Target:
- Expand the educational space of students as part of the development of research skills of students in Russian history lessons;
- Contribute to the formation creative thinking, development of a personal attitude towards social problems society;
- Study the events of 1991, the causes and consequences of the collapse of the USSR.
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Municipal educational institution secondary school of the Lenin state farm
Methodological development of the lesson
On the history of Russia, grade 11.
Dukhanina Anna Viktorovna _
Lesson on Russian history, grade 11.
Topic: “The collapse of the USSR: a pattern or an accident.”
Target:
- Expand the educational space of students as part of the development of research skills of students in Russian history lessons;
- Contribute to the formation of creative thinking, development of a personal attitude towards social problems of society;
- Study the events of 1991, the causes and consequences of the collapse of the USSR.
Tasks:
- Continue to develop students’ understanding of the mutual influence of the country’s development trends;
- To develop in students independence, creative activity, initiative, as stable personality traits, and the ability to creatively solve problems that arise in life.
- Develop the ability to study, acquire and deepen or expand knowledge, work with books, multimedia aids, master skills and abilities and creatively apply them in practice;
Planned results
Students will learn about:
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the causes of interethnic conflicts during the years of perestroika;
- objective prerequisites for the formation of national movements to leave the USSR;
- the historical significance of the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Russia;
- the origins and manifestations of the constitutional crisis in the USSR;
Attempts by the Soviet leadership to preserve a multinational state and the reasons for the failure of these attempts;
- the circumstances of the termination of the existence of the USSR.
Basic knowledge
Dates and events:
March 17, 1991 - all-Union referendum on the preservation of the USSR; All-Russian referendum on the introduction of the post of President of the RSFSR
Names:
M. S. Gorbachev, N. I. Ryzhkov, B. N. Yeltsin, A. A. Sobchak, R. I. Khasbulatov, A. V. Rutskoy, G. I. Yanaev.
Basic concepts and terms:perestroika, federation, confederation, interethnic conflicts, state sovereignty, constitutional crisis, lease, State Emergency Committee.
Form : combined lesson (updating and deepening previously acquired knowledge (grade 9), learning new material, applying knowledge and developing skills)
Teacher's methods of activity:explanation, story, conversation, organization of individual presentations, work with text,use of multimedia aids,solving cognitive tasks and problematic issues.
Lesson equipment: textbook “” 11th grade, worksheet notebook, multimedia technical teaching aids, Computer textbook “History of Russia. XX century” Antonova T.S., Kharitonova A.L., Danilova A.A., Kosulina L.G.
Plan: | 1. The role of Russia within the USSR. 2. The beginning of decay. 3. Confrontation of personalities . 4. Collapse of the USSR. |
Introduction | The collapse of the USSR is one of the most significant events in world history of the 20th century. This is perhaps the only assessment that is accepted by most historians and politicians. All other issues related to the analysis of the causes and significance of the collapse of the USSR remain the subject of heated debate. Today in class we will try to find possible answers to the problem posed:The collapse of the USSR: a pattern or an accident. |
In the ideological life of society, issues of national identity increasingly came to the fore. In politics, this was reflected in the growth of separatist movements, in the general struggle of the republics with the Center (Kremlin)... And with the Center in mass consciousness Russia was identified. Russian ideologists and scientists, primarily of a national-patriotic orientation, persistently raised the question of the true position of Russia in the Union, of the relative weight of the RSFSR in the USSR in terms of the main indicators of economic and social development. In their opinion, a picture emerged of the depressing situation of the Russian Federation, which was shamelessly used by the Union government as a donor to other republics. In the family of peoples of the USSR, Russia found itself in the position of “Cinderella”. Producing 60% of the gross social product and providing 61% of the national income produced, the RSFSR was one of the last places in the country in terms of living standards. The country's budget was formed mainly at the expense of Russia, and more than 70 billion Russian rubles were redistributed annually from its pocket in favor of other republics. In 1989, for example, Russia contributed more than 100 billion rubles to the all-Union budget, but received back only 30 billion the following year. Russians found themselves in a particularly difficult situation. Even within the RSFSR, in terms of the number of people with higher education per capita, they were in 16th place in the city and 19th in the countryside. The so-called demographic problems of the Russian nation have worsened. For many years now, the birth rate among Russians has not ensured simple reproduction of the population, and in a number of areas Central Russia mortality exceeded the birth rate (including in Moscow itself, where the increase was due to migrants). Every year, more than 3,000 settlements were erased from the map of Russia. Under the influence of such facts, which became public knowledge, the conviction grew stronger that Russia needed independence: economic, political, spiritual. |
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Organization of work with the document in mini-groups on the first issue (worksheet task No. 1) Formulating a general conclusion. |
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Restructuring, weakening central government exposed the long-hidden contradictions of the Soviet system, including the unresolved national question and its new aggravation caused by the strengthening of the positions of national elites in the union and autonomous republics of the USSR. « An amazing discovery awaited the leaders of national movements in the text of the 1977 Constitution of the USSR, which they disliked - the coined formula: “The Soviet Union consists of sovereign states.” The formula, which no one had ever attached importance to, suddenly turned out to be winning. Since it is a union of sovereign states, then, therefore, it is not a federation, but a confederation. Initially massive national movements in the republics they were ready to be content with the idea of a confederation: the republics delegate certain powers to the center. Moreover, Moscow has no powers other than those transferred to it by the republics"(L.M. Mlechin). |
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Exercise. In the reference literature, find the meaning of the terms “federation” and “confederation”. Which of them corresponded, in your opinion, to the USSR before 1985? (A federation is a state consisting of entities that have a certain legal and political independence; a confederation is a permanent union of states that maintain an independent existence and unite to coordinate their activities on certain issues). Listening to student responses. A possible vector of answers should be aimed at the idea that the USSR was still formally a federation, in fact a unitary state, but over time it could acquire real federalism. |
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In March 1990, at an all-Union referendum, the majority of citizens spoke in favor of preserving USSR and the need for its reform. By the summer of 1991, a new Union Treaty was prepared, which gave a chance to renew the federal state. But it was not possible to maintain unity. The USSR collapsed. Why? |
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Working with the circuit Prerequisites collapse of the USSR |
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Here are the most common explanations offered by researchers: As the central leadership weakened, conflicts on ethnic grounds began. The first of them occurred completely unexpectedly as a result of a fight at a skating rink between Yakut and Russian youth in Yakutsk in February 1986. Which? |
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Slide 2 | Trying to save the USSR, M.S. Gorbachev initiates the signing of a new Union Treaty, to which 12 of the 15 Union republics agree (except for the three Baltic ones). Page But the coup attempt undertaken by opponents of M.S. Gorbachev in the country's top leadership on August 19-21, 1991 (the so-called August Putsch), disrupted the signing of this document. On December 8, 1991, in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus announced the denunciation (termination) of the Union Treaty of 1922 and the formation of the CIS - the Commonwealth of Independent States, which was joined a few days later by the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan.Thus, the USSR collapsed.December 25, 1991 live on Central Television M.S. Gorbachev announced his voluntary resignation from the post of President of the USSR. The Soviet Union ceased to exist. Thus ended the era of M.S. Gorbachev. |
Summing up the results of the lesson. | The significance of such large-scale events is determined by time. Only 20 years have passed since the collapse of the USSR, historians and politicians, citizens of the states that arose in the place of the USSR, are at the mercy of emotions and are not yet ready for balanced, well-founded conclusions. Let us therefore note the obvious: the collapse of the USSR led to the emergence of independent sovereign states; the geopolitical situation in Europe and throughout the world has changed radically; the severance of economic ties became one of the main reasons for the deep economic crisis in Russia and other countries - the heirs of the USSR; Serious problems arose related to the fate of Russians who remained outside Russia, and national minorities in general. |
Consolidation of the formulation of students’ personal attitude to the topic under consideration (using technology - POPS formula) |
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Homework: | historical design.Imagine that M.S. Gorbachev would have given the order for the arrest of B.N. Yeltsin, L.M. Kravchuk and S.S. Shushkevich, accusing them (quite rightly) of conspiracy to overthrow the legitimate government. Technicallyit was possible - the power structures and the nuclear button were still in the hands of the President of the USSR. How would events develop further? Try to create your own scenario for the development of events 10 years in advance - until the end of 2001. |
Zhuravlev V.V. and others. History of modern Russia. 1984-1994 // Teaching history at school. 1995. No. 8. P. 46-47
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………......3
Topic: “Collapse of the USSR”
2 The collapse of the USSR - a pattern or an accident………………………...21
3 Geopolitical position of Russia after the collapse of the USSR………………20
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….21
References…………………………………………………………………………………24
Topic: “The Formation of Christianity in Russia” ………………………………………………………25
Answers to control tasks……………………………………………………28
Introduction
The topic of the work is relevant because at this stage of development and political transformations taking place in the Russian Federation and neighboring states, the successors of the former USSR, when the main characters of that period had already left the political scene, the interest in this period in Russian history itself had subsided somewhat, we can try to consider this time in the history of our state in order to find answers to the questions and problems that we have are arising now.
The purpose of the work is a geopolitical analysis of the causes of the collapse of the USSR.
As for the sources, the main ones were periodical literature of that time, namely the newspapers “Moskovsky Komsomolets” and “Arguments and Facts”, some magazines - the international yearbook “Politics and Economics”, “ Business people", etc. I trust the last two sources somewhat more than newspapers, since these are serious publications. In addition, textbook sources are “History of the Soviet State by N. Werth” and “History of the Fatherland” (school textbook). But these sources cannot be used as the main ones for the reason that they reflect a certain ideological position, and comments that are free of this shortcoming are important to us. This is why I prefer to rely mainly on magazines.
In order to understand the processes that took place in the USSR and led to its collapse, it is necessary to consider the features of the development of this state, the form of government in the USSR, the state regime, the form of the administrative-territorial structure, as well as some other problems Soviet statehood.
"Collapse of the USSR"
1. The August 1991 events and their assessment.
August putsch- an attempt to forcibly remove M. S. Gorbachev from the post of President of the USSR and change his course, undertaken by the self-proclaimed State Committee for a State of Emergency (GKChP) - a group of conservative conspirators from the leadership of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR government on August 19, 1991, which led to radical changes in the political situation in the country. It was accompanied by the declaration of a state of emergency for 6 months, the deployment of troops to Moscow, the resubordination of local authorities to military commandants appointed by the State Emergency Committee, the introduction of strict censorship in the media and the banning of a number of them, the abolition of a number of constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens. The leadership of the RSFSR (President B.N. Yeltsin and the Supreme Council of the RSFSR) and some other republics (Moldavian SSR, Estonia), and subsequently also the legitimate leadership of the USSR (President and Supreme Council of the USSR) qualified the actions of the State Emergency Committee as a coup d'etat.
The goal of the putschists. The main goal of the putschists was, according to their official statements, to prevent the liquidation of the USSR, which, in their opinion, was to begin on August 20 during the first stage of signing a new union treaty, turning the USSR into a confederation - the Union of Sovereign States. On August 20, the agreement was to be signed by representatives of the RSFSR and Kazakhstan, and the remaining future components of the commonwealth during five meetings, until October 22.
Choosing the moment. Members of the Emergency Committee chose the moment when the President was away on vacation in Crimea and announced his temporary removal from power for health reasons.
- GKChK forces. The State Emergency Committee relied on the forces of the KGB (Alpha), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Dzerzhinsky Division) and the Defense Ministry (Tula Airborne Division, Taman Division, Kantemirovskaya Division). In total, about 4 thousand military personnel, 362 tanks, 427 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles were brought into Moscow. Additional airborne units were transferred to the vicinity of Leningrad, Tallinn, Tbilisi, and Riga.
The airborne troops were commanded by generals Pavel Grachev and his deputy Alexander Lebed. At the same time, Grachev maintained telephone contact with both Yazov and Yeltsin. However, the putschists did not have complete control over their forces; So, on the very first day, parts of the Taman division went over to the side of the defenders of the White House. From the tank of this division, Yeltsin delivered his famous message to the assembled supporters.
- Information support for the putschists was provided by the State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (for three days, news releases certainly included revelations of various acts of corruption and violations of the law committed within the framework of the “reformist course”), the State Emergency Committee also secured the support of the Central Committee of the CPSU, but these institutions were unable to have a noticeable impact on the situation in the capital , but for some reason the committee was unable or unwilling to mobilize that part of society that shared the views of the members of the State Emergency Committee.
Leader of the coup. Despite the fact that Yanaev was the nominal head of the conspirators, the real soul of the conspiracy, according to many analysts, was Kryuchkov
Opponents of the GKChK. The resistance to the State Emergency Committee was led by the political leadership of the Russian Federation (President B. N. Yeltsin, Vice President A. V. Rutskoi, Chairman of the Government I. S. Silaev, Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council R. I. Khasbulatov).
In an address to Russian citizens on August 19, Boris Yeltsin, characterizing the actions of the State Emergency Committee as a coup, said:
At the call of the Russian authorities, masses of Muscovites gathered at the House of Soviets of the Russian Federation (“White House”), among whom were representatives of a wide variety of social groups - from supporters of anti-Soviet political organizations, students, intelligentsia to veterans of the Afghan war. The three killed during the incident in the tunnel on the Garden Ring were representatives of various professions - an architect, a driver and an economist.
The former head of the Yukos company, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, claims that in 1991 he “went to defend the White House”
Background.
· On July 29, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and the President of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev met confidentially in Novo-Ogaryovo. They scheduled the signing of a new Union Treaty for August 20.
- On August 2, Gorbachev announced in a televised address that the signing of the Union Treaty was scheduled for August 20. On August 3, this appeal was published in the Pravda newspaper.
- On August 4, Gorbachev went to rest at his residence near the village of Foros in Crimea.
- August 17 - Kryuchkov, Pavlov, Yazov, Baklanov, Shenin and Gorbachev’s assistant Boldin meet at the “ABC” facility - the closed guest residence of the KGB at the address: Academician Vargi Street, possession 1. Decisions are made to introduce a state of emergency from August 19, to form the State Emergency Committee, to demand Gorbachev to sign the corresponding decrees or resign and transfer powers to Vice President Gennady Yanaev, Yeltsin to be detained at the Chkalovsky airfield upon arrival from Kazakhstan for a conversation with Yazov, then act further depending on the results of the negotiations.
- The beginning of the coup. On August 18 at 8 o’clock in the morning, Yazov informs his deputies Grachev and Kalinin about the upcoming introduction of a state of emergency.
- In the afternoon, Baklanov, Shenin, Boldin and General V.I. Varennikov travel on Yazov’s personal plane to Crimea to negotiate with Gorbachev in order to secure his consent to introduce a state of emergency. At about 5 p.m. they meet with Gorbachev. Gorbachev refuses to give them his consent.
The Emergency Committee agreed that the group would go to Crimea to see Gorbachev in order to persuade him to make a decision to introduce a state of emergency. ... Another purpose of our visit to Foros to Gorbachev was to disrupt the signing of a new union Treaty scheduled for August 20, which, in our opinion, had no legal framework. On August 18, we met with him, where, as you know, we did not agree on anything.
- V. Varennikov, interview
- At the same time (at 16:32) all types of communications were turned off at the presidential dacha, including the channel that provided control of the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR. In a later interview with Gorbachev, it is stated that a group of guests cut the communication lines only in his cabin, and the facility itself in Foros and the lines in other rooms worked properly. In addition, communications in Gorbachev’s cars, incl. control of strategic forces also worked.
- On August 19, at 4 a.m., the Sevastopol regiment of the USSR KGB troops blocked the presidential dacha in Foros. By order of the Chief of Staff of the USSR Air Defense Forces, Colonel-General Maltsev, two tractors blocked the runway on which the President's flight assets are located - a Tu-134 plane and a Mi-8 helicopter. In a later interview with Gorbachev, it is stated that in essence there was no blockade, because “About 4,000 people in the nearest units and units were directly subordinate to me, and these were mainly units of my personal security.”
Development of main events.
- At 6 o’clock in the morning, the USSR media announced the introduction of a state of emergency in the country and the inability of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev to perform his functions “for health reasons” and the transfer of all power to the State Emergency Committee. At the same time, troops were sent to Moscow and other large cities, and political figures of the “democratic opposition” were put on the wanted list.
- At night, Alpha moved to Yeltsin’s dacha in Arkhangelskoye, but did not block the president and did not receive instructions to take any action against him. Meanwhile, Yeltsin urgently mobilized all his supporters in the upper echelon of power, the most prominent of whom were Ruslan Khasbulatov, Anatoly Sobchak, Gennady Burbulis, Mikhail Poltoranin, Sergei Shakhrai, Viktor Yaroshenko. The coalition compiled and faxed an appeal “To the Citizens of Russia.” B. N. Yeltsin signed a decree “On the illegality of the actions of the State Emergency Committee.” Echo of Moscow became the mouthpiece of opponents of the coup.
- Yeltsin's condemnation of the State Emergency Committee during a speech from a tank of the Taman division at the White House. Russian President B.N. Yeltsin arrives at the “White House” (Supreme Council of the RSFSR) at 9 o’clock and organizes a center of resistance to the actions of the State Emergency Committee. Resistance takes the form of rallies that gather in Moscow near the White House on Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment and in Leningrad on St. Isaac's Square near the Mariinsky Palace. Barricades are being erected in Moscow and leaflets are being distributed. Directly near the White House there are armored vehicles of the Ryazan regiment of the Tula Airborne Division under the command of Major General Alexander Lebed and the Taman Division. At 12 o'clock, from a tank, Yeltsin addresses those gathered for the rally, where he names what happened coup d'etat. From among the protesters, unarmed militia groups are created under the command of deputy Konstantin Kobets. Afghan veterans and employees of the private security company Alex take an active part in the militia. Yeltsin is preparing space for retreat by sending emissaries to Paris and Sverdlovsk with the right to organize a government in exile.
- Evening press conference of the State Emergency Committee. V. Pavlov, who developed a hypertensive crisis, was absent from it. The members of the State Emergency Committee were noticeably nervous; The whole world went around the footage of G. Yanaev’s shaking hands. Journalist T. Malkina openly called what was happening a “coup,” the words of the members of the State Emergency Committee were more like excuses (G. Yanaev: “Gorbachev deserves all respect”).
- By order of the State Emergency Committee, preparations were made for the previously unplanned seizure of the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR by special forces of the KGB of the USSR. However, the generals responsible for preparing the assault began to doubt the feasibility. Alexander Lebed goes over to the side of the White House defenders. The commanders of Alpha and Vympel, Karpukhin and Beskov, ask Deputy Chairman of the KGB Ageev to cancel the operation. The assault was called off.
- In connection with the hospitalization of V. Pavlov, the temporary leadership of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was entrusted to V. Kh. Doguzhiev, who did not make any public statements during the putsch.
- For the first time in its modern history, Russia is creating its own Ministry of Defense. Konstantin Kobets is appointed Minister of Defense.
- On the night of August 21, tank units controlled by the State Emergency Committee carried out maneuvers in the area of the White House (the building of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR). Supporters of Boris Yeltsin clash with a military column in the tunnel under New Arbat. (see Incident in the tunnel on the Garden Ring)
- Alpha Group refuses to storm the White House. At 5 o'clock in the morning Yazov gives the order to withdraw troops from Moscow. On the afternoon of August 21, a session of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR begins, chaired by Khasbulatov, which almost immediately accepts statements condemning the State Emergency Committee. Vice-President of the RSFSR Alexander Rutskoi and Prime Minister Ivan Silaev fly to Foros to see Gorbachev. Some members of the Emergency Committee fly to Crimea on another plane to negotiate with Gorbachev, but he refuses to accept them.
- Mikhail Gorbachev returns from Foros to Moscow together with Rutskoi and Silaev on a Tu-134 plane. Members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested.
- Moscow declared mourning for the victims. A mass rally was held on Krasnopresnenskaya embankment in Moscow, during which demonstrators carried out a huge banner of the Russian tricolor; At the rally, the President of the RSFSR announced that a decision had been made to make the white-azure-red banner the new state flag of Russia. (In honor of this event, in 1994 the date August 22 was chosen to celebrate State flag Russia.)
- The defenders of the White House are supported by rock groups (“Time Machine”, “Cruise”, “Shah”, “Metal Corrosion”, “Mongol Shuudan”), who are organizing the “Rock on the Barricades” concert on August 22.
Live, Yeltsin, in the presence of Gorbachev, signs a decree suspending the Communist Party of the RSFSR
Much later, in 2008, Gorbachev commented on the situation as follows:
One of the members of the State Emergency Committee, Marshal Yazov, about the lack of levers to control the situation:
Architect of the design and construction cooperative "Kommunar" Ilya Krichevsky
Afghan veteran, forklift driver Dmitry Komar
Economist of the Ikom joint venture Vladimir Usov
All three died on the night of August 21 during an incident in a tunnel on the Garden Ring. All three were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Meaning. The August putsch was one of those events that marked the end of the power of the CPSU and the collapse of the USSR and, according to popular belief, gave impetus to democratic changes in Russia. Changes took place in Russia itself that contributed to the formation of its statehood, in particular, even during the events of August 20, 1991, it had its own Ministry of Defense.
On the other hand, supporters of preserving the Soviet Union argue that the country began to be in chaos due to the inconsistent policies of the then government.
2. Is the collapse of the USSR a pattern or an accident?
The reasons for the collapse of the USSR and the collapse of the Soviet Empire require an objective analysis, which in no case can be reduced to identifying external (hostile) and internal (subversive) influence, i.e. to a "conspiracy theory". The external pressure of the liberal-democratic West on the USSR was truly enormous, and the activities of “subversive elements” within the country were extremely effective and coordinated. But both of these factors became decisive only in a situation when the existence of the Soviet Empire entered a stage of internal crisis, which had deep and natural causes rooted in the very specifics of the Soviet system and the Soviet system. Without understanding these internal reasons for the collapse and their analysis, any attempts to restore the USSR (and especially to create a New Empire) will be futile and unpromising. Moreover, any purely inertial conservatism in this matter can only worsen the situation.
Let us identify several factors that led the Soviet Union to geopolitical and socio-economic collapse.
Firstly, at the ideological level, during the entire existence of the socialist regime, purely national, traditional, spiritual elements were never introduced into general complex communist ideology. Being largely national-communist de facto, it was never transformed into one de jure, which hindered the organic development of Russian-Soviet society, gave rise to double standards and ideological contradictions, and undermined clarity and awareness in the implementation of geopolitical and socio-political projects. Atheism, materialism, progressivism, "enlightenment ethics", etc. were deeply alien to Russian Bolshevism and the Russian people as a whole. In practice, these provisions borrowed from Marxism (by the way, in Marxism itself, which are quite arbitrary elements a kind of tribute to old-fashioned positivist humanism in the style of Feuerbach) were perceived by Russian communists in the vein of folk-mystical, sometimes unorthodox eschatological aspirations, and not as the rationalistic fruits of Western European culture. However, the ideology of National Bolshevism, which could find more adequate, more Russian terms for the new socio-political system, was never formulated. Consequently, sooner or later the limitations and inadequacy of such an ideologically contradictory structure were bound to have a negative impact. This especially made itself felt in the late Soviet period, when senseless dogmatism and communist demagoguery finally crushed all ideological life in society. This “freezing” of the ruling ideology and the persistent refusal to introduce organic, national and natural components into it for the Russian people resulted in the collapse of the entire Soviet system. Responsibility for this lies not only with the “agents of influence” and “anti-Soviet”, but, first of all, with the central Soviet ideologists of both the “progressive” and “conservative” wings. The Soviet Empire was both ideologically and actually destroyed by the communists. To recreate it in the same form and with the same ideology is now not only impossible, but also pointless, since even hypothetically this will reproduce the same preconditions that have already led to the destruction of the state once.
Secondly, at the geopolitical and strategic level, the USSR was uncompetitive in the long term to resist the Atlanticist Western bloc. From a strategic point of view, land borders are much more vulnerable than sea borders, and at all levels (number of border troops, cost of military equipment, use and deployment of strategic weapons, etc.) After World War II, the USSR found itself in an unequal position compared with the capitalist bloc of the West, grouped around the United States. The USA had a gigantic island base (the American continent), completely controlled and surrounded on all sides by oceans and seas, which were not difficult to defend. Plus, the United States controlled almost all coastal zones in the South and West of Eurasia, creating a gigantic threat to the USSR and at the same time remaining practically out of reach of potential destabilizing actions of the Soviet Union. The division of Europe into Eastern (Soviet) and Western (American) only complicated the geopolitical position of the USSR in the West, increasing the volume of land borders and placing it close to a strategic potential enemy, and in a situation of passive hostility of the European peoples themselves, who found themselves in the position of hostages in a geopolitical duel. the meaning of which was not obvious to them. The same thing happened in the southern direction in Asia and the Far East, where the USSR had immediate neighbors either controlled by the West (Pakistan, Afghanistan, pre-Khomeinist Iran) or rather hostile powers of a non-Soviet socialist orientation (China). In this situation, the USSR could acquire relative stability only in two cases: either by rapidly advancing to the oceans in the West (to the Atlantic) and in the South (to the Indian Ocean), or by creating neutral political blocs in Europe and Asia that were not under the control of any one country. from the superpowers. This concept (of neutral Germany) was tried to be proposed by Stalin, and after his death by Beria. The USSR (together with the Warsaw Pact), from a geopolitical point of view, was too big and too small at the same time. Maintaining the status quo was beneficial only to the United States and Atlanticism, since at the same time the military, industrial and strategic potential of the USSR was increasingly exhausted, and the power of the United States, a protected island, was increasing. Sooner or later, the Eastern Bloc was bound to collapse. Consequently, the reconstruction of the USSR and the Warsaw bloc is not only almost impossible, but also unnecessary, because even in the case of (almost incredible) success it will only lead to the revival of an obviously doomed geopolitical model.
Thirdly, the administrative structure of the USSR was based on a secular, purely functional and quantitative understanding of intrastate division. Economic and bureaucratic centralism did not take into account either the regional, much less the ethnic and religious characteristics of the internal territories. The principle of leveling and purely economic structuralization of society led to the creation of such rigid systems that suppressed, and at best “preserved” the forms of natural national life of various peoples, including (and to a greater extent) the Russian people themselves. The territorial principle operated even when nominally we were talking about national republics, autonomies or districts. At the same time, the process of regional-ethnic leveling became more and more distinct as the entire Soviet political system “aged”, which towards its last stage was increasingly leaning towards the type of Soviet “nation-state” rather than the Empire. Nationalism, which largely contributed to the creation of the USSR in the early stages, in the end became a purely negative factor, as excessive centralization and unification began to give rise to natural protest and discontent. The atrophy of the imperial principle, the ossification of bureaucratic centralism, the desire for maximum rationalization and purely economic productivity gradually created from the USSR a political monster that has lost its life and is perceived as the forcefully imposed totalitarianism of the center. Some communist theses of literally understood "internationalism" are largely responsible for this. Consequently, this aspect of the Soviet model, which operates not with a specific ethnic group, culture, religion, but with abstract “population” and “territory,” should not be revived under any circumstances. On the contrary, one should get rid of the consequences of such quantitative approach, whose echoes are so tragically reflected today in the issue of Chechnya, Crimea, Kazakhstan, the Karabakh conflict, Abkhazia, Transnistria, etc.
These four main aspects of the former Soviet model are the main factors in the collapse of Soviet statehood, and they are responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Empire. It is quite natural that with a hypothetical re-creation of the USSR, radical conclusions should be drawn in this regard and radically destroy those reasons that have already historically doomed a great nation to state disaster.
It is generally accepted that the collapse of the USSR was inevitable, and this point of view is held not only by those who considered it a “prison of nations”, or “the last of the endangered species - a relic” - a “multinational empire”, as an expert on the problems put it interethnic relations in the USSR M. Mandelbaum in the preface to the almanac of articles published by the American Council on Foreign Relations on the eve of the collapse of the USSR.*
3. Geopolitical position of Russia after the collapse of the USSR.
Russian foreign policy at the end of the 20th century. has become more defined, forward-looking and geopolitically sensitive. But serious problems remain related to the possibilities of its implementation. They are due to such circumstances as: the discrepancy between ideas in our country and abroad about the future of Russia, incl. about its positions in the world order; risks of new isolation of the country; the emergence of alternative geopolitical models that do not take into account or infringe upon the interests of our state.
To realistically assess the possibilities of Russian geopolitical projects embedded in the country’s foreign policy in the second half of the 1990s, it is necessary to once again analyze the features of the current situation. The geopolitical position of a state is determined not only by physical geography, but also by changes in the global geopolitical order and geo-economic processes. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia's geopolitical status declined. In the post-Soviet space, not excluding parts of the territory of the Russian Federation itself, external centers of power began to establish themselves. Disintegration processes have called into question Russia's geopolitical subjectivity.
The current geopolitical position of our country in the world can be viewed from two points of view. In the first case, Russia is assessed as the geographic center of the global system (heartland) and the integration core of Eurasia. The idea of Russia as a kind of “bridge” between Europe and Asia is also widespread (this also has a philosophical justification: domestic thinkers, in particular N. Berdyaev, spoke of Russia as a “mediator” between the West and the East).
Modern Russia retains its geopolitical potential as the center of Eurasia, but with limited possibilities of use, which leads to its transformation into a regional power with a tendency to further decline in its geopolitical status. Economic weakness (according to IMEMO data for 1998, our country produces only 1.7% of world GDP), lack of state will and public consensus on development paths do not allow the implementation of the heartland model in its new interpretation: Russia as the integration core of Eurasia.
The geopolitical structure of the post-Soviet space is changing qualitatively, which is losing its original “Russian-centrism”. CIS, which includes all former Soviet republics, except for the three Baltic ones, operates very ineffectively. The main factors restraining its collapse are the dependence of many post-Soviet states on Russian fuel raw materials, other economic considerations, and, to a lesser extent, cultural and historical ties. However, as a geopolitical and geo-economic center, Russia is clearly weak. Meanwhile, European countries are actively interacting with the post-Soviet republics, especially Germany and Turkey with its attempts to restore the unity of the Turkic world “from the Adriatic to the Great Chinese wall", China (Central Asia), the USA (Baltic states, Ukraine, Georgia), etc. Uzbekistan and Ukraine are claiming the status of new regional powers, in which Western geostrategists see a natural counterbalance to Russia and its “imperial ambitions” regarding the territories of the former USSR (Brzezinski’s idea ).
Post-Soviet states are included in whole line geopolitical unions alternative to the CIS (European, Turkic, Islamic and other types of integration). Their role is underestimated in Russia, where there is still a strong belief that “they will not get away from us.” New regional cooperation systems are emerging on the borders of the Russian Federation. In some of them she takes part as much as she can - the Baltic, Black Sea, Caspian, Asia-Pacific systems, but in a number of cases the unification takes place without her presence. Countries are actively interacting Central Asia. Meetings of the “troika” (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan) and the “five” (the same plus Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) regularly take place here, formulating their special interests. As an alternative to the CIS, this region is considering its own Central Asian Union, Turkic integration (including Turkey) or the unification of Muslim countries within the framework of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. A characteristic event is the meeting in Dushanbe (December 1999) of the heads of government of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, dedicated to the development of the Central Asian Community in the 21st century.
An important geopolitical phenomenon is the consolidation of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan (the association is called GUAM); in 1999, Uzbekistan (from now on - GUUAM) joined the process. This bloc is intended as a geopolitical counterbalance Russian influence in the post-Soviet space. Ukraine is very active here, whose leaders have repeatedly exchanged visits with the heads of the countries that make up GUUAM. Official Kyiv, with the encouragement of the West, is trying to play the role of a geopolitical alternative to Moscow. In addition, the experience of recent years shows: in Eastern Europe, the ideas of a union of any configuration, but without Russia, are, as a rule, projects of an alliance against Russia, which means that the prospects for recreating the medieval Balto-Pontic belt (the “cordon sanitaire” along its western border) should cause our state has concerns.
The important task of overcoming transport dependence on Russia by the CIS countries is already being solved. For example, the Central Asian states are “cutting a window” to the Indian Ocean. Built Railway Tejen - Serakhs - Mashhad, connecting Turkmenistan with Iran, which gives the countries of the region access to this ocean (which in the future is also useful for Russia, especially in the case of the construction of the North-South transport corridor along the relatively short route Kazakh Yeraliev - Krasnovodsk - Kizyl56 Atrek - Iran). Options for an alternative communication axis connecting Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan are being considered. The idea of the Great Silk Road (GSR) has been revived, which almost completely removes the southern neighbors of the Russian Federation from its influence on communications. It is unlikely that Caspian (Azerbaijani) oil will be transited through Russia: oil pipelines leading to Georgia (Supsa) and Turkey (Ceyhan) are now considered promising. Only oil exports from Kazakhstan can go through the port of Novorossiysk. In addition, it is natural for Turkmenistan to introduce visas for Russians. Our country itself gave the reason for such actions, accusing Georgia and Azerbaijan of supporting Chechen separatists and by initiating the process of establishing a visa regime with these countries. In fact, this means their exit from the CIS.
As a result, the CIS participants “scatter”, reorienting themselves to other geopolitical centers. Only the Moscow-Minsk axis remains geopolitically stable: it strengthens the unity of Eurasia on a pro-Russian basis and prevents the creation of the Balto-Pontic belt. Russia is clearly on the path to losing its geopolitical role as the center of Eurasia. Based on this circumstance, many Western researchers already believe that the main global processes are determined by the relations between America, Europe and the Asia-Pacific region (APR).
The geopolitical unity of the Russian Federation itself is in question; the National Republics are developing their external relations, guided by ethnocultural criteria. In a number of them, Turkish influence increased, especially in the North Caucasus and the Volga-Ural region (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan). In republics with a Muslim population, the influence of Saudi Arabia and Iran is felt (to a lesser extent). Islamic countries even compete for such influence. The result of geopolitical stratification Russian space the actual "autarky" of Chechnya appeared, and North Caucasus In general, it has become a risk zone within Russian borders.
Geopolitical problems are also associated with other regions of the Russian Federation. Thus, the Far East remains an abandoned outskirts of Russia and is forced to independently develop ties with China, Japan, etc. The exclave region is in a difficult situation. Kaliningrad region, at the same time maintaining the role of the country's western military outpost. In this problematic situation, pressure from neighboring countries claiming parts of Russian territory (Karelia, Pskov region, border with China, Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands) is increasing.
After the collapse of the USSR, Russia's access to the sea was severely limited. The role of geopolitical “windows” is played by: in the Baltic Sea, St. Petersburg with the Leningrad region (it is clear that the Kaliningrad exclave does not count here); at the Black Sea - Krasnodar region(Novorossiysk) and Rostov region(attempts to revive Taganrog); in the Caspian - Astrakhan (Dagestan is excluded due to ethnopolitical problems); on the Pacific Ocean - Primorsky Territory and (much less) Khabarovsk Territory, Sakhalin and Kamchatka. It is important that the Baltic and Black Seas are classified as “closed”, because the straits are controlled by other powers (hence the minimal geopolitical significance of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets). The Sea of Japan is also “closed”. Therefore, the Kola and Kamchatka peninsulas are of particular military strategic importance - the only territories of Russia that have access to the open spaces of the World Ocean: the Northern and Pacific fleets are based here, respectively [Kolosov and Treyvish 1992].
The role of our country in the quality of transit hub. Really functioning international communications now bypass Russia. Relations between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region are mainly carried out by sea, bypassing its territory (sea transportation is quite cheap). Russian land communications are also not operational. But the GSR is being recreated in the form of a trans-Eurasian corridor connecting East Asia and Europe by land. Work begins on the implementation of the transport corridor project - "Europe - Caucasus - Central Asia" (TRACECA), which finds support both in China and Japan, and in the European Union (especially in Germany). The TRACECA project was approved in 1993 at a conference in Brussels (the leaders of eight states of Transcaucasia and Central Asia participated; later Mongolia, Ukraine and Moldova joined the program). And in September 1998, a meeting of the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria was held in Baku, where an agreement was adopted on the development of a transport corridor, transit and communications.
Thus, the trans-Eurasian corridor, due to geopolitical changes at the end of the 20th century. must bypass the largest state that considers itself the center of Eurasia - Russia. The most important highway of the future is supposed to be laid from China through Kazakhstan (Kyrgyzstan), Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia to Turkey and further to Europe (via Turkey and Bulgaria or through Ukraine, Moldova and Romania). Theoretically, its “northern” version is still possible from Europe through Belarus or Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan with access through Turkmenistan to Iran and the Indian Ocean, i.e. simpler in terms of the number of boundaries overcome. But the West today supports the option of bypassing our territory, preferring not to make its relations with the Asia-Pacific region dependent on unstable Russia (despite the fact that the internal political stability of a number of GSR countries is even more questionable). Russia is paying such a high price for the geopolitical disintegration of the USSR space with the loss of Transcaucasia and Central Asia, its “soft underbelly.”
True, there are vulnerabilities in the emerging belt of small states to the south and southwest of Russia's borders. Ethnopolitical instability is typical for the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China, bordering Central Asian countries. The location of the connection between the HSR and Chinese communications has not been determined. This is claimed by Kazakhstan, already connected to China in transport terms, and Kyrgyzstan, which can be supported by geopolitical rivals of Kazakhstan (in in this case it is necessary to build roads in the high mountainous regions of the Tien Shan, for which the Chinese are ready). A special position is occupied by Iran and Armenia, pushed aside from the GSR. They insist on using their land communications, but other participants in the project, for geopolitical reasons and with the support of the West, propose using a ferry from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan (bypassing Iran) and a road directly connecting Azerbaijan with Georgia (bypassing Armenia). Finally, communication between Georgia and Ukraine is planned to be carried out by sea, since land communications pass through semi-independent Abkhazia and Russia.
So on southern outskirts In the post-Soviet space and in South-Eastern Europe, a “new rimland” is being formed, covering the “Eurasian heartland” in a semi-ring. Russia turns out to be the remote northeastern corner of Eurasia, located on the sidelines trade routes. Existing communications, such as the Trans-Siberian Railway, are poorly used as a transit “bridge”; the prospects for their reconstruction are unclear (although Japan has shown interest in the reconstruction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, it is investing money in the reconstruction of the roads that make up the HSR). At the turn of the century, Russia poorly used its “triple” geopolitical potential: the integration core of Eurasia, a transit state and a developed economic center. In the meantime, we have to talk only about potential, prospects, opportunities, and not about decisions, actions and achievements.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we will summarize the results and draw appropriate conclusions.
The implementation of economic reforms with the subsequent abolition of the USSR and a gradual transition to the market caused an abundant flow of contradictory discussions about the collapse of the so-called. Soviet Empire. But it should be noted that the collapse of the USSR was not the collapse of a classical empire. Let us note once again: the collapse of a unique multinational country did not occur for natural reasons, but mainly at the will of politicians pursuing their goals, contrary to the will of the majority of peoples living in the USSR in those years.
In 1978, Collins put forward several general provisions relating to territorial expansion and contraction of states. When, two years later, Collins, having formalized his principles and given them quantitative form, applied them to the Soviet Union, the conclusions he obtained completely contradicted the generally accepted point of view. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many American politicians and interest groups expressed alarm over the supposedly rampant Soviet military buildup that threatened the United States and its allies. Collins foresaw the onset of a period of instability in the USSR, partly due to the excessive military-imperial expansion of the Soviet power. IN long term such instability could lead to the disintegration of the “Russian Empire”, incl. to the Soviet Union's loss of control over Eastern Europe and its own collapse. He foresaw that the disintegration of the central power of the Russian state would be a precondition for the emergence of powerful ethnic separatist movements. The scientist noted that the formal mechanism for the dismemberment of the Soviet Union already exists in the form of 15 union republics with nominal autonomy and their own state institutions. This federal structure, while rendered meaningless under a strong central government, supports ethnic identities while at the same time providing an organizational framework that allows for the emergence of truly independent states once the power of the center is seriously weakened. Collins believed that the disintegration of the Soviet Union he predicted would most likely occur under the leadership of dissident communist politicians, and that these favorable structural opportunities would encourage some communist leaders to align themselves with regional ethnic groups.
Much of his analysis seems accurate and insightful today. The collapse of the USSR, however, was also predicted by other observers. But in contrast to their expectations that it would be the result of a war with China or the uprising of the Islamic republics of the USSR, Collins, for the most part, pointed to the true reasons for the collapse that occurred. The main drawback of the forecast was its timing. According to the scientist, the disintegration of the Soviet Union should have taken many decades.
Collins' analysis was carried out along three dimensions: a) the principles of this model as applied to the history of the Russian Empire over a long period of time; b) the applicability of the model to the collapse of the Soviet Union; c) its sources in Weber's social theory, as well as aspects of Weber's thinking that Collins may have missed. Collins lists five geopolitical principles that outline factors affecting expansion, contraction, or stability state borders for long periods of time. These principles concern mainly the ability of a state to wage war and control its population.
1. Advantage in size and resources. Other than that equal conditions large and resource-rich states win wars; therefore they expand, while smaller and poorer ones contract.
2. Advantage in location. States bordering militarily powerful countries in fewer directions, i.e. “peripheral” are in an advantageous position compared to states that have powerful neighbors in a greater number of directions, i.e. with "core" ones.
3. Fragmentation of core states. Core territories facing adversaries on multiple fronts tend to fragment over the long term into an ever-increasing number of small states.
4. Decisive wars and turning points.
5. Overexpansion and disintegration. Even “world” empires may be subject to weakening and long-term decline if they achieve excessive, from a military point of view, expansion.
So, more than 10 years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Collins compiled a plausible scenario for the future collapse, based on the principles of geopolitics and ethnopolitical science. In its external characteristics, this scenario seemed to correspond to what actually happened.
Collins's opponents, in particular the political scientist G. Derlugyan, argue that nuclear weapons, despite their "symbolic significance", lead to deadlock"in interstate rivalry. Competition was imposed on the Soviet Union in non-military areas - economic, political, cultural and ideological production, where America's significant advantages left it no chance of victory." The USSR basically ensured its territorial security in the traditional sense (which is why Gorbachev could afford to take numerous unilateral initiatives in the field of arms limitation), but in the post-Stalin era, something more was required from Soviet leaders and from Soviet society, and, above all, concern for improving the level and quality of life associated with changes in the structure of the population (growth of the urban population employed in industry).
Literature
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2. Butenko V. Where we are coming from and where we are going. Lenizdat, 1990.
3. Weber M. Selected works. M.: Progress, 1990.
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6. International Yearbook: Politics and Economics, 1991
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9. Tikhonravov Yu.V. Geopolitics: Tutorial. - M.: INFRA-M, 2000. -269 p.
10. Igor Kommersant-Bunin. Union republics: putsch as an indicator of chemical composition // Kommersant, No. 34 dated August 26, 1991.
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THE FORMATION OF CHRISTIANITY IN Rus'
Following Kiev, Christianity gradually comes to other cities Kievan Rus: Chernigov, Novgorod, Rostov, Vladimir-Volynsky, Polotsk, Turov, Tmutarakan, where dioceses are created. Under Prince Vladimir, the vast majority of the Russian population accepted the Christian faith, and Kievan Rus became a Christian country.
Residents of the north and east of Rus' showed much greater resistance. The Novgorodians rebelled against Bishop Joachim, who was sent to the city, in 991. To conquer the Novgorodians, a military expedition of the Kievites, led by Dobrynya and Putyata, was required. Residents of Murom refused to allow Vladimir's son, Prince Gleb, into the city and declared their desire to preserve the religion of their ancestors. Similar conflicts arose in other cities of the Novgorod and Rostov lands. The reason for such a hostile attitude is the population’s commitment to traditional rituals; it was in these cities that elements of a religious pagan organization developed (regular and stable rituals, a separate group of priests - magi, magicians). In the southern Western cities and rural areas, pagan beliefs existed more as superstitions than as a formal religion. In rural areas, resistance to Christianity was not so active. Farmers and hunters who worshiped the spirits of rivers, forests, fields, and fire most often combined faith in these spirits with elements of Christianity.
Dual faith, which existed in villages for decades and even centuries, was only gradually overcome through the efforts of many, many generations of clergy. And now everything is still being overcome. It should be noted that elements of pagan consciousness are highly stable (in the form of various superstitions). So many of Vladimir’s orders, designed to strengthen the new faith, were imbued with a pagan spirit.
One of the problems after formal baptism was the education of subjects in the Christian spirit. This task was performed by foreign priests, mainly immigrants from Bulgaria, whose inhabitants adopted Christianity back in the 9th century. The Bulgarian Church had independence from the Patriarch of Constantinople, in particular, it could elect the head of the church. This circumstance played a big role in the development of the church in Rus'. Not trusting Byzantine Emperor, Vladimir decided to subordinate the Russian Church to the Bulgarian, and not the Greek, hierarchs. This order was maintained until 1037 and was convenient because Bulgaria used service books in the Slavic language, close to spoken Russian.
Vladimir's time cannot be considered a period of harmony between government and society. The historical significance of this time was as follows:
Creating conditions for full-blooded cooperation of the tribes of the East European Plain with other Christian tribes and nationalities.
Rus' was recognized as a Christian state, which determined a higher level of relations with European countries and peoples.
The immediate consequence of the adoption of Christianity by Vladimir and its spread in the Russian land was, of course, the construction of churches. Vladimir immediately after baptism ordered churches to be built and placed in the places where the idols had previously stood: thus, the Church of St. Basil was erected on the hill where the idol of Perun and other gods stood. Vladimir ordered to build churches and assign priests to them in other cities as well, and to bring people to baptism in all cities and villages. Here two questions arise - in which cities and regions and to what extent was Christianity spread under Vladimir, and then - where did the clergy at the churches come from? There is news that the Metropolitan with bishops sent from Constantinople, with Dobrynya, Uncle Vladimirov, and with Anastas went to the north and baptized the people; Naturally, they first walked along the great waterway, up the Dnieper to the northern end of this route - Novgorod the Great. Many people were baptized here, a church was built for new Christians; but from the first time Christianity was not widespread among all the inhabitants; From Novgorod, in all likelihood, the preachers went by water to the east, to Rostov. This ended the work of the first Metropolitan Michael in 990; in 991 he died. It is easy to imagine how his death must have saddened Vladimir in his new position; the prince could hardly be consoled by other bishops and boyars; soon, however, a new metropolitan, Leon, was called from Constantinople; with the help of Bishop Joachim Korsunyan, who he installed in Novgorod, paganism was completely crushed here. Here is an interesting piece of news about this from the so-called Joachim Chronicle: “When they learned in Novgorod that Dobrynya was going to baptize, they gathered a veche and swore they would not let him into the city, not to give idols to be overthrown”; and exactly when Dobrynya arrived, the Novgorodians swept away the large bridge and came out against him with weapons; Dobrynya began to persuade them with gentle words, but they did not want to hear, they took out two stone-shooting machines (vices) and placed them on the bridge; The chief among the priests, i.e., especially persuaded them not to submit. their wise men, a certain Bogomil, nicknamed the Nightingale for his eloquence.
The Russian Church, which developed in cooperation with the state, became a force that united residents of different lands into a cultural and political community.
The transfer of the traditions of monastic life to Russian soil gave originality to the Slavic colonization of the northern and eastern Slavs of the Kyiv state. Missionary activity in lands inhabited by Finnish-speaking and Turkic tribes not only drew these tribes into the orbit of Christian civilization, but also somewhat softened the painful processes of the formation of a multinational state. This state developed on the basis not of a national, but of a religious idea. It was not so much Russian as Orthodox.
When the people lost faith, the state collapsed. The state collapse of Rus' reflected the ongoing collapse of the ethnic system: although Russians still lived in all the principalities and they all remained Orthodox, the sense of ethnic unity between them was destroyed. The adoption of Christianity contributed to the widespread spread of literacy in Rus', the enjoyment of enlightenment, the emergence of rich literature translated from Greek, the emergence of its own Russian literature, and the development of church architecture and icon painting.
Since the Christianization of ancient Russian society was an ideological action undertaken by the grand ducal authorities in order to illuminate feudal relations, the introduction of Kievan Rus to Christianity stimulated the socio-cultural development of our ancestors not directly, but indirectly. The development of the process of Christianization of some types of socio-cultural activities was accompanied by simultaneous opposition to others. For example, while encouraging painting (frescoes and icons were needed for religious purposes), the newly established church condemned sculpture (there is no place for sculpture in an Orthodox church). Cultivating a cappella singing, which accompanies Orthodox worship, she condemned instrumental music, which had no liturgical use. People's theater (buffoonery) was persecuted, verbal folk art, monuments of pre-Christian Slavic culture were exterminated as “pagan heritage”.
Regarding the adoption of Christianity in Ancient Rus', only one thing can be said unequivocally: it became a new round in the development of social relations of the Eastern Slavs.
Answers to test tasks.
Exercise 1.
1.What were the names in Rus' of the participants in military predatory campaigns, immigrants from Northern Europe, the founders of the Old Russian state? Varangians.
2. The upper class of feudal lords in Rus' in the 9th–13th centuries Boyars .
3. People's Assembly in Rus' in the 9th–12th centuries. Veche.
4. Type of land ownership in Russia, family estate, inherited. Patrimony .
5. Armed detachments under the prince in Ancient Rus', who participated
in campaigns, management and personal farming. Squad.
6. The Council under the Prince in the Old Russian State was subsequently a permanent estate-representative body under the Grand Duke. Boyar Duma .
a) under an agreement b) took out a loan c) as a result of military actions Answer B.
8.What was the name of the tribute collection ancient Russian prince with a squad from free community members? Polyudye.
9. Conditional ownership in Russia at the end of the 15th – beginning of the 18th centuries. Estate.
10. Unofficial government under Ivan the Terrible in 40–50. XVI century The chosen one is glad.
11. The highest class representative body in Russia, created by Ivan the Terrible in 1549. Zemsky Sobor.
12.What were the names of the central, state government bodies in Russia? XVI V. - Boyar Duma, XVII V. - Senate, XIX V. - State Council.
13. The system of maintaining officials in Rus' at the expense of the local population. Feeding .
14.Form of dependence of peasants: attachment to the land and subordination to administrative and judiciary feudal lords Serfdom .
15.What is the name of the policy of forced centralization, without sufficient political and economic prerequisites, with the aim of strengthening the personal power of the king? Oprichnina .
16.What was the name of the systemic crisis of the Russian state at the end of the 16th – beginning of the 17th centuries? Time of Troubles .
17. The process of transition from a traditional feudal society to a new industrial one. Modernization .
18.Type of government power characteristic of Russia XVIII- the beginning of the twentieth century, when all legislative, executive, and judicial power was concentrated in the hands of the monarch. Monarchy .
19. List the main directions of Russian social thought of the 19th century. a) those who advocated the development of Russia along the Western European path - Westernism, b) defending the original path of development of Russia- Slavophiles .
20. Name the main political and ideological trends of the 30-50s. XIX century Conservatism, liberalism, radicalism.
21.List the basic principles of the “theory of official nationality.” Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality.
22. List the main trends of revolutionary populism: rebellious, propagandistic, conspiratorial .
23. Radical revolution, deep qualitative change in the development of society, the transition from an outdated socio-economic system to a more progressive one. Revolution.
24. A form of government in which the highest state power belongs to an elected representative body, characteristic of the Soviet period of development. Republic.
25.What was the name of the form of power of the working class in alliance with the poorest peasantry, was established as a result of the socialist revolution. Dictatorship of the proletariat.
26.What was the name of the economic policy of the Soviet government?
a) from 1918 to 1921 - policy of war communism,b) from 1921 to 1929. - new economic policy (NEP).
27.The transition of private enterprises and sectors of the economy into state ownership, the policy of the Bolsheviks in the first years of Soviet power. Nationalization.
28. The process of creating large-scale machine production, the introduction of machine technology into all sectors of the economy. Industrialization .
29. Transformation of small individual farms into large public farms. Collectivization.
30. A model of the socio-political structure of society, characterized by the complete subordination of a person to political power, comprehensive control of the state over society. Totalitarianism.
31. Conventional name for the period in the history of the Soviet state from the mid-50s to the mid-60s. Thaw.
32. What is the name of the period international relations from the second half of the 40s to the beginning of the 90s. The twentieth century, characterized by the confrontation between two world socio-economic systems. Cold War era.
Task 2
2.a)2, b)4, c)5, d)3, e)1
6.1d), 2e), 3c), 4b). 5a).
7.a), b), d), g).
8.c) 1547, i)1549, g), 1550, a)1551, h)1555, d)1555, b)1555-1556, f)1565, e)1613.
10.b), e), f), g).
11. 1-e), 2-d), 3-a), 4-c), 5-b).
a) 1714 - Peter 1 founded the Academy of Sciences and the library,
c) 1721 - declared Russia an Empire.
d) 1708 - provincial reform, 1719 - founded 12 colleges
e) 1711 - wedding of Peter and Catherine 1.
f) 1712 - St. Petersburg is the capital.
g) 1718 - established the Admiralty Board.
h) 1722 - approved the law on the procedure for civil service in the Russian Empire and the report card in the authorities.
13.b), d), g), c), a, f).
14.a), b), d), f).
15.a), b), d).
16.a), d), f), i).
18. d), i), a), f), c), h), e), b), g)
19. c), i), k).
20. b), d), e), g)
22. c), d), b), g), a), e), h), f)
24. VTsIK - All-Russian Central Executive Committee
RSDLP - Russian Social Democratic Labor Party
GOELRO is an abbreviation for State Commission on electrification of Russia
VKP(b) - All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions
Red Army - Workers' and Peasants' Red Army
CPSU - Communist Party of the Soviet Union
GKChP - State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR
25. a), b), d), g)
27. a-2; b-2; at 3; g-1; d-1; e-4; f-4; z-2; u-1; k-4; l-1; m-4
Election of B. N. Yeltsin as President of the Russian Federation
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On the phased con-
constitutional reform and dissolution of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation
First war in Chechnya – 1994
Task 3.
Horizontally: 6 Impeachment; 3Christianity; 5. Entente; 7Unia; 9 Formation; 11 Uprising; 13 Dictatorship; 15 Heretic; 17 Trekhpolye; 19 pacification; 21 Civilization; 23 Strike; 25 Label; 27 Empire; 29 Perestroika; 31 Historiography; 33 Occupation; 35 Methodology; 37NATO; 39 Serf; 41 Reformation; 43 Kamenev; 47 feudal lord; 49 Renaissance; 51 defaults; 53 Nevsky; 55 Nationalization; 57Donskoy; 59 Senate; 61Monk; 63 Veche; 65 Romantics; 67batch; 69 World; 71 Rear; 73 Absolutism; 75 Ermak; 77 Repression; 79 Decree; 81 Opposition; 83 Five-Year Plan; 85 subjectivity; 87 Prince.
Vertically: 2 Theory; 4 Cathedral; 6 Industrialization; 8 Manufactory; 10 Gorbachev; 12 Tips; 14 Destiny; 16Intervention; 18 Communism; 20 Crimean; 22 Rotation; 24 Polis; 26 Khrushchev; 28 war; 30 Abroad; 32 Strike; 34 History; 36 Kurchatov; 38 Periodization; 40 Castro; 42 Thaw; 44 Gilyarovsky; 48 Volok; 50 True; 52 Covenant; 54 Yanaev; 56Oprichnina; 58 Revolution; 62 Stolypin; 64 Salavat; 66 Vyatichi; 68 Smerd; 70Community; 72 Atheism; 74 Orthodoxy; 76 Stagnation; 78 System; 79 Duma; 81 Terror; 82 Chronicle; 84 Tiun; 86 Life; 88 Plenum; 90 Hitler.
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Abstract on the topic: The collapse of the USSR, an accident or a pattern
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Introduction. 3
Chapter 1. Prerequisites and causes of disintegration processes in the USSR on the eve of the collapse. 5
1.1 Reasons for disintegration in the USSR. 5
1.2 The process of collapse of the Soviet state (autumn 1990 - winter 1991). Characteristics of the stages. 8
Chapter 2. “Regularities” and “accidents” in the process of the collapse of the USSR. 15
2.1 Contradiction of reasons for the collapse of the USSR. 15
2.2 Historical background for the collapse of the USSR. 17
Conclusion. 20
List of used literature... 22
Introduction
The collapse of the USSR, the disintegration of a multinational empire, which for three hundred years played one of the key roles on the Eurasian continent, is one of the most significant events in the world history of the 20th century. This is perhaps the only assessment that is accepted by the majority of historians and politicians without controversy or reasoning.
Consideration of the problem of the causes of the collapse of the USSR is far removed from this consensus, since this process has quite multifaceted trends in its development. The possibility and feasibility of preventing these contradictions is practically impossible at the present time, since the polarization of society continues into those who negatively assess the collapse of the USSR and those who see in its disintegration the path to progress, the birth of a new Russia. Scientific analysis of the process of collapse of the Soviet state is associated with various subjective political and ideological positions of researchers.
In this work, an attempt is made to summarize the main views on the causes and prerequisites for the collapse of the USSR, on the issues of a natural or random element in the issue of disunity of the USSR.
Purpose of the study: to consider the main trends and causes of the collapse of the USSR, to highlight the elements of accidents and patterns of this process.
To achieve this goal, they put forward next tasks: consider the reasons for disintegration in the USSR; highlight the process of collapse of the Soviet state (autumn 1990 - winter 1991). Characteristics of the stages; determine the contradiction in the reasons for the collapse of the USSR; consider the historical background of the collapse of the USSR.
When writing the work, materials from Russian researchers were used - M. Zuev, Sh. Munchaev, V. Ustinov and others; classic works of foreign authors (N. Werth, J. Hosking).
Chapter 1. Prerequisites and causes of disintegration processes in the USSR on the eve of the collapse 1.1 Causes of disintegration in the USSR
The reasons for the collapse of the USSR are multifaceted. They can be considered in various aspects - political, national, international, economic. Let's try to dwell on each of them.
It should be noted that one of the main prerequisites for the disintegration of the Soviet state lies in the very nature of the country. The USSR was created in 1922 as a federal state. However, over time, it increasingly turned into an essentially unitary state, governed from the center and leveling out the differences between the republics and subjects of federal relations.
The first conflict on ethnic grounds occurred back in 1986 in Alma-Ata. In 1988, hostilities began between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, a territory populated predominantly by Armenians, but which was part of the AzSSR. In April 1989, mass demonstrations took place in Tbilisi for several days. The main demands of the demonstrators were democratic reforms and independence of Georgia. The Abkhaz population advocated revising the status of the Abkhaz ASSR and separating it from the Georgian SSR.
The growth of centrifugal tendencies in the USSR had very serious reasons, but the Soviet leadership, as in its other political actions, showed a complete inability to cope with them. The refusal to consider national contradictions as a serious problem in fact only further confused the issue and, rather, contributed to the aggravation of the struggle rather than vice versa.
Thus, the growing confrontation between the union center and the republics became not only a struggle for reforms, but also a struggle between the central and local elites for power. The result of these processes was the so-called “parade of sovereignties.”
On June 12, 1990, the First Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Russia. It legislated the priority of republican laws over union laws. The first president of the Russian Federation was B.N. Yeltsin, the vice-president was A.V. Rutskoy.
By the fall of 1990, it was already obvious that after five and a half years of perestroika, the Soviet Union had entered a new stage in its history, both in terms of domestic policy and in the development of relations with the whole world. A genuine revolution of minds took place, making it impossible to return to the previous state. However, and this was a grave danger for the future of the experiment undertaken by Gorbachev and his team to modernize the country, none of the three key problems that arose after 1985 were resolved:
1) the problem of political pluralism, an organic component of any process of democratization;
2) the problem of creating a market economy.
Although it should be noted that on July 20, 1990, the main provisions of the program adopted by the Russian government, dubbed the “500-day Mandate of Confidence” and providing for the privatization of state property and freeing prices, were published in the press. This “Yeltsin plan” was presented as an alternative program to the more cautious plan that was being prepared for the entire Soviet Union by the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Ryzhkov. However, this program turned out to be stillborn;
3) the problem of the federal contract.
One of the important prerequisites that played a role in the collapse of the USSR was economic factor. The moribund planned economy demonstrated rapidly growing rates of inflation (in the last years of the USSR, prices rose quite quickly), a gap between cash and non-cash rubles, destructive for any economy, a planned system bursting at the seams and a breakdown in economic ties with the union republics.
The processes of the collapse of the Soviet state took place against the backdrop of democratic transformations in the countries of Eastern Europe, which resulted in their fall in 1989-1990. communist regimes.
Thus, by 1991, a rigid knot of contradictions had formed in the USSR in the political, national, and economic spheres. The impossibility of resolving the problems facing the country as a whole predetermined the fate of the Soviet state.
1.2 The process of collapse of the Soviet state (autumn 1990 - winter 1991). Characteristics of stages
From the point of view of political analysis, the year from the autumn of 1990 to the winter of 1991, which, according to the French researcher N. Werth, is key in the process of the collapse of the USSR, is divided into three stages:
1) the period before the signing on April 23, 1991 by Gorbachev, representing the union center, and the leaders of nine republics (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan) of the document known as the “9+1 Statement”, which declared the principles of the new union treaty.
2) the period from the end of April 1991, marked by a kind of “truce,” seemed to be established in the relations between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, who were mutually concerned about the decline in the authority of any state power. Gorbachev played a more subtle political game, ceasing to systematically resort, as was evident during the January events in Vilnius, to using conservative forces to create a “counterweight” to Yeltsin. Meanwhile, the political and economic situation in the country deteriorated so much that in August an attempt by conservative forces to carry out a coup d'état became possible;
- the period after the failure of the putsch on August 19-21, when the defeat inflicted on the conservative camp catastrophically accelerated the collapse of the Union, led to the abolition of previous government structures, including the KGB, the suspension of activities and the subsequent ban of the CPSU. In less than four months, a new and very unstable geopolitical formation arose in the place of the former USSR - the CIS.
Moving on to a more detailed consideration of these periods, we note that the first open conflict between supporters of Gorbachev and Yeltsin erupted in October 1990 during a discussion of alternative economic reform projects. On October 11, speaking at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Gorbachev expressed support for the option presented by the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Ryzhkov. This plan, which ultimately provided for a transition to “real” prices, freeing wages, increasing the independence of enterprises, and social protection of the unemployed, the appearance of which its implementation would inevitably cause, was immediately criticized by the authors of a competing project known as the “Program 500” days”, which received the support of Yeltsin and the majority of Russian parliamentarians. G. Yavlinsky, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, and then B. Yeltsin spoke in the Russian parliament on October 17 against a “return to the administrative-command system.” The “500 days program,” approved by the people’s deputies of the RSFSR several weeks earlier, Yeltsin said, was torpedoed by the first measures taken in accordance with the presidential plan. The mutually exclusive nature of the two programs was beyond doubt. Yeltsin's supporters refused any kind of compromise, convinced that the president's plan would soon fail.
On November 23, the republics were presented with another version of the draft new union treaty. All republics took part in its discussion, with the exception of the Baltic and Georgia. Although references to socialism disappeared from the draft and the “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” gave way to the “Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics,” the influence of the center was felt in every article of this version of the treaty.
At the same time, already at the time of presentation, this project belonged to the past: three days earlier, on November 20, a bilateral agreement was concluded between Russia and Ukraine, according to which the two republics recognized each other’s sovereignty and the need for economic cooperation without the participation of the center on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Two days later, a similar agreement was signed between Russia and Kazakhstan. These agreements, said Boris Yeltsin, create a model of the new Union and the core around which it will be formed.
On January 12, during the operation of the Soviet Army to seize the Lithuanian television building in Vilnius, 16 people were killed. This action, enthusiastically greeted by the Lithuanian National Salvation Committee, created from opponents of the independence of the republic, the military, conservatives, and part of the press, led to a final split in the intelligentsia, which until then had mostly supported Gorbachev.
The events in Vilnius, repeated a few days later in Riga, sharply aggravated the conflict between reformers and conservatives. On January 22, B. Yeltsin strongly condemned the use of force in the Baltic republics. On January 26, the Union government announced the introduction of joint police and military patrols of the streets of large cities from February 1 under the pretext of intensifying the fight against rising crime. On January 24, 1991, he announced the withdrawal of fifty- and hundred-ruble banknotes from circulation on the pretext of fighting the “shadow economy.” The immediate and, in fact, the only tangible result of this operation was the indignation and growth of discontent among the population.
On February 21, in the midst of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations sweeping Moscow, Leningrad and other major cities, Yeltsin, in a televised speech, demanded Gorbachev’s resignation and the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In response, Gorbachev accused the “so-called democrats” of “seeking to destabilize the country” ahead of the all-Union referendum on the issue of preserving the USSR, scheduled for March 17.
The reformers' demands received strong support from leading organizations of the independent labor movement that emerged during the summer strikes of 1989, primarily in the coal basins of Donbass, Kuzbass and Vorkuta. In 1991, miners began a strike on March 1, now demanding not only an increase in wages in connection with the announced increase in retail prices after April 2, but also the resignation of Gorbachev, the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the nationalization of the property of the CPSU, a real multi-party system, the departition of enterprises and organizations . In essence, the process of departitionization had already been going on since the fall, when at hundreds of enterprises workers and strike committees removed party committees and official trade union bodies from business and occupied their premises. Once again, as in 1917, the incapacity of official structures became obvious, and the “power vacuum” fully manifested itself, primarily in the localities.
Chaos in public administration increased even more after the referendum on March 17. According to the results of the referendum, 80% of Russians supported holding general elections of their own president, and only about 50% of Muscovites and Leningraders and 40% of Kiev residents expressed a desire to preserve the Union in the proposed form.
The ambiguous results of the referendum were quickly overshadowed by the increase in prices (from 2 to 5 times), which horrified the population, which caused all the more indignation because wages were increased by an average of only 20–30%. The most massive strikes of labor collectives took place in Minsk, clearly showing how much the self-awareness of the working class grew and radicalized after the summer of 1989: not limiting itself to economic demands, the workers opposed the socio-political system as a whole, putting forward slogans for the resignation of Gorbachev and the entire union government, the abolition all privileges, abolition of the KGB, restoration in full private property to the land, holding free elections based on a multi-party system, departitioning enterprises and transferring them under the jurisdiction of the republics. In April, the number of strikers exceeded one million.
Under these conditions, among conservatives the idea of organizing a conspiracy both against the new model of the Union and against reforms in general arose. On the morning of August 19, TASS transmitted a message about the creation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR (GKChP), which included 8 people, including Vice-President of the USSR Yanaev, Prime Minister Pavlov, KGB Chairman Kryuchkov, Minister of Defense Yazov, Minister of Internal Affairs Dot Pugo. Stating that USSR President Gorbachev, who was on vacation in Crimea, “is unable to fulfill his duties due to health reasons,” the State Emergency Committee announced its intention to restore order in the country and prevent the collapse of the Union. State Emergency Committee announced the introduction of a state of emergency in individual regions countries. Power structures that, in the opinion of the State Emergency Committee, acted contrary to the Constitution of the USSR were disbanded. The activities of opposition parties and movements were suspended, rallies and demonstrations were prohibited. Military equipment and troops were gathered in Moscow. In Resolution No. 1, the State Emergency Committee promised to increase wages, give all workers 15 acres of land, and provide everyone with housing. A state of emergency was established for six months and censorship was introduced.
However, having met popular resistance led by RSFSR President Yeltsin, the putsch failed. Indecision and split in the troops, the confusion of the putschists, who fell into prostration in the face of an unexpected reaction from Muscovites (as well as Leningraders, residents of other major cities), tens and then hundreds of thousands of whom spontaneously gathered in front of the building of the Russian parliament, which became a stronghold of resistance to the newly-minted junta, the hesitation of the troops brought into Moscow in front of the unarmed people who opposed them, the support of Yeltsin by the majority of governments around the world and international public opinion– in their totality, all these factors determined that the coup attempt was eliminated in less than three days.
On the evening of August 21, Gorbachev returned to Moscow, but by this time Yeltsin, who emerged as the main winner from this test, in the words of one French politician, “won the shoulder straps of the head of state.”
The failure of the coup attempt, which demonstrated the incredible growth of public consciousness and political maturity of the masses, sharply accelerated the collapse of the USSR, led to Gorbachev’s loss of influence and power, and the abolition of the previous institutions of central government. In the days that followed the failure of the coup, eight republics declared their independence, and the three Baltic republics, which had already achieved recognition by the international community, were recognized by the Soviet Union on September 6.
M. Gorbachev, despite his newly confirmed commitment to communist ideals, resigned his post as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and dissolved Central Committee. The activities of the CPSU were suspended, and a few weeks later they were completely banned by Yeltsin. Due to the removal from the competence of the KGB of a number of important functions and directorates, this organization was greatly reduced. There was a complete renewal of the political establishment (from media leaders to members of the government), which included reformers and Yeltsin’s associates, who immediately consolidated the new position with a number of parliamentary resolutions. Gorbachev, wanting to preserve the center and thereby his post, proposed a new - but too reminiscent of the past - version of the union treaty. However, the political positions of the President of the USSR were already too weakened by the putsch.
Chapter 2. “Regularities” and “accidents” in the process of the collapse of the USSR 2.1 Contradiction of the reasons for the collapse of the USSR
The process of holding a referendum on the preservation of the USSR (March 1991) and the subsequent collapse of the country during the Belovezh Accords (December 1991) can be considered one event of a contradictory nature. The majority of the population said “yes” to conservation at the same time. big country”, and its collapse, approving the national-state independence of their republics. There is still no agreement among experts about what this phenomenon means. But it is obvious that the factors that determined the “lifetime” of the USSR were complex. Some of them can still be named.
Our century has witnessed the transformation of many government entities. It's not just about empires. A number of federal states collapsed, and in some others elements of confederal relations were introduced. Difficult fate also affected individual unitary state units (the collapse of Pakistan, the division of the Republic of Cyprus, the formation of the Palestinian Authority within Israel, the federalization of Belgium, the introduction of a system of relations close to a federal one in Spain and Great Britain).
Ethno-territorial separatism is very noticeable in global political processes. Along with this, opposite trends are also expressed - towards regional integration. The most striking example here is the formation of the European Union, but a similar direction of political processes is also typical for other regions of the world. It can be stated that for now geopolitical processes are akin to tectonic ones: they are observed, but not controlled. The region cannot be considered unique either Northern Eurasia, where over the course of a century two sociopolitical systems have changed: the Russian Empire and the USSR, and now there is a third (CIS).
In the 20th century, the world experienced two revolutions in technology: heavy industrialization (around World War II) and the computer revolution (begun in the 1950s and 1960s). Radical changes also took place in the field of politics: the introduction of universal suffrage, a radical reorganization of public administration (the creation of a “rule of law state”), and the emergence of a “welfare state.” These changes were global in nature, but their leaders were the countries of Western Europe and North America, where the “primary modernization” - the industrial revolution - began earlier. The leaders were followed by other countries that began “secondary” industrial modernization from other countries. starting positions. Russia was among them. The states living in the “catch-up development” mode were faced with the task of covering in the shortest period of time a path that took the West many decades to achieve. One of the options for “secondary modernization,” as many historians and sociologists admit, was the “socialist path of development.” “Secondary” modernization often gives rise to a special type of society called “mobilization”. As a result, in order to achieve socially significant goals, society was forced to pay a higher “price”, regardless of costs, including human casualties.
The peculiarity of the Soviet Union was that here technological modernization was not synchronized with changes in the political system. If at the stage of heavy industrialization (the creation of production of means of production, communication systems operating on the basis of an internal combustion engine and an electric motor, etc.) the imbalance between the technological and political foundations of society did not manifest itself so clearly, then the scientific and technological (computer) revolution of the second half of the 20th century V. in countries of this type could not be implemented without a radical transformation of their political organization. The archaic political system itself came into conflict with the development needs of the country and its peoples. The victim of this conflict was the state, which carried out accelerated modernization in a “mobilization” mode and failed to historical moment carry out “demobilization”.
The costs of “catch-up development” and increasing global unevenness were complemented by the intrastate sociocultural distance between the peoples and regions of the USSR. IN Soviet time It was never possible to level out the level of socio-economic and socio-cultural development of ethnic groups and regions of the country. Thus, fertile soil was created for the ideology of nationalism. Its spread in the 19th and especially in the 20th centuries. has acquired an avalanche-like character, determined by modernization processes. Although the right to self-determination was central to the Bolshevik national program and enabled the creation of the USSR, few of the country's peoples were in control in the 1920s. at the level of development that presupposes the desire for national-state independence. But later, the socio-economic development of the USSR led to the growth of nationalism among the numerous peoples of the country. We are talking about the emergence of a national political, managerial, creative elite that accumulates the values of a given people. Nationalism developed in a particularly crisis form among peoples who had not gone through all stages of the modernization process. The very state structure of the USSR left room for the implementation of this ideology.
2.2 Historical background collapse of the USSR
The Russian Empire was a unitary state, although it included a number of self-governing territories. During the revolution and civil war, federalist ideas allowed the Bolsheviks to “gather” lands and peoples and recreate Russian statehood. In the early 1920s. The USSR was created. The new Union of four countries (Russian and Transcaucasian Federations, Ukraine and Belarus) took shape as a confederation. Each state had the right to secede from the Union. Subsequently, Ukraine and Belarus even became members of the UN, and this is one of the signs of state sovereignty. At the same time, trends of unitarianism also developed. Their carrier was the Communist Party. Already at the XII Congress of the RCP (b) (1923), the thesis about its dictatorship was adopted, which was established as a constitutional norm. The party performed the functions of a unitary state. Elements of confederalism, federalism and unitarism coexisted in the state structure of the Soviet Union until recently.
Of course, Unitarianism dominated. But he was strong as long as the power of the Communist Party remained. With its weakening (second half of the 1980s), confederal and federal sentiments revived. Separatist movements emerged. In conditions of commodity shortages, domestic customs began to be introduced. Appearance “ business cards buyer” highlighted the collapse of the unified financial system. The Belovezhskaya agreements of December 1991 only legally formalized the collapse of a single state.
In the works of the late 1980s. our research team consistently insisted on the reorganization of the USSR, taking into account both the peculiarities of the state structure (the combination of elements of confederation, federation and unitarianism), and the integration experience of the Western European community. A gradual transition to a type of regional integration was proposed. Perhaps, by choosing this vector of development, it would be possible to already have in Northern Eurasia a political system of a more civilized and, most importantly, promising type than the CIS.
The policy of the Government of M.S. Gorbachev was multidirectional. On the one hand, the core that held together both the political and economic system of the USSR (party leadership, state dominance in the economy, hierarchy of subordination of territories, etc.) was removed. Instead, a new durable structure was not created. The 1991 referendum, according to the plan, was supposed to strengthen the legitimacy of the central government and formally and legally suppress separatist sentiments. But could it have legal consequences? The referendum procedure requires that the issue be clearly understood and not subject to multiple interpretations. In reality, the referendum invited people to simultaneously speak out on several issues, artificially combined into one phrase. The legal consequences of such a vote would be negligible. At the same time, the “Novo-Ogarevo process” was underway, during which lower-level autonomous entities acquired a new “patron” in the person of the central government. As experience has shown, this policy turned out to be a failure.
We must not forget about the personal factor, which ultimately decided the fate of the USSR. We are talking not only about disagreements in the CPSU Central Committee, which led to an attempted coup in August 1991. (It is known that it was then that the Baltic republics declared their independence, and soon Ukraine.) The confrontation between the leadership of the USSR and the RSFSR, which became the last the drop that destroyed the Soviet Union. Thus, we do not consider the collapse of the USSR to be either a random or inevitable event, but interpret it as a manifestation of social patterns that are not fully realized.
Conclusion
Analysis of the material presented in the work allows us to come to the following conclusions and generalizations.
The reasons for the collapse of the USSR lie on various levels - political, economic and spiritual. Exhausting opportunities for extensive development; a sharp drop in economic growth rates; the undivided dominance of the command-administrative system of economic management; further centralization in economic management; crisis of the system of non-economic coercion, lack of real economic incentives for workers; huge costs for the military-industrial complex; The economy of the USSR could no longer withstand competition with the West - all this is determined by the economic crisis.
The crisis of the political system was due to the fact that complete dominance in the socio-political life of the CPSU and Marxist-Leninist ideology; the determining role of the party leadership in making almost all decisions; intensifying repression against dissidents; increased bureaucratization in public administration; deepening crisis in interethnic relations.
In the spiritual sphere, comprehensive ideological control over culture and education was asserted; widespread double morality and double standards of behavior; increasing the gap between word and deed; avoidance of an objective analysis of the state of affairs in society; another round of rehabilitation of Stalinism; the growth of mass skepticism, political apathy, and cynicism; a catastrophic decline in the authority of management at all levels.
The pattern of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the nature of the predetermination of the collapse of the Soviet Union, is also exaggerated by many researchers. Rather, a group of people who wanted to come to power determined the fate of the USSR; there was a banal change from one political group to another, without taking into account the opinion of the majority of the population.
Thus, the collapse of the USSR was not a natural phenomenon, but rather an accidental one, since a country of such a scale needed at least another 10-20 years before it naturally came to naught. The main reason for the collapse, therefore, was the inability of the political forces of the Soviet Union to continue their policies.
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REX news agency publishes an article in two parts by historian Boris Rozhin (Crimea, Sevastopol) as part of the story “20 years without the USSR.”
7. The USSR collapsedand communists. Lenin and Stalin built who knows what, and then their heirsthey destroyed it themselves.
There is a classic attempt here to shift responsibility from the killer to the victim.
The statement itself postulates that the USSR was destroyed due to malicious intent. And the communists are to blame for this evil intent. They say that the entire heritage of our ancestors was wasted. In fact, everything is very transparent here. The Soviet elite of the mid-80s can be divided into those who wanted the collapse of the USSR and those who advocated its preservation. Those who wanted and worked for the collapse of the USSR were anti-communists, because together with the USSR they sought to destroy communism “in a single country.” In this they were helped by both anti-communist public groups and the generally anti-communist West. It was within the framework of their will and actions that the murder was carried out. That’s why the USSR was destroyed by anti-communists (of course, not without the help of other factors).
What is the fault of the “communists”, read those who wanted to preserve the country? After all, they had solid resources and public support expressed in the 1991 referendum. First of all, “in criminal negligence leading to the death of a person.” Having failed to provide adequate resistance to the anti-communists who were destroying the country, the elite groups that advocated the preservation of the USSR showed criminal inaction. This is their main historical fault. And the same share of responsibility lies with the pro-Soviet silent majority, which was criminally inactive at the moment when the anti-communists were killing the country. Moreover, what should be indicated separately, not only the communists, who constituted only a significant, but still percentage of the entire population of the country, were inactive. Those who did not have a party card were also inactive, but also silently watched as the USSR was killed. Therefore, the responsibility of communists and non-communists who were silent when the country was being killed is equal. Those people who dared to speak out during the period of collapse were rare - some were members of the party, others were not. But neither one nor the other can provide a complete alibi for their group - the silent majority of party and non-party members who voted for the preservation of the USSR showed equally criminal inaction. Therefore, for the most part, this pro-Soviet party and non-party majority, representatives who were already more than 18 years old during the Perestroika period, bears one degree or another of responsibility for not resisting the death of the country.
The responsibility of the killer and the one who did not stop him (although he could) are different, but, nevertheless, it exists. Therefore, of course, we must understand that without this “non-resistance” it would have been much more difficult for anti-communists to destroy the country. There are no calls to repentance here. Understanding this point is necessary so that the next time at a critical moment for the country, the silent majority does not just as passively watch the killer do his job.
8. The USSR collapsed because Stalin did not leave worthy heirs
This moment is especially funny, if only because Stalin did not leave any heirs at all, if only due to the circumstances of his death. Nevertheless, this stamp is often found, and what is especially interesting, among anti-communists. The logic here is simple - they say, okay, even if the “bloody tyrant” was an “effective manager, but he died, and there was no one to replace him. This is very revealing historical ignorance, since this thesis postulates the idea that statesmen of Stalin's caliber appear at the behest of human will. Stalin worked not with those whom he could imagine in his dreams, but with those who were at his disposal. When such “guilt” is attributed to Stalin, stretching into decades into the future, one can only ask who Stalin should have made a “worthy heir.” What store sells statesmen of this caliber, of whom there are at best 5-6 in the entire history of Russia? Who is the “magic correct successor” whom Stalin did not appoint? Beria? Well, so after his death he actually ruled the country, although he was killed. Is Stalin to blame for the murder of Beria? Or maybe Beria is to blame for allowing himself to be killed?
I wish I could find out the name of this very “worthy heir.” After all, from the position of post-knowledge, we know very well that there was no figure equal to Stalin after his death - we would like to hear alternative personalities. But there are none. Someone will say - yeah, that’s where you got caught - around Stalin there were only mediocrities and after his death there were also only mediocrities and will even quote something about “a lion leading the rams.”
In fact, the clip of Stalin's people's commissars was a group completely talented people. Talented in their narrow fields of activity. But to manually control such a complex structure as the USSR, a universal statist like Stalin was required, who was able to adequately manage the country in the multidimensional space of tasks and functions facing him. Everyone who came after Stalin did it worse. And not even because they were untalented - they simply did not possess all the qualities that Stalin had, and therefore ruled the country worse than Stalin in some respects. Therefore, claims to Stalin - “Damned one, where is the good heir?” are essentially a claim – “Bloody Stalin, why didn’t you find another bloody Stalin for us?” And you can’t undermine it - Stalin after Stalin, according to the logic of things, would definitely be no worse. In this regard, claims against the “successor of Stalin” are reminiscent of the current search in modern Russia for a “new Stalin.” It’s true that it is not clear, if in the USSR for 38 years after Stalin’s death they did not find a figure equal to him, then why should we expect such a figure literally right now? Is Stalin also to blame? To say that Stalin is responsible for what happened in the country after his death is ridiculous. Stalin was in demand until his death as a leader. After his death - from those who ruled the country after him. From Beria, Khrushchev, Malenkov, Brezhnev and others. But as we know, Stalin is the most convenient historical character in order to blame everything on him - from “unprepared heirs” to forest fires in 2010.
9. In 1991, a natural revenge of the “white” losers in the Civil War took place.”.
Despite its obvious ahistorical nature, this thesis can often be found in discussions. With him, in principle, everything is very transparent - the opponents of the Bolsheviks, known as “whites,” were defeated in the Civil War and were either destroyed or expelled from the country. By the time the USSR collapsed, all that remained of them were pitiful scraps of mossy old men. What was the revenge? Were the losers able to return to their homeland? In fact, no—the vast majority died abroad. Were those who returned able to restore their pre-revolutionary privileges? No. Have they returned to power? No. Did you get the property back? No. What's the revenge, brothers? The fact that, sitting abroad, they gloated over the destruction of their homeland? Eco has fallen asleep in his old age.
In reality, who is in power now? They come from the CPSU, the KGB, the Komsomol, that is, products of the very system that drove the “whites” out of the country. Therefore, there is no revenge of the “whites” in nature. Those “whites” lost a long time ago, and those “reds” won a long time ago, and that Civil War ended long ago, no matter how the current “white sectarians” raged about its results.
In 1991, it was not the “whites” of the Revolution who won. The degenerated anti-communist partyocracy and the West won, and together they plundered the destroyed country. The role of the “whites” is, at most, wedding generals, at the festival of the total cutting of their former homeland. Therefore, the current “white revanchists” are very funny in their naive belief in the “great white revenge”, since during the entire period of the struggle of the West with the USSR, they obediently trudged along in the train of the army, which set as its goal the destruction of their homeland. As a result, the country was destroyed (without any serious participation of the “whites”), but it was not the “whites” who came to power. This is the “Great White Revenge”. Of course, there will be cries about the coat of arms and other pre-revolutionary symbols as visual evidence of “victory,” but we can just as well say that the Soviet anthem testifies to the “revenge of the Reds.”
10. The reasons are not important, the USSR was destroyed and that’s good.
This thesis is purely ideological in nature, but at the same time it is one of the most frequently encountered. The anti-communist and anti-Soviet genesis of this thesis is obvious. From the point of view of such people, the USSR was an absolute all-encompassing evil and therefore had to be destroyed. And it was destroyed, how and why it was done is not important. The main message is that the USSR has been destroyed, receive it and sign it. Of course, there is no analysis or reflection here, not even close - a purely ideological work on the cremation of the body. Why is such work being carried out and further attempts are being made to convince the population that the destruction of their country is good?
First of all, because the silent pro-Soviet majority has not gone away. It turned out to be a stranger at the post-Soviet “celebration of life.” Of course, there is a certain pattern in this - you have to pay for your silence during the murder of your own Motherland - in blood, shame, humiliation. This point is partially realized. But at the same time, sympathies for the Soviet system have not gone away, and for the current state of affairs, these sympathies pose a certain threat, since this very silent pro-Soviet majority is, in fact, a nutritional base for groups whose goal is the revival of the country/empire /union based on Soviet experience. Shame is shame, but you can’t always feel sorry for yourself and engage in self-flagellation? In recent years, certain progress has been made towards the self-organization of this very silent majority, therefore, from the point of view of those who rejoice at the death of the USSR, it is necessary further work by demoralization and atomization of the pro-Soviet majority, which is still silent, but at a certain moment may, unlike 1991, speak out. In this regard, it is worth stating that the discussion on the topic of whether it is good or bad that the USSR collapsed is not only and not so much a discussion about the past and history. This is, first of all, a discussion about the present and the future, about the choice of development path.
From the point of view of modern Westernizers, the Soviet experience and Soviet history should be sealed in the past and labeled “criminal.” Therefore, when you see that the discussion is moving into this plane, you must understand that active ideological work is underway aimed at preventing the current ideological course from being changed.
The current wave of sympathy for the USSR, expressed in the idealization of Brezhnev’s times or the glorification of Stalin, poses a danger to the pro-Western course, first of all, because from the past, which should be sealed, ideals incompatible with our ideological reality penetrate into our everyday life. A conflict arises between current ideals and the seemingly destroyed Soviet ones, the bearers of which are beginning to become the youth, which in the future creates a certain threat. And, of course, some would like young people to really believe that the reasons for the collapse of the USSR are not important. The dominant point of view should be the emotionally charged assessment “USSR = evil.” Therefore, a meaningful discussion with such characters is not possible in principle, since people simply do their job. Such characters can be clearly seen, say, in the program “ Historical process“, where the position of “The USSR is absolute evil” is very clearly revealed in the speeches of Svanidze and company.
But what is especially pleasing is that every year the percentage of young people who seek to understand the reasons for the death of the USSR is growing. They grew up after the death of the country and their interest is their own reflection, young people who were not involved either directly or indirectly in the death of the country.
Their interest can no longer be attributed to the stupid Soviet agitprop, all conscious life they listened to exactly the opposite - about the criminal past, the bloody Stalin, repressions, the Gulag and an ineffective economy, stupid Soviets, etc., and they were especially hammered into it that “the USSR is evil.” But as practice shows, this thesis is less and less satisfying to young people, who are looking in the past, albeit often idealized, for answers and ways on which to build the future. After all, who else but the youth thinks about how and where the country is moving - they have to live in it. Not finding answers in the bleak present, they look for them in the recent past.
And while interest in society, and primarily among young people, in the country’s development paths will continue, huge sympathy for the Soviet experience is objectively inevitable, since in the foreseeable past the USSR is the closest and most understandable example of how to make the country better, but with taking into account the sad experience of the collapse of the country, so as not to repeat the mistakes made in Soviet times. Therefore, attempts to divert public discourse from analyzing the complex of reasons that led to the death of the USSR will inevitably fail. The best way to describe this process is to quote Lincoln: “ You can deceive some of the peoplefor a while, and all the people for a while, but you cannot deceive all the people all the time.it's time».
The times when it was possible to deceive the entire people all the time are gradually ending. And therefore, a comprehensive study of the causes of the death of the USSR is extremely important. First of all, for our future.
Conclusion
In general, we can talk about this topic for a long time, which once again shows the complexity of such a historical problem as the “collapse of the USSR.” I don't pretend to cover all aspects - that would require a slightly different investment of time and effort. 10 theses are what, 20 years later, seem important to me in the public discourse about the causes of the death of the Soviet Union.
Despite the fact that 20 years have passed since the death of the country, complete reflection has not occurred in society. All sorts of mythologies, both Soviet and anti-Soviet, are swarming in our heads; a comprehensive, detailed analysis of the causes of the death of the USSR has not yet been made, which means that society still lacks a clear understanding of how and why the Soviet Union died. This misunderstanding poses a certain threat, since the technologies that were used to destroy it are quite applicable to modern Russia. Moreover, they are already being used against her. Therefore, the main point in the permanent discussions around the causes of the death of the USSR is to seek an understanding of how to prevent a repetition of the destruction of our state; otherwise, after a certain number of years, our descendants will argue why the Russian Federation collapsed and who is to blame for it.
perestroika collapse of the Soviet Union
In the early 70s there was struck according to all concepts of turning to market economy. The very word “market” has become a criterion of ideological unreliability. From the second half of the 70s. The organization of industrial production began to change. Industrial research and production associations (NPOs) appeared. The practical result of such measures was only gigantism. The desired merger of science and production did not happen. But during these years there was a rapid and successful merger and interweaving of the official economy with the shadow economy - various kinds of semi-legal and illegal production and trading activities, into which entire enterprises were drawn. The income of the shadow economy amounted to many billions. By the beginning of the 80s. The ineffectiveness of attempts at limited reform of the Soviet system became obvious. The country entered a period of deep crisis.
Due to these and many other reasons, by the mid-80s. the opportunity for a gradual, painless transition to a new system of social relations in Russia was hopelessly missed. The spontaneous degeneration of the system changed the entire way of life of Soviet society: the rights of managers and enterprises were redistributed, departmentalism and social inequality increased. The nature of production relations within enterprises changed, labor discipline began to decline, apathy and indifference, theft, disrespect for honest work, and envy of those who earn more became widespread. At the same time, non-economic coercion to work remained in the country. Soviet man, alienated from the distribution of the produced product, turned into a performer working not out of conscience, but out of compulsion. The ideological motivation for work developed in the post-revolutionary years weakened along with the belief in the imminent triumph of communist ideals; in parallel, the flow of petrodollars decreased and the external and internal debt of the state grew.
In the early 80s. Without exception, all layers of Soviet society suffered from lack of freedom and experienced psychological discomfort. The intelligentsia wanted true democracy and individual freedom.
Most workers and employees associated the need for change with better organization and remuneration, and a more equitable distribution of social wealth. Part of the peasantry expected to become the true masters of their land and their labor.
However, ultimately, completely different forces determined the direction and nature of reform of the Soviet system. These forces were the Soviet nomenclature, burdened by communist conventions and the dependence of personal well-being on official position.
Thus, by the beginning of the 80s. the Soviet totalitarian system actually loses support in society and ceases to be legitimate. Its collapse becomes a matter of time.
The first concrete step towards political reform was the decisions of the extraordinary twelfth session of the USSR Supreme Council (eleventh convocation), held on November 29 - December 1, 1988. These decisions provided for a change in the structure of the highest bodies of power and public administration of the country, empowering the newly established Congress of People's Deputies and elected by it The USSR Supreme Council has real power functions, as well as changes in the electoral system, primarily the introduction of elections on an alternative basis.
1989 was a year of radical changes, especially in the political structure of society. The elections of people's deputies of the USSR that took place in 1989 (March - May) were preceded by an election campaign unprecedented in our country, which began at the end of 1988. The opportunity to nominate several alternative candidates (9,505 candidates were nominated for 2,250 deputy seats) finally gave Soviet citizens a truly choose one of several.
A third of people's deputies were elected from public organizations, which allowed the communists, as the most massive " public organization“to have a majority at the Congress, or, as they say in civilized countries, a lobby. This was announced as an achievement: the share of communists among people's deputies was 87% against 71.5% of the previous convocation, on the basis of which the resounding conclusion was made that in conditions of freedom of choice the authority of the party was confirmed.
In the elections held on March 26, 1989 in 1,500 territorial and national-territorial constituencies, 89.8% of those included in the voter lists participated. These elections marked a significant shift in society towards democracy, or so it seemed at the time. The work of the Congress was followed by the whole country - a decrease in labor productivity was recorded everywhere.
The First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (May 25 - June 9, 1989) became a very major political event. This has never happened before in the history of this country.
Of course, now one can look with irony at the battles that took place at the Congress, but then it looked like a victory for democracy. There were few practical results of the Congress, in particular, a new Supreme Council of the USSR was elected. Several general resolutions were adopted, for example the Decree on the main directions of domestic and foreign policy of the USSR.
Discussions at the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (December 12-24, 1989) were more businesslike in nature compared to the first Congress. The Second Congress adopted 36 normative acts, incl. 5 laws and 26 regulations. One of the central issues on the agenda of the Second Congress of People's Deputies was the discussion of measures to improve the economy. The issue of combating organized crime was discussed. The congress considered reports by a commission devoted to both foreign policy problems (assessment of the non-aggression treaty between the USSR and Germany of August 23, 1939, political assessment of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 1979) and domestic political issues (about the Gdlyan investigative group, about the events in Tbilisi April 9, 1989, about privileges)...
When the First Congress of People's Deputies opened, many pinned their hopes on it for better life. But, like many of the hopes of our people, they were not destined to come true. The First Congress is now called a “game of democracy,” which, in fact, it was. By the Second Congress, people's interest had already noticeably subsided. It has already become clear to the people that life cannot be made better in one magical stroke. Reform of the electoral system was a necessary matter, but it gave the people little concrete, urgent value.
Introduction of the presidency.
In the summer-autumn of 1989, reformers in the CPSU, who did not want to get rid of the tenacious embrace of the conservatives, gave the democrats the opportunity to gain political strength and influence, allowing them to present center-right unity in the CPSU as a strategic line, and not as a temporary tactical maneuver. The situation in the country required a decisive development of a course towards a mixed economy, the creation of a rule of law state and the conclusion of a new union treaty. All this objectively worked for the Democrats.
By the winter of 1989/90, the political situation had changed significantly. Gorbachev, not without reason, feared that the spring elections in the republics would lead to the victory of radical forces (“ Democratic Russia", RUH and others), who will immediately - following the example of the Baltic states - try to take an independent position in relation to the Supreme Council of the Union headed by him, took a step that he and his like-minded people opposed several months ago. Using his authority in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which he headed, he managed - with the resistance of the Interregional Deputy Group - to pass a decision on the establishment of the post of President of the USSR. Having become President, Gorbachev received broad political powers and thereby greatly strengthened his power in the country.
Then the political struggle turned to state level. A de facto plurality of power arose, in which the union and republican structures could neither act without regard to each other, nor reach an agreement among themselves. The “war of laws” between the Union and the republics was fought with with varying success and by the winter of 1990/91 it reached its climax due to the tragic events in the Baltic states, the struggle over the Union Treaty and the Union budget. All this happened against the background of the rapid collapse of the economy and interethnic confrontation between the republics and within them.
As a result, there has been another shift in the mentality of society. After democrats came to power in the large industrial centers of Russia and Ukraine, a lot of time passed, but the situation continued to deteriorate. Moreover, democracy was clearly degenerating into anarchy, increasing the longing for a “strong hand.” Similar sentiments took hold of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: in December, fearing unpredictable developments, it delegated additional powers to the President, and at the same time additional responsibility. Gorbachev, in January of this year, formed a new Cabinet of Ministers, in which key positions were occupied by representatives of the “enlightened” bureaucracy and the military-industrial complex.
Speaking about the USSR, it is necessary to make a significant reservation about the first president of the Soviet Union, who became Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, since this also played a role in the history of the USSR, in particular in the collapse. The election of Gorbachev to the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was not at all predetermined by the alignment of political forces. There was, as Mikhail Sergeevich himself admitted, another candidate. But as a result of a hidden hardware game, inaccessible to mere mortals, it was his team that won.
Naturally, Gorbachev needed to consolidate his hold on power. And in order to ideologically justify his fight against the “sclerotic gerontocrats”, the old party guard, he was forced to proclaim a course towards the renewal of socialism with its leading and guiding force - the CPSU. At first, in April, when people mourned the alcohol campaign, personnel changes began. One after another, the party leaders of the regions and republics went to their well-deserved rest. The cleaning of the apparatus was supervised by the now half-forgotten Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, and in two years he completed his task - he planted loyal people for all key positions.
This is where all the party “perestroikas” before Gorbachev, as a rule, ended, but Ligachev’s influence in the party increased so much that the secretary general felt his competitor’s breath on the back of his head. And before the new nomenklatura had time to fall to the trough, Gorbachev announced that perestroika was continuing.
However, it was not so easy to “overthrow” Ligachev in the party arena, and Gorbachev, in the end, had to create alternative structures in the form of the Supreme Council and the Congress of People’s Deputies in order to keep the apparatchiks in constant tension. In sitting on two chairs at once, Gorbachev found an undoubted benefit for himself: the partycrats could always be intimidated by the democrats, and the democrats by the glory of the CPSU.
The struggle in the country's political arena was mainly around two points. The first is the general scenario for the development of perestroika. Will this be a gradual ingrowth of established management structures into the market economy and the introduction of state-bureaucratic capitalism “from above”? Or, on the contrary, the liquidation of these structures and the spontaneous formation of capitalism “from below”?
The second key point: since reforms require obviously unpopular measures, responsibility for their adoption and all associated costs are assigned, as a rule, to political opponents. Most often, the Center acted as the scapegoat. This was manifested, for example, during the political scandal that erupted in the Supreme Soviet of Russia, when the Union government announced a decision to introduce negotiated prices for a number of goods (in November 1990). Meanwhile, this decision was agreed upon with B.N. Yeltsin, and with I.S. Silaev. The opposite cases are also known, when
The center itself found the “goat”: the five percent sales tax introduced by decree of the President, which took just under a billion (931.5 million) rubles from the pockets of the population in January-February 1991 alone, was “blamed” on the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR.
By the end of 1990, a stalemate had established: neither the communist reformers nor the liberals could, each individually, achieve positive changes in the economy, politics, and social sphere. The main thing is that they could not stand alone against the threat of general anarchy. The first - because they have largely lost the support of the people, the second - because after their first victories they managed to lose many of their adherents.
Understanding of the need for political compromise was observed in both one and the other camp. Communist reformers (and even communist conservatives represented by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the RSFSR) in their documents of the second half of 1990 called for civil harmony, expressed their readiness to create not just a bloc of forces of “socialist orientation”, but to enter into an alliance with all democratic parties and movements. Their opponents, having had a hard time resolving the practical issues they faced when they came to power at the local, and in some places at the republican level, also seemed to be internally ready to cooperate. The idea of a compromise with part of the apparatus and the center and the creation of a strong executive power is, for example, the leitmotif of the December program article by G.Kh. Popov, entitled, not without pretension: “What to do?” The idea of civil harmony through the suspension or complete dissolution of all political parties became popular by the end of 1990 and appeared on different flanks of the liberal democratic movement. A.A. also talked about this. Sobchak, and the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia V.V. Zhirinovsky. The liberals apparently realized that their time was running out before it began.
The political wind rose of perestroika has changed in Once again. An acute crisis of the existing political system broke out. Having proclaimed the slogan “All power to the Soviets!”, the reformers did not even think about the fact that the Soviets, which had ceased to be the transmission belts of the CPSU, were unable to organize a normal process political development. The CPSU press sharply criticized the “incompetent democrats” who did not know how to organize the work of those Soviets in which they held the majority. “Incompetent democrats” nodded at “sabotage” on the part of the former ruling caste - the executive apparatus, mafia structures. However, the point is deeper. Political crisis the end of 1990 - the result not so much of incompetence or sabotage as of an outdated type of statehood.
Each political force sought to find its own way out of this crisis. The most painful reaction to it was the “state estates” - those strata whose very existence was now at stake. They increasingly energetically pushed the President and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to establish an authoritarian presidential regime under nominal Soviet power. Gorbachev, although not without hesitation, was forced to do this. He needed support, but there was nowhere to get it: the CPSU had lost its mobilization abilities, and cooperation with the liberals did not work out - the inertia of confrontation affected it.
However, even if it had happened, the authoritarian transformation of the regime could hardly have been avoided. For liberals - at least those of them who determine the weather on the political horizon - considered the strengthening of executive power and authoritarian methods of transition to a market economy as something long-term, and not as a temporary tactical measure, therefore, strictly speaking, not only democrats, but and they were liberals only in quotation marks. It was enough to read the draft Constitution of Russia to see: the totalitarian regime is supposed to be replaced not by universal democracy, but by authoritarian power. At the same time, however, unlike the communist reformers, the liberals aimed at changing the foundation of the political system, at transforming Soviet power into a parliamentary republic.
The year 1990 was marked by the unilateral decision of some union republics (primarily the Baltic ones) on self-determination and the creation of independent national states.
Attempts by the union center to influence these decisions with economic measures were ultimately unsuccessful. A wave of proclamation of the sovereignty of union republics, the election of their presidents, and the introduction of new names swept across the country. The republics sought to get rid of the dictates of the center by declaring their independence.
The real danger of an uncontrolled collapse of the USSR, threatening unpredictable consequences, forced the center and the republics to look for a path to compromises and agreements. The idea of concluding a new union treaty was put forward by the Baltic popular fronts back in 1988. But until mid-1989, it did not find support among any political leadership country, nor among people's deputies who have not yet freed themselves from the remnants of imperial sentiments. At that time, it seemed to many that the agreement was not the most important thing. The center finally “ripened” to realize the importance of the Union Treaty only after the “parade of sovereignties” changed the Union beyond recognition, when centrifugal tendencies gained strength.
It is impossible not to mention the putsch in 91, since it accelerated the process of the collapse of the USSR, that is, after the putsch, the USSR actually ceased to exist.
The signing of the new Union Treaty, scheduled for August 20, 1991, prompted conservatives to take decisive action, since the agreement deprived the top of the CPSU of real power, posts and privileges. According to the secret agreement of M. Gorbachev with B. Yeltsin and the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev, which became known to the Chairman of the KGB V. Kryuchkov, after the signing of the agreement it was planned to replace the Prime Minister of the USSR V. Pavlov with N. Nazarbayev. The same fate awaited the Minister of Defense, Kryuchkov himself, and a number of other high-ranking officials.
However, on the night of August 19, 1991, President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev was forcibly removed from power. A group of high-ranking officials, which included Vice President G. Yanaev, KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov, Defense Minister D. Yazov, and Prime Minister V. Pavlov, formed the self-proclaimed, unconstitutional State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR (GKChP).
By resolutions of the State Emergency Committee, a state of emergency was introduced in a number of regions of the country, mainly in the RSFSR, and rallies, demonstrations, and strikes were prohibited. The activities of democratic parties and organizations, newspapers were suspended, and control was established over the media.
But, for only three days the State Emergency Committee was able to hold out in power, from the first days it encountered active resistance Russians.