The entry of post-Soviet republics into NATO and its impact on the national security of the Russian Federation Egorov, Igor Stepanovich. sea soul

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Egorov, Igor Stepanovich. The entry of post-Soviet republics into NATO and its impact on the national security of the Russian Federation: dissertation... candidate of political sciences: 23.00.02 / Egorov Igor Stepanovich; [Place of protection: Moscow. state region University].- Moscow, 2011.- 231 p.: ill. RSL OD, 61 11-23/312

Introduction

CHAPTER 1. Military-political threats to Russia's national security at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries 12

1.1. NATO's expansion to the East in the context of globalization processes... 12

1.2. The entry of post-Soviet states into NATO as a guarantee against political pressure from Russia 20

1.3. NATO political stereotypes regarding Russia 35

Chapter 44 Conclusions

CHAPTER 2. Military-political cooperation of post-Soviet states and NATO as a threat to Russia’s national security .,45

2.1. Policy of national elites of post-Soviet states regarding accession to NATO 45

2.2. Entry of post-Soviet republics into the North Atlantic Alliance: the illusion of “congruence” between NATO and the European Union 61

2.3. The entry of post-Soviet states into NATO as a factor in the weakening of the North Atlantic Alliance 75

Chapter 108 Conclusions

CHAPTER 3. Partnership and confrontation between Russia and NATO in the context of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation 113

3.1. Russia and NATO: problems of military-political interaction and counteraction 113

3.2. Relations between Russia and the United States as the core of partnership and confrontation between Russia and NATO 130

3.3. The new military-political space in Europe and its consequences for the national security of Russia 162

Chapter 171 Conclusions

Conclusion 173

Literature

The entry of post-Soviet states into NATO as a guarantee against political pressure from Russia

However, the scale of the changes in relations between East and West became clear only at the end of the decade. The old order not only changed, but also began to disappear, and with it the divisions that had existed in Europe since the 40s. The slow formation of a new structure in Europe began. In Central and Eastern Europe, previously impenetrable barriers to normal international relations began to be dismantled, and democratic principles and structures began to be established.

In November 1989, the Berlin Wall, a symbol of the divided capital, was destroyed and by October 1990 Germany became a unified country. The political stagnation of the Cold War ended and new governments were elected in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania. The Baltic countries: Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia gained independence, and political transformations took place in Albania. The Soviet Union collapsed. The Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan became sovereign.

The Alliance's London Declaration of July 1990 set the direction for NATO's further transition from the Cold War era to an era of cooperation and partnership. In 1991, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Organization practically gave the United States a free hand. In November this year, Alliance governments defined the scope and scope of security expansion and adopted a new Strategic Concept, making East-West cooperation a central and integral part of NATO policy. New concept NATO provided the Alliance with a certain base necessary for its continued existence in the region.

The transformation of NATO from a Cold War weapon into an instrument of “peace and harmony” on the continent showed that the United States does not want to lose a political instrument for maintaining power in the world. At the initiative of the United States, there arose public opinion on cooperation with the NATO bloc to resolve both general military issues (conventional arms control in Europe, preventing war on the continent) and relatively private political problems - the situation in certain areas of the Euro-Atlantic region, without this bloc recognizing any police role.

Cooperation between Russia and NATO developed in this direction until the decisions of the Brussels session of the NATO Council in early 1994, when two ideas arose: the first was to create a cooperation program for achieving peace “Partnership for Peace” (PfP) as a complement to the NATO system and at the same time, the possibility of the block going beyond its competence; second, expanding the Alliance's ability to respond to crisis situations, in particular the conflict in former Yugoslavia in the early 90s. Neither of these was at one time challenged by Russia as an attempt to unilaterally change the rules of behavior that had developed at the end of the Cold War; the United States simply ignored Russia, taking advantage of its preoccupation with internal problems.

In essence, the NATO treaty is a surprisingly simple document, beginning with a short “preamble” that explains that states are acceding to the treaty in the spirit of the UN Charter, and that the treaty gains legitimacy from that charter. The rest of the text consists of only 14 articles, which set out the most important obligations that member states undertake in relation to each other and the union as a whole. Some articles deserve special attention. Article 3 lays the foundation for collective defense planning and Member States undertake under this article to maintain and develop, individually and collectively, their defense capabilities. Article 4 sets out the framework for consultations between member states in cases where one of them perceives a threat to its security. It is this article that highlights the critical importance of the Alliance's broad consultation process and explains the reasons for the Alliance's adoption of new missions aimed at strengthening security in the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole. Article 5 specifically reaffirms the right to individual or collective self-defense as defined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. It states that countries that have signed North Atlantic Treaty, have agreed that an attack on one or more of these countries will be considered an attack on all these countries as a whole. Article 6 defines geographical region to which Article 5 applies.

Article 9 establishes the North Atlantic Council as the only official body directly created by the treaty, and the council is charged with creating "such subordinate bodies" as may be necessary to achieve the purposes of the treaty. The modern structure of committees and agencies subsequently created by the council, which draws on appropriate international civilian and military components, forms the organization now known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In other articles of the treaty, each of the participating countries assumes specific obligations related to defense and security. None of these obligations affect the rights or obligations of states under the UN Charter. Each of these countries also undertakes to contribute in various ways to the development of peaceful and friendly international relations, including "strengthening their free institutions", "achieving a greater understanding of the principles on which those institutions are founded", and "promoting the creation of conditions of stability and prosperity " The agreement also provides for the possibility of activities to eliminate conflicts in the field of international economic policy of the member states and develop economic cooperation between them.

However, membership in and cooperation with NATO is not just about planning for a rainy day. It is aimed at maintaining the great power of the United States on the authority and policies of its allies. Under the slogan of strengthening political and military cooperation with other countries and the desire to create a united Europe, the United States is strengthening its political image in the world.

NATO political stereotypes regarding Russia

The Western European component of the problem of NATO expansion is quite relevant, since the confrontation between consistent “Euro-Atlantists” and supporters of reducing the American presence on the continent was as much a part1 of the overall picture as the contradictions between “neo-isolationists” and Euro-Atlantists in the United States and their corresponding groups in the Russian political elite. Even more significant is that the contradictions within the alliance had a decisive influence on the course of discussions and on the balance of power between the “neo-isolationists” and their opponents in the American establishment.

It should be recalled that the very idea of creating the North Atlantic Alliance in 1948-49. was put forward not by Washington, but by Western Europeans - primarily the British to consolidate special Anglo-American relations, as well as the French, who wanted to create a barrier to a possible German revenge in the form of American armed forces stationed in continental Europe on an ongoing basis. Western European elites were in equally were concerned about a fairly radical shift to the left of public sentiment in France, Italy and other countries and hoped, through the formation of a military alliance, to transform internal political threats to the establishment in such a way that they would take on the nature of problems related to national security.

As is known, over the four decades that passed from the creation of NATO until the fall of the Berlin Wall, relations between the Alliance's allies were far from cloudless. At the same time, as a rule, periods of a more restrained attitude of the Americans towards their European allies (for example, during the presidency of D. Eisenhower) were marked by active efforts by Europeans, primarily the British, Italians, Germans and small countries of Western Europe, to maintain the transatlantic axis. In other times (as, for example, under R. Reagan), it was the Americans who took on the main mission of maintaining cohesion in the Alliance. However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, according to former US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, a previously unfamiliar sense of mutual disappointment in the effectiveness and objectives of the Alliance on both sides of the Atlantic made itself felt.

On the American side, the most frequently cited reason for the cooling was the growing dissatisfaction with the uneven distribution of material costs for European security needs and the reluctance of European NATO allies to take on more responsibility by increasing defense spending. Reducing defense items in the federal budget has been a traditional part of the program of the Democratic majority in the US Congress. Now, with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, an increasing number of Republican congressmen began to show their interest in redirecting these financial flows. Thus, the contours of a very broad coalition of supporters of reducing the American share in NATO funding were taking shape, within which the ideology of a small neo-isolationist core coincided with the real interests of a significant part of the American establishment. Ideologically neutral calls to reduce spending on the security of allies, primarily for reasons of economy, found understanding among the general public, and subsequently became the most popular argument of opponents of NATO expansion.

At hearings in the US Congress, the budgetary costs associated with US membership in NATO were estimated at $150-170 billion per year.20 As noted in the American press, this figure significantly exceeded the costs of all other members of the Alliance combined. Influential figures on the liberal flank, such as Barney Frank and Colorado Representative Patricia Schroeder, have loudly railed against American taxpayer money being spent on defense. Western European countries, which, instead of military spending, direct funds to provide their citizens with free education and healthcare, which America cannot afford. According to the influential liberal magazine Atlantic Monthly, which called North Atlantic Alliance"an extraordinary anachronism," the United States "has shouldered too much of the burden of responsibility for Europe and carried it too long. It's time to put America first." Let us note that the tone of such discussions in the United States was typologically similar to the discussions of the same time in the USSR and Russia regarding the unjustified costs of subsidies to “poor relatives” from among friendly countries and union republics.

In addition to disagreements over collective security spending, the United States was increasingly at odds with its European allies on military-strategic issues. The Europeans, especially Germany, expressed their disagreement with the military doctrine of the Alliance developed by the Americans, which placed nuclear deterrence of the enemy at the forefront. Looking back, we can rightfully say that in 1990-93. A significant threat to American hegemony in European affairs was posed, of course, not by the disintegrating Soviet Union, and certainly not by Russia voluntarily inflicting blow after blow on itself, but by internal disagreements on European security issues, both among the American elite and among NATO allies. Among the latter, the most consistent role is the role of a counterweight to American hegemony

France continued to play. It was Paris that was the main potential ally of the American “neo-isolationists,” as well as those few in Eastern Europe who already at that time believed that the limitless growth of American influence, instead of solving European security problems, could, on the contrary, itself turn into the main problem. However, in the real situation of the early 1990s, French attempts to contain American ambitions did not meet with support in the east, gripped by the ecstasy of geopolitical self-destruction. In particular, there was no understanding of the French objections to the creation in December 1991 of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, established on the initiative of the United States and Germany - the first NATO "lounge" for conducting political discussions with the participation of Eastern Europeans and former Soviet republics. As the prominent American Euro-Atlanticist Leslie-Gelb noted, “nobody wants to reduce the American presence in Europe - neither Western nor Eastern Europeans, nor the Soviet republics, no one, with the exception of Paris

Entry of post-Soviet republics into the North Atlantic Alliance: the illusion of “congruence” between NATO and the European Union

The European orientation of Russian mass consciousness can hardly be correctly explained only by the foreign policy ideas of Russians (the United States, unlike Western Europe, is an antagonist of Russia), geographic proximity, cultural and historical reminiscences. No less important here is the existential component of the image of the West: within its framework, Western experience is quite clearly differentiated into American and European, and the latter is recognized as much more adequate to the needs and demands of Russian society.

The attractiveness of the Western European example for Russians lies in the social orientation of European economic institutions, in their characteristic wider system social guarantees. In this regard, the popularity enjoyed by the “Swedish” (or “Scandinavian”) model in Russia is very characteristic (in the survey conducted, the example of Sweden took second place among European countries after Germany). This orientation of Russian public opinion is all the more remarkable because Russian liberal-oriented media inform the audience little about the socio-economic institutions of Western European countries.

One of the paradoxes of Russians’ attitude to Western experience is the discrepancy between its attractiveness (especially in the Western European version) and mass ideas about the optimal path for Russia’s development. Survey data on the problem of “choosing a path” is very contradictory and often does not coincide with each other, but still allows us to state a growing tendency towards rejection of the Western model and preference for a special Russian path, the content of which, however, remains extremely unclear. This trend obviously reflected the influence of the foreign policy component on the existential, general deterioration of Russian-Western relations. No less important, it seems to us, is another factor that we encountered during in-depth interviews with residents of Russian cities.

Many respondents spoke about the unacceptability of the “Western path,” citing not its own qualities, but the impossibility of its implementation in Russian conditions. It seems that a national inferiority complex, a lack of faith in the country’s strengths and capabilities, reinforced by the protracted crisis and failures of modernization reforms, is a socio-psychological factor that largely determines the attitude of Russian public opinion to Western experience and its ideas about the prospects for the development of Russia itself.

Winston Churchill said the following: “Russia has never been as strong as she would like, but she has never been weak as some people think.” Russia has always played a significant role in world affairs. But the problem for our country was that throughout long period Over time, a situation arose in which Russia was on one side, and practically the rest of the world on the other: Russia was returning to the family of civilized nations. Russia is ready to act within the framework of international procedures and rules, within the framework of civilized communication to achieve common goals. Russia, due to its geopolitical position, being a European country, intends to pursue a balanced policy in both the East and the West.

The geopolitical situation, which changed radically after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 1991, brought to the fore a new threat - Islamic fundamentalism. And it was the fight against international terrorism (of which the ongoing operation in Chechnya is a part) that, according to respondents, became the main point of contact between the interests of Russia and NATO. In general, 25% of respondents say that the interests of these two parties coincide, but almost twice as many respondents (48%) believe that these interests are incompatible. It should be noted here that the majority of respondents who answered the open question about in what areas and spheres the interests of Russia and NATO coincide (22%) confidently named the fight against international terrorism. Terrorism is the main area in which not only cooperation, but also pooling of efforts is possible. Speaking about other lines of cooperation, respondents came to the conclusion that maintaining peace and security on the planet as a whole also meets the interests of both the North Atlantic Alliance and our country: “Fight for peace and security”; “in,maintaining peace on the planet”; "preserving peace on Earth".

Some of the respondents are inclined to view the relationship between our country and NATO in the plane of Russia’s existential, civilizational self-determination: These liberal-minded respondents define Russia as a country building capitalism and a democratic society of the Western type. And therefore, as they believe, it would be completely justified for our country to strive for a bloc of Western countries, which NATO serves as the personification. From the logic of their reasoning it follows that even such a radical form of cooperation as Russia’s entry into the North Atlantic Alliance is desirable and possible.

At the same time, another part of the respondents insists on a fundamental difference between Russia and the countries of the alliance. Historically, they believe, there are more differences and contradictions between us than similarities. Those surveyed see a divergence of interests between Russia and NATO in the following issues.

Relations between Russia and the United States as the core of partnership and confrontation between Russia and NATO

Is NATO's expansion to the East, in the context of its multi-vector expansion, a source of threats for Russia, and if so, in what sense? In the opinion of the author of this work, there are sufficient grounds to assess the expansion of the Alliance as a real threat from military-strategic, political, and cultural-civilizational points of view. The lack of obviousness for a number of experts and politicians of the military threat from NATO is associated with its dynamic nature, under which in this case This refers to the growing aggressiveness of the Alliance as its composition changes and the elites regroup as a result of the victory of supporters of a tougher offensive strategy over the “doves.” In confirmation of the bloc's peaceful intentions towards Russia, one can always quote from statements made in a previous historical period, or by officials who, to one degree or another, lost in the fight against supporters of expansion. However, if the initial criterion for judging a threat is not the intentions of the parties (a purely subjective factor), but their material capabilities of causing mutual damage - and this is precisely the method of determining the threat adopted in American and NATO practice - then in the current state of Russian defense and armed forces Russia's forces are vulnerable beyond any expansion. This is especially true for conventional weapons in Europe, in which Russia is now four times inferior to NATO.44

Of course, the “Yugoslav-type” threat against Russia cannot be considered realistic as long as there remains at least an approximate equality of strategic nuclear forces between the United States and Russia and the possibility of their use in response to aggression exists. However, the Prime Minister's statement

Hungary V. Orban in the fall of 1999 on the admissibility of placement nuclear missiles on Hungarian soil “in a crisis situation” in combination with anti-Russian diplomatic provocations in Poland indicate the unconditional presence of a potential threat posed by new and future members of the Alliance, which can become actualized in the shortest possible time if the Eastern European ruling elites deem it necessary “in a crisis situation” direct socio-economic discontent in their countries against an external enemy and will find understanding on this issue among the most expansionist-minded American and NATO officials.45 It should be remembered that NATO refused to include in the text of the Founding Act a commitment not to place nuclear weapons on the territory of future members and even more so will not give it in the future. Although NATO's senior leadership and its individual members; At the moment, he is not considering conducting any military actions against Russia, be it. then nuclear or conventional forces, as a realistic scenario, demonstration of belligerent intentions at a lower level, especially by states; eastern and southern flanks, poses an independent threat to -; Russia because it affects psychologically vulnerable elite groups that have lost immunity to various forms of blackmail and forceful pressure both within the country and outside.

Here lies a rather vague boundary between military and non-military threats, the latter being much more relevant for today’s Russia, although many in the West seem to them to be abstract and therefore of secondary importance. The galvanization of NATO and its attack on the vital interests of Russia revives disputes between “Westerners” and their various opponents, which are largely destructive for the entire national identity, as well as discussions about whether Russia is a European or Eurasian power or, perhaps, a completely special, isolated one. geopolitical unit. The perception of NATO as a military-political equivalent of Western civilization or Europe as a whole puts Russian Westerners in a situation of a false choice - either to achieve the utopian goal of integrating Russia with NATO at the cost of great humiliation, or to recognize Russia as essentially a non-European, non-Western country, and themselves as something like a fifth column, or at least a civilizational minority, which must, as today, secure access to institutions of power through quasi-democratic methods or resign itself to existence in cultural and political enclaves.

One of the ways to neutralize this cultural-psychological, and therefore political, threat is to abandon the perception of the West as a monolithic, integrated whole, and to give historically transitory institutional formations the status of exponents of a certain absolute idea of the West. However, the radical abandonment of the analytical tools of the Soviet era, coupled with the impoverishment of information and scientific study Western world, gave many Russian observers an exaggerated idea of the consolidation of the West (which is, in a sense, the reverse side of the very real disunity of Russian society). The confrontation within Western, in particular American, society on the issue of the fate of NATO, the presence of serious opposition to expansion, including in government structures, remained unnoticed in Russia or was obscured due to the unprofitability of this information both for Russian isolationists and for adherents of total integration with the West . In today's circumstances, an understanding of the deep internal conflicts of the Western world, a refusal to absolutize the temporary relationship of forces within it, as well as between the West and other “poles” of the world community, is necessary first of all Russian Westerners if they want to restore the legitimacy of their

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1. Import of spent nuclear fuel to Russia. ... Alekseevich Tambov region Communist Party of the Russian Federation + + Potapov Sergey Aleksandrovich Communist Party of the Russian Federation + + Rashkin Valery Fedorovich Saratov region Communist Party of the Russian Federation + + Reshulsky Sergey Nikolaevich Communist Party of the Russian Federation - - Rogonov Petr Petrovich Bryansk region Communist Party of the Russian Federation - - Rodionov Igor Nikolaevich Communist Party of the Russian Federation - - Romanov Valentin Stepanovich Samara region Communist Party of the Russian Federation + + Romanov Petr Vasilievich Krasnoyarsk region Communist Party of the Russian Federation - - Svetlana Evgenievna Savitskaya Moscow region Communist Party of the Russian Federation - - Saikin Valery Timofeevich Communist Party of the Russian Federation - - Sapozhnikov Nikolai Ivanovich Communist Party of the Russian Federation - - Safronov...
Date: 06/08/2001 2. Home addresses of the "elite" 123 k. 4 apt. 183 -Abakumov Dmitry Lvovich 169-82-16 st. Glebovskaya 5, apt. 92 -Abganeyev Rinat Zakharovich 191-91-06 Novokhoroshevsky Prospect, 21, apt. 26 -Abramov Igor Ivanovich Moscow, st. Kolomenskaya, 9, apt. 356 -Abramovich Alexander...
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Date: 09/12/2000 4. List of 582 “thieves in law” ... 1951, leader of organized crime group 88: Burilin Igor Ivanovich, criminal nickname: Burila, Burilo, Egor, Russian, 05/17/1960, born, level. Kiselevsk, Kemerovo region, address: Kemerovo, Russia 89. Burkalov Vladimir Stepanovich, criminal nickname: Blonde, Russian. 07/15/1949 ...
... Gosh, Georgian, 1937, address: Tbilisi, Georgia, Avlabarsky lane, 5; information: killed in 1989 in Tbilisi 210. Egorov Alexander Yuryevich, criminal nickname: Egor, 1961, leader of organized crime group 211. Elerdzhia Georgy Sandroevich, criminal nickname: Giya, 1960, leader of the organized criminal group... 5. Rem Vyakhirev: “They gave me a badge [Order of Merit for the Fatherland, IV degree ] Well, I’m happy. I said “thank you” and left.” “Rem Ivanovich is such a worker, and Victor Stepanovich - more of a poet“It’s his job to come up with something new.”
Its owner Igor Makarov lived in Turkmenistan for 20 years, and his contacts turned out to be beneficial to Gazprom.
Date: 09.11.2012 6. Sponsors of "A Just Russia". ... Alexander Stepanovich- General Director of Autoservice LLC. Third on the list. 96.) Andrey Viktorovich Tsenin - director of Autotransservice LLC. Fourth on the list. Tomsk region, district No. 73 97.) Nemtseva Galina Grigorievna - Deputy General Director of CJSC Siberian Agrarian Group. Fifth on the list. 98.) Sergey Aleksandrovich Sakharov - manager of the Tomsk branch of the Joint-Stock Commercial Bank “Promsvyazbank. Sixth on the list. Tula region - Tula, district No. 75 1. Zotov Igor ...
Date: 10/03/2007 7. Organized crime in Kazakhstan: who is who. ... Evgeny Vladimirovich, born in 1968 Peshkov Igor Nikolaevich, born 19b5 Spiridonov Evgeny Anatolyevich, born in 1966 OCG "CHIVANINA" Chivanin Vyacheslav Trofimovich born 1956 Fitryat Ali-Gulam Huseyn-Ogly, born in 1956. Akhangorov Vagif Samatovich, born in 1956 Atankulov Sadirbay Satimbekovich, born 196Z Boychenko Dmitry Olegovich, born in 1963 Egorov Genady Mikhailovich, born in 1956 Kulakov Vladimir Evgenievich, born in 1948 Krivenko Yuri Alexandrovich, born in 1967 Ryltsev Ivan Stepanovich, born 1940 Smaglin Oleg Georgievich, born in 1959...
Date: 07/16/2002 8. Presidential Marathon: from dawn to dusk. ... On 04.1996 we were already in the Kremlin: three Kulikovs, Soskovets, me, Barsukov, Grachev and the head of the administration Egorov. I insisted that Chernomyrdin be called. Yeltsin did not want to see him under any pretext; he believed that Victor Stepanovich marks his place...
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Date: 11/15/2000 9. List of 266 leaders. Dontsov Anatoly Stepanovich, born in 1936. Vitaly Dianozovich Jeiranoshvili, born in 1955, nickname “Vitalik”. Egorov Alexander Yurievich, born in 1961, nickname "Egor".
Harutyunyan Igor Yuryevich, born in 1962, nickname " Igor Baku".
Date: 09/17/2000 10. Solntsevskaya organized crime group (IV). ... Moscow 42. Bulakh Nikolay Stepanovich- born 1959 Moscow region 43. Bunin Gennady Ivanovich - born 1960 Moscow 44. Burtsev Yuri Alekseevich - born 1938 Moscow region 45. Bykov Vyacheslav Egorovich - born 1961 Rostov 46. Balva Igor Modestovich - 1958...
... b.b. Moscow region Ernogolovka 87. Evstafiev Alexander Vasilievich - born 1964 Tomsk region 88. Egorov Boris Viktorovich - born 1975 Moscow "Crocodile" 89. Egorov Mikhail Andreevich - born 1962 Moscow 90. Egorychev Vladimir Anatolyevich - born 1963 Moscow...
Date: 06/30/2000 11. "Near zero". Brotherhood of the Black Book, where Yegor is accepted by a colleague Igor, is not an occult sect, but merely a business organization benefiting from the chaos reigning in the post-Soviet book market.
We'll have a drink afterwards, if you can wait, Andrey Stepanovich“, - Yegor answered instead of hello.
Date: 08/13/2009 12. The Diamond Hoof, or the return of the Prodigal Goat (1999). Already on April 22, 1993, the head of the department of finance and monetary circulation of the Russian government Igor Moskovsky and Evgeny Bychkov reported to Finance Minister Boris Fedorov on the results of negotiations on possible supplies to Golden ADA and...
Victor's reaction Stepanovich was unexpectedly sharp: “I don’t know any kids or goats and I don’t want to know!”
Date: 10/04/2002 13. 6.30 October 4 - October 5 ... 1973 Panteleev Igor Vladimirovich, 1973 Papin Igor Vyacheslavovich, 1955 Parnyugin Sergey Ivanovich, 1972 Peskov Yuri Evgenievich, 1975 Pestryakov Dmitry Vadimovich, 1965 Petrov Oleg Mikhailovich, 1974 Pimenov Yuri Alexandrovich, 1954 Polstyanova Zinaida Alekseevna, 1943 Romanov Alexey Alexandrovich, 1959 Ruban Alexander Vladimirovich, 1960 Rudnev Anatoly Semenovich, 1944 Savchenko Alexander Romanovich, 1956 Saigidova Patimat Gatiromagomedovna, 1969 Salib Assaf, 1969 Svetozarov Valentin Stepanovich, 1947 ... 14. September 21 - October 2 ... in the shadow business related to non-ferrous and rare earth metals, one can only guess what place Victor promised in his empire Stepanovich former Minister of Non-ferrous Metallurgy of the USSR (a native of the Karaganda Metallurgical Plant...
Group commander - Igor- responsible for a company of unarmed barricade guards. Instead of letting me in first, he demands that I stay in place, and if riot police break through from the mine, open fire to kill and prevent them from entering the basement. Igor and more... 15. October 3 - 6.30 October 4 To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Government of the Russian Federation V. S. Chernomyrdin Dear Victor Stepanovich!
correspondent for Moskovsky Komsomolets Igor Fedorovich Nadezhdin, who distinguished himself so much on October 2 in the cordon of the “White House” together with colleagues from the Central Internal Affairs Directorate, and on October 5 Solovyov allowed “interrogations and confrontations of the seriously wounded, sometimes...

Thesis

Egorov, Igor Stepanovich

Academic degree:

PhD in Political Science

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Speciality:

Political institutions, processes and technologies

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CHAPTER 1. Military-political threats to the national security of Russia at the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st centuries.

1.1. NATO's expansion to the East in the context of globalization processes.

1.2. The entry of post-Soviet states into NATO as a guarantee against political pressure from Russia.

1.3. NATO's political stereotypes regarding Russia.

Conclusions on the chapter.

CHAPTER 2. Military-political cooperation of post-Soviet states and NATO as a threat to Russia’s national security.,

2.1. The policy of national elites of post-Soviet states regarding accession to NATO.

2.2. Entry of post-Soviet republics into the North Atlantic Alliance: the illusion of “congruence” between NATO and the European Union.

2.3. The entry of post-Soviet states into NATO as a weakening factor

North Atlantic Alliance.

Conclusions on the chapter.

CHAPTER 3. Partnership and confrontation between Russia and NATO in the context of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation.

3.1. Russia and NATO: problems of military-political interaction and counteraction.

3.2. Relations between Russia and the United States as the core of partnership and confrontation between Russia and NATO.

3.3. The new military-political space in Europe and its consequences for the national security of Russia.

Conclusions on the chapter.

Introduction of the dissertation (part of the abstract) On the topic "The entry of post-Soviet republics into NATO and its impact on the national security of the Russian Federation"

One of the determining factors in world politics in the 21st century. in the context of globalization is the process of NATO expansion, therefore consideration of its essence, causes, main forms and possible consequences for the analysis of Russia’s national security policy is extremely relevant. In the context of globalization, the internal sovereignty of states is actually weakening across an ever-increasing range of political directions, the field of activity of the governments of individual countries is limited in terms of the possibility of the sovereign formation of their societies, the isolated solution of problems affecting national territory, and all this contributes to the growing importance of NATO on a global scale. IN scientifically from the point of view of a systems approach, it is determined to be appropriate to analyze the entire world society from the point of view of studying modern globalization, as an environment for the supposed spread of the American system throughout the world.

Political globalization means that political events (conflicts, political struggle, elections, etc.) in a particular country, which, according to the prevailing ideas until now, are exclusively their internal affairs and do not allow outside interference, can acquire global significance and affect the interests of other states. Political globalization thus presupposes some acceptable form of overcoming the principle of non-intervention and is accompanied by the introduction into world practice of new mechanisms for ensuring peace, including peacekeeping operations or international sanctions against “undesirable” regimes. There are different approaches to what forms the process of globalization can be given. The most common approach highlights the activities of international organizations as global actors in world politics, where organizations such as the UN and NATO assume responsibility for ensuring international security.

In order to understand the strategic implications of globalization, it is necessary to analyze both the structure and the process of change in the existing world system. During the Cold War, structure mattered most because stability was ensured by a bipolar world. In current conditions, the structure retains its importance, but for the analysis of international relations the dynamics of the changes taking place are more important. In line with globalization, NATO has undergone great changes and the tasks it solves have expanded. It seems that NATO can, in cooperation with partner states, strengthen security on a global scale, which is what caused NATO to expand beyond its traditional geographical area of operation. Significant changes in NATO are also associated with the expansion of this organization, which represents a unique political process. After the sixth enlargement in 2009, the number of NATO members reached 28.

The relevance of the research topic is determined both by the ongoing global political processes in which international organizations play a very important role, and by the need to analyze the regional and global aspects of the activities of the North Atlantic Alliance, which became a major actor in world politics at the turn of the 20th-21st centuries. After the Cold War, NATO expanded its activities far beyond the traditional geographical area specified in the original Charter.

Territorially, NATO includes the countries of North America, Western, Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the Baltics. Georgia and other countries of the post-Soviet space have declared their desire to join NATO. To understand the significance of NATO in modern world politics, it is also important that this organization attracts countries that are not its members to its activities in one form or another through programs “ Partnership for Peace", Mediterranean Dialogue (Mediterranean Initiatives), etc. Russia was also involved, first in the 19+1 format, and today in the 28+1 format [And], at the same time, its strategic position regarding NATO is not clear and sometimes contradictory.

NATO's base territory and main members are European countries. However, it develops on the basis of American civilized values. From the point of view of the ideologists of this organization, the modern development of NATO is unthinkable without expansion, without the inclusion of new countries. The very process of NATO expansion at the beginning of the 21st century has become one of the key ones in the modern system of world politics, having a huge impact on the fate of the world community, and, above all, of course, Europe. NATO actively fits into the emerging transnational environment of world politics, occupying one of the leading positions in it. NATO's activities at the global and regional levels reflect the process of globalization and regionalization of world politics. That is why the interest in the global and regional aspects of NATO's functioning is understandable. Special meaning These aspects of NATO's activities are acquired in connection with the expansion of the alliance at the expense of the post-Soviet republics. It is important to keep in mind that the admission of new members to NATO and, consequently, its territorial parameters will continue to expand in the future.

One of the important consequences of the processes of globalization and democratization developing in the modern world is that humanitarian problems and issues of respect for human rights go beyond the exclusively internal competence of individual states. Because of this, NATO is proposing a new world order system, “Pax NATO,” which, in turn, should replace the existing “Pax Europeana” - that is, “peace in a European way.” Specifically, we are talking about a regional defense organization that seeks to become the core " global responsibility» not only in Euro-Atlantic region, but also throughout the world. Thus, NATO's activities acquire a transcontinental character.

The degree of scientific development of the topic. Quite a lot of work has been devoted to NATO activities. Among them, especially noteworthy are the works of Bales J., Brzezinski Z., Wallerstein I., Karl T., Kissinger G., Murphy S., Nye J., Rosenau D., Soros J., Fukuyama F., Huntington S., Schmitter F. and other authors, in which theoretical approaches are successfully combined with practical recommendations for studying the influence of geopolitical and economic factors, globalization, complex interdependence, democratization on the problems of ensuring international security. Considerable attention in the works of foreign political scientists is paid to the development of approaches to studying the activities of international political institutions.

The works of domestic researchers are of fundamental importance for the analysis of various aspects of international security: Alimov A.A., Arbatov A., Arbatova N.K., Achkasova V.A., Vasilyeva N.A., Ivanova P., Izotov A.B., Inozemtseva V., Karaganova S.A., Kosolapova N.A., Kortunova A.B., Lebedeva M.Mi, Lomagina H.A., Margieva V.I., Melvilya A.Yu., Morozova V.E., Petrovsky V.E., Pushkova A., Sokolova S.B., Tkachenko S.L., Torkunova A., Ustinova V.I., Utkina A.I., Khudoleya K.K., Tsygankova P.A., Yagya V.S., in publications that discuss the process of NATO expansion and the role of the North Atlantic Alliance in ensuring security in Europe, the problem of Russia's new position in the world, its foreign policy and integration into the world community.

An analysis of the works of the listed authors shows that the process of globalization is considered as the main direction in the development of world politics. Within the framework of these trends, the growth of the role of international organizations, especially such as the UN, EU, and NATO, is inevitable. The multipolar structure of the world is essentially oligarchic. Real power, that is, a real opportunity to have a decisive influence on the course of global political and economic development, will be located by the centers of power, the world oligarchs of the 21st century.

Publications in analytical journals give a certain understanding of the factors and ways of formation, the nature, directions of NATO strategy during the period of globalization; they examine Russia’s attitude towards the West and, including international organizations, through the prism of a complex of national interests, disbelief in the strengths and capabilities of the country , experiencing a protracted crisis and failures of modernization reforms.

In general, in its entirety, with critical analysis and comparison, the sources and literature cited in the review act as a kind of theoretical foundation for the research problems solved in the dissertation.

Research hypothesis. Russia has a rational geostrategic position in the world to influence world politics and has the necessary strategic potential to maintain the status of a superpower in the world. Today the main political task Russia, with a rational settlement of domestic politics, maintain balance political forces on the world stage.

The object of the dissertation research is the policy of individual post-Soviet republics aimed at joining the North Atlantic military bloc.

The subject of the study is the consequences of the entry of post-Soviet republics into NATO for the national security of Russia.

The main goal of the work is to study the political motivation and consequences of the entry of post-Soviet republics into NATO and their impact on the national security of Russia.

To achieve this goal, the dissertation student set himself the following tasks:

Find out the political motivation for NATO's expansion to the East in the context of globalization processes;

Reveal the reasons for the desire of post-Soviet states to join the North Atlantic Alliance;

To identify the essence of the policy of the national elites of post-Soviet states regarding joining NATO;

Explore military-political cooperation between post-Soviet states and NATO as a threat to Russia’s national security;

Characterize NATO's political stereotypes regarding Russia;

To justify the entry of post-Soviet states into NATO as an illusion of “congruence” between NATO and the European Union;

Assess the possible consequences of the new military-political situation in Europe for Russia's national security. The methodological basis of the study is comprehensive and systematic approaches, institutional, historical, political science and sociological methods: comparative qualitative analysis, comparative analysis, decision-making analysis, which made it possible to comprehensively reveal the internal logic of the process of NATO expansion in the context of globalization.

During the research process, international treaties, official government documents, domestic and foreign sources, statements, speeches, interviews were studied, analyzed and compared officials leadership of NATO and Russia, materials from meetings of government bodies, as well as “Internet sources”.

Theoretical and empirical basis The research included: US National Security Strategy for the New Century, Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (1993), Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 1993-2000. , Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2000), Message from the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin " About national security", National Security Concept of the Russian Federation

2000), giving an idea of the strategic interests of NATO and Russia at the present stage, Draft Treaty on a Constitution for Europe (2004), Strategy for relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union for the medium term (2000-2010). Among the sources also used are the message of the President of the Russian Federation D.A. Medvedev to the Federal Assembly (November 30, 2010), speeches of former NATO Secretary General D. Robertson, reports of NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, results of meetings between the Presidents of Russia and the USA Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama in London on April 2, 2009 and in Yokohama (Japan) on November 14, 2010 behind closed doors during the APEC Leaders' Summit, etc.

The scientific novelty of the study is:

In the results of the analysis of the process of NATO expansion to the East in global and regional contexts;

In substantiating the conclusion about NATO expansion as a consequence of the globalization process;

In systematizing NATO’s international activities in a two-vector direction: regional and global from the point of view of “ foreign policy usefulness»;

In developing a model for studying NATO's international relations in a globalizing world;

The results of the study of the main aspects of NATO expansion through the prism of relations with the Russian Federation;

In justifying the expansion of NATO as the US desire to establish a new world order.

Main provisions submitted for defense:

1. NATO's Eastern Expansion is a working model of conscious and active participation large group countries in the processes of world stratification, reflecting their strategic goals determined by globalization and the aspirations of geopolitical consolidation of the results "". Many, although by no means all, of the new NATO members, having entered the alliance, turned into states semi-hostile to Russia. It is not the “old” NATO of the Cold War period that is expanding to the “East”, and this process is not dictated by the conditions of competition between the two systems - behind all this today there is a “new” NATO, realizing its claims to a monopoly in determining the nature and ways of ensuring European security.

2. The process of globalization in the world, namely globalization on the American platform, plays a decisive role in the expansion of NATO. That is why NATO is a kind of world gendarme controlling the process of consolidation of countries according to the American model. The practice of local wars in recent decades confirms that unwanted political leaders who lead anti-American policies are immediately destroyed by NATO armed forces and, as a result, NATO’s political authority in the world is growing as a force capable of maintaining world peace.

3. Western European politics, closing in the absence of any pressure on the idea of NATO, actually creates new fault lines in Europe that are no longer of systemic, but of historical origin: the alliance cares not so much about the security of the countries joining it, but about the isolation of Russia from European politics. The transformation of Eastern European societies and the collapse of the Soviet empire did not lead to the initially expected catastrophic consequences, and Russia, remaining an important political entity in Europe and the world and objectively forced to adapt to the current situation, is quite reasonably taking adequate measures to ensure its national security.

4. Military-political cooperation between post-Soviet states and NATO is acquiring a protracted latent character. At the same time, the technology of involving post-Soviet states remains old, where the main core is the exclusion of the influence of Russian foreign policy on these countries with the subsequent Americanization of these countries. Thus, NATO is a political instrument for establishing a new world order - the “ democratization of the world

5. Russia is not interested in confrontation and a return to the conditions of the Cold War with the West. Within the framework of such a paradigm, NATO’s expansion to the East takes on a completely different meaning and can be positively received if this expansion outlines the contours of the long-term perspective of the role and place of NATO and Russia within the created Euro-Atlantic collective security systems.

The theoretical and practical significance of the dissertation is determined by the possibility of using the main provisions of the work, theoretical and factual material in the educational and scientific activities of universities, research work of state and research institutions. The conclusions contained in the work can be used for further conceptual developments on interaction between NATO and the Russian Federation. In addition, the results obtained contribute to a better understanding of the problem of international relations in modern Russia, which makes it possible to take into account positive and negative trends when formulating a development strategy for Russia in a globalizing world in the 21st century.

Approbation of the study. The main provisions of the dissertation research were tested at interuniversity scientific and practical conferences on the topic: “Current problems of economics, management of the national economy and economic education” in Moscow at the Moscow State University in 2009 and 2010, an international scientific and practical conference in St. Petersburg at the Academy strategic studies, information and high technologies June 22-23, 2010 on the topic: “Geopolitics, state security, international relations", international scientific and practical conference in Moscow at the Moscow State University on February 21, 2011 on the topic: "Socio-political, historical, legal and economic problems of Russia in the conditions of modern globalization, in speeches at the department social sciences and public administration of MGOU, are presented in 12 publications by the author with a total volume of 5.5 pp.

Conclusion of the dissertation on the topic "Political institutions, processes and technologies", Egorov, Igor Stepanovich

Conclusions on the chapter

1. The Russian Federation finds itself in a difficult situation when the choice of decision-making has become extremely limited for many reasons. The Kosovo crisis "showed that cooperation between Russia and the West, unprecedented in its nature, in fact turned out to be superficial and not durable. This is explained by the fact that at the end of the era of bipolarity, nothing was created that could replace the old security system. Thus, further The development of Russia’s relations with the West and, mainly, with NATO and the United States, will depend on the correctly chosen foreign policy course of Russia, on the mutual interest of NATO countries and Russia in cooperation and development of relations, in order to ensure a reliable security structure throughout the European space.

2. After the Rome Summit, the NATO-Russia Council became a useful mechanism for consultations, cooperation, joint decisions and joint actions on the entire range of tasks defined by the Rome Declaration. NATO has once again proven that it can operate beyond its Areas of responsibility"and solve global problems of modern international relations.

3. Today for Russia, perhaps the most pressing question is not only about deepening integration into the world community, but about preserving its own political identity in a changing world and pursuing a line worthy of a truly significant state. We are talking about how and at what cost this person will be saved and who will personally do this in the coming years.

4. The time has come to analyze the real capabilities and resources that Russia has to implement its foreign policy, and first of all, give ourselves an answer to the question: can we really be a global player in the international arena on a par with NATO or should we be content with only a limited area responsibility most directly related to our national interests, primarily in the field of security.

5. The problems of NATO expansion cannot but worry Russia. NATO has become a global military-political organization, having long ago gone beyond the geographical zone defined at the very beginning. NATO cooperates with many countries and the process of its expansion is inevitable. NATO has expanded, is expanding and will continue to expand. Today Russia’s place is “outside” global NATO, so our country must strive to achieve a decent level of cooperation on a par with the Alliance. .At the same time, the issue of Russia's accession to NATO is not on the agenda. The main goal of the Russian leadership at this stage should be the desire to participate, to one degree or another, in the work of other NATO institutions, including non-military ones, since in the future this will help create an atmosphere of trust, bring closer positions on key issues of international security and ensure proper participation of Russia in NATO's work.

Conclusion

A study of the geopolitical situation in the world, internal political processes in Russia and an analysis of the discussions of the 1990-2011s in the United States and Russia related to the formation of the course of each of these countries on the issue of NATO1 expansion to the East allows us to draw a number of general conclusions.

First of all, the validity of the approach proposed in the work to considering the problem of NATO expansion from the point of view of parallel developing internal political trends in the United States and Russia, which acted in relation to each other as the main counterparties in the international political conflicts of the 1990s on the issue of the future, is confirmed. Alliance. The actions of either side on this issue cannot be satisfactorily explained from the point of view of traditional realistic, geopolitical and other theories that imply the immanent nature of “national interests” as a constant and determining factor in foreign policy. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, the idea of national interests turned out to be extremely blurred and fraught with deep internal conflict - both in “reformist” Russia, whose international political identity in 1991 was largely a “blank slate”, and in The United States, whose national interests and the tasks they defined during the Cold War, which justified the policy of forceful presence in Europe, were largely realized and brought dividends, although it lost its relevance and internal political legitimacy (from the point of view of influential social forces in American society ). Under these conditions, Russian-American relations have largely lost their former autonomy in relation to internal political factors, determined by the systemic logic of bipolar confrontation, and the question of the essence of national interests, both in Russia and in the United States, has become the subject of heated discussions, in which they often clashed. incompatible interests of various social forces.

In both countries, the range of views on the future of the North Atlantic Alliance, in the context of the proposed transformation of the entire military-political architecture in Europe, was extremely wide. Throughout the decade, the Russian foreign policy elite was active both in the forces that advocated maximum integration of Russia with the Alliance and, ideally, in joining it, and in the politicians who considered the preservation of NATO as a real threat that required countermeasures on the part of Russia.

Likewise, in the United States, the amplitude of fluctuations ranged from successive neo-isolationists, who advocated the actual freezing or even partial curtailment of American obligations towards European allies to the “globalizers” of the Alliance - supporters of the maximum expansion of its mission, area of responsibility and numerical strength, up to giving it the functions of a “ministry of security” on a global scale: At the same time, the moment of the emergence of an independent Russian foreign policy in the fall of 1991, the relationship between the positions of the most influential elite groups in the United States and Russia was exactly the opposite of what was to emerge by the end of the decade: a moderate neo-isolationist consensus prevailed in the American establishment, characterized by a skeptical attitude towards the future of NATO and American involvement into European affairs and gave priority to resolving internal economic difficulties and social conflicts, as well as the struggle for domestic and world markets with the economic giants of the Pacific region.

1. NATO’s expansion to the East is a working model of conscious and active participation of a large group of countries in the processes of world stratification, reflecting their strategic goals determined by globalization and the aspirations of geopolitical consolidation of the results “ Western victories in the Cold War" Many, although by no means all, of the new NATO members, having entered the alliance, turned into states semi-hostile to Russia. It is not the “old” NATO of the Cold War period that is expanding to the “East”, and this process is not dictated by the conditions of competitive struggle between the two systems - behind all this today there is a “new” NATO, realizing its claims to a monopolistic determination of the nature and ways of ensuring “ European security».

The crisis and collapse of the world socialist system, the self-liquidation of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War created a new situation in world politics. The United States began to fill the resulting void under various pretexts (preventing military-political crises, expanding democratization in the world, economic cooperation, military assistance, etc.), hiding the true reason for the expansion of US strategic influence on the countries of the post-Soviet space using NATO as an instrument.

NATO's new military-strategic concept was adopted at the Washington session in April 1999, and was the organization's response to the fundamentally changed situation in Europe and the world as a whole. The main idea of the new strategy is the creation of " global NATO"- a military alliance that would expand the scope of its responsibility to the whole world. In Washington and Brussels these plans are called “globalization of structures Euro-Atlantic security." At the same time, the adoption of a new alliance strategy is justified by the emergence of numerous local conflicts, new missile and

See NATO Strategic Concept//LCP://easla1r.oge.ia/eigo-a11an11s/na1o/81ga1eey of nuclear powers, as well as states potentially dangerous in terms of developing the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. One of the main goals of NATO's global strategy is to protect the interests of the United States and the leading states of the bloc on a global scale. In military terms, we are talking about revising spheres of influence from the Atlantic to the Middle East, developing new land and sea theaters of military operations. In this case, the bet is made on independent use forces without prior sanctions from the UN Security Council or OSCE. In essence, there is a claim to the right to carry out military actions outside the bloc’s area of responsibility54.

The expansion of NATO to the countries of Central-Eastern Europe and the Baltic states has upset the balance of armed forces, which will subsequently lead to the undermining of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Today, even without taking into account the forces of new members, NATO exceeds Russia by 5 times in population, more than 10 times in military spending, 3 times in the number of armed forces and the number of conventional weapons. Currently, according to existing data, the ratio of the combat potentials of general purpose forces of Russia and NATO is estimated at one to four.

It is obvious that America and Europe, even each individually, have a significant superiority over Russia, both in material (including military-economic) and human resources, and in moral, political and ideological aspects. Why, in this case, move close to Russia’s borders by expanding NATO? After all, in a purely geostrategic In terms of Russia, driven into a corner (if, God forbid, this happens), it will be all the same to hit all the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance or the countries of the Eastern European region (from the Baltic to the Black Sea) with its nuclear weapons.

The simultaneous increase in the power of NATO conventional forces and the approach to Russian borders has a destabilizing effect on the balance of strategic

54 Carpenter T. NATO's Empty Victory. Cato Institute, Washington, D.C. 2004.P. 45. nuclear forces, as the alliance gains access to central (formerly rear) areas of key military-economic importance. NATO tactical aviation can already strike at strategically important targets deep in Russian territory on the northern and southern flanks, respectively, from Norway and Turkey, and in the central direction from Central and Eastern Europe.Conventional weapons of NATO countries are able to solve strategic problems in Russian territory, causing defeat objects of strategic nuclear forces. As a result, Russia finds itself in a situation of a certain depreciation of its nuclear potential, but this, undoubtedly, it will never allow.

The new US National Military Strategy, adopted in February 2011, states that “the United States will remain a leading economic and military power for the foreseeable future.” At the same time, it is recognized that the United States alone will not be able to ensure reliable security for itself and its allies, which requires further decisive steps to deepen ties with partners in addressing security issues and creating opportunities for partnerships with new and diverse groups of players on the world stage.

According to a prominent American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski (“One More Chance”, MO edition, 2010) the rise of America to the level of the most powerful state in the world entrusts Washington with a number of missions, including:

Lead, direct and shape the underlying power relations in a world of changing geopolitical equilibrium and rising national expectations so that a global system of greater cooperation can emerge;

Contain or end conflicts, prevent terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and contribute to the collective maintenance of peace in regions torn by civil wars, so that violence in the world does not spread, but declines.

It was precisely these missions that largely formulated the provisions of NATO’s new strategic concept, adopted at the summit in Lisbon. The document carefully elaborates the key areas of development of the alliance, the implementation of which will secure its place among the leaders of globalization as a military-political alliance designed to provide forceful support for the processes of creation and development of the global community.

For NATO, a unique niche in this process is formed by one of the features of globalization, associated with the increase in the functions of supranational and transnational structures" against the backdrop of a progressive decline in functions nation state. However, NATO is not an independent player in the field of world globalization and builds a line of behavior based on the American strategy of global leadership.

As part of the mentioned features of globalization, the new strategy of US global leadership is based, among other things, on maintaining Washington’s leading positions in major international institutions (in addition to NATO, these are the UN, IMF, WTO, etc.), managing regional processes and organizing special bilateral ties with the leading countries of the world , not included in military-political alliances under the auspices of the United States - primarily with China, India and Russia, which would exclude (or make it as difficult as possible) the emergence of a center of power equal in power to the United States or the rapprochement of these states in anti-American positions.

According to Washington’s plan, along with solving a set of independent tasks, NATO is planned to be used as a global unifying structure for regional cooperative security organizations, including NATO-SCO, NATO with individual CSTO countries (within the framework of interaction on Afghanistan), as well as direct NATO-SCO ties China, NATO-Japan, NATO-India. For the same purposes, further development of the NATO-EU strategic partnership and the creation of a legitimate legal basis for NATO-UN and OSCE relations are envisaged.

In preparing the alliance for this role, the strategic concept calls for the allies to focus their primary efforts not only on traditional collective defense missions, but also on further enhancing crisis management and security capabilities through partnerships.

To this end, the main emphasis is expected to be placed on the following areas of internal and external transformation of the block:

Maintaining the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of NATO forces at the proper level, their technological equipment, mobility and ability to deploy to remote theaters, increasing the efficiency of the decision-making and control system;

Systematic strengthening of the political and military foundations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, creation of the necessary infrastructure and resources in the interests of ensuring the global actions of the alliance, going beyond the traditional Euro-Atlantic zone of responsibility;

Forming a global partnership, including expanding NATO cooperation with Japan, Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, North Africa and the Middle East;

Expanding strategic cooperation with the EU, strengthening ties with

UN; NATO expansion, including the development of relations with Ukraine and Georgia based on the decisions of the Bucharest summit in 2008.

3. Western European policy, closing itself in the absence of any pressure on the idea of NATO, actually creates new fault lines in Europe that are no longer of systemic, but of historical origin: the alliance cares not so much about the security of the countries joining it, but about the isolation of Russia from European politics. The transformation of Eastern European societies and the collapse of the Soviet empire did not lead to the initially expected catastrophic consequences, and Russia, remaining an important political entity in Europe and the world and objectively forced to adapt to the current situation, quite reasonably takes adequate measures to ensure its national security.

Russia's policy towards NATO may be determined by certain actions the alliance itself, which to one degree or another affect its national interests (vital, important, less important) or are considered by it as hostile, unfriendly or completely unacceptable. Most often, this can happen in the process of joint activities, primarily peacekeeping, and possibly joint retaliation operations against a common threat. In these circumstances, Russia has at least three options.

First. Refuse joint actions, withdraw from the peacekeeping group, placing all the blame on the side that, in Russia’s opinion, is acting ■ incorrectly, exceeding or distorting the mandate issued by an international organization. Thus, Russia does not bear any responsibility for what its partners have done and retains its prestige as a state striving for objectivity and justice. It may attempt to separately carry out a peacekeeping mission. At the same time, by doing so, it undermines the principle of partnership, jeopardizes the joint operation to which it agreed in principle, and ultimately undermines the chances of equal participation in future joint actions.

Second. Neglect your own aspirations, if they are not vital for Russia, in the name of maintaining partnership with the alliance, hoping that the main burden of responsibility, in the event of an unfavorable development of events, will fall on NATO. In general, Russia proceeds from the fact that good relations with the alliance and their maintenance at a high level are more important for Russia than the possible results of the joint operation itself. Most likely, the NATO leadership will be sympathetic to such a Russian position - maintaining solidarity in the name of partnership. At the same time, this would mean that Russia does not have its own role in carrying out certain missions, in conducting certain operations, that, not being in an alliance with NATO, it is actually in it as a junior partner with no independent role. With this approach, all the laurels (benefits) can go to NATO, and all the bruises and bumps (damage) can go to Russia. Not to mention the fact that Russia will have to share responsibility with NATO for mistakes and blunders made during the joint operation (mission). The choice in this case depends on the content of the Russian partnership with NATO: whether it is strategic or tactical in nature.

Third. Russia has taken an active position from the very beginning. This means that it expresses its disagreement with the position or actions of NATO partners not in order to get out of the game or to whitewash itself before future generations, but in order to find a way out of the current situation through compromise, to find a solution that would ultimately suit all participants in the joint action. This would allow Russia to maintain positive aspects the two scenarios described above, avoiding them negative consequences. However, this also has its difficulties: achieving a compromise is much more difficult than simply speaking (voting) “for” or “against”. Not only national but also corporate interests play a role here.

It is especially difficult for representatives of military professions to make compromises, preferring clarity, simplicity and seeing the situation in black and white. However, in Russia's partnership with NATO, compromise is inevitable, so we have to learn it on the fly.

When choosing one or another scenario, it is important for a politician to be able to foresee how the decision he makes today will look like or influence the development of the situation in a month, a year or a decade. Despite all the opportunities that the Founding Act opens up for Russia, it does not solve all the problems of its diplomacy in Europe and in the international arena as a whole. Even Russia's European policy is not limited to NATO. Meanwhile, the new situation is encouraging for it in the sense that Russia is part of NATO and can strengthen its position in the outside world through the alliance; at the same time, she is outside NATO and has a free hand in a world that is increasingly demanding her return to big politics.

4.Military-political cooperation between post-Soviet states and NATO is becoming protracted and latent. At the same time, the technology of involving post-Soviet states remains old, where the main core is the exclusion of the influence of Russian foreign policy on these countries with the subsequent Americanization of these countries. Thus, NATO is a political instrument for establishing a new world order - the “ democratization of the world» in the context of globalization processes occurring in all spheres of human social life.

The transformation of NATO from a Cold War weapon into an instrument of “peace and harmony” on the continent showed that the United States does not want to lose a political instrument for maintaining power in the world. At the initiative of the United States, public opinion arose about cooperation with the NATO bloc to resolve both general military issues (control of conventional arms in Europe, prevention of war on the continent) and relatively private political problems - the situation in certain regions Euro-Atlantic region without recognizing any police role for this bloc.

The strategic goal of NATO enlargement was to overcome the Cold War divisions of Europe, strengthen democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, and make the Alliance the cornerstone of a new pan-European security structure. This meant that the Alliance would eventually include most (if not all) of the eastern half of the continent. Selected countries will remain outside the alliance because they will not meet the requirements or will not want to join NATO for their own historical reasons.

Obviously, the key issue for the future will not be the size of NATO, but its main purpose. The inclusion of post-Soviet republics in the list of NATO members is not an end in itself, but a mechanism of pressure on Russia. It doesn’t matter that Russia does not pose any threat to NATO, it is important that the United States needs Russia’s resources and therefore political and military pressure on Russia is determined by the strategic goals of the United States. The NATO expansion process has become a global process. The North Atlantic Alliance is actively cooperating with the countries of the Transcaucasus, which once again emphasizes the enormous potential of this international organization. The main partners of the Alliance in this region are Georgia and Azerbaijan. In Azerbaijan, which officially declared back in 1999 its desire to join the Alliance as a full member and sent its peacekeeping contingent"under Turkish command into the German zone of occupation of Kosovo, as a result a special presidential commission was created on cooperation with NATO and there is practically no opposition to this idea. In this regard, purely geopolitical considerations come to the fore, such as the need to strengthen the southeastern flank of the Alliance represented by Turkey. Therefore, the most realistic prospect is the involvement of buffer coalitions and institutions, such as

GUAM, in the Stability Pact in the South Caucasus. Thus, the membership of these states in NATO is categorically unacceptable for a significant part of citizens and political elites these countries (for example, in Finland, 66% of survey participants and 75% of members of parliament are against NATO membership). However, even today the possibility of such traditional neutrals as Sweden, Finland and Austria joining NATO at the official 1st level is not excluded in principle by anyone.

Of course, the current dynamics of increasing the number of NATO participants in decisive degree caused by general underlying processes associated with the collapse of the world socialist system and its military-political core - the Warsaw Department, socio-political changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, active processes globalization, which predetermined the growing political role of NATO. But for Russia, the severity of the problems arising in connection with the expansion of the bloc is not dulled, and the task is to develop, together with NATO, a post-confrontational strategy in order to minimize the possible negative consequences of the expansion of the bloc, avoiding a return to the recent past with its tough confrontation, arms race and balancing on the brink war, becomes one of the priorities.

5. Russia is not interested in confrontation and a return to the conditions of the Cold War with the West. Within the framework of such a paradigm, NATO's expansion to the East takes on a completely different meaning and can be positively received if this expansion outlines the contours of the long-term perspective of the role and place of NATO and Russia within the created Euro-Atlantic system of collective security.

Strengthening the US-NATO power tandem is intended to further position the alliance as the leading regional security structure in Europe with expanded capabilities for projecting power on a global scale. At the same time, NATO will continue its policy of expansion by

The East will actively intervene in conflicts around the world in order to achieve their settlement in the interests of the West. Along with additional steps to strengthen the power component of the US-NATO tandem, we should expect increased efforts to weaken the economy and military power Russia and its allies, even to the point of attempts to limit their sovereignty and make territorial claims. With reference to the features of globalization, attempts may be made to achieve greater transparency in strategically important sectors* of Russian industry. individual enterprises of the military-industrial complex, scientific developments. Such a forecast requires close attention to the actions of our Western partners both within the framework of global processes of world change, and in the regions directly adjacent to the borders of our country.

Entry strategy; Russia in a globalizing world must be comprehensive. The successful use of the benefits of globalization by a specific state is determined by its skillful and pragmatic actions across the entire spectrum of globalization processes—in the economy, trade, control over financial, information flows and natural resources, in education? and demographic management; processes; Such actions can only be successful if they rely on a modern economy, science and production, combat-ready and combat-ready armed forces.

At the core of its foreign policy? Russia” adheres to the provisions in relation to NATO; agreements reached and in accordance with which the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council was created55. The central task of the Joint Permanent Council the formation of a higher level of trust, unity of purpose and skills of consultation and cooperation between Russia and NATO.

Area of consultation and cooperation:

55 Fundamental Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Paris, May 27, 1997) issues of mutual interest relating to security and stability in Euro-Atlantic region or specific crises, including Russia's and NATO's contribution to security and stability in the region;

Conflict prevention, including preventive diplomacy, crisis management and conflict resolution, taking into account the role and responsibilities of the UN and OSCE and the activities of these organizations in these areas;

Joint operations, including peacekeeping operations, in each specific case, under the leadership of the UN Security Council or under the responsibility of the OSCE and, if used, a multinational task force (MOF), participation in them at an early stage;

Russia's participation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace program;

Exchange of information and consultations on strategy, defense policy, military doctrines of Russia and NATO, as well as budgets and infrastructure development programs;

Arms control issues;

The whole range of nuclear safety issues; preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery, combating illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and strengthening cooperation in specific areas of arms control, including political and defense aspects of proliferation;

Possible cooperation in the field of tactical anti-missile defense; strengthening regional air traffic safety, increasing air traffic capabilities and mutual exchanges, where necessary, to promote confidence through enhanced transparency measures and information exchange related to air defense and related aspects of airspace management and control; this will include exploring possible appropriate cooperation in the field of air defense;

Increasing transparency, predictability and mutual trust regarding the size and functions of conventional forces of Russia and NATO member states;

Mutual exchanges, as necessary, on nuclear weapons issues, including Russian and NATO doctrine and strategy; coordinating a program of enhanced cooperation among relevant military organizations, as detailed below;

Development of possible cooperation in the field of arms through Russian participation in the work. Conference, NATO National Armament Directors;

Conversion of the defense industry;

Development of mutually agreed defense-related cooperation projects in the fields of economics, environment and science; implementation of joint initiatives and exercises in the field of emergency situations and disaster management;

Combating terrorism and drug trafficking;

Improving public understanding of the evolving relationship between Russia and NATO, including the establishment of a NATO documentation center or information office in Moscow.

Political consequences characterize the fact that despite the extremely low probability of a large-scale military attack on Russia, the expansion of NATO to its borders will have very negative political consequences. This will significantly narrow its political freedom of action in the PSP, cause damage to economic and humanitarian ties and transit through the CIS, and increase the overall vulnerability of the military-political situation.

Particularly disastrous consequences would be the accession of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to NATO:

This would create a divided nation complex in Russia;

It would sharply complicate economic, humanitarian and military-technical relations with these countries and transit through their territory;

It would deprive the Russian Federation of a number of important military facilities (early warning radar, Black Sea Fleet bases, etc.) and would open a vast new “window of vulnerability” in the defense system;

It would sharply worsen the conditions for cooperation with the United States in the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

It would push Russia far towards a blockade with the PRC in the political and military fields;

It would cause a huge increase in anti-Western, chauvinistic, pro-authoritarian sentiments;

It would stop military reform in terms of recruiting, training and equipping troops, again redirecting the army to plans for a big war in the European theater;

Finally, this could lead to political destabilization in these countries, even to the point of division and mass violence, which would draw Russia and the West into direct confrontation.

Strategic line Russian politics in relation to NATO can be outlined in the form of two interrelated goals.

Firstly, avoiding frontal resistance to NATO expansion, slow down or completely block those aspects of it that contradict the interests of the Russian Federation both geographically (entry of Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, etc.) and functionally (expansion of military presence and military actions in the post-Soviet space in addition to or contrary to the position of the Russian Federation).

Secondly, through various channels of cooperation, make Russia’s actual role in transforming and fulfilling new NATO tasks more significant than that of most “old” and even more so “new” members. The maximum task is to try to use the resources of the alliance in Russian interests. An example here can be Moscow's policy on Afghanistan in 2001-2002. (when the Taliban regime, hostile to the Russian Federation, was destroyed by the hands of the United States and NATO), which was, of course, a brilliant success of Russian diplomacy after the end of the Cold War.

Thirdly, relations between Russia and NATO should naturally develop, although at different speeds in relation to different members of this bloc and groups within it. An important practical component of such relations should be their educational component, permeating all the main directions of the Russia-NATO partnership: political dialogue, - military; cooperation, as well as humanitarian issues; scientific and public diplomacy.

Fourthly, a natural step in the development of the educational component should be joint work to harmonize approaches to seeing the world and strengthen true mutual understanding. To this end, under the auspices of the Russia-NATO Council, it is advisable to launch joint research on strategies for preventing and resolving conflicts through linguistic and cultural partnerships, as well as improving interlinguistic and intercultural communication in the study and teaching of foreign languages56.

The practical implementation of this two-pronged strategy presupposes a significant change, not in words, but in deeds, in the system of Russian foreign policy priorities. However, it would pay huge dividends. With such

56 Russia - NATO: " Third dimension» partnerships. Lisbon. November 19-20, 2010, as a matter of cooperation, NATO would never undertake actions that infringe on the interests of the Russian Federation, for fear of losing its partnership with it with enormous damage to its security. At the same time, further expansion of NATO and transformation of the alliance, if it occurred with the consent of Russia, would not entail costs for its national interests.

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The 224th garrison military court in St. Petersburg began to consider the case of the head of the 113th service of the commissioner for the quality of weapons and military equipment of the Directorate of Military Representations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Igor Egorov, who entered into a contract with resellers.

Captain 2nd rank Egorov is accused of receiving a bribe on an especially large scale. And Chinese-made anchor chains were intended for modern Project 12700 minesweepers.

An officer with a pedigree

An exemplary biography of real sailors, father and son Egorov, was written by Georgy Pescherov, a professor at the Moscow State Regional University. The biography is entitled “Sea Soul” and is available, for example, on the Proza.ru website. The Egorov family comes from the village of Tavel, Chistopol district of the then Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Later, the younger Egorov would name six of his companies after this village, some of which he would be able to attach to state defense orders.

The elder Egorov devoted his entire life to serving in the Navy. “The highest professionalism, conscientious attitude to the assigned work and responsibility,” writes the author of the biography Pescherov about Egorov Sr., who managed to rise to the rank of head of the Russian Navy yacht club.

Son Igor, according to the biographer, “continued the family tradition”, “took up the baton of his father” and all that. Our hero has behind him not only the Naval Academy, but also a diploma in the specialty “Finance and Credit” from the St. Petersburg State University of Economics and Finance. By the way, as the biographer reports, the elder Egorov at one time also “worked to increase his intellectual level,” but only in the spirit of his time; in 1980 he successfully graduated from the University of Marxism-Leninism.

In May 2011, the younger Egorov, with the rank of captain 2nd rank, was appointed head of the 113th Service of the Commissioner for the Quality of Arms and Military Equipment of the Directorate of Military Representatives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. “With pride in the successor of the naval traditions of the I. S. Egorov family, we can say that he found his calling and recognition in the interesting, complex, honorable and responsible service of a naval officer,” writes Pescherov.

As for recognition, this is absolutely true! His connections, apparently, were so strong that even after the military representative was miserably fired for commercial activities (meaning his six LLCs with the name Tavel in the name, which had lured in to the Ministry of Defense), after some time the Leningrad Regional Military Court ordered the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation to cancel the order for the early dismissal of Egorov Jr.

Vicious supplier

The real story of Igor Egorov is not so rosy. By the time of his proven illegal activities in August 2014, as follows from his service card, Egorov had two disciplinary sanctions in the absence of incentives. He also does not have any state awards.

But he decided to impose a tribute on the general director of the supplier of deck equipment and ship supply products, Petrotsep LLC, Valentin Ponomarev.

At the beginning of May 2014, Ponomarev came to Egorov’s office at 203 Fontanka River Embankment with a request to help secure a military representative office of the Ministry of Defense for Petrotsep LLC, which would subsequently allow this organization to participate in contracts for state defense orders. Within three months, the 1st Department of the 177th Military Representation of the Russian Ministry of Defense was assigned to the supplier. And a few days later, Egorov began to put forward monetary demands to Ponomarev, as they say, for general patronage and not causing obstacles in his work.

The officer demanded 13 million rubles from the director for assistance in concluding an agreement between Petrotsep LLC and Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard JSC for the supply of anchor chains for Project 12700 minesweepers. The cost of the contract was almost 80 million rubles.

Egorov’s condition was also the employment and inclusion of his relative Yuri Kuzhel, his brother-in-law, among the co-founders of Petrotsep LLC. The last condition was met, Kuzhel received a salary of approximately 65 thousand rubles at his new place of work. From September 2014 to May 2016, when Egorov was detained, Kuzhel was paid almost 1.4 million rubles.

Ponomarev tolerated such liberties from Egorov, probably only because he himself was distinguished by, let’s say, cheating. The director snatched the same contract for the supply of anchor chains from the only manufacturer of such chains in Russia - the Nizhny Novgorod company "Krasny Anchor". In February 2015, the TASS agency reported that the Petrotsep company, which won the tender, supplied Chinese-made chains for warships, and the Red Anchor company protested the results of the competition in the St. Petersburg department of the FAS, since it offered more profitable terms, moreover, unlike resellers, it has its own production. The technical director of Petrotsep then confirmed to the agency that the company is not a manufacturer, but only supplies products from China.

One can only guess what quality of anchor chains are now installed on the unique Russian minesweepers of Project 12700, which have the world’s largest hull made of solid fiberglass. According to data from open sources, one such ship, the Alexander Obukhov, has been built to date, and two more are already under construction.

Covetous officer

In November 2015, Egorov received from Ponomarev the first part of the bribe in the amount of 2.4 million rubles, simultaneously reducing total amount bribes from 13 to 9 million. Further, the military representative repeatedly demanded that the balance be paid to him.

Finally, in May 2016, Ponomarev went to the security officers and laid out everything he knew about Egorov. The fake 1.3 million rubles was handed over to the “patron” on May 18, 2016, under the control of employees of the regional FSB Directorate. By this time, the required bribe amount had dropped to 6.5 million rubles.

The investigation into Egorov’s case was carried out by the Military Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee of Russia for the St. Petersburg Garrison. The “patron” was charged with receiving a bribe on an especially large scale and was placed in the Kresty pre-trial detention center. Two months later, Egorov Jr. entered into a pre-trial cooperation agreement, and the preventive measure was changed to house arrest. However, already in September 2016, the agreement was terminated after investigators learned that during the preliminary investigation Egorov took bribes twice.

By the way, in his own way he managed to spoil his “business partner” by writing a police report against him. The activities of the Petrotsep company began to be studied as part of a pre-investigation check, however, according to information from Our Version on the Neva, it has not yet come to the point of initiating a criminal case.

Fate is in my hands and happiness is always with me.

Egorov Stepan Georgievich was born on January 1, 1951 in the village of Tavel, Chistopol region of the TASSR, into the family of a teacher. Father - Georgy Stepanovich Egorov, born on August 28, 1917, professional teacher, devoted his whole life to pedagogical activity in rural areas he named his son Stepan in honor of his grandfather. Mother - Egorova Nadezhda Ignatievna, born September 14, 1920, a housewife, a kind and attentive woman, devoted her entire life to raising children. As a child, Stepan was a very serious child, he even smiled very rarely, but he loved to misbehave. The older sister Tamara helped her mother in raising her younger brothers and often Styopa got it from her for petty pranks.
In 1958, Stepan went to 1st grade at the Tavel eight-year school. He liked to study, but there were some problems with maintaining school discipline. Stepan learned to read and write even before school, and therefore, at first, in the first grade, he found it somewhat boring to study and he compensated for the boredom by self-indulgence. With the opening of a new school in the village of Murash, Egorov G.S. was sent there as a teacher and Stepan went to school with his father for several years in the village of Murash, which was located one and a half kilometers from his native village. My father was an excellent accordion player; he had a Russian wreath, a talyanka, and a khromka in his collection, and of course he taught his children to music. Having matured a little, Stepan learned to play the harmonica, but with age his interests changed, he liked sports more. He enthusiastically practiced on the horizontal bar, loved sports games and especially billiards. In the summer I swam in the river, jumped off the bridge with the boys, in general, I grew up like an ordinary village boy.
In 1966 he graduated from the Tavel eight-year school and continued working on his native collective farm and at the same time studied in the 9th grade of an evening school. With age, his views on life changed and Stepan began to intensively train with barbells.
In 1967, after graduating from the 9th grade of evening school, Stepan entered the Chistopol River School. The inexorable thirst for romance and the desire for independence contributed to this decision. He liked studying at the river school, apparently it was here that his love for the water element arose, and in his free time Stepan was engaged in classical wrestling and attended a song and dance club. Subsequently, such exercises yielded results; he repeatedly took prizes at the Tatar national holiday Sabantuy in lifting weights. Stepan completed his educational practice on the tourist ship "Desna" along the route Perm - Rostov on Don - Astrakhan - Perm. It was the first practical river routes during his studies that laid the foundation for his future life path. In 1969, Stepan graduated from the Chistopol River School (GPTU-5) as a motorist-helmsman and ship repairman of the 2nd category. The beginning of Stepan’s career is associated with the USSR River Fleet, where he mastered the fairways of the Kama and Volga rivers on the motor ship “Kimra”.
Subsequently, the desire for knowledge took its toll and in 1969 Stepan entered the Chistopol Agricultural College, from where on October 28, 1969 he was drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR. He served in the Navy in the city of Leningrad in the 13th brigade of ships as a mechanic on a destroyer. From the first days, Stepan liked service in the Navy, his favorite profession, sea element, exemplary order, this is apparently what he lacked all his life.
On one of his days off while on leave, on February 23, 1970, at the Basic Sailors Club of the Leningrad Naval Base, he met his future wife, Valentina. Subsequently, his wife, Valentina, recalls how a handsome young sailor invited her to dance, after which they began dating and subsequently they developed serious relationship. I fell in love with her very much, recalls Stepan Georgievich, I couldn’t even sleep at night. Seeing my torment, my friend Sasha asked if you had fallen in love, Stepan. I answered, yes, I just can’t find a place for myself. Almost two years of meetings on weekends while on leave, where the young people walked along the embankment, visited museums, and, in general, had fun in their free time together.
In the beautiful autumn of October 12, 1972, Stepan Georgievich Egorov and Valentina Anatolyevna Lavrenkova got married. Valentina, born July 26, 1953, trained as a nurse. Father: Anatoly Filippovich, a miner by profession, worked in the Lugansk region, died while working in a mine due to a methane explosion. Mother: Zinaida Lavrentievna, worked all her life on a state farm, was a hardworking and clean woman. Thanks to her hard work, the whole family was clothed, shod and fed. I practically didn’t have an ordinary childhood, I had to work, because in the village there was more than enough work, and my parents had a large farm, Valentina recalls, in the village a child quickly learns to be independent, from an early age children in the village see how adults live, how they work and they themselves are accustomed to work. After finishing school, Valya went to Leningrad. At first she worked in construction for three years, then she graduated from medical school and continued her career as a nurse. Valentina had a charismatic character, people were drawn to her, almost all employees Medical Academy, where she worked for many years. Subsequently, in order to raise her grandson, she left her job, but a few years later, when her grandson had grown up, Valentina completed a massage course and, thanks to her powerful energy, again found herself in the thick of public events.
On January 5, 1973, Valentina gave birth to Stepan’s son, Igor, and on December 31, 1981, a daughter, Marina. Igor, like his father, devoted his entire life to military service in the Navy. Igor himself came up with a name for his younger sister - Marina. At one and a half years old, Marina ate very poorly and when she was forced to eat, she told her mother, if I put slippers on the plate, then you won’t scold me, mom, I’m small. One day, when brother Zhora came to visit, during breakfast, Marina proposed a competition to see who could eat buckwheat porridge with milk the fastest. While eating, Marina dripped milk onto her dress and had to go change clothes, since she was a very clean girl and never wore dirty clothes. She asked Zhora not to eat yet, to wait until she changed clothes. Valya comes into the room and sees that Zhora is sitting and not eating anything, he says, why are you listening to the child, eat while she’s still changing clothes. Then Marina comes in in a new dress and sees that Zhora has already eaten his porridge, she sits down at the table and says in an offended voice, you are a traitor. Marina has been an independent girl since childhood. The father recalls that Marina was a real Cinderella, she cooked and did the laundry herself, since her parents were always at work. Marina graduated from St. Petersburg University in 2004 State University economics and finance with a degree in banking, got married and gave birth to a daughter, Alena, on December 18, 2009.
Our family life began like all military men, Valentina recalls, I was at home with the children, and when the children grew up I had to work, and Stepan was either studying in Kronstadt, or on a trip to the sea, or on a business trip. A loving, faithful, patient, hardworking keeper of the family hearth - all this is about Valentina. Of course, we went on vacation to relatives and visited our parents. Stepan remembers how great it was in the village that his mother-in-law made sausage from environmentally friendly products and with his own hands, the result was excellent food with a specific natural taste.
For success in combat and political training on December 8, 1972 Egorov S.G. The hydroacoustic destroyer Neustrashimy is appointed to the position of chief sergeant of the team. Stepan liked military service in the navy and decides to devote his whole life to it. After graduating from the 114th School of Midshipman-Warrant Officers in Kronstadt on February 21, 1973, Egorov S.G. receives the military rank of midshipman with a specialty in hydroacoustics and is sent to continue further service to the Yacht Club of the USSR Navy.
During his military service, Stepan Yegorov constantly worked to improve his intellectual level, the thirst for knowledge, for understanding the unknown constantly haunted him, and as a result, he entered the University of Marxism-Leninism and successfully graduated from it in 1980.
On March 14, 1988, by order of the commander of the Leningrad naval base, Egorov S.G. he is assigned the next military rank of senior midshipman and he is appointed to the post of head of the Yacht Club of the Russian Navy.
On December 31, 1996, Honored Sea Dog, coach and educator of a whole galaxy of Navy athletes, senior midshipman Egorov S.G. with more than 27 years of military service, he is retiring.
During his military service, Egorov S.G. was awarded numerous awards, including: medal “60 Years of the USSR Armed Forces”, medal “For Impeccable Service” 3rd class, medal “For Impeccable Service” 2nd class, medal “70 Years of the USSR Armed Forces”, medal “For Impeccable Service” 1st class, etc.
Stepan devoted his entire life to military service in the Navy. The highest professionalism, conscientious attitude to the assigned work and responsibility - these are the few character traits of Stepan that allowed him to gain authority among personnel and the leadership of the USSR Navy. Stepan went from a mechanic-coxswain to the head of the Yacht Club of the Russian Navy in St. Petersburg.
Subsequently, son Igor continued the family tradition, took up the baton of his father and devoted himself to serving in the Russian Navy. Brought up in the spirit of love for the navy, from childhood he dreamed of warships, long voyages, and was attracted by the harsh, adventurous life of a military sailor.
As a child, from almost 10 months to 4 years, Igor was raised in the family of his great-grandmother Agafya Vasilyevna and great-grandfather Lavrenty (in the village his grandfather was called Lavrin) Vasilyevich in the Smolensk region, Elninsky district, the village of Garnechya. The older generation is always wiser, more experienced in life situations, and their fate was not easy. Agafya Vasilievna recalls how during the war the Germans forced them to dig trenches and forced them to various jobs. During bombings and artillery shelling, they hid in the cellars. Grandfather Lavrin fought from the first day to the last, went through the entire war in units of the regular troops of the Red Army. After the war, he was an active participant in the development of his native state farm. Grandfather Lavrin raised Igor according to his own rules, so that from childhood Igor was accustomed to order and to tidy up his things. His grandfather handed him the key to the chest where Igor put his things. Valentina remembers how little Igor in the village fell in love with eating sour cream and black bread, and he still has this love to this day. And in our village there lived a witch grandmother Anastasia, recalls Valentina, who knew how to charm various diseases, tamed pigeons, and even treated wild animals. I remember how she once cured a calf, which was then taken to the zoo.
As a child, Igor was fond of classical dancing, went to the regional Robinson club, participated in competitions and received well-deserved prizes. But the main goal in life, which he identified for himself as a child, is to conquer the sea. In 1990 he graduated from secondary school No. 197 in St. Petersburg. After graduation high school For Igor, the crucial moment finally came when he independently took a step towards achieving his intended goal.
In 1990, he entered the Higher Naval School. M.V. Frunze. He liked to study and studied well, especially since studying at a military school involved sea voyages. In September 1994, Igor was on a friendly visit to the city of Antwerp and the city of Brussels (Belgium) on the training ship Smolny as part of an honor guard company. In 1995, he graduated from the Higher Naval School named after M.V. Frunze with a degree in “Ship Armament” with the qualification of an electrical engineer and received lieutenant shoulder straps.
Upon graduation from school, he was assigned to the position of commander of a raid minesweeper of the 4th division of ships of the Leningrad Naval Base of the Baltic Fleet in the city of Kronstadt. From the first days of military service, Lieutenant Egorov I.S. proved himself to be a competent commander, repaired and prepared his ship for going to sea, for which he was noted by the command as the best officer of the Leningrad Naval Base.
In 1996, he graduated from the Higher Special Officer Classes of the Navy and received the qualification “commander of a warship.”
From September 1997 to August 1998, he served in the military as an assistant commander of the Hasan Management Company of the Leningrad Naval Base of the Baltic Fleet.
From July 31, 1998 to August 31, 2001, he served in the weapons department of the Leningrad Naval Base of the Baltic Fleet as a senior officer-specialist in mine, anti-mine, underwater sabotage, torpedo and anti-submarine weapons and weapons, in the city of Kronstadt. The deep theoretical knowledge acquired in school and in classes, as well as the commanding skills acquired on the ship, allowed the young specialist to successfully perform his functional duties.
In 2001 he entered the Naval Academy named after Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov. Within the walls of the Maritime Academy Egorov I.S. comprehended the naval component of the science of military art, grew and matured as a commander and head of the operational level of the Armed Forces.
In 2003, Egorov I.S. graduated from the Naval Academy named after Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov with a qualification - specialist in the field of management, majoring in "Military and Administrative Management" and was appointed to the 208th military representative office of the RF Ministry of Defense, where for several years he successfully completed positions leading test engineer, senior officer, group leader and deputy head of the military representative office.
In 2003, Igor married Egorova (Metelkova) Svetlana Anatolyevna, born September 1, 1977. On July 8, 2003, Sveta gave birth to Igor’s son, Oleg.
Almost until he was 5 years old, Oleg was raised by his grandmother Valentina. Oleg was always a cheerful, cheerful boy, he helped his grandmother with work at the dacha, taught his grandmother to turn on the tape recorder and use new electronic equipment. Subsequently, he quickly mastered the computer. He loved having books read to him, and he himself learned to read early. Valentina remembers how Oleg once found a half-ripe berry and asks his grandmother when it will be ripe. Grandmother replies, wait a little and she will soon be there. And Oleg sat near the berries for about two hours, waiting for the berries to ripen, during which time the grandmother managed to calmly weed several beds. Once as a child, Oleg said that if there was no computer in the kindergarten, then he would not go to kindergarten. And subsequently he really refused to go to kindergarten.
The desire for knowledge constantly drove him during his military service and Egorov I.S. enters the St. Petersburg State University of Economics and Finance and in 2003 successfully graduates with a qualification as an economist with a degree in Finance and Credit.
Subsequently, in 2008, Egorova I.S. sent to advanced training courses for command staff of the Directorate of Military Representations in Moscow, after which he continues his military service in the system of military missions as the head of the 113th Service of the Commissioner for the Quality of Weapons and Military Equipment of the Directorate of Military Representations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. In 2009, for skillful leadership of the entrusted division, Egorov I.S. receives the next military rank of captain 2nd rank. Among the awards he received for high military professionalism are medals: “300 years of the Russian Navy”, “In memory of the 300th anniversary of St. Petersburg”, “For military valor"II degree, "For impeccable service" I, II and III degrees.
During his military service, Igor Stepanovich Egorov, as an applicant, independently works on a dissertation, which he successfully defends in 2012 and he is awarded the academic degree “Candidate of Political Sciences.”
The unit under the command of Captain 2nd Rank I. S. Egorov is a friendly, close-knit team that, thanks to good training, organization and discipline, makes every effort to successfully complete the tasks assigned to it by the Motherland. The commander’s business qualities, such as conscientiousness, knowledge and love for the chosen profession, and exactingness, helped to achieve this to a large extent. With pride in the continuation of the naval traditions of the I. S. Egorov family, we can say that he found his calling and recognition in the interesting, complex, honorable and responsible service of a naval officer.

The entry of post-Soviet republics into NATO and its impact on the national security of the Russian Federation Egorov, Igor Stepanovich. sea ​​soul

The entry of post-Soviet states into NATO as a guarantee against political pressure from Russia

NATO political stereotypes regarding Russia

Entry of post-Soviet republics into the North Atlantic Alliance: the illusion of “congruence” between NATO and the European Union

Relations between Russia and the United States as the core of partnership and confrontation between Russia and NATO

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Introduction of the dissertation (part of the abstract) On the topic "The entry of post-Soviet republics into NATO and its impact on the national security of the Russian Federation"

Conclusion of the dissertation on the topic "Political institutions, processes and technologies", Egorov, Igor Stepanovich

List of references for dissertation research Candidate of Political Sciences Egorov, Igor Stepanovich, 2011

The entry of post-Soviet republics into NATO and its impact on the national security of the Russian Federation Egorov, Igor Stepanovich. sea soul