For many centuries, the history of Russia is connected with the struggle that the peoples of the Caucasus undertook at different stages of history for their sovereignty and independence from the Moscow government. Sometimes they united under religious slogans and advocated the creation of a sovereign Islamic state in their region. There are also examples of how they were prompted to take up arms by political or economic reasons. But in all cases, the armed confrontation between the Russians and the Russians resulted in incalculable suffering for both peoples.

What is Ichkeria?

In 1991, the process of collapse of the Soviet Union was completed. One of its consequences was the formation of self-proclaimed Ichkeria (CRI) on the territory of the former Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In July 1991, after the unilateral declaration of the sovereignty of this unrecognized state entity, its first president was the leader of supporters of the separation of Chechnya from Russia, Major General of Aviation of the former USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev. His portrait is placed at the beginning of the article.

The actions of the separatists caused a sharp deterioration in relations between the CRI and the government of Russia, which included this territory. The contradictions that arose and gradually deepened led to a military conflict, which caused numerous casualties suffered by both sides and an escalation of tension throughout the North Caucasus.

Two Chechen military fires

The fighting aimed at establishing constitutional order in Chechnya took place in two stages and went down in history under the name “Chechen campaigns”, the first of which covered the period from December 1994 to August 1996, and the second, which began in August 1999, continued with varying intensity for almost a decade.

It would seem, what is Ichkeria in comparison with Russia, which, due to its vastness, is usually called one sixth of the Earth? However, despite the numerical superiority, during the First Chechen War, government troops failed to complete the tasks assigned to them. By postponing the solution to the problem until a more favorable time and withdrawing them from the combat zone, Moscow thereby actually recognized the existence of Chechen Ichkeria and the legitimacy of its separatist government.

Further events that unfolded three years later became a continuation of the armed conflict, which by that time had assumed an even greater scope. Despite the fact that its active phase lasted no more than a year, over the next 10 years, clashes between government troops and the forces of Chechen self-government did not stop in the territory of this region.

Attempt to abolish Ichkeria

In 2007, the Islamist separatist Doku Umarov, who by that time had become the president of the republic (the portrait is given below), announced its abolition and transformation into a vilayat - an administrative-territorial unit adopted in a number of Muslim countries of the Near and Middle East, as well as North Africa. This new state formation was to become the core of the Caucasus Emirate proclaimed and headed by the same Doku Umarov. Having received the name Nokhchiycho (CHRN), the newly formed vilayat replaced the previously proclaimed Ichkeria.

What the Caucasus Emirate is is not difficult to understand from the goals that its supporters set for themselves. Their plans included the creation of an independent Muslim state in the North Caucasus, based on the ideology of Islamism, Salafism and Wahhabism. The methods of its construction were to conduct both open and underground terrorist struggle. It is no coincidence that such trends have caused active opposition from the Russian government.

Leader of the Chechen diaspora

Despite all the efforts made by Doku Umarov, his initiative to abolish the republic and give it a different form of political structure met sharp criticism from representatives of the foreign Chechen diaspora, who were supporters of the first president of Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Dudayev, who died in 1996.

One of these emigrant groups was headed by the former brigadier general of the ChRI - Akhmed Zakaev. It was he who in 2009 called on the residents of Chechnya to recognize the legitimacy of the pro-Russian government led by Ramzan Kadyrov and to stop military resistance. In addition, Zakayev headed the cabinet of ministers of the republic and became the head of the government formed at that time.

Conclusion

An even more complete idea of ​​what Ichkeria and the vilayat of Nokhchiycho that replaced it are can be obtained from the fact that in Russia their authorities were included in the list of terrorist organizations prohibited in the country, and belonging to them is still punishable by law.

What followed was full of many dramatic events, the memory of which has not been erased to this day. However, thanks to the joint actions of the current leadership of the republic and the government of the Russian Federation, its secession from Russia has been removed from the agenda. Nevertheless, many problems that became a legacy of the period of the collapse of the USSR are still waiting to be resolved.

Against all odds, I woke up earlier than expected. Well, since this happened, I’ll serve society. Namely, I’ll start writing about “The Russia we are looking for.” It is also the Russian National State.

And I will start with the form of government. Or, in other words, from the form of the state’s relationship to its territory. To your parts, that is.

Actually, what to choose from. There are only a few more or less viable government forms. Let’s list them – “according to the textbook”, with a few comments.

UNITARY CENTRALIZED STATE. All parts of the state are administrative-territorial units and do not have the status of state entities. Local authorities are headed by central appointees. Elected power exists at the very, very bottom (well, some kind of “local government”) and any of its decisions can be canceled by order of an appointee.

UNITARY NON-CENTRALIZED STATE. All parts of the state are administrative-territorial units and do not have the status of state entities. Local authorities, however, are elected by the population and have quite significant powers.

UNITARY MIXED STATE. All parts of the state are administrative-territorial units and do not have the status of state entities. But some are governed by appointed officials, and some are governed by elected officials.

In this case, there are all sorts of different options. For example, some territories (usually considered “troubled” or “rebellious”) may be governed by appointees, or even directly from the center; “prosperous” territories are governed by authorities elected by the population. Or - some territories (for example, those with the status of “developed”) are governed by de facto local elected authorities, officials from the center are only tolerated there - but the old “developed” territories, on the contrary, lie under the capital’s appointees. It can be more cunning.

A UNITARY STATE WITH AUTONOMIES (I would like to say “with complications”, that’s how it is). The state can be centralized or decentralized, but there are parts of it that need to be “specially tinkered with” and have some special rights. As a rule, we are talking about a greater level of self-government than “usually by territory”. Sometimes these rights are very significant.

A unitary state with autonomies differs from a federation (about which below) mainly in that autonomies are considered something extraordinary, some kind of “complications”. They work with them as if they were “complications” - for example, there are some special government structures that deal specifically with these issues, but not on a general basis (as in the federation).

“To get a feel for it”: China is a typical unitary state with autonomy. In general, it is wildly centralized, but Hong Kong itself has incredible sovereignty (it practically decides all issues, with the exception of defense and foreign policy). Other “special autonomous entities” that will still exist - for example, Taiwan, when it is returned - will also have such rights. Which does not particularly violate the general style of the Chinese method of management, but, so to speak, sets it off.

FEDERAL STATE. Consists of entities that have the characteristics of a state. They have sovereignty, which they delegate to the center. There are issues that are the exclusive competence of the center - as a rule, these are defense, foreign policy and finance (to a certain extent). There is a unified federal legislation, but it does not exclude the presence of local laws (or even constitutions).

There are many types of federations, depending on how exactly the states that are part of the federation are structured, and they can be structured very differently. There is even a federation of monarchies - the United Arab Emirates, with a hereditary monarch-president. Theoretically, the strangest hybrids are possible - for example, a federation consisting of a monarchy, two republics (presidential and parliamentary), some transnational corporation (part of a given state as a subject, why not), three ethnic autonomies (one of which is also a federation of eight subjects) and the capital federal district. But in most cases, everything is simpler and more boring: as a rule, federations consist of unitary states, relations between them and the center are regulated by the so-called “upper house of parliament,” which consists precisely of representatives of these very subjects of the federation.

UNITARY-FEDERAL STATE. Some parts of the state are administrative-territorial units, and some have characteristics of states.

This thing differs from a unitary state with autonomy in that there are many subjects of the federation, and they have to be perceived as “part of life.” Accordingly, they work with them as in a federation - for example, the upper house is formed from representatives of the constituent entities of the federation, and so on.

To make it clear. Ukraine is a unitary state with autonomy (Crimea). The Ukrainian Rada is a unicameral parliament; deputies from Crimea sit there “in working order.” Relations between Simferopol and Kiev are established, so to speak, in a special way. At the same time, the very existence of Crimean autonomy is perceived by Kiev as something unnecessary that has to be “endured.” But pre-Putin Russia, on the contrary, is a typical unitary-federal state. It is divided into 21 republics (full-fledged states), and inferior regions-krais (46 regions and 9 territories without small things). The very existence of republics is considered the “norm of life”; issues are resolved through the upper house of parliament, which has the nightmarish name “Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation”, in general - everything is like in an ordinary federation. After “strengthening the vertical” the situation changed somewhat – but that’s a different story.

CONFEDERATION. A temporary union of states “for some special purpose.” It is not a state (if only because members of a confederation can be members of another confederation). Quite often, confederation is a form of divorce prior to the division of property. Or vice versa - something like an engagement before marriage (that is, transformation into a federation or a unitary state). Such engagements, however, are easily frustrated - see the fate of Arab confederations such as the UAR.

Now about federations in more detail. They are divided, as a rule, into TERRITORIAL and ETHNIC. That is, the subjects of federations are either historical lands that have experience of self-government, or territories inhabited by different peoples.

For example, the United States is a territorial federation. States were created without taking into account the ethnic composition of those living in them. State boundaries are drawn in accordance with treaties that do not appeal to national composition. There is no concept of a “titular nation” and everything else associated with it. This does not mean that such points are not taken into account at all - for example, in Hawaii, the Hawaiian language is recognized along with English as an official language, and in several southern states Spanish functions on the same basis. And yet.

But the late Czechoslovakia (circa 1969), for example, was an ethnic federation. It consisted of a “Czech” part and a “Slovak” part. Their borders were determined primarily by national composition. When the federation was divided, no one doubted that this was precisely the “division of peoples.” During the period of popularity of Moravian independence (there was such a thing), the right to such was justified by the idea that “Moravians are not Czechs” (although the real difference lies in the difference in national ideas, that is, the basic drinks consumed, but this is an aside).

What is the current Russian Federation? This centralized unitary-federal state of ethnic type.

Where did it come from? After “strengthening the vertical of power” (especially after 2004, when governors became appointed), Russia became precisely a centralized state. Which, alas, did not serve to decorate it, but that’s another topic. The unitary-federal Erefia was born from the foam of perestroika. De facto, this order was established as a result of the “parade of sovereignties” in the Russian Federation (starting with Yeltsin’s Kazan statement and ending with the signing of a new federal treaty). But the ethnic character of the federation was set by the Bolsheviks. Who, destroying the Russian Empire, carved up the territory in accordance with their nation-building plans.

What happened? Russia is divided into Russian regions-krais and national “non-Russian” republics. Regions and territories do not have the rights of states. Therefore, Russians do not have their own statehood within the Russian Federation, while other peoples do. Some of these peoples - such as the Tatars, Yakuts or Chechens - have very large official and even greater unofficial opportunities for self-government (and self-government). The system of relations is built - almost officially - in such a way that the main costs (economic and not only) are borne by the regions, while the benefits and preferences are received by the republics. And so on - “everyone here knows everything.”

Now – what do we want?

Let's start with what Russian nationalists DO NOT want. So, they do not want to live in a state whose very structure will in any way contribute to the oppression of the Russian people. This is one of the “never again” series.

Therefore, maintaining the current state of affairs is unacceptable. Because the situation when non-Russian peoples in Russia “even by law” (!) have more rights and opportunities than the Russian people is intolerable.

But there may be different opinions about the best device.

) I will continue later (

Due to the fact that the heated discussion of Ukraine-USA-gays-Orthodox-Soviet is constantly blurring the Russian national agenda (which dominated, for example, in 2013), I would like to once again recall the basic principles and ideals that our site is trying to popularize:

1. Russians are a great European people with a brilliant true history of the 200-year-old Russian Empire. Unlike many other nations, we do not need to invent or falsify anything, inventing “ancient ukrov” and similar low-grade fantasy.

2. In 1917, a national catastrophe occurred, during which the transformation of the Russian people into the Russian nation was interrupted, Russian national building was stopped, entire social strata were destroyed, powerful cultural and political degeneration occurred, Russians moved from a typical European Empire to an equally typical totalitarian an Asian state (compare the USSR with Maoist China, North Korea, Cambodia or North Vietnam).

3. In 1991, the totalitarian Asian state collapsed, but the price of getting rid of the oppression of Asian idiots was monstrous territorial losses and complete economic collapse, which ended with the distribution of state property to Soviet crooks. The current borders of the Russian Federation are unfair, the current structure of the economy and large property is unfair, and in addition, the promised democratic reforms were curtailed, Asian totalitarianism was replaced by a Latin American oligarchy, and then by a Latin American autocracy.

4. Nevertheless, due to the return to the global information space and the opening of borders since 1991, the level of culture and political literacy of Russian people is slowly but surely growing. Russian national building (the acquisition of political, economic and informational subjectivity by the Russian people), despite obstacles from the Latin American state, has resumed and is gradually gaining momentum.

5. The task of the Russian national movement is to create Russian political, economic and intellectual elites that will provide subjectivity to the Russian people, turning them from a people proper into a nation (political community). The second step, after gaining subjectivity and reformatting the Russian Federation into a democratic national state with the rule of law and a competitive economy, should be the organization of a review of the results of the 20th century, which was unsuccessful for us, including the borders generated by this century.

6. The absolute imperative of the foreign policy of the Russian nation-state is the return of Ukraine, Belarus and Northern Kazakhstan (discussed: the Baltic states). Until such a return takes place, all talk about the status of a regional power (and especially a world power) is nothing more than propaganda chatter.

7. The absolute imperative of the United States and the EU is to maintain the Russian Federation and the Russian people in the Latin American state for as long as possible: with authoritarian “national leaders”, the absence of working constitutional and state mechanisms, a permanent crisis economy, the omnipotence of the intelligence services and regular palace coups that prevent them from standing on a path of sustainable and constant development, provoking crisis after crisis.

8. The current Ukrainian crisis is a failure when the Latin American elites of the Russian Federation, for a reason unknown to us, began implementing part of the program to return Great Russia. However, as Latin American elites, they stopped after the first steps, having neither the strategy nor the moral strength to win the confrontation that had begun, stuck between a real conflict with the US and the EU and capitulation. Since an unyielding will is absolutely necessary for victory in any conflict, it can be predicted that the indecisive Latin American Russian Federation will lose the conflict, after which it will either collapse itself or be reformatted by external actors.

9. Accordingly, the tactical task of the Russian national movement becomes the accumulation of financial, media and organizational resources, as well as obtaining maximum public support by the time when the authorities of the Russian Federation who lost the confrontation begin to scatter and a window of opportunity for political activity opens. It should be noted that this activity will be actively hampered (even to the point of political assassinations) by both liberals who openly represent the interests of the United States and the EU, as well as the numerous political, economic and power lobbies of non-Russian elites of the Russian Federation who want to retain property and influence. It is also quite likely that the powerful security apparatus of the Russian Federation, after the flight of the current authorities of the Russian Federation due to direct bribery, will come under the control of either liberals or multinationals, or will be fragmented between them.

10. We would prefer that the political subjectivity of the Russian people be returned in the course of successive soft democratic reforms (as happened, say, in Spain after the death of Franco), but the growing confrontation with the West coupled with the paradoxical capitulation of the reigning Latin Americans leaves no hope for soft development events.

11. Russian nationalism, which does not raise questions of the subjectivity of the Russian people, denies the European essence of the Russian people, is not interested in the ownership of large property in the Russian Federation, supports an independent Ukraine (Belarus, Kazakhstan), tries to replace the real Russian history with fantasy, reducing issues of national revival with the support of Putin and etc. is not Russian nationalism, but a provocation.

12. It is critically important for Russian nationalism to obtain the support of the active 5% of the population: large, medium and small owners, intellectuals and media managers, the officer corps of the army and intelligence services, the politically active middle class. It is these active 5% that will decide the fate of the country during a political crisis, the remaining 95% of the broad masses will follow the leaders and activists. An appeal to opinion polls makes sense only as part of propaganda, but in reality opinion polls mean something only in an established democratic system, where the opinion of the electorate directly influences the possible outcome of the elections. There is no established democratic system in the Russian Federation and none is expected in the near future, so discussions about what “the people want” are mainly an intellectual exercise, divorced from real life. But what the active 5% want is really important.

13. And these active 5% cannot be attracted by the denial of individual rights, a free competitive economy, the great destiny of the great Russian people, anti-Europeanism and the need to restore Russia's real influence. People from the top 5% go on vacation to Europe, not to the DPRK, and this is the main fact on which to rely in developing the ideology of Russian nationalism. Talk about the “Stalinist Eurasian multinational empire” will make sense when we see top managers and colonels on vacation in the PRC, and not in Nice. Russian nationalism should be based on realism, rationalism and real Russian history, and not meaningless mumbling about “Eurasian spirituality.” Likewise, radical Westernism, associating the interests of the United States and the EU with the interests of the Russian people, is senseless. Neither the US nor the EU are interested in the emergence of a democratic, stable Russian nation-state, since this would mean the revival of a destroyed center of power. Nobody needs competitors, so the United States and the EU will either try to pin the defeatist liberalism of the 90s on the Russians (“Collect all the money and give it to Brussels!”), or promote pupation in the Orthodox Eurasian socialist Northern Nigeria.

14. Russian nationalism must be intellectually honest and fundamentally express the real thoughts and feelings of the active part of the Russian population. This is the only way to win sympathy in a situation of total public cynicism and disappointment in any ideologies. Extreme honesty is the only reasonable strategy in a society where “honesty” is denied as a concept.

15. A Russian nationalist is not obliged to publicly declare his sympathies and wear “Yarussky” T-shirts, since among the active part of society there are many of our sympathizers, whose current situation, however, prevents an open declaration of national views. A top manager of a state corporation who secretly supports the national movement is much more valuable than a marginalized person who openly marches with the imperial flag. Russian nationalism should not be about noisy marches and slogans, but about quiet deeds.

16. Russian nationalists should pay special attention to the Russian resistance of Donbass in all its forms (from combatants to information support networks to secret and overt sponsors) - these are people who have proven themselves in action and who can play a critical role in further events of the Russian Federation. One active participant in the Donbass campaign is more valuable for the Russian cause than all the talk about an abstract “people” taken together.

17. It should be remembered that during a political crisis, revolutionaries of the first wave almost universally die, are imprisoned, and find themselves out of work; the fruits of their exploits are collected by the second wave. Russian nationalists at this stage should not enter into confrontation with the Latin American authorities of the Russian Federation, leaving the high honor of becoming martyrs to a liberal, communist-patriotic revolution or any other public stupid enough for this. At the same time, we should not act as supporters of the Latin American government - otherwise the consequences of its decisions (on which we have no influence) will begin to hit the Russian national movement, putting us in the situation of “a hangover at someone else’s feast.”

18. Reasonable neutrality in relation to the authorities, public and secret gathering of supporters, building social connections (including non-public ones, public organizations often provoke the authorities), sincere communication with Donbass veterans, increasing media influence (including organizing new media without an obvious national bias) , propaganda among the active 5%, preparing mass public opinion - this is what Russian nationalism should do today. This is what you personally should do if you consider yourself a Russian nationalist. A nation is a collective effort, not a passive wait for good people to hand you National Russia on a silver platter.

19. Russian nationalism is interested in National Russia, which will ensure freedom, prosperity and greatness for the Russian people. Since this coincides with the natural aspirations of every reasonable Russian person, Russian nationalism is supported by historical, political, economic and social REALITY, which other projects for the future of the Russian Federation, which are pointless fantasies, and even directly malicious quasi-religious political cults, do not have. Nevertheless, apathy, indecision, anti-intellectualism, focus on a passive audience, organizational weakness and suicidal attacks on power structures can lead to defeat and another 10-20 years of vegetation for the Russian people until the next historical chance appears.

20. In other words, the future depends on you. From your Russian mind, Russian courage, Russian determination, Russian idealism and Russian dignity (for a person who values ​​himself will never agree for his country to vegetate in Latin America). If you don’t have enough of them, then National Russia will be built by the next generation - and you will end up in it as helpless old men who spent the best part of their lives fighting the Latin American idiots who seized command posts. This is also a choice, but I personally wouldn’t want to spend another 10-15 years with the Milonovs and Mizulins after the next round of degeneration. I believe that my people and my loved ones deserve civil rights, a democratic system, a competitive economy of opportunity, a great nation and a great country.

And I'm ready to fight for it.

Russian people have a natural gift for feeling injustice and lack of freedom. But in the era of mass media, this feeling is offset by streams of harmful ideological cliches and sticky conclusions that have distracted the Russian people from a healthy attitude towards their own history and their current situation. An information and ideological war is being waged against the Russians. And ideology can only be defeated by ideology. What does it mean: ideological writings and the trail of journalism that follows them, propaganda projects, declarations of slogans - something absolutely necessary for the Russian people to resist the destructive actions of the media and, in general, the information environment in which we are all involuntarily immersed.

The foundations of the Russian worldview were set out more than once in various kinds of declarative works or philosophical and political doctrines of private writing. I had the opportunity to participate in the creation of the Manifesto for the Revival of Russia, which became the basis for the political position of the Congress of Russian Communities (1993-1999), the National Manifesto (2009), which currently expresses the ideology of the Great Russia party, and in collaboration with Boris Vinogradov, published the book “Becoming Russian” in Russia" (2011), and then summarize national conservative ideas in the book "Russian Ideology", which is planned to be published in the near future. I have also produced many programs dedicated to Russian national ideology as part of the electronic video channel "Russian News".

There is a core idea in Russian ideology that is worth repeating constantly and illuminating from different angles. In order for it to constantly be the focus of attention of educated Russian people who are looking for a reliable basis for their position, and often for a personal propaganda contribution to the liberation of the Russian people from the tyranny of the oligarchy. This is the idea of ​​the Russian national state, expressed in the key slogan of the Russian movement: “Russia - Russian power.”

Unfortunately, recently people have been joining the Russian movement who stopped in their intellectual development somewhere in the mid-90s or even earlier - they simply stopped reading books and current journalism. They invite us to “dance from the stove,” and therefore to repeat our favorite liberal fictions about the Russian people, the Russian state, and Russian nationalism. If the official media are trying to discredit Russian nationalism and intimidate the Russian people with its “animal grin,” then well-wishers, who suddenly feel involved in the Russian people, are trying to persuade them. Persuade them to abandon everything Russian and strive only for “social security” and “common sense.” It’s as if both become accessible to a Russian person only after he renounces everything Russian - first of all, the idea of ​​a Russian national state.

First of all, they are trying to “remind” us that “Russia is a multinational state.” At the same time, they believe that they are quoting Yeltsin’s Constitution, supposedly adopted by us in an all-Russian referendum. Firstly, this Constitution was not adopted in a referendum (there were not enough votes for this), and secondly, in the text of this Constitution, which was foisted on us by deception, there are no words “multinational state”. It only talks about “multinational people”. Which, of course, is absurd if by “multinationality” we mean several nations. This term can only be conventionally reasonable in the sense of a plurality of “nationalities,” that is, nationalities. As in any state, many peoples live in the Russian Federation. If they prefer to be called “nationalities,” then the generalized “people of the Russian Federation” is made up of them. This completely fruitless thought can be accepted. But for a state to contain many nations, such an idea can only be considered absurd. There can only be one nation in one state. Historical Russia also never had many nations. Even in the USSR, the “Soviet people” - “a new human community” could be considered a nation. But there was no plurality of nations in it. Such plurality is present only in international organizations - for example, in the United Nations.

The theoretical question is: was there and is there a nation in Russia? In the political sense, a “nation” is a community of solidarity of citizens (subjects) who are aware of this community and accept it as its creators. In a national state, this awareness is universal and constant; in a pre-national state, it is inherent either in the leading social stratum or in the entire population, but only in times of special danger to the state. And, if we are talking about Russia, then we should name this nation and say where it comes from. A nation does not arise out of emptiness, but is generated by a people who have reached a certain level of self-awareness.

Russian self-awareness includes, as signs of national solidarity, outstanding military triumphs, which were shared as common glory by all the Russian people. Starting with the Battle of the Ice and the Battle of Kulikovo. In this empathy, as well as in the consolidation of the duty to serve “Faith, Tsar and Fatherland,” the sign of the existence of a nation is manifested. This means that the nation existed in Russia even before the very term with which we now operate appeared. And the Russian Empire was a Russian national state. Other peoples also had their home in it, the leading strata of which joined the administration of the Russian state and became Russified, recognizing Russia as a Russian state. At the same time, Russia has never been a “multinational”, much less a “multi-confessional” state. And if such a state is ever achieved, then the existence of Russia will cease, and the history of the Russian people will end.

Can we say that the Russian Federation is a nation state? After all, we have terms about “national security” and recently even created a “national guard”. Some dreamers believe that a “Russian nation” appeared from somewhere in the Russian Federation. From where - no one knows. And the only justification for this fantasy is the distribution of Russian passports and the registration of all citizens of the Russian Federation as members of a certain “nation” - that is, the state. This approach cannot be considered to be in any way justified. For the “Russian nation” is no more real than the “Soviet people,” and formal citizenship does not contain obligatory loyalty to the state and the state-forming people.

Currently, the Russian Federation is a non-national (or even anti-national) state. And, of course, non-denominational. In the Russian Federation and other fragments of historical Russia, there is a nation, of course. To the extent that the state-forming Russian people feel themselves to be a community responsible for their fate and the fate of the state. Such responsibility is obvious, but the power circles of the Russian Federation use it only for imitative patriotism, which replaces political solidarity with loyalty to the anti-national authorities. In this sense (as in many others), the Russian Federation ceases to be a state - there is no state-oriented worldview in it, no nation, no legal institutions designed to preserve the national character of the state. The Russian Federation is something faceless, in no way connected with the history of Russia. And the power of such a connection is shunned in every possible way.

In Russia there can only be one nation - Russian. This is a historical fact. Even if Russians in Russia made up not 80% of the population, but, say, 10%, the situation would not change. Russia is Russians united by relations of solidarity and who have created state institutions on this basis. This is the formula of modern Russian statehood. Anyone who doesn’t like this doesn’t like the Russian State.

Only the Russian people can continue the history of Russia. Without the Russian people, Russia is nothing. Any other people, if they disappeared, would not affect the history of Russia in any way. Therefore, in history there is only Russian Russia, and not “Russia in general” or “Russia for everyone.” As much as Russia is Russian, it exists.

Of course, representatives of other peoples can enter the Russian nation if they Russify their political view of things, if they are patriots of Russian Russia, and not some other. Then these will be those who are part of the Russian nation. Otherwise, these are political marginals who belong in unique ethnographic reserves. This choice can be humanely given to them. Commitment to marginalized ethnicity should be respected, but it should also be recognized that the marginalized cannot be given political rights. What can you do, Russia is a Russian country, a country where the Russian nation exists, and there cannot be any other nations here.

Our country cannot be multi-religious either. Russia is historically the center of Orthodoxy, the Christian center. We do not consider Catholics and Protestants to be Christians, although they repeat words from Scripture. But they do not understand anything about it and distort the meanings so that we define them as heretics. These can be quite decent people in everyday matters. But in dogmatic questions they veered somewhere away from Christ. And if they insist on their delusions or try to impose them on us, then they turn into our enemies. And the enemies of our worldview cannot be in the same nation as us.

Russia is the core of Orthodox civilization, the stronghold of Christianity. Representatives of other faiths cannot have any rights that elevate them above the Orthodox. All other confessions here can only have a representative character, because historically in Russia there were no other confessions, no other world religions.

Yes, over time, some people with different religious views moved in with us. Some peoples converted to Islam. But this does not mean at all that Russia is multi-confessional, and here you can put Orthodoxy and any other confession on the same level.

If we had national state power, it had to grow from national roots, be flesh and blood of the Russian people. These roots and this flesh are absolutely Orthodox, and no others. This does not mean that other beliefs should be suppressed or persecuted. Destructive cults - of course, but we must tolerate the presence of world religions - to the extent that they do not encroach on the Orthodox essence of Russia.

The special relationship between the current government and the bureaucracy of the Moscow Patriarchate does not mean the emergence of any signs of a Russian national state. Firstly, because this bureaucracy is thoroughly permeated with ecumenism and captured by the crypto-Catholic sect, and secondly, because the government officials have developed even warmer relations with Jewish rabbis and Islamic mullahs.

If Judaism in Russia cannot in any way be considered a “traditional confession” (as its status is indicated in Russian legislation), and it is also not a world religion, then Islam in Russia is certainly traditional, and in its prevalence covers the whole world. However, there are not as many Muslims in the Russian Federation as they say. Conversations generally attribute all non-Orthodox peoples of the Russian Federation to Islam. Hence the crazy numbers, reaching 20 and 25 million. This is a deliberate lie spread by mossy “multi-religious” and “multinational” people. That is, enemies of Russia and Russians. The overestimation is by an order of magnitude, that is, ten times.

The deception is organized like this: they gathered one hundred thousand Chechens and migrants in the square on Bayram and declared our country half Muslim. Of course, there was and cannot be anything Muslim in the statehood of historical Russia. Yes, now Moscow has been occupied by immigrants; a monstrous cathedral mosque has been built for them, without asking the Russians, to which crowds of Muslims flock in the thousands from all over the Moscow region. But these are not residents of Moscow, not Muscovites, not Russians. These are people whom the Russophobic authorities brought to the center of the country in order to suppress everything Russian and everything Orthodox. And also to demonstrate to us what idiots we are for allowing the Russian Orthodox capital to be populated by foreigners and non-Basmachis.

The role of Orthodoxy in the formation of the Russian state is well known. The Russian people are state-forming people - this is also clear to every sane person. Maybe there are other peoples who participated in the state building of Russia? There is no doubt that many peoples gave Russian statehood their worthy representatives. But is there at least one people in Russia, besides the Russians, who built statehood? That the peoples resisted Russian statehood is true. That the peoples of Russia were fleeing extermination is true. But there are no peoples who would create Russia together with the Russian people.

The people closest to us in number are the Tatars (5%). Did the Tatars participate in building the Russian state? No, they resisted Russia - both in the Volga region, and in Crimea, and in Siberia. On the contrary, we had to fight the Tatars for a long time. The Tatars tried to prevent the Russians from developing and extending their statehood to undeveloped spaces in the east and south. Only in opposition to the Tatars (Crimean, Astrakhan, Volga) did the Russian state emerge. This does not mean that a modern Tatar, or a Tatar from the time of Ivan the Terrible, could not serve the Russian state. Could. And there were more Tatars in the army of Ivan the Terrible than outside the walls of the Kazan Kremlin. But there were also ten thousand Russian mercenaries outside the walls of the Kazan Kremlin. Here the question was not ethnic, but political: either dominance would remain with the Tatar khans, or with the Russian Tsar and the Russian Orthodox people.

During the time of Ivan the Terrible, the Tatars were already split, and in the ethnic sense they formed into a community only under the rule of the White Tsar. Kazan Tatars are the fruit of Russian statehood, and not vice versa. At the same time, we, Russians, are obliged to respect in every possible way the contribution made by individual representatives of the Tatar people to our statehood. By the way, can we name at least a dozen names?

Are the Tatar people now the builders of the Russian state? No, not at all! No other nation, except the Russian, bears the burden of statehood. If there is something from the state in the Russian Federation, it is only due to the fact that the Russians have not yet given up and have not thrown the idea of ​​reviving their native state out of their hearts. From other nations we often see competitive relationships. Are there Tatars or representatives of other nations in the Russian movement? Are any Tatar organizations supported by the Russians? No, this is not visible. And we know how the Kazan Tatars treat Russians - the Tatar ethnic clan rules there and has seized power. Of course, he represents not all Tatars, but an ethnic oligarchy, suppressing everything Russian in Tatarstan. But do the rest of the Tatars really have something against and support the Russians who are fighting for the status of the Russian language and the access of Russians to public service? No, this is not the case.

Russians strive to ensure that the Russian state is restored. It can only be restored as Russian. Therefore, Russians strive to preserve Russian statehood in any form, but so that it is necessarily Russified. But the Tatars and other peoples do not. They are fighting for their local privileges, local rights, and even for the creation of their own ethnic statehood - like the peoples of the former USSR who supported Yeltsin’s “parade of sovereignties.” When they flee to the Russian Federation and remember the “friendship of peoples,” we must remember the genocide of Russians in their ancestral nests. These uninvited guests are not ours - they are guests of the Russophobic oligarchy, “socially close” to the oligarchy hostile to us.

Why is the Russian Federation not only not a Russian state, but not even a state at all? Because in some cases the status of a foreigner in the Russian Federation is higher than the status of a citizen. Firstly, these are foreigners close to the oligarchy, for whom the Russian Federation is a free hunting zone. Foreign or multinational corporations are at home here. Gazprom or Rosneft, VTB or Alfa Bank are international structures, not Russian ones. They act exclusively contrary to Russian national interests and even against Russian statehood, subjugating it to themselves. Secondly, uninvited guests freely enter the Russian Federation - having no connection with the Russian statehood and replenishing ethnic criminal structures. Thirdly, in the Russian Federation there are no restrictions on the acquisition by foreigners of land for housing construction and the construction of housing here. And in court, foreigners are treated equally with Russian citizens. Not only Russians, but all citizens of the Russian Federation are freely discriminated against by foreigners. But also criminal elements - formally citizens of the Russian Federation, but actually members of anti-state groups.

The task of the Russians is to Russify the legal system, saturate it with Russian meanings, equalize the rights of respectable citizens, infringe on the status of foreigners in comparison with citizens, decisively defeat the rights of criminal elements and uninvited guests - immigrants, as well as all kinds of ethnocrats.

The constitution should have a clause on state-forming status only for the Russian people. No other people should have state-forming status, otherwise it will be a lie in the founding document, and no statehood can be built on lies. Only the Russian people created Russia! But the Russian national state is a total Russification of all legislation.

The state-forming status of the Russian people without the Russification of the entire body of laws that will guarantee this status is worth nothing. Each declarative position (and there should also be such in legislation - so that the meaning of the legal system does not slip away) must be supported by laws, and the constitutional status of the Russian people must be supported by a number of laws. They must infringe on other peoples to the extent that tendencies arise against the Russian content of statehood. If a person does not want to live in Russian Russia, he either lives on a reservation or he moves abroad. In this sense, there must be infringement. If you do not speak Russian, you cannot acquire any civil rights. Because they are not even able to understand what these rights are and what responsibilities they imply.

Civil status should be the same, but this status assumes only Russian content. Russian culture, Russian education, the Russian state language - all this takes precedence and is protected from any competition within Russian territory.

The constitutional norms of the future Russian national state cannot be directed against other peoples who live on the territory of our country, but they must be aimed at ensuring that these peoples live in peace with the Russian people. So that the Russian people do not adapt to everyone, but on the contrary, so that other peoples strive to live in peace and harmony with the Russians. The Russians became too good-natured and gave up positions for the sake of peace, which they never achieved. On the contrary, the more peace-loving we are, the more impudent the ethnocrats are, the more atrocious the ethnobandits are. There should be no ethnic clans in the Russian state. Ethnic attempts to de-Russify Russia must be eliminated, and the impossibility of this is enshrined in law.

Russian solidarity is ensured not only by laws but also by the Russian social atmosphere and government efforts in the field of promoting national values ​​and customs, in cultural and educational policies. Therefore, we all solve a common problem together, each in our own place - due to our capabilities, powers and abilities. When we build the Russian national state in relations between Russian people, the Russophobic oligarchy will collapse by itself.

Aryan myth in the modern world Shnirelman Viktor Aleksandrovich

“Russian Empire” or “Russian National State”?

25 years ago, Roman Szporluk proposed dividing Russian nationalists into those who are trying to save the empire and those who stand for building a national state (Szporluk 1989). These debates have not died down and still seem relevant. However, over the past 10 years, their meaning has changed: “empire” is now often associated not with the USSR, but with Russia, and the nation state is understood as a “purely Russian state”, free from any ethnic minorities. The latter may look like the same Russia, or it may appear in the form of separate Russian regions that have received state registration.

In the early 1990s. An uncompromising supporter of the empire was the rock musician and at the same time right-wing radical ideologist S. Zharikov, who tried to revive the teachings of the patriarch of Western anti-Semitism, H. Chamberlain. Linking the Russians with the Aryans, he contrasted the Indo-Europeans with the Semites as “masculine” with “feminine” and “solar” with “lunar”. Claiming that Christianity had spiritually enslaved the Aryans, he advocated empire and royal power. Instead of Christianity, he proposed introducing a “traditional tribal cult,” that is, returning to paganism. And the “national leader” was combined in his head with the “power of Svarog.” At the same time, he saw the “Masons” and “Jewish Masons” as his most terrible enemies (Zharikov 1992).

The idea of ​​the “Russian Empire” appears most clearly in the religious system of V. M. Kandyba. This system, on the one hand, is designed to unite “ancient Russian beliefs” with the “true” teachings of Christ, and on the other, to contrast them with “distorted Western Christianity.” Anti-Semitism, emanating from the idea of ​​a “Jewish-Masonic conspiracy,” plays a significant role in this, and in order to once again emphasize the close relationship of his teaching with the version of the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion,” Kandyba makes King Solomon the founder of Freemasonry (Kandyba 1997a: 166; Kandyba, Zolin 1997a: 156–157)312. His co-author P. M. Zolin goes even further. Commenting on the fantasies of the “great psychologist,” he not only popularizes the classics of world anti-Semitism, but does his best to assure the reader of the existence of a “Jewish-Masonic conspiracy.” After all, even if the “Protocols” were a fake, their predictions are being realized with high accuracy, he declares (Kandyba, Zolin 1997a: 394), repeating the attitude towards the “Protocols” that is popular among anti-Semites (about this, see: Korey 1995: 155).

Such fantasies take on a special appearance in Kandyba’s esoteric works, due to the fact that their author seems to be trying to seize the baton from the “international Zionism” constructed by Russian anti-Semites. Kandyba himself has a dream of “world domination,” and he assures that the Russians have already possessed it more than once, that the Kiev prince Vladimir allegedly tried to return it, and that all this inevitably awaits world civilization in the future (Kandyba D. 1995: 162, 182). That is why Kandyba announces “the idea of ​​​​conquering world domination and the victory of Yavi (this is how the name of Yahweh is glorified. - V. Sh.)”… the idea of ​​“the victory of the light principle in man over his dark earthly nature” (Kandyba D. 1995: 144). Accordingly, the author presents the Jews as a “branch of the southern Rus,” reducing the intensity of the Russian-Jewish conflict to the level of a family quarrel. He even sympathizes with the ancient Israelis, “our younger brothers,” who lost their statehood and fell into Babylonian captivity (Kandyba D. 1995: 144, 151). At the same time, he clearly disapproves of the activities of the “Volga Rus”, who tried to establish their financial, cultural and administrative dominance in the “Russian Empire” in the early Middle Ages. Without distinguishing between Jews and Khazars and calling them all “Volga Rus,” Kandyba accuses them of “international financial intrigues” that put many groups of “southern Rus” in heavy debt dependence (Kandyba D. 1995: 157).

One can only sympathize with the author who sets himself a historiographical trap with his complex “meta-historical” constructions. Indeed, why, while repeatedly noting disagreements and civil strife between “ancient Russian tribes and unions” within the Empire, admiring the global conquests of the Rus and their ability to impose tribute on vast territories, does he express indignation at tributary relations only in one case - when it comes to the Khazar Kaganate, which itself he calls it a “Russian-Jewish state” (Kandyba D. 1995: 160)? It is quite obvious that he is dominated by the “Khazar syndrome”, characteristic of many other Russian neo-pagans.

An attentive reader will notice that Kandyba does not treat all “Russians” equally kindly. The activities of the “Russian-Jews” irritate him. But in order to avoid accusations of anti-Semitism, which is present among many modern Russian nationalists in their attitude towards Khazaria, he tries to soften the relevant passages as much as possible. This is done with the help of linguistic tricks - by introducing euphemisms “foreigners”, “merchants”. It was the “foreigners” who were representatives of the “incomprehensible trade and financial octopus” that entangled the entire Eastern Europe in the Khazar era, and it was from them that the legendary Prince Bravlin cleared it, Prince Svyatoslav waged victorious wars with them, and the uprising of the Kievites was directed against them in 1113 (Kandyba D. 1995: 157–160, 178). The author diligently hides the fact that “our younger brothers” and “foreigners” are, in fact, the same persons. Not without reason, he hopes to be clearly understood by like-minded people who understand the meaning of neo-pagan mythologies perfectly.

What about Christianity? In this regard, Kandyba’s judgments are equally contradictory. It is clear to him that Christianity was an alien ideology aimed at undermining the “Russian spirit,” behind which certain “financial and military interests” were hidden. Following the example of his predecessors, he accuses Prince Vladimir and some of his successors of all conceivable and unimaginable crimes against the Russian people (Kandyba D. 1995: 137, 158, 160–163, 177–180). At the same time, he recognizes Christ as a “Russian prophet”, pays tribute to his wisdom and even... justifies Vladimir’s introduction of Christianity by the urgent needs of the multinational Kyiv state (Kandyba D. 1995: 162, 202).

In other words, like all other nationalist concepts, Kandyba’s constructions suffer from striking contradictions. But, unlike the materials discussed above, they have an important feature: Kandyba, like no one else, openly blurts out the secret dream of a number of Russian radicals about world domination. That is why for them there are no more terrible enemies than Christianity and the Jews, which, in their opinion, are the only serious obstacles to this goal.

However, Kandyba does not reject all Christianity, and in words he is most concerned not with the “Zionist conspiracy”, but with the expansion of “false Christianity”, hostile to the “Russian Religion” he creates. He describes the origin of “false Christianity” as follows. Allegedly, once upon a time one of the Rus’ detachments, led by a priest named Yahweh, ended up in the Eastern Mediterranean. After his death, Yahweh was deified by the local inhabitants. Later, the “South Russian priest” Abram, who lived in Ur, carried out a religious reform and created Judaism, the religion of the “Rusalim”. From the context of the book, it is quite obvious that the term “Rusalim” is introduced by the author to refer to Jews. Indeed, according to him, the latter not only believed in the god Yahweh, but it was their “blond king” David who captured the “Russian Donkey”, renaming it Jerusalem, and on the site of the “Temple of Rev on Siyan Mountain” he built the temple of Yahweh, giving the mountain the name Zion (Kandyba 1997a: 46–47, 72, 163; Kandyba, Zolin 1997a: 42–43, 50, 69, 153). However, the author claims that there never was such a people as Jews, but there were “Ararat Rus” who settled on the lands of the “Palestinian Rus” and forgot about their kinship (Kandyba 1997a: 259).

Kandyba makes Jesus Christ a “Russian prophet from Galilee”, with one stroke of the pen declares Jerusalem as the place of his birth and completely confuses the reader by calling him the father of both the “Roman warrior Pandora”313 and a certain “carpenter” and, finally, sending the young Jesus to India and Nepal for the study of Vedic texts (Kandyba 1997a: 197; Kandyba, Zolin 1997a: 180–187. Cf.: Ivanov 2000: 44–45)314. The latter allegedly became one of the most important sources of the true “pure teaching” of Jesus Christ. Contrary to the entire New Testament tradition, the author proves that Jesus Christ did not come at all to atone for human sins, but to fight the “Pharisee Church” and restore the true “Russian Religion”. However, the Pharisees subjected him to painful execution, and the “Roman ideologists” distorted his teaching and made it the basis of their misanthropic ideology, calling it “Christianity.” Since then, the latter has carried out the barbaric destruction of “the entire spiritual wealth of the Russian Religion” - churches, libraries, written documents. In particular, Kandyba accuses the “Rusalim” of burning the “Great Etruscan Library” and the “Old Russian Library of Alexandria,” where all documents on “Russian history” over the past 18 million years were destroyed in the fire. Ancient Russian rituals were abolished, Vedic knowledge was prohibited, the original texts of the Gospels were rewritten and distorted, even the alphabet was changed beyond recognition so that no one could read “Old Russian.” In particular, it was the distortion of the “primordial alphabet” that Constantine the Philosopher allegedly dealt with in Crimea (Kandyba 1997a: 227–241, 276–277)315.

The attack on the “Russian tradition” is still ongoing: the enemies destroyed the “Russian Empire”, violated its shrines, and now they want to completely deprive the Russian people of their ideology (Kandyba 1997a: 230). Kandyba accuses the Christian Church of all kinds of sins - here are murders, debauchery, the spread of venereal and mental diseases, the darkest machinations, the robbery of the Russian people, the cultivation of foreign values, and the inculcation of the cult of cruelty. It is to the priests that Kandyba’s words, full of anger, are addressed: this “criminal mafia scum is robbing the holy Russian people, profiting from their desire for spiritual life and faith in the Ideal” (Kandyba 1997a: 324).

Although Kandyba avoids the term “Jews” in every possible way, replacing it with euphemisms such as “Rusalim” and “Roman ideologists,” he makes it quite clear who he is talking about. After all, resisting Christianization, “many Russian peoples believed that it was better to perish than to pray to foreign Jewish gods.” And Christian priests have always served mainly “persons of Jewish (Rusalim) nationality” (Kandyba 1997a: 228, 324). Kandyba does not shun the blood libel, declaring that the Eucharist included a ritual that previously consisted of “eating the blood of a foreign child.” He insists that even now the “Rusalim” are engaged in the murder of Russian babies and the sale of their organs abroad (Kandyba 1997a: 228, 325). Consequently, all the author’s accusatory pathos against Christianity is directed primarily against Jews. These also include his threats, which will be discussed below.

According to Kandyba, the conspiracy of the “Rusalim” against humanity is rooted in the very division of sacred space into North-South and West-East, where North and East mean the pure, spiritual principle, and South and West mean the base material. That is why the “Rusalim” who initially lived in the South, selfish and gold-loving, settled all over the world, created a wide global trade and financial network and planned to use it to seize power over the world. This idea was taken into its service by Christianity, which was obliged to teach peoples obedience (Kandyba 1997a: 233–234).

But Kandyba connects the primordial idea of ​​world domination and God's chosenness with the Russian heritage. He notes the fundamental differences in its implementation between the “northern” and “southern Rus”: if the former sought to rule the world openly with the help of knowledge and weapons, then the latter wanted to achieve this in the most insidious ways - through trade and finance and succeeded a lot in this (Kandyba 1997a: 234, 283). But, Kandyba insists, the establishment of material prosperity on Earth brings death and destruction to humanity, alienating it from the spiritual, and this must be avoided in every possible way (Kandyba 1997a: 440). That is why the “Russian Empire,” built on different principles, became an obstacle for the “Rusalim” on their path to world domination, their “only mortal enemy,” and they tried with all their might to destroy it (Kandyba 1997a: 341–342).

After all, the pure teaching of Christ, in Kandyba’s understanding, was preserved only in Rus', where Andrew the First-Called allegedly brought it in its original form (Kandyba 1997a: 206). The further fate of the teachings of Christ in Rus' is presented by the author in a rather confusing way. On the one hand, he connects the Christianization of Rus' with Prince Vladimir and, like many neo-pagans, accuses him of cruelly inculcating this “Western ideology.” The first Russian Metropolitan Hilarion also gets it from him for participating in the “Rusalem conspiracy” against the peoples of the world (Kandyba, Zolin 1997a: 261–264). However, on the other hand, the author insists that the “Russian peoples” did not accept “Christianity” and almost until 1941 remained faithful to the “Russian Religion” in the form of Orthodoxy and Islam. And only recently, under foreign influence, religion here was reborn and “Orthodox Christianity” became “a breeding ground for debauchery and devilish temptations” (Kandyba 1997a: 229).

All this was a consequence of the machinations of evil foreign forces. For the first time they achieved the collapse of the “Russian Empire” in 1917. However, while briefly describing the events of 1917, the author falls into monstrous contradictions. On the one hand, he strongly vilifies the “German-Rusalem” Romanov dynasty, which pursued an exclusively “anti-Russian” policy and was rightly overthrown by the Russian people. After all, as the author claims, the royal government and its entourage consisted of 99% “Rusalim” (Kandyba 1997a: 335). But, on the other hand, a little lower, he insists that the revolution was inspired by the machinations of Western “Rusalim” and that 90% of the revolutionary organizations consisted of “Rusalim”. And at the same time, he represents Soviet history as the continuous struggle of Lenin and Stalin against the “Rusalim” (Kandyba 1997a: 342, 345, 350, 353). The author assigns the role of a silent extra in all these processes to the Russian people.

However, no matter how contradictory the author’s views may seem, his political sympathies are obvious. His main priority is the "Russian Empire". Therefore, he is a supporter of Soviet power, accuses the White movement of supporting foreign intervention during the Civil War, and at the same time stands for the unification of “Reds” and “Whites” against “criminal democracy” and the “anti-people regime” (Kandyba 1997a: 344). In other words, the author's red-brown inclinations are obvious. No matter how the historical situation develops, his anger is always directed against the West and the “Rusalim.” In them alone he sees the causes of all the troubles of the “Russian Empire” - they are guilty not only of the crimes of the Romanov dynasty, but also of the outbreak of the First World War, the collapse of the Russian Empire, the turmoil of 1917, the “ritual murder” of Stalin and the denigration of his activities, “ Brezhnev stagnation" and the dismemberment of the USSR (Kandyba 1997a: 342, 350–354).

Kandyba goes so far as to accuse the United States and the supposedly ruling “Rusalim” there of plans for the physical destruction of the Russian and neighboring Islamic peoples. He needs all this in order to demand the creation of a powerful “Russian-Islamic Union”, the restoration of the “Russian Religion” and the complete “destruction of Evil” up to the use of a preventive nuclear strike (Kandyba 1997a: 354–355). This threat is addressed primarily to the “Rusalim,” and the author states: “They don’t have long to live, and their death will be terrible and painful, and this ancient prophecy will come true during the lifetime of the current generation of these madmen” (Kandyba 1997a: 440). The price of “victory” does not frighten him, because all the same, sooner or later Russians are destined to turn into “radiant immortal humanity from Light”, into “a single type of radiant energy” and dissolve in the Universe. It is in this that Kandyba sees “the path of salvation, the path of science, reason and conscience” (Kandyba 1997a: 88, 381–382). Such a destiny follows from esoteric teaching. In fact, the fight against “Christianity” should, according to Kandyba, end in a new Holocaust, even more terrible than that perpetrated by the German Nazis.

Kandyba’s ideas were enthusiastically picked up and disseminated by the Samara neo-pagan newspaper “Veche Roda”. Its founder was A. A. Sokolov in the 1980s. was the editor-in-chief of the Samara newspaper Volzhsky Komsomolets, and then at the turn of the 1980s - 1990s. - People's Deputy of the USSR. Brought up by Soviet ideology, he became disillusioned with the communists and equally does not accept the monarchy. Being an ardent supporter of Russian ethnonationalism, he sees no other way out but to turn to pre-Christian pagan antiquity and direct all his energy to the fight against the “harmful Kaganate.” This is a typical path for those who today join the ranks of Russian neo-pagans.

By his own admission, Sokolov turned to politicized neo-paganism in July 1994, when he began to develop the ideas of the “Russian Family Veche Vedic Tradition” as the basis for the state ideology of the Russian Federation. To do this, he became a participant in the Russian liberation movement and founded an opposition newspaper in Samara, a “youth socio-political publication”, “Freethinker”. In 1996, this publication was closed for extremist views. Then Sokolov began publishing an openly racist newspaper, “Veche Roda,” speaking on behalf of a certain Russian Family Veche liberation movement.

Answering questions from a journalist in 1996, Sokolov reproduced Kandyba’s historiosophical and religious ideas about the Russian Family, the Heavenly and eternal nature of the “Russian Family Veche Vedic Tradition”, as well as the fact that over the last millennium the latter was allegedly replaced by “Anti-Russian Rootless Immoral Ruthless Totalitarian Kagan principle”316. This supposedly happened thanks to the machinations of “foreign intelligence”, which created a caste of non-Russian people within Kievan Rus, which in the form of the “Rootless Elite” seized power over the Russian Family. Sokolov denounced the totalitarianism of the “Kagan (Negro, Christian) Caste system of government,” identifying it with the modern democratic system. He stated that for a thousand years now Russia has been ruled by a “non-Russian and semi-Russian minority” led by the Great Kagan.

Following the neo-pagan myth, Sokolov associated the political “anti-Slavic” coup with the name of Prince Vladimir, who, it turns out, was a resident of the Khazar and Varangian Khaganates and led the “colonization of Rus'.” In this he relied on Christianity, which, Sokolov emphasized, was a typical technique of the Kaganate, which helped him get rid of the ancient local cultural tradition. Thus, the great Russian culture with its thousand-year-old writing and science was ruined, and its place was taken by “non-Russian (Christian) churches” designed to eradicate the Russian Spirit and strengthen the power of the “non-Russian minority.”

What kind of “minority” this is, Sokolov did not directly explain, using euphemisms - “Rootless Elite”, “Kagan principle”, “World Kaganate”. But for anyone familiar with the modern anti-Semitic Khazarian myth, there are no secrets here. It is extremely clear what kind of enemy the Russian people had to fight. Sokolov did not hide this. After all, he not only called Christianity a “foreign faith,” but also saw in it “the religion of the ancient Jewish cattle-breeding tribes” (“Zion Tradition”), directly opposite to the “Russian Vedic Tradition.” And he considered the Old Testament to be instructions for the colonization of other peoples. He associated true democracy with a system of national proportional representation, supposedly characteristic of the “Russian Tribal Veche Vedic System.” Therefore, he demanded the immediate restoration of this system; otherwise, he declared, the Russian Family would face death. At the same time, he referred to one of the Eurasian works of Prince N. S. Trubetskoy (1921), where he warned against the disastrous nature of foreign domination. Sokolov picked up these words all the more readily because he did not recognize the legitimacy of the modern Russian state system, seeing in it the dominance of “non-Russian (Kagan) laws.” He saw the ideal in the creation of a “Unified Great Russian Tribal (National) State within the Russian Federation,” that is, a purely Russian state. In his opinion, only this will put an end to the “suffering of the Great Russian Family” and the collapse of the power of the “non-Russian and Masonic elite” (Parhomenko 1996).

To the question of what it means to be Russian, Sokolov answered without hesitation: “It is impossible to be Russian without the Russian Spirit. To be Russian means that the Russian Spirit is within us!” When asked by the correspondent to explain the meaning of the “Russian Spirit,” he rushed into confused discussions about feelings, intuition, reason and will as the integral essence of Russianness (as if other peoples did not have these feelings). Realizing that this was not enough, he added the presence of the “Russian Tribal structure”, “Russian Tribal state”, “Veche structure” and “Vedic tradition”. The “Russian Religion” has not been forgotten either, which, following Kandyba, he characterized as “Russian monotheistic materialistic teaching – Russian Vedas (Knowledge) – Science.” We are talking about “truly Russian”, “purely Russian”, which has allegedly been persecuted since 988. Sokolov explained that “Russianness” requires “service and worship of the Russian Family (Russian Ancestors) as the only true way to achieve immortality!” . Since all this can raise new questions, in order to avoid ambiguities, he put an end to the discussion by talking about “a person who is Russian by blood” (Parkhomenko 1996: 4). Now everything was falling into place: it was about creating a Russian state for people purely Russian by blood. In other words, Sokolov dreamed of a racist state like the former South Africa. It is no coincidence that he reproached the Soviet government for “forcibly crossing one Clan, incompatible by tradition, ideology and morality, with another.” There remains, however, the question of where Sokolov dreamed of finding “purely Russian by blood people” in order to populate the racist state dear to his heart.

His ethnological views are of some interest. He used the term “Kin” to mean ethnos, ethnic community, and referred to nation (by which he meant nationality) as a “species”. Therefore, he, like other Russian ethnonationalists, included Great Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians in the Russian ethnos, considering them as separate nations (Parkhomenko 1996: 5). In his mouth, the Russian Patrimonial Principle meant the trinity of these components, and he stood for the voluntary reunification of Great Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and was even ready to give the palm to Kyiv or Minsk. And it did not occur to him that if the apartheid regime was introduced, which directly follows from his concept, all non-Russian peoples would have every right to demand withdrawal from the statehood he constructed, and Russia would completely collapse. His words about his friendly attitude towards non-Russian indigenous peoples are unlikely to deceive any of them. After all, in the Veche of the Russian Family that he created, which claimed to govern the country, there was, by definition, no place for any non-Russians. And it was not at all an accidental reservation that his words about “blacks who are at a very low moral level of development” sounded. It seems that he was ready to find such “blacks” in Russia. In any case, his ethnological views made it possible to do this. And indeed, with reference to Imam Shamil, he painted an unattractive image of the mountaineers (“drunkenness, robbery, unbridled self-will, wild ignorance...”), apparently believing that Shamil was writing about certain eternal qualities inherent in them.

Sokolov adhered to a two-color idea of ​​the modern world, where at one pole there are “traditional Tribal (National) Veche values”, and at the other – the values ​​of “Rootless Totalitarian Nazism”, focused on the Masonic motto “From multitude to unity”. To the second he attributed the desire to level out cultural diversity and turn people into faceless “economic animals” (Parkhomenko 1996: 5). By identifying “Nazism” (that is, aggressive nationalism) with “internationalism,” Sokolov demonstrated the complete confusion of his ideas about the modern world.

Today, the “Hyperborean idea” is used not only for neo-imperial claims. Paradoxically, some of those who advocate expanding democracy in Russia and regionalism also turn to it. Indicative here are the views of the Petrozavodsk journalist and amateur philosopher V.V. Shtepa, who began his career as a “traditionalist” and a big fan of A. Dugin, but then, after a tour of Western Europe, revised his previous views and became a staunch critic of “Byzantinism” and a supporter of regionalism. In many ways, in solidarity with the New Right and remaining a follower of Yu. Evola, Shtepa speaks in florid language about the values ​​of modern European democracy, which allows for pluralism and gets rid of rigid normativity. He proves that Russia will be saved only by the project of a new Northern civilization based on regionalism. The Hyperborean idea serves him as an Aesopian language, allowing him to defend the values ​​of freedom, creativity and democracy, the prototype of which he finds in the world of Hellenism and in the medieval Novgorod Republic. He contrasts them with “the dictates of the Abrahamic religions,” meaning by this an authoritarian regime. Following Nietzsche, Shtepa sees in Hyperborea a “look into the future”, a “futurological project”. He states that Hyperborea may never have existed, but it can be created in the 21st century. as a kind of international Northern community, covering all northern countries and peoples, supposedly similar in culture. However, he nowhere explains what exactly he means by “cultural proximity,” since the North, as is known, is inhabited by peoples with very different cultures. But he praises the “Nordic man” as a “Varangian discoverer”, a creator, a bearer of a free spirit, possessing the will to everything new and not constrained by tradition. He contrasts this with the supposedly endlessly conservative and despotic south with its Abrahamic religions, which supposedly look only backward, do not encourage creativity and sow only hatred (Shtepa 2008).

The idea of ​​“North” fascinates Shtepa not so much with the past as with the future. In his opinion, the North as an “archetype of the Earthly Paradise” erases the contradictions between the West and the East. Discussing Hyperborea, he refers to the same Warren, Tilak and Zharnikova, but paradoxically sees in it not reality, but a utopia, understandable only on an intuitive level (Shtepa 2004: 126–130). Shtepa is critical of multiculturalism and sharply criticizes it for its excessive emphasis on ethnicity and race. The counterbalance to this is the idea of ​​Hyperborea, based on spirit, and not on blood. Opposing the “Tatar-Muscovite empire” with its inevitable assimilation, he proposes as an alternative a certain Northslavia with its “Pomeranian nature.” Sometimes he calls it Belovodye, emphasizing that it does not coincide with modern Russia (Shtepa 2004: 312–319).

Fluently using Aesopian language, Shtepa does not care about the clarity of the concepts used and, addressing different audiences, presents his ideas in very different ways. Thus, speaking at a conference dedicated to the indigenous peoples of the North, he presented the Northern civilization as multi-confessional, multi-ethnic and multilingual, and addressing Russian nationalists, he spoke about the “colonial status of Russians”, who allegedly turned into a “national minority” suffering from “ethnocracy”. He argued that the “raw materials empire” not only does not serve the interests of Russians, but that Gazprom officials are allegedly even “anthropologically different from Russian people.” He was also concerned about the growing number of “ethnic Muslims” and the dominance of “ethnic mafias.” He advocates the abolition of Article 282 of the Criminal Code, which prosecutes “inciting national hatred.” It is noteworthy that in this case he refers to “freedom of speech” in the United States and completely ignores the fact that similar articles exist in the legislation of a number of leading European states. At the same time, he calls on Russian nationalists to shift their emphasis from “fighting enemies” to building positive, creative regional projects (Shtepa 2011).

Shtepa advocates for a political nation rather than the “white race” and tries to redefine the term “Russian” as “a sign of Russian culture and civilization” not associated with ethnic Russians alone. And for supporters of “ethnic Russianness” he offers reservations. At the same time, he proves that if each region shows its “ethnocultural face” in full force, then no migrants will take root there. Speaking against conservatism, he reverently refers to the ideas of the American ultra-conservative P. Buchanan, who speaks out in defense of tradition. In other words, Shtepa’s views are marked by striking contradictions, and he acts less as a philosopher than as an ideologist, and at times displaying cultural racism, which he borrowed from the New Right.

To an even greater extent, such sentiments are reflected in Shiropaev, who, having revised his previous views, offers a non-standard solution to the problem of statehood, unexpected for a Russian nationalist. He opposes great power and imperialism, which he associates with the hated “Eurasian project.” He also does not share traditional anti-Westernism: it is in the West that he proposes to look for allies, but at the same time he perceives the West in racial tones in the form of a “white world.” Moreover, Shiropaev even doubts the unity of the Russian people and sees in them a conglomerate of subethnic groups that differ both psychologically and physiologically. Therefore, he is a supporter of Russian separatism, believing that in several small Russian states it will be easier to defend the interests of Russians than in a huge multinational empire317. Their center of gravity, in his opinion, should be “Great Rus'”, covering the central and northwestern regions of Russia, and in his imagination it is depicted as homogeneous in “cultural and racial” terms. In addition, he endows her with Germanophile attitudes (Shiropaev 2001: 126–129)318. However, while rejecting “imperialism,” Shiropaev is not at all a principled opponent of any empire. In his dreams, the confederation of Russian republics is depicted as a springboard for “new white colonization” and the formation of a “modern neocolonial empire” (Shiropaev 2001: 129). In other words, his “Aryan counter-project” largely resurrects the ideas of the German Nazis and reflects the features of “catch-up modernization” - he is attracted by the image of a classical colonial empire with a dominant master people and the colonial population subject to it. This, in his opinion, is what distinguishes Russian Westernism.

P. Khomyakov is also a fierce opponent of the empire. Having a great interest in its genesis, he does his best to demonstrate its negative role in world history. At the same time, he freely manipulates facts, caring only that they work for his concept. Ignoring the political reality of ancient Western Asia, he artificially constructs a huge “empire” there, including a variety of actually existing states, and declares it a product of the “Semitic world.” Moreover, by his own admission, it does not matter where the center of such an “empire” was located and what it was called. Much more important to him seems to be the centuries-old expansion of the “empire” to the north, in which it always saw a resource for exploitation and capture of slaves (Khomyakov 2003: 194–204, 273–274). Khazaria also finds a place in this picture of the world, turning out to be a fragment of the “First Empire” (Khomyakov 2003: 245–246). Moreover, in the light of the racial approach, the almost eternal confrontation of the southern “empire” with the northern “white people” turns out to be a variant of the classic racist mythology about the clash of “Aryans” with “Semites”, especially since the author unconditionally classifies the entire population of the “empire” as the “Semitic race” " It is noteworthy that he also represents this population as “descendants of marginals and descendants of populations of anthropoids” (Khomyakov 2003: 204–205), thereby turning them into a special biological species.

As a result of such manipulations with historical facts, Khomyakov portrays “whites” not just as a constant victim of the “empire,” but as an object of encroachment by a “lower species.” He portrays the South as nothing more than a “concentration camp” surrounded by black “cannibals.” In addition, he states that the propaganda activities of the "empire" were carried out by the state church. At the same time, he is concerned not so much with the real situation in ancient Western Asia as with the modern situation, and, as for Petukhov, references to ancient societies serve him as an Aesopian language that helps illuminate modern problems. This also allows him, firstly, to emphasize that the “totalitarian empire” was not a local phenomenon, but a global evil, and secondly, to connect it with the “foreigners” who allegedly imposed such political orders on the “whites”, for whom they were "someone else's heritage." In other words, the types of statehood, in Khomyakov’s view, turn out to be closely related to the racial factor. Therefore, in order to successfully fight the “empire,” he calls on Russians to join the ranks of the “national White movement” (Khomyakov 2003: 217). And in order to kindle in them hatred for the “empire,” he paints it as a monstrous monster, demonizing it in every possible way. Moreover, he finds the archetypes of its “cannibalistic morality” in the Bible and portrays the Semitic peoples as “genetic monsters” (Khomyakov 2003: 231).

Paying tribute to modern migrant-phobic sentiments, Khomyakov warns against the degradation of Europe due to the influx of immigrants. He sees salvation in the creation of a “national-aristocratic state” and states that today Russia is closest to this (Khomyakov 2003: 334–335). He places his bet on the Russian middle class, which, in his opinion, has overcome “anti-racist prejudices” and is more ripe than others for technocratic and biological thinking, declaring “outsiders” as individuals of a different species (Khomyakov 2003: 349). In the fight against the “imperial center”, he relies on the Russian regions, setting Ukraine as an example for them (Khomyakov 2003: 355). Like Shiropaev, he is not afraid of the collapse of Russia, and in the name of the prosperity of the “Russian Aryans” he is ready to give up both a significant part of the territory and the “Russian Asians” living there. His model of the future Russian national state includes the European part of Russia with the northern part of the Volga region, as well as the region of the Northern Urals and the Tyumen region, but he does not need the North Caucasus (Khomyakov 2006: 99). Anti-imperial sentiments are also shared by some other neo-pagan ideologists, for example, V. Pranov and A. P. Bragin mentioned above, who believe that the idea of ​​empire contradicts the “Russian spirit” (Bragin 2006: 488–489). An ethno-national homogeneous state based on “national-racial values” seems to them much more tenable (Pranov 2002: 193; Bragin 2006: 174).

The materials reviewed indicate that Russian radical nationalists do not agree on how they see the desired state - an empire or a nation state. Even for those who are inclined towards the idea of ​​a national state, it is difficult to decide what exactly they mean by “national” - Russian or Slavic, and if Russian, then limited only to Great Russians or including also Ukrainians and Belarusians. In any case, they believe that the unity of society in such a state should rest on a single faith. However, original paganism was aimed precisely at clan-tribal differentiation, and not at integration (which is why there was a need to replace it with world religions). Contrary to this, many authors associate paganism with monotheism and believe in the existence of a “single Slavic faith.” They care little about the fact that, for example, the Czechs, having become acquainted with the Russian imperial version of Pan-Slavism, back in the 1840s. they recoiled from Russia in horror and since then have diligently avoided Pan-Slavism in general (Masaryk 1968: 76, 90; ?erny 1995: 27 ff.). Modern Ukrainians are not attracted by the prospect of returning to the empire (Honchar et al. 1992; Borgard 1992; Koval 1992: 36; Yavorsky 1992: 41 ff.).

Be that as it may, radical Russian nationalists until recently could not decide what kind of political structure they needed - an empire or a nation state. However, they were convinced that in any case the “white (Aryan) race” should dominate in this state. But in recent years, the idea of ​​an ethno-national state seems to be gaining more and more support in this environment. It is on this platform that today’s Russian national democrats stand (Shnirelman 2012b: 124–125).

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