The main areas of NATO activity at the present stage. NATO in the modern world (what is the new bloc concept)

This article was written by Vladimir Gorunovich for this site and the Wikiknowledge site, placed on this site for the purpose of protecting information, and then corrected.

Dark energy(eng. dark energy) - a hypothetical form of energy, the existence of which is assumed by some cosmological models (Accelerated expansion of the Universe).
Within these models, there are two options for explaining the essence of dark energy:

dark energy is a cosmological constant - a constant energy density that uniformly fills the space of the Universe (in other words, non-zero energy and vacuum pressure are postulated);
dark energy is a kind of quintessence - a dynamic field, the energy density of which can change in space and time.

The first explanation is accepted in cosmology as standard. Choosing between the two options requires highly accurate measurements of the expansion rate of the Universe. The expansion rate of the Universe is described by the cosmological equation of state.

It is assumed that dark energy should also make up a significant part of the so-called hidden mass of the Universe.

1 Dark energy and cosmological models
2 Dark energy and the "expansion of the Universe"
3 Dark energy and fundamental interactions
4 Dark energy and the law of conservation of energy
5 Dark energy and field theory
6 Dark energy - summary

1. Dark energy and cosmological models

The conclusion about the presence of acceleration in the expansion of the Universe assumed (by the Big Bang hypothesis) was made on the basis of observations of supernovae carried out in the late 1990s. Then they added to the justification: the so-called cosmic microwave background radiation, gravitational lensing, nucleosynthesis of the hypothetical Big Bang. The obtained data are consistent with the lambda-CDM model.

In astronomy, distances that cannot be directly measured (distances to other galaxies) are determined using Hubble's law and redshift. But Hubble's law requires the introduction of a Hubble parameter equal to the ratio of a certain known distance to the redshift value. In astronomy, the distance to a Type Ia supernova can be determined from its luminosity using the “standard candle” method, using the fact that all exploding Type Ia supernovae at the same distance should have almost the same observed brightness. By comparing the observed brightness of supernovae in different galaxies, the distances to these galaxies can be determined.

In the late 1990s, for distant galaxies with type Ia supernovae, it was found that supernovae have a brightness lower than that which they should have based on the distance determined by Hubble's law. It turned out that the distance to these galaxies, calculated using the “standard candles” method (for supernovae Ia), turned out to be greater than the distance calculated using Hubble’s law based on the previously established value of the Hubble parameter. From which it was concluded that the Universe is expanding at an accelerating rate. Based on these observations, the existence of an unknown form of negative pressure energy called "dark energy" was postulated.

But one more conclusion can be drawn: Hubble's law does not work or is not accurate, and do not introduce a hypothetical acceleration of the fictitious expansion of the Universe. As for the date of the beginning of the accelerated expansion of the Universe (approximately 5 billion years ago), it has the same relation to reality as the age of the Universe assumed by the Big Bang hypothesis (13.75 billion years).

Cosmologists did not want to deal with their mistakes and transferred everything to physics. Of course, physics will deal with this fairy tale, but physics has enough other mathematical fairy tales awaiting investigation.

2. Dark energy and the “expansion of the Universe”

The expansion of the Universe has not been experimentally proven. No one has measured the distances to distant galaxies and shown that they are increasing over time. The red shift in the spectra of distant galaxies can be explained without resorting to the Doppler effect and the Big Bang hypothesis.
And since the very fact of the expansion of the Universe has not been proven, then we cannot talk about accelerating the non-existent expansion of the Universe. Consequently, cosmological models of the “Accelerated Expansion of the Universe” are just unproven hypotheses and the existence of dark energy arising from them is just an assumption of mathematical models, the accuracy of which has not been proven in physics and raises reasonable doubts.

In addition, the Big Bang hypothesis is now rejected by physics:

The Big Bang hypothesis ignores some of the laws of nature and therefore cannot be considered a theory,
The Big Bang hypothesis introduces forms of energy, matter and elementary particles that do not exist in nature,
the Big Bang hypothesis does not take into account the real properties of elementary particles,
Big Bang hypothesis manipulates physical forces

Therefore: the Big Bang hypothesis is a fallacy in physics. Or to put it simply: the Big Bang hypothesis is a biblical tale of the 20th century. It is not surprising that the Pope liked her so much.

3. Dark energy and fundamental interactions

The presence of the following two types of fundamental interactions in nature has been experimentally established:

electromagnetic interactions,
gravitational interactions.

These types of fundamental interactions correspond to two forms of energy:

electromagnetic energy,
gravitational energy.

Since all types of interactions in nature must be reduced to the listed two types of fundamental interactions, then, consequently, all forms of energy must also be reduced to these two forms of energy. And until the presence of other types of interactions in nature is established (except for fictitious ones, of course), the presence of other forms of energy in nature will not be proven.

Thus, dark energy, as a certain isolated type of energy, contradicts the fundamental interactions existing in nature.

4. Dark energy and the law of conservation of energy

Energy cannot arise from nothing - i.e. from a vacuum, created by nothing and disappeared into nothing. The law of conservation of energy is a fundamental law of nature. All forms of energy known to science obey this law. If dark energy does exist in nature, it must also obey the law of conservation of energy. The introduction of its own law of nature for dark energy goes beyond the boundaries of physics - physics studies only nature and its laws, and the world of fairy tales is not physics.

Consequently, processes of transformation of “dark” energy into other types of energy, as well as reverse transformations, must take place in nature. All that physics has managed to encounter so far are reactions similar to such processes with the participation of neutrinos in the microcosm. Since neutrinos interact extremely weakly with other elementary particles and in more than 99% of cases pass unnoticed through sensors, the illusion of energy disappearance is created (during the emission of neutrinos, for example, during the decay of a neutron) and similarly the illusion of energy appearing out of nothing (during the reaction of neutrino absorption). Physics has learned to recognize these events and has established that the law of conservation of energy works here too. Physics has not established any other “losses” or “gains” of energy.

Thus, if dark energy really exists in nature, it should obey the law of conservation of energy and discontinuous losses and appearances of known forms of energy should be observed in nature. From the absence of the latter in nature, it follows that dark energy as a separate form of energy does not exist in nature. In nature, processes with weakly interacting elementary particles (for example, neutrinos and their excited states) can be observed, creating the illusion of such events. But it will be a known form of energy.

Well, if any model ignores the laws of nature, then this means that before us is a mathematical fairy tale.

5. Dark energy and field theory

According to the field theory of elementary particles, any form of energy in nature must consist of or be created by elementary particles existing in nature. This form of energy can be transferred by elementary particles in a real state in accordance with the laws of nature, including the law of conservation of energy. Well, since all elementary particles consist of an electromagnetic field, this form of energy will be an electromagnetic form of energy (or its derivative - a form resulting from electromagnetic energy or created by electromagnetic energy).

Thus, dark energy either does not exist in nature or can be reduced to an electromagnetic (or gravitational) form of energy - this can be neutrino energy, emitted in gigantic quantities by stars (see the article Red shift and the Mystery of solar neutrinos).

6. Dark energy - the result

Dark energy as a separate form of energy:

contradicts the fundamental interactions existing in nature,
is not observed during transformations of energy of different forms,
does not have behind it any fields that actually exist in nature.

The presence of the expansion of the Universe itself has not been proven in physics: the red shift in the spectra of distant galaxies can be explained without resorting to the Doppler effect and the Big Bang hypothesis. The need of some models for dark energy is not proof of its existence in nature.

Therefore, dark energy as a separate form of energy cannot exist in nature. In nature, there are “invisible” forms of electromagnetic energy - this is the energy carried by neutrinos, emitted in gigantic quantities by stars. But in order to fill the Universe with neutrinos, 13.75 billion years is clearly not enough, and in general, it is better to say goodbye to the fairy tale about the big bang - which contradicts the laws of nature.

Vladimir Gorunovich

Structure and organization

The North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) was formed in 1949 to represent

leaders of 12 countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy,

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Great Britain and the United Kingdom

United States of America. Greece and Türkiye joined in 1952; Fede-

Rative Republic of Germany in 1955; Spain in 1982.

Treaty of the North Atlantic Alliance, signed in Washington, 4

April 1949, provided for mutual defense and collective security

danger, initially against the threat of aggression from the Soviet

Union. It was the first post-war alliance created by the United States

states of America, and represented a union of capitalist countries.

The reason for creating the treaty was the increasing scope of the Cold War.

Because Western European countries felt too weak-

mi for individual protection from the Soviet Union, they began in 1947

whether to create a structure for cooperation in defense. In March 1948

5 countries - Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK signed

The Brussels Treaty, which became the basis for NATO a year later.

The basic principle of NATO, like all military alliances, was Article 5:

"The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of

them, in Europe or North America, would be considered an attack

against them all." NATO was developed in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter

United Nations, which provided for the right

collective self-defense by regional organizations. This obliged the nations

members of NATO, to the defense of Western Europe and the North Atlantic; also agreement

was developed with the aim of deepening the political, economic and social

connections between its members.

NATO armed forces were created in 1950 in response to the Korean

a war that began in June 1950 and was perceived by Western

countries as part of a worldwide communist offensive. War for

ended in a truce in 1953, and in the same positions in which

began. NATO's main policy-making body is

North Atlantic Council, which meets in Brussels (until 1967,

when the meetings took place in Paris).Each participating country provides

ambassadorial level representative, and these representatives meet

at least once a week. The council also meets twice a year at

ministerial level and occasionally at the level of heads of state. Military

NATO matters are considered by the Defense Planning Committee. Military Committee NA-

TO (under the direction of the defense planning committee), consisting of senior

military representatives of each NATO member country except Iceland,

which does not have armed forces, and is represented by a civilian and

France, which withdrew from the military alliance in 1966 while remaining

protection. The armed forces of NATO member countries include a designated

peacetime commander, who in case of war will serve as

local orders of the military committee. Commanders are responsible for developing plans

protection for their areas, for determining the requirements for troops and for pro-

conducting military exercises.

Organization of the Warsaw Pact.

The Warsaw Pact was founded in 1955, 6 years after the formation of NATO, but cooperation between the countries of the socialist camp existed long before that: after the Second World War, governments led by communists came to power in the countries of Eastern Europe, partly due to the fact that After the Second World War, Soviet troops remained in Eastern Europe, creating a psychological background. Before the formation of the Department of Internal Affairs, relations between the states of the socialist system were built on the basis of treaties of friendship and cooperation. In 1949, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was created, which initially included the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia, and then a number of other countries.

Due to some imbalances in relations between the USSR and its allies after March 1953 in Eastern Europe, signs of mass discontent appeared in some countries of the socialist camp. There were strikes and demonstrations in some cities of Czechoslovakia, and the situation in Hungary worsened. The most serious unrest occurred in June 1953 in the GDR, where strikes and demonstrations caused by deteriorating living standards brought the country to the brink of a general strike. The Soviet government was forced to introduce tanks into the GDR, which, with the help of the police, suppressed the protests of the workers. After the death of I.V. Stalin, the new Soviet leadership undertook a number of trips abroad for the purpose of negotiations and personal acquaintance with the leaders of the socialist countries. As a result of these trips, the Warsaw Pact organization was formed in 1955, which included almost all the countries of Eastern Europe, except Yugoslavia, which traditionally adhered to a policy of non-alignment. Within the framework of the Department of Internal Affairs, a unified command of the Armed Forces and a Political Advisory Committee were created, a body coordinating the foreign policy activities of the countries of Eastern Europe. Representatives of the Soviet army played a decisive role in all military-political structures of the Department of Internal Affairs.

Relations between alliances and with other countries.

The creation of NATO was a consequence of the Cold War and therefore its entire

activities were aimed at confrontation with the Soviet Union and

other socialist countries (later united in the Warsaw Pact).

In 1949, the US nuclear monopoly was eliminated, which led to

a sharp increase in the tendency of rivalry and an increase in production

weapons of mass destruction. After the creation of thermonuclear weapons in

50s, and after that, delivering it to the target, the USSR directed its efforts

to establish military-strategic parity with the United States, which is

came out at the turn of the 60-70s.

The first crisis began a year after the formation of NATO in 1950

year - there was a crisis in Korea. The US military command intended

to use atomic weapons, he was held back only by fear of similar

response measures from the USSR. In the current situation, the USSR considered it necessary

provide military-technical assistance to Korea. In addition to the USSR, assistance to the DPRK

provided to the PRC and other socialist countries. By mid-1951

The situation in Korea has stabilized, peace negotiations have begun,

truce..

Thanks to the change in the top leadership of the USSR and the so-called Khrushchev Thaw, a meeting of the foreign ministers of the USA, Great Britain, France and the USSR was held in 1954. On a number of issues about collective security in Europe and a number of crises. Since Western representatives advertised the defensive nature of NATO at the meeting, after the meeting the Soviet government came up with a proposal for the USSR to join NATO and conclude a treaty on collective security in Europe with the participation of the United States. All these proposals were rejected by the West.

For all further initiatives of the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on

conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries

NATO refused and declared these initiatives as propaganda.

The most dangerous international crisis arose in the fall of 1962 in

connection with the situation around Cuba. After the revolution in Cuba and the establishment of socialism there, the Soviet Union, due to the territorial proximity of Cuba to the United States, deployed atomic missiles there. In response, the United States pulled its fleet to the island and issued an ultimatum. At the beginning of the negotiations, a compromise was reached and nuclear missiles were withdrawn from Cuba.

The leaders of the USA and the USSR during the Caribbean and Korean crises, despite mutual hostility, managed to avoid a direct military clash, which was likely

would lead to a nuclear war with all its consequences.

Western politicians used a bloc strategy to encircle the territory of the USSR and its friendly states in Europe and Asia from the west, south and east with a chain of military-political alliances and bases that housed American air and naval forces. Subsequently, the world community became aware that in the 50s, the United States developed secret plans to start a war against the USSR, which included atomic bombing of dozens of Soviet cities. In violation of international law, American military aircraft flew at high altitudes in USSR airspace for reconnaissance purposes for several years.

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1991

NATO's role in European military affairs has become uncertain. Direction

NATO activities in Europe have shifted towards cooperation with

European organizations such as the Organization for Safety and Security

cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in order to plan policies with less

threat to continental security.

NATO is also working towards including former

countries participating in the Warsaw Pact and the CIS countries in order to surround

Russia in a ring from their bases and dictate their terms and also buy up

Russian raw materials at reduced prices.

Currently, NATO, mainly represented by the United States, has no

a sufficiently strong political and military counterbalance and therefore

practically unlimited in their actions, which is clearly seen in the example

military conflict in the Balkans, in which the United States pursued policies

unilateral support for the Croats and the extermination of the Serbs, as in the future

potential allies of Russia. In the future, it is possible that Japan, which is now actively developing in a bloc with neighboring countries (for example, China, Korea...) will become a counterweight to NATO in international relations, and it is quite possible that Russia will join this new anti-NATO bloc and the lost parity will be restored.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, North Atlantic Alliance (English: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO; French: Organization du traité de l "Atlantique Nord, OTAN) - a military-political bloc. Appeared on April 4, 1949 in the USA. Then NATO member states became the USA, Canada, Iceland, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Italy and Portugal. It is a “transatlantic forum” for consultation by allied countries on any issues affecting the vital interests of its members, including events capable of jeopardizing their security; provides deterrence or protection from any form of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.

Today, NATO is an international organization that already includes 29 countries, and its impact is felt not only in the Euro-Atlantic region, but in other parts of the world. The members of this organization include all the most politically influential, economically powerful and militarily strong Western states, including three nuclear powers (USA, UK, France) - permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The profound changes that have occurred in the political situation in Europe and in the world as a whole have led NATO countries to the conclusion that it is necessary to transform the Alliance by shifting the emphasis of its activities from the military component to the political one, updating its goals, functions, strategic concept and political face.

Russia has to coexist with NATO and build normal relations with it. It is necessary to create an effective mechanism for interaction with this large and complex international organization, which has become an integral part of the European security system.

In 1954, the Soviet Union offered to join NATO. The offer was rejected. As a result, in contrast to NATO, the Warsaw Pact was signed on the initiative of the USSR. Later, the USSR repeated its proposal to join NATO in 1983; after 1991, Russia also repeatedly made a similar proposal. Now there are many contradictions about Russia's entry into NATO. Many are in favor, but most see this as beneficial only for the United States, however, we will return to this a little later.

It is worth noting the main official purpose of NATO: NATO members agree that an armed attack on one or more members of the alliance in Europe or North America will be perceived as an attack on the entire alliance. In this regard, they agree that in the event of such an attack, they, as an exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense, will assist the attacked member or members, independently and jointly with other members, acting as necessary, including with the use of armed force. forces to restore and maintain security in the North Atlantic "acting as necessary, including the use of armed force" means that other members of the alliance are not obliged to enter into armed conflict with the aggressor. They still have an obligation to respond, but they can choose how to respond independently.

The functions and goals of NATO after the Second World War were aimed at containing the Soviet bloc, however, after its collapse, the need arose to revise classical doctrines.

Note that at the turn of the 1980s - 1990s, NATO, which throughout the post-war period performed a deterrent rather than a military-offensive function, faced the need for external adaptation to new international conditions and closely related internal structural restructuring. During the Cold War, NATO was a regional pact whose purpose was to provide “collective defense” for its members. However, after the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Warsaw Warsaw, the need to preserve NATO in the form in which it existed throughout the post-war years was “... called into question...”. Thus, in the early 1990s, NATO faced an inevitable crisis of its own institutional identity.

The changes that led to the end of the Cold War allowed NATO to put forward a number of initiatives to enhance security and stability:

Creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991. It was then renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and became the main forum for consultation and cooperation between NATO and non-NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Changing nature of the main threats to international security.

The strategic concept of the alliance, adopted in November 1991.

The 1991 Strategic Concept emphasized the need for a global approach to security. The North Atlantic Alliance has taken a course towards establishing broad contacts and actively developing interaction with countries outside of NATO:

- “Partnership for Peace” (1994 program), which invited all OSCE countries to cooperate with NATO on the basis of individual projects on issues such as ensuring transparency of military planning and military spending; implementation of joint planning, resolution of crisis situations; Air defense, etc.

Today, efforts are being made to strengthen the role of the alliance as an instrument for the strategic involvement of the United States in Europe while simultaneously providing greater independence to the European members of the alliance. A wider use of multinational formations formed by NATO members from among European countries is envisaged.

The alliance has taken a course towards establishing broad contacts and actively developing cooperative interaction with countries that are not members of NATO. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was created, a consultative forum that included, along with NATO states, former socialist countries, and then states that arose on the territory of the collapsed USSR.

According to V.V. Shtolya “... After the end of the Cold War, the victors were faced with the question of creating a new world order, the nature of which, perhaps, for many decades will predetermine the fate of humanity, all countries and peoples in the still emerging, largely unsettled geopolitical balance of interests and forces...”

In my opinion, the relationship between Russia and NATO occupies a central place in the process of establishing a new post-bipolar world order and has an important impact on the contours of the emerging new security system not only in Europe, but throughout the world.

Relations between Russia and NATO were formally established in 1991 at the first ceremonial meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), which was created after the end of the Cold War as a forum for consultations to develop new cooperative relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe . In 1994, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace, an important program of practical security and defense cooperation between NATO and each of its partner countries.

According to the Russia-NATO agreement, “Russia and NATO do not consider each other as adversaries. The common goal of Russia and NATO is to overcome the remnants of previous confrontation and rivalry and strengthen mutual trust and cooperation,” however, this situation today, in connection with the latest events in the Caucasus, is more than controversial. NATO expansion is a direct threat to Russia's security. Based on this, in Russia since 1993. There is an active campaign against NATO expansion. Moscow has put forward many reasons why it is opposed to expansion:

1) expansion will maintain the bloc approach, Russia and the Alliance will no longer trust each other, this will create new dividing lines in Europe. Russia will be forced to look for new allies, including military ones. It will have to allocate more funds for defense, revise its military doctrine;

2) the emergence of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in NATO will create a military-strategic imbalance in favor of an expanding Alliance. NATO will establish not only its political control over the new members, but also the military infrastructure remaining from the Warsaw Pact Organization will be in its hands;

3) the NATO military machine will approach directly the borders of Russia. This will complicate relations between Russia and NATO. Russia will need security guarantees;

4) the previous argument is interconnected with the problem of adaptation to modern conditions. In particular, this is related to the issues of deployment of nuclear forces and permanent armed forces of the Alliance on the territory of new members;

5) in addition, expansion may lead to a change in the situation within Russia itself - it will strengthen the positions of opponents of expansion, especially the left.

There are extremely important areas where Russia and NATO are certainly allies and not adversaries - this is the fight against international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the revival of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The plan for military cooperation between Moscow and Brussels, adopted in 2003, set the goal of increasing the level of operational interaction between the headquarters of Russian and NATO troops and conducting joint exercises on land and at sea. This plan was carried out successfully. Among the very promising projects of Russia and NATO is joint air patrol. This project was supposed to be operational in a year or two, which would increase the safety of flights over Europe. Now this important and useful work has been discontinued. Thus, it should be recognized that the military-political situation in the world is not in Russia’s favor, and cooperation with the West has not led to a reduction in military danger. Threats to international security from developed and developing non-European states are increasing. In general, an analysis of the scale and direction of NATO’s internal and external transformation indicates the globalization of the alliance’s interests, which creates the preconditions for a conflict of interests in various parts of the world, including the post-Soviet space and regions bordering Russia.

Today, the key problem of Russian security and foreign policy is the persistent image of Russia as an unprincipled force that takes into account exclusively material factors - an image that has taken root not only in the West, but also in the East, not only among elites, but also in broad sections of public opinion. The internal political circumstances shaping Russia's foreign policy indicate that in the foreseeable future this unattractive image will in any case not fade, and Russia's behavior as a subject of world politics will continue to be based on an assessment of the momentary balance of material resources, outside of any system universal values and long-term principles that would be attractive to a wide range of participants in the global community.

Interesting statements by modern political scientists on the question of Russia’s accession to NATO:

Nikolai Zlobin, an employee of the Washington Center for Defense Information:

We should try it. At least to see for what reason they will refuse. Although Russia's membership in NATO would be beneficial to the United States. This would strengthen their influence on Eurasia, and the alliance would have a huge source of energy. Russia should also join NATO in order to raise its status. In general, if I were Moscow, I would listen to the famous American comedian Gaucho Marx on this issue. He said that he would never become a member of a club that would accept him as a member.

Alexander Rahr, expert at the German Foreign Policy Council:

After joining NATO, Russia will have the opportunity to participate in building a new Europe, it can move closer to the West and resolve its conflicts with Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan. The problem is that after September 11, the alliance turned into an organization that strengthens a unipolar world led by the United States. And Moscow will never agree to the role of a follower. In addition, if Russia joins NATO, Russia's relations with China, India and the Arab world will deteriorate sharply. Moscow will also have to abandon its military-industrial complex and adopt NATO standards.

Mikhail Margelov, head of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs:

Today such a possibility should not even be considered. They simply won’t accept us there. Unfortunately, judging by the nature of the deployment of military bases and the acceleration of the procedure for new members to join NATO, we continue to be considered by the alliance as one of the possible sources of threat. At the same time, I would not rule out Russia joining the alliance in the future, depending on what it intends to fight next. If we deal with the common threats of global terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and environmental and social disasters, then we are on our way.

Sergei Karaganov, head of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy:

Theoretically, Russia should join NATO. In this case, the alliance would turn into a real alliance for international security, which could truly counter new threats. But in reality this question does not arise. Because NATO is still dominated by forces that do not want Russia to be there. Moreover, in recent years these forces have become stronger due to the expansion of the alliance.

Konstantin Kosachev, head of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs:

Russia should not join NATO, because in its current form this organization is clearly outdated and not adapted to solving the problems that humanity faces (the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism). And he cannot assist us in solving such problems. In terms of overall security, Russia is self-sufficient and does not need additional “cover” from NATO. The prospect of NATO itself taking responsibility for protecting Russian territory from possible aggression also seems unrealistic.

Sergey Oznobishchev, director of the Institute for Strategic Assessments:

I believe that it would be in Russia’s interests to begin negotiations on the prospects and conditions for joining NATO. However, such negotiations can be initiated only after the top officials of the country and the alliance agree on the fundamental possibility of such a step. Most likely, the conversation should not even be about Russia’s direct entry into NATO, but about the alliance, with our help, transforming into another organization. Otherwise, today's confrontation between Russia and NATO will continue, simulating partnership and cooperation, which in reality does not exist.

These statements are very contradictory, but one thing is clear: relations between Russia and NATO remain very tense and are in a very unstable state. Therefore, efforts must be made to achieve agreement and balance in the modern world system.

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At the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. The world has entered one of the most difficult and contradictory periods of its hysteria, characterized by extreme uncertainty in the prospects for the development of the geopolitical situation and the expectation of major changes in the entire world order.
In 1991, the military structures of the Warsaw Pact Organization ceased to exist, and the Soviet Union collapsed. This dramatically changed the entire strategic and political situation in Europe and the world. The transition from a bipolar world to a unipolar one has practically begun.
The Cold War was officially ended, which actually ended with the defeat of Russia. However, its geopolitical goals and hidden mechanisms for its implementation continue to influence the development of interstate relations.
The United States has accelerated efforts aimed at ensuring its undivided world leadership, relying on the military-political NATO bloc.
Increasingly arming itself and introducing its standard into the practice of world diplomacy, the United States began to show, ignoring the UN, the CSCE and world public opinion, a constant readiness to punish “with fire and sword” all those who oppose the establishment of the “new world order.” And they really do - in Iraq, Libya, Bosnia and Herzegovina and finally in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The question naturally arose - what place will the North Atlantic Alliance take in this system, will it survive or will it be dissolved? At the same time, it should be recalled that the NATO bloc differs significantly from all the blocs that preceded it in that, firstly, it united all the major Western powers, and, secondly, in peacetime it already has a permanent military organization, unified command and headquarters, united armed forces, while in previous blocs the formation of joint command bodies and united armed forces began only with the beginning of the war.
However, the bloc was not dissolved, because its leaders assured that it would be transformed from a weapon of the Cold War into an instrument of peace and harmony on the continent.
That is why, by the end of the Cold War, both in the former USSR and in NATO countries there was a consensus on what to do with this bloc. Despite the collapse of the Warsaw Department, no one in the USSR particularly insisted on immediately dissolving the NATO bloc. On the contrary, it was believed that a cooperative relationship could be established with him that would help consolidate the results of the end of the Cold War. In particular, in cooperation with the NATO bloc, it would be possible to resolve both general military issues (conventional arms control in Europe, preventing war on the continent) and relatively private political problems - the situation in certain areas of the Euro-Atlantic region without recognizing this bloc as having any or a police role.
In this direction, cooperation between Russia and NATO developed until the decisions of the Brussels session of the NATO Council in early 1994, when two ideas arose: the first was to create a program of cooperation for achieving peace “Partnership for Peace” (PIP) as an addition to the NATO system and at the same time the possibility of the block going beyond its competence; the second is to expand the Alliance's ability to respond to crisis situations, in particular the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Neither of these was at one time challenged by Russia as an attempt to unilaterally change the rules of behavior that had developed at the end of the Cold War.
Russian diplomacy actually stated agreement with NATO’s military-political dominance in Europe. Recognized the viability of the above ideas included in the strategic concept of NATO, agreed with its primacy in resolving conflicts in Europe, with the right to intervene in internal affairs, bypassing international organizations.
In 1997, the “Founding Act on Relations between Russia and NATO” was signed. Although the signing of this act was only a political declarative action, it essentially authorized the implementation of NATO plans.
As a result, we have, firstly, the inclusion of three new members into the NATO structure - Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland. The consequence of this step was that the NATO military group, including the aviation one, advanced to the East by 650-750 km, and the composition of NATO air forces increased by 17-20%. NATO has at its disposal a wide network of airfields (about 290), military bases with extensive infrastructure, built by the Soviet Army and left on the territory of these states. Their use makes it possible for NATO, if necessary, to launch missile and bomb strikes up to the Volga and Urals, and to hit the positions of Russian strategic missiles. And secondly, the most brutal, unprovoked missile and bomb attacks on defenseless Yugoslavia, which practically undermined the existing system of international security, trampled the norms of international law, and pushed aside the UN, OSCE, and Security Council. Thus, a serious application has been made for a model of a new world order in the 21st century: a unipolar world led by the United States; NATO as international gendarme and "supreme judge"; the rule of force as a universal means of “pacifying” dissent; dictatorship and blackmail are a form of communication with dissident members of the world community.
As US President B. Clinton said on June 23, 1999, “NATO can, if necessary, carry out a military operation similar to Yugoslavia at any time and anywhere in the world - be it in Africa or Central Europe.”
Thus, by delivering unprovoked attacks on Iraq, Yugoslavia and making similar statements, the United States and NATO are trying to accustom the world community to the idea that a unipolar world has become a de facto and Washington, in alliance with NATO, will judge and punish everyone without any participation in this by the UN and OSCE.
A new European security system began to take shape in 1989. According to Washington and a number of leading European countries, its basis should be the European Union and NATO, and institutions such as the OSCE and the UN should be relegated to the background, as well as Russia, which is not member of the EU and NATO.
At the same time, the United States should be recognized as the leading country in this structure, and all international relations should be oriented toward whose interests.
The new military-strategic concept of NATO, adopted at the Washington session in April 1999, is also focused on consolidating this structure and order, which is presented by the leadership of the union as NATO’s response to the fundamentally changed situation in Europe and the world as a whole, highlighting the task of resolving regional and local conflicts in and around the Euro-Atlantic region, arising from crises “on the periphery of the alliance” as a result of “ethnic and political hostilities, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed attempts at reform, violations of human rights and the collapse of states.”
This also includes the problems of the fight against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons and their means of delivery, as well as against the global spread of technology that can be used to produce weapons. The bloc's security interests can also be threatened, the concept says, by terrorism, sabotage, organized crime and interruptions in the supply of vital resources. Therefore, all these factors may determine NATO’s military response.
The concept pays a lot of attention to the development of “European identity” in the field of security and defense. It is noted that this process requires close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if necessary, the European Union.
Russia, which is not a member of the EU and NATO, faces the threat of being excluded from participation in decision-making that directly affects its vital interests.
As stated in NATO's new strategic concept, “a new Europe is being born, and at the same time a Euro-Atlantic security structure, with NATO at its core, is unfolding.” Thus, the North Atlantic bloc claims to be the basis of security on the continent, where the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe already operates. Thus, NATO seeks to push aside this pan-European structure, expanding the possibilities for its military activity.
Calls for NATO to transform from a collective defense organization into a collective security organization were counterproductive.
As a military-political alliance of leading Western countries, the North Atlantic Alliance will never be able to abandon its main task - to be a conductor of a policy of pressure on undesirable states, which was once again confirmed in the new NATO strategic concept, which assigns to this bloc the right to conduct “response operations to crises” far beyond the territory of the countries that are members of the North Atlantic Alliance.
Nevertheless, the NATO bloc has become an integral part of the European security system and is unlikely to be eliminated in the foreseeable future. Most likely, Russia will have to coexist with NATO and build certain relations with it. Not quite partners, not allies, but not hostile either. As a means of calming fears in many European countries, NATO has proven itself. He also played an important role in limiting the “nationalization of defense” of individual European states, which would certainly lead to an arms race. But it goes without saying that after what the bloc did to Yugoslavia, the attitude towards it should be different.
The question of expanding NATO's spatial sphere of action is not directly raised. However, from a number of provisions of the new concept it is immediately clear that such an expansion of the bloc’s scope beyond the region designated in the Washington Treaty as the North Atlantic region north of the Tropic of Cancer is provided for.
So, referring to the fact that the treaty provides for repelling an attack on the territory of the participating states, “no matter where it comes from,” the authors of the concept argue that “security considerations for the alliance require consideration of this issue on a global scale.” In this regard, the document provides that the armed forces of the alliance will fulfill its obligations for collective defense “and conducting operations in crisis situations” that sometimes arise “far from the areas of their usual location, including outside the territories of NATO countries.”
NATO's appropriation of the functions of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction especially clearly reflects the alliance's intention to carry out its actions in other regions.
This is directly stated in §56 of the Concept: “The defensive activities of the alliance, aimed against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, must continue to be improved, including through work on missile defense. Since NATO forces may be deployed beyond the Alliance's borders, the capabilities available to those forces must be flexible, mobile, rapidly deployable and survivable."
Thus, we can fully state the birth of a “new NATO,” i.e., an organization that is not limited to the needs of collective defense and national territories, but claims to be something more than a regional structure.
In the new NATO strategic concept there is not a word about “universal interests” or equal security for all countries. The national security strategy of the United States as a leading world power clearly states: “Our national security strategy is formed based on American interests and values, the United States proclaims a global responsibility for the protection of democracy on a planetary scale, and has vital interests in all regions of the world.” Now the new NATO strategic concept is focused not on defense, but on preventive actions outside its area of responsibility, that is, almost exclusively on the projection of force. The emphasis in politics is on military force.
NATO countries, home to only 12% of the world's population, account for 21% of all military personnel, 40% of all conventional weapons, 45% of nuclear weapons, 56% of all military spending in the world, 80% of all military modernization spending and 90% of all spending for R&D. NATO countries' military spending is on average 4.5 times higher than the world average, which allows them to spend an average of $100,000 per soldier per year. Thus, against the backdrop of an absolute quantitative reduction in NATO’s military potential after the end of the Cold War, there is a sharp relative qualitative increase in the militarization of the alliance.
According to military experts, the NATO bloc currently has in its armed forces about 2.9 million personnel, up to 50 combat-ready divisions and 100 separate brigades, up to 16.5 thousand tanks, 25 thousand guns of various calibers, more 5 thousand combat aircraft.
No changes have been noted in the alliance's nuclear strategy. The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside NATO (a clear allusion to Russia, as well as nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan) is also, according to the leaders of the alliance, a significant factor in favor of maintaining the doctrine of “nuclear deterrence.”
Maintaining sufficient nuclear power of the alliance, the concept says, requires broad participation of European NATO countries in the collective planning of the activities of nuclear forces and their deployment on their territory in peacetime. “Nuclear forces stationed in Europe and subordinate to NATO create an important political and military link between European and American members of the alliance. Therefore, the alliance will maintain their adequate level in Europe.”
The prospect of strengthening the US leadership role in NATO and maintaining American dominance on the European continent is also obvious. The powerful military potential of the United States and its claim to sole leadership in the world have an undoubted influence on the formation of NATO's military strategy in the direction of its compliance with American strategic guidelines.
This is clearly spelled out in the new concept: “The presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to the security of North America.”
Very little is said about Russia in the new concept. In the part regarding partnership, it is noted that “Russia plays a unique role in Euro-Atlantic security” and that stable relations between it and NATO are necessary. However, despite this and other statements by the military-political leadership of NATO that it does not currently consider Russia as its enemy, in practice the United Armed Forces of the alliance are targeting a possible confrontation specifically with the Russian Federation. And this is due to the fact that Russia in the modern world community is the only force that has the potential, including nuclear, sufficient to destroy any country in the alliance, including the United States. Therefore, according to NATO, it is the main source of the so-called “risk”. The level of this “risk” is increasing due to the instability of the unpredictable situation in the Russian Federation. In this regard, the interests of NATO would be met by the maximum weakening and collapse of Russia, mastering its resources, establishing control over its nuclear potential. Statements that the West is interested in a strong and rich Russia are simply hypocrisy. Western financial circles managed to firmly tie Russia to their political chariot, making it completely dependent on IMF loans. This position of Russia was apparently taken into account when developing a new NATO strategy.
NATO's new strategy and the barbaric bombing of Yugoslavia are radically changing the military-political situation in Europe. They demonstrate the readiness of the alliance, at its own discretion, to impose its version of resolving a crisis situation on a sovereign state by force of arms. Consequently, it can be argued that at present, after almost a decade has passed since the end of the global military confrontation, the contradictions between the very fact of the existence of a developing military alliance (generated by the Cold War) and the absence of a real, rather than imaginary, enemy have approached their peak . And the NATO leadership was doomed to find a resolution to this contradiction by creating a new enemy, inventing new tasks for the bloc and deciding to carry out a military action.
To preserve the alliance, the leadership of the alliance today urgently needed the presence of a real, tangible enemy and the threat emanating from it, which could be presented to the whole world. And they found it in Yugoslavia.
There are no guarantees that this alliance will no longer use force in this or that point of the globe and there cannot be.
In any case, the new concept of the alliance confirms the possibility of such a development of events. For she legitimized two things. Firstly, the actual withdrawal of NATO from the framework of the regional organization permitted by the UN Charter, the transformation of this alliance into a bloc with global responsibility. Secondly, this concept returned military force to its function as a real (used) instrument of foreign policy.

Introduction

1. The essence and structure of NATO. Development of NATO after the fall of the Warsaw Pact

1.1. Concept, main purpose and structure of NATO

1.2. NATO's development after the end of the Cold War

2. Features and Prospects of relations between Russia and NATO

2.1. General issues of relationship development

2.2. NATO expansion to the east is a threat to Russia

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

The topic of this work is the activities of NATO and its impact on the modern system of international relations.

The relevance of the topic is due to the need for Russia to respond to NATO's expansion to the east, which is impossible without understanding the processes taking place in NATO policy after the fall of the Warsaw Pact.

The North Atlantic Alliance remains the primary vehicle for maintaining the United States' involvement in European security affairs. As a result of its expansion, it plays a crucial role in unifying a continent that has been divided for almost 50 years.

Today, NATO - an international organization that already includes 19 states, and in the near future there will be 26 countries - is a reality, its impact is felt not only in the Euro-Atlantic region, but in other areas of the world. The members of this organization include all the most politically influential, economically powerful and militarily strong Western states, including three nuclear powers (USA, UK, France) - permanent members of the UN Security Council.

There is an increasing political and scientific urgency for a comprehensive study of NATO activities, both past and present. It is necessary to create an effective mechanism for interaction with this large and complex international organization, which has become an integral part of the European security system.

Russia has to coexist with NATO and build normal relations with it, which determines the relevance of the topic.

Goal of the work: explore the key features of NATO's influence on modern international relations.

Job objectives:

Determine the features of NATO’s development after the fall of the Warsaw Warfare.

Study the structure of NATO at the present stage of development.

Study the issues of NATO expansion to the East.

Consider the problems and prospects of relations between Russia and NATO.

Object of study is the evolution of NATO's foreign policy strategy in the context of the end of the Cold War and the new parameters of the diplomatic process caused by these changes.

Subject of research are the process of the alliance searching for its role in the new political realities and the functioning of the diplomatic mechanism of the alliance, both within the union itself and outside it, in particular in relations with the Russian Federation.

1.1. Concept, main purpose and structure of NATO

First, it is necessary to determine the essence and development goals of NATO; for this purpose, you can turn to network resources. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) North Atlantic Treaty Organization,NATO; fr. Organization du traité de l "Atlantique Nord , OTAN) appeared on April 4, 1949 in the USA. Then the USA, Canada, Iceland, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Italy and Portugal became NATO member states. It is a “transatlantic forum” for allied consultations on any matter affecting the vital interests of its members, including events that could threaten their security, and provides deterrence or protection against any form of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state. .

In 1954, the Soviet Union offered to join NATO. The offer was rejected. As a result, in contrast to NATO, the Warsaw Pact was signed on the initiative of the USSR. . Later, the USSR repeated its proposal to join NATO in 1983; after 1991, Russia also repeatedly made a similar proposal.

NATO Goal: NATO members agree that an armed attack on one or more members of the alliance in Europe or North America will be perceived as an attack on the entire alliance. In this regard, they agree that in the event of such an attack, they, as an exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense, will assist the attacked member or members, independently and jointly with other members, acting as necessary, including with the use of armed force. forces to restore and maintain security in the North Atlantic" acting as necessary, including with the use of armed forces“means that other members of the union are not obliged to enter into an armed conflict with the aggressor. They still have an obligation to respond, but they can choose how to respond independently.

This distinguishes the treaty from Article 4 of the Brussels Treaty, which founded the Western European Union, which explicitly states that the response must necessarily be of a military nature. However, it is often implied that NATO members will provide military assistance to those under attack. In addition, the article limits the scope of the alliance to Europe and North America (pre-1963 Algeria), which explains why NATO did not intervene in the Falkland Islands conflict.

The highest political body of NATO is the North Atlantic Council (NATO Council), which consists of representatives of all member states with the rank of ambassador and meets twice a year under the chairmanship of the NATO Secretary General. The North Atlantic Council also meets at the level of foreign ministers and heads of state and government, but formally these meetings have the same status as sessions at the level of foreign ministers. Council decisions are made unanimously. In the period between sessions, the functions of the NATO Council are performed by the NATO Permanent Council, which includes representatives of all member countries of the bloc with the rank of ambassadors.

Since December 1966, the highest military-political body of the organization has become the Military Planning Committee, which meets twice a year at its sessions at the level of defense ministers, although formally it consists of permanent representatives. In the period between sessions, the functions of the Military Planning Committee are performed by the Standing Military Planning Committee, which includes representatives of all member countries of the bloc with the rank of ambassadors.

The highest military body of NATO is the Military Committee, consisting of the chiefs of general staff of NATO member countries and a civilian representative of Iceland, which does not have armed forces, and meets at least twice a year. The Military Committee is subordinate to the commands of two zones: Europe and the Atlantic. The Supreme Command in Europe is headed by the Supreme Commander (always an American general). Subordinate to him are the main commands in three European theaters of military operations: Northern European, Central European and Southern European. During the period between meetings, the functions of the Military Committee are performed by the Standing Military Committee.

The main bodies of NATO also include the Nuclear Planning Group, which usually meets twice a year at the level of defense ministers, usually before meetings of the NATO Council. Iceland is represented in the Nuclear Planning Group by a civilian observer.

1.2. NATO's development after the end of the Cold War

The collapse of the socialist bloc at the end of the 1990s gave rise to doubts about the need to preserve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which had completed its mission. Based on the historical experience of the second half of the 20th century, the logic of the realistic approach to military alliances forced us to assume that practically no defense alliance could survive its own victory over the enemy. Politicians and experts in the United States and Western Europe, who accepted this logic, were of the opinion that, in order not to contradict the forces of history, NATO should be dissolved, or at least limited in its claims. For example, Germany, represented by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, supported by Czechoslovakia, during the second half of 1990 (before the Paris CSCE summit in November 1990) pursued an active line towards “deeper institutionalization” of the CSCE, intending to transform this forum into the cornerstone of a new European security system. In Moscow in the early 1990s, the idea of a "European Security Council" of Europe's major powers was more popular.

The functions and goals of NATO after the Second World War were aimed at containing the Soviet bloc, however, after its collapse, the need arose to revise classical doctrines.

Note that at the turn of the 1980s - 1990s, NATO, which throughout the post-war period performed a deterrent rather than a military-offensive function, faced the need for external adaptation to new international conditions and closely related internal structural restructuring. During the Cold War, NATO, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and Article 5 of its own Charter, was a regional pact whose purpose was to ensure the “collective defense” of its members. However, after the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Warsaw, the need to preserve NATO in the form in which it existed throughout the post-war years was “... called into question...”. Thus, in the early 1990s, NATO faced an inevitable crisis of its own institutional identity.

Many of the underlying issues that divided Europe during the Cold War were complicated by the antagonism that existed between East and West in the ideological, political and military spheres. The changes that led to the end of the Cold War allowed NATO to launch a number of initiatives to enhance security and stability and create structures for dialogue, confidence-building and cooperation with former adversaries, as well as with other European states and neighboring countries throughout the Mediterranean region.

One of the first steps in this direction was the creation in 1991 of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. It was then renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and became the main forum for consultation and cooperation between NATO and non-NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic region.

The most important factor in the revision of NATO's strategic priorities was the change in the nature of the main threats to international security.

The degree of conflict and political-military instability in Europe and the world has not so much decreased as acquired a qualitatively new content. The problems of regulating numerous sources of regional tension came to the fore, which not only turned into one of the key areas of world politics, but also acquired a sharply militarized character - the predominance of the so-called forceful pacification over the “traditional peacekeeping” of the Cold War era became increasingly obvious. However, the nature of these changes did not emerge immediately - NATO’s strategic concept was formed under the influence of the external situation.

The first step towards solving the problem of transforming NATO from a defensive alliance into an organization aimed at ensuring the “collective security” of its members was to be approved in November 1991. Strategic concept of the alliance. It was also distinguished by “...optimism about the increased “opportunities for successfully resolving crises in the early stages...” and the potential for developing pan-European dialogue and cooperation in this area, as well as recognition of the leading role of the CSCE in conflict resolution in Europe (with the possible participation of the EU, WEU and UN).

Events taking place in the world far outstripped the course of NATO's strategic thought: parallel to theory, and often ahead of it, the practice of increasingly active participation of the alliance in peacekeeping and military pacification operations developed. It was the direct experience of practical participation in managing crises and conflicts in Europe during the 1990s, as well as the alliance’s new operational and tactical concepts in this area, that served as the basis for the formation of NATO’s modern anti-crisis strategy.

in 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was created - a consultative forum, which, along with NATO states, included former socialist countries, and then states that emerged on post-Soviet territory;

in 1994, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was initiated, inviting all OSCE countries to cooperate with NATO on the basis of individual projects on issues such as ensuring transparency of military planning and military spending; the introduction of civilian control over the armed forces; implementation of joint planning, training and combat training of military units for peacekeeping, rescue and humanitarian operations; crisis management; Air defense, communications, logistics (see Appendix 1).

The initiative to develop the Partnership for Peace program belonged to the United States and was approved by NATO countries. Its main direction is to strengthen the influence of the alliance countries in the post-socialist space and control over the further “democratization” of the Eastern European states and CIS countries.

In their 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO leaders recognized that “the security of the Union must take into account the global context” and that “the Union’s security interests may be affected by broader threats, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and acts of terrorism and sabotage". NATO argued essentially the same thing in its 1999 Strategic Concept, this time placing “acts of terrorism” at the top of its list of “other threats.”

Considering the process of NATO restructuring in the global space “after the Cold War” can be characterized as follows:

There is a certain decline in military activity within NATO. Although the traditional task of organizing collective defense in the event of external aggression and providing adequate military capabilities remains fundamental, the scale of military preparations has been reduced since the end of the Cold War. The size of the armed forces has been reduced, some of them have been transferred to a reduced level of combat readiness, and the role of the nuclear component in military strategy has been reduced. As part of the ongoing restructuring of the military command, it is planned to reduce the total number of headquarters at various levels from 65 to 20.

Today, efforts are being made to strengthen the role of the alliance as an instrument for the strategic involvement of the United States in Europe while simultaneously providing greater independence to the European members of the alliance. In 1994 the course towards the formation of a “European Security and Defense Identity” (ESDI) within NATO was officially approved; It was decided that the military capabilities of the alliance could be used for the operations of the Western European Union (WEU). The concept of a “Combined Joint Task Force” (CJTF) has been adopted, which can be separated from NATO as a “separable, but not separate force” for operations carried out by European members of the alliance without the participation of the United States.

A wider use of multinational formations formed by NATO members from among European countries is envisaged.

Since 1993, the possibility of expanding the alliance and joining the former socialist countries and the Baltic countries has taken center stage in discussions regarding NATO. In 1997 An official decision was made on the upcoming accession to the union of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, which became full NATO members in 1999.

Subsequently, the main attention began to be paid to defining and justifying new missions of the alliance that went beyond the functions that were outlined in the North Atlantic Treaty. At the same time, the need to reorient the alliance towards solving the tasks of crisis management and peacekeeping, with a corresponding change in ongoing military preparations and ensuring flexibility and mobility of the armed forces, is especially emphasized.

For the first time, NATO’s Strategic Concept included among its possible tasks “conducting operations to respond to crisis situations not falling under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty” (i.e., not related to collective defense against external aggression). The first practical experience of using NATO forces for these purposes was the missile and bomb attacks on Yugoslavia, which began in March 1999. The official goal of this operation was to end the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. NATO's military campaign against Yugoslavia showed that the alliance claims the right to use force outside the territory of member countries and without the authorization of the UN Security Council.

Thus, with the end of the Cold War, the most important factor in the revision of NATO's strategic priorities was the change in the nature of the main threats to international security. Despite the fact that the confrontation between the superpowers is a thing of the past, the degree of conflict and political-military instability in Europe and the world has not so much decreased as acquired a qualitatively new content. The problems of regulating numerous sources of regional tension came to the fore, which not only turned into one of the key areas of world politics, but also acquired a sharply militarized character - the predominance of the so-called forceful pacification over the “traditional peacekeeping” of the Cold War era became increasingly obvious. However, the nature of these changes did not emerge immediately.

The actions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over the past decade and a half testify to its claims to a certain key role in the processes associated with the dynamic transformation of the entire system of international relations, which is characterized by two mutually exclusive trends. An important aspect is that NATO is de facto practically incapable of influencing the processes taking place in the world and is the conductor of US policy, as clearly demonstrated by the operations in Iraq and Yugoslavia. In this regard, a pressing issue for Russia is the development of relations between our country and the North Atlantic Alliance, either as opponents or as allies in the fight against terrorism.

2.1. General issues of relationship development

The end of the Cold War destroyed the “second world,” which included the then Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community. The socialist system lost the competition to capitalism, including by its own standards: it failed to achieve creating higher labor productivity than under capitalism, and this was ultimately decisive for her fate. The intermediate position between developed and backward countries, which was successively occupied by the Russian Empire and then the USSR, turned out to be vulnerable not only economically, but also politically.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union occurred precisely during this meeting. A few years later, in 1994, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace, an important program of practical security and defense cooperation between NATO and each of its partner countries.

2) the emergence of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in NATO will create a military-strategic imbalance in favor of an expanding Alliance. NATO will establish not only its political control over the new members, but the military infrastructure remaining from the Warsaw Pact Organization will also be in its hands;

3) the NATO military machine will approach directly the borders of Russia. This will complicate relations between Russia and NATO. Russia will need security guarantees;

5) in addition, expansion may lead to a change in the situation within Russia itself - it will strengthen the positions of opponents of expansion, especially the left.

NATO Secretary General John Robertson spoke about the relationship between Russia and NATO after the Cold War as follows: “There is currently a paradox in the relationship between NATO and Russia. On the one hand, we have a huge range of issues that we must solve together - from nuclear safety issues to the fight against international terrorism. But on the other hand, we have still not been able to tap into the potential for cooperation that exists in this area, because we are still fixated on our differences.” As the practice of recent events has shown, relations between Russia and NATO are still far from ideal; almost in August 2008, a rupture in relations appeared, which, however, is not an adequate way out of the current situation in the world.

Some of the NATO-Russia differences are very real and significant. So J. Robertson emphasizes the need to overcome them: “We cannot allow our differences to jeopardize the entire range of issues that constitute the essence of the relationship between NATO and Russia... NATO and Russia play a leading role in ensuring European security, and constant dialogue on strategic issues meets both our mutual interests and the interests of all other states.”

Russian-NATO cooperation is not limited only to the military and military-political areas. There are a number of other aspects of interaction in the non-military sphere: civil emergency planning, search and rescue operations, scientific, environmental and economic cooperation.

In the Founding Act of 1997. the following was said about the development of cooperation between Russia and NATO: “...NATO and Russia will consult and cooperate in the following areas:

development of mutually agreed upon cooperation projects in the field of economics, environment and science;

implementation of joint initiatives and exercises in the field of emergency situations and disaster management."

However, old stereotypes from the Cold War prevented the full realization of the possibilities for developing relations between Russia and NATO. In early 1999, Russia suspended participation in the PCA due to disagreements over NATO's air campaign to end political and ethnic repression in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo. However, some types of cooperation continued unabated, including peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, Russia played a key diplomatic role in resolving the Kosovo crisis, and a Russian peacekeeping contingent was present as part of the Kosovo Force deployed in June.

Since 1999, relations between Russia and NATO began to improve significantly. When Lord Robertson took over as NATO Secretary General in October of that year, he took upon himself the task of moving NATO-Russia relations off the ground. And after his election to the post of President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin announced that he would also help restore relations with NATO in the spirit of pragmatism.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, against the United States served as a stark reminder of the need for concerted international action to effectively counter terrorism and other emerging security threats. Immediately after the attacks, Russia opened its airspace to the international coalition's campaign in Afghanistan and provided intelligence information in support of the anti-terrorist coalition.

High-level contacts between Russia and NATO over the following months, including two meetings between Robertson and President Putin and a meeting of Russian and NATO foreign ministers in December 2001, allowed opportunities to be explored, new impetus and new meaning to the relationship. Russia-NATO.

Intensive negotiations led to the adoption of a joint Declaration on a new quality of NATO-Russia relations, signed by the heads of state and government of Russia and NATO member countries on May 28, 2002 in Rome, which established the NATO-Russia Council.

The intensive strengthening of relations between Russia and NATO was severely tested in August 2008, when Georgia attacked South Ossetia. Recent events have clearly demonstrated NATO's dependence on US politics. The main goal of the American provocation carried out by Saakashvili was not at all to restore the territorial integrity of Georgia. The main thing was to create conditions for achieving Washington's long-term plans in Transcaucasia. The admission of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO is the next step in this direction.

Most observers are convinced that the United States and NATO will continue the information war against Russia.

Let us note that relations between Russia and NATO experienced different periods in their history, including periods of serious cooling. And now, they have entered another “cold period” period. However, it should be noted that NATO is even more interested in cooperation with Russia than vice versa. This is due to the fact that it is impossible to imagine successful NATO operations in Afghanistan without the support of Russia, through whose territory both humanitarian and other cargo from the Alliance member countries passed.

There are extremely important areas where Russia and NATO are certainly allies and not adversaries - this is the fight against international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the revival of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The plan for military cooperation between Moscow and Brussels, adopted in 2003, set the goal of increasing the level of operational interaction between the headquarters of Russian and NATO troops and conducting joint exercises on land and at sea. This plan was carried out successfully. Among the very promising projects of Russia and NATO is joint air patrol. This project was supposed to be operational in a year or two, which would increase the safety of flights over Europe. Now this important and useful work has been discontinued. Thus, it should be recognized that the military-political situation in the world is not in Russia’s favor, and cooperation with the West has not led to a reduction in military danger. Threats to international security from developed and developing non-European states are increasing. In general, an analysis of the scale and direction of NATO’s internal and external transformation indicates the globalization of the alliance’s interests, which creates the preconditions for conflicts of interests in various parts of the world, including the post-Soviet space and regions bordering Russia.

2.2. NATO expansion to the east is a threat to Russia

Since 1993, the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance has formed one of the leading storylines in relations between Russia and the West, in the formation of Russian foreign policy in general, in the struggle of ideas and political currents on the issue of Russia's military-strategic orientation and, ultimately, its civilizational affiliation. At the same time, the history of discussions about NATO expansion indicates deep differences in the perception of the problem by Russian and Western observers. In Russia, officials and most experts involved in “realpolitik” viewed expansion as a consolidated strategy of the West (or at least American elites) and tried to either influence the situation with unsubstantiated threats or limit the damage through agreements with NATO on private issues - thereby demonstrating to both supporters and opponents of expansion in the West their actual recognition of its inevitability. However, the report of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP) argued that expansion is not predetermined and proposed influencing the elites of the United States and NATO countries in order to block expansion.

Meanwhile, the author of the most fundamental American study on this issue (and written from the perspective of pro-expansionists) believes that NATO’s expansion to the east “was by no means inevitable... At the beginning of its discussion, the prospect of the dissolution of NATO was at least as likely as its expansion ... both in the administration and in Congress, only a small handful of people were positive about this idea."

According to the recognized authorities of the realist school, after the disappearance of the Soviet threat, NATO was doomed to collapse as an alliance that had lost its defensive function, and its preservation and, especially, expansion give grounds for Russian “realists” to believe that the true interests of its participants, and especially the United States, are inherently predatory.

In the Russian community of politicians and experts, there have existed and continue to exist different, in many ways diametrically opposed, points of view regarding NATO expansion to the East. Some believe that the expansion of the alliance creates a direct military threat to Russia from the West, which is pursuing the goal of economic enslavement and dismemberment of the country, while many are convinced that NATO expansion is a natural response to the “imperial ambitions” or “imperial nostalgia” of Moscow and, perhaps, its only negative effect lies in the indirect propaganda feed of “national-communist revenge”.

This polarity in assessments (which largely persists to this day, at least in expert and political circles) reflects the depth of the public split in the assessment of national history and civilizational identity and is itself a factor of national security that requires consideration when carrying out any was foreign policy.

There are enough reasons to assess the expansion of the alliance as a real threat from a military-strategic, political, and cultural-civilizational point of view. The fact that a military threat from NATO is not obvious to a number of experts and politicians is due to its dynamic nature, which in this case means the growing aggressiveness of the alliance as its composition changes and the elites regroup as a result of the victory of supporters of a tougher offensive strategy over the “doves.” The statement of Hungarian Prime Minister V. Orban in the fall of 1999 sounded an alarming signal. about the possibility of placing nuclear missiles on Hungarian soil.

Although the senior leadership of NATO or its individual members does not currently consider the conduct of any military action against Russia, whether by nuclear or conventional forces, as a realistic scenario, the demonstration of bellicose intentions at a lower level, especially by states of the eastern and southern flank, represents poses an independent threat to Russia, since it affects psychologically vulnerable elite groups that have lost immunity to various forms of blackmail and forceful pressure both within the country and outside.

Here lies a rather precarious boundary between military and non-military threats, the latter being much more relevant for today’s Russia, although many in the West seem abstract and therefore of secondary importance. NATO’s attack on Russia’s vital interests revives disputes between “Westerners” and their various opponents that are as fruitless as they are destructive to the entire national identity, as well as discussions about whether Russia is a European or Eurasian power or, perhaps, a completely special one , an isolated geopolitical unit. The perception of NATO as a military-political equivalent of Western civilization or Europe as a whole puts Russian Westerners in a situation of a false choice - either to achieve the utopian goal of integrating Russia with NATO at the cost of great humiliation, or to recognize Russia as essentially a non-European, non-Western country, but themselves - something like a fifth column, or at least a civilizational minority, which must, as today, secure access to institutions of power through quasi-democratic methods or accept existence in cultural and political enclaves.

One of the ways to neutralize this cultural-psychological, and therefore political, threat is to abandon the perception of the West as a monolithic, integrated whole, and to give historically transitory institutional formations the status of exponents of a certain absolute idea of the West. Meanwhile, the radical rejection of the analytical tools of the Soviet era, combined with the impoverishment of information and scientific study of the Western world, gave many Russian observers an exaggerated idea of the consolidation of the West (which is, in a sense, the flip side of Russian society’s own, very real disunity). The confrontation within Western, in particular American, society on the issue of the fate of NATO, the presence of serious opposition to expansion, including in power structures, remained unnoticed in Russia or was obscured due to the unprofitability of this information, both for Russian isolationists and for fanatical adherents of total integration with the West. In today's circumstances, an understanding of the deep internal conflicts of the Western world, a refusal to absolutize the temporary balance of forces within it, as well as between the West and other “poles” of the world community, are necessary primarily for Russian Westerners if they want to restore the legitimacy of their direction as an integral part of the Russian sociocultural and the political spectrum.

What resources does Russia have to influence the process of NATO expansion at the current stage? The opportunities for this within the PCA are essentially minimal, since NATO is institutionally interested in further expansion. Therefore, if the passivity of Russian diplomacy in previous structures (CCAC and PfP) led to negative consequences, then at this stage, on the contrary, reducing bilateral contacts to the necessary minimum seems to be the most rational solution. In these circumstances, rapprochement with India, China, the countries of the Near and Middle East pursuing an independent policy, as well as those European countries that still remain neutral, is a condition for preventing geopolitical isolation, but it can only have an indirect impact on the dynamics of NATO expansion.

In the course of this work, the following conclusions were made:

The modern history of NATO begins with the Meeting of Heads of State/Government of Member States in Rome in November 1991, where the Strategic Concept was defined, defining new approaches to security based on dialogue, cooperation and collective defense. At the same meeting, the Declaration of Peace and Cooperation was adopted, which defined new tasks and directions for NATO in the light of a new common institutional framework for security in Europe and the development of partnerships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, once former adversaries. To establish closer relations with the latter, a special North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established. With the development of these partnerships, the expansion of the number of partner states at the expense of the CIS countries and the emergence of the NATO Partnership for Peace program, in 1997. The NACC was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

NATO's anti-crisis strategy and operations, their nature and direction, are acquiring critical importance in the modern world, striving for a multipolar one, both from the point of view of Russia's relationship with the alliance, and in the light of the broader interests of ensuring the security of the Russian Federation. On the one hand, NATO's so-called crisis response in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and other regions represents the most visible (but far from the only) manifestation of the expansion of the alliance's mission and sphere of influence. Moreover, depending on the location and nature of NATO anti-crisis operations, they themselves can become the cause of acute conflicts and crises on both a local and regional scale, including in relations with the Russian Federation.

NATO's place in the emerging international political system on the European continent is determined by the political and military capacity demonstrated by the North Atlantic Alliance, as well as by the expansion of its spatial area. But due to the fact that this structure does not include Russia, the transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance in its current form into the central element of the “pan-European architecture” is either problematic or fraught with aggravation of tensions. This issue could be transferred to a constructive plane as a result of a more radical transformation of the union and the formation of qualitatively new relations with Russia. In May 1997 between them the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security was concluded, which defined “the goals and mechanism of consultations, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint actions that will form the core of the relationship between Russia and NATO.” The Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council was created and began to function.

However, the question of the real nature and scale of their future cooperation, according to many authors, remains open. The possibility of such cooperation was jeopardized by NATO's military operation against Yugoslavia, which Russia characterized as undisguised aggression. Such actions prompted her to sharply reduce the level of relations with NATO (withdrawal of Russian representatives from the alliance headquarters, withdrawal from PfP and other measures).

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