: “military district - operational command - brigade”.
The number of military districts was reduced, each of which established its own reserve command. During the rearmament reform, the number of military units was also reduced.
Reduction degree:
- Ground forces - 90%;
- Navy - by 49%;
- Air Force - by 48%;
- Rocket Forces strategic purpose– by 33%;
- Airborne troops - by 17%;
- Space Forces - by 15%.
A significant part of the rearmament was the reduction in the number of military personnel. Officers were the most affected by the reformation: with approximately 300 thousand people, the number officers decreased by almost half.
It must be said that the optimization of numbers was determined to be unsuccessful. The actions of the military department led to complex problems: the professional part junior staff The army command was completely destroyed. Experts, by the way, recognized the program to replace warrant officers with sergeants as a failure.
It is expected that the warrant officers will return to their units in the required composition. By the beginning of 2018, the military department plans to increase the size of the Russian army. So, the total number of officers will be 220 thousand people, warrant officers and midshipmen - approximately 50 thousand people, contract soldiers - 425 thousand people, conscripts - 300 thousand people. A significant number of conscripts testify to.
The reform of military education implies the reduction of some military institutes and universities, and instead of them, scientific centers were formed under the leadership of the Ministry of Defense.
Optimization of social security for military personnel
The second stage of the reformation, which includes resolving issues social nature, was aimed at the following activities: providing housing, increasing material allowances, advanced training and professional retraining.
At the moment, the number of military personnel without housing has decreased significantly compared to 2009. Unfortunately, not everything went smoothly. In the first years of the second stage, this issue was successfully resolved, but since 2012, the number of people who do not have their own apartment has grown inexorably.
The elimination of the queue for housing, according to the plan of the Ministry of Defense, was to be completed by 2013. However, this process was not implemented for a number of serious reasons. In such conditions, the department took the only the right decision instead of housing, give those on the waiting list a one-time cash payment.
The increase in material allowances for military personnel occurred in 2012. Salaries were increased almost 3 times, and military pensions also increased. All allowances and additional payments in force before the reformation were abolished, and completely new additional payments were introduced instead.
All contract servicemen, according to the professional retraining reform, were required to undergo special “survival courses” aimed at improving their skills. Retraining of officers is carried out when a serviceman is appointed to a position.
Rearmament reform at present
Currently, the third stage of the reform of the rearmament of the Russian Armed Forces is underway. As of 2016, the total share of new weapons in the Russian Military Forces was 47%, while, according to the plan, this figure should have been only 30%. For the army, this means receiving an additional number of modern tanks, small arms and other types of weapons.
The ultimate goal of the reform is to increase the number of modern weapons to 70% by 2020. Thus, the modernization of the army of the Russian Federation must be completed on time and in full.
In addition to technical improvements, the rearmament reform contributed to increasing the level of combat training of military personnel, conducting large-scale exercises, the formation of new military institutions and units, optimization of the structure of the Military forces, etc.
The best assessment of the current state of affairs can be the opinion of our sworn “friends” from the West, who emphasize the ever-increasing military power our country.
Browser -Observer 2003 № 6 (1 6 1 )
MILITARY REFORM IN RUSSIA
Oleg Lisov,
head of the VIMI sector
The first attempts at serious and systematic reform of the Armed Forces of our state in recent decades were made in the 70s, when, at the direction of the USSR Minister of Defense D. Ustinov, new organizational and personnel staffs and new technology was translated a whole army(28th, stationed in Belarus). After knocking together and fully equipped new technology She took part in the Zapad-81 maneuvers, showing excellent results for those times. Unfortunately, this experience was not used, and the subsequent period of stagnation and the so-called “perestroika” did not allow the country’s leadership to further engage in reforming the army.
Over the past 10 years, in all layers of Russian society and, first of all, Russian politicians The debate about the need to reduce the army and reform the Russian Armed Forces continues. The country's leadership is hesitantly (either out of ignorance or out of fear?) making attempts to do something in this direction, but significant and, most importantly, positive results there are still no results from these attempts. At the same time, the Armed Forces are finally losing their combat readiness and combat effectiveness, the best, young and promising officers are leaving the army, equipment is aging, the number of accidents is growing sharply, and the prestige of the Armed Forces has fallen to its lowest level. Military service was no longer honorable duty and duty (as it is written in the Constitution of the Russian Federation and as it should be), and almost a shame.
The military reform carried out in Russia since mid-1997 was designed to adapt the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the new military needs of the state and its changed economic capabilities. However, the financial and economic collapse of August 1998 interrupted the program of civilized military reform and delayed its implementation for many years.
Regulatory framework for reform
Until 1998 guiding document to determine the strategy for reforming the Armed Forces, the “Plan for the reform and construction of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” was approved by the President, which was then replaced by the “Fundamentals (concept) of state policy for the military development of Russia for the period until 2005”, approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation in July 1998. In accordance with this document, unfortunately, each law enforcement agency developed its own internal plans reforming the forces, which then had to be coordinated with the General Staff of the Armed Forces and united into general document, in order to ensure a systematic process of reform, construction and strengthening of Russia’s military security according to a single plan. In accordance with this plan, some organizational and staffing measures were carried out, but over time it turned out that the measures taken did not achieve the objectives, and many transformations did not improve, but, on the contrary, worsened the country’s security organization system and required cancellation or replacement with new ones (Table 1). 1).
The main measures of the military reform of the Russian Federation, carried out until 2005.
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Stages and main activities on reforming the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation |
Goals and tasks to be solved and possible consequences |
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Stage 1 - until 2000 |
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(Significant reductions in troop personnel, reduction (enlargement) of military districts, changes in the structure of troops and the organization of military command). |
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Reduction in the number of personnel of the Russian Ground Forces from 420 thousand people. up to 348 thousand people |
Increasing the efficiency of troop control |
|
Reform of the Main Command of the Ground Forces. |
Significant reduction in numbers. |
|
Inclusion of the military space forces (VKS) and missile and space defense forces (RKO) into the composition Missile Forces strategic purpose (Strategic Missile Forces). |
Reduction in the number of administrative staff. |
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Education from VKS and RKO new independent kind troops - space and its transfer to the Russian Air Force. |
Reducing the cost of maintaining management staff. |
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Strategic Missile Forces - reorganization from a type of troops into a branch of troops. |
Reducing costs for R&D and scientific development. |
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Completion of the formation of the structure of the Russian Armed Forces, consisting of four services - the Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force and Strategic Forces. |
Elimination of parallelism in the work of military headquarters and leadership. |
|
Merger of the country's Air Force and Air Defense into one branch of the Russian Armed Forces - the Air Force. |
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|
Establishment unified system military-administrative division of the territory of the Russian Federation into strategic directions: North-Western - within the borders of the Leningrad Military District; Western - within the boundaries of the Moscow Military District; Southwestern - within the borders of the North Caucasus Military District; Siberian Military District and Far Eastern Military District - within the borders of the Far Eastern Military District (5 military districts). |
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|
Stage 2 - until 2002 |
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(Reducing numbers, increasing funding, increasing combat readiness, transferring some units to contract service). |
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Reconstruction of the High Command of the Ground Forces (2001). |
Increasing the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of units and formations. |
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Increasing combat readiness, modernization and development of new types and types of weapons. |
Reforming and strengthening the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation. |
|
Creation of parts and connections of “constant readiness”: |
Preservation of the officer corps. |
|
three divisions and four brigades of “constant readiness” have been formed in the Leningrad, Moscow, North Caucasus and Siberian military districts, which are at least 80% staffed with l/s, 100% armed, trained and constantly subject to increased requirements). |
Raising the social and moral status of military personnel. |
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Steps to increase the number of contract soldiers in the Armed Forces. |
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Promotion social status and the rights of military personnel. |
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Experimental transfer of an airborne division to a contract basis, with subsequent study of experience and its implementation in other troops. |
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Development and adoption of the Law “On Alternative Civil Service in the Russian Federation (AGS)”. |
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Stage 3 - until 2005 |
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(Increase in “constant readiness” units and formations, increase in purchases military equipment. Transfer of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the entire state defense system to the principle of “effective sufficiency”). |
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Concentration of efforts and funds to gradually increase the number of formations and units of “constant readiness” (such units and formations must be created in all types of aircraft. In Ground forces it was planned to have up to 10 full-blooded divisions). |
Increasing the efficiency of troops and military equipment. |
|
Improving the structure of command and control of troops. |
Strengthening the role and place of the military-industrial complex in the country's defense system. |
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Transfer of the Armed Forces proper to a three-service organizational structure (land, air-space, sea). |
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Modernization and improvement of weapons and military equipment. |
Increasing the combat power of the Armed Forces, strengthening the process of re-equipping the army, introducing new types and models of weapons and military equipment. |
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Increased purchases of weapons and military equipment, enhanced and effective implementation of them among the troops. |
Implementation of the constitutional right of a citizen to alternative service. |
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Preparation of a regulatory, legal, organizational, staffing and socio-economic justification for the introduction of an alternative civil service (ACS) in the Russian Federation, along with compulsory military service (the ACS law has been put into effect in the Russian Federation only since 2004). |
Fulfillment of assumed international obligations. |
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Creation of a unified rear of the Armed Forces for the army, navy, aviation, troops of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, border, internal and railway troops. |
Reducing the number of conscripts. |
|
Reaching 100% provision of the Armed Forces with all resources (combat, financial, etc.). |
Scientific and technical development of new types of equipment and mastery of this technology. |
In addition, over time, it became clear that reforms in the law enforcement agencies were and are being carried out by certain groups of certain officials who were not interested in them, and their actions are often based not on scientifically developed and well-verified calculations, but on their purely personal feelings and accumulated experience and knowledge. The results of such work are an annual reduction in numbers, the merger and division of branches and branches of the armed forces, the consolidation of districts, the reorganization of the administrative apparatus, the reform of combat formations, the liquidation of scientific schools and the entire system of training scientific personnel, the reduction of military schools and academies. But where is the expected result - a positive effect? Such implementation of organizational and staffing measures does not solve the main task - strengthening the military security of the state, but, on the contrary, weakens it and aggravates the situation of the Russian Armed Forces. The results of each reform are extremely painful not only on personnel, their moral and psychological state and financial situation, but on the most important thing - the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of forces and means to protect the state. An analysis of the measures taken as part of the reform of the Russian military machine shows that the effectiveness (effectiveness) of many of the measures carried out until recently, frankly speaking, does not correspond to the initial calculations - no extra financial resources appear, numbers are not reduced, and expenses are not reduced. As a result, combat readiness does not increase, and some activities remain experiments and previously made decisions are canceled or replaced by others (for example, the liquidation and re-establishment of the Main Command of the Ground Forces). This kind of event first sharply reduces the efficiency of the functioning of the entire military body, then there is a loss of the best, experienced part of the troop personnel and, finally, a partial or complete loss of combat readiness of units and formations. So, if by the beginning of the 90s the ground forces had 80 combat-ready formations, then in 2002 - 20 formations of the ground forces and 15 in other types of armed forces eke out a miserable existence, of which only one 42nd division in Chechnya is responsible these increased requirements.
Also interesting is the composition of those called up for military service conscript contingent - 89% of young men of conscription age either evade service or are exempt from it in various ways- they get sick, give birth to more than 2 children, go on the run, go abroad, etc.
Of the 11% of conscripts, mainly from remote areas and remote areas, 7% have elementary education, 30% are secondary, and 40% have never studied or worked anywhere, and only about 20% meet the requirements.
An analysis of the first stage of military reform in Russia allowed "attentive" researchers from the London Institute for Strategic Studies in their report "Military Balance 1999-2000." draw very pessimistic and rather amateurish conclusions. Their meaning is as follows: “the general state of combat readiness of all the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, with the exception of nuclear ones, remains low due to the lack of funds for training, maintenance and procurement of weapons. However, despite the difficulties in 1999, the Russian Armed Forces demonstrated higher than seemingly the ability to deploy large combined forces." At what expense and with what efforts?
Main directions of reform implementation
As experience and practice show, the main thing in solving the most complex and enormous problem of our state - reforming its Armed Forces - should be a systematic approach. This primarily includes:
Correct formulation of political tasks facing the state and the Armed Forces;
Scientific determination of the future appearance of the Armed Forces (what the Armed Forces should be);
Optimal reform of those parts and formations that exist at the time of reform;
The gradual construction and creation of new units and formations for the successful defense of the country and the possible conduct of war for the next 10, 20, 30 or more years.
Reforms in the Armed Forces, as a rule, are carried out in four main directions - changing the command and control system of the Armed Forces, changing the recruitment system, changing the training and education system, changing the system of equipping troops with weapons, military equipment, various types of allowances and maintenance. This has not been implemented in our Armed Forces until recently. Military science states that there are three states of the level of combat readiness of any military unit or formation - combat-ready, partially combat-ready and not combat-ready. The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces introduced the fourth category - the supercritical level of combat readiness of all the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - this is current state our aircraft.
It is well known that all the above tasks must be determined and formulated in the main government documents- “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” - a political document that defines the main directions of state policy in the field of ensuring the security of the individual, society, state and the country’s security from external and internal threats; "The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation" is a political document that defines the military-political, military-strategic and military-economic foundations for ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation and a number of other fundamental legal planning and executive acts. Unfortunately, these legal documents began to appear only in 2000. It can be considered that from that moment, on the basis of a whole package of such normative and legal acts, systematic work began to continue in our country to reform its Armed Forces.
Economic aspects of military reform
With the collapse Soviet Union, with the formation of the Russian Federation and its entry into the perestroika era, military expenditures of the state began to decline sharply, and if in 1992 they amounted to 5.56% of GDP, then in 2002 - approximately 2.5% of gross domestic product, and in 2003 - 2.65%. Moreover, the reduction in expenses occurred simultaneously and was accompanied by an indiscriminate reduction in the size of the Russian Armed Forces, the squandering and destruction of weapons and military equipment (Table 2). In practice, real spending on national defense, taking into account inflation, the war in Chechnya and a number of other economic and environmental consequences and other negative aspects of our history, according to experts, in last years decreased by 70-75%.
Recognizing the importance and need for a clear and mandatory implementation of military reforms in the security forces of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation has finally designated the allocations for its implementation as a separate line in the budget. Moreover, if in 2001 only 4.5 billion rubles were allocated for these purposes, then in 2002 it was already 16.544 billion rubles, i.e., practically, the amount increased almost 4 times, and in 2003 - 15.8 billion rubles. IN next year this amount should be more significant, and the country’s leadership stipulates that it is possible to increase allocations for these purposes.
Allocations for the national defense of the Russian Federation in 1992-2003.
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Indicators |
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GDP, billion rubles |
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Actual expenditures on national defense, billion rubles. |
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Actual allocations, % of GDP |
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The main element of reforming the Armed Forces, unfortunately, in accordance with decisions taken there was and remains a radical reduction in the number of troops. From total number personnel of law enforcement agencies 2 million 360 thousand people. military and 960 thousand people. About 600 thousand civilian personnel should be fired. From the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation proper, whose number is 1 million 200 thousand people. (Table 3), 365 thousand people should be dismissed, and about 140 thousand people from other law enforcement agencies. In fact, during 2001, the staffing level of the RF Armed Forces was reduced by 91 thousand people. and 14.5 thousand people. civilian personnel. As of January 1, 2002, the strength of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was 1.274 million military personnel. Subsequently, some politicians propose to increase the strength of the Russian Armed Forces to 600-800 thousand people, however, it is scientifically substantiated that for the reliable organization of military security of the state, the strength of the Armed Forces of any country should be 1% of the population. According to estimates of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Russia should have an Armed Forces of 1 million 200 thousand people, which will reliably ensure border protection and military security of the state and be well within its financial capabilities.
According to the adopted "Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation" the level of expenses for national security(this includes defense) should be approximately 5.1% of GDP, and in the opinion of our President, this figure should not exceed 3.5% of gross domestic product. The main task for the Armed Forces in at this stage- creation of units and formations of “constant readiness” in all types and branches of troops. This task was set by the President of the Russian Federation at a meeting with the high military command in July 2002. In the near future, the Ground Forces will have 10 full-blooded divisions of “constant readiness”, and in other types of armed forces the number of such formations is planned to be increased
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Indicators |
Number |
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Composition of the RF Armed Forces |
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Total number |
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Officers and warrant officers (midshipmen) |
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Soldiers and sergeants (sailors and foremen); (conscription service) |
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Warrant officers (midshipmen), sergeants and soldiers (foremen and sailors); (contract service) |
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To others, no less important direction reform is the creation of combat-ready units and formations with the involvement of more contract soldiers. According to many experts, when modern level development of technology, this can only be achieved by transferring the Armed Forces to a contract basis. Such experiments are already being carried out. Such an experiment is being carried out in the Pskov Airborne Division. According to conservative estimates, the transfer of just one division to a contract basis is estimated at 3-3.5 billion rubles, and for the entire Armed Forces at 150-200 billion rubles. This is only a translation.
No one has yet calculated how much it will cost to maintain such troops. It is clear, as world experience shows, that it is impossible to solve all the problems of the army with the help of contract soldiers. According to the experience of most European countries The Armed Forces in these countries are recruited in two ways - by contract and by conscription. Foreign experts clearly consider this model of army recruitment to be the best and have long abandoned a completely hired Armed Forces. And this is the right decision.
The third important area of reforming the Armed Forces is the development and adoption of a completely new legal act for our country, which allows young people called up for military service to undergo non-military, as well as civilian - alternative service. The adoption of such a document will entail the creation of an entire state system for organizing such a service and will likely require large expenses. On July 24, 2002, the President of the Russian Federation signed a new Federal Law “On Alternative Civil Service in the Russian Federation (AGS),” which will come into force in our country in January 2004.
The appearance of such an unusual document for our country is dictated by the provision of Russian citizens with the right to alternative service, which is written in Article 59 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws "On military duty and military service" and "On defense". After the adoption of the Law "On Alternative Civil Service", it will be necessary to develop and adopt a regulation on alternative civil service (ACS), adapt it to the conditions individual regions, identify organ executive power, who will exercise this control and be responsible for the person’s performance of this service. This will certainly require new expenses.
Some calculation data
1998-1999 on behalf of the President of the Russian Federation and the government of the country General base The Armed Forces, together with a number of research institutes, conducted a comprehensive scientific study "Forecast of financial and economic support for the construction of the RF Armed Forces for the period up to 2010." All work was based on the scientifically proven number of armed forces of 1 million 200 thousand people, the existing volumes of monetary allowances, standards for the supply of clothing and food, the established level of medical and other types of allowances, services and support.
In table 3, 4 and 5 show the results of these studies. Despite the considerable time that has passed since the publication of these data, with minor amendments, they could be used for further developments.
The results of the forecast of financial and economic support for the construction of the RF Armed Forces for the period up to 2010 indicate that even if the most successful option for the development of the Russian economy is implemented, the country's Ministry of Defense will be able to receive financial resources in the required volumes only starting from 2005. This circumstance will clearly require a revision of some deadlines for the implementation of the most important measures of military reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
billion rubles (in 1998 prices)
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Preparation |
Procurement of arms and military equipment |
Builder- |
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Table 5
Required distribution of total expenses of the RF Ministry of Defense
for the intended purpose in 1988-2005.
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Preparation |
Procurement of arms and military equipment |
Builder- |
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Some conclusions
1. Despite whole line negative points(sometimes the weak theoretical validity of the event, the lack of sufficient and real funding, the reluctance of some senior managers carry out unpopular reforms, improperly organized and not fully carried out measures, etc.), a number of organizational, staffing, structural, financial and social reforms continue to be carried out in the Russian Federation in line with the military reform of its Armed Forces.
2. The annual increase in funding for military reform (from 4.5 billion rubles in 2001 to 16.5 billion rubles in 2002) gives new impetus to its continuation and expansion.
3. In the course of the ongoing reform in the RF Armed Forces, three new divisions and four new brigades of “permanent readiness” have already been created and are functioning in the Leningrad, Moscow, North Caucasus and Siberian military districts. They are staffed personnel by no less than 80%, by property and weapons by 100%, and increased demands are constantly placed on them. It is planned to have such units and formations in all types of aircraft.
4. The President of the Russian Federation assigned to the leadership of the Armed Forces the main task- create units and formations of “constant readiness” in all types of aircraft. In particular, it is planned to have 10 such formations in the Ground Forces, and the construction of the Armed Forces and the entire defense of the country should be carried out according to the principle of “effective sufficiency.”
5. Practical steps on the creation of units and formations staffed on a contract basis (transfer of the Pskov Airborne Division), should give practical result to further expand this experiment to all types and genera of aircraft.
6. When reforming units and formations, it is necessary to use the experience and miscalculations identified during the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya, NATO combat operations in Yugoslavia and the US Armed Forces in Afghanistan, and possibly future battles in Iraq.
7. With the adoption by the leadership of the Russian Federation in 2002 of the Federal Law “On Alternative Civil Service in the Russian Federation (ATS)” and its entry into force in January 2004, the process of consolidation in the state continues legislative norms for implementation Russian citizens their rights and responsibilities (only 11% of the conscript contingent is currently serving in the military, 89% of young men of conscription age avoid serving in the Armed Forces).
8. As the experience and practice of building and reforming the Armed Forces of other states shows, such negative decisions and mistakes are always present when implementing such grandiose transformations as military reform. To reduce them you need:
Participation in the transformation process large number disinterested participants (experts);
Competent approach and scientifically based development of the creature, move and final results any event carried out;
Practical consolidation of the results obtained directly in the troops;
Evaluate and use the experience gained to take further steps in the reform process.
9. The purposeful nature of military construction in new, changed conditions requires a rather complex and well-developed system of planning and implementation of the entire process of this construction. To do this, it is necessary to have a package of specially developed regulatory legal acts that define the goals, objectives and functional responsibilities of various government agencies in managing military development and generally strengthening the combat power of the state. For further, targeted and legitimized work to implement practical life For the planned measures to reform the Armed Forces of Russia, it would be advisable to adopt the Law of the Russian Federation “On Military Reform” - defining the basic principles, stages, boundaries, norms and rules of military development.