Kerch-Feodosia landing operation

The Kerch-Feodosia operation is the most significant landing operation in the Great Patriotic War. Despite the fact that our troops did not manage to completely solve the tasks assigned to them, this landing operation was one of the heroic pages in the annals of the Great Patriotic War, a symbol of the courage of the soldiers of the Transcaucasian Front, who stormed the rocky shores of the Crimea in the December cold of 1941, without special landing craft. and any experience in carrying out similar operations.

The landing in Crimea was dictated by the situation that developed on the Soviet-German front at the end of 1941, and, in particular, on its left wing, after the defeat of the Germans near Rostov. The main goal of the planned operation was to capture the bridgehead from which actions to liberate Crimea were to begin. In addition, the landing was supposed to pull enemy forces away from Sevastopol and thereby ease the position of the city’s defenders, and then completely release it. Successful actions would eliminate the threat of an invasion of German troops into the North Caucasus through the Kerch Strait.

In total, the enemy had forces in Crimea equivalent to 10 divisions. At the same time, he concentrated two-thirds of his troops near Sevastopol, and one-third was allocated for the counter-defense of the Kerch Peninsula (the 42nd Army Corps, consisting of the 46th and 73rd infantry divisions, the 8th Romanian cavalry brigade and two tank battalions). The total number of enemy troops on the Kerch Peninsula was about 25 thousand people, about 300 guns and mortars, 118 tanks. The capabilities of the Kerch group increased significantly due to the dominance of enemy aviation, which numbered over 500 bombers and about 200 fighters in Crimea.

When planning the Kerch operation, the command of the Transcaucasian Front initially set a very narrow task for the troops, which essentially boiled down to occupying only the eastern coast of the Kerch Peninsula with a subsequent methodical attack to the west with the goal of reaching the Jantara and Seitdzheut fronts.

Then this operation was conceived in the form of a sea and parachute landing on the eastern coast of the Kerch Peninsula (Cape Khorni, Kizaulsky lighthouse) with the subsequent transfer of the main forces to the peninsula to develop a general offensive on the Tulumchak, Feodosiya front. Its (operation's) development began on December 3, 1941.

The operation was supposed to be carried out by the forces of the 56th and 51st armies (7–8 rifle divisions, 3–4 artillery regiments of the reserve of the High Command, 3–4 tank battalions, aviation of both armies and 2 long-range air divisions).

The navy was supposed to facilitate the landing and provide the flanks of the advancing armies.

Subsequently, the operation plan underwent some changes. The final course of action was developed by December 13 by the command of the Transcaucasian Front after agreement with the command of the Black Sea Fleet. It was planned, simultaneously with the crossing of the Kerch Strait, to land several landing forces - a naval landing (2 divisions and a brigade with reinforcements) in the Feodosia area, an airborne landing in the Vladislavovka area, and an auxiliary amphibious landing in the Arabat and Ak-Monay area. The task of the landing force is to capture the Ak-Monai Isthmus and strike at the rear of the enemy’s Kerch group.

The implementation of this plan was supposed to lead to the operational encirclement of the enemy in the western part of the Kerch Peninsula.

The operation was to involve the 51st and 44th armies (consisting of 9 rifle divisions and 3 rifle brigades) and reinforcements - 5 artillery regiments, motorized pontoon and engineer battalions, 2 long-range air divisions and 2 air regiments.

Before the start of the operation, the 51st Army included the 224th, 396th, 302nd, 390th Rifle Divisions, the 12th and 83rd Rifle Brigades, the Azov Military Flotilla Marine Battalion, the 265th, 457th, 456th, 25th Corps Artillery regiments, 1st division of the 7th Guards Mortar Regiment, 7th separate flamethrower company, 75th, 132nd, 205th engineering battalions, 6th and 54th motorized pontoon battalions of the Azov military flotilla, Kerch naval base.

The army was commanded by Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov.

Before the start of the operation, the 44th Army included the 236th, 157th Rifle Divisions, 63rd Mountain Rifle Division, 251st Mountain Rifle Regiment, 105th Mountain Rifle Regiment with a light artillery regiment division, 1st Division of the 239th Artillery Regiment , 547th Howitzer Artillery Regiment, 61st Engineer Battalion.

The army was commanded by Major General A. N. Pervushin.

In reserve were the 400th, 398th rifle divisions and the 126th separate tank battalion, which at the end of December 1941 participated in the landing in separate units.

The 156th Rifle Division from the Transcaucasian Front was allocated to defend the coast of the Azov Sea.

The general leadership of the operation was carried out by the commander of the Transcaucasian Front (from December 30 - the Caucasian Front), Major General D. T. Kozlov. The landing of troops was entrusted to the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky and the Azov Military Flotilla, which was part of it, led by Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov.

The landing was entrusted to the Azov military flotilla, the Kerch naval base and the Black Sea Fleet.

On December 1, 1941, the 46th Wehrmacht Infantry Division and the 8th Romanian Cavalry Brigade were in defense on the Kerch Peninsula. Between December 11 and December 13, the German command transferred the 73rd Infantry Division and assault gun divisions here.

The total number of enemy field troops on the Kerch Peninsula was 10–11 thousand people. They were part of the 11th German Army (headquarters in the city of Simferopol).

The enemy's defense consisted of field and long-term fortifications. The depth of the defensive zone was 3–4 km. The city of Feodosia and the surrounding area were equipped as a strong resistance center.

Anti-landing defense was created in places convenient for landings and was built according to a system of strong points. It was echeloned to a considerable depth and consisted of field and long-term type fortifications with fire communications between them. The fortifications were covered with wire fences. The main strongholds were created in the northeastern part of the peninsula from Cape Khroni to Aleksandrovka, as well as in the areas of Cape Takyl and Mount Opuk. Feodosia, with a garrison of more than 2 thousand people, was turned into an antilanding defense hub. A significant amount of ground and anti-aircraft artillery was stationed in populated areas, which were turned into strong centers of resistance with all-round defense. The approaches to Feodosia from the sea were mined.

The most strongly fortified areas were Yenikale, Kapkany, and Kerch. There was the maximum amount of infantry and firepower here.

From December 3 to December 25, the troops of the 51st and 44th armies, reinforcements and air forces intended to participate in the upcoming operation regrouped and concentrated in loading areas, on ships and vessels.

Poor meteorological conditions of this period complicated the regrouping, and especially the relocation of aviation from the airfields of the Caucasus.

The supporting air forces (132nd, 134th Long-Range Aviation Divisions, 367th SB Bomber Regiment, 792nd Pe-2 Dive Bomber Regiment, 9 Fighter Aviation Regiments) were insufficiently equipped with materiel. The aircraft in service were outdated types (TB, SB, I-153, I-16). There were no more than 15% of high-speed fighters and bombers in the air force, and some of them were located in the rear at the airfields of long-range divisions (132nd and 134th), organically part of the latter, and independently participating in operations didn't accept it.

The 702nd Pe-2 dive bomber regiment was not trained in dive bombing and was used as a reconnaissance force.

The airfield network of the Krasnodar region was absolutely unprepared to receive a large number of aircraft. The command of the air forces of the Transcaucasian Front, which arrived at this theater, did not know local conditions well. The huge apparatus of the air force of the North Caucasus District was not used to assist the command and often even interfered with the work of the front headquarters.

The Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet was not immediately subordinated to the front operationally and basically continued to provide the defense of Sevastopol. They took an active part in the actions on the Kerch Peninsula only from time to time. Due to poor organization and difficult weather conditions, the relocation was accompanied by numerous accidents and forced landings. In fact, only 50% of the air units intended to carry it out were able to take part in the initial stage of the operation. The remaining 50% continued to remain at rear airfields and on the highway. The front did not receive the necessary vehicles for landing troops in Vladislavovka at the start of the operation.

The landing force was planned to have over 40 thousand people, about 770 guns and mortars and several tanks. Thus, the balance of forces was assumed to be in favor of the Transcaucasian Front: for infantry - 2 times, for artillery and mortars - 2.5 times. In tanks and aviation, the advantage remained on the enemy's side. Before the landing, the numbers changed somewhat.

The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla were many times superior to the enemy in terms of ship composition, but our sailors almost completely lacked special landing and landing equipment, which in turn affected the speed of landing (landing) on ​​the shore. It turned out that ferries, barges and boats here are not able to replace any battleships and cruisers.

The balance of forces and means of the parties before the start of the landing operation

Strengths and means	USSR	Germany	Ratio
Connections	6 Rifle Division, 2 Brigade, 2 GSP	2 pd, 1 cbr, 2 rep
Personnel*	41,9	25	1,7:1
Guns and mortars	454	380	1,26:1
Tanks	43	118	1:2,7
Aircraft	661	100	6,6:1
Ships and vessels	250	-

* thousands of people.

The training of troops for upcoming actions (loading, unloading, landing operations) was carried out hastily and insufficiently organized. In addition, the effect of special training sessions was greatly reduced, since some of the formations that underwent this special training were then removed from participation in the operation (345th Infantry Division, 79th Infantry Brigade, which were redeployed to reinforce the Sevastopol garrison) and replaced by units that did not have time to undergo special training.

The engineering units did a tremendous job of constructing tracks, repairing piers, finding resources and preparing floating facilities, as well as means of loading and unloading troops (gangways, ladders, boats, rafts, etc.). The troops received a large number of obstacles: mines, subtle obstacles, explosives - to secure occupied landing lines. To strengthen the ice of the Kerch Strait, local means (reeds) were collected and prepared, the Temryuk, Kuchugury, Peresyp piers, on the Chushka spit, Taman, Komsomolskaya and others were repaired.

Scheme of landings and operations of the Red Army, Black Sea Fleet and Azov Flotilla from December 25, 1941 to January 2, 1942

The first and subsequent echelons of troops necessarily included sapper units.

However, when determining the balance of forces in an amphibious operation, one should proceed from how many troops the crossing facilities in the first echelon allow to be landed. In this case, a lot also depended on the weather.

Preparations for the landing operation, as already noted, began on December 3. The commander of the 51st Army decided to land advanced troops from the Sea of ​​Azov at the following points: at Ak-Monaya - 1340 people, at Cape Zyuk - 2900 people, at Cape Tarkhan - 400 people, at Cape Khroni - 1876 people, at Cape Yenikale - 1000 people. In total, it was planned to land 7,616 people, 14 guns, 9 120 mm mortars, 6 T-26 tanks.

According to the “Calculation of forces and means for the landing of amphibious assault forces by the Azov military flotilla,” 530 people were intended for landing in the Kazantip Bay area, for landing on Cape Zyuk in the western group - 2216 people, two 45-mm cannons, two 76-mm cannons, four 37-mm cannons, nine 120-mm mortars, three T-26 tanks, as well as 18 horses and one radio station (the tanks were transported on the Khoper barge, which was towed by the Nikopol steamship. - Note auto), for landing in the eastern group - 667 people and two 76-mm guns. 1209 people, two 45-mm cannons, two 76-mm cannons, three T-26 tanks (delivered by the Dofinovka tugboat and the Taganrog barge) landed in the area of ​​​​Cape Khroni. Note auto) and one vehicle as part of the western group, 989 people, two 76-mm cannons and two 45-mm cannons as part of the eastern group. It was planned to land 1000 people in Yenikal. Units of the 244th Infantry Division and the 83rd Infantry Brigade were loaded onto the ships of the Azov Military Flotilla.

The landing was to take place at night, and the landing was to take place 2 hours before dawn. Each detachment was assigned warships, which were supposed to support the landing with the fire of their guns.

The loading area for the formations of the 51st Army was Temryuk and, partially, Kuchugury. The Kerch naval base, with 10 groups of three detachments, was supposed to land troops from the 302nd Infantry Division (3327 people, 29 guns, 3 mortars) in the area of ​​the Nizhne-Burunsky lighthouse, Karantin station, Kamysh-Burun, Eltigen and the Initiative commune "

The first attack included 1,300 people. The landing was to be carried out suddenly, without artillery preparation, under the cover of a smoke screen from torpedo boats.

Troops were loaded onto ships in Taman and Komsomolskaya.

On December 10, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet arrived in Novorossiysk with a task force to lead the preparations and the immediate course of the operation. The landing itself was planned for December 21.

At the same time, the German command was preparing its troops for a second assault on the Sevastopol defensive region, and at dawn on December 17, they launched an attack on Sevastopol. During fierce battles, despite the stubborn resistance of our troops, the enemy, who had a great superiority in forces in the direction of the main attack, managed to advance 4–6 km in four days, wedging in the direction of the Northern Bay.

For the small territory held by the defenders of Sevastopol, this was extremely dangerous. Our troops immediately launched a counterattack and stopped the enemy offensive, but it was necessary to turn the situation around. Under these conditions, the Supreme High Command Headquarters subordinated the Sevastopol defensive region to the commander of the Transcaucasian Front and demanded that he immediately send a capable combined arms commander to Sevastopol to lead ground operations, as well as one rifle division or two rifle brigades and at least 3 thousand marching reinforcements. In addition, the WCF was supposed to strengthen the aviation support for the defense of Sevastopol, allocating for this at least 5 air regiments, and establish an uninterrupted supply of ammunition and everything necessary for the battle to the defensive area.

At the direction of Headquarters, the 345th Infantry Division from Poti, the 79th Marine Cadet Brigade from Novorossiysk, a tank battalion, an armed marching battalion, and a division of the 8th Guards Mortar Regiment were sent to Sevastopol on warships. During December, 5,000 tons of ammunition, 4,000 tons of food, 5,500 tons of other cargo, 26 tanks, 346 guns and mortars were delivered to Sevastopol. The ships of the Black Sea Fleet increased their support for the defenders of Sevastopol with their fire. True, this was done with varying degrees of success.

After a “thrashing” from the Supreme Command Headquarters, the command of the Black Sea Fleet, and then the Transcaucasian Front, began to quickly strengthen the Sevastopol defensive region. They received instructions in this regard on December 20, and on December 22, units of the 345th Infantry Division and the 79th Marine Brigade counterattacked the group of German troops that had resumed the offensive on the flank and restored the situation.

The commander of the 345th Infantry Division, Lieutenant Colonel O.N. Guz, addressing the Transcaucasian soldiers heading into battle, said: “Everyone - we will lie here, we will litter these hills and valleys with bones, but we will not retreat. There will be no such order from me or the commander.” The division commander's call expressed the mood of all the defenders of the hero city.

The enemy's second attempt to break through to Sevastopol, made on December 28, was also unsuccessful.

In connection with the transfer of part of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front and the forces of the Black Sea Fleet to strengthen the defense of Sevastopol, it was necessary to clarify the plan for the landing operation. The landing of troops was no longer planned simultaneously, but sequentially: on the northern and eastern coasts of the Kerch Peninsula - at dawn on December 26, and in Feodosia - on December 29. According to the changed plan, the tasks of the front troops were clarified.

51 And now the task was set: to simultaneously land troops on the northern and eastern coasts of the peninsula, and then capture the city of Kerch with attacks from the north and south. In the future, take possession of the Turkish Wall and advance in the direction of Art. Ak-Monay. The landing of troops was entrusted to the Azov military flotilla and the Kerch naval base, which for the duration of the operation were subordinate to the commander of the 51st Army.

44 And received the task, in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet, with the main forces to land in the Feodosia area, capture the city and port, destroy the enemy’s Feodosia group and, having intercepted the Ak-Monai Isthmus, cut off its path to the west. Part of the army's forces was to advance to the east with the task of destroying the encircled group of Germans in cooperation with 51 A with cutting blows. With the arrival of units of the 51st Army at the Ak-Monai position of the 44th Army, the task was set to be ready to develop success in the direction of Karasubazar. In addition, the 44th Army was ordered to land troops in the area of ​​Mount Opuk with the task of striking to the north to assist the 51st Army in crossing the Kerch Strait and in the Koktebel area in order to prevent the approach of enemy reserves from Sudak.

Due to the impossibility of covering the troops landing in the Feodosia area with fighter aircraft from distant Caucasian airfields, it was decided to land an airborne assault force as part of a parachute battalion in the Vladislavovka area on the night of December 30 with the task of capturing the airfield and ensuring landing and further actions from this airfield of front-line aviation . However, already during the hostilities, the plan was abandoned - our command had almost no serviceable transport aircraft at its disposal.

By the decision of the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, the available fleet forces were divided into 2 groups. Group "A" was intended for landing troops in Feodosia and group "B" - at Mount Opuk. There were also covering forces.

Group “A” included a naval support detachment: the cruiser “Red Caucasus”, the cruiser “Red Crimea”, the destroyers “Nezamozhnik”, “Shaumyan”, “Zheleznyakov”. These ships were loaded with 5,419 people, 15 guns, six 107 mm mortars, 30 vehicles and 100 tons of ammunition. This material part belonged to the 251st Infantry Regiment of the 9th Mountain Rifle Division, the 633rd Infantry Regiment of the 157th Infantry Division, a Marine Corps battalion, two battalions of the 716th Infantry Regiment of the 157th Infantry Division, and the 256th Artillery Regiment. The remaining ships of group “A” were combined into 2 transport detachments and 2 security detachments.

The 1st transport detachment transported the 236th Infantry Division. These ships (8 transports) loaded: 11,270 people, 572 horses, 26 45 mm guns, 18 76 mm guns, 7 122 mm guns, 199 vehicles, 20 T-37/T-38 tanks, 18 tractors , 43 carts, 6 gigs and 313 tons of ammunition.

The 2nd transport detachment (7 ships) transported the 63rd Mountain Rifle Division (without the 246th Mountain Rifle Regiment).

To organize the landing itself, Group “A” was assigned a detachment of landing craft: 2 minesweepers, 2 towing steamers, 15 MO-type boats, 6–10 self-propelled longboats.

Group B included landing ships and covering forces.

The landing ships (gunboats “Red Adjaristan”, “Red Abkhazia”, “Red Georgia”, one tugboat, one bolinder, several MO boats) loaded 2493 people, 42 horses, 14 guns, 6 120 mm mortars, 8 vehicles , 230 tons of ammunition and food from the 105th Mountain Infantry Regiment and the 1st Division of the 239th Artillery Regiment.

The transport "Kuban", which transferred from group "A" to detachment "B", loaded 627 people, 72 horses, 9 guns of the 814th regiment.

The landing ships were supported by covering forces: the cruiser Molotov, the leader Tashkent and the destroyer Smyshlyny.

Loading points are Novorossiysk, Anapa and Tuapse. Loading was to be carried out only at night, the landing of the first throw was to be done before dawn, after a powerful barrage of naval artillery fire on the port and city of Feodosia.

The unloading of three divisions (236th, 63rd and 157th) in the Feodosia area was supposed to be carried out within two days.

The command and headquarters of the Transcaucasian Front, the Black Sea Fleet and the armies maintained extreme secrecy in preparation for the operation. In addition to limiting the circle of people involved in developing the operation plan, it was strictly forbidden to announce landing points to units before going to sea, and landing on the northern and eastern coasts was planned simultaneously 2 hours before dawn without artillery and aviation preparation.

Due to the fact that the landing of troops 51 A was planned without artillery preparation, the transports were armed with their own artillery, which was installed on the decks and intended to immediately suppress all enemy firing points that could interfere with the landing. Each ship also had devices for firing anti-tank rifles, light and small machine guns, and well-trained crews who were supposed to cover and ensure the landing of the first echelons with their fire.

The actions of the divisional artillery (infantry support group), reinforcement artillery and coastal artillery of the Kerch naval base (long-range artillery group) were coordinated. The actions of the naval artillery were coordinated with the actions of the paratroopers on the shore.

Additional funds were sought. The engineering troops prepared 176 canoes, 58 longboats, 17 oak boats, and 64 fishing boats.

The assault detachments were staffed only by volunteers, which made it possible to display the most courageous, daring and enterprising fighters in them.

Preparations for the operation have been completed. But on the eve of the landing the weather deteriorated sharply. Additional difficulties arose. And yet, due to the difficult situation of our troops near Sevastopol and in the interests of achieving surprise, it was decided not to postpone the landing.

On the night of December 25, troops of the 51st Army (224th Infantry Division and 83rd Marine Brigade) began loading onto ships. Strong winds and waves prevented the ships from accepting soldiers and cargo, which was already disrupting the ships' schedule for going to sea.

On December 25, 5 detachments, boarded on ships of the Azov military flotilla in the Kuchugury and Temryuk areas, from 13 hours to 16 hours 40 minutes, one after another towards the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula, went to sea to complete the assigned task. Despite a strong storm when approaching the shore and opposition from the enemy, the detachments managed to land on December 26 in the area of ​​​​Cape Zyuk and in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bCape Khroni.

The landing was very difficult, as the storm at sea reached force seven. Because of this, the predetermined formation of detachments was constantly scattered. The seiners carrying the troops, in conditions of heavy seas, could not independently cope with the bad weather. Most of the small vessels, canoes and boats were simply broken. The tugs were looking for the surviving barges and stubbornly dragged them to the Crimean coast. Near it, the soldiers jumped into the water, and carried equipment, ammunition and light guns in their arms for 10 meters or more. And the elements succumbed.

At Cape Zyuk, 1,378 people, 3 T-26 tanks, 4 guns and nine 120-mm mortars were landed from the 1st and 2nd detachments. 1,452 people, 3 T-26 tanks, 4 guns, the headquarters of the 143rd Infantry Regiment and the 83rd Marine Brigade from the fourth detachment were landed on the captured bridgehead at Cape Chroni.

Detachment No. 3 was unable to land troops at Cape Tarkhan due to heavy losses in ships and troops. The same fate befell the fifth detachment, which, due to a strong storm, did not reach Yenikale and turned back.

The next day, the enemy desperately bombed the ships of the 1st and 2nd landing detachments and destroyed several of them, including the Penay transport.

The main landing force on the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula landed at Cape Khroni. During December 27 and 28, the landing of second echelons and part of those forces and equipment that could not be landed at Cape Zyuk and Cape Tarkhan continued here.

In the following days, due to a storm, no landing was made. Only on December 31 did mass landings begin. On December 26 and 31, a total of about 6 thousand people, 9 T-26 tanks, 9 guns and 10 mortars and 204 tons of ammunition were landed here.

The Germans quickly recovered from the shock and, with the support of their aviation dominating the skies, launched a counteroffensive. As a result, the landing sites at Cape Zyuk and Cape Khroni were quickly captured by them, and our landing forces, which advanced to the southwest from the coast, found themselves cut off from supply channels. There were fierce battles. Red Army soldier Georgy Vorontsov distinguished himself in one of them. The T-26 tank, on which he was moving as part of the landing force, was blown up by enemy mines and stopped. The Germans decided to capture the crew of the combat vehicle. But attempts to get close to the tank were invariably thwarted by Vorontsov’s machine gun fire. Then the German soldiers lay down and began throwing bunches of grenades at the T-26. Risking his life, Vorontsov quickly picked them up and threw them aside. Not a single grenade exploded on the tank. The courageous soldier of the 132nd separate motorized engineering battalion reliably guarded the tank until reinforcements arrived, for which he was subsequently awarded the Order of Lenin. Despite the courage of individual fighters, the landings of the “northern coast” did not complete the tasks assigned to them, but attracted significant enemy forces and thereby facilitated the actions of other landings.

Landing detachments from the 302nd Infantry Division, intended for landing on the eastern coast of the Kerch Peninsula and loading in Taman and Komsomolskaya Bay, mostly completed their landing on time. But due to a strong storm, the ships of the Kerch naval base were unable to go to sea in a timely manner. The landings began shortly before dawn on December 26. Here, the crews of patrol and torpedo boats especially distinguished themselves with their courage and combat skill. Operating in pairs, they provided each other with mutual fire support: while one of them was landing, the other was covering him with fire. Suppressing and destroying enemy firing points and covering the landing with smoke screens, the boats helped the paratroopers gain a foothold and expand the captured bridgehead. The artillery of the 51st Army and the Kerch naval base provided great assistance to the landing groups, which with powerful blows suppressed enemy firing points in Kamysh-Burun, Yenikal, Kerch and other points.

Overcoming strong enemy fire resistance, detachments of the 302nd Infantry Division landed and entrenched themselves in the Kamysh-Burun area. On the first day, half of the planned landing was landed. The build-up of forces became possible only a day later - December 28, when the storm subsided somewhat. By the end of December 29, almost all the main landing forces had landed in the Kamysh-Burun area (11,225 people, 47 guns, 198 mortars, 229 machine guns, 12 vehicles, 210 horses). Here, on December 28, a landing force came ashore, intended for operations in the area of ​​​​Mount Opuk, where landing detachment “B” was sent from Anapa twice, but a storm and some other reasons related to the organization of the transition prevented it from landing.

The landing operation in the Kamysh-Burun area is also full of examples of courage and mass heroism in the name of the Motherland. Here's one of them. The sailors from the gunboat “Red Adzharistan” behaved courageously at sea; they were the first to go into the chilly water and help the paratroopers cross to the shore. The residents of the fishing village on the Kamysh-Burun Spit also showed themselves to be real patriots. Delighted by the return of their native army, they, without fear of enemy fire, rushed to the aid of the paratroopers and, together with them, unloaded weapons and ammunition from approaching ships. Women and orderlies picked up the wounded soldiers and took them to their homes, where they cared for them like mothers.

The landing forces landed on the northern and eastern coasts of the Kerch Peninsula, occupied bridgeheads and launched battles to expand them. However, not having enough tanks and artillery, they were soon forced to go on the defensive. They were forced to do this by the insufficient support of our aviation. Even on the most crucial - the first - day of the operation, she made only 125 sorties.

The significance of the heroic actions of the paratroopers on the northern and eastern coasts of the Kerch Peninsula cannot be diminished. They pinned down significant enemy forces and reserves and created conditions for a successful landing in Feodosia. By the end of December 28, the loading of the troops of the 44th Army, intended for landing, was completed, hidden from the enemy in Novorossiysk and Tuapse. The first landing force - two rifle regiments - was landed on the ships of the naval support detachment, and an assault detachment consisting of 300 sailors was landed on 12 boats of the landing craft detachment. At 3 o’clock on February 29, the Black Sea Fleet ships from group “A” with the landing force were at the target.

At about 4 a.m. on December 29, a naval support detachment opened fire on the port of Feodosia. At the same time, a detachment of landing craft headed to the entrance to the port. Rushing into the passage between the lighthouse and the booms, the patrol boats broke into the port and landed an assault group of sailors to seize the berths. Stunned by the audacity of the Soviet sailors, the Nazis rushed about. The Red Navy took advantage of this. They destroyed the enemy on the piers and on the port pier. During this period, the crew of the patrol boat under the command of Junior Lieutenant Chernyak, who, under enemy fire, landed an assault group and captured the lighthouse, especially distinguished themselves. Another patrol boat, led by the commander of the landing craft detachment, Senior Lieutenant A.F. Aidinov, burst into the harbor, combed all the berths with fire and gave the signal “Entry into the harbor is free.” At this signal, the ships headed for the piers with the first landing force.

The boats of the landing craft detachment began transferring from the cruiser parts of the advance detachment (663rd Infantry Regiment of the 157th Infantry Division, 251st Mountain Rifle Regiment of the 9th Mountain Rifle Division), led by Major G.I. Andreev. The enemy concentrated artillery fire on the harbor. The commanders of the longboats, under hurricane fire and an incessant storm, transferred paratroopers from the ships to the port piers. Petty Officer 1st Class Ivan Dibrov, who had great strength, carried the paratroopers in his arms into the boat, and then landed them on the pier. When the longboat's rudder was knocked off by an enemy shell, Dibrov steered the longboat with a piece of board instead of a rudder for four hours.

Despite heavy enemy fire and a force-six storm, which made it difficult for ships to moor to the wall, by 5 o'clock three destroyers broke through into the port and began landing troops with their military equipment on a wide pier. Soon the cruiser "Red Caucasus" moored here, and in less than an hour it landed troops directly on the pier without the help of boats. Following him, the Kuban transport entered the harbor and by 11:30 am completed the landing directly on the pier. By this time, 1,700 people had already landed. The landing of the first landing party from warships directly onto the port piers made it possible to sharply reduce the landing time and contributed to the achievement of success. At 9:15 a.m., the cruiser “Red Crimea” also finished unloading.

The ships had to moor and land troops under fire and bomb attacks from enemy aircraft and at the same time fire themselves in order to suppress batteries and other firing points. During the landing, the cruiser "Red Caucasus" received several holes. When an enemy shell pierced the tower, the warheads caught fire. There was a threat of explosion and destruction of the ship. The tower personnel began a selfless fight against this fire. Sailor Pushkarev, risking his life, grabbed the burning charges and threw them overboard. Thanks to the dedication of our sailors, the cruiser was saved. However, increased enemy fire forced him and other warships to move away from the pier and berths. Maneuvering in the bay, they fired artillery, supporting the actions of the landing troops. All this happened during the day under the continuous influence of enemy aircraft. The cruiser and destroyers alone were attacked from the air thirteen times.

There were street battles all day in Feodosia. The advance detachment, without waiting for the city to be completely cleared, attacked the enemy on the adjacent heights, captured them and cut off the Germans’ escape route. Meanwhile, the sailors from the assault group continued to clear the city of the remnants of enemy troops. By the end of December 29, not a single occupier remained in the city.

On the night of December 30, the first detachment of transports arrived in Feodosia. During the day, he landed the 236th and part of the forces of the 157th Infantry Division. The second echelon of the landing force - the 63rd Mountain Rifle Division - landed on December 31. From December 29 to 31, 23,000 people, 34 tanks, 133 guns and mortars, 334 vehicles and transporters, 1,550 horses and about 1,000 tons of ammunition and other cargo were landed and unloaded in the Feodosia area.

In order to clarify the situation, let us once again touch upon the fate of the 2,000-strong landing party, which Group “B” from the ships of the Black Sea Fleet was supposed to land at Mount Opuk. Due to the disorganization and vicissitudes of the weather, the landing, but at Kamysh-Burun, was carried out only on December 28.

As a result of the heroic efforts of the soldiers of the Transcaucasian Front and the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet, as well as a carefully organized and well-executed landing in Feodosia, Soviet troops gained a foothold on the Kerch Peninsula and created a threat of encirclement and destruction of the entire Kerch enemy group. The commander of the 11th German Army, General Manstein, assessed the situation that developed after the Soviet landing: “It was a mortal danger for the army at a time when all its forces, with the exception of one German division and two Romanian brigades, were fighting for Sevastopol.” To prevent encirclement, the German command was forced to hastily withdraw its troops from Kerch and at the same time strengthen them in the Feodosia direction. At the beginning of January, in addition to the 46th Infantry Division, units of the 73rd Infantry Division and the Romanian Mountain Infantry Corps operated here. The 132nd and 170th infantry divisions, transferred from near Sevastopol, were also approaching this area.

With these forces, the enemy managed to organize a strong defense in the Feodosia region. Meanwhile, our 44th Army, which could have played a decisive role in cutting off the Kerch group of Germans, advanced only 10–15 km, which allowed the main enemy forces to slip out of the Kerch Peninsula. This was also facilitated by the indecisive actions of the command of the 51st Army, which did not use the previously landed units of the 224th Infantry Division and the 83rd Marine Brigade to immediately pursue the retreating enemy.

There were other serious reasons that did not allow the enemy to cut off the escape route. One of them is the failed attempt to land an amphibious assault in the Ak-Monaya area on January 1, 1942. The winter was cold, and ships with landing forces, trapped by ice, were unable to reach the landing area. The airborne assault on the Arabat Spit did not reach its target either, as it was launched late and away from the enemy’s main escape routes.

During the fighting, the 44th Army managed, overcoming desperate enemy resistance, to expand the bridgehead in the northern and western directions. By January 2, the front of its actions ran along the line Kulepa-Mosque, Karagoz, Koktebel. To the north - at the Kiet, St. Asan line - units of the 302nd Infantry Division of the 51st Army reached the line.

The largest landing operation in the history of the Great Patriotic War was carried out at a high price. Irreversible losses amounted to 32,453 people, of which the Transcaucasian Front had 30,547 dead, and the Black Sea Fleet and Azov Military Flotilla - 1,906 people.

Tragedy of the Crimean Front

Possession of the Crimean peninsula was of strategic importance. Hitler called it a Soviet unsinkable aircraft carrier threatening Romanian oil.

October 18, 1941The 11th Wehrmacht Army under the command of Infantry General Erich von Manstein began an operation to seize Crimea. After ten days of stubborn fighting, the Germans reached operational space. TO November 16, 1941 all of Crimea, except Sevastopol, was occupied.

December 26, 1941started Kerch-Feodosia landing operation. The troops of the Soviet 51st and 44th armies of the Transcaucasian Front recaptured the Kerch Peninsula, advancing to 100-110 km behind 8 days.

Soviet troops stopped January 2, 1942 at the line Kiet - Novaya Pokrovka - Koktebel. The Soviet 8 rifle divisions, 2 rifle brigades and 2 tank battalions were opposed there by one German infantry division, a reinforced infantry regiment and Romanian mountain and cavalry brigades.

Mansteinwrote in his memoirs:

“If the enemy took advantage of the created situation and began to quickly pursue the 46th Infantry Division, and also decisively hit the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a hopeless situation would have been created not only for this new section of the 11th Army’s front. The fate of the entire 11th Army would have been decided 1st Army. A more decisive enemy could have paralyzed all the army's supplies with a rapid breakthrough on Dzhankoy. Troops recalled from Sevastopol– 170th and 132nd PD– could arrive in the area west or north-west of Feodosia no earlier than 14 days later."

The command of the Transcaucasian Front nevertheless planned to carry out operations to liberate Crimea. The operation plan was reported to the People's Commissar of Defense January 1, 1942. The attack of the motorized mechanized group (2 tank brigades and a cavalry division) and the 51st Army (4 rifle divisions and 2 brigades) was planned to reach Perekop, where it was planned to drop an airborne assault force in advance. 44th Army (3 rifle divisions) - reach Simferopol. Two mountain rifle divisions were to strike along the Black Sea coast. The Primorsky Army was supposed to pin down the enemy near Sevastopol and land troops in Yevpatoria, followed by a direction to Simferopol. General task–destruction of all enemy forces in Crimea. The operation began on January 8-12, 1942.

However, the operation was not started on time, and January 15, 1942 The Germans and Romanians launched a counterattack, recapturing Feodosia on January 18. Soviet troops were pushed back 10-20 km, to the Karpacz Isthmus.

February 27, 1942The Soviet offensive began both from Sevastopol and from the Karpacz Isthmus. There, Soviet 7 rifle divisions and 2 brigades, and several tank battalions acted against 3 German and 1 Romanian infantry divisions. The second echelon of Soviet troops included 6 rifle divisions, one cavalry division and two tank brigades. The Romanian division on the northern flank retreated again to Kiet, 10 km. March 3, 1942 the front stabilized - now it arched to the west.

On March 13, 1942, Soviet troops (8 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades) again went on the offensive. The Germans held out, and on March 20, 1942 they tried to launch a counterattack with the forces of the 22nd Panzer Division (which had just been reorganized from an infantry division) and two infantry divisions. The Germans were repulsed.

On March 26, 1942, four Soviet divisions attempted to advance, but were in turn repulsed.

The last attempt at a Soviet offensive in Crimea was April 9-11, 1942.

“There will be no increase in the forces of the Crimean Front at the present time. Therefore, the troops of the Crimean Front will firmly gain a foothold on the occupied lines, improving their defensive structures in engineering terms and improving the tactical position of the troops in certain areas, in particular by capturing the Koi-Asan node.”

By this time, the Crimean Front included 16 rifle divisions and 3 brigades, a cavalry division, 4 tank brigades, and 9 reinforcement artillery regiments. The front had 225 bombers and 176 fighters (serviceable). The enemy had 5 German infantry and 1 tank divisions, 2 Romanian infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade, as well as the Groddeck motorized brigade, which consisted mainly of Romanian units under the command of the German headquarters.

With such a balance of forces (Manstein assessed Soviet superiority in forces as double) the Germans and Romanians crossed May 8, 1942 on the offensive.

Mansteindecided to reverse the factor of the numerical superiority of Soviet troops in St. oh good. The front line consisted of two sections. The southern section from Koi-Asan to the Black Sea coast (8 km) consisted of well-equipped (since January 1942) Soviet defensive positions, occupied by the 44th Army. The northern section from Koi-Asan to Kiet (16 km) curved to the west. The Soviet command should have expected that the Germans would strike in the Koi-Asan area in order to cut off the northern group (47th and 51st armies).

Indeed, given the small number of his forces, Manstein could only count on environment as many Soviet forces as possible in as small a territory as possible and then destroying them with aviation and artillery. His forces were sufficient for operations on a narrow section of the front, but further east the Kerch Peninsula expands, and there the numerical superiority of Soviet forces could cost the Germans dearly.

The idea of ​​the German operation "Hunting for Bustards" was based on delivering the main attack not in the Koi-Asan area, but at the southern end of the front line, where it was least expected. Moreover, three German infantry and tank divisions, as well as the Groddeck brigade, were supposed to attack here, that is, at least half all German-Romanian forces. In the northern and central sectors of the front, the Germans and Romanians were supposed to conduct a demonstration of the offensive, truly moving into it only after the breakthrough of the southern group. In addition, in the first hours of the operation, massive air strikes were carried out on the headquarters of units of the 47th and 51st armies.

The German ploy worked - Soviet reserves remained in the north after the start of the offensive. On May 8, the Germans broke through the Soviet defenses in a 5 km section, to a depth of 8 km. On May 9, heavy rain began to fall, which prevented the Germans from bringing a tank division into battle, but before the downpour, the Groddeck motorized brigade managed to advance, cutting off the 44th Army from its rear positions.In addition, a German boat landing force landed in the rear of the 44th Army. This was only one battalion, but it assisted the German offensive.

May 11, 1942The German 22nd Panzer Division reached the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula. It was followed by the German 170th Infantry Division and the Romanian 8th Cavalry Brigade. 8 Soviet divisions found themselves in the resulting cauldron, and on that day the commander of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, died. On the same day, Stalin and Vasilevsky sent an angry directive to the commander-in-chief of the troops of the North Caucasus direction, which began with the words

“The Military Council of the Crimean Front, including Kozlov, Mekhlis, have lost their heads, and to this day cannot contact the armies...”

And ending by order:

"don't let the enemy pass".

However, the Germans and Romanians advanced rapidly. On the evening of May 14, the Germans were already on the outskirts of Kerch. On May 15, 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters ordered:

“Don’t surrender Kerch, organize defense like Sevastopol.”

However, already May 16, 1942 The German 170th Infantry Division took Kerch. May 19, 1942 fighting on the Kerch Peninsula ceased, with the exception of the resistance of the remnants of Soviet troops in the Adzhimushkai quarries.

From 270 thousand fighters and commanders of the Crimean Front for 12 days battles were lost forever 162.282 person - 65% . German losses amounted to 7.5 thousand. As it is written in “History of the Great Patriotic War”:

“it was not possible to carry out the evacuation in an organized manner. The enemy captured almost all of our military equipment and heavy weapons and later used them in the fight against the defenders of Sevastopol”.

On June 4, 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters declared the command of the Crimean Front to be responsible for the “unsuccessful outcome of the Kerch operation.”

Army Commissar 1st Rank Mehlis was removed from his posts as Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army and demoted to the rank of Corps Commissar.

Lieutenant General Kozlov was removed from his post as front commander and demoted to the rank of major general.

Divisional Commissar Shamanin was removed from his post as a member of the Front's Military Council and demoted to the rank of brigade commissar.

Major General Vechny was removed from the post of chief of staff of the front.

Lieutenant General Chernyak and Major General Kolganov were removed from their posts as army commanders and demoted to the rank of colonel.

Major General Nikolayenko was removed from his post as commander of the front air force and demoted to the rank of colonel.

July 1, 1942 (even before the capture of Sevastopol) Manstein received the title Field Marshal General.

Add a signature

photo from the Internet, Kerch region. prisoners of war

I "d say it"s rather May 1942 (17-19), after Operation Trappenjagd.

Clarification

It is after the conquest of Sevastopol.

Image attached is from the book:

Bessarabien Ukraine-Krim. Der Siegeszug Deutscher und rumänischer Truppen

Besuche von Weltgeschicher Bedeutung (Visits of world historical importance), which describes an international delegation who came to see how the German-Romanian troops conquered Sevastopol.

Text translation:

It was after the conquest of Sevastopol.

Images taken from the book:

Bessarabien Ukraine-Crimea. Der Siegeszug Deutscher und rumänischer Truppen

Besuche von Weltgeschicher Bedeutung (Visits of World-Historical Significance), which describes the international delegations that came to see German-Romanian troops capture Sevastopol.

Presumably this is Marfovka.

Also Marfovka.

Soviet ammunition, the first two are high-explosive, the rest are fragmentation.

Kerch Peninsula, autumn 2010.

Kerch Peninsula, autumn 2010.

my excavations

Spent cartridges

Akmonai positions. Dota.

bullet marks

Personal weapon of a soldier 633 SP, 157 SD.

Fragment of a Mosin sniper rifle.

Kerch area, May 1942, in the photo Il-2.

May 1942, Kerch region.

All 5 photos from the Bundesarchiv, Germany

“Alarmists will be shot on the spot...”

FROM THE TRAGEDY of the Crimean Front during the reign of Khrushchev, one of the most confusing myths about the Great Patriotic War was created - the myth that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief specially sent his mediocre in military affairs, but “faithful dog” Mehlis to various fronts, and he kept the command in fear. As a result, in particular, the Crimean disaster of May 1942 occurred.

On the cover of the book by Doctor of Historical Sciences Yuri Rubtsov “Mekhlis. Shadow of the Leader" (M., 2007) the following summary about the hero of the work was made: "The mere mention of the name of Lev Mekhlis caused horror in many brave and honored generals. For many years this man was Stalin’s real shadow, his “second self” and, in fact, the master of the Red Army. He was so fanatically devoted to his leader and country that he stopped at nothing to complete his task. On the one hand, Mehlis is accused of having the blood of hundreds of innocent commanders on his hands, some of whom he personally shot. On the other hand, he was respected by ordinary soldiers, whom he always took care of. On the one hand, Mehlis was one of the main culprits for the defeat of the first months of the Great Patriotic War and the collapse of the Crimean Front in the spring of 1942. On the other hand, his inflexibility and firmness more than once saved troops in the most desperate situations. Was Mehlis the embodiment of evil? Or did he simply personify his controversial times?

The documents cited in the book by a respected colleague did not allow either the author or the readers to draw an unambiguous conclusion. Although, I note that our historiography is dominated by a persistent hostility towards the personality of this deputy people's commissar of defense and head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. The majority of the creative intelligentsia evaluates this historical figure with a minus sign.

Our information. Lev Zakharovich Mehlis was born in 1889 in Odessa. He graduated from 6 classes of the Jewish commercial school. Since 1911 in the army, he served in the 2nd Grenadier Artillery Brigade. In 1918 he joined the Communist Party and was in political work in the Red Army. In 1921-1922 - in the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, which was headed by Stalin. In 1922-1926 - one of the personal secretaries of the General Secretary of the Central Committee Stalin, in 1926-1930 he studied at courses at the Communist Academy and the Institute of Red Professors. In 1930, he became the head of the press and publishing department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and at the same time the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Pravda. In 1937-1940 - Head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, in 1940-1941 - People's Commissar of State Control. According to the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, “he was truly an honest man, but in some ways crazy,” because he had a mania for seeing enemies and saboteurs everywhere. On the eve of the war, he was reappointed head of the Main Political Directorate, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense (while retaining the post of People's Commissar of State Control). In 1942 he was a representative of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters on the Crimean Front. After the defeat of the Crimean Front troops in May 1942, he was removed from his posts, and in 1942-1946 he was a member of the military councils of a number of armies and fronts. In 1946-1950 - Minister of State Control of the USSR. Died February 13, 1953.

Konstantin Simonov is sometimes credited with the following statement about Mehlis: “I was on the Kerch Peninsula in 1942. The reason for the most shameful defeat is clear to me. Complete distrust of the army and front commanders, tyranny and wild arbitrariness of Mehlis, a man illiterate in military affairs... He forbade digging trenches so as not to undermine the offensive spirit of the soldiers. Moved heavy artillery and army headquarters to the very front line. Three armies stood on a front of 16 kilometers, the division occupied 600-700 meters along the front, nowhere and never have I seen such a saturation of troops. And all this mixed into a bloody mess, was thrown into the sea, died only because a madman commanded the front ... "

BUT THIS, I note, is not Simonov’s personal assessment. Here is how it was. On the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the Victory, on April 28, 1965, the front-line writer decided to express some thoughts related to the history of the Great Patriotic War. There is such a fragment in the material. It is worth citing in full (I quote from: K. Simonov. “Through the eyes of a man of my generation. Reflections on I.V. Stalin.” M., APN, 1989).

“I would like to give an example of an operation in which the true interests of waging war and false, sloganeering ideas about how a war should be waged, based not only on military illiteracy, but also on the lack of faith in people generated in 1937, clearly collided. I'm talking about the sad memory of the Kerch events of the winter - spring of 1942.

Seven years ago, one of our front-line writers wrote to me the following: “I was on the Kerch Peninsula in 1942. The reason for the most shameful defeat is clear to me. Complete distrust of the commanders of the armies and the front, tyranny and wild arbitrariness of Mehlis, a man illiterate in military matters... He forbade digging trenches so as not to undermine the offensive spirit of the soldiers. Moved heavy artillery and army headquarters to the most advanced positions, etc. Three armies stood on a front of 16 kilometers, the division occupied 600-700 meters along the front, nowhere have I ever seen such a saturation of troops. And all this mixed into a bloody mess, was thrown into the sea, died only because the front was commanded not by a commander, but by a madman...” (I emphasize that these are not the words of Simonov, but of a writer he knew. - A.M.)

I did not talk about this in order to once again give an unkind word to Mehlis, who, by the way, was a man of impeccable personal courage and did not do everything he did with the intention of personally becoming famous. He was deeply convinced that he was acting correctly, and that is why, from a historical point of view, his actions on the Kerch Peninsula are fundamentally interesting. This was a man who, during that period of the war, regardless of any circumstances, considered anyone who preferred a convenient position a hundred meters from the enemy to an uncomfortable one fifty meters away, a coward. He considered everyone who wanted to simply protect the troops from possible failure to be an alarmist; He considered everyone who realistically assessed the enemy’s strength to be unsure of their own strength. Mehlis, for all his personal readiness to give his life for his Motherland, was a pronounced product of the atmosphere of 1937-1938.

And the front commander, to whom he came as a representative of Headquarters, an educated and experienced military man, in turn also turned out to be a product of the atmosphere of 1937-1938, only in a different sense - in the sense of fear of taking full responsibility, fear of contrasting a reasonable military decision with an illiterate one. the onslaught of “everything and everything - forward”, fear of transferring his dispute with Mehlis to Headquarters at the risk of himself.

The difficult events of Kerch from a historical point of view are interesting in that they seem to screw together both halves of the consequences of 1937-1938 - both the one that was presented by Mehlis and the one that was presented by the then commander of the Crimean Front Kozlov.”

I WILL NOT argue with the great writer. Everyone has their own view of the past. I will express my personal opinion about Mehlis, supported by familiarity with the documents of that time. Yes, indeed, Lev Zakharovich is a very difficult and controversial political figure. He was harsh, sometimes even very, often straightforward in his assessments and demands. To put it mildly, he did not like to be diplomatic. He was tough, even to the point of cruelty, and during the war he went beyond this line in a difficult front-line situation.

Several examples can be given in this regard. September 12, 1941. 34th Army of the North-Western Front. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Mehlis personally draws up order No. 057 for front troops: “...For demonstrated cowardice and personal withdrawal from the battlefield to the rear, for violation of military discipline, expressed in direct failure to comply with the front order to come to the aid of units advancing from the west, for failure to take measures to save the material part of the artillery... Major General of Artillery Goncharov, on the basis of the order of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 270, is to be publicly shot in front of the formation of the commanders of the headquarters of the 34th Army.” Moreover, the general had already been extrajudicially shot the day before on the basis of an oral order from Mehlis and Army General K.A. Meretskova.

Cruel? Yes, it's cruel. But this is war, and we were talking about the fate of the entire state... Moreover, in those tragic months, a very nervous situation reigned at the front in the conditions of retreat under the pressure of German troops.

In this regard, it should also be noted that Stalin did not condone this kind of reprisals. At the beginning of October, he harshly reprimanded commanders and commissars who practiced lynching and assault instead of educational work. Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0391 of October 4, 1941, signed by Stalin and Chief of the General Staff B. Shaposhnikov, was called: “On the facts of the replacement of educational work with repression.” In it, Stalin demanded “in the most decisive manner, right up to bringing the perpetrators to trial in a military tribunal, to fight all phenomena of illegal repression, assault and lynching.”

I'LL ALLOW myself a little digression. Since the time of perestroika, historical literature and journalism have been dominated by the desire to evaluate the actions of statesmen and their motives from the standpoint of the realities of the present time - a time of peace and goodness. Then the situation was fundamentally different, and the life school of that generation was different. Many were tested in the fight against the special services of Imperial Russia and in the fratricidal Civil War. This embittered the future Soviet leaders; there were no sentimental people among them.

It is also impossible to understand the reasons for the extreme cruelty towards other military leaders in 1941 - the same command of the Western Front - without the context of the circumstances of the dramatic beginning of repelling the aggression of Nazi Germany. Unfortunately, despite the decisions made to declassify documents from the Great Patriotic War, we do not know everything about them.

A specific example: a telegram from the Chief of the General Staff, Army General G.K. Zhukov to the troops of the western military districts on June 18, 1941. This document is still inaccessible to researchers - even to employees of the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, involved in the preparation of a new multi-volume history of the Great Patriotic War.

And such a telegram existed. In 2008, the Kuchkovo Pole publishing house published a book by counterintelligence veteran Vladimir Yampolsky, “...Destroy Russia in the Spring of 1941,” which included materials on the case of the commander of the Western Front, Army General D.G. Pavlova. There is such an episode in the protocol of a closed court session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on July 22, 1941. Member of the court A.M. Orlov reads out the testimony of the defendant - the former communications chief of the Western Front headquarters, Major General A.T. Grigoriev at the investigation: “...And after the telegram from the Chief of the General Staff of June 18, the district troops were not put on combat readiness.” Grigoriev confirms: “All this is true.”

There is every reason to assert that on June 18, 1941, Stalin allowed the troops of the first strategic echelon to be brought to full combat readiness, but the directive of the General Staff authorized by him turned out to be, for some reason, unfulfilled by the command of the western military districts, and primarily in the Western Special.

Another document has survived, indicating that on June 18, 1941, a telegram was sent from the Chief of the General Staff to the command of the western military districts. This research was carried out in the late 1940s - the first half of the 1950s by the military scientific department of the General Staff under the leadership of Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky. Then, while Stalin was still alive, it was decided to generalize the experience of concentrating and deploying troops of the western military districts according to the plan for covering the state border on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. For this purpose, five questions were asked to the participants in those tragic events who held command positions in the troops of the western districts before the war (fragmentary answers to some questions were published in the Military Historical Journal in 1989).

The questions were formulated as follows: 1. Was the plan for the defense of the state border communicated to the troops, as far as they were concerned; when and what was done by the command and headquarters to ensure the implementation of this plan? 2. From what time and on the basis of what order did the covering troops begin to enter the state border and how many of them were deployed before the start of hostilities? 3. When the order was received to put troops on alert in connection with the expected attack by Nazi Germany on the morning of June 22; what and when were the instructions given to carry out this order and what was done by the troops? 4. Why was most of the artillery located in training centers? 5. To what extent were the headquarters prepared for command and control of troops and to what extent did this affect the course of operations in the first days of the war?

The editors of the Military Historical Journal managed to publish answers to the first two questions, but when it was the turn to answer the third question: “When was the order received to put the troops on combat readiness?”, the editor-in-chief of the magazine, Major General V.I. Filatov received a command from above to stop further publication of responses from participants in the events of June 1941. But even from the first two answers it follows that the telegram (or directive) of the Chief of the General Staff existed...

NOW about the behavior of Mehlis himself at the front.

From the memoirs of Colonel General of the Engineering Troops Arkady Khrenov: “In one of the companies he was caught by an order to attack. Without hesitation, he became the head of the company and led it behind him. None of those around him were able to dissuade Mehlis from this step. It was very difficult to argue with Lev Zakharovich..."

From the memoirs of Major General David Ortenberg, who edited the newspaper of the 11th Army “Heroic March” during the war with Finland (1939-1940) and, together with Mehlis, was surrounded by one of our divisions: “Army Commissar 1 1st rank put the editorial staff on a truck - a former Leningrad taxi, and gave several soldiers for security: “Get through.” And they broke through the still fragile ice of the lake. And Mehlis himself, together with the division commander, led its exit from the encirclement... Seeing that ours could not knock down the Finnish barrier near the road, Mehlis placed the soldiers in a chain, got into the tank and, moving forward, opened fire from a cannon and machine gun. The soldiers followed. The enemy was knocked out of his position."

The statement of Army General Alexander Gorbatov about Mehlis has also been preserved: “At every meeting with me until the liberation of Orel, Mehlis did not miss an opportunity to ask me any question that could lead to a dead end. I answered simply and probably not always the way he wanted. However, it was noticeable that, although with difficulty, he was changing his previous attitude towards me for the better. When we were already behind the Eagle, he suddenly said:

I have been looking closely at you for a long time and I must say that I like you as an army commander and as a communist. I followed your every step after you left Moscow and didn’t quite believe the good things I heard about you. Now I see that I was wrong.”

Mehlis, of course, did not have an academic military education and did not possess military leadership talents like the great Rokossovsky. By the way, he highly valued this commander and, shortly before the disaster of the Crimean Front, which became obvious to him in the spring of 1942, he asked Stalin to appoint Konstantin Konstantinovich as commander of the Crimean Front. Alas, due to a serious wound, Rokossovsky was still in the hospital at that time (on March 8, 1942, the commander of the 16th Army of the Western Front, Rokossovsky, was wounded by a shell fragment and was treated until May 23. - Ed.).

At the same time, Mehlis knew what war was. After all, during the Civil War he was at the front, was a commissar of a brigade, then the 46th Infantry Division and the Right Bank Group of Forces in Ukraine, participated in battles against the gangs of Ataman Grigoriev and one of the most talented commanders of the White Army - General Ya.A. Slashchev, was wounded.

Since the Civil War, Mehlis had a habit of telling people directly about mistakes and miscalculations. Naturally, he made many enemies from this. Mehlis always spoke with pathos, but sincerely. Of course, he could not do without his characteristic manner of seeing everything either in white or in black. It should be noted that as People's Commissar (Minister) of State Control, he was forced to engage in what today would be called anti-corruption measures, and as a result of inspections, many Soviet officials had to change their warm offices to barracks in Kolyma. Even under Stalin, officials stole and ruled at the expense of the state. Is this not where the origins of hatred towards Stalin’s “chief controller” come from on the part of the descendants of the families of the Soviet nomenklatura, most of whom have adapted well to the new life?..

And then the Great Patriotic War began. Mehlis is back in the army. On January 20, 1942, he arrived at the Crimean Front (until January 28, 1942, the front was called the Caucasian Front) in the status of an authorized representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. On the eve of his arrival, the troops successfully carried out the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation (December 26 - February 2) and captured a vast bridgehead.

Commander of the Caucasian Front, Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov received instructions from the Supreme Command Headquarters to speed up the concentration of troops on the bridgehead in every possible way. They decided to transfer additional forces there (47th Army) and, no later than January 12, launch a general offensive with the support of the Black Sea Fleet. The point was to reach Perekop as soon as possible and strike at the rear of the Sevastopol Wehrmacht group. By the summer of 1942, Crimea could actually become Soviet again.

Our information. As a result of the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation, by January 2, 1942, Soviet troops completely occupied the Kerch Peninsula. As the commander of the 11th Army, Erich von Manstein, admitted after the war, “in the first days of January 1942, for the troops that landed at Feodosia and approached from Kerch, the path to the vital artery of the 11th Army - the Dzhankoy - Simferopol railway - was actually open. The weak covering front (of the Sevastopol Wehrmacht group - Ed.), which we managed to create, could not withstand the onslaught of large forces. On January 4, it became known that the enemy already had 6 divisions in the Feodosia area.” The German general also believed that “if the enemy took advantage of the created situation and quickly began to pursue the 46th Infantry Division from Kerch, and also struck decisively after the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a situation would have been created that was hopeless not only for this newly emerged sector ... However, the front command postponed the offensive, citing insufficient forces and means.

The offensive of the Soviet troops nevertheless began, but it was not possible to break through the positions of the German divisions. This breakdown is usually described as saying that our command underestimated the strength and capabilities of the enemy. Historians try not to name the specific culprits for the failure of the offensive, which could have led to the liberation of all of Crimea, so as not to offend anyone.

It is kept silent that the offensive failed due to the lack of a well-thought-out plan, as well as clear logistical and combat support for the troops landing in Crimea. This was primarily manifested in the lack of transport ships for the transfer of manpower and artillery from the “mainland”. The situation with the provision of ammunition and fuel to the troops was also catastrophic. This is the testimony of Major General A.N. Pervushin, commander of the 44th Army participating in this operation (he was seriously wounded in January 1942 - Ed.).

Then weather conditions intervened - the ensuing thaw rendered field airfields completely unusable. The lack of normal communications and air defense systems also had an impact. They “forgot” to deliver anti-aircraft artillery to the port of Feodosia, and as a result, until January 4, 5 transports were killed from unpunished actions of German aviation, and the cruiser “Red Caucasus” was seriously damaged.

On January 18, the Germans, taking advantage of the passivity of the Soviet troops, recaptured Feodosia. Then General Kozlov decided to withdraw troops to the Ak-Monai positions - a defensive line approximately 80 kilometers from Kerch. It was in this situation that Mehlis arrived at the front.

Two days after his arrival, he sent Stalin a telegram with the following content: “We arrived in Kerch on January 20, 1942. We found the most unsightly picture of the organization of command and control... Komfront Kozlov does not know the position of the units at the front, their condition, as well as the enemy grouping. For any division there is no data on the number of people, the presence of artillery and mortars. Kozlov leaves the impression of a commander who is confused and unsure of his actions. None of the leading workers of the front have been in the troops since the occupation of the Kerch Peninsula...”

Our information. Kozlov Dmitry Timofeevich (1896–1967). In military service since 1915, he graduated from the school of warrant officers. Participant of the First World War. In the Red Army since 1918, he commanded a battalion and a regiment. After the Civil War he studied at the Frunze Military Academy. During the Soviet-Finnish War, he commanded the 1st Rifle Corps of the 8th Army. Since 1940 - Deputy Commander of the Odessa Military District, then - Head of the Main Directorate of Air Defense of the Red Army. Since 1941 - commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District. After the disaster in Crimea, he was demoted to the rank of major general. In August 1942, he was appointed commander of the 24th Army of the Stalingrad Front, and from August 1943, deputy commander of the Trans-Baikal Front. Participated in battles against Japan.

Mehlis’s telegram is usually characterized as follows: two days were “enough” for the arrogant People’s Commissar of State Control to get an idea of ​​the state of affairs at the front. However, in essence Mehlis was right. The main provisions of his telegram corresponded, by the way, to the contents of the order of the front command itself No. 12 of January 23, 1942. The order was signed by Kozlov, a member of the Military Council of the front F.A. Shamanin and Mehlis.

To this we must add that the command of the Caucasian Front at that time was in Tbilisi. And from there he directed the fighting. From a thousand kilometers away.

Mehlis really quickly figured out what was going on. And he immediately raised before Headquarters the question of separating an independent Crimean Front from the Caucasus Front and transferring command and control of troops to the Kerch Peninsula. At the same time, he demanded replenishment of manpower (3 rifle divisions), and began to demand that the front-line command urgently restore order in artillery, air defense, and logistics support.

"1. The command of armies, divisions, regiments should take into account the experience of the battles of January 15-18, 1942, immediately restore order in the units... Have regimental artillery and anti-tank artillery (anti-tank - A.M.) in infantry battle formations...

2. Alarmists and deserters should be shot on the spot as traitors. Those caught intentionally wounding left-handed crossbowmen should be shot in front of the line.

3. Within three days, restore complete order in the rear..."

Mehlis especially carefully checked the condition of the air force and artillery of the front, on which the combat effectiveness of the entire group of our troops depended to a decisive extent. It turned out that due to poor logistics, 110 faulty aircraft accumulated on the Kerch Peninsula, so less than one sortie was carried out per day.

Mehlis, using his official status, obtained additional weapons from the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff - the front received 450 light machine guns, 3 thousand PPSh, 50 mortars of 120 mm caliber and 50 mortars of 82 mm caliber, two divisions of M-8 rocket launchers. The issue of allocating an additional number of tanks to the front, including heavy KVs, anti-tank rifles and ammunition, was being resolved.

On January 24, a new commander of the front air force was appointed - Major General E.M. Nikolaenko. A little later, the new chief of the engineering troops arrived - Major General A.F. Khrenov. In anticipation of the planned offensive, Mehlis also ensured that a large number of political workers at various levels were sent to the front, including specialists in special propaganda against the Germans.

The 47th Army (commander - Major General K.S. Kalganov), transferred from northern Iran, crossed the ice of the Kerch Strait to the peninsula.

On February 15, Stalin received Mehlis. At the meeting, to the displeasure of the Supreme, he asked for additional time to prepare the front for the offensive. This relates to the question of whether Mehlis thoughtlessly carried out the orders of Headquarters. And Stalin agreed with him - apparently, Mehlis’s arguments worked.

On February 27, 1942, the planned offensive began. The Crimean Front had 12 rifle divisions, four tank brigades, and one cavalry division. But the command of the Crimean Front, instead of actively using tanks, including KV and T-34, to break through the German defense in the treeless terrain of the Kerch Peninsula, sent forward infantry, whose attacks the Germans repulsed with machine-gun fire.

For three days they drove the infantry into senseless attacks, killing thousands of people. 13 Soviet divisions advanced against three German and one Romanian. And the irretrievable losses are enormous (by April already 225 thousand people).

On March 9, Mehlis sent Stalin a proposal to immediately remove Kozlov and the staff of Major General F.I. Tolbukhin from his posts. Only the chief of staff of the front was replaced - with Major General P.P. Eternal. On March 29, Mehlis again insisted in writing to Stalin on the removal of Kozlov. The description given to the commander is unflattering: he is lazy, “a gluttonous gentleman of the peasants,” is not interested in operational issues, regards trips to the troops as “punishment,” in frontline troops, does not enjoy authority, does not like painstaking, everyday work.

Instead, Mehlis asked to appoint one of the following generals: N.K. Klykov, but he commanded the 2nd Shock Army breaking through to Leningrad and at that moment it was impossible to change him; K.K. Rokossovsky, who was still recovering in the hospital; Commander of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, whom he met on the Kerch Peninsula. But for some reason the latter’s candidacy did not find Stalin’s support.

By the beginning of May, the front group of troops prepared for an offensive, but it was postponed. On May 6, 1942, Headquarters ordered the front to go on the defensive, apparently having information about the upcoming German offensive. But the front command did not have time to reorganize the troops for defense. Their group remained offensive.

Meanwhile, the German command strengthened its 11th Army. Back in early April, the 22nd Tank Division appeared in its composition (180 Czech tanks LT vz.38: weight - 9.5 tons, frontal armor - from 25 to 50 mm, 37 mm gun). On May 8, the Germans went on the offensive with massive air support (Operation “Hunting for Bustards”). The command post of the 51st Army was destroyed, and General Lvov was killed on May 11.

Already during the May breakthrough of our defense by the Germans, Headquarters gave General Kozlov the following instructions:

“1) The entire 47th Army must immediately begin to withdraw beyond the Turkish Wall, organizing a rearguard and covering the retreat with aviation. Without this there will be a risk of being captured...

3) You can organize a strike with the forces of the 51st Army so that this army is gradually withdrawn beyond the Turkish Wall.

4) The remnants of the 44th Army also need to be withdrawn beyond the Turkish Wall.

5) Mehlis and Kozlov must immediately begin organizing defense along the Turkish Wall.

6) We do not object to the transfer of headquarters to the place you indicated.

7) We strongly object to the departure of Kozlov and Mekhlis to the Lvov group.

8) Take all measures to ensure that artillery, especially large artillery, is concentrated behind the Turkish Wall, as well as a number of anti-tank regiments.

9) If you are able and manage to detain the enemy in front of the Turkish Wall, we will consider this an achievement...”

But neither the Turkish Wall nor the Kerch contours were equipped in engineering terms and did not pose a serious obstacle for the Germans.

Worse than that. All three armies of the front (44th, 47th and 51st), prepared for the offensive, were deployed in one echelon, which sharply reduced the depth of defense and sharply limited the ability to repel enemy attacks in the event of a breakthrough. When the Germans launched a decisive offensive, their main blow fell precisely on the most unsuccessful formation of troops - on the 44th Army (commander - Lieutenant General S.I. Chernyak). The second echelon of this army was located only 3–4 km from the front line, which gave the Germans the opportunity, even without changing the positions of their artillery, to inflict fire on our units throughout the entire operational depth. Which is what they did.

In addition, most of the Soviet troops were concentrated on the northern sector of the Crimean Front. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the German command, imitating the main efforts in the north, delivered the main blow from the south, where the 44th Army was located.

Here is Mehlis’s sharp and emotional opinion about her commander: “Chernyak. An illiterate man, incapable of leading an army. His chief of staff, Rozhdestvensky, is a boy, not an organizer of troops. One can wonder whose hand nominated Chernyak to the rank of lieutenant general.”

“Failures in wars are always inevitable, but they cannot be justified if they arose due to the carelessness of the people entrusted with the conduct of the war. This apparent disregard for the enemy served as a tragic prelude to the fateful turns of May 1942.”

Valentin Pikul. "Square of Fallen Fighters"

On the night of May 7, the military council of the Crimean Front, with the approval of Mehlis, sent the necessary orders to the troops (in connection with the expected German offensive - Ed.). Alas, the workers at the front headquarters were not concerned with the speed of their transfer. As a result, by morning they had not even reached all the army commanders!

On May 7, the Germans began intensive air strikes against Soviet positions, especially control posts. The next day, under cover of artillery fire, infantry units launched an attack.

On May 8, Mehlis sent a telegram to Stalin in which he wrote: “Now is not the time to complain, but I must report so that Headquarters knows the front commander. On May 7, that is, on the eve of the enemy’s offensive, Kozlov convened a military council to discuss the project for a future operation to capture Koi-Aksan. I recommended that this project be postponed and that instructions be immediately given to the armies in connection with the expected enemy advance. In the signed order of the front commander, he stated in several places that the offensive was expected on May 10–15, and proposed to work until May 10 and study the army defense plan with all command personnel, unit commanders and headquarters. This was done when the entire situation of the previous day showed that the enemy would advance in the morning. At my insistence, the erroneous timing was corrected. Kozlov also resisted the movement of additional forces to the 44th Army sector.”

All the data is stark: tomorrow the Germans will launch an offensive, and the commander in the order indicates the period of May 10–15. Obviously, the reconnaissance of the front headquarters did not work.

In response to his telegram, in which he once again asked to replace Kozlov, Mehlis received a very irritated message from Stalin: “You are holding the strange position of an outside observer, not responsible for the affairs of the Crimean Front. This position is very convenient, but it is completely rotten. On the Crimean Front, you are not an outside observer, but a responsible representative of Headquarters, responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obliged to correct the command’s mistakes on the spot. You, together with the command, are responsible for the fact that the left flank of the front turned out to be extremely weak. If “the whole situation showed that the enemy would attack in the morning,” and you did not take all measures to organize a resistance, limiting yourself to passive criticism, then so much the worse for you. This means that you have not yet understood that you were sent to the Crimean Front not as State Control, but as a responsible representative of Headquarters.

You demand that we replace Kozlov with someone like Hindenburg. But you cannot help but know that we do not have Hindenburgs in reserve... If you had used attack aircraft not for side activities, but against the enemy’s tanks and manpower, the enemy would not have broken through the front and the tanks would not have gotten through. You don’t need to be Hindenburg to understand this simple thing while sitting on the Crimean Front for two months.”

Mekhlis seems to have deservedly received the nuts. Especially considering that Stalin then recalled him from the front and demoted him. The Supreme’s irritation is understandable: despite the numerical superiority of our troops in the Kerch region, they were unable to stop the German offensive. But let's figure out what in Mehlis's position could have caused Stalin's anger? In my opinion, first of all, Mehlis limited himself to the position of an observer and did not interfere in the decision-making process, which was obvious even to a non-professional military man. Having attack aircraft, anti-tank artillery, and T-34 and KV, superior to German Czechoslovak-made tanks with a weak 37-mm cannon, the Soviet command could stop the German 22nd Panzer Division.

Today all the pressure is falling on the head of Mehlis, on the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky, who supposedly “created tricks for the Crimean Front,” against the commander-in-chief of the troops of the North Caucasus direction, Marshal S.M. Budyonny, to Headquarters. And the front command had nothing to do with it... Without justifying Mehlis’s mistakes, for which he was punished by Stalin, I note that until the last he tried to reverse the rapidly deteriorating situation in May 1942.

It is known how the German “hunt for bustards” ended: on May 13, the defense of our troops was broken through, on the night of May 14, Marshal Budyonny allowed the evacuation from the Kerch Peninsula, on May 15, the enemy occupied Kerch. This allowed the Germans to concentrate their efforts on taking Sevastopol.

This is the price of the disaster on the Crimean front. But we will not “savor” its details and will keep in our hearts the bright memory of all the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army who died on Crimean soil.

Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR

About the facts of replacing educational work with repression

Recently, there have been frequent cases of illegal repression and gross abuse of power by individual commanders and commissars in relation to their subordinates.

Lieutenant of the 288th joint venture Komissarov, without any reason, killed Red Army soldier Kubica with a revolver shot.

The former chief of the 21st UR, Colonel Sushchenko, shot and killed Jr. Sergeant Pershikov because he was slow to get out of the car due to a hand problem.

The platoon commander of a motorized rifle company of the 1026th Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Mikryukov, shot and killed his assistant, junior platoon commander Baburin, allegedly for not following orders.

The military commissar of the 28th Panzer Division, Regimental Commissar Bankvitser, beat one sergeant for smoking at night; He also beat up Major Zanozny for having an incontinent conversation with him.

The chief of staff of the 529th Infantry Regiment, Captain Sakur, without any reason, hit Art. Lieutenant Sergeev.

Such facts of perversion of disciplinary practice, excesses [the word “excesses” was written by Stalin instead of “violations”, intolerable in the Red Army. - Ed.] granted rights and power, lynchings and assault are explained by the fact that:

a) the method of persuasion was incorrectly relegated to the background, and the method of repression in relation to subordinates took first place;

b) everyday educational work in units in a number of cases is replaced by abuse, repression and assault;

c) the method of explanations and conversations between commanders, commissars, political workers and Red Army soldiers has been abandoned, and clarification of issues incomprehensible to the Red Army soldiers is often replaced by shouting, abuse and rudeness;

d) individual commanders and political workers in difficult battle conditions become confused, panic and cover up their own confusion by using weapons without any reason;

e) the truth has been forgotten that the use of repression is an extreme measure, permissible only in cases of direct disobedience and open resistance in a combat situation or in cases of malicious violation of discipline and order by persons deliberately going to disrupt the orders of the command.

Commanders, commissars and political workers must remember that without the correct combination of the method of persuasion with the method of coercion, it is unthinkable to impose Soviet military discipline and strengthen the political and moral state of the troops.

Severe punishment in relation to malicious violators of military discipline, accomplices of the enemy and obvious enemies must be combined with a careful analysis of all cases of violation of discipline that require detailed clarification of the circumstances of the case.

Unreasonable repressions, illegal executions, arbitrariness and assault on the part of commanders and commissars are a manifestation of lack of will and lack of arms, often lead to the opposite results, contribute to the decline of military discipline and the political and moral state of the troops and can push unstable fighters to defect to the enemy’s side.

I order:

1. Restore rights to educational work, widely use the method of persuasion, and do not replace everyday explanatory work with administration and repression.

2. All commanders, political workers and superiors should talk daily with the Red Army soldiers, explaining to them the need for iron military discipline, honest performance of their military duty, the military oath and orders of the commander and superior. In conversations, also explain that a serious threat looms over our Motherland, that defeating the enemy requires the greatest self-sacrifice, unshakable steadfastness in battle, contempt for death and a merciless fight against cowards, deserters, self-harmers, provocateurs and traitors to the Motherland.

3. Widely explain to the commanding staff that lynchings, assault and public abuse, which humiliates the rank of a soldier of the Red Army, lead not to strengthening, but to undermining the discipline and authority of the commander and political worker.

At the front I found unimaginable panic. All cannons, machine guns, and anti-tank rifles were abandoned on the battlefield, and people fled in groups and alone to the Kerch Strait. And if they saw a board or log floating near the shore, several people immediately jumped on this object and immediately drowned. The same thing happened if they managed to find any floating craft on the shore or saw an approaching boat - they rushed in like a cloud, immediately everything was flooded, and people died.

I have never seen such panic in my life - this has never happened in my military experience.

It was some kind of disaster, although the enemy did not particularly attack. His aviation worked well, and it created panic. But she managed to do this only because our aviation was inactive, and the front command was confused and lost control.

Despite this, I managed to occupy the near defensive Kerch perimeter and gain a foothold on it. I ordered Mehlis and Kozlov to lead this defense, and if we have to evacuate, they must be the last to leave Kerch land.

Some people have already reached the Taman Peninsula through the Kerch Strait. There I had a three-regiment rifle brigade stationed. I ordered her to detain everyone crossing and put them on the defensive line of Taman.

After all this, I called HF I.V. Stalin and reported on the situation. He asked, “What do you think you’ll do next?” I replied that we would fight on the near defensive line (to defend Kerch). But Stalin said: “You must now firmly defend the Taman Peninsula and evacuate Kerch.”

I nevertheless decided to defend Kerch for as long as possible, because the fall of Kerch would immediately affect the defense of Sevastopol, which had half of its combat ammunition in this direction when I arrived. And I brought it to 15.5.42 to 6 rounds of ammunition...

I was at the front command post when I.A. approached me. Serov (Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs - Ed.) and introduced himself as an NKVD commissioner from Beria. Serov asked me what the orders would be. I replied that during the evacuation he should sink the locomotives so that they would not fall into the hands of the Germans.

After 2-3 hours, Serov came up to me and reported that my order had been carried out and the locomotives were flooded. I asked: “How?!” He replied that he lowered them from the pier. I said: “What a fool. I told you that this needs to be done during the evacuation, but we are not going to leave yet, and we need steam locomotives.” I ordered him to leave Kerch and not complicate matters.”

Then we moved to Taman, where my command post was. And suddenly I lost contact with Kerch, with which we were connected by a single wire - a high-frequency telephone. It turned out that Serov ordered him to be cut.

When I asked why he did this, Serov replied that this connection belonged to the NKVD and he had the right to dispose of it.

I told him: “But, unfortunately, you don’t know how to manage things. Therefore, I will put you on trial as a traitor to the Motherland, because you deprived me of the opportunity to manage the front, I was left without communication.”

The next day, Beria called me from Moscow and asked me to settle the matter with Serov. I repeated that Serov would be brought to justice. Then Beria said that he was recalling Serov to Moscow and would punish him himself.”

From the diary entries of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny,
in May 1942, commander-in-chief of the troops
North Caucasian direction.

Letter from the “disgraced general”

“11.2.66 Hello, Alexander Ivanovich!

Thank you very much for not forgetting the old disgraced general. My fall from grace has lasted for almost 25 years.

The events of those days often appear in my memory. It’s hard to remember them, especially because the blame for the death of all our regiments lies not only with us, the direct participants in these battles, but also with the leadership that was exercised over us. I don’t mean Mehlis, a layman in operational art, but the commander of the North Caucasus direction and Headquarters. I also mean Oktyabrsky The outstanding writer of the twentieth century, Konstantin Simonov, who repeatedly visited the Kerch Peninsula during the days of military confrontations reflected in his famous “Different Days of the War,” had every right to declare: “You can’t film a war from afar, a war can only be filmed up close.” With these words, K. Simonov once again emphasized the invaluable role of film and photographic documents, which left for posterity the heroism and tragedy of the people's victory over fascism.

One of such genuine evidence of the horrors of the Great Patriotic War was the photograph of military photojournalist Anatoly Garanin, “The Death of a Soldier,” which became a classic of Soviet military photography.

Assigned to the headquarters of the Crimean Front, A. Garanin, as a representative of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, in the spring of 1942 once again went to the front line to film the attack of soldiers on the enemy during the battle.

The unit, carried away by the commander, rushed forward. Anatoly pointed his “watering can” at a group of soldiers. The shot should have been successful - several people were caught in the lens, rushing forward in a single impulse towards the enemy. But at that very moment, before the camera shutter was released, an enemy shell suddenly exploded a few meters from the attackers. The frame instantly became different. The explosion disrupted the picture of the battle and made terrible adjustments to the photo. Instead of the intended image of the attack, the film captured the tragedy. The mortally wounded soldier closest to us slowly sinks to the Crimean soil. For him, the war was over - his body accepted the deadly metal.

Somewhere far from here there will be the tears of a wife, mother, children and relatives and the eternal hope for the return of a loved one from that damned war - a hope that fades away every day after the Victory...

An archive of film and photographic documents helped establish that the famous Ak-Monai positions, located in the western part of the Kerch Peninsula, became the location where the photograph “Death of a Soldier” was taken. Unfortunately, no one yet knows the exact location of filming. A strip of land from the village of Ak-Monay (Kamenskoye) to the Black Sea itself, almost 17 kilometers long, bears witness to the death of a soldier. The very place where from January to May 1942 there were fierce battles with varying success, ending in tragedy for the troops of the Crimean Front.

Who is the fighter whose death we see in the picture? His name remains unknown. He was most likely buried in one of the many mass graves located in the Ak-Monai Isthmus area. The remains of a soldier may rest in Semisotka, Kamenskoye, Batalny, Yachmennoye, Uvarovo and other villages, in which there are several mass graves with thousands buried. The majority, despite the almost seventy years that have passed since the end of hostilities in Crimea, remain nameless. And the main reason for this is the destruction of archival documents.

The photograph “Death of a Soldier” once again makes us think about the cruelty of the most barbaric war in the history of mankind, where the death of one is a tragedy, and the death of millions is a statistic. The same imperturbable statistics that consider more than seventy percent of those who did not return from the war to be missing in action. In combat - Marines of the 83rd Brigade (1942).

Kerch-Feodosia landing operation

E. Manstein (left)

On December 17, 1941, after strong artillery bombardment, German troops launched a second assault on Sevastopol. By order of Manstein, five divisions rushed to the offensive.

Erich von Manstein

As a result of the December offensive, the Germans managed to get 6-7 km closer to the city in the northern sector. The position of the defenders of Sevastopol became significantly more complicated: the city, bay and airfields found themselves in the fire zone of German artillery of all calibers. The introduction of another division into battle on December 21 - the 170th Infantry - allowed Manstein to re-densify the battle formations of the assaulters and ultimately achieve a change in the situation in his favor. By December 25, Manstein’s troops were literally a stone’s throw from the Northern Bay.

However, at this moment the Soviet command made a “knight’s move” and tried to seize the initiative by landing a large amphibious assault in the Crimea.

The Crimean coast was a fairly long area that needed to be defended, even in sparse formations. The concentration of the main efforts of German troops in the Crimea against Sevastopol made the defense of the coast almost formal. Despite serious problems with air cover for warships far from bases, the Soviet fleet could rightfully lay claim to dominance in the Black Sea.

The plan for landing sea and airborne assault forces on the Kerch Peninsula appeared at the command of the Transcaucasian Front at the end of November 1941, shortly after the abandonment of Crimea by Soviet troops. The first report outlining the main ideas of the operation was sent to the Supreme Command Headquarters on November 26, 1941.

The proposal was received with interest, and on November 30, a detailed report was sent to the Supreme Command Headquarters detailing the plan and calculating the number of troops allocated. Initially, it was planned to capture the landing force only in the eastern part of the Kerch Peninsula and move further to Feodosia. By Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 005471 of December 7, 1941, this plan was approved and the front began its practical implementation.

By the time the landing plan in Crimea was approved, E. von Manstein’s 11th Army defending the peninsula was opposed by part of the forces of D.T. Kozlov’s Transcaucasian Front located on the Taman Peninsula - the 51st and 44th Armies.

D.T. Kozlov

Of course, the 51st and 44th armies did not transform from troops hastily leaving the Kerch Peninsula into a grouping for a relatively large landing operation by magic. As in other sectors of the front, the armies were strengthened for active operations due to newly formed formations.

The 51st Army of Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov included the 224th, 302nd, 390th and 396th Infantry Divisions, the 12th Infantry Brigade, and the 83rd Marine Brigade.

V.N. Lviv(killed in battle)

The 44th Army of Major General A.N. Pervushin included the 157th, 236th, 345th and 404th Rifle Divisions, the 9th and 63rd Mountain Rifle Divisions, and the 74th Marine Brigade. Of these, the 345th and 404th divisions and the 74th brigade were formed in the fall of 1941.

A.N. Pervushin

The reserve of the commander of the Transcaucasian Front on the Taman Peninsula included the 156th, 398th and 400th rifle divisions and the 72nd cavalry division. The last three formations belonged to the formations of the autumn of 1941.

Preparations for the operation were ordered to be completed by December 19. The landing was supposed to begin on December 21.

Preparations for the operation were interrupted by the aggravation of the situation in the Sevastopol region. To counter the crisis, it was necessary to transfer to the city on December 20 and 21 the 345th Infantry Division and the 79th Marine Brigade, originally intended for landing in Feodosia. The transfer of troops also distracted the combat and transport ships involved in the landing operation. As a result, it was possible to begin the landing only on December 26.

On December 26, troops of the 51st and 40th Soviet armies were landed in the Kerch area and 30 in the Feodosia area.

Landing plan

Auxiliary landing at Kerch. The Azov flotilla was supposed to deliver from Temryuk and Kuchugur the 244th Infantry Division and the 83rd Marine Brigade, which were subordinate to the 51st Army of Lieutenant General Lvov (13 thousand people in total), and land the first detachment in the north in Ak-Monai and Arabat, the second detachment - north of Kerch at capes Zyuk, Tarkhan and Khroni. The third detachment is at Yenikape.
These detachments were supposed to force the enemy defense to disperse their forces.

The enemy forces on the Kerch Peninsula were represented by the German 46th Infantry Division and the Romanian regiment of mountain riflemen guarding the Parpach ridge area.

The total number of enemy troops on the Kerch Peninsula was 25 thousand personnel, 180 guns and 118 tanks. Two aviation groups with up to 100 aircraft were based at airfields in the Kerch region. In addition, the grouping of enemy troops on the Kerch Peninsula could be supported by aviation from airfields located in the areas of Simferopol and Saki.

To enhance surprise, no artillery preparation was planned. A group of paratroopers was supposed to land in the southern part of Cape Zyuk. After occupying Kerch, the 51st Army was supposed to advance on Vladislavovka.
In the south, the 302nd Infantry Division, transferred here from Kerch, was supposed to land from the Taman Peninsula. Disembarkation points: Old Karantin, Kamysh-Burun, Eltigen and the Initiative commune. Troops were to land at these points suddenly and simultaneously. Three attack waves were envisaged.
The short distance to the landing site allowed Rear Admiral Frolov to quickly transfer troops and bring coastal artillery into action.

K.S. Frolov

Therefore, fire support from ships was not provided. The patrol boats were to take over the defense of the landing beaches, while the torpedo boats were to provide smoke screens to the attacking force.
Auxiliary landing on Cape 0puk. A division of gunboats and a detachment of torpedo boats, together with a patrol boat and a patrol ship, were to be delivered from Anapa to Cape Opuk and 3 thousand people from the 44th Army (Detachment “B”) were to land there. This landing group was supposed to prevent any movement of troops along the coast and advance north in the direction of Kerch in order to connect there with the 51st Army and act together with it. This group was supposed to be supported by the artillery of the southern group, expelled from Feodosia.

The main landing in Feodosia. The troops assigned for landing in Feodosia were Detachment “A” (23 thousand people, 34 tanks, 133 guns), which arrived from Novorossiysk; only the last train arrived from Tuapse. Detachment “A” was formed from units of the 44th Army (Major General Pervukhin). The transportation of troops was provided by the forces of the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Captain 1st Rank Basisty, who replaced Rear Admiral Vladimirsky, who was wounded on September 21, 1941, when the destroyer Frunze was sunk off the Tendra Peninsula by dive bombers. The ships were to be boarded at night. It was planned to land the troops after strong artillery preparation directly on the piers of Feodosia.
The landing forces in Feodosia were divided into three detachments. The frontline included a marine assault detachment of 300 people and an amphibious force of 12 patrol boats, 2 minesweepers, tugs and barges and a hydrographic group, as well as an artillery support detachment - the cruisers "Red Crimea" and "Red Caucasus", the destroyers "Zheleznyakov", “Shaumyan” and “Nezamozhnik”, which provided fire support and, in addition, themselves had to transport the forward detachment - approximately 3 rifle regiments and heavy equipment.

destroyer “Shaumyan”

The main landing forces were planned to land in two echelons. The first - 11,270 people, 572 horses, 51 4.5-12.2 cm guns - was loaded onto transports:
“Zyryanin” (2593 br. tons), “Tashkent” (5552 br. tons), “Zhores” (3972 br. tons), “Red Profintern” (4638 br. tons), “Nogin” (2109 br. tons) , Shakhtar (3,628 br. tons) and Kuban (3,113 br. tons). Two destroyers were brought in to guard them.
The second echelon—6,365 people, 905 horses, 58 guns, 14 tanks—was loaded onto the transports “Berezina” (3,087 tons), “Kalinin” (4,156 tons), “Kursk” (5,801 tons), “Dmitrov” "(3689 br. tons), "Krasnogvardeets" (2719 br. tons), "Azov" (967 br. tons), "Fabricius" (2334 6 rub. tons) and "Serov", security - leader, for the destroyer and three minesweepers.

transport “Jacques Jaurès”

The covering force consisted of the cruiser Molotov, the leader Tashkent and one destroyer.

cruiser "Molotov"

leader of “Tashkent”

After the capture of Feodosia and the Ak-Monaisk Isthmus, part of the 44th Army was supposed to advance to the east and, in cooperation with the 51st Army, destroy the encircled German troops. Having successfully completed this task, the 44th and 51st armies were to advance on Karasubazar, 60 km west of Feodosia.
Auxiliary landing on the southern coast.

In order to disrupt the coastal communication between Alushta and Feodosia, west of Feodosia, near Sudak and Koktebel, a landing of one battalion of minesweepers and torpedo boats was planned.

Landing on the Kerch Peninsula

On the evening of December 25, after the troops boarded ships in Temryuk, a strong storm began (wind 14 m/s). The cold wave spread throughout Crimea, and the Kerch Strait froze. General Lvov and Admiral Eliseev (Chief of the Fleet Staff) were of the opinion that this circumstance would provide greater surprise. They decided to start the operation. According to the plan, the landing was supposed to begin on December 26 at 5:00 am, 2 hours before dawn, but all groups were late.
The 2nd group landed at Cape Zyuk only at 10 a.m., after two hours of artillery fire to suppress German batteries.

It was soon reinforced by the first group, which was too late to reach Arabat and Ak-Monai. However, the difficulties encountered - great excitement, attacks by German aircraft and resistance from German defenses - prevented the landing of all groups.
The Azov flotilla managed to create 3 minor bridgeheads between December 26 and 29. Strong opposition prevented her from unloading heavy equipment. The paratroopers were able to bring only a small part of their equipment ashore, as they were forced to jump into icy water. The lack of fuel did not allow aviation to provide support to the landing force. German aviation significantly interfered with the transportation of troops.
The second echelon managed to land only partially. On December 29, the Soviet high command decided to group its forces (approximately 6 thousand people, 9 tanks and 10 guns) at Cape Tarkhan. There they prepared for defense, while two bridgeheads had to retreat. The attack on Kerch was delayed.
At the moment when the Azov flotilla was preparing to leave on December 25, the troops were loaded onto the ships of Admiral Frolov in Taman and Komsomolsk. Bad weather delayed the departure of transport ships. Only the first echelon landed systematically. The patrol ships were discovered before they approached the shore. German artillery opened fire, but the Russians managed to land in 4 places.

The second echelon was 4 hours late and arrived only at 7:00 a.m., and only one group managed to strengthen the bridgehead in Kamysh-Burun. Soon the third echelon arrived, but the groups returned back to the Taman coast. By the evening of December 27, the Russians only had a bridgehead at Kamysh-Burun, which contained half of the originally planned troops. They were driven out from other bridgeheads. In total, 3,600 people were landed. On December 27, stormy weather (wind 7-8 points) prevented ships with landing forces from going to sea. Only on the night of December 29 could the transfer be resumed again. Now almost the entire landing force was landed in Kamysh-Burun (a total of 11,225 people, 47 guns and 12 armored vehicles). Thus, on December 29, 17,500 people were landed on the northern and eastern coast of the peninsula.

The weakness of Soviet air cover allowed German aviation to operate unhindered. Some of the vehicles were sunk, and without artillery and tanks the Russians could not advance. Manstein gave the order to the commander of the 42nd Army Corps, Lieutenant General Sponeck, with the forces of the only division remaining on the Kerch Peninsula to throw the enemy into the sea.

Hans von Sponeck

The assault on Sevastopol had reached its decisive stage; it seemed that one more effort was enough to occupy the most important of the resistance centers - Stalin's fort. Manstein could not send reinforcements to Feodosia and Kerch, except for two Romanian brigades (8th Cavalry and 4th Mountain). In Sevastopol, both opponents were at the limit of their capabilities. The Russians hastily sent there the battleship Paris Commune, the cruiser Molotov, the leader Tashkent and three destroyers to fire at the tip of the advancing wedge of German troops north of the city.
On the morning of December 30, a Soviet reconnaissance group accidentally discovered that the Germans had abandoned Kerch. General Sponeck received news the day before that the Russians had landed troops in Feodosia and, in order not to be cut off, by his own decision, contrary to Manstein’s directive, ordered the 46th Infantry Division to retreat by a forced march to the west. Manstein's cancellation of this order did not reach the corps command, since all lines of communication were broken. The Russians occupied Kerch.

On December 25 at 9:00 a.m., Russian landing detachment “B” was concentrated in Anapa. He went to sea four hours late. The onset of the storm did not allow heavy equipment to be loaded onto the patrol ship "Storm" and onto the lighter. On December 26, the detachment went to sea, but due to poor organization and stormy weather, it was forced to return to Anapa twice without reaching Cape Opuk, where a support group was waiting for it. Then Rear Admiral Abramov 2 received an order to land troops on the bridgehead in Kamysh-Burun. Leaving Novorossiysk at 17:00 on December 28, he began disembarking at 22:00.
On December 28, loading onto the vessels of Detachment “A” in Tuapse and Novorossiysk was completed. The organization was no better than in Kerch and Taman. Some regiments were late, others confused transport ships. At 18:00 the landing force left, an hour later a group of artillery support ships left. Two submarines, intended to provide navigational support for the landing, left at 3 o'clock. The Germans knew this movement of the Russians, and they followed it. The lack of naval forces made it impossible for the Germans to attack the Russians at sea. Soviet aviation, on the contrary, bombed Marfovka, where the headquarters of the German troops was located, as well as Vladislavovna and the railway line near Feodosia.
At 03:18 on December 29, a detachment of artillery support ships opened fire. At 04:03 they stopped firing, and the first group landed on the pier from the patrol boat SKD 0131, followed by SKA 013. After a short battle, the Russians took possession of the lighthouse. The entrance to the port was provided by the Russian tug "Kabardinets". At 04:00 the first destroyer entered the port, at the same time the cruiser "Red Crimea" entered the port, anchored 360 m from the pier. Boats and boats began to transport paratroopers to the shore. The weather was getting worse. A snowstorm hampered the landing operations, and four German batteries opened fire.

Then the commander of the cruiser "Red Caucasus", Captain 2nd Rank Gushchin, decided to land troops directly on the pier. Enemy fire intensified, and German aircraft began operating at dawn. When the cruiser moved away from the wall, it received a direct hit in one of the towers, and the first victims appeared. By lunchtime the landing of 4,500 men was completed. The ships retreated to the raid to provide artillery support to the landing forces, of course, without a spotter aircraft. The adjustment was carried out on the shore by artillery observers. At 08:30, five Soviet aircraft of the LAGG-3 type appeared. At midnight the cruisers were forced to leave the raid. "Red Caucasus" returned to Novorossiysk.

On the evening of December 28, Feodosia was occupied by the Russians. At 23:00, one minesweeper landed a small group at the Sarygol station, which was supposed to cover the approaches to Feodosia from the east. The Germans, with air support, put up stiff resistance north of the city. The Russians did not have any heavier military equipment. The guns were transported on longboats one at a time and unloaded without cranes. The arrival of both subsequent landing groups was delayed. The first detachment, due to a large wave and seasickness of the troops, arrived on December 29 at 22:00, and on the morning of December 30 it was attacked by aircraft. Soon a thick, black smoke screen rose over the roadstead. The cruisers were attacked from the air more than 10 times, but all attacks were repulsed. The second detachment arrived on December 31 at 01:00.
On the shore, events unfolded favorably for the Russians, but somewhat slowly. On December 30, the 44th Army was still 6 km from Feodosia. German reinforcements (170th and 132nd infantry divisions withdrawn from Sevastopol) could arrive in the Feodosia area only after a few days. If the Russians decided to advance on Dzhankoy, they would completely cut off the supply of the German 11th Army. However, their plan, in which they overestimated the German defenses, called for the movement of the 44th Army in the first phase (from 29 December to 4 January) north and east in order, together with the 51st Army, to destroy German forces on the Kerch Peninsula. The 51st Infantry Division pursued the German 46th Infantry Division retreating from Kerch, which, due to poor roads, was forced to abandon all heavy military equipment (398 armored vehicles, 68 guns). But, nevertheless, the division avoided encirclement.
On December 31, the Russians occupied Vladislavovka. In order to cut off the Germans' lines of communication on the northern coast, the 12th Infantry Brigade was landed in Ak-Monay, and the parachute group occupied the approaches to the Arabat line; however, this turned out to be useless, because the Germans did not try to occupy it. Taking advantage of the slowness of the Russians, Manstein succeeded with the remnants of the 46th Infantry Division and the 213th Infantry Regiment of the 73rd Infantry Division, as well as two Romanian brigades, to create, however, a weak front line east of Feodosia.

Romanian General Radu Corne

Bad weather interfered with the actions of aviation on both sides, which, however, was more noticeable for the Germans than for the Russians. The German command was also concerned about the capabilities that the Russians had due to complete dominance at sea. On December 29, an order was given: just in case, to strengthen the defense of Yevpatoria and Ak-Mosque. The 4th Air Fleet mined raids in Kerch, Feodosia, Yalta, Yevpatoria, Ak-Mechet and Perekop on January 1 and the following days.
By January 1, the Russians had the following forces: 40,519 people, 236 guns, 43 tanks and 330 armored vehicles.
Despite the activity of German aviation, the fleet landed the last echelon in Fesdosia. 4 transports were soon sunk and many were damaged. In the frozen Kerch Strait, ship movement was impossible. By January 5, the ice was so thick that it allowed the crossing of troops. The next day, 13 thousand people from the 302nd, 244th and 296th rifle divisions and the 12th rifle brigade crossed the ice without heavy equipment. People walked at intervals of 5-7 m. The rest of the 51st Army (8250 people, 113 guns, 820 armored vehicles) was transferred from Taman on small ships using two basic icebreakers. The 47th Army and the Cossack division returned back to Anapa and Novorossiysk in order to cross from there by ship to Kamysh-Burun.
Meanwhile, Manstein suspended the assault on Sevastopol. On December 25, he stopped the attack on the southern sector and sent the 170th Infantry Division in the direction of Kerch. It was followed on December 30 by the 132nd Infantry Division. On January 2, the garrison of Sevastopol went on the offensive in the northern sector.

The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation ended with the capture of an important operational bridgehead in Crimea - the liberation of the Kerch Peninsula, the capture of important enemy strongholds in Crimea - the cities and seaports of Kerch and Feodosia, the troops advanced 100-110 km to the west.

As a result of the operation, the position of the troops of the Sevastopol defensive region was strengthened. On January 1, 1942, the German command was forced to stop its second attack on Sevastopol and transfer part of its forces from there to the Feodosia region. The Kerch enemy group suffered heavy losses. These results were achieved thanks to the heroic actions of the ground forces and navy. The operation, carried out as part of the Red Army's counteroffensive in December 1941, was the largest amphibious landing operation during the Great Patriotic War. Its main significance was that the enemy lost the opportunity to use the Kerch Peninsula as a springboard for penetration into the Caucasus. At the same time, it diverted part of the enemy’s forces from near Sevastopol, making it easier for its defenders to repel the second enemy assault.

Memorial “Adzhimushkay” (Kerch)

The Kerch-Feodosia operation of December 1941 became one of the first amphibious assaults of the Second World War and for a long time remained the largest in terms of the number of troops involved. This operation is not deprived of attention in the literature, but most of the works devoted to it have two drawbacks: firstly, they almost do not use German documents, and secondly, they are based mainly on documents of the Soviet fleet and almost do not describe the actions of the landing force on the shore. A new series of publications dedicated to the events on the Kerch Peninsula on December 26–30, 1941 is intended to correct both of these gaps.

Operation plan

The landing on the Kerch Peninsula had been planned by the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet and the Transcaucasian Front since the end of November 1941. It was supposed to be carried out in three different places: the Azov flotilla landed on the northern coast of the peninsula, the Black Sea Fleet landed on the southern coast, and the Kerch Naval Base (KVMB) evacuated to Taman directly in the Kerch Strait. Parts of two armies – the 51st and 44th – took part in the operation. Moreover, the latter had to act immediately in large formations - a landing on the Black Sea coast made it possible to use warships and sea vessels to transport troops. In the Kerch Strait and the Sea of ​​Azov, the landing was carried out by small ships and boats.

Directly on the western shore of the Kerch Strait, the 302nd Mountain Rifle Division of the 51st Army of Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov (823rd, 825th, 827th and 831st regiments), as well as units of the Kerch base, were to land (chief - Rear Admiral A.S. Frolov) - first of all, its engineering company. They were supported by the base's coastal artillery, which had at its disposal the 140th separate coastal defense artillery division of six batteries: three 203 mm, four 152 mm, nine 130 mm and four 75 mm guns (though not all of them could fire on the opposite bank). In addition, the 25th corps artillery regiment was stationed on Taman - three 152 mm and nine 122 mm guns. The air defense of the base was carried out by the 65th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment.

Head of the Kerch naval base, Rear Admiral A. S. Frolov. Photo from the exhibition of the Central Naval Museum

The base was subordinate to small naval forces: three divisions of water area security boats (“small hunters” and minesweeper boats), two raid security groups and floating battery No. 4, rebuilt from a non-self-propelled barge (displacement - 365 tons; armament - three 100-mm guns , one 37-mm machine gun and anti-aircraft machine guns). In addition, to participate in the operation, the Black Sea Fleet transferred to the base the 2nd brigade of torpedo boats and a group of “small hunters” from the 4th and 8th sea hunter divisions.

Kerch Peninsula, topographic map of 1938

It was decided to land south of Kerch in a twenty-kilometer strip from Cape Ak-Burun to the Kommuna Initiative collective farm near Lake Tobechik. The troops were supposed to land at five points. The main forces of the 302nd Division unloaded in the harbor of the village of Kamysh-Burun and on the Kamysh-Burun Spit; part of the forces landed north of the bay near the village of Old Karantin, as well as south of Kamysh-Burun - in Eltigen and the Initiative Commune. In the area of ​​the plant. Voikov and Cape Ak-Burun were supposed to make demonstrative landings. The starting point of the landing movement is Taman, 25 km (2nd and 3rd detachments) from the landing site and the village of Komsomolskoye west of Taman (1st detachment).

Kamysh-Burunskaya Bay, view from the north, modern photo. On the left you can see the spit and the fish factory on it, on the right – the Zaliv plant (former ship repair yard)

Landing Forces

To participate in the operation, 37 fishing seiners (6 of them armed with 45-mm cannons) and three tugboats were allocated, hauling two barges and a bolinder, a landing barge from the First World War without an engine. In addition, the landing was ensured by 6 patrol boats of the MO-4 type and 29 torpedo boats (the torpedoes were removed from them, and the chutes at the stern were adapted for landing soldiers). Subsequently, the minesweeper "Chkalov", floating battery No. 4 and armored boat No. 302 were added to these forces. Torpedo boats took 15–20 people on board, seiners – 50–60 people. All ships could transport 5,500 people and up to 20 field guns in one voyage.

Azov fishing seiner with a displacement of 80 tons. Such boats were the main means of transporting troops
Source – A. V. Nemenko. The story of one landing

To deliver the first landing force to each of the four landing points, two torpedo boats and 4–6 seiners were intended. The assault groups with walkie-talkies were the first to land from the torpedo boats, then the seiners landed the main crew. Employees of the headquarters of the Kerch base were appointed heads of the landing points, and they were also commanders of the assault groups. After landing, two seiners were supposed to remain at each point: one for observation, the second for evacuating the wounded. The following points were chosen for landing:

• No. 1 – Old Quarantine(technician-quartermaster 1st rank A.D. Grigoriev, head of the administrative and combat unit of the KVMB headquarters);
• No. 2 – Kamysh-Burun Spit(Senior Lieutenant N.F. Gasilin, flagship artilleryman of the KVMB);
• No. 3 – Eltigen(Major I.K. Lopata, head of the mobilization unit of the KVMB headquarters);
• No. 4 – berth of the sintering factory in the Kamysh-Burun port(Captain 3rd Rank A.F. Studenichnikov, Chief of Staff of the KVMB). Here, a reinforced company of the 302nd Infantry Division landed from four “small hunters” (MO-091, MO-099, MO-100 and MO-148). At the same time, Studenichnikov led the entire detachment of the first throw, and then had to carry out general coordination of the landing from the board of the MO-100 boat. With him was the head of the base's political department, battalion commissar K.V. Lesnikov.

General plan of the Kerch-Feodosia operation
Source – Kerch operation. M.: Voenizdat, 1943

The first throw was designated as 1st landing detachment, it also included mooring teams, signalmen and reconnaissance officers - a total of 225 people at each point (rifle company and sapper squad) from the 823rd and 825th regiments of the 302nd mountain rifle division, 831st regiment of the 390th rifle division. According to the final report of the base, a total of 1,154 people were accepted onto the ships of the 1st detachment.

It is worth noting that the base command took direct control of the landing, acting in the forefront. Rear Admiral Frolov himself was going to place his command post on the “small hunter” and be directly in the strait - only a direct order from the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral F. F. Oktyabrsky, forced him to stay in Taman.

2nd squad landings under the command of Senior Lieutenant Petrovsky, it essentially represented a reinforcement of the 1st detachment - it consisted of three companies of the same regiments (200 people each), unloaded from ten seiners and two motorboats. Each company was reinforced with two 76 mm field guns. According to the final plan, one company landed in Old Karantina, one in Kamysh-Burun itself, and another in Eltigen. A total of 744 people were accepted onto the ships. The detachment was accompanied by 2 “small hunters” and 6 torpedo boats.

3rd squad Lieutenant Commander N.Z. Evstigneev formed the bulk of the landing party and landed at the same three points as the 2nd detachment. It consisted of the 823rd, 825th and 831st rifle regiments - 1,200 people each with four 76 mm guns. Each regiment was assigned a barge with a tug and three seiners. A serious danger was posed by the fact that the bulk of the personnel was transported on a non-self-propelled barge.

Alas, the units of the 302nd division had no combat experience and were not prepared for landings or night operations. Only since December 15, in the Taman Bay, it was possible to conduct ten exercises with units of the division involving the minesweeper "Chkalov" and eight seiners. The landing had to be carried out suddenly - in the dark, without artillery preparation, only under the cover of a smoke screen from torpedo boats. The suppression of enemy firing points was assigned to the 45-mm guns of MO-type boats. At dawn, the landing was to be supported by the artillery of the Kerch base - for this, spotters with walkie-talkies landed on the shore along with the paratroopers.

Enemy forces

On the German side, the Kerch Peninsula was defended by the 42nd Army Corps, but in fact only its 46th Infantry Division was located in the Kerch area. The 72nd Infantry Regiment was intended to defend the northern coast of the peninsula, the 97th Regiment was in reserve west of Kerch. The 27-kilometer strip on the coast of the Kerch Strait was defended by the 42nd Infantry Regiment, which consisted of 1,529 people in combat (excluding rear services and support services) - including 38 officers, 237 non-commissioned officers and 1,254 privates. German documents do not report the total strength of the regiment.

The eastern part of the Kerch Peninsula and the location of enemy forces according to Soviet intelligence data
Source – Kerch-Feodosia operation. M.: Voenizdat, 1943

In addition, in the Kerch area there was a fairly strong artillery group: the 114th and 115th artillery regiments, parts of the 766th coastal defense artillery regiment (four batteries of the 148th division, two batteries of the 147th division and one battery of the 774th division), as well as the 4th battery of the 54th coastal defense artillery regiment - a total of 35 serviceable 105 mm field howitzers and 15 heavy 150 mm howitzers, as well as 7 long-range 100 mm guns. Of the latter, four (captured Dutch) were permanently installed at Cape Takil; all the rest of the artillery had mechanical traction and could change positions. The main part of the artillery was located on the coast of the Kerch Bay, where the 1st division of the 64th Luftwaffe anti-aircraft regiment was located (at least sixteen 88-mm guns and several 20-mm machine guns).

The area from Cape Ak-Burun to Kamysh-Burun was defended by the 3rd Infantry Battalion with the support of the 3rd Battery of the 114th Artillery Regiment. Further south, in the area of ​​Eltigen and the Commune Initiative, there was the 3rd Infantry Battalion with the 1st Battery of the 114th Artillery Regiment. Judging by the German descriptions, the coastline itself was guarded only in the villages of Eltigen and Stary Karantin, and only on the Kamysh-Burun Spit was there a reinforced patrol of the 1st battalion with two anti-tank guns and several machine guns. The main forces of the 1st and 3rd battalions were located where it was more convenient to live - in the villages of Kamysh-Burun, Eltigen, Communa Initiative and Tobechik, as well as on the territory of the iron ore plant.

Ruins of an iron ore plant, modern view

On the morning of December 26, it was raining in the Kerch area, the temperature was 3–5 degrees Celsius, and the waves in the strait were 3–4 points. By evening the temperature dropped to zero, and wet snow began to fall.

Landing of the 1st detachment

The command of the Kerch base received the order for the landing on December 24; the landing was required to take place on the night of the 26th. By dawn on December 25, the ships were concentrated at the pre-designated landing points - Taman and Komsomolsk. Despite training and pre-developed planning tables, the landing was slow and disorganized. At the appointed time (by one o'clock in the morning) only the 1st detachment (the first throw detachment) completed it. The 2nd detachment was late with its departure by an hour, the 3rd – by two hours.

To move to Kamysh-Burun, a route was chosen through the shallow Tuzla ravine and south of the Tuzla spit, since to the north of it the strait was visible and shot through by the enemy. Some of the fences and signals installed here were torn down by the storm - as a result, the barges of the 3rd detachment ran aground, and their removal took until 11 a.m. The remaining ships approached the designated landing points at different times, ultimately landing troops in places other than those intended by the plan - sometimes by order, sometimes in private order.

Fragment of a modern topographic map of the area of ​​the villages Kamysh-Burun (Arshintsevo) and Eltigen (Geroevskoye)

At about 5 o'clock in the morning, Senior Lieutenant Gasilin from the Kamysh-Burun Spit reported on the radio that the assault group had landed from torpedo boats secretly and without losses, and that landing point No. 2 was ready to receive paratroopers. A little later, technical quartermaster Grigoriev from Stary Karantina (point No. 1) reported that he had landed on the shore and was fighting with superior enemy forces (after which the connection was interrupted). There were no messages from Eltigen (point No. 3) from Major Lopata.

But the main events took place in the harbor of Kamysh-Burun, where a group of four torpedo boats and six seiners moved. Having already entered the harbor, the flagship MO-100 ran aground literally fifty meters from the pier. It turned out that the harbor was filled with silt, and the depth here did not exceed one and a half meters (with the draft of a MO-4 type boat being 1.25 m). As a result, helmsman Konstantin Kozlov waded to the pier and secured the mooring end to it, by which the boat was pulled to the pier. Following him, MO-148 approached the pier, also landing paratroopers without enemy opposition. Only after this did the Germans discover the landing: the next two Soviet boats were already moored under fire. However, the landing took place with virtually no losses, and the fighters of the assault group successfully gained a foothold in the workshops of the sintering factory.

Until the situation was clarified, Captain 3rd Rank Studenchikov did not dare to land the rest of the landing party in Kamysh-Burun itself and sent the approaching seiners to land on the spit. The MO-148 boat went to Taman, the other three remained off the coast for fire support. Alas, the Kamysh-Burun Spit was under constant fire from enemy artillery (three 105-mm guns of the 3rd battery of the 114th artillery regiment). According to a German report, “good results were achieved against the enemy who landed on the Rybachy Peninsula”. Apparently, as a result of this particular shelling, the head of landing point No. 2, Senior Lieutenant Gasilin, was killed.

The German patrol from the spit withdrew south without a fight and by noon took up positions near the road from Eltigen to Kerch. The Germans took with them a heavy machine gun and two anti-tank guns, but the limber with ammunition for one of them had to be abandoned on the spit.

Fight on the shore

What happened at other landing sites? Only an assault group from torpedo boat No. 15 was able to land at Old Karantina - 25 people, led by the head of landing point No. 1, 1st Rank Quartermaster Technician Grigoriev (according to the report of the base headquarters, 55 people were landed here - that is, both boats unloaded ). A heavy battle immediately ensued, which Grigoriev reported via radio to the base headquarters. Soon the radio malfunctioned and communication was interrupted.

For unclear reasons, the Eltigen group of ships split into two detachments in the Tuzlinskaya ravine, moving along different routes. The first to go were two torpedo boats with an assault group and two seiners, one of which carried the group commander. Behind and somewhat to the north are two other boats and four other seiners.

At Eltigen, torpedo boat No. 92 was the first to approach the shore. While the paratroopers were landing, it was turned around and then thrown onto the sandbank. There were 25 paratroopers and 4 sailors on the shore, including the boat commander, Senior Lieutenant Kolomiets; four more sailors supported them with heavy machine gun fire from the boat. During the ensuing battle, the radio operator was one of the first to be killed - as a result, Major Lopata was never able to contact base headquarters. The paratroopers managed to occupy a large stone barn fifty meters from the boat, turning it into a stronghold.

Seeing the battle, the crew of one of the seiners turned their ship to the north and, without enemy opposition, unloaded it at the base of the Kamysh-Burun Spit. Another seiner did not unload and, accompanied by a torpedo boat, returned to Komsomolskoye. But the second group of ships, apparently, turned to the south and, without enemy opposition, landed troops at the Commune Initiative - where this was provided for in the original plan of the operation.

Shore in the area of ​​the Commune Initiative, modern photo

Having not received information from Eltigen and Stary Karantina, the head of the KVMB, Rear Admiral Frolov, ordered the commander of the first throw detachment, Senior Lieutenant I. G. Litoshenko, with the rest of the ships to unload on the Kamysh-Burun Spit. However, the large seiners of the 1st detachment were able to approach the shore only one and a half hundred meters, ran into a sandbank and were forced to unload the paratroopers (about 250 people) at a depth of 1.2–1.5 m. As it turned out, there was only a sand bar here, beyond which the depth again exceeded two meters. As a result, many paratroopers drowned. Only after this the landing site was moved to the pier of the sintering factory - the Kuban seiner was sent there, and, possibly, other ships.

Landing area on a 1941 topographic map

For the Germans, the landing was a complete surprise. The first report about it arrived at the headquarters of the 42nd regiment from the headquarters of the 1st battalion in Kamysh-Burun at 4:45 (Moscow time - at 5:45). It stated that "many large and small ships" they are trying to land troops on the spit and in the area of ​​the shipyard south of the village (ship repair plant No. 532, now “Zaliv”), as well as in Old Karantina. Five minutes later, a report was received from the 3rd battalion stationed in Eltigen - it was reported that 70 people had landed in the southern part of the village (the number of paratroopers was more than doubled).

At 6:10, the command of the 42nd Regiment reported to the headquarters of the 46th Infantry Division that the Russians had managed to create bridgeheads in two places - in Kamysh-Burun and at the Commune Initiative. The landing at Old Karantina was quickly defeated: the 3rd company of the 1st battalion reported the destruction of the enemy and the capture of 1 officer and 30 privates, one commissar was shot. Perhaps it was Quartermaster Technician 1st Rank Grigoriev, whose body, according to Soviet army newspapers, was later discovered with signs of torture. The fact is that the rank insignia of the 1st rank quartermaster technician coincided with the rank insignia of the company political instructor - three “heads up”. As for the landing commissar, he was senior political instructor Grabarov - on the morning of December 27, he and several paratroopers reached the Tuzla Spit on a accidentally found boat. There were no other commanders among the landing group. Note that after the war, speaking at the trial, the former commander of the 11th Army, Erich von Manstein, assured that the “order on commissars” (Kommissarbefehl) in his army was not communicated to the troops and was not executed.

The command of the 42nd regiment began to transfer its reserves to the landing site: at 6 o'clock in the morning (7 o'clock Moscow time) an infantry platoon from the 13th company, located in Churubash, was sent to Kamysh-Burun, as well as an anti-tank platoon from the 14th company , located in Kerch - both of these units were transferred to the 1st battalion.

Sources and literature:

1. Chronicle of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union at the Black Sea Theater. Issue 1. From June 21 to December 31, 1941 M.-L: Office of the Naval Publishing House of the NKVMF, 1945
2. Kerch operation. December 1941-January 1942 General Staff of the KA, Military History Department. M.: Voenizdat, 1943
3. A. I. Zubkov. Kerch-Feodosia landing operation. M.: Voenizdat, 1974
4. V. A. Martynov, S. F. Spakhov. Strait on fire. Kyiv: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1984
5. S. S. Berezhnoy. Ships and vessels of the USSR Navy. 1928–1945. M.: Voenizdat, 1988
6. A. V. Nemenko. The story of one landing http://www.litsovet.ru/index.php/material.read?material_id=490298
7. Report on the landing operation to capture the Kerch Peninsula and the cities of Kerch and Feodosia 12/26–31/41. Operations department of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters. Sevastopol, 1942 (TsAMO RF, fund 209, inventory, 1089, file 14)
8. Report on the operation to cross the Kerch Strait and landing troops on the Kerch Peninsula of the Kerch naval base of the Black Sea Fleet on December 26–29, 1941. Operational department of the KVMB Black Sea Fleet, 1942 (TsAMO RF, fund 209, inventory, 1089, file 1)
9. Operational reports of the headquarters of the Transcaucasian and Caucasian fronts 11.22.41–01.15.42 (TsAMO RF, fund 216, inventory, 1142 case 14)
10. 42nd Army Corps War Log (NARA, T-314, R-1668)

A new super project by a leading military historian.

From Manstein’s breakthrough through Perekop positions to the failure of the first assault on Sevastopol, from the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation and the unsuccessful offensive of the Crimean Front to the Kerch disaster and the fall of the Main Base of the Black Sea Fleet, from the long German occupation of the peninsula to the rapid (in just a month) liberation of Crimea in the victorious spring of 1944 years, when our advancing troops lost four times less than the defending enemy - this book analyzes in detail all the operations of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in the struggle for Crimea.

Separately, the actions of our ground forces - tank crews, infantry, artillery - and the combat work of the Soviet Air Force and the Black Sea Fleet are considered.

Sections of this page:

The general counteroffensive of the Red Army, which began in November near Tikhvin and Rostov and continued near Moscow in December 1941, could not leave the Crimean peninsula aside. The interception of the strategic initiative by Soviet troops in the winter of 1941/42 followed a single pattern: a strike on the extended flank of the enemy strike group. Accordingly, in Crimea, a blow was struck on the coastal flank of the 11th Army. The coast of the peninsula was a fairly long area that needed to be defended, even in sparse formations. The concentration of the main efforts of German troops in the Crimea against Sevastopol made the defense of the entire coast almost formal. She concentrated on several areas.

The plan for landing sea and airborne assault forces on the Kerch Peninsula appeared at the command of the Transcaucasian Front at the end of November 1941, shortly after the abandonment of Crimea by Soviet troops. The first report outlining the main ideas of the operation was sent to the Supreme High Command Headquarters on November 26, 1941. The proposal was received with interest, and on November 30, a detailed report was sent to the Supreme High Command Headquarters by the Front's Military Council detailing the plan and calculating the number of troops to be allocated. Initially, it was planned to capture the landing force only in the eastern part of the Kerch Peninsula and move further to Feodosia. In this document, for the first time, two armies appear, which subsequently carried out the landing - the 51st A and the 44th A. The first was supposed to involve three infantry divisions and one brigade, the second - three infantry divisions with reinforcement units. Accordingly, the first aimed at capturing Kerch, and the second - further south, at the Chongelek Tatar region. Also in the plan dated November 30, for the first time, a landing in the area of ​​​​Opuk (by the forces of one civil service unit) appears. At the same time, the front command planned an airborne assault in the area of ​​the Salyn and Bagerovo stations with the aim of capturing the Turkish Wall and preventing the approach of enemy reserves. In the first days of December, there were already relatively detailed studies with the outfit of forces and specific landing sites. Planning for the 51st Army was led by General P.I. Batov, later replaced by V.N. Lvov. Already in the plan dated December 2, 1941, Tarkhan, Khroni and Mama Russkaya appear as landing sites on the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula.

Landing on the cruiser "Red Caucasus". On December 28, 1941, the cruiser had to land infantrymen at night, moored to the Feodosia pier.

Landing on board the "small hunter". Kerch-Feodosia operation, December 1941

At the beginning of December, the front command issued preliminary orders, in particular regarding artillery. The landing was supposed to be supported by artillery from the triangle of Akhileon, Kosa Chushka, Batteryka. It was also envisaged that artillery and mortars would be landed in the first echelon of troops, without means of propulsion, relying on manual rolling. At the same time, orders were given to prepare rifle units for landing and conduct exercises involving boarding and disembarking from ships and vessels.

Transports from the Temryuk pier went to sea at 14.00-17.00 on December 25, from the Kuchugury pier - at 19.00, from the Taman and Komsomolskaya piers - at 2.00-3.00 on December 26, 1941. Already during the landing period, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov changed his decision, reducing the Ak-Monai detachment to 500 people, and ordered it to be landed not at Ak-Monai, but in the Kazantip Bay. Due to this detachment, the landing at Cape Khroni was intensified. However, late in the day the weather worsened, seriously hampering the landing. As the commander of the AzVF S.G. later recalled. Gorshkov: “Due to the large difference in speed and different seaworthiness, the marching order of different types of ships and vessels was disrupted, many of them fell behind and were forced to travel alone. Seiners, canoes and boats towed by landing ships were overwhelmed by water, and sometimes torn off and carried out to sea.” Due to the storm, headwind and rolling waves, the landing forces were late in approaching the landing sites from two to six hours and landed already in daylight.

The 1st detachment, delayed by a storm, did not reach the Kazantip Bay and the landing force was landed somewhat to the west of the 2nd detachment. As a result, instead of an ambitious landing at Ak-Monai, it was landed in the high area. 43, 1 (3 km west of Novy Svet) incomplete battalion of the 83rd infantry brigade under the command of Lieutenant Kapran (193 people), which took up defense 2 km from the coast.

The 2nd detachment approached the shore in the area west of Cape Zyuk at 7.00 on December 26. A 47-mm cannon was fired from the shore, suppressed by the Don gunboat. The seiners could not get close to the shore because of their draft; the boats were thrown ashore and broken. As indicated in the naval report, the landing soldiers went ashore in chest-deep icy water. It was not possible to unload artillery and tanks. Towards the middle of the day the situation worsened due to the appearance of enemy aircraft. The self-propelled scow "Phanagoria" was sunk, taking about 100 people with it. Already in the dark, the Khoper barge was placed closer to the shore, a gangplank was made and three tanks and artillery were unloaded onto it. According to the order for the defense of the coast of the 46th Infantry Division, the entire section from Cape Zyuk to Chelochin was entrusted to... the connection's communications battalion. Accordingly, resistance to the landing on the shore was less than in other areas where infantry units were defending (see below).

A collision occurred at the landing site of the 2nd Detachment, showing how important it is to use specially trained units for landing operations. When about 1000 people had already landed, the commander of the 224th Infantry Division, Colonel A.P. Degtyarev demanded to carry out... a return landing. He motivated this by the impossibility of completing the task with the forces landed in a day (according to the plan, 2,900 people were supposed to land). They did not begin to replant. As a result, in the region of high 43, 1, 878 people, 3 tanks, 2 37 mm guns (anti-aircraft), 9 120 mm mortars, 2 76 mm guns were landed west of Cape Zyuk. According to the operational report of the 51st Army, a rifle company of the 185th rifle regiment, a battalion of the 143rd rifle regiment and 200 marines landed.

To fend off the landing at Cape Zyuk, the German command had to advance the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 97th Regiment of the 46th Infantry Division, located in the depths and on the coast of the Kazantip Bay. Their first task is to form a barrier at the dominant heights west of Lake Chokrak. The estimate of the number of those who landed in the report on the actions of the 97th brigade, I must say, was quite accurate - 1000 people.

At Tarkhan, the 3rd detachment, under fire from the shore and air strikes, landed only about a platoon, according to the army report. The Voroshilov dredger of the 3rd detachment, which was delayed in landing, came under air attack and was sunk, killing 450 people. 200 people were rescued by the Uragan ship, the Dofinovka tugboat and CL No. 4 and Dniester. The boat minesweeper, crowded with people picked up from the Voroshilov, returned to Temryuk due to the obvious disruption of the landing.

The most successful operation on the first day of the landing was the 4th detachment at Cape Khroni, which landed with the help of the Taganrog barge (bolinder), which was later used as a pier. “At Cape Chroni” here means that it was actually landed at the heights. 71, 3 west of Cape Khroni with a battalion from the 143rd rifle regiment, the 160th rifle regiment and the 83rd infantry brigade (1556 people) and three tanks. The landing was led by the commander of the 83rd infantry brigade, Colonel I.P. Leontyev, who immediately launched an offensive in the direction of Adzhimushkai. The landing force manages to reach Bulganak, where it enters into battle with soldiers of the German rear units.

As indicated in the report on the actions of the 72nd brigade, already at 3.30 a strong noise of battle was heard in the area of ​​the neighboring 42nd brigade (where the KVMB landing force landed). Soon the division command reports that “the Russians landed at Kamysh-Burun.” To carry out a counterattack, the 1st battalion of the regiment is withdrawn from positions in the Kerch region, but the counterattack does not begin immediately, but only closer to 15.00. The action report notes that the attack, supported by artillery, is “not in the direction of the bridgehead, but in the direction of height 164.5 into the deep flank of the enemy.” The army report on the results of the operation indicates that units of the 143rd rifle regiment “began to flee, throwing away their weapons and surrendering.” However, the disorderly retreat was stopped, and the detachment fortified itself on the northern slopes of the heights for the night. 154, 4. According to German data, the counterattack really does not achieve a decisive result. According to the report of the 72nd PP, “The left wing was stopped by large forces of the enemy, who entrenched themselves in well-equipped old field fortifications and are offering fierce resistance.” Also, the German strike group is fired from the flank from the sea (the gunboats remaining off the coast). The capture of any significant number of prisoners on December 26 does not appear in German data; probably, the army report was somewhat ahead of the events.

The 5th detachment did not land at all. Due to strong resistance in the Yenikale area, it was redirected to Cape Khroni, but ultimately stood at Cape Akhileon. According to the naval report, the minesweepers of the detachment lost the canoes and boats in tow, and the storm also disrupted the movement of the seiners. The detachment commander turned back to search for boats and seiners, and as a result, the detachment’s landing on December 26 did not take place.

As a result, on the first day of the operation, about 2,500 people were landed on a wide front, with very rough observance of the landing areas; some of the ships returned to Temryuk with the landing force. Essentially, this can be called, if not a failure, then a great failure of the landing force landed by the Azov military flotilla.

On the same day, December 26, the Kerch naval base began landing in the Kamysh-Burun area. According to the KVMB plan, it was planned to land at the points of Stary Karantin, Kamysh-Burun, Eltigen, the Nizhne-Burunsky lighthouse and the Initiative commune. Kamysh-Burun was chosen as the direction of the main attack. The first drop at each landing point, consisting of 325 soldiers, was supposed to be made from 2 torpedo boats and 4 seiners. In total, 1,300 soldiers and commanders landed in the first rush. The 302nd Infantry Division, allocated by the army for the landing, had no combat experience, but still managed to receive minimal landing training. Since December 15, its fighters have conducted 10 exercises on boarding and disembarking from seiners and a minesweeper.

Just as in the case of the AzVF, the KVMB ships allocated for the landing were divided into detachments, there were three of them. The landing began at 16.00 on December 25th. As noted in the naval report: “Despite a pre-developed plan, the landing was slow and unorganized.” At the appointed time, only the 1st detachment completed the landing of the troops (by 1.00 a.m. on December 26). This was due to the fact that the seiners approached the piers from the roadstead at their own discretion, outside the plan, as well as the delay of some parts of the landing force. In total, 1154 people were accepted by the 1st detachment, 744 people by the 2nd detachment and 3327 people by the 3rd detachment.

The disorganization of the landing was aggravated by stormy weather; as a result, only the 1st detachment reached the landing site in a timely manner. Accordingly, the 2nd detachment was late in leaving by an hour, and the 3rd detachment - by 2 hours. The situation was aggravated by the need for detachments to follow through the ravine between Tuzlinskaya Spit and Tuzla Cape, which was difficult in terms of navigation due to the shallow depths and narrowness of the fairway. However, following another route between Pavlovsky Cape and Tuzla Spit was excluded due to the danger of enemy shelling. The passage at night in stormy conditions, with the fencing of dangerous areas torn down by the storm, led to the grounding of some of the ships. Transports, barges, and “bolinders” were refloated before 11.00 and followed to the shore already in the light of day.

As a result, by 5.00 on December 26, almost according to schedule, only the 1st detachment consisting of 20 seiners and 8 torpedo boats reached Eltigen, Kamysh-Burun and Stary Karantin. According to German data, the landing begins around 4.45 am Berlin time. The report on the actions of the 42nd Regiment reports a report from the 1st Battalion at 4.45: “Several large and small ships are trying to land on the Rybatsky Peninsula near Kamysh-Burun. At the same time, the boats are trying to enter the bay near the shipyards.” At 4.50 a message follows from the III Battalion: “The enemy, numbering 70 people, has landed in the southern part of Eltigen.” At that time, the 42nd Regiment of the 46th Infantry consisted of 1,461 soldiers and officers and defended a 27 km long coastline. The 1st and 3rd battalions of the regiment were the main opponent of the landing by the KVMB forces, the 2nd battalion was located in Kerch and the surrounding area.

The most effective was the landing at Kamysh-Burun, where the first attack secured a foothold on the Kamysh-Burun spit and the pier of the ship repair plant. The landing was supported by artillery, the Germans especially note this: “During the entire time, the entire coast is under fire from the enemy’s heavy and heaviest guns from the opposite bank.”

The fate of other units is much more dramatic. Due to strong opposition in Old Karantina, only 55 soldiers were able to land, led by the commander of the landing point, Quartermaster Technician 1st Rank Grigoriev. The rest of the landing party went to Kamysh-Burun. This is confirmed by the report on the actions of the 42nd brigade, which says about the landing in the 1st battalion zone: “Most of the enemy boats were forced to turn back under concentrated fire.” Regarding those who landed, the German report provides testimony from prisoners, according to which “the boat approached the shore several hundred meters, and the soldiers were forced to wade through shallow water.”

Grigoriev’s group was quickly defeated, which is confirmed by both the naval report and the report on the actions of the 42nd paragraph. The latter states: “Units of the 3rd company destroy the enemy who landed on its site and capture an officer and 30 soldiers. One commissar was shot." According to Soviet data, the detachment split into two groups and tried to break through to Kamysh-Burun, a group of fighters led by Grigoriev was surrounded and died, the second group led by senior political instructor Grabarev found a boat and retreated to their ships. The 19 people who landed in Eltigen, led by the commander of the landing point, Major Lopata, fought surrounded by battle. The report on the actions of the 42nd brigade about the resistance of this small group says: “In the zone of the 3rd battalion, the enemy manages to gain a foothold in the southern houses of Eltigen. Fierce street battles are unfolding. The last stubborn resistance was broken closer to noon, 2 commissars were shot.” The scrupulous notes on the commissars are most likely associated with the implementation of the notorious order on the commissars.

The cruiser "Red Caucasus" at sea. The cruiser was a completed ship, laid down before the First World War under the name “Admiral Lazarev”. The cruiser's main caliber was four 180-mm cannons in single-gun turrets.

The next wave of landings approaches the shore already in daylight and is expected to be met with a barrage of fire. Some of the seiners turn back to Taman under fire. The second detachment of 12 seiners arrives at 7.00. Moreover, the newly arrived German anti-tank guns opened fire; even a slight delay worsened the situation. The main part of the landing party lands on the Kamysh-Burun Spit and the pier of the ship repair plant, where the first attack took hold. Here, at Kamysh-Burun, the landing achieved partial success, encircling and defeating the 2nd and 12th companies of the 42nd infantry regiment, which were making their way to their own, abandoning transport. Another partial success was the landing south of Eltigen (it was not possible to land in Eltigen itself). As indicated in the report of the 42nd brigade, “the enemy manages to capture an iron plant not occupied by our troops, located west of the Kamysh-Burun - Eltigen road.” Here, by all indications, there was a lapse in the organization of German coastal defense.

The 3rd detachment, consisting of 9 seiners, 3 tugs, a “bolinder” and 2 barges, arrived only at 13.00. According to German data, this happened a little earlier, around noon. The main forces of the 823rd Guards Regiment of the 302nd Guards Division on the “bolinder” (refloated, which it ran into in the dark) reached Kamysh-Burun Bay. Here he becomes a victim of artillery fire and air strikes, killing up to 300 people and almost all the material. As stated in the report of the 42nd PP: “One large tug takes a hit and lists. About 200 Russians jump overboard and swim or wade to the Fisherman's Peninsula." The sinking of the "bolinder" by an air strike is confirmed by the report of the 42nd brigade. According to the army report, part of the landing force actually reached the shore by swimming: “the personnel rushed into the sea, to the shore.” As the commander of the 51st A, V.N., later testified. Lvov during negotiations with front headquarters, most of those who escaped from the “bolinder” did not have weapons. It was apparently thrown into the sea as it made it difficult to swim to the shore. The barge with the main forces of the 825th Guards Regiment (up to 1000 landing troops) caught fire and was returned back to Taman.

As a result, as stated in the naval report, on December 26, the KVMB landed about 2,200 people. Of these, 1,500 people are in Kamysh-Burun, 120 on the Kamysh-Burun Spit, 500 people south of Eltigen (in the area of ​​the Initiative Commune) and 55 in Old Karantina. Small detachments were almost immediately destroyed. As it is plainly written in the army report: “The main forces of the 302nd Guards Division did not land.” Simultaneously with the landings by the AzVF and KVMB forces, on December 26, an attempt was made to land Detachment “B” at Mount Opuk. However, already at sea the ships were scattered in the darkness by the wind. Arriving at the scene on the gunboat “Red Adzharistan”, the detachment commander, Rear Admiral N.O. Abramov did not find the remaining ships and decided to return to Anapa, gather the detachment together and land on December 27. Essentially, the landing was disrupted. Summing up the events of December 26, we have to admit that the successes of the first day of landing were extremely limited.

On the second day of the operation, the Soviet troops failed to turn the situation in their favor. On December 27, the landing was practically not carried out due to a strong storm (7–8 points). The German command, in turn, tried to throw troops into the sea with counterattacks. The gathering of forces of the 97th brigade for a counterattack on the units landed at Cape Zyuk (more precisely, height 43, 1) was completed only on the morning of December 27; as a result, the counterattack on the bridgehead took place only at 13.00. The landing party responded with a counterattack with tanks, but all three vehicles were hit by the Germans. Also, this detachment was isolated from other landing groups by mining the isthmus near Cape Zyuk (which was a consequence of a mistake with the landing site).

Despite the lack of reinforcements, Colonel Leontyev’s detachment tried on the morning of December 27 from the high area. 154, 4 resume the attack on Adzhimushkai. According to German data (report of the 72nd PP), he manages to achieve initial success with competent actions: “Shortly before dawn, the enemy passes between the positions of the 2nd and 3rd companies and, with the forces of about two companies, attacks the anti-aircraft gun positions on the northern outskirts of Adzhim-Ushkai.” . However, this attack was eventually repulsed by the Germans. At the same time, Leontyev’s attack forces the Germans to postpone their own counterattack on the bridgehead; it begins after 9.00 am. According to the report of the 72nd brigade, the Germans deployed two battalions against this bridgehead (which coincides with the Soviet assessment). The detachment turns out to be quite a “tough nut to crack”; the report on the actions of the 72nd brigade notes “stubborn resistance from a well-entrenched enemy and artillery fire from ships.” Later, when summing up the results in the report of the 72nd brigade, it was noted: “The frequent fire of enemy naval artillery created great difficulties for our troops.” Enemy pressure and the threat of encirclement force the detachment to retreat to the sea to a height. 106, 6. Detachment Art. Lieutenant Kapran is attacked, but holds his position, suffering minor losses.

Destroyer "Nezamozhnik". The ship was one of the “novik” destroyers inherited from the tsarist fleet.

The Germans' attempt to drop KVMB troops into the sea was also unsuccessful. The counterattack on the detachment in the Eltigen area (Comune Initiative) fails. The report of the 42nd brigade states: “On terrain completely devoid of shelter, in conditions where the enemy has dug in for more than a kilometer, it is possible to advance only slightly. The enemy is supported from the other side of the strait and from ships by guns of heavy and extremely heavy caliber.” In general, an unstable balance remains in the bridgeheads.

At the same time, due to the pause that has arisen, German defense in the Kerch region is being strengthened. South of Kerch, 88-mm and 20-mm anti-aircraft guns are placed on Cape Ak-Burn, which can flank both the approaches to Kerch and Kamysh-Burun. The 2nd Battalion of the 97th Regiment of the 46th Infantry, removed from Feodosia, arrives in Kerch.

Disembarkation resumes on December 28. In the area of ​​Khroni Cape, the landing is carried out early in the morning by the forces of the 3rd detachment; it is possible to land about 400 people (according to the army report, 300 people of the 143rd joint venture). The report of the 72nd brigade confirms the fact of the landing, despite the shelling: “The Russians are landing up to the battalion and are trying to advance in a southern direction.”

In general, the pause that occurred on December 27 had a negative impact on the position of the detachments on the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula. They did not receive additional forces, and the enemy received time to assemble strike forces and provide them with artillery support. Attack of two battalions of the 97th infantry regiment on the hill. 43, 1st detachment begins on the morning of December 28, and by noon the landing force is pushed into a narrow space near a steep bank. Here the paratroopers take their last stand. The report of the 97th PP stated: “Here he defends himself especially stubbornly in crevices and between cliffs. Sometimes enemy soldiers stand in the water, they have to be killed one by one, since for the most part they do not surrender." Soon the main landing forces are defeated. The Germans claimed 468 prisoners (including one officer), 300 killed and wounded Soviet soldiers. Their trophies were unloaded guns, including two 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and 5 tractors. The remnants of the detachment held several resistance nests on the shore, in which, according to the prisoners interrogated by the Germans, there were about 200 more people. This is quite consistent with the size of the detachment of 878 men mentioned in the naval report. It should be said that the army report says nothing about the fate of this detachment that resisted to the end.

On December 28, Leontyev’s detachment was knocked out of its position, suffered heavy losses, and began to retreat to Cape Tarkhan. As a result of the counter-offensive, the Germans manage to take the landing site. The report of the 72nd PP states: “The remnants of the enemy are still holding out on the very shore and in the quarries just east of Hill 115.5.” Detachment Art. Lieutenant Kapran was cut off from the sea and surrounded, although his destruction did not take place.

Events developed somewhat less dramatically south of Kerch. On December 28, the KVMB at 4.00–5.00 landed 678 people of the 827th Guards Regiment in Kamysh-Burun. The landing at night is confirmed by the enemy. However, attempts to develop an offensive from the bridgehead held at Kamysh-Burun to the west and connect with the landing force at Eltigen were unsuccessful. At the same time, the Germans' attempts to liquidate the bridgeheads ended in nothing. The factory in the Kamysh-Burun area changes hands. Only in the area north of Eltigen do they manage to somewhat limit the size of the Soviet bridgehead; in the report of the 42nd Infantry Division this is described as follows: “The offensive is developing well, the enemy is thrown back to a small coastal strip and is forced to huddle in a narrow space.”

Detachment “B” of the 44th Army (2393 people) was redirected here, to Kamysh-Burun, on three gunboats, originally built as landing craft, and another “bolinder”. However, this landing was not particularly successful. The gunboats ran aground 50–150 m from the shore, and the landing force had to be transported by boats. "Bolinder" is out of order.

As a result, by the morning of December 29, the landing force of the 51st Army found itself in a difficult, close to catastrophic, situation. In the ZhBD of the 11th Army, the assessment of the situation near Kerch was quite unambiguous: “The army command believes that as of December 28, the situation on the Kerch Peninsula is under control, the destruction of enemy units still on the peninsula will take place on December 29.” Considering the difficult situation of the landing forces, this statement does not look like empty boasting. In the report on the actions of the 42nd brigade, the situation on the morning of December 29 is assessed as stable: “In the first half of the day on December 29, both enemy bridgeheads were reliably blocked, after receiving reinforcements, counterattacks were launched, and the first successes were noted.” During negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky, held on the night of December 28-29, D.T. Kozlov admitted: “The situation at the end of the day today on the front of the 51st Army was not in our favor.” At this moment, the situation changed sharply in favor of the Soviet troops - a landing took place in Feodosia, deep in the rear of German troops on the Kerch Peninsula.

Another Black Sea “novice” is the destroyer “Shaumyan”.

While fighting was going on on the Kerch Peninsula with landing forces pressed to the sea, at 13.00 on December 28 in Novorossiysk the first landing force began landing on the cruisers "Red Caucasus" and "Red Crimea", the destroyers "Zheleznyakov", "Shaumyan", "Nezamozhnik" and transport "Kuban". At 17.00, 300 fighters of the assault groups and a hydrographic party were received on 12 patrol boats. As part of the first landing, 5419 soldiers and commanders, 15 guns and 6 mortars, 100 tons of ammunition and 56 tons of food were loaded. As stated in the report of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters: “Despite the fact that the ships were placed in the Novorossiysk port according to a pre-approved disposition, well known to the leading command staff of the Red Army units, the loading and landing of troops was not organized enough.” The units arrived late and the names of the ships were confused. Some ships were loaded with more troops than planned.

Despite the removal of the 79th Brigade from the troops planned for the landing, the front command tried to select the most well-prepared units for the first strike. As expressed by D.T. Kozlov in negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky on the night of December 28-29, 1941: “The first echelon is one regiment of the 9th State Duma, a personnel regiment trained for amphibious assaults, a battalion of marines and one regiment of the 157th division, staffed by Kuban soldiers.” In general, the formations of the 44th Army were well equipped by the standards of December 1941 (see Table 1).

In advance, on the evening of December 26, in Novorossiysk, loading of materiel and horses began on the transports of the 1st detachment (“Zyryanin”, “Jean Zhores”, “Shakhtar”, “Tashkent”, “Azov” and “Kr. Profintern”). Two more transports, “Serov” and “Nogin”, were busy with transportation to Sevastopol and began loading on the morning of December 28 and the evening of December 27, respectively. The loading of troops of the 44th Army onto transports began at 17.30 and ended at 23.00 on December 28. The 1st transport detachment was loaded with the 236th Infantry Division, and the 2nd Detachment with the 63rd State Guards Division (minus one regiment). As a result, the 1st transport detachment received 11,270 people, 572 horses, 26 45-mm guns, 18 76-mm guns, 7 122-mm howitzers, 199 vehicles (mostly lorry-and-a-half), 18 tractors, 20 light tanks, ammunition, food fodder and other property. At 3.00 on December 28, loading of materiel and horses began in Tuapse, and then the embarkation of personnel of the 63rd State Duma on the transports of the 2nd detachment (“Kalinin”, “Dimitrov”, “Kursk”, “Fabricius” and “Krasnogvardeets”). The detachment's transports carried 6,365 people, 906 horses, 31 76-mm guns, 27 122-mm howitzers, 92 vehicles, 14 tanks, ammunition, food fodder and other property. Thus, by the evening of December 28, the Soviet command had assembled sufficiently large infantry and artillery forces capable of radically changing the situation in Crimea.

Scheme from the report of the commander of the 46th engineer battalion. It is clearly visible that at night the battalion was two steps from the harbor.

It would be expected that the non-simultaneous landing of troops in Crimea would have a negative impact on the conditions of the landing in Feodosia. However, the situation was very ambiguous. On the one hand, the landing in the Kerch region weakened the German defense in the Feodosia region due to the withdrawal of reserves. According to the defense plan of the 46th Infantry Division, the II Battalion of the 97th Infantry Division formed the Feodosia coastal defense sector from Koktebel to Dalniye Kamyshi (including populated areas). With the beginning of the landing of the 51st Army, he was removed from Feodosia and hastily set off for the eastern tip of the Kerch Peninsula. The German defense of Feodosia is deprived of units that had the opportunity to explore the city and its surroundings. On the other hand, in the last days of December, the regrouping of the 11th Army was in full swing with the common goal of countering the landings, both those that had already landed and those still planned. To strengthen the defense of the Kerch Peninsula, the command of the 11th Army advanced the 46th engineer battalion (a separate motorized unit) under the command of Captain Streit, which had previously been involved in the assault on Sevastopol. He was then, even before the landings, called “the last reserve of the 11th Army.”

Moreover, it should be emphasized that Streit’s battalion was not intended to organize the defense of Feodosia. As indicated in the report on the actions of the 46th Sat, the final point of the route was Ak-Monai: “Here the battalion was supposed to take over the coastal defense and, together with 6 companies of various construction battalions, which were planned to be subordinated to it, build a position in the narrowest place of the peninsula Kerch from Ak-Monai in a southern direction." That is, the task of the 46th SB was to re-equip the Soviet Ak-Monai positions in the event of a radical change in the situation on the Kerch Peninsula. On the afternoon of December 28, while in Novorossiysk the landing of Soviet troops on ships and vessels took place with varying degrees of organization, the 46th Rifle Brigade was on the march from Karasubazar to Ak-Monai. The battalion reaches the Feodosia area in the afternoon.

A night march to a designated area in an unfamiliar area on bad roads was considered impractical, and the 46th Sat made a stop. As stated in the report on the actions, “the battalion, with the permission of the commander of the sapper units of the corps, settled down for the night in Feodosia in order to resume the movement to Ak-Monai the next morning at dawn.” That is, by and large, the battalion ends up in Feodosia by accident. Later it was joined by two companies of the road construction battalion. The city commandant's office indicates the location to sappers and builders.

A very significant issue for assessing subsequent events is the action plan of the German units in Feodosia. In his report on what was happening, the commander of the 46th Sat, Captain Streit, wrote the following on this issue: “... there was no information about the alarm plan, there were no instructions regarding the actions of the battalion in the event of an enemy landing or other attack. As it turned out later, there was an alarm and defense action plan for the units located in Feodosia; in addition, a few days earlier, everyone should have been put on high alert. In this situation, the fact that the relevant orders were not brought to the attention of the units arriving in Feodosia had a negative impact.”

Here Streit most likely has in mind the plans of the 46th Infantry Division and its bringing into combat readiness at the “Christmas Man” signal (see above). This allows us to conclude that, firstly, the command of the 11th Army did not undertake a targeted radical reinforcement of troops in Feodosia after the landings in the Kerch region, and secondly, that local commanders showed a general careless attitude towards the organization of defense. Orders and defense plans were not communicated to units transiting through Feodosia. The situation was aggravated by the fact that German sappers arrived at dusk in an unfamiliar city. At the same time, despite the blatant facts of negligence in the organization of defense, the very fact of the presence in the Feodosia region of the 46th Rifle Brigade, which had extensive combat experience, worsened the conditions for the landing of the planned Soviet assault. Also in Feodosia there was a heavy weapons company of the 186th infantry regiment of the 73rd infantry division, a division from the 77th artillery regiment and the 54th artillery regiment, and the 902nd assault boat team (100 people), one anti-tank company, one coastal battery. Another factor influencing the situation in the Feodosia region was the presence in the city of a senior commander in the person of Colonel Boehringer, chief of the sapper units of the 11th Army. He could subjugate any units in the city.

At 3 a.m. on December 29, a detachment of warships approached Feodosia. At night, orientation for entering the port was provided by the lights of the Shch-201 and M-51 submarines, which were advanced to the port in advance; this was typical for navigation support for Soviet landing forces. Under the cover of naval artillery fire, specially designated boats burst into Feodosia harbor and landed a group of reconnaissance officers on the protective pier, who captured a lighthouse and two anti-tank guns. Not only was the harbor not mined, but the boom gates were open on the night of the landing. In total, 266 people from the assault force were landed in the harbor by boats.

Following the boats, destroyers broke into the harbor: according to the report of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters, the first to enter the port was the EM “Shaumyan” at 4.40, followed by the EM “Nezamozhnik” at 4.56 and the EM “Zheleznyakov” at 5.00. The first landed 330, the second - 289 and the third - 287 people. The destroyers completed the landing by 5.35–5.51 (“Shaumyan” and “Nezamozhnik”), the last was “Zheleznyakov” by 7.00.

For the reasons described above, the beginning of the landing of Soviet troops becomes a very unpleasant surprise for the German sapper units located in the city. On the one hand, all units of the 46th Brigade were located approximately in the center of the city, partly near the harbor (according to the map attached to the report, south of the harbor). On the other hand, they were completely unfamiliar with the area and did not have a clear plan of action. At the first, most important moment of the landing, they only took up the defense of their location. There was no contact with construction companies in the southern part of the city.

With an experienced ear, sappers define “the firing of a large number of Russian automatic weapons,” i.e., a landing by large forces. In the documents of the 11th Army (appendices to the ZhBD) there is evidence that Boehringer contacted army headquarters. It sounds like this: “At 7.00 a call from Colonel Boehringer from Feodosia. He established contact with the field commandant (Lieutenant Colonel von Kohler). Fierce fighting in the harbor of Feodosia." The response to Boehringer's report was an order to "defend every block."

However, the head of the engineering service of Manstein’s army did not carry out this order. On the contrary, he makes a radical decision to withdraw sappers from Feodosia (which threatened to become a mousetrap) and gives the order to withdraw the 46th brigade to the fork in the Kerch-Simferopol road (on the outskirts of Feodosia). The order is immediately transmitted to the companies, in addition, an order is given to immediately withdraw transport from the city. By that time, some of the vehicles located in the immediate vicinity of the harbor were lost. The purpose of such a maneuver was, as the commander of the 46th Rifle Brigade later wrote, “to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to advance both to Simferopol and Kerch.” How justified was the failure to comply with the order? Moreover, artillery battalions of the 46th Infantry Division remained in the city.

Actually, it was the German artillery divisions located in Feodosia that provided the first resistance to the landing. At 5.08, the cruiser "Red Caucasus" was hit in the area of ​​the first pipe, which caused a fire. At 5.21 a.m. a German shell hit the cruiser's turret, pierced the armor and caused a fire. On the cruisers and destroyers there were killed and wounded from fire from the shore. Boehringer himself reported all this to the headquarters of the 11th Army by telephone: “Fierce fighting in the harbor of Feodosia. German artillery takes an active part in them. One enemy ship is on fire."

However, the pace of the landing left much to be desired. At 5.02 the cruiser "Red Caucasus" approached the wide pier from the outside and began to moor. At the same time, part of the landing force began landing by longboats. The cruiser's mooring took place in extremely difficult conditions due to strong squeezing winds. To moor the cruiser, the tugboat “Kabardinets” was included in the detachment, which promptly arrived at the landing site from Anapa. However, seeing the intense shelling of the ships, the captain of the tug became afraid and returned to Anapa (was put on trial).

"Red Caucasus" managed to unmoor and set the gangplank only at 7.15. Due to the cluttered pier No. 3, only soldiers and commanders landed; unloading artillery and vehicles turned out to be impossible. Under these conditions, several companies with combat experience could significantly change the situation in the harbor. Instead, Boehringer leaves the city and takes them with him. The height of cynicism in this regard appears to be Boehringer’s report already from Karasubazar (on the road to Simferopol) at about 15.00: “The coastal artillery fired until the last shell, then the artillerymen picked up carbines.” The question of why Boehringer’s subordinates did not stand shoulder to shoulder with the artillerymen remained unanswered.

The reaction of the command of the 11th Army to the landing in Feodosia was quite quick. Already between 6.30 and 8.00, orders were given to send the Romanian 4th mountain brigade and 3rd infantry brigade (Cornet regiment) and the 240th anti-tank division to Feodosia. That is, either closely spaced or motorized units were advanced first. Aviation was ordered to operate only in Feodosia. At 8.00 a meeting was held with the participation of Manstein. The head of the operations department, T. Busse, receives the task of finding out what forces, primarily artillery, can be released for Feodosia on the west coast and in the XXX AK zone. Artillery is requested, including from near Kherson (210 mm howitzers). At 9.30, Manstein made a decision to immediately withdraw one regiment of the 170th Infantry Division from the front and send it to Alushta at night, as well as prepare the withdrawal of another regiment from the front.

On the morning of December 29, when the battle had been raging in Feodosia for several hours, attempts by units of the 46th Infantry Division to drop landing troops into the sea were still ongoing in the eastern part of the Kerch Peninsula. A surprise for the Germans was the attempt of Kapran’s detachment to break through to the sea. This forced the 97th Regiment to go on the defensive. Thus, the attempt to eliminate 200 brave souls holed up in the coastal rocks was stopped. Leontiev’s detachment, according to the Soviet version of events, tried to advance, but later “the detachment fought surrounded by battle.” According to the German version of events, the detachment was defeated. The report of the 72nd PP states: “At 9.15, List’s group and the 2nd battalion jointly destroy the last enemy forces (300 prisoners). The enemy’s landing site has been completely cleared, the enemy in the regiment’s sector has been eliminated.” The Soviet detachment at Kamysh-Burun itself tried to advance; there were battles with varying success on the territory of the factory. The Germans considered the attack on the bridgehead at the Commune Initiative to be very effective; the report of the 42nd brigade states: “The offensive is developing well, the Russians are suffering heavy losses. They amount to at least 100 killed and 200 wounded, 60 people were taken prisoner.” At the same time, it is not stated that the bridgehead has been eliminated.

However, the psychological effect achieved by the very fact of the landing in Feodosia exceeded even the wildest expectations. Boehringer's disregard for a direct and unambiguous order paled in comparison to the actions of the XXXXII AK headquarters. While at the headquarters of the 11th Army the mood was far from panicky, on the ground things reached the point of outright arbitrariness. Closer to noon on December 29, Manstein gives the order to the command of XXXXII AK: “The 46th Infantry Division must destroy the landing enemy. Concentrate the main forces on the northern shore. I forbid leaving. The army takes over the holding of the isthmus near Feodosia. The orders given there to the Romanian CBD and MP remain in force.” The order is transmitted at 11.09 on December 29. However, already at 10.00 on December 29, the commander of the XXXXII Corps, Count Sponeck, ordered the 46th Infantry Division to leave the Kerch Peninsula. This infuriated Manstein and Sponeck was suspended and subsequently arrested and imprisoned in a fortress. Later, in his memoirs, E. von Manstein wrote: “The case of Count Sponeck shows how tragic the conflict between the obligation to carry out an order and his own opinion about operational necessity can be for a military leader.”

Aerial photograph of Feodosia Bay.

What infuriated Manstein most was that Sponeck gave the order to withdraw and turned off the radio, that is, he acted in such a way as not to hear a response ban. Such “tricks” were periodically performed by various German commanders, but in this case for Sponeck it had the most far-reaching consequences.

The losses of the 46th Infantry Division in the rapid retreat across the snow-covered Kerch Peninsula amounted to 9 heavy field howitzers, 12 light field howitzers, 4 heavy and 8 light infantry guns, 14 heavy and 73 light machine guns, 12 heavy and 25 light mortars, 3 heavy and 34 light VET. Casualties from December 25 to January 3 were moderate, with 152 killed, 429 wounded, and 449 missing.

While the scandal with the withdrawal of the 46th Infantry Division from Kerch was unfolding, sappers withdrawn from Feodosia tried to hold the crossroads of roads north of the city. However, they were soon outflanked and knocked down from their original position. Command of the defense in the Feodosia region is taken by Lieutenant Colonel von Alphen (commander of the 617th Engineer Regiment). The artillerymen are leaving the city, abandoning their equipment. Meanwhile, Soviet units are moving forward, covering the positions of the 46th Sat.

The idea of ​​defending the crossroads was finally buried with the landing of a small detachment (a reinforced company) in Sarygol, on the road from Feodosia to the east. According to the report of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters, he was landed at about 23.00 from BTShch-26. The detachment fires at the positions of the 46th Brigade with mortars. At night, Lieutenant Colonel von Alphen orders a perimeter defense around the village of Nizhnyaya Baybuga. This is quite consistent with Soviet data, which speaks of the advance of the landing force to the town of Lysaya to the north-west of Feodosia and nearby heights with the right flank 5–6 km and the left flank 3–5 km from the city. In Feodosia itself at that moment, small scattered groups of Germans were destroyed. By the morning of December 30, Feodosia was completely liberated from the enemy. 2,000 Red Army soldiers were released from captivity. Judging by the report of the Oberquartermaster of the 11th Army on losses dated December 31, 1941, during the previous ten days 7 leFH18, 3 sFH18, 1 10-cm K18 and 2 sFH M/37(t) were lost. In all likelihood, most of the losses relate specifically to Feodosia (the losses of the 46th Infantry Division were higher and were dealt with later). During the night, units of the Romanian mountain brigade approached the Near Baybuga area.

The counterattack planned for the morning, the striking force of which was to be the Romanian units, ended in complete failure. As the commander of the 46th Sat later reported: “It was impossible to induce the Romanians to take even one step forward. The Romanian officers were not with their units, but in a house located in the rear.” The artillery was lost, so not a single shot was fired as artillery preparation.

Meanwhile, the units that landed in Feodosia went on the offensive. The decisive advantage was gained through the use of tanks. As stated in the ZhBD of the 11th Army: “The Russian tanks that broke through caused the same panic among the Romanians as in September during the breakthrough north of Melitopol. The panicked retreat of the Romanians, unfortunately, carried away the German soldiers with it.” As the commander of the 46th Brigade later wrote, two anti-tank guns he had jammed due to frost, and the Romanians did not use their anti-tank guns. An attack by Soviet tanks pushes back the Romanians and the 46th Rifle Brigade 1.5 km west of the village of Dalnie Baybugi. There are Romanian units here, reinforced by German artillery.

In the period from December 29 to 31, 23 thousand people, 1,550 horses, 34 tanks, 109 guns, 24 mortars, 334 cars and tractors, 734 tons of ammunition and 250 tons of other cargo were transported and landed in the Feodosia area. By the end of December 31, the troops of the 44th Army that had landed in Feodosia managed to advance 10–15 km from the city and capture Vladislavovka. The Romanian units that pulled up to Feodosia, although they were not able to drop troops into the sea, were still able to hold back their advance until the German divisions arrived. On the morning of December 31, the chief of staff of the 11th Army, in a conversation with the chief of staff of the GA “South,” uttered a phrase that largely determined the further development of events: “The situation near Feodosia may pose a danger to the Crimea and the 11th Army.” Accordingly, it was proposed to stop the attack on Sevastopol and strengthen XXXXII AK at the expense of forces withdrawn from LIV AK. As a result, Hansen receives an order to stop attacks on Sevastopol.

During January 1, 1942, the troops of the 44th Army were unable to advance northward. By the end of January 2, Soviet troops reached the Kiet-Nov line. Pokrovka, Izyumovka, Koktebel, where they met organized enemy resistance. The losses of the landed 63rd Guards Division, 236th and 157th Divisions, 251st Guards Regiment and the naval detachment of the 44th Army during this period can be assessed as moderate. From December 30, 1941 to January 2, 1942, they suffered 431 killed, 161 missing, and 705 wounded.

The landing of the 51st Army continued, and the landings began pursuit. Commander of the Caucasian Front D.T. On January 1, 1942, Kozlov reported to the Supreme High Command Headquarters a plan for the liberation of Crimea with a strike on Perekop, which was approved the next day.

During negotiations with the Chief of Staff of the 44th Army on Christmas Day, January 2, D.T. Kozlov said directly: “The question is this: who will concentrate the troops faster and more, I want General Pervushin, you and all your workers to understand this.” However, the conditions of the troop concentration race were extremely difficult. During negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky on the evening of the same day, the front commander admitted: “The ice situation on the Kerch p/o [probably still the “strait.” – Note auto.] does not make it possible to transport anything.”

In the vicinity of Kerch, the 51st Army took rich trophies, but some of the weapons and equipment were domestic models captured from the enemy. So, as of January 10, 1942, ABTU 51st A reported the capture of 232 domestic and 77 German trucks, 44 domestic and 41 German passenger cars, 35 tractors and 12 Soviet-made tanks. All this equipment was faulty.

The trophy of exceptional value was 4 OV brand locomotives and 80 wagons and platforms. They were repaired and brought into a condition suitable for movement. The seizure of 10,000 tons of coal in Kerch was a serious help. This made it possible to organize the railway. transportation in the interests of front-line troops, albeit on a limited scale. This was another omission on the part of the command of the XXXXII AK and the 46th Infantry - Railway. the transport was not taken away or destroyed.

Transports lost in Feodosia. In the foreground is “Zyryanin”, behind it is “Tashkent”.

However, in addition to the obvious advantages, the idea of ​​landing in Feodosia also had obvious disadvantages. The large distance from the front's aviation bases did not allow for reliable air cover. As a result, the transports in the port were hit by German bombers. The first to die was “Tashkent” (5552 GRT), which managed to unload. The next one, on January 4, was “Zyryanin” (3592 brt), transporting liquid fuel and shells, hit by bombs while pumping fuel. On the same day, the Nogin (2150 GRT) was attacked and sunk. On January 9, the Spartakovets and Chatyr-Dag were sunk. On January 16, he was blown up by a mine “Jean Zhores” (3972 brt). Cargo was also slowly removed from the piers of Feodosia, and therefore a lot of ammunition was destroyed during the bombing of the port by enemy aircraft.

All this led to a decrease in the rate of accumulation of troops on the bridgehead near Feodosia and a shortage of the most necessary supplies. On the contrary, the Germans hastily concentrated the troops withdrawn from the group aimed at Sevastopol. This allowed them to achieve a quantitative and qualitative advantage and launch a counteroffensive. E. von Manstein writes: “It was to be waged by three and a half German divisions and one Romanian mountain brigade against the enemy, whose forces had now increased to eight divisions and two brigades. While the enemy had tanks, albeit in limited numbers, we had none.” Here Manstein is being somewhat disingenuous, since the strike force assembled near Feodosia included assault guns. In reality 1941–1942 they were an extremely problematic example of German armored vehicles for Soviet anti-tank defense and light tanks. Already as of January 8, XXXXII AK had two platoons of assault guns under its command: 4 self-propelled guns from the 197th battalion and 2 self-propelled guns from the 190th battalion. The main forces of these two assault gun battalions remained under the command of LIV AK near Sevastopol.

The German offensive began on January 15, and by January 18 the attackers had completely occupied Feodosia, encircling part of the forces of the 44th Army. It was announced that 10 thousand prisoners, 177 guns and 85 tanks had been captured. The remnants of the 44th Army retreated to the Parpach Isthmus. The army commander, General A.N., was seriously wounded. Pervushin, member of the Military Council A.G. died. Komissarov, the chief of staff, Colonel S.E., was shell-shocked. Christmas. General I.F. took command of the army. Dashichev. The main consequence of the German counterattack was the loss of Feodosia as a supply port for Soviet troops in Crimea.

The condition of the troops of the 44th Army after Feodosia can be assessed as depressing (see Table 2).

Entrusted to the ill-fated D.T. Kozlov’s troops tried to recapture the peninsula during a difficult period for the Red Army in peculiar natural conditions. The landing in Feodosia on December 29, 1941 was a “knight’s move” that dramatically changed the operational situation in Crimea, but this success was not consolidated. The accumulation of troops, ammunition, and fuel in Feodosia proceeded slowly. The advance of the 51st Army along the muddy roads of the Kerch Peninsula due to the thaw was also late. All this allowed the German 11th Army to counterattack on January 15, 1942 and soon reoccupy Feodosia.

Already on the evening of January 17, order No. 0183/OP of the front headquarters follows: “The Caucasian Front, on the morning of January 17, goes on the defensive on the line of the Ak-Monai positions.” Accordingly, Tulumchak, Korpech, Koi-Asan and Daln were designated as cover positions. The reeds, and the Ak-Monai positions became the main line of defense.

In the middle of the day on January 17, a conversation took place between D.T. Kozlova with A.M. Vasilevsky, at which the front commander firmly and consistently defended the expediency of the measures taken. Kozlov motivated his orders as follows: “I did not decide to risk the final loss of the divisions and proposed to retreat to the Ak-Monai positions in order to tighten up and wear down the enemy.” Moreover, he bluntly stated: “The situation that has developed today does not necessitate a revision of the decision made.” In a conversation with Moscow, the front commander also assessed the enemy’s intentions as the most decisive: “Throw our units into the sea with a strike from the right and left.” Ultimately, Vasilevsky, who began the conversation with Kozlov with a rather shady assessment of the enemy near Feodosia, by the end of two hours of rather intense negotiations agreed with the arguments of the front. As a result, the troops retreated to the Ak-Monai positions.

Faced with a serious crisis in Crimea, the Supreme Command Headquarters sent its representatives to Crimea - Army Commissar 1st Rank L.Z. Mekhlis and Deputy Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Major General P.P. Eternal. Mehlis arrived at the front on January 20, 1942. A new stage of the struggle for Crimea began.

Conclusions. The Kerch-Feodosia operation and the subsequent struggle for Feodosia gives rise to polar assessments, both positive and negative, in domestic historiography. An important issue is the viability of the bridgeheads formed as a result of the landing of troops of the 51st Army by the forces of the AzVF and the KVMB. A study of the documents of the parties leads to the disappointing conclusion that by the morning of December 29, 1941, most of the landed troops were either defeated or were on the verge of defeat. On the other hand, it cannot be said that all bridgeheads were close to collapse. The most stable position was for the units of the 302nd Guards Division at Kamysh-Burun. The liquidation of this detachment on December 29 (as indicated in the ZhBD of the 11th Army) seems unlikely. Unlike other bridgeheads, it was also supported by the artillery of the 51st Army. At the same time, the liquidation of other bridgeheads made it possible to free up at least two or three infantry battalions for an attack on the bridgehead. This would be a serious test for him, if not a disaster.

The tragic fate of a significant part of the landed troops makes us think about the viability of the plan for the landing operation on the Kerch Peninsula as a whole. Here, the study of German documents leads to the conclusion that the positions of the 46th Infantry Division near Kerch were not at all an impregnable fortress. The area of ​​Cape Zyuk, defended by signalmen, could become a gap in the defense of the 46th Infantry Division and the XXXXII Corps as a whole. However, this required a massing of landing craft to land and supply large forces. For example, the involvement of gunboats (formerly “epildifors”) from the Black Sea Fleet for landing in the Sea of ​​Azov.

At the same time, failures in the Kerch region simultaneously became a magnet drawing together German reserves. In particular, the battalion of the 97th PP, placed on defense in the Feodosia area. This created the basis for the success of the landing in Feodosia, which made it possible to seize the initiative from the enemy for a long time.

However, as practice has shown, it was not enough to land troops; they still had to be fully supplied. In this regard, the assessment made hot on the heels of the events in 1943 in the “Collection on the Study of War Experience” is indicative. An unsightly picture was given of the release of weakened formations onto the peninsula: “Some division, weakened in artillery and without convoys, was loaded and transported, and its “rear” (as it was customary to call the remnants of the division, although these rear included 7/8 artillery regiment) with several thousand horses and a hundred (sometimes more) vehicles remained on the Caucasian coast." As a result, the transported units could not “really fight or live” for a long time. The 44th Army, in the face of the concentration of large enemy forces, needed to really fight.