In the central sector in the Yelnya area, Army Group Center went on the defensive. There, the approaching army corps were transferred to the 4th Army, and both tank groups were again withdrawn from its composition. Until the last days of August, the Russians launched strong attacks against the army group, whose front arched in a wide arc to the east, apparently still hoping to recapture the Smolensk area.
In the Elninskaya arc, which G.K. undertook to eliminate. Zhukov, according to the encyclopedia "Great Patriotic War", there were 6 German divisions (all infantry) - 15, 137, 78, 292, 268, 7. Zhukov had 8 divisions at his disposal, of which 5 were rifle divisions (107, 100, 19, 120, 303), two mechanized (106, 103) and one tank (102nd). First of all, while still at the General Staff, he timely assessed the danger of the Yelnya ledge, formed as a result of the breakthrough in mid-July of the troops of the 2nd German tank group south of Smolensk and the capture (July 19) of the city of Yelnya. From this bridgehead, the German command had the opportunity to strike the flank of the Western Front and develop an offensive towards Moscow in the shortest direction.
The concept of the operation provided for a decisive operational maneuver - a two-way envelopment of the ledge in order to encircle and destroy the enemy group in this area with attacks from the north and south under the base of the Elninsky ledge. At the same time, active offensive actions from the east to pin him down, dismember him and destroy him piece by piece. Despite approximately equal ratio forces, the commander of the front forces managed to create a significant superiority over the enemy in forces and means in the attack directions.
DIRECTIVE OF THE Supreme Commander-in-Chief N001253 TO THE COMMANDER OF THE RESERVE FRONT TROOPS ON THE PREPARATION OF AN OPERATION TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY'S YELNINSKY GROUP.
On August 30, the left-flank 24th and 43rd armies go on the offensive with the tasks: to finish off the enemy’s Yelnya grouping, capture Yelnya and, subsequently delivering attacks in the directions of Pochinok and Roslavl, by September 8, 1941, reach the front of Dolgiye Niva, Khislavichy , Petrovichi, for what:
a) the 24th Army, consisting of eight infantry divisions, one TD, one infantry division - destroy the enemy’s Elninsky group with concentric attacks and reach the front of the station by September 1. Bolshaya Nezhoda, Petrovo, Stroina; in the future, developing the offensive, strike in the direction of Pochinok and, having captured the latter, by September 8 go to the front of Dolgiye Niva, Khislavichy;
b) the 43rd Army, leaving the 22nd and 53rd Rifle Division on the occupied defense front and the main forces of the army in the defense of the Spas-Demensky and Kirov positions, two rifle and two tank divisions on August 30, go on the offensive in general direction to Roslavl and, having captured Roslavl, by September 8 go to the Khislavichi, Petrovichi front; ...
On August 30, 1941, after a short artillery preparation, troops of the 24th Army under the command of General K.I. Rakutin went on the offensive, overcoming fierce resistance, broke through the enemy’s fortified defenses and by July 6 created a threat of encirclement of the entire Elninsky group. German command additionally brought four infantry divisions into the battle, but all enemy counterattacks were repelled, although at times very difficult situations arose. Fearing complete environment, it began a hasty withdrawal of its troops. Pursuing the enemy, our troops advanced 25 km, liberated the city of Yelnya, and defeated a dangerous enemy group. Only an extremely limited number of tanks and aircraft did not allow our troops to complete the encirclement and complete destruction Elninsky group of Nazi troops. In contrast to the private offensive operations previously undertaken in 1941 on various fronts, where passivity on other sectors allowed the enemy to transfer forces from other directions and localize our offensive, in the Elninsky operation offensive actions were taken by troops to assist the 24th Army and ensure success The 16th and 20th armies of the Western Front on the Smolensk and 43rd armies of the Reserve Front on the Roslavl directions.
Our losses amounted to 31,853people, of which 10,701 were killed or missing and 21,152 people were wounded.
Zhukov presented a generalized report on the results of the operation to Headquarters. On the basis of his Supreme Command Headquarters, the General Staff issued orders and directives summarizing the experience of the Elninsky operation with the aim of bringing it to the entire Red Army. To cultivate an offensive spirit, the Soviet Guard was established. In particular, the 100th, 127th, 153rd and 161st rifle divisions were the first to be awarded the title of guards.
The Elninsky operation, despite the fact that it was not possible to encircle and destroy German troops, became the first successful offensive operation of the Great Patriotic War on the scale of the front.
Due to the decline in the offensive capabilities of the German troops of Army Group Center in mid-November 1941, the Soviet command began developing a plan for an offensive operation near Moscow. On November 29, the Supreme Command Headquarters approved it and determined the timing of the start of the operation. Its plan was to defeat the main enemy groups, which were trying to capture Moscow from the north and south, with blows from the right and left wings of the Western Front, in cooperation with the Kalinin and Southwestern Fronts. The main role was assigned to the troops of the Western Front.
To carry out the operation, the Headquarters concentrated quite large forces: Western Front [Army General G.K. Zhukov; 1st shock, 30th, 20th, 16th, 5th, 49th and 50th armies and group of forces of Major General P.A. Belova (reinforced 1st Guards Cavalry Corps) and 10th Army], Kalinin Front (Colonel General I.S. Konev; 29th, 31st and 22nd Armies), right wing of the Southwestern Front (Marshal Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko; 3, 13th Army and the operational group of Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko), which had 1.1 million people, 7652 guns and mortars, 774 tanks and 1000 combat aircraft.
They were opposed German group armies “Center” Field Marshal F. Bock, then Field Marshal G. Kluge, 9th, 4th and 2nd armies; The 3rd and 4th tank groups (from December 31 - the 3rd and 4th tank armies), numbering over 1.7 million people, about 13.5 thousand guns and mortars, 1170 tanks and 615 combat aircraft.
In general, Soviet troops were inferior to the enemy in numbers, with the exception of aviation, which, thanks to two successful air operations carried out in October-November, gained operational dominance in the air.
According to the operational plan, the Western Front launched two attacks simultaneously: one north of Moscow in converging directions towards Ktin and Solnechnogorsk, the other south in the direction of Stinogorsk (now Novomoskovsk), Uzlovaya, Bogoroditsk. The Kalinin Front went on the offensive with its left wing with the goal of going to the rear of the Klin enemy group and, together with the troops of the right wing of the Western Front, destroying it. It was also planned to encircle enemy troops in Kalinin (now Tver). The Southwestern Front received the task of defeating the enemy in the Yepets area and assisting the troops of the left wing of the Western Front.
Powerful blows Soviet troops in early December, near Kalinin, Yakhroma, Naro-Fominsk and south of Kashira, they developed into a counteroffensive. It began on December 5 with a strike by the 29th and 31st armies of the left wing of the Kalinin Front against the superior forces of the 9th German army. Given the general advantage of the enemy in forces and means, the front command managed to create a group of eight rifle divisions, which ensured a 1.5-fold superiority in men in the direction of the main attack. By the end of December 9, the 31st Army cut the Kalinin-Turginovo highway and, in cooperation with the 29th Army, created a threat of encirclement of the enemy in the Kalinin area. The German command began to withdraw units from the city. On December 16, Kalinin was released. On December 22, the 39th Army was transferred to the Kalinin Front from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, which was introduced into the battle in the zone between the 22nd and 29th armies. Conducting intense battles, the troops of the Kalinin Front reached the line along the left bank of the Volga north-west and east of Rzhev, where they were stopped by the enemy.
Front troops advanced 60-120 km in the southern and southwestern directions. The railway connection between the north-western and western strategic directions was restored, which ensured the interaction of the Kalinin, Western and North-Western fronts, creating conditions for a subsequent operation with the aim of deeper coverage of the entire enemy group operating in the Moscow direction.
On December 6, the armies of the right wing of the Western Front went on a counteroffensive (1st Shock, 30th, 20th Armies and part of the forces of the 5th Army), on December 7 - the 16th Army. As part of the Moscow offensive operation, the Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation began. The front troops were opposed by the 3rd Kalinip and 4th German tank groups and part of the 4th Army. Despite the enemy's advantage in artillery and armored vehicles, the front command created a 1.6 times superiority in men and broke through the enemy defenses. On December 11, Soviet troops liberated Istra, December 12 - Solnechnogorsk, December 15 - Klin. For the non-stop pursuit of the enemy, advanced troops, mobile cavalry and tank groups under the command of Major General L.M. were widely used. Dovator, Major General F.T. Remizov, Major General tank troops M.E. Katukov, Colonel P.G. Chanchibadze and others. On December 20, troops of the 16th and 20th armies liberated Volokolamsk. By the end of December 21, the troops of the right wing of the Western Front reached the line of the Lama and Ruza rivers, where they met organized resistance from German troops in previously prepared positions. Attempts to immediately break through their defenses at this line were unsuccessful. Until December 25, Soviet troops fought in order to improve their position. As a result of the Kshsh-Solnechnogorsk operation, the troops of the right wing of the Western Front defeated the 3rd and 4th tank groups of the enemy, throwing them back 90-100 km.
The troops of the left wing of the Western Front (part of the forces of the 49th Army, 50th, 10th Army and a group of forces of Major General P.A. Belov), having launched the Tula offensive operation on December 6, went on a counteroffensive at different times: 10th Army - 6 December to Stalinogorsk. 50th Army - December 8 at Shchekino. Soviet troops attacked from several directions powerful blows along the 2nd German Tank Army, which was deeply wedged into the defense south of Tula, and to the north - along the right-flank formations of the 4th Wehrmacht Army in the Maloyaroslavets-Tarusa area. Despite the overall superiority in forces and means, the fascist German command, fearing encirclement east of Tula, gave the order to withdraw troops from the “bag”. On December 11, the troops of the 10th Army liberated Stapshogorsk, and on December 13 - Epi-fan. By December 16, the advanced formations of the army reached the river line. Upa, covering the deep rear of the 2nd Tank Army of the Wehrmacht from the southwestern direction. Meanwhile, due to stubborn enemy resistance south and east of Tula, the advance of the 50th Army developed slowly. On December 12, its units reached the river. UPA, on December 16, a group of Belov’s troops came here. Two days earlier, the 49th Army went on the offensive, liberating the city of Aleksin on December 17 and thereby ensuring the offensive of the 50th Army. In general, during the Tula offensive operation, Soviet troops advanced more than 100 km and eliminated the immediate threat to Moscow from the south.
At the same time, the right-flank armies of the Southwestern Front (3rd, 13th and operational group of Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko) began the Yelets operation on December 6. During it, two enemy infantry divisions were surrounded and destroyed. The troops of the 2nd German Field Army suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment. By the end of December 16, the enemy was driven back to the line east of the city Livny. During Yelets operation Soviet troops advanced 80-100 km. The cities of Yelets and Efremov were liberated and the enemy's wedge south of Tula was eliminated.
On December 17, without a pause after the Tula offensive operation, the Kaluga offensive operation of the troops of the left wing of the Western Front began, consisting of the 49th (Lieutenant General I.G. Zakharkin), 50th (Lieutenant General I.V. Boldin), 10th (Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov) armies and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps. Here the Soviet troops were opposed by the main forces of the 2nd Tank Army and part of the formations of the 4th Army of the Wehrmacht. The operation was carried out successfully, the actions of the mobile front group under the command of Major General B.C. were especially swift. Popova. In just one day, it advanced up to 90 km and on December 21 broke into Kaluga, which was completely liberated only on December 30 by the joint efforts of the mobile group and the approaching formations of the 49th and 50th armies. During the operation, hundreds of settlements were liberated, including Likhvin and Kozelsk.
At the end of December, the 10th Army and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, in cooperation with the partisans on a wide front, crossed the river. Oka. By January 9, 1942, the troops of the left wing of the Southwestern Front reached the line east of Lobanov and Yukhnov, Zubovo, Sukhiichi, advancing 120-130 km westward.
The troops of the center of the Western Front, the left flank of which consisted (after the unification of the Western and Reserve Fronts on October 10) of the 5th, 3rd, 43rd (Lieutenant General K.D. Golubev) armies, and the right flank of the 49th Army, drank on the offensive on December 18 with the goal of pinning down the enemy here, depriving him of the opportunity to transfer forces to the flanks of Army Group Center. Basically, the offensive in this direction achieved its intended goal.
The Bryansk Front, recreated on December 24, Colonel General Ya.T. Chsrevichenko; 61st (Lieutenant General M.M. Popov), 3rd, 13th (Major General A.M. Gorodnyansky) armies and the operational group of Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko, when interacting with the troops of the Southwestern Front, due to fierce enemy resistance, was unable to complete the task set by Headquarters to capture the areas of Orel and Kursk. By January 8, the formations of the Bryansk Front managed to advance only 5-25 km and reach the river line. Pine east of Livny.
In general, having defeated the formations of Army Group Center during the offensive operation, which broke through to the near approaches of Moscow from the north and south, Soviet troops completed the task assigned to them. Over 11 thousand settlements were liberated from the invaders, and the danger of encirclement of Tula was eliminated. Soviet troops reached the line Selizharovo, Rzhev, Volokolamsk, Ruza, Mosalsk, Bedev, Mtsensk, Novosil, throwing the enemy back 100-250 km. The enemy was dealt a heavy defeat: 38 divisions were defeated, including 11 tank and 4 motorized. The losses of the Soviet troops were: irrevocable - 139,586 people, sanitary - 231,369 people.
The Moscow offensive operation became the first strategic offensive operation of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War. The victory near Moscow significantly improved the military-political and international situation Soviet Union. Soviet troops thwarted the fascist German plan for a “lightning war” and dispelled the myth of the invincibility of the German army.
“The Smolensk battle,” wrote Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, “lasted two months and included a whole series of fierce operations that took place with with varying success for both sides..." At its final stage, Soviet troops successfully carried out the Dukhovshchina and Elninskaya offensive operations, during which the Soviet Guard was born. And if the battles for the liberation of Yelnya are known from many publications and memoirs of military leaders, the Dukhovshchina operation is little known even before still remains, as it were, in the shadows.
In the 20th of July 1941, in the midst of fierce battles for Smolensk, the Soviet command created five operational groups under the command of generals I. I. Maslennikov, V. A. Khomenko, S. A. Kalinin, K. K. Rokossovsky and V. Y. Kachalova. Their task was to break through the enemy front with strikes from the areas of Ilyino, Bely, Yartsevo and Roslavl and, together with the forces of the 16th and 20th armies fighting near Smolensk, defeat the Dukhshchinsko-Smolensk group of German troops, throwing them back beyond Orsha. In addition, two cavalry groups were sent to the enemy’s rear from the Zharkovsky and Osipovichi areas: generals Selivanov and Gorodovikov, who were supposed to go to the area west of Smolensk and paralyze the work of the German rear and the transfer of its reserves. These task forces included 12 rifle, 3 tank and 5 cavalry divisions.
The operational groups were unable to complete their task and seize the initiative from the enemy in the Western direction, although they diverted significant enemy forces to themselves, thereby easing the position of the 16th and 20th armies, which managed to avoid encirclement and retreat beyond the Dnieper crossings. And the Nazi command was forced for the first time to give its troops the order to move to defense in the Western direction.
The Headquarters of the Supreme Command decided to make a new attempt to seize the initiative in the Western direction, for which to concentrate forces and resources in two areas (east of Dukhovshchina and northeast of Yelnya), conduct two offensive operations: defeat the Dukhovshchina and Yelnya enemy groups and return Smolensk. Beginning - August 8. The leadership of these operations was entrusted to the commanders of the Western and Reserve Fronts, Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko and Army General G.K. Zhukov.
The main role in the Dukhovshchina offensive operation was assigned to the 19th Army of Lieutenant General I. S. Konev. This army was formed in June 1941 on the basis of the North Caucasus Military District and in early July was transferred to the Western Front, where its formations immediately entered the battles of Vitebsk, Rudnya, and Smolensk. During the rapidly changing combat situation, part of its divisions was reassigned to the 16th Army (127th, 129th and 158th Infantry Division) and the Rokossovsky group (38th Infantry Division), the rest, after losses, were reorganized near Vyazma and later entered to the 30th Army. By the beginning of the offensive, the 89th (commander Colonel T.F. Kolesnikov), 91st (Major General N.F. Lebedenko) and 166th (Colonel A.N. Kholzinyov) were included in the 19th Army from the disbanded Kalinin group. rifle divisions, from the front reserve - the 50th rifle division (commander Colonel A. A. Boreyko). To replenish them, 20 communist companies of political fighters were sent. The army was reinforced with four artillery regiments.
On the evening of August 6, Marshal Timoshenko visited the headquarters of the 30th Army, where he assigned its commander, General Khomenko, the task of supporting the offensive of the 19th Army with his own forces, and on August 7 he was already at the headquarters of the 20th Army. An order was brought to the army commanders for the troops of the Western Front, where they were given the task: “firmly holding the line of the Dnieper River with the left wing of the front and repelling enemy attacks on its right wing, with the center to defeat and destroy the enemy’s Dukhshchina grouping”; The 16th and 20th armies had to use active offensive actions on the lines of Yartsevo and the Dnieper crossings to pin down enemy forces and not allow them to be transferred to the Dukhshchina direction.
On August 8 at 5 o'clock in the morning, after aviation and artillery preparation, formations of the 19th and then 30th armies went on the offensive and, having broken the first line of defense of the 9th Army of Colonel General Strauss, advanced 8-10 km in a few days . These successful offensive actions contributed to the escape of the Soviet combined division from encirclement.
This is her story. During the July battles of General Kalinin’s group, the 503rd Regiment, 91st Infantry Division, having crossed the Vop River, went deep into the enemy’s defenses and was cut off from their troops. The head of the political department, regimental commissar N.A. Shlyakhtin, who was here, led the regiment and tried to lead it out of encirclement. After several unsuccessful attempts Shlyakhtin took him west, into the forest. Here he was joined by groups of soldiers and commanders from the 27th, 134th and other rifle divisions retreating to the east - over two thousand people gathered. Shlyakhtin formed a consolidated division from them. On August 7, a group of about a hundred people departing from the border, led by the former deputy front commander, Lieutenant General I.V. Boldin, established contact with her. He headed the consolidated division, and Shlyakhtin became its commissar. On August 10, scouts Osipov and Tagirov crossed the front line, contacted General Konev and agreed on joint actions.
On August 11, in the area of the village of Domashenki, the 166th Infantry Division went on the offensive. Its actions were actively supported by aviation, which made 149 sorties that day, dropping 240 high-explosive and more than 300 fragmentation bombs at the enemy’s location, firing 195 rockets. Direct hits destroyed many guns, tanks, vehicles with ammunition, and fuel tanks. The combined division attacked the enemy from the rear. The enemy lost 1,500 killed that day, 80 vehicles and a lot of other equipment. The political report of the 19th Army reported that the losses of the 166th division were: 1 killed Red Army soldier and 75 wounded. In the combined division, when leaving the encirclement, two generals who were leaving with Boldin from the very border died: the commander of the 27th Infantry Division Stepanov and the corps commander Borisov. After leaving the encirclement, the combined division began to be called “Boldin’s group” in documents. It came out in full strength of 1,654 people, with a convoy and covering detachments. General Boldin again became deputy commander of the Western Front, Shlyakhtin was appointed head of the political department of the 50th Army of the Bryansk Front (died in October 1941).
The offensive operations of the 19th and 30th armies were suspended by increased resistance from the enemy, who transferred a mechanized corps from General Hoth's tank group to the combat area.
On August 14, Marshal Timoshenko met with General Zhukov. After analyzing the progress of offensive operations, they, in agreement with Stalin, decided to strengthen the strike forces of the 19th and 24th armies and more carefully prepare a further offensive.
A day later, the 19th Army received the 64th Rifle (commander Colonel A.S. Gryaznov) and 101st Tank (commander Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel G.M. Mikhailov) divisions transferred from the 16th Army and from the front reserve 45th cavalry division General N. M. Dreyer. In addition, it was reinforced by the 43rd mixed aviation division General G.N. Zakharov, two cannon artillery regiments, three artillery battalions and two batteries of rocket artillery (Katyusha).
On August 17, the offensive resumed. Under the cover of aviation and artillery fire, it began with the crossing of the Vop River, along which the leading edge of the enemy defense passed. On the night before the offensive, sappers built 10 bridges and equipped several fords. During the artillery barrage and rapid offensive, the defenses of the enemy's 161st Infantry Division were crushed. The enemy command sent aviation against the Soviet troops. But its raids were successfully repulsed by the pilots of the 401st Fighter Aviation Regiment under the command of K.K. Kokkinaki.
In Konev's army, the 64th Rifle Division, which had rich combat experience, especially distinguished itself. Formed in 1925 in Smolensk and staffed mainly by Smolensk soldiers, in the first days of the war it courageously defended the approaches to Minsk. Having escaped from the Minsk encirclement, its thinned regiments were formed near Vyazma, and from the end of July it was again in battle as part of General Rokossovsky’s group near the city of Yartsevo.
On August 17, its 30th regiment under the command of order bearer Colonel A.I. Efremov with a swift blow broke through the enemy’s defenses and, together with the neighboring 159th and 288th rifle regiments, liberated the villages of Ryadyn, Selkovo, Batyevo, and the Zaitsevo state farm from the enemy, destroying more than 300 Nazis and captured 420.
Other formations of the 19th Army also advanced successfully. On August 17, an order from the commander of the Western Front noted these successes. The order ended with the words: “Follow the example of the 19th Army! Develop your offensive more boldly and decisively!”
To stop the advance of the Soviet troops, Hitler's command introduces a new mechanized corps into battle.
On August 20, Marshal Timoshenko, in a telephone conversation with Stalin, asked for reinforcements: “...Replenishment of 30 thousand, 24 KB tanks and 20 anti-tank guns.” On the same day, reinforcements were sent to the troops.
On August 21, north of Yartsev, the 57th German Mechanized Corps entered the battle. Artillerymen of the 219th artillery regiment of the 64th division, with the assistance of army artillery, shot down enemy tanks. Marshal Timoshenko wrote home on August 22: “Yesterday the Nazis launched a counterattack on me, as a result of which we defeated them and took many prisoners. We captured 60 guns and destroyed 85 tanks.”
The news of the successful offensive in the Dukhshchinsky direction spread throughout the country. Against the backdrop of failures on other fronts (success had not yet emerged in the Yelninsky direction), this offensive looked promising and inspired hope. In "Red Star" there were one after another reports from special correspondents Z. Hiren and Y. Miletsky about the successes of the army ("Successful battles of commander Konev's units", "New successes of commander Konev's units", "Commander Konev's units continue to develop success").
War correspondents and foreign journalists frequented the 19th Army and its neighboring troops. One of the first to arrive was a brigade consisting of famous writers M. Sholokhov, A. Fadeev, E. Petrov and the secretary of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, Colonel A. Karpov. They visited the army headquarters in the village of Vasilisino, the army command post, and the positions of the 64th, 166th and 50th rifle divisions.
During the Dukhovshchina offensive operation, General Konev’s troops were assisted by their active actions and other armies of the Western Front. Thus, the right-flank 30th Army of General Khomenko, with the forces of the 162nd, 250th and 251st Rifle Divisions, successfully conducted offensive battles and by August 23 liberated the regional center and the territory of the Baturinsky district. The left-flank 16th Army of General Rokossovsky pinned down significant Nazi forces on the Yartsevo line. The battles here were fought by the 38th and 152nd rifle divisions. The 1st Moscow Proletarian Motorized Rifle Division under the command of Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel A.I. Lizyukov, was especially distinguished for its valor and courage. Its regiments north of Yartsev repeatedly crossed the Vop River and fought into the depths of the enemy’s defenses. In intense battles that lasted until September 10, the division suffered heavy losses. Among the dead was its commissioner I.I. Tyupilin.
Fierce fighting also took place in the area of the Dnieper crossings, where formations of General Lukin’s 20th Army fought: the 73rd, 129th, 144th, 153rd, 161st and 229th rifle divisions. The 153rd division of Colonel N.A. Gagen and the 161st division of Colonels A.I. Mikhailov, then P.F. Moskvitin at the Pnevo-Ratchina line crossed the Dnieper River with battles, captured and held, trying to expand, a bridgehead on its right shore. The Nazis' attempts to resettle Soviet troops into the Dnieper were unsuccessful. The fighting here did not subside day or night and continued for a month (from August 8 to September 9).
During the successfully launched Dukhovshchina offensive operation, the enemy suffered significant damage in manpower and equipment. However, it was not possible to complete the operation due to lack of manpower and resources. (Like Elninskaya). September 10, by order of the Army Headquarters Western direction went on the defensive.
On September 12, I. S. Konev was awarded the rank of Colonel General and he was appointed commander of the Western Front. (Marshal Timoshenko was appointed to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western direction). Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin took command of the 19th Army.
For participation in the Dukhovshchina offensive operation and assistance in its implementation, for courage and organization in these and previous battles, four divisions of the Western Front were transformed into guards divisions. By orders of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR dated September 18, 21 and 26, 1941, the 153rd, 161st and 64th Rifle Divisions became known as the 3rd, 4th and 7th Guards Divisions, respectively. rifle divisions, the 1st Moscow Motorized Rifle became the 1st Guards Moscow Rifle Division.
Anatoly Trofimov
"Smolensky Region", No. 1, 1991
Yelninsk operation 1941
The temporary liberation of the city of Yelnya in 1941 was recorded as an outstanding feat for Marshal Zhukov. Soviet encyclopedia“The Great Patriotic War” tells about this feat of Marshal Zhukov as follows:
“ELNINSKAYA OPERATION 1941, offensive. operation of troops of the 24th A Reserve France, carried out on August 30. - 8 Sep. during Battle of Smolensk 1941 with the aim of eliminating the so-called. Elninsky ledge. The Elninsky ledge formed in the middle. July as a result of a breakthrough by the 2nd tank. group pr-ka south of Smolensk and mastering it on July 19, Yelnya. German - fash. the command planned to use this ledge as an advantageous springboard for resuming the offensive on Moscow. Attempts by troops of the 24th A (general - Major K.I. Rakutin) in July - Aug. They were not successful in eliminating the Elninsky ledge, although they had tanks and motorized vehicles. The pr-ka's formations suffered serious losses (the German - fascist command was forced to replace them with infantry formations). Aug 21 commands, troops of the Reserve French. gene. army G.K. Zhukov ordered the general. - Major K.I. Rakutin will stop attacking. actions and begin preparing a stronger and more organized strike against the enemy. Under hand Zhukov, the front headquarters developed an operation plan, according to which the 24th A was given the task of encircling and destroying the Yelninsky pr-ka grouping (4th A of Army Group Center) with counter strikes at the base of the ledge and continuing the offensive to the west. Without superiority in forces and means except artillery, army troops 30 Aug. went on the offensive and broke through the enemy defenses. Having repelled counterattacks, army troops by September 4. deeply covered the main pr-ka forces defending in the ledge. Under the threat of encirclement, the pr-k began to retreat. The 19th Infantry Division broke into Yelnya and, interacting with neighboring formations, by the morning of September 6th. liberated the city. Pursuing the pr-ka, army troops advanced 25 km to the west and on September 8. went to pp. Ustrom and Stryana, where it is silent. - fash. troops in a pre-prepared defense. line there was organized resistance. The success of the army was facilitated by the offensive. actions of neighboring troops of the 16th and 20th A West. fr. on Smolensk and 43rd A Reserve fr. on Roslavl directions. E. o. the first offensive operation of the war. As a result, her troops of the 24th A defeated two tanks and one motorized unit. and 7 infantry. divisions of the pr-ka, eliminated the Elninsky ledge, which threatened the lion. wing of the Western troops. fr., that means the territory has been liberated.”
While glorifying Zhukov, the encyclopedia both understates and outright lies.
The Germans replaced the tank divisions in the Yelnya salient with infantry ones, not because they had suffered any particularly heavy losses from Zhukov, but because Guderian's tank and motorized divisions had been sent south to encircle Soviet forces near Kiev. In connection with such a weakening of Army Group Center, the Germans, already in the first half of August, decided to withdraw their troops from this ledge, which measures about 20 km by 20 km. However, this decision depended on the actions Soviet command. On August 15, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Bock, wrote in his diary: “It is difficult to give a definitive answer to the question of whether it is better to hold the ledge or leave it. If the Russians continue to attack the salient, then holding it is unprofitable. If they stop attacking, which is quite possible, then the ledge is worth saving, since it will not only become stronghold for our further attacks in east direction, but will also make it possible to provide certain cover for the Smolensk railway junction and the Smolensk-Moscow highway.”
The Encyclopedia reports about the troops provided to Zhukov: “Without superiority in forces and means.” But this is an outright lie. The 24th Army alone had 11 divisions, of which 2 were tank and 1 motorized, and the 43rd Army also had 6 divisions, of which 2 were tank. The Germans believed that Soviet division strength is equal to 65% of the German one, thus, even by this count, Zhukov had at least 11 divisions, even without taking into account the fact that a quarter of them were tanks. In addition, in addition to the divisional artillery, Zhukov had 16 more corps artillery regiments, RGK and VET regiments. According to the diagram in the encyclopedia, the Yelninsky ledge was defended by 4 German infantry divisions of the 20th German army corps: 137th, 78th, 292nd and 268th. However, as early as August 15, in Halder’s diary, there was an entry: “On Guderian’s front, the 78th and 137th infantry divisions are being withdrawn to the rear behind the arc of the front at Yelnya.” That is, only two German divisions remained to defend the Yelninsky ledge, and the overall superiority of Zhukov’s troops over the Germans was approximately 5.5 times.
On the other hand, Yelnya, of course, is already a town and a station, and liberating it would be useful, but neither Stalin nor the General Staff of the Red Army would have given Zhukov such large forces for such nonsense as liberating a small town. In fact, Zhukov’s task was different - in paragraph 2 of the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters dated August 25, 1941, it was ordered: “To the troops of the Reserve Front, continuing to strengthen the defensive line with the main forces at the line of Ostashkov, Selizharovo, Olenino, r. Dnepr (west of Vyazma), Spas-Demensk, Kirov, 30.8 with the left flank 24th and 43rd armies go on the offensive with the tasks: to finish off the enemy’s Yelnya grouping, capture Yelnya and, subsequently delivering attacks in the direction of Pochinki and Roslavl, by 8.9 go to the front Dolgiye Niva, Khislavichi, Petrovichi".
That is, Zhukov had to first destroy the Germans in the Yelninsky ledge with artillery and infantry and thereby make a breakthrough of the front. And then tank divisions advance through this breakthrough to the west, reach railway Smolensk - Bryansk (Roslavl and Pochinok are railway stations on this road) and advance even further (Khislavichi, Petrovichi, this is about 100 km west of Yelnya). This is why Zhukov was given tank divisions.
Zhukov completely and diligently screwed up the task entrusted to him by the Supreme Command Headquarters and advanced only to the second line of German defense, which had been equipped since August 15 by the 78th and 137th German infantry divisions that had previously moved to it, that is, he advanced west of Yelnya by about 15 kilometers. Why?
Perhaps this is answered by Halder, who wrote in his diary on September 5: “Our units surrendered the front arc at Yelnya to the enemy. The enemy is still for a long time, after our units had already been withdrawn, fired at these positions we had left and only then carefully occupied them with infantry. The hidden withdrawal of troops from this arc is a good achievement of the command.".
That is, Zhukov shot the entire stock of shells out of nowhere, and he had nothing to break through the second line of German defense. By the way, immediately after this description of Zhukov’s feat, Halder made a note: “In the sector of the 8th Army Corps (9th Army), the enemy again began violent attacks in the style major battles, characteristic of the (First) World War".
And the chief of artillery of the Red Army, Colonel General N.N. Voronov, in his report to Stalin, reported on the use of numerous artillery allocated to Zhukov near Yelnya:
“The artillery occupied remote firing positions and observation posts and had almost no forward observation posts in the leading infantry units. The extreme insufficiency of communications equipment in the artillery of a number of divisions (lost in previous battles) jeopardized the fire control of divisions and groups and forced them to resort to the use of poorly established infantry communications. General desire to sit in shelters, dugouts etc. did not contribute to living leadership. Many of the recently appointed battery commanders were poorly prepared for shooting. Poorly organized observation provided little information about the enemy, his firing points, engineering structures etc. The batteries spent a lot of shells, firing at “far-fetched requests from the infantry,” according to direct orders from infantry, combined arms and senior artillery commanders, often without any benefit to the cause, but only to calm the nerves. Artillery bombardment of the line was carried out, but the desired results were not achieved. Every day we repeated the same thing, did not use false transfers of fire, and trained the enemy to our patterned actions.”
That is, the common aphorism: “Generals always prepare for past wars,” this is about Zhukov and people like him.
After the exploits at Yelnya and the defense of Leningrad, which the Germans refused to storm on the eve of Zhukov’s arrival in Leningrad, G.K. Zhukov commanded the Western Front from October 1941 to August 1942. And all this time (with the exception of a short period in the spring of 1942) his chief of staff was V.D. Sokolovsky, and it was under Zhukov, in June 1942, that Sokolovsky became a colonel general. And one must assume that their friendly work was explained complete unity their views on how to fight - on tactics. And from February 1943 to April 1944, Sokolovsky himself commanded the Western Front. And it must be said that under the command of Zhukov and Sokolovsky, the Western Front immeasurably consumed human and material resources, achieving invariably poor results.
In the end, in August 1943, Stalin himself went to the headquarters of the Western Front, but the military professionals, one might think, managed to mislead their commander-in-chief “ objective reasons", and no organizational conclusions followed. More precisely, Stalin sent Mehlis to the Western Front as a member of the military council, but the wretchedness of the front’s actions continued.
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Many of our people think that the Red Army won its first victory over the Nazi military machine in the winter of 1941, when it pushed back Wehrmacht units 120-250 km from Moscow. This happened 1-2 days before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and until the moment of the counter-offensive, the Red Army was retreating and retreating.
(30 August – 8 September 1941)
Here is the first victory!
"Where?" - “Under Yelnya.” - "And when?" -
"In September. Besides, not somewhere
We won then -
Where the enemy gathered for Moscow
Break through, and in an arc,
Like a bow, an arrow tried
Let us in front of you.”
Up to seventy thousand
And five hundred guns there
They were ready to whip us
And make a mess.
Stalin sent Zhukov
Straighten the enemy's arc. -
I didn’t let you down - I glorified myself
And brave troops.
Here we dashingly clenched our pincers,
Our shells are raining down.
Ten days - and the Germans are quiet
We went back to our place.
And although they weren’t surrounded,
But they were beaten badly:
Up to two thirds were driven into the ground,
Fewer of ours died.
Our guard was born
In these Elninsky battles,
And hope began to shine
Defeat the enemy in sight.
Many of our people think that the Red Army won its first victory over the Nazi military machine in the winter of 1941, when it pushed back Wehrmacht units 120-250 km from Moscow. This happened 1-2 days before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and until the moment of the counter-offensive, the Red Army was retreating and retreating. Actually this is not true. The first major victory was preceded by one small but important victory. This happened in the early autumn of 1941 in the Smolensk region, when units of the Red Army defeated the Elninsky group of Nazis. The victory at Yelnya, which became the first victory in that war, marked a significant event - the birth of the Soviet Guard! The losses of the Red Army amounted to approx. 30 thousand people (out of 60), the Wehrmacht - 45-50 thousand (out of 70).
The Yelny offensive operation is the first success of the Red Army in battles with the Wehrmacht. This operation took place from August 30 to September 8.
The purpose of the operation was to eliminate the Elninsky ledge, which was a convenient springboard for an attack on Moscow. The Yelnya ledge was formed in mid-July as a result of the breakthrough of the 2nd Wehrmacht tank group south of Smolensk and its capture of Yelnya on July 19.
It was hot July days in the Smolensk region. German troops were rushing to Moscow. On July 16, Nazi units entered Smolensk and captured the regional town of Yelnya, which is southeast of Smolensk, from where they intended to make an attack on Moscow, turning the city into a well-fortified defensive line. The tank group of Guderian's troops wedged into the defensive line of the Soviet troops on the front sector of the 24th Army of General K.I. Rakitina.
The attempt of the troops of the 24th Army of Major General K.I. Rakutin in July-August to liquidate the Elninsky ledge was not successful, although the enemy’s tank and motorized formations suffered serious losses, but the losses of the Red Army were also great, the offensive potential of the units was lost, it was not possible to build on the success managed.
The Military Council and the headquarters of the Reserve Front, after a comprehensive study of the situation, developed a plan for the defeat of the fascist group defending in the Yelninsky ledge. The plan of the operation included counter strikes from the north and south under the base of the ledge to break through the enemy’s defenses and, developing an offensive, to encircle the main forces of the 20th Army Corps. At the same time, it was planned to dissect the enemy group with a blow from the east and destroy it piece by piece. Thus, taking into account the configuration of the front line, the design of the operation was based on a decisive form of operational maneuver - two-way envelopment with the goal of encircling and defeating the enemy piecemeal. At the same time, it was envisaged that the defeat of the Elninsky group would be completed by September 3 and reach the line of the temporary storage facility. Carefree, Novo-Tishovo, Kukuevo. Subsequently, building on the success, the army was supposed to capture Pochinok and on September 8 reach the line Dolgiye Niva, Khislovichi.
At the direction of Zhukov, a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy’s defenses and fire system was organized. Major General L. A. Govorov, a great master of artillery, provided Zhukov with especially great help here both in reconnaissance and in suppressing the fire system. While preparations for the operation were underway, while ammunition was being delivered and troops were regrouping, Zhukov was studying the enemy and interrogating prisoners. In those days, Hitler’s soldiers were still full of enthusiasm, behaved impudently, and were confident that they would soon capture Moscow, which was already so close.
Once captured German tankman. Zhukov himself interrogated him.
- Who you are?
- Mechanic-driver of such and such a company, such and such a battalion, such and such a division.
— What is the task of your division?
The prisoner does not answer.
- Why do not you answer?
“You are a military man and you must understand that I, as a military man, answered everything that I had to answer to you - who I am and what part I belong to.” And I cannot answer any other questions, because I took an oath. And you have no right to ask me, knowing that I am a military man, and you have no right to demand from me that I violate my duty and lose my honor...
“If you don’t answer, we’ll shoot you—that’s all.”
The prisoner turned pale, but did not break:
- Well, shoot if you want to commit a dishonorable act towards a defenseless prisoner. Shoot. I hope you don't. But still, I will not answer anything beyond what I have already answered.
Zhukov did not interrogate further and, turning to those around him, said:
- Well done! He behaves with such impudence, it’s simply rare. Well, how can you not respect him? You can't help but respect!
After such interrogations, Zhukov left, not so much having received the information he needed, but rather upset by the strength and confidence of the enemy soldiers. But he was convinced: you need to know what the enemy is like, what moral condition, level of training and discipline of soldiers. Underestimating this can lead to mistakes and miscalculations.
Once he interrogated a prisoner who turned out to be more talkative and was so remembered by Zhukov that he recounts the conversation with him in his memoirs, and did not even forget his last name - Mittermann.
During the operation, the army created artillery group, consisting of army group long-range (ALD) and infantry support groups (IS) in divisions. The artillery preparation was planned to last one hour. It was envisaged that the duration of artillery preparation would be reduced if the infantry reached the attack line, 300-400 m from the enemy front line, earlier than the established time. However, in all cases, the last 10-minute, most powerful fire raid on attack targets and enemy artillery firing positions should not have been shortened.
Artillery support was to be provided by the method of sequential concentration of fire, as well as by the fire of individual batteries and escort guns operating in infantry combat formations.
Aviation support was not planned, since all combat aircraft of the front at the beginning of the operation, at the direction of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, were transferred to the Bryansk Front, with the exception of 20 aircraft left in the interests of the 24th Army for reconnaissance and adjustment of artillery fire. This circumstance, naturally, significantly weakened the force of the army’s attack.
During the preparation of the operation, military councils and headquarters of the front and army made great effort to resolve measures to support combat operations (combat, political, engineering, logistics support, etc.). However, it was not possible to completely resolve all issues due to the very limited period of preparation for the operation (only about 4 days) before the start of hostilities. For example, if the divisions were 70-80% manned, then the artillery material was only 25-50% (except for the 107th Infantry Division, which had 90%). Failed to accumulate and required quantity ammunition, as a result of which, as subsequent events showed, already on the second day of the operation there was an acute shortage of ammunition.
All this required additional time for preparation. But it was impossible to delay the start of the operation. The offensive of the 24th Army was supposed to contribute to the success of the counterattacks of the Bryansk Front, launched against the enemy’s 2nd Tank Group advancing in a southern direction.
From the point of view of planning and preparation of the Elninsky offensive operation, the creation of strike groups and the concentration of the main efforts at the base of the salient in the main directions should be noted as a positive phenomenon. The groups included all serviceable tanks and about 80% of the artillery.
The operational formation of the army was single-echelon. This was due to the relatively shallow depth of the combat missions of the northern and southern strike groups(up to 10 km). It was supposed to accomplish the task by delivering a strong initial strike. The battle formations of many divisions were formed in two echelons.
In the course of hostilities, the Elninsky offensive operation can be divided into three stages:
- first - a breakthrough of organized defense in the directions of the main attacks (August 30-31);
- the second - repelling fierce counterattacks of the enemy, who sought to disrupt the offensive of the 24th Army (September 1-3);
- third - development of the offensive, pursuit of the retreating enemy and liquidation of the Yelninsky ledge (September 4-8).
Preparing the offensive near Yelnya, Zhukov spent a week preparing and regrouping the troops stationed there. In total, ten divisions went on the offensive to carry out this operation. The main blow was delivered by the 24th Army, coming from the northeast. Several formations of the 43rd Army were moving towards it, from the southeast. On August 30, the offensive began. After artillery preparation, the troops successfully broke through the enemy’s defenses. By September 4, constantly repelling strong counterattacks, the northern and southern encircling groups approached each other - a clear threat of encirclement loomed over the Nazis. Under this threat, the enemy began quick departure from the Yelnya region, Stalin called on September 4. Here is a recording of his conversation with Zhukov:
- At the Zhukov apparatus.
- At the apparatus Stalin, Shaposhnikov. Hello. It turns out that you are planning to liquidate Yelnya, direct forces towards Smolensk, leaving Roslavl in its current unpleasant situation. I think that this operation, which you are planning to carry out in the Smolensk region, should be carried out only after the liquidation of Roslavl. And it would be even better to wait until Smolensk, liquidate Roslavl together with Eremenko, and then sit on Guderian’s tail, moving a certain number of divisions to the south. The main thing is to defeat Guderian, and Smolensk will not leave us. All.
Zhukov. I wish you good health, comrade. Stalin. Comrade Stalin, I am not planning an operation in the direction of Smolensk and I believe that Timoshenko should deal with this matter. I would like to strike 109, 149 and 104 now in the interests of the quickest defeat of the enemy’s Elninsk group, with the liquidation of which I will receive an additional 7-8 divisions to reach the Pochinki area, and, having shielded myself in the Pochinki area towards Smolensk, with a powerful group I could strike in the direction of Roslavl and to the west, that is, to the rear of Guderian. As experience shows, delivering a deep strike to 3-4 divisions leads to trouble, because the enemy quickly envelops such small groups with his mobile units. That is why I asked for your consent to such a maneuver. If you order a strike in the Roslavl direction, I can organize this matter, but it would be more useful if I first liquidated Yelnya. Today, by the end of the day, the right flank of our Elninsky group is occupied by Sofievka. The enemy's throat remained only 6 km. I think [the] complete tactical encirclement will be completed tomorrow. All.
Stalin. I'm afraid that the area in the direction of Pochinok is wooded and swampy and your tanks will get stuck there?
Zhukov. I'm reporting. The strike is planned through Pogulyaevka south of the river. Khmara in good terrain with access to the Storeno-Vaskovo area, 30 km north-west of Roslavl, 10 km south of Pochinok. In addition, you should not strike in the old direction. A German soldier came over to our side today and showed that the defeated 23rd Infantry Division had been replaced by the 267th Infantry Division that night, and right there he observed SS units. A strike to the north is also advantageous because it will be at the junction of two divisions. All.
Stalin. You don’t really believe in prisoners of war, ask him with passion, and then shoot him. We have no objection to your proposed maneuver 10 kilometers south of Pochinki. You can act, especially concentrate the air strike, also use RS. When do you think you'll start?
Zhukov. I will regroup by the 7th. 7 preparation, 8 at dawn strike. I kindly ask you to reinforce me with RS-76 shells, and 152 mm 930, and 120 mm mines. In addition, if possible, one regiment of ILs and one regiment of Pe-2 and 10 KV units and 15 T-34 units. That's all my requests. All.
Stalin. Unfortunately, we do not have RS reserves yet. When we have it, we'll give it to you. You will get RSs, it’s just a pity that Eremenko will have to act alone against Roslavl. Can you organize pressure on Roslavl from the northeast?
Zhukov. Nothing, nothing, comrade. Stalin. I can only use separate detachments, reinforced with artillery, but this will only be a pinning blow, and main blow I’ll apply at dawn 8, I’ll try, maybe it will come out at dawn 7. Eremenko is still far from Roslavl, and I think Comrade. Stalin that blow 7 or 8 will not be a late blow. All.
Stalin. Will the famous 211th division sleep for long?
Zhukov. I'm listening. I'll organize it on the 7th. 211 is now being formed, it will not be ready until the 10th, I will pull it as a reserve, I will not let it sleep. I ask you to allow the immediate arrest and trial of all the alarmists about whom I reported. All. (Information about this has not been found. - V.K.)
Stalin. 7 will be better than 8. We welcome and allow them to be judged to the fullest extent. All. Goodbye.
Zhukov. Be healthy.
At 7 a.m. on August 30, 1941, some 800 guns, mortars, and rocket launchers from the 24th Army rained down fire on the enemy defenses despite heavy fog and poor visibility. Artillery preparation began.
On this day, only the southern strike group achieved success; its divisions advanced up to 1.5 km in the breakthrough area.
The units of the northern strike group advanced less successfully. At 8.00 the tanks of the 102nd Panzer Division successfully attacked the enemy, but the infantry fell behind and did not take advantage of their success. Instead of suppressing the firing points with fire from the spot before the infantry approached, the tanks retreated back. The enemy took advantage of this, put itself in order, and during subsequent attacks put up stubborn resistance to the division. In addition, due to the weakness of reconnaissance, the fire system in the enemy’s defenses, especially in anti-tank terms, was not fully exposed. This, in particular, is evidenced by the fact that in the course of our two attacks alone, up to 10 anti-tank guns, 12 machine guns were destroyed, and 2 fascist gun bunkers were destroyed.
Separate units of the regiments of the first echelon of the 107th Infantry Division did not have time to occupy initial position, as a result of which a simultaneous strong attack failed. The second echelons of regiments and then divisions brought into battle were also unable to reach significant results. In general, the formations of the northern group advanced only 500 m during the first day of the battle. The divisions of the strike groups fought fighting and at night. In some areas they broke the resistance of the Nazis.
On August 21, stubborn fighting continued. The enemy fought back fiercely. Only the 107th Infantry Division managed to break through its defenses by the end of the day, advancing up to 2 km in depth.
On this day, the southern strike group was unable to build on the success of the first day of the offensive and advanced only 500 m. In general, over the two days of the offensive, both groups advanced 2 km in some areas.
The low pace of advance was due to a number of reasons. Among them, the main ones should be noted: insufficient concealment of enemy defenses by intelligence; poor effectiveness due to the limited amount of artillery ammunition; lack of experience of some commanders in organizing combat in a short time and skillful management divisions and units; timid use of maneuver by infantry and tanks on the battlefield; failure of a significant number of unit commanders who personal example led the soldiers into the attack.
Aviation did not provide significant assistance to the army formations either (by the beginning of the offensive, four aviation regiment, supporting the combat operations of army formations). On the first day of the offensive, due to fog and poor knowledge of the area of operation, she was able to strike only two enemy airfields. At 9.30, five PE-2s, accompanied by six MIG-3s, bombarded the Selescha airfield, and at 10.30, nine IL-2s and twelve Yak-1s bombed Olsufyevo.
Over the next two days, the enemy launched a series of counterattacks with a strength of up to an infantry battalion with tanks, supported by artillery and aviation, against units of the 102nd Tank, 107th and 303rd Rifle Divisions, trying to prevent the development of the offensive and hold the neck of the Yelninsky ledge. The following example demonstrates the tenacity of our troops and the intensity of the fighting. The 586th Infantry Regiment of the 107th Infantry Division, which had penetrated the enemy’s defenses, was counterattacked from several directions. The regiment commander, Colonel I.M. Nekrasov, being wounded, skillfully led the battle of his units. He ordered the organization of a perimeter defense, the personnel to bury themselves in the ground, and the entire artillery of the regiment was deployed for direct fire. tanks. And it yielded results. The regiment survived and successfully repelled all attacks, and the soldiers of the 1st battalion captured two guns with ammunition during the battle and opened fire from them.
Recalling the events of those days, the former commander of the Reserve Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, wrote: “Our 19th, 100th and 107th divisions fought especially courageously. From the observation post of the division commander of the 107th division P.V. Mironov, I saw an unforgettable picture of the fierce battle of the rifle regiment commanded by I.M. Nekrasov. The regiment of I.M. Nekrasov quickly captured the village of Voloskovo, but found itself surrounded. He fought for three days. With the support of other units of the 107th Division, artillery and aviation, the regiment not only broke through the encirclement, but also crushed the opposing enemy, while capturing an important stronghold - railway station" Other units and units also steadfastly repelled counterattacks.
Back on August 31, the commander of the 24th Army, in order to develop the emerging success of the offensive, decided to create the 102nd, 107th and 100th divisions from units “ combined detachment as part of a tank group, airborne company, a motorized battalion and an artillery group of 10 guns (the formation area is the forest south of Monino, the detachment is called “Ivanov’s Detachment”). He had to make a swift strike in the direction of Sadki, Bol. Nezhoda to go to the Novo-Tishovo, Petrovo area, cut the Yelmya-Baltutino highway, organize a perimeter defense and prevent enemy reserves from approaching Yelnya. It was planned to bring it into battle in the zone of the 107th Infantry Division, which had the greatest advance in depth. He had 20 tanks and rifle company as a tank landing force. It was a kind of improvised mobile army group.
On the morning of September 3, the detachment was brought into battle. When entering, its main forces were subjected to air strikes and heavy artillery shelling, as a result of which there were large losses in personnel (up to 25%) and equipment. 7 tanks were knocked out on the battlefield, and of the remaining 13, only one was operational. The detachment, of course, was unable to develop an offensive. However, despite the desperate resistance of the Nazis, acting together with units of the 107th Infantry Division, he managed to reach the village of Sadki. The reconnaissance detachment of the 107th division advanced more decisively that day. By the end of the day he went to Sofievka.
The soldiers of the 100th Infantry Division showed courage and bravery. For example, the 355th Infantry Regiment of this division attacked the strong stronghold of Mitino on September 3. The enemy, relying on previously prepared positions, offered stubborn resistance. The first two frontal attacks were unsuccessful. Then the regiment commander, Major 3. S. Bagdasarov, decided to capture this strong point with a simultaneous attack from three directions; from the west, north and southeast. The 1st was the most successful rifle battalion, which, supported by artillery fire, quickly burst into the village of Mitino from the west. During the battle, the soldiers of the 1st company, having captured enemy trenches, destroyed the Nazis in hand-to-hand combat and captured three machine guns.
On the morning of September 3, the divisions of the southern group also resumed their offensive. Despite the difficulties of the wooded and swampy terrain, they captured the settlements of Leonovo and Shcheplevo. Due to poor terrain reconnaissance, 15 tanks of the 103rd separate tank battalion, advancing with the infantry of the 303rd Infantry Division, were stuck in a swamp south of Leonov. By the morning of September 4, only 9 vehicles were recovered from the swamp.
Thus, by the end of the day, the formations of the northern and southern groups, showing massive heroism, courage and determination, narrowed the neck of the Yelninsky ledge to 6-8 km.
The enemy, unable to withstand the blow of the troops of the 24th Army and being under the threat of encirclement, on September 3 began to withdraw his forces from the Yelninsky pocket, hiding behind strong rearguards along the entire front of the salient. The front commander demanded the shortest possible time complete the encirclement of the enemy and capture Yelnya. To build up the attack of the northern group, he ordered the commander of the 24th Army to bring into battle one rifle regiment of the 127th Infantry Division, which was defending at the turn of the river. Snake. The regiment quickly attacked the enemy in the zone of the 102nd Tank Division.
Army formations along the entire front began to pursue the enemy. But there were fierce battles on the flanks. Nazi troops They tried to avoid encirclement and put up stubborn resistance. Our units, although slowly, continued to move forward. By the end of September 5, the 100th Rifle Division occupied Chaptsovo (north of Yelnya), and the 19th Rifle Division broke into Yelnya. Other divisions also operated on the approach to the city. On September 6, Yelnya was liberated by Soviet troops. By the end of September 8, the divisions of the 24th Army had completely eliminated the Yelninsky bridgehead and reached the defensive line along the Nov. Yakovlevich, Novo-Tishovo, Kukuevo.
Repeated attempts made by the army to break through this enemy line did not produce significant results, and it was forced to move on to consolidating the success achieved.
The glorious result of the Elninsky offensive operation was the liquidation of the Elninsky ledge. Significantly improved operational position troops of both the 24th Army and the Reserve Front as a whole. The threat of an enemy invasion into the operational depth of our defense and an attack on the flank of the Western and Reserve Fronts was removed. Five fascist divisions in the Yelnya area suffered significant damage. Their losses in manpower amounted to 45 thousand people.
A day after the victory at Yelnya, Stalin received Zhukov:
- Oh, then it worked out well for you near Yelnya. I was wrong then...
Stalin’s praise made it possible to finally smooth out the contradictions between him and Zhukov and the head Soviet state gave the marshal freedom of action at the front.
Zhukov was pleased with the course of events, but at the same time he was upset, because the successfully developing offensive was not completed by encirclement; there was not enough strength to finally close the corridor through which the German group, which had already been virtually encircled, was escaping. If Zhukov had more tanks and aircraft at his disposal, he would not have released von Bock’s parts from this ring.
And yet the significance of the Elninsky operation during the Great Patriotic War is very significant. This was the first significant offensive operation of the Soviet troops that ended so successfully. And it is no coincidence that, noting in the order precisely the offensive success and high morale of the divisions that participated in this operation, the Headquarters assigned these divisions guards ranks. They were received by the 100th and 127th Rifle Divisions of the 24th Army, which, respectively, became known as the 1st and 2nd Guards Rifle Divisions. Thus, in the battles led by Zhukov, the Soviet Guard was born.
Georgy Konstantinovich himself later recalled:
“From August 22 to 29, the 100th Division was preparing for an offensive... During the preparation, I had the opportunity to visit these units several times, and I was quite confident of success... Overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, by the end of September 5, units of the 100th Division were deeply wedged into defense of the enemy and reached the rear routes of his Group, thereby assisting other army formations in capturing the city... As a result of the successfully carried out operation to defeat the Yelninsky group, the mood of the front troops rose and faith in victory strengthened.”
Today, Yelnya is a small town in the Smolensk region, with a population of about 9.5 thousand people. By city standards, it is close to an urban village. But then, in 1941, this town became the first symbol of the emerging victory. The city was assigned honorary title Russian Federation"City military glory"(October 8, 2007) with the presentation of a certificate from the President of Russia - for the courage, fortitude and mass heroism shown by the defenders of the city in the struggle for freedom and independence of the Fatherland. In addition, the city awarded the Order Patriotic War, 1st degree (July 28, 1981) - for the courage and fortitude shown by the defenders of the city during the Great Patriotic War, the active participation of workers in the partisan movement and the successes achieved in economic and cultural construction.
In the battles on Elninsk land soviet soldiers showed miracles of courage. 14 soldiers and officers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Here, during the fiercest battles of 1941, the Soviet Guard was born; On September 18, 1941, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, the formations that most distinguished themselves in battle were awarded the title of “Guards.”
The recapture of the city by the Germans occurred a month later, on October 6, and lasted until August 30, 1943, when during the Elninsk-Dorogobuzh operation it was liberated by the forces of the 10th Guards and 21st armies with the support of units of the 2nd tank corps(Western Front).
In honor of the liberation of the city, a salute was given in Moscow with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns.