As soon as they called him... The Devil in the flesh, Antichrist, Black Death - all these nicknames were given to him simple people. Those who were exiled to concentration camps, suffered in the ghetto, went to be shot... Adolf Hitler completely changed the course of history not only in Germany, but also in the whole world. After himself, he left complete devastation in Europe and a document that regulated the work of the remaining Reich government. Hitler's political testament is interesting from a historical point of view; it reveals to us the nature of this dangerous person, his secret plans and hidden beliefs.

Main points of the document

The will itself is small. It consists of two parts, in which Adolf Hitler sums up his life, political and military activities. He also speaks candidly about why World War II began. He also names the reasons that prompt him to commit suicide, and thanks his citizens for their love, respect and support. He accuses Himmler and Goering of conspiracy and coup and removes them from all posts. Instead it changes completely

The dictator also disposes of his property, namely: he bequeaths the collection of works of art he collected to the gallery hometown Linz on the Danube, he gives away his personal belongings that have a certain value loyal comrades and colleagues, everything else - National Socialist workers' party Germany. Adolf Hitler asks that his marriage to Eva Braun be recognized as legal and that the newly-made spouses be cremated after their death. He appoints the executor of his last will

Causes of World War II

In his will, the Fuhrer describes the period between the world wars as a time of reflection and the incubation of ideas. All of Hitler's plans during these years were formed, according to him, under the influence of love for his own people and devotion to them. The dictator writes that he did not want to start World War II, but was forced to accept it difficult decision in the name of prosperity

His reasons for attacking neighboring countries mainly come down to his personal hatred of the Jews. The rulers of states with such roots or their activities for the benefit of this nation are what provoked his aggression. In the document, he completely absolves himself of blame for starting the bloodshed. And he says that he has repeatedly proposed controlling and limiting the world's armaments.

Hitler's quotes from his political testament are interesting and reveal his actions in solving the German-Polish problem. “In just three days, I made an offer to the British ambassador to eliminate this conflict, but it was rejected, since the British government needed this war,” he writes. Hitler cites the reason for the refusal as the influence of propaganda disseminated by the Jews, and as a result, the increase in business activity beneficial to London.

Why did the Fuhrer choose suicide?

Hitler's political testament also conveys to us the reasons why he decided to take his own life. First of all, it is the impossibility of leaving the Reich. The Fuhrer writes that the strength of his army has weakened, the morale has been undermined from within by traitors and cowards. Therefore, his last will is to share the fate of millions of Germans who decided not to flee, but to remain in the occupied country. But since falling into the hands of the enemy is unacceptable for Hitler, death is the only correct solution.

The Fuhrer writes that he dies with a light heart. He is inspired by the exploits of the rank and file at the front, the exorbitant help from the rear and the ardent hearts of German youth. Hitler's speech in the document contains gratitude to all these people, thanks to whose enormous efforts the Reich flourished, and the glory of Germany thundered throughout the world. Self-sacrifice ordinary residents and him own death, the ruler of the Reich is confident, will provide grain that in the future will be able to germinate and revive the National Socialist movement. He asks the people not to repeat his suicide, but to save their lives in order to continue the fight and give birth to future heroes of Germany.

Political appointments

The Fuhrer was very disappointed in his close associates, especially Goering. In his will, he excludes him from the party and completely deprives him of his rights. Instead, Admiral Doenitz should take the chair of the Reich President and Commander-in-Chief of the military forces. He also removes Himmler, Reichsfuehrer and Chief Minister from office. At Hitler's request, he should be replaced by Karl Hanke and Paul Giesler.

Himmler and Goering intrigued, but the Fuhrer revealed their secrets. Hitler was informed of their desire to seize power and negotiate with the enemy. All this, according to the ruler of the Reich, caused enormous damage to the country and led to the defeat of his people in this war. Therefore, dying, he wants to atone for his guilt before the Germans by appointing them a worthy and honest cabinet of ministers. The Fuhrer hopes that the new government will be able to continue his work and make Germany "the queen of all nations." Among his followers: Borman, Greik, Funk, Tirak and others German figures that time.

Main mission of followers

Hitler's political testament carries the main message to the future generation: they must continue to develop the activities of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany. Some members of the new cabinet appointed by the Fuhrer, including Bormann, Goebbels and their wives, also wanted to commit suicide along with their leader. But Hitler orders them not to do this, since their activity, intelligence and resourcefulness should serve the benefit of the country, should revive it from the ruins and raise it from its knees.

The Fuhrer wishes them firmness and justice. They should not give in to fear, because the honor of the nation for his followers should be above all. According to Hitler, the main task of coming generations is to continue the development of the party, to sacrifice to it own interests, be faithful to duty and up to last straw blood to obey the new government. The German people are obliged to observe racial laws, and at the same time hate and destroy the poisoner of the whole world - the Jewish community.

The significance of Hitler's political testament

world history

It is huge, as it was able to shed light on many distorted facts and propaganda of the USSR government, the oppressed Jews and other peoples who suffered in that war. It is true that Hitler was a ruthless tyrant and a murderer of millions of innocents. But the fact that he was a weak-minded, nervous hysteric, as Soviet films show us, is a myth. It is clear from the will that it was written by a reasonable person. He was wise enough, he simply directed his activities in the wrong direction, which resulted in the death of millions of people. The document also refutes the version that the Fuhrer allegedly managed to escape to Latin America and there safely live to be a hundred years old. But we see: he loved his ideology so much, placing it above all else, that he wished to die with it.

Hitler's political testament indicates that it was not only the Fuhrer who was responsible for the war. The same England, wanting bloodshed for its own selfish purposes, became the indirect culprit for the beginning of the collapse of Europe. When Churchill realized what he had done, it was already too late to stop the Fuhrer, who had advanced into the very depths of the continent. And the Soviet Union itself was an aggressor similar to Hitler. It was he who unleashed a series of wars from 1938 to 1941: he swallowed up the Baltic and captured parts of Poland and Finland.

Opinion of historians

It is diametrically opposite. Some say that his will is extremist in nature, so it was banned from being distributed in many districts and regions Russian Federation. In principle, the decision is correct. After all, the legacy of the main murderer of the 20th century became the basis of the policy of neo-Nazis, who in Lately have intensified their illegal activities throughout the country. The document has no right to life, it must be destroyed just like Hitler himself. But this is only one side of the coin. If you look from a different angle, the will is a historical value, interesting for discovering new facts about this person, his environment and the policies of Nazi Germany.

Other historians evaluate the document and draw attention to the fact that there is not a single bad word about the Russian people in its lines. Despite the fact that Germany fell under Soviet shells and bombs, Hitler’s speech was not riddled with curses against the USSR. As before, he blames the Jews for all the troubles on earth. Hitler's quotes burn with aggression and hatred towards this people.

What happened after the death of the Fuhrer?

Hitler's political testament was written and passed on to his followers. But not all of his comrades were ready to submit to his will. So, the new Reich Chancellor Goebbels appointed by him did not want to stay alive. Out of love and devotion to his Fuhrer or fear of being severely punished by the victors, but he also committed suicide. Other generals did the same: Hitler’s adjutant Burgdorf and the last chief of staff Krebs.

Some say that this is ordinary cowardice. But one can argue with this, since not everyone dares to take their own life. And their death by their own hands now looks, centuries later, more dignified than the death of the same Goering, who breathed his last in an American prison, or Himmler, who died on an English bunk. And this is not to mention those dozens hanged in 1946. No, we don’t sing to the bloodsuckers, we’re just trying to look at events objectively, putting aside personal prejudices and opinions.

History reveals many nuances about the Fuhrer’s habits. Everyone knew Hitler as an ardent vegetarian. He hated people who smoked and fought against this problem at the state level using all possible methods. bad habit. His eternal mania for reading and processing book material was known to his associates. They often saw him in libraries, at seminars and conferences. The Fuhrer idolized cleanliness and avoided people with runny noses.

Hitler was always a man of few words. But this only concerned personal communication. When it came to politics, there was no stopping him. Pondering his speech for a long time, he walked silently around the office for hours, but when he began to dictate to the typist, she did not have time to write everything down word for word. The verbal flow was accompanied by quotes, exclamations, active gestures and facial expressions.

Adolf Hitler changed the course of history; we remember him as a tyrant and murderer. Despite many positive qualities his character, there is no excuse for him in the troubles that this evil genius has brought to innocent people all over the world.

Pétain and Hitler

First, a task for history buffs.

Which of the generals of World War II is known for going over to the enemy’s side, ordering fire on his compatriots, being declared a traitor in his homeland, sentenced to death - and yet today is revered by many as a hero?

What do you think, General Vlasov? No.

This is General de Gaulle! Hero of France, elected president of the country for many years. He was called a traitor in 1940.

And because he did not want the peace so desired by all the French, but strived for an endless and hopeless war. Because he was indifferent to the fate of one and a half million French prisoners of war suffering in Hitler's concentration camps. For peace with Nazi Germany gave them hope. And continued resistance doomed them to death.

Is every world good? And is every war with a technically and numerically superior enemy hopeless? Aren't we tormented by this question today? The same way the French suffered from it 74 years ago?

“PARIS IN RUINS WILL NOT CHANGE THE RESULT”

The year was 1940. Dusk was gathering over Europe undeclared war. The endless power of the armadas swung at world domination tyrant, paralyzed the will of politicians. Who can blame the French, who, at this moment of complete hopelessness, chose as their leader not a young upstart, but the respected and wise Marshal Philippe Henri Petain?

“De Gaulle is a populist, he has zero support in France,” President Roosevelt wrote to Prime Minister Churchill in those years.

And with Petain it was almost unanimous. For he promised peace.

Marshal Petain was a hero of the First World War. Real, not paper. He crushed the Germans at Verdun in 1916. He knew how to reason with them. When the threat of war with Hitler was already knocking on the country, at the request of the public, French Prime Minister Reynaud called the 84-year-old marshal to power, appointing him deputy prime minister.

But when the gray-green men Eastern Neighbor accompanied by howitzers, tanks and armored vehicles crossed the border of their homeland, exterminating those preparing for a long peace French soldiers, the heroic marshal offered the most reliable way achieving peace...surrender.

Of course, the word “surrender” was not mentioned. It was about an innocent thing - a truce. The Germans were systematically destroying France, Petain said, and it was his duty to save the rest of the country. “We are not able to fight the aggressor. We have no choice but to negotiate with Hitler.”

He had few opponents.

Is it perhaps the young Deputy Minister of Defense de Gaulle, yes... British Prime Minister Churchill, who visited at that time hard times France. “I emphasized,” he writes in his memoirs, “what a tremendous ability the defense of a large city, house by house, has to wear down the forces of an invading army. I reminded the marshal of Clemenceau’s words: “I will fight before Paris, in Paris and beyond Paris.” But Petain was calm. “It is possible,” he said, to turn Paris into ruins, but this will not change the final result.”

It’s good to be an adviser if the English Channel is between you and Hitler, the French probably thought. Would “sir” agree to conduct street fights in his London? Knowing the further actions of the British Prime Minister, I will say: Churchill would agree!

“AFTER A DEFEAT, YOU MUST NOT FORGET ABOUT ORDER”

On June 14, the invaders triumphantly entered Paris. The French government fled. On June 15 in Bordeaux, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, French leaders tried to convince themselves of the need to “make peace with Hitler.”

Churchill described this tragicomedy of the French elite with caustic irony. Commander-in-Chief French troops, having mediocrely missed the possibility of a counter-offensive, General Weygand put forward a killer argument for immediate surrender: “While the French army remains quite disciplined and strong... it is necessary to maintain order within the country after defeat. Otherwise there will be anarchy."

Deputy Prime Minister Laval (later Hitler's favorite) went further: “France must not only make peace with Germany, but also change sides; she must become an ally of the conqueror and end the war on the winning side.”

As always in such cases, the allies were most to blame. The British were reproached for not helping with planes, artillery, and sending few divisions... “It’s an interesting war,” Churchill comments on the situation. “They ask for planes and at the same time agree on surrender.”

(And we wonder: why today the same English people don’t give us anything!)

The sweeter the image of Hitler became, the uglier the “image of yesterday’s comrade-in-arms.” General Weygand: “In three weeks England’s neck will be broken like a chicken.” Pétain: “An alliance with Great Britain is tantamount to “coitus with a corpse.” Leader of the parliamentary faction of nationalists Jean Ibarnegara: “It’s better to be a Nazi province! At least we know what it means."

It's better to be a Nazi province... That says it all.

At that time, the concept of “Stockholm syndrome” was not yet known, but “Bordeaux syndrome” was already developing...

“ALL THE GARCONS AND RESTAURANTEES WANTED ONE THING - A TRUCE”

On June 16, Petain becomes prime minister, and on June 17, he addresses the nation on the radio. He called on the French to “stop fighting” and, through the Spanish embassy, ​​approached Germany with a proposal to conclude a truce.

Eyewitnesses claim that “ordinary people greeted the news with undisguised joy.” In one of the works I found a quote from the memoirs of the Russian emigrant writer Roman Gul: “Everyone: peasants, winegrowers, artisans, grocers, restaurateurs, cafe garçons, hairdressers and soldiers running like rabble - everyone wanted one thing - anything, just to end this is a fall into a bottomless abyss... Everyone had one word on their mind - “armistice” (truce), which meant that the Germans would not go to the south of France, would not come here, would not station their troops here, would not take cattle, bread, grapes , wine... De Gaulle, who fled from France to London, who wanted resistance at all costs, at that moment, alas, was not with France, not with the people. Petain was with the people.”

Left without Paris, the marshal dug in in the resort of Vichy, where on July 10, parliamentarians, with 569 votes in favor and 80 against, adopted a constitutional law that transferred full power to him.

The people finally received what they asked for: the main person responsible for peace with the enemy. With unlimited powers. And therefore with unlimited liability. From which you can then ask in full...

The signing of the armistice with Hitler on June 22, 1940 was framed humiliatingly (in the same saloon car and in the same place, in the Compiegne Forest, where the Germans signed their own surrender more than 20 years ago). And at first glance, the conditions of peace were tolerable. The country was divided into a German-occupied zone with a “special status” and its center in Paris, and a “free” south with its capital in Vichy. The French army, with the exception of 100,000 men, was to be disbanded.

The armistice meant the end of the war for France. Churchill later explained Pétain's motives: “Part of the country could remain unoccupied and part of the army free. But if the war continued overseas, everyone who did not manage to escape from France would be taken to Germany as prisoners of war,” writes Churchill.

However, 1.5 million French prisoners of war remained in German camps. It was precisely the concern for the lives of soldiers that many, both then and later, explained Petain’s agreements with Hitler.

Indeed, not without the knowledge and consent of the marshal, many prisoners were released. But 750 thousand other French, contrary to the provisions of the agreement, were sent to forced labor in Germany.

The Marshal did not know what to say to his people.

“AS BEHIND TWO SOLDIERS...”

The old man lived in the moral categories of the First World War, where soldiers and officers showed nobility and loyalty to their word. And he believed Hitler as a veteran of “that” war. His call to the Fuhrer for a truce began with the words: “Now we are with you, as befits two soldiers...”.

Hitler also strongly emphasized his respect for Petain: “I am happy to shake hands with a Frenchman who is not responsible for this war.” He willingly made concessions. Hitler was generally a master at negotiating, because he never fulfilled his promises. While he was kissing the marshal, the General Staff was preparing a detailed plan for the occupation of the free zone of France, codenamed “Attila,” writes Churchill, and the corresponding directive was issued by Hitler on December 10, 1940.

The goal of Hitler's kisses was nowhere more mercantile - to push France into war with England. Formally leaving French fleet Under the leadership of Petain, Hitler tried in every possible way to force the marshal to attack his former allies. He resisted, but did not take the fleet somewhere further away, to one of the colonies. As a result, in order not to be handed over to the Germans, the British destroyed French ships in the roadstead of one of the Algerian ports. Petain responded by ordering the bombing of Gibraltar.

Hitler was pleased.

Did the marshal know that by asking Hitler for peace, he actually took a ticket to war? Only now against those whom he betrayed by signing memorandums and agreements with the dictator? Knew. And he tried to resist passively.

Waving with a wry smile the next anti-English agreement with the Fuhrer and the Duce, he declared in Vichy in a narrow circle: “It will take six months to discuss this program and another six months to forget about it.”

“WE HAVE AGREED ABOUT... COLLABORATIONISM”

There was, however, one caveat. Petain was the only legitimate leader of the German-occupied countries who not only signed a peace agreement, but, in fact, recognized the legal annexation of part of his territory. Including Paris. In exchange for that long-awaited peace! Moreover, he agreed to “build” a “new European order” with Hitler and agreed to cooperate with the tyrant and invader.

Collaboration is the key word!

After a personal meeting with Hitler in October 1940, Petain made an appeal: “French people,” he said, “I accepted the Fuhrer’s invitation of my free will. I was not subjected to any “dictation” or any pressure from him. We agreed on cooperation between our two countries. History will carry out its judgment on me alone. Until now I spoke to you as a father, today I speak to you as the head of a nation. Follow me! Keep your faith in eternal France!

What a beautiful word Petain introduced into his political vocabulary - “cooperation”! In French: "collaborer". He savored it more than once when speaking to his compatriots.

From him it began to travel around the world - “collaborationism”. Only for some reason not in the sense of a triumphant transition from war to peace. And as a mark of criminal cooperation with the enemy.

There were many who wanted to “collaborate” with the marshal. About a million French were civil servants during the war and collaborated with the occupiers. Only the staff of the French police (analogous to the Gestapo) was 32 thousand people. And, characteristically, they did not feel like traitors at all. And, as it were, patriots who put the interests of the nation above their own ephemeral freedoms.

Regarding freedoms, this was fair to some extent. Having come to power, Petain significantly reduced them. The state built by the marshal very quickly became authoritarian. There was no place for democracy or freedom of the press. But the marshal’s cult of personality was evident.

Today, historians have not come to a common conclusion: was Petain a convinced fascist?

I think it's all about something else. It is impossible to cooperate with Hitler (no matter what his next reincarnation is called) and remain a democrat.

According to amendments to the French constitution, the republican slogan “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” gave way to the motto “Labor, Family, Fatherland.” How could it be otherwise in a country over which fascism hangs? If political life prohibited, where else can a person prove himself?

Weren’t our moral authorities writing about these “small” values ​​at a time when it seemed that Yanukovych was forever? Isn’t this what Vakarchuk sang about?

“Our defeat was the result of our promiscuity. The state of permissiveness destroyed everything that was created by the spirit of sacrifice. Therefore, I urge you, first of all, to intellectual and moral revival,” Petain said while speaking on the radio. And then he did the same as everyone else. When everything is bad in a country, are the traitorous politicians to blame? No - homosexuals, lace panties and other degradation of morals.

After the struggle for morality, the marshal moved on to the fight against the Jews. Could he have acted differently, having “made peace” with Hitler? He started cautiously - by limiting their voting and educational rights. And it all ended in death factories. Of the 350 thousand Jews living in France in 1939, 150 thousand were sent to concentration camps, including 20 thousand children. After liberation, about 3 thousand people returned - the rest died. And this is also the price of peace with Hitler.

The marshal himself and his supporters sincerely believed that concessions to Germany were necessary to save statehood, gain time and accumulate strength for national revival.

“I ALSO CLEARED THE PATH...”

November 11, 1942 Hitler's army According to the plan, Atilla crossed the demarcation line and occupied the south of France. Chapter French state turned into a purely decorative figure. In 1944, the Germans forcibly took him to Germany.

And the “populist” de Gaulle at this time victoriously returned to his homeland at the head of the Free French troops.

In February 1945, Pétain was arrested and soon appeared in court. Historians write that the marshal was confident in the acquittal verdict, because peace with Hitler saved France: “At a time when General de Gaulle was fighting outside his homeland, I was also clearing the way for liberation... If I had not saved France, then nothing would have happened liberate except ruins and cemeteries.”

However, the Supreme Court found the marshal guilty of treason and sentenced him to death. Two days later, General de Gaulle, who had once served under Pétain, commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment in the fortress on the island of Ile d'Yeu.

The former national hero died in prison in 1951 at the age of 95. With a reputation as a traitor to the motherland. Some of his compatriots evilly changed his surname, calling him “Puten” (putane - whore). “On me alone will history carry out its judgment!” - he said pathetically, signing an agreement with Hitler. He didn't know how right he was...

Perhaps, understanding this, de Gaulle did not allow him to be shot?

The people are a strange civilizational formation. When difficult times come and bloody sacrifices are made, he turns into an ordinary man and idolizes the one who freed him from these victims, who brought peace to his native land. Peace at any cost.

And after the war, the people become a nation again. Mercilessly asking for every centimeter given to the adversary native land, for every minute of shame and captivity. Petain's sentence simply could not have been different.

But there was no mercy for those who followed him either. Only for 1945 during lustration state apparatus 40 thousand collaborators were repressed. 2 thousand were executed. Some historians bring the total number of victims of the “justice” to 2 million.

What to prefer? A war to the last drop of blood - with catastrophic destruction and the death of millions of people? Or capitulation with the preservation of lives, part of the territory, cultural heritage?

Once upon a time, in Prague, a local historian told me: “It is believed that the Czech Republic has not won a single war. But despite this, she became successful democratic country, preserving its architecture, culture and history.”

Hitler occupied Czechoslovakia as well as desperately fighting Poland. But the Czech Republic practically did not resist. Just like Pétain's France. And Poland was destroyed and exterminated. Now they are all in European Union. And everyone equal rights. Was it necessary then, in 1939, to stand to death? And if necessary, then to whom?

I will not draw parallels with our reality. History conducts them itself.

======================================== ================

The author succeeded in writing the text. And it seems historical analogies with the capitulation of the Kyiv ruling elite to Putler’s aggression, they themselves suggest themselves...
If not for one thing that is decisive in my opinion, BUT...
Yes. Pétain capitulated to the fascist aggressor. although there remained opportunities for continued resistance... But at least he was an independent French politician and became a traitor-collaborator only after crushing defeat at the front.

But this is not the case with the Ukrainian political elite.
The first and main difference: this is that all of it, this “elite”, together with the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, was initially flesh and blood of that same good old “personnel department” of the Old Square... That is. it's as if Hitler first appointed French government and the General Staff, and then started the war... (Laval, who initially sympathized with Hitler, is an exception.)
And the defeats of the Ukrainian army, deadly "cauldrons" for volunteer battalions, the elites of the nation - now this is completely clear to everyone sane - were by no means predetermined by the balance of forces, but became the result of direct and gross betrayal and treason.
And the same goes for long list obviously treacherous decisions and sabotage, which practically guaranteed the aggressor’s achievement of his goals, already listed by me earlier in the note.

So if we compare Poroshenko with any of the anti-heroes of the 2nd World War, it is more likely with Quisling, but with Quisling in advance, even before the invasion, put by Hitler at the head of Norway and who, for the sake of camouflage, was for the time being allowed to make patriotic speeches in defending the country's independence...

OKW Directive No. 29 of May 17, 1941

Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

Supreme Command.

National Defense Department (I operational).

Top secret.

For command only.

Directive No. 29

1) The goal of German military operations in the southeast [of Europe] - to expel the British from the Balkans and to expand the basis for the use of German aviation in the eastern part of the Mediterranean - has been achieved, and the implementation of these objectives will be further improved by the conduct of Operation Merkur.

The protection of Greek territory in the future, except for the exceptions specified below, is the task of the Italians. Therefore, the German authorities in general issues protection and management of the country do not interfere. Any mediation activity desired by the Greeks should especially be rejected.

To tighten up the rear, negotiate with the Italian armed forces on transport routes and their protection.

2) The German Wehrmacht shall be guided by the following:

Ground troops.

Only the troops absolutely necessary to provide the supply base intended for Operation Merkur remain in Greece, as well as one division in Thessaloniki (point 3), whose task is to guard Lemnos and the islands that may be subject to capture in the future.

However, until the end of Operation Merkur, all sending areas airborne assault, including the islands provided for, must remain in German hands. All troops that are not necessary according to this instruction must be withdrawn as soon as possible.

The Italian High Command will be informed that the agreements required for the rapid transfer to Greece must be concluded with the commander of the 12th Army. The latter, as commander-in-chief of the German forces in the Balkans, transfers his headquarters to Thessaloniki as soon as the situation allows (Operation Merkur).

The 10th Aviation Corps, even after its relocation to Greece, continues to wage the air war independently according to the directives of the commander-in-chief air force, in whose direct subordination he remains. In the defense of the Balkan region, he must interact with the command of the 12th Army (the commander-in-chief of the German forces in the Balkans), and in military operations in North Africa- with the African Corps. Orders on deployment, requiring a unified settlement in the Balkans, are given by the command of the 12th Army also for the 10th Aviation Corps.

The airfield network of the air forces in Greece and the islands is at the disposal of the Air Commander-in-Chief for control air war in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Airfields and facilities that are not necessary are transferred to the Italian armed forces.

After the capture of Crete, its protection initially falls under the responsibilities of the commander-in-chief of aviation (airborne corps), who makes a proposal on the moment of changing the corps. I reserve orders on this issue, as well as on the future occupation of the island.

Navy:

In addition to Thessaloniki, the German naval forces remain in charge Athens port and, so far as is required for coastal navigation, coastline between both harbors. Commander-in-Chief naval forces reaches an appropriate agreement on this issue with the Italians. The coastal defense of Crete will also subsequently be the task of the German Navy if Crete remains occupied by German troops.

In matters of deployment, the same procedure applies as in relation to the 10th Aviation Corps.

On the North Aegean coast, ensure, as before, German influence on the Bulgarian coastal defense.

Command of operations and sea transportation is exercised according to the directives of the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces by the Admiral of the South-East group, together with the Italian naval forces assigned to him.

For the rest, the admiral of the South-East group must interact with the competent Italian authorities.

3) Only the German Wehrmacht is authorized to carry out military measures in the Thessaloniki region. Proposals for the exact division of powers in this area should be submitted by the main command of the ground forces (the commander-in-chief of the German forces in the Balkans).

4) The administration of Greek regions subject to further occupation by German troops is regulated by the General Command of the Ground Forces in agreement with the Commissioner of the German Empire in Greece. At the same time, as far as possible, use the Greek administration and refuse to introduce German authorities.

5) The commander of the troops in Serbia, in order to carry out his urgent economic functions, must be endowed with all powers by the main command of the ground forces and provided with security troops so that he can independently carry out the tasks assigned to him.

Adolf Gitler

Plans for the complete occupation of France

Operation Anton - code name armed operation against the Vichy France regime by the armies of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in November 1942.

The Germans had a plan to occupy southern France under the control of the Vichy puppet regime in December 1940, codenamed Operation Attila. Soon the plan for Operation Attila (capture of Southern France) was combined with the plan for Operation Camellia (capture of Corsica), after which the plan for Operation Anton emerged.

After the landing of Anglo-American troops in Morocco and Algeria on November 8, 1942 (Operation Torch), A. Hitler could not allow the same landing to occur in the French part of the Mediterranean. After a conversation with the Vichy Prime Minister Pierre Laval, he ordered German troops to occupy Corsica on November 11, 1942, and Southern France on November 12, 1942. The Vichy regime essentially limited its resistance to a radio message about a protest against the violation of the 1940 armistice. At this point, the government's power became purely nominal.

OKW Directive No. 19 on preparations for Operation Attila

Supreme Commander armed forces.

Supreme Command.

Operational management headquarters.

National Defense Department.

Top secret.

For command only.

Transfer only through an officer.

Directive No. 19

Operation Attila

1) In the event that a movement for secession arises in the parts of the French colonial empire now under the rule of General Weygand, prepare for the rapid occupation of the currently unoccupied region of the French metropolis (Operation Attila). At the same time, the task is to then secure the French metropolitan fleet and aviation units located at airfields located on its territory, at least preventing them from going over to the enemy’s side.

The preparations should be disguised so as not to alarm the French, both in political and military interests.

2) The invasion must take place, in the appropriate case, in such a way that:

a) operating between the Garonne and Rhone rivers, quickly break through with motorized groups (sufficient air cover of which should be provided) to the Mediterranean Sea, capture ports as early as possible (primarily the important military harbor of Toulon) and cut off France from the sea;

c) carry out an invasion along the entire front by formations located on the demarcation line.

The time interval between the issuing of the order for an operation and the entry of troops should be as short as possible. To achieve this, individual connections can already be pulled closer, but in such a way that the purpose of their use is not obvious.

Unified French military resistance to the invasion is unlikely. If local resistance arises, the latter must be mercilessly crushed. For this, as well as for actions against possible pockets of resistance, provide for the use of aviation formations of bombers (primarily dive bombers).

3) In order to prepare measures aimed against the French fleet going to sea and going over to the enemy’s side, in the future it is necessary to continuously monitor the basing points, condition, possibilities of action, etc. of each naval division. The Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces, in cooperation with the Abwehr-Foreign Directorate, will issue the appropriate orders, using the opportunities created by the Armistice Commission.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and Air Force will study the question of how best to take control of the French fleet in cooperation with the invading ground forces. The following are subject to special consideration:

blocking exits from ports (primarily Toulon),

airborne landing,

acts of sabotage,

attacks submarines and aviation on ships going to sea.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy should express his views on whether and to what extent the French fleet should be deprived of the relief granted to it by the armistice agreement.

I reserve the decision on how to implement these measures. Offensive action would only be permitted if the French armed forces offered resistance or if parts of the fleet put to sea in defiance of a German counter-order.

4) The seizure of French airfields and the air units located on them is subject to direct agreement between the air force and the ground forces. Use other opportunities (for example, airborne landings).

5) The Commander-in-Chief report to me (the ground forces have already done so) their intentions for Operation Attila (in in writing through the headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command). At the same time, also indicate the required period of time between the issuance of the order and the actual implementation of the measures.

6) Preparations for Operation Attila require the strictest secrecy.

The Italians should not have any information about these preparations and intentions,

Adolf Gitler

Plans for invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, Spain and Portugal

Operation Felix was the code name for Nazi Germany's operation to capture the naval base of Gibraltar, which belonged to Great Britain during World War II. The operation plan was developed by the General Staff of the German Armed Forces in 1940. According to the plan of the German generals, Gibraltar was to be attacked from sea and air, after which it was planned to land troops. Having captured Gibraltar, the German fleet would have blocked the access of ships of the Anti-Hitler Coalition to the Mediterranean Sea, turning the adjacent territories inaccessible to the fleet of the countries of the Anti-Hitler Coalition.

For complete success This operation, A. Hitler planned to attack Gibraltar from the land side. To do this, it was necessary to lead Wehrmacht units through the territory of neutral Spain. Dictator of Spain F. Franco in exchange for travel German troops on its territory, it asked A. Hitler to supply vital resources, as well as a guarantee that after the end of the war, Spain would get a number of African colonies. Germany could not afford this and the operation was cancelled.

A plan for Operation Isabella was also developed. Operation Isabella is the code name for A. Hitler’s planned invasion of Portugal and the creation of a network of military bases in Spain after the victory over the USSR. The operation was developed in June 1941, but the operation was not implemented.

OKW Draft Directive No. 19 (Operation Felix)

Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

Supreme Command.

Operational management headquarters.

National Defense Department.

[by hand:] F 9

Fuhrer's Headquarters.

[by hand:] a special purpose document.

Top secret.

For command only.

Directive No. 19

Operation Felix

1. The purpose of the operation is to include the Iberian Peninsula in the front of the fighting of the Axis powers and expel the English fleet from the western part of the Mediterranean Sea.

To do this you should:

a) capture Gibraltar and close the strait to the passage of English ships as effectively as possible;

b) keep a group of troops ready to immediately occupy Portugal in the event that the British violate its neutrality or if it itself does not take a strictly neutral position;

c) prepare the transportation after the occupation of Gibraltar of 1-2 divisions (including the 3rd tank division) from Gibraltar to Spanish Morocco to secure the strait and the North-West Africa region.

2. Order of subordination.

The leadership of operations under my directives is the responsibility of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The most important tasks are:

a) for the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces (the commander in Spain is Field Marshal von Reichenau):

the attack on Gibraltar and related measures in North-West Africa,

possible action against Portugal,

regulation of movement railways and marching, as well as resolving issues of troop quartering, etc. (as in the area of ​​combat operations of the ground forces, special orders will be given regarding supplies to the Wehrmacht High Command);

b) for the commander-in-chief navy: fighting German submarines, additional security of Spanish ports, securing the strait after the capture of the cape,

usage sea ​​route to supply the troops committed to action in Spain;

c) for the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (the commander in Spain is Air Force General Baron von Richthofen):

independent attack on the English Gibraltar squadron and the port,

preparation and support of the attack on the Cape in cooperation with ground forces,

long-range reconnaissance,

protection of formations put into operation in Spain from enemy air raids.

The headquarters of the 8th Aviation Corps, along with its other tasks, undertakes communication with the high Spanish command, for which purpose, as necessary, it is reinforced by officers from other branches of the armed forces.

3. Behavior towards the Spaniards.

Throughout the operation, commanders and troops must keep in mind that we are operating in an allied country that has experienced a bloody civil war and that is still forced to contend with all sorts of internal and economic difficulties.

Use Spanish reserves only in exceptional cases.

Military task The Spaniards will primarily secure the foothills of Gibraltar before the entry of German troops, and otherwise defend the island possessions from capture by the British and repel possible attempts to land them on the continent. If assistance in the capture of Gibraltar is offered, it should be accepted.

The supreme military leadership in Spain nominally belongs to the head of state, Franco. The merits of the Spanish command and Spanish formations should be especially noted in due form.

4. The timing of all military activities will be determined by the planned interaction table to be compiled by the headquarters of the Wehrmacht Supreme Command. Preparatory measures must be carried out in such a way that I can schedule the entry of troops (F-Day) and the air invasion of Spain for January 10, 1941.

IN in general terms the following stages should be distinguished.

Stage I: activities that can be completely camouflaged.

a) Preparation of military operations in Spain by small reconnaissance groups (dispatched by the head of the foreign counterintelligence department).

b) Strengthening the Spanish defense of Gibraltar with special units suitable for this purpose (carried out by the head of the foreign counterintelligence department).

c) Establishment of a primary supply base in Spain, as far as absolutely necessary, through economic transport.

d) Transfer to the Spaniards in the form of the sale of German batteries to strengthen the defense capabilities of primarily the Canary Islands.

Near the border, troop movements and other measures (for example, guarding transport routes leading to Irun, storing supplies) should only be carried out covertly at this first stage.

Stage II, events that, although they indicate, for example, certain military preparations on this side of the Pyrenees, do not yet directly compromise Spain,

a) Transfer of troops to the border for concentration.

b) Relocation of the required aviation formations to airfields intended for the departure of these formations for the operation.

c) Timely dispatch of submarines to western part Mediterranean Sea.

The dates by which it will become necessary to implement these measures are indicated in the planned interaction table. Maintain camouflage at this stage as well, creating the appearance of a concentration of troops carried out in preparation for the occupation of the not yet occupied parts of France.

Stage III: entry of troops into Spain, invasion of air units.

The entry procedure is subject to determination by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces for all types of armed forces participating in the operation in such a way that:

a) the advanced units quickly entered Gibraltar and the necessary supplies were provided there air defense;

b) following this provision, the deployment of artillery and its combat operations began in a timely manner (especially against enemy artillery and mined terrain north of the cape);

c) the supply of air units arriving at Spanish bases was ensured;

d) then formations were able to follow, intended to strengthen the Spanish coastal defense and enter Portugal.

Air formations must be activated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force in such a way that:

a) apply as early as possible (but not earlier than day “F”) a strong beat in parts English fleet, and in the event that the Gibraltar squadron is out of reach - at the port facilities;

b) be able to hit parts of the English fleet from the territory of Spain that are within the range of aviation;

c) timely prepare and support, in accordance with the requirements of the ground forces, a ground attack on the cape.

Presumably, from F-Day, the command will also have the unoccupied part of France at its disposal for transportation.

Stage IV: attack on Gibraltar.

It is necessary that this offensive can begin approximately 25 days after crossing the border. It must be prepared by the overwhelming use of technology (artillery and formations of dive bombers provided with ammunition beyond any norm, demolition work, fire from heavy tanks) in such a way that the assault itself would require the least significant losses in manpower.

Stage V: blocking the strait and transferring German troops to Spanish Morocco.

Responsible for this task is the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, at whose disposal the ground forces provide their batteries if necessary. For outside world The protection of the strait is the work of the Spaniards, who must take part in it within the limits of the means available to them.

Vessels intended to transport troops to Spanish Morocco should be promptly pulled into suitable harbors.

Stage VI: the withdrawal of units operating on the Iberian Peninsula for the purpose of their new use (as well as possible entry into Portugal) will depend on the situation.

5. I expect reports from the commanders-in-chief by 16.12 for reports giving an idea of ​​the planned order of implementation of activities at individual stages (planned table of interaction - according to the previous model).

Supreme Command.

Operational management headquarters.

National Defense Department.

[by hand:] F 11

Top secret.

For command only.

Transfer only through an officer.

Reason: Directive No. 18, paragraph 2 (Operations Headquarters. National Defense Department. No. 33356/40. Top Secret. For command only).

On the subject: Operation Felix.

Operation Felix will not be carried out, since there are no longer political prerequisites for it.

The reconnaissance activities currently underway must be fully completed. All other scheduled events are cancelled; Stop the preparations you have started.

Batteries intended to strengthen the Spanish islands and coasts are not subject to transfer.

Chief of staff

Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht

Correct: captain (signature illegible)

DIRECTIVE N: 32
("AFTER "BARBAROSSA")

Discussions about the reason for the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941 and about the readiness of the Red Army itself to launch an offensive most often come down to attempts to compare the technical details of military readiness. But so far these attempts remain attempts that do not lead to a mutually agreed conclusion. For each of the disputing parties has the right to choose and justify their arrays of figures, which in their own way may look correct (although there may be counter-arguments that cast doubt on these same figures). Examples:

We open “A Brief History (of the War...)”, Moscow, “Voenizdat”, 1965, p. 52:

The total strength of the Soviet Armed Forces six months before the start of the war, by January 1941, was 4,207 thousand people. The fascist German army at the time of the invasion of the USSR was more than twice as large as the Soviet one.

Strange comparison. The number of USSR troops is given for January 1941, and the number of attacking German troops is given at the time of the attack, i.e. for June 1941. But didn’t the composition of the Soviet army change from January to June 1941? How does it turn out? total number German army at the time of the attack? About 9 million? Are these numbers correct? Maybe. But it depends on how you look at it. What is meant by the term “German army at the time of the invasion of the USSR”? ALL and EVERYWHERE (both training and security, and not only on the border with the USSR, and in hospitals)? And how many began to cross that border on June 22, 1941? All 9 million? And then, it is known that in the spring of 1941 (i.e. after January) about 800 thousand reserve military personnel were called up to the Red Army for BUS ("large training camps"). Should they be taken into account at the time of June 22, 41? Those. German 9 million should be compared not with 4.2 million, but with 5 million? But how many German troops were there in the first echelon of the attack? There is something on this issue in the book " Short story" (p. 53):

In the first echelons, the enemy had 103 divisions, of which 10 were tank divisions, that is, almost twice the strength of the first echelon of Soviet troops.

So - 103 divisions... Again, some kind of avoidance of a direct answer. Okay, but how many Soviet divisions were there in the first (uh-uh), in the western districts? We read on the same page above:

In total, in the western border districts before the war there were 170 divisions... The troops of these districts accounted for more than half the strength of the entire Red Army (about 54 percent). ... But the real capabilities of our troops did not correspond to the number of divisions...

Well, we now know that this turned out to be not enough. And 54% of approximately 5 million is about 2.5 million. Some certainty is already emerging. How many advancing Germans were there? Is it possible to find specific values?

IN last chapters The books also come across some numbers. For example, on page 556 there is a table "Distribution of Nazi divisions in 1941-1945." As of June 22, there is the following data:

The total number of Nazi divisions is 217.5
Quantity on Soviet-German front – 153 (70,3%)

The total number of Nazi divisions is 314.5
Quantity on the Soviet-German front - 179 (57%)

And on page 569 there is finally a table entitled “Number of troops and weapons” (USSR and Germany on active fronts). However, it begins with... December 1941:

December 1941 – 4197 (USSR), 5093 (Germany)
......
January 1945 – 6532 (USSR), 3100 (Germany)

Initially, Hitler “released” 80-100 divisions for the Eastern Campaign. Then (by the beginning of 191) talk turned to 144 divisions (not counting the divisions of Italy, Romania, Hungary, and Finland). That's pretty much how it remained. On June 22, 152 German divisions, 12 Romanian, 2 Hungarian, 3 Italian, 18 Finnish - a total of about 3.5 million people - entered the battle.

ABOUT! It's getting closer! In total, this means that on June 22, 1941, the enemy launched an attack on the USSR in the amount of 3.5 million. But, excuse me, Finland declared war on the USSR on June 25. Hungary and Romania have not yet gone into battle on June 22 either. Therefore, from 3.5 million people it is necessary to subtract some of the strength of the armies of the German allies. There were 35 divisions allied to Germany (or 19%). Those. it turns out that on June 22, 1941, approximately 2.8 million German troops alone went to attack the USSR (And Soviet troops in western districts(see above) it was... about the same - 2.5 million).

In the end, it turns out that the advancing Germans did not have much of an advantage in the number of troops. Moreover, the attacker, it is believed, should have more soldiers, since in the attack (as a rule) the losses are higher. But... for some reason the Red Army, which was on the defensive, suffered really big losses. This is explained by the fact that although the Germans had approximately the same number of troops, they created an overwhelming superiority in the directions of the main attacks.

Maybe. But that’s what reconnaissance is for, to determine in advance the locations of these possible main attacks. Why haven't they identified it? Did Soviet intelligence find out something in advance? As it turns out, I found out. But for some reason the Soviet General Staff did not want to take this into account when deploying covering troops. It was possible to ignore such information only in one case - if German attack REALLY WAS NOT TAKEN INTO ATTENTION.

But Hitler still attacked. Those. he must have had some reason for this. Some suggest that it is of a strategic nature. But then (to check) it makes sense to look into whether Hitler had any plans for “after Barbarossa”? As it turns out, he did. And this is evidenced by his Directive N: 32, which (unlike Directive N: 21) little known among historians.

A brief explanation of its text is in the book by L. Bezymensky “SPECIAL FOLDER “BARBAROSSA”, in Chapter 7 “Pyramid of Death” (fragments pp. 254-264)
. . . . . .

WHAT WERE UP TO AFTER "BARBAROSSA"

In no case should we accept the date that appears on the document with that name as the moment the development of Operation Barbarossa began. The same can rightfully be said about the moment the development of the operation is completed. According to normal logic, one could consider that the development of Operation Barbarossa as a military strategic plan ended on June 21, 1941, on the eve of the day when the three German army groups began to act in strict accordance with the orders developed by the OKW and OKH. But in reality this was not the case. The process of developing the operation continued after June 21, because the appetites of the German General Staff and the Nazi leadership under no circumstances stopped at those military lines that were noted in “Directive N: 21”. Even that purely theoretical line “A-A” (from Arkhangelsk to Astrakhan), which was drawn along a line on the map Soviet Union, did not at all exhaust the plans that were hatched in the imperial chancellery. This is understandable: after all, the operation itself represented a decisive step in the struggle to seize world domination, and for this, of course, it was necessary not only to step over the notorious “A-A” line, but also to move much further. Where to?

In the history of “additional” planning for Operation Barbarossa, there are several weeks in which it received significant development in comparison with “Directive N: 21”. This happened in early July 1941 - when Hitler and all his military advisers (not to mention the leaders of the Nazi Party) were absolutely sure that the Soviet Union had already been defeated. ... On July 27, he “predicted” Halder that “in a month our troops will be at Leningrad and Moscow, on the Orel-Crimea line, at the beginning of October on the Volga, and in November in Baku and Batumi” (KTB. Halder, Bd. I, S. 1023). In these same July days, Hitler named another target - the Urals. July 16, 1941 dates back to what later became a classic document of aggression... the minutes of a meeting at Hitler’s headquarters, at which Hitler, Bormann, Rosenberg, Goering, Keitel and Jodl talked about how they could “divide the Russian pie.” This protocol, which was first announced at the Nuremberg trials and was often quoted in various works, dedicated to the Second World War, registered the complete confidence of the Nazi clique that the Soviet Union had already been defeated and the Soviet Army would not be able to provide any significant resistance.

Was the Wehrmacht ready for this situation? Certainly. The Nazi generals always knew how to foresee cases when it was necessary to develop success, but they did not know how to foresee their own defeats. No one in the German General Staff made plans in case of failure of “Barbarossa”, but already at the beginning of June 1941, that is, even before the attack on the USSR, “Directive N: 32” was developed - on actions “after Barbarossa”. But more about her a little later. First we will deal with the comparatively less well-known, but perhaps even more adventurous plan of German imperialism.

So, mid-July 1941. At Hitler's headquarters and the General Staff there is complete confidence in victory. Under these conditions, a development is placed on General Halder’s desk, in which it is assumed that the war is over, and that only 56 divisions will be needed to “secure and occupy” the occupied territory. They will carry out occupation tasks, and in addition, carry out “raids” into unoccupied areas. For this purpose, Halder decided to create several special groups, namely:

a) one tank corps for operations in Transcaucasia;
b) two tank corps to control the mouth of the Volga;
c) one tank corps for operations in the Southern Urals and one for operations in the Northern Urals (KTB. OKW, Bd. I, S. 1023).

In the Urals? Yes, in the Urals. A special development entitled “Operation against the Ural Industrial Region” and dated July 27, 1941 was devoted to this seemingly phantasmagoric task. It said:

“I. The operation will be carried out by mechanized troops with a force of 8 tank and 4 motorized divisions. If necessary, separate infantry divisions will also be involved, which will be tasked with guarding rear communications.
.....
The operation, by design, will be tied to highways and railways..."
......
Finally, specific directions of action were envisaged from Astrakhan to Kuibyshev, even with a stop south of the Urals(east of Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk), and in the north up to Vorkuta. No more and no less!

Of course, today one can sneer at the generals from the OKW and OKH, who believed that they could, with 12 divisions, pass through almost the entire European territory Soviet Union and capture the Urals. As in the planning of Operation Barbarossa itself, here the German generals believed that they would operate in the Urals as if in a vacuum. For them the Red Army no longer existed, for them there was no Soviet population. It’s not without reason that they say: whomever the gods want to punish, they deprive of their minds...

But since August 1941, you will not find any mention of the Urals in the documents of the German General Staff. Developments of events in Soviet-German. front quickly sobered up both General Halder and many other generals - they began to note with fear the growing power of the Soviet resistance. I had to forget about the Urals, because the entire building of “Barbarossa” was shaking.
......
The Urals played another specific role in German military planning. The fact is that Hitler’s Germany, in the “ideal case” of developing aggression, would somehow have to meet the interests of Japanese imperialism. Theoretically, it was believed that the meeting between the Wehrmacht divisions and the Japanese samurai should have taken place somewhere near Novosibirsk. In any case, Hitler wanted to keep the Urals for himself. And although by the end of 1941 it became clear that neither Siberia nor the Urals were out of the question, the aggressors attempted to formally divide spheres of influence. At the end of December 1941 Japanese ambassador in Berlin, General Oshima handed over to Ribbentrop a draft of a special agreement on the “division of spheres of influence” between Germany and Japan (T. Sommer, Deutschland und Japan zwischen den Machten, Tubingen, 1962, S. 428). The project consisted of three parts. The first part, called “Division of Operation Zones,” stipulated that the dividing line between Japanese and German interests should be 70 degrees east longitude along the entire length of the Asian continent - from the north of Siberia through Central Asia to the Indian Ocean. In the Indian Ocean basin itself, operations could be carried out on both sides of the dividing line. The second part (titled “General Outline of Operations”) suggested that Japan should seize Anglo-American bases and territories in East Asia and dominate the Western Pacific. As for Germany and Italy, they were intended to seize territories in Europe and Asia, in particular in the Near and Middle East, as well as in the Mediterranean basin (“Probleme des zweiten Weltkrieges”, Koln, 1967, S. 134).

This document was thoroughly discussed in Berlin. From the side of the “experts” came whole line objections: for example, the admirals considered it impossible to give the Japanese any precise assurances regarding the delimitation of interests in the world's oceans. And the General Staff of the Ground Forces proposed replacing the division of the world along the 70th degree of Eastern longitude with a certain “natural border”, which should have passed much further east, namely: along the Yenisei, then along the border between the Soviet Union, Mongolia and China and further to Afghanistan. According to this dividing line as the Ural industrial area, and the Siberian industrial complex should have fallen into the hands of the Germans (Ibid, S. 137).

The agreement was nevertheless signed in its original form. Hitler, apparently realizing that it was too early to talk about a specific division of spheres of influence, decided not to tease Japan and agreed with the 70-degree line - fortunately, he could cede Siberia to the Japanese all the more readily because he did not have it at his disposal. At that moment, it was much more important for him to strengthen military cooperation with Japan and intensify the actions of both aggressors against the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition.

But the 70th degree divided not only the Asian part of the Soviet Union. Even more significant was the fact that the southern tip of this imaginary watershed faced the Indian Ocean, and Indian Ocean The eyes of not only the Japanese, but also the German Nazi leadership were riveted.

It is no coincidence that in the history of Operation Barbarossa there is another chapter - its “southern” chapter, concerning plans related to the advance of the Wehrmacht through the Caucasus to the Middle East and further to Afghanistan and India. In Western historical literature, the prevailing opinion is that all such activities of Hitler were at the stage of very preliminary consideration and, strictly speaking, represented another chimera. This thesis is not confirmed by anything; rather, on the contrary, it is refuted by all the archives discovered after the defeat of the Third Reich.

The main document that refutes the thesis about “chimeras” is the above-mentioned “Directive N: 32”, developed in June 1941. It directly intended to begin preparations for an operation “on the other side of the Caucasus.”

This directive had a curious “overture”: it was discovered that in different groups of the German military clique there were different ideas about the period “after Barbarossa”. If the brown Fuhrer himself believed that the main efforts needed to be concentrated in Europe and Asia, then the adherents of German colonialism could not give up the dream of returning African possessions. Therefore, in the preparation of “Directive N: 32,” those groups that considered it necessary first of all to gain a foothold in Africa in order to, based on the military bases captured there and the returned colonies, begin the fight against the British and Americans, gained the upper hand. This goal was closely linked to the intended capture of the entire Iberian Peninsula. As you know, Hitler was not satisfied with the alliance that existed between him and the fascist dictator Franco. Not trusting his ally, he assumed that it would be much safer to simply occupy Spain along with Portugal and turn the Pyrenees into a large military bridgehead.

However, the original version of “Directive N: 32” was refuted by Hitler as too one-sided. On his instructions, it was revised. Leaving open the possibility of using West African bases, Hitler demanded a rapid advance through North Africa and Egypt to the Arabian Peninsula. Here Rommel’s troops operating in North Africa and the Germans were supposed to converge, forming the first pincers. expeditionary force, who should have pass through Bulgaria and Turkey. Then it was planned to carry out the second pincer movement: to combine the attacks of the above-mentioned two groups with the third, moving from the north, that is, through Transcaucasia. This way was meant crush French and English possessions in the Middle East. The entire Arabian Peninsula was to fall into German hands.

But this was not the last word in planning “after Barbarossa.” Subsequently, the united German troops had to make the leap from Arabia to India, at the same time, another strike was supposed to follow in the same direction - from Afghanistan.

The German military has long been paying attention to Afghanistan, considering this country a suitable base for action against India. Back in the 30s, Rosenberg’s department was preparing its agents in Afghanistan, relying mainly on a group of traitors from among national political figures. As early as December 18, 1939, Rosenberg sent a memorandum to Hitler in which he proposed to use Afghanistan “if necessary against British India or Soviet Russia” (ADAP, Bd. VIII, S. 431). Immediately after the start of the war, German agents in Afghanistan became noticeably more active; the leader of the local Waziri tribes, the so-called “fakir from Ipi” Haji Mirza Khan, also played a significant role in these plans. The Waziris were in the zone between India and Afghanistan and had to raise an uprising, to the “aid” of which, of course, German troops would come.

This was the general political background against which Hitler ordered to begin preparations for an operation against India carried out from the territory of Afghanistan. Of course, one “little thing” fell out of this “harmonious” plan: in order for German troops to move from Afghanistan to India, they first had to be in Afghanistan, having first covered “some” 7-8 thousand kilometers, separating Afghanistan from the western borders of the Soviet Union. However, intoxicated by his first military successes, it was easy for Hitler, in his over-inflamed imagination, to “jump” over such a “small” space as a space of several thousand kilometers.

How was the Wehrmacht going to “reach” Afghanistan and India? In the same July 1941, another plan was developed - a plan to move through the Caucasus, seize the Caucasian oil fields and advance to the Iran-Iraq border. ....

However, Iraq was only one and, moreover, most likely an auxiliary direction of future global aggression. The long-range target was India. To achieve this goal, in addition to the troops, a “fifth column” - the “fakir from Ipi” and others - had to act. (So, the Germans assigned big hopes on the leader of the Indian nationalist movement Subhas Chandra Bose.) It was assumed that the nationalist forces of India would revolt at the moment when German troops approached the Indian border. The task of reaching the Indian border was assigned to the so-called “Formation F” - a motorized corps under the command of General Felmy, which was formed in Greece and specially equipped for operations in subtropical and tropical conditions.

Neither the plan to capture Afghanistan nor the plan to enter India was implemented. Discussing this topic, the famous German historian Andreas Hilgruber wrote that “everything related to Afghanistan, and in general all plans related to Directive N: 32, were envisaged for the time “after Barbarossa.” However, the cardinal prerequisite for the implementation of such plans, namely: the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union, never became a reality” (A. Hillgruber, op. cit., S. 388).

No, I didn't! Hitler could not implement “Directive No. 32”, he could not carry out other plans, such as operations “Tannenbaum” (capture of Switzerland), “Silberfuchs” (capture of Sweden), “Felix” - “Isabella” (capture of Spain and Portugal) , could not even move to conquer the American continent. For a simple reason: the Soviet people, with their legendary feat, thwarted the Barbarossa plan and thereby saved the whole world from fascist enslavement.

================

So, in order to “crush French and English possessions in the Middle East,” Hitler needed a “corridor”via Bulgaria and Turkey. And also the way via North Africa, where his troops could only get via Spain . And although Spain was led by its recent ally, General Franco, he was in no particular hurry to join the Axis countries and attack British bases (also Gibraltar). As it turned out, the chief of Hitler's military intelligence, Abwehr, Admiral Canaris, played a big role in the fact that Franco refused Hitler's proposals to act on the side of the Axis countries. There is information about this, for example, in the 16th chapter of John Waller’s book “THE INVISIBLE WAR IN EUROPE” (Smolensk, “Rusich”, 2001) (pp. 205 – 216, fragments):

(Pictured: V. Kanaris (left) and R. Heydrich at a banquet in Berlin, 1936)

CHAPTER 16 FAILURE OF THE VELIX PLAN

HOW GIBRALTAR WAS SAVED

For many Germans, the victory of tank divisions over French army became an event that they savored for a long time. ....

General Canaris did not share the general euphoria and did not consider the fall of France a victory. “If Hitler wins,” he told his subordinate Colonel Heinz, “that will be the end of us, and also the end of the Germany we love and want to see. If Hitler loses,” he added, “it will also be our personal defeat because we could not get rid of him.” ...

For a variety of reasons, Hitler's High Command... turned its gaze towards Spain. Goering advised Hitler to occupy Spain and North Africa first, not Great Britain. In June 1940, before the treaty with France was signed, General Guderian, commander of the 19th Panzer Corps, also argued for the need to capture Britain's strategic bastion of Gibraltar. The general even advised Hitler to postpone the signing of the treaty with France so that he could pass through the whole of Spain in two tank divisions, capture Gibraltar, and from this bridgehead capture French North Africa. General Alfred Jodl, head of the OKW transport department, presented the Fuhrer with a plan that proposed cutting off Great Britain from its eastern possessions by seizing Spain, Gibraltar, North Africa and the Suez Canal.

The plan, which was soon called Operation Felix, aimed to occupy Gibraltar, as well as Spanish possessions in North Africa and, in particular, Spanish Morocco, Rio de Oro and the Canary Islands, in order to use Spanish ports as a base German submarines in the Battle of the Atlantic. In the event of a successful development of events, it was possible to strike a blow, and possibly fatal, to Great Britain.

This plan, however, clearly went against the wishes of General Franco. Despite the serious assistance of Nazi Germany during the Spanish Civil War, he had his own vision of national interests. On June 12, 1940, he declared a “peaceful” situation; then, two days later, with the agreement of the French and English but not the Germans, he sent troops to occupy Tangier.

The British, of course, were concerned that Hitler would be able to convince Spain to enter the war with all the ensuing consequences for the Allies.

Sir Samuel Hoare, an ardent supporter of peaceful action, was urgently sent to Spain on a special mission to persuade Franco not to succumb to German pressure. The chorus did not believe in the success of its mission so much that it kept a plane ready in case war suddenly broke out.

Hoare's consultations with the Spanish government, which began in mid-June 1940, were so difficult that the British Ministry of Defense gave him the authority to promise, if necessary, that Britain would be “ready to discuss after the war any question relating to common interests with Spain.” Perhaps this innocent-sounding statement might have given the Spaniards reason to think that Gibraltar might fall to them. The chorus refrained from veiled or explicit promises to discuss the fate of Gibraltar after the war, since the discussion had settled down, and Franco, for reasons best known to himself, did not make any demands regarding this bastion of the British and seemed “determined not to enter the war.” Despite the off-the-record outbursts of bravado at the start of negotiations and expressions such as “why don’t you end the war; you won’t win it,” the caudillo turned out to be surprisingly accommodating. There was evidence that Franco delivered to Hitler following conditions- before entering the war and opening its country to the passage of German troops, Germany must give French Morocco and Algeria to Spain. Such conditions irritated Hitler, since Franco’s demands were obviously impossible for him to fulfill.

On July 10, Field Marshal Keitel asked Canaris, a well-known expert on Spain, to check the possibility of organizing a blockade of Gibraltar. Ten days later, the admiral, upset by the course of events in France, went to Spain. He was to be accompanied by Abwehr officers Hans Pickenbrock, Lieutenant Colonel Hans Mikosch, Captain Hans-Jochen Rudloff, as well as the Abwehr station chief in Spain, Captain Wilhelm Leisner. He was, however, able to go there alone and spent enough time there to see his old friends: General Juan Vigon, Chief of the General Staff of the Spanish Armed Forces, and General Carlos Martinez Campos, Chief of Spanish Intelligence. Canaris urged them to persuade Franco not to agree to Hitler's requests. It seems significant that only his personal relationships with these people allowed such amazing frankness; this strongly suggests that Canaris had long since brought them to his side as a “confidant liaison” in Spain. One of Canaris's biographers, Dr. C. H. Abshagen, probably got it right when he wrote of the admiral's relationship with Vigon and Martinez Campos as one based on “mutual trust.”

On July 18, Franco announced his claims to Gibraltar, but not with the goal of taking it away from the British, and then so that Germany would not claim it. The British Special Envoy, Samuel Hoare, whom Cadogan once called “that little bore”, became very agitated, apparently not understanding the true background of such a statement.

In August, Canaris spoke with Franco's cousin Ramon Serrano Suñer, who was preparing to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The admiral urgently asked Serrano Suñera to do everything possible to persuade Franco to withdraw from the war - a surprisingly frank conversation. Almost immediately after this conversation, Franco sent Serrano Sunier to Berlin to personally clarify Hitler’s attitude to this issue. At a meeting with Serrano Suñer on 16 September, Hitler did not insist on Spain's entry into the war, perhaps deciding to leave more strong arguments in favor of this to a meeting with Franco himself.

At an informal meeting during which Canaris was supposed to recruit Franco to collaborate with Hitler to capture Gibraltar, he did the opposite. Canaris warned Franco that if he became an ally of the Axis, Spain would suffer not only economically, but would also lose its islands, and perhaps even the Iberian Peninsula would be captured by the British. Moreover, Hitler's war plans did not include troops to defend Spain.

Franco must have hoped, having conceded to Hitler, to subsequently share the laurels of victory with Germany, and at that time there were such chances. But convinced by Canaris that Hitler's cause was doomed, he considered it more profitable to remain on the sidelines. As Winston Churchill said: “Franco changed his mind and decided not to drag his exhausted people into another war.”

Knowing that Franco feared a German invasion of Spain if he refused to cooperate, Canaris used his strongest argument:

Hitler has no intention of invading Spain by force. Having revealed the Fuhrer's secret, Canaris told Franco about Plan Barbarossa, Hitler's ambitious plan to take over Russia. It was for this reason that Germany could not contribute troops to the Spanish campaign, let alone defend Spain. The Abwehr chief surprised Franco with his conviction that Hitler would not win the war; thus Spain, as an active ally of Germany, was sure to be the target of revenge by the victorious Allies after the war.

On August 8, encouraged by Canaris's secret assurances, Franco presented his extortion terms to the German ambassador Eberhard von Stöhrer. Caudillo said that he would join Hitler if he was promised Gibraltar and French Morocco as a reward. Germany was also to promise, if necessary, military aid and supplies of wheat and oil to strengthen Spain's weak economy. The main requirement was to first land German troops on the English coast for a full-scale invasion, and only after that Spain agreed to enter the war.

This proposal caused Hitler to rush Canaris to Spain again in an attempt to persuade Franco to join the Axis or at least soften his “outrageous” demands. Canaris did not do this in conversations with his old friend. On the contrary, he again reminded Franco of the mistake of siding with Hitler, who was doomed to defeat. General Halder writes in his diary on August 9, quoting Canaris’s words upon his return: “Spain on its own will not be able to do anything against Gibraltar... It will be difficult to drag Spain into the war, as Hitler wants. Economic problems!"
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Determined to reach an understanding with Franco, Hitler himself decided to meet with him. This meeting was scheduled for October 23 in the French border village of Hendaye to discuss the Felix plan. ......

Hitler arrived in Hyundai on his personal train, accompanied by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, Field Marshal Keitel and Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. It was striking that Admiral Canaris was absent from the delegation. Disliking Canarisa and fearing that, as close friend Franco, he would focus all the attention on himself and receive all the praise for bringing Franco into the Axis, Ribbentrop had Canaris expelled from the delegation. But this is exactly what Ribbentrop did not even have to worry about.

General Franco was accompanied by his cousin, Foreign Minister Ramon Serrano Suñer ( According to Canaris biographer Ian Colvin, an expert on German intelligence services for the British Foreign Office, Canaris instructed his Vatican agent Joseph Müller to make strictly secret contact with Spanish Foreign Minister Serrano Suñer during his visit to Rome and tell him the following: “Admiral [Canaris] asks you to tell Franco not to involve Spain in this game at any cost. You may think that we have strong positions. In fact, the situation is desperate, and the chances of winning the war are very small.” - Colvin, "Canaris, Chief of Intelligence", page 128) and the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin, General Eugenio Espinosa de los Monteros. Hitler prepared extensive protocol events with great pomp and splendor in order to flatter Franco. ....
The meeting in Hyundai was supposed to be carried out with a certain diplomatic ritual, at the end of which Franco was supposed to graciously yield to Hitler's wishes regarding Gibraltar, thus becoming a full ally of Germany in the war and receiving protection in the event of a British retaliatory strike. Franco did not compromise and did not allow German troops to set foot on the territory of his country.

The day before arriving in Hyundai, Hitler paid a visit to Vichy leader Pierre Laval in France. He also planned to meet personally with Marshal Henri Pétain the day after the Hendaye conference in order to persuade the French to abandon neutrality and act jointly with Germany against Great Britain. Franco, caught between two leaders of the Vichy government, was unhappy. When Hitler made it clear that he could not ignore the interests of France, Franco realized that he would not receive territorial gains by entering the war on the side of the Germans, and, in addition, he would lose a lot. Canaris's warning about British retaliatory measures became increasingly convincing.

For his part, Hitler obviously also realized the futility of his attempts to put pressure on Spain. Canaris had already informed Hitler (and not without reason) that much could not be expected from Franco in the Hyundai. ..... At a conference in Brenner Pass on October 15, Halder spoke with General von Epdorff: “The question of Gibraltar is closely linked to the interests of France. The participation of Spain will inevitably raise the problem of French colonial possessions and cooperation with France in North Africa.” Halder correctly notes that if France had learned about the transfer of its colonies to Spain, then “she would have stopped defending her colonies and would have handed them over to the British.”

The demands of Franco and Pétain were mutually unacceptable, and, in fact, this fact doomed the meeting in Hyundai to failure. Franco, for his own reasons, did not want to make concessions to Hitler. In addition, Canaris constantly emphasized that Germany would not open the Spanish front as long as Great Britain remained a threat, particularly at sea, and above all, at a time when Germany needed to mobilize all its forces for the upcoming, although still kept secret, invasion in USSR.

The meeting in Hyundai became completely meaningless when Franco expressed his doubts about Germany's victory in the war, which greatly offended Hitler. Caudillo emphasized that even if the British Isles were captured, the British government and navy would continue the war from Canada with the help of the Americans. This idea largely coincided with Canaris’s point of view. After the war, the wartime regent of Hungary, Admiral Miklós Horthy, said that Canaris predicted back in September 1938 that Germany would be doomed to defeat in any war if the United States entered it on the side of Great Britain and France. Canaris spoke about this as a warning to Horthy, convincing him that Hungary should not fight.

Although a meaningless memorandum of understanding was signed as a result of the meeting in Hyundai, neither the Fuhrer nor Franco got what they wanted. An angry Hitler later told Mussolini: “I’d rather have four teeth pulled out than do this again!”

Despite Franco's position, Hitler did not abandon Operation Felix. He was convinced that an attack on Gibraltar to cut off the Mediterranean at the same time as the main attack on the USSR by the end of 1940 would be a more effective step in the fight against Great Britain than a risky invasion across the English Channel. But in December Hitler lost the last vestiges of faith in Spain.

Franco's subsequent refusal to have anything to do with German plans The occupation of Vichy France (Operation Attila) forced Hitler to annul all agreements with Spain. February 6, 1941 Franco in Once again gave a negative response to Hitler's request to enter the war, using the disastrous state of the Spanish economy as an excuse. Ribbentrop, in one of his rare accurate assessments, told Hitler that in his opinion Franco had “no intention of entering the war.”
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If Hitler had known that his chief of military intelligence, Admiral Canaris, was the inspirer of Franco’s incorrigible behavior, then, undoubtedly, Canaris would have paid for it with his life immediately, and not four years later. Canaris's actions were fraught with enormous risk.
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After the war, when General Reinhard Gehlen, head of the new West German intelligence service, and one of his senior officers, Captain Eric Waldmann, visited Franco to renew contacts, the head of the Spanish intelligence service (G-2) spoke about Canaris's role. Chief G-2 also claimed that as a sign of his gratitude after the war, Franco provided Canaris' widow with a house in Spain and other assistance......

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So, after the war with France in the summer of 1940, Hitler did not stop his desire to expand his influence into neighboring countries. There were several options:

- Conduct a landing on the British Isles.
- Move troops through Spain to North Africa.
- Move troops to the Middle East (via Bulgaria and Turkey).
- Attack the USSR.

Hitler chose the latter.

Why?