Chapter Ten COUNT ROSTOPCHIN - TWO OPPOSITE POINTS OF VIEW In the time of Fabius, the crowd adored people like Varro. Superleader Hannibal also rejoiced at the arrival of this sub-leader into the army. Has anything changed by the time Patriotic War 1812 - after all, it has passed since then

GORNOSTAYEV M. V.

GOVERNOR GENERAL OF MOSCOW

F. V. ROSTOPCHIN:

PAGES OF THE HISTORY OF 1812.

MOSCOW – 2003.

UDC882

Governor General of Moscow:

pages of history of 1812. - M.: IKF “Catalog”,

The book offered to the reader reveals some pages of the life of Fyodor Vasilyevich Rostopchin, the Governor-General of Moscow in 1812, one of the most interesting and controversial characters national history. Rostopchin’s vigorous patriotic activity during the Napoleonic invasion could have become a model of zealous service for the good of the Fatherland, but was negatively assessed by domestic historians and today almost forgotten. Intended for all those interested in the history of Russia.

1. Brief biography. …………………………5

2. Relationships and interaction

and in 1812. ……………………………………..8

3. Organization of evacuation of government institutions

from Moscow in 1812. …………………………………………..24

4. and the fire of Moscow in 1812. ………………..35

Notes……………………………………………………..52

Human memory is inconsistent. The heroes of bygone days become, in the eyes of their descendants, figures who do not deserve attention, and sometimes even scoundrels. Public opinion forms a negative stereotype, and writers and scientists soon provide an appropriate basis for it. All this is also true in relation to Fyodor Vasilyevich Rostopchin, a talented writer and popular publicist, Pavlov’s favorite and head of the foreign board, friend and, finally, the Moscow Governor-General in 1812, who became famous for his active patriotic activities and fiery hatred of the enemy, embodied in the grandiose fire of Moscow, which disrupted Napoleon’s plans. The traditionally critical attitude in Russian historiography towards the role of Rostopchin in the events of the Patriotic War of 1812 is known, which developed in the mid-19th century and has survived to this day. If D. Buturlin compared Rostopchin with ancient Roman heroes, then such pre-revolutionary researchers as, and considered him a man of low abilities, moral qualities and an incapable official who interfered with his plans to defeat Napoleon. Later, this assessment, only now strengthened, was repeated by Soviet authors. wrote about Rostopchin: “He was a man of a quick and undisciplined mind, a wit (not always successful), a loud joker, a fanfare, proud and self-confident, without special abilities and calling for anything." in the article “Kutuzov and the Fire of Moscow” he called Rostopchin “a liar and a coward.” He went the furthest, not shy in epithets, calling the count either “who considered himself a great politician and commander, the tsar’s favorite and careerist,” then “an inveterate serf owner and self-lover,” then “the Tsar’s noisy favorite,” then “a crafty courtier” and even “a traitor and coward."

Today, historians have an opportunity to reconsider established assessments regarding certain characters in Russian history. This fully applies to Rostopchin, whose activities remain largely unknown and unexplored, but studying them will more fully reveal the picture of the events of our past and especially the heroic pages of 1812.

The volume of the publication, unfortunately, does not allow us to fully present the material accumulated by the author on state and social activities, therefore only some of the most important issues will be considered on the pages of this book.

1. BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF F. V. ROSTOPCHIN

Blessed are those who have not witnessed shame

Russia. Blessed are those who will avenge the Fatherland.

Fyodor Vasilyevich Rostopchin was born on March 12, 1763 in the city of Livny, Oryol province. His family was ancient, but not noble. According to legend, the Rostopchins descended from the Crimean Tatar prince Davyd Rabchak, a distant descendant of Genghis Khan, who lived in the 15th century. However, the descendants of Genghisid, who served the Moscow sovereigns since 1432, did not occupy high positions and the history is practically unknown. According to the rules of that time, Rostopchin was enlisted in the Preobrazhensky Guards Regiment from early childhood and therefore already had the rank of second lieutenant by the age of twenty-two. The young officer was smart, talented, and most importantly, he had a great thirst for action. But, having no noble patrons, he was forced to settle for a modest army career. Although Rostopchin participated in the Russian-Swedish war of 1788-90, in the siege of Ochakov during the Russian-Turkish war of 1787-91, he did not even receive the St. George Cross, to which he was nominated for the Finnish campaign. However, unexpectedly, in Iasi, fate brought him together with the count, who arrived to conduct peace negotiations with the Ottoman Empire. Rostopchin, who took a direct part in drawing up the protocols, was sent to St. Petersburg with the news of the conclusion of peace. This event marked the beginning of his court career; on February 14, 1792, he received the rank of chamber cadet. But even at court, the ambitious Rostopchin did not want to be content with modest assignments. At this time, he tried in every possible way to attract the attention of Catherine II, not only earning the description of a witty participant in her salons, but also marrying the niece of the maid of honor and the Empress’s favorite, Ekaterina Petrovna Protasova. But neither his brilliant mind nor his marriage contributed to his career, and the desperate Rostopchin was about to resign when chance helped him again. As a chamber cadet, he was supposed to be on duty at the small court of Grand Duke Pavel Petrovich. However, other chamber cadets, trying to please the empress, performed this duty in bad faith, often not coming to serve the heir. Therefore, the conscientious Rostopchin often remained to replace his less responsible comrades, but his patience had limits and he sent a letter to the chief chamberlain, in which he spoke about his comrades in a rather insulting manner. The letter received publicity and caused a scandal. Rostopchin was challenged to a duel by several courtiers, but the empress calmed everyone down by sending him to the village. However, this incident, having destroyed hopes for a career, made Rostopchin a hero in the eyes of the heir to the throne. Several years passed, and when on November 5, 1796, news of the critical situation of the Empress spread throughout St. Petersburg, Rostopchin was among the few people who were completely confident in their future. From this day his brilliant rise began. Count of the Russian Empire, Grand Chancellor of the Order of Malta, holder of many highest orders, director of the postal department, first member of the College of Foreign Affairs, and finally, richest man Russia, Rostopchin, considered by everyone as a favorite, still did not turn into a temporary worker. He received the salary of the third person present on the board, and pointedly refused the princely title and some higher positions. At the court of the wayward emperor, who did not spare even his favorites, Rostopchin was the only person who were not afraid to express their own opinions. However, otherwise the count acted in the spirit of the times, organizing intrigues, eliminating rivals, and, in the end, he himself fell victim own actions. He was dismissed on February 20, 1801, and already on March 1, Paul I, having lost his most faithful servants Rostopchin and Arakcheev, was killed.

2. INTERACTION AND RELATIONSHIP

F.V. ROSTOPCHIN AND M.I. KUTUZOV IN 1812

The question of the direct culprit for the abandonment of Moscow by the Russian army in 1812 is one of the most pressing in Russian historiography. Such acuity arises because the facts and logic of reasoning often contradict the conclusions of historians and thereby create a new and very difficult problem Rostopchin's personal guilt in the death ancient capital, multi-million dollar losses of government and private property.

Rostopchin, as Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of Moscow, from the very beginning of the war, carefully monitored the possibility of military danger for the city. The primary source of such conclusions for him were reports of military operations, personal correspondence with Barclay de Tolly and Bagration. But, realizing the danger of such one-sided information, the count at the end of July sent titular adviser Voronenko to the army, one of the main goals of whose activity was to collect information about the true state of affairs. Thus, the totality obtained from different sources information allowed Rostopchin, even on August 12, not to assume the possibility of the enemy approaching the capital. However, caution did not fail him, and that same day he wrote to Bagration about his intention to begin the evacuation of government property if the Russian army retreated to Vyazma. The events of the following days changed his assessment. Although Kutuzov's appointment strengthened Rostopchin's hope for a happy continuation of the war for Russian weapons, the retreat continued. Kutuzov immediately after arriving at the army wrote to Rostopchin about his intention to defend the capital.

Knowing virtually nothing about the plans of the new commander-in-chief, on August 18 the Governor-General gave orders to begin preparations for the evacuation of some government departments, stipulating that the removal of property should begin after special orders. But, for clearer and more consistent actions, Rostopchin needed to know for sure about the fate of the subordinate city. On August 17, Kutuzov wrote to the count from Gzhatsk: “In my opinion, the loss of Moscow is connected with the loss of Russia.” Of course, such a statement could reassure many, but not Rostopchin, especially since from the moment the Russian army entered the Moscow province, he fell directly under the military command. However, there were still big hopes for a general battle. On the eve of it, on August 21, the commander-in-chief writes to Rostopchin: “All movements until now have been directed towards this single goal and towards the salvation of the capital city of Moscow - may the Almighty bless these enterprises of ours...”. As can be seen from the correspondence, Kutuzov diligently avoided the question of the fate of Moscow, limiting himself only to expressing his intentions. No instructions were given regarding the evacuation of government property.

Rostopchin himself most likely already had strong doubts about the commander-in-chief’s intention to defend the ancient capital, about which he wrote to the Nizhny Novgorod governor on August 24. There was no certainty even after the end of the Battle of Borodino. On the evening of August 26, Kutuzov sent a letter to the Governor General, informing him of his intention to continue the battle the next day and asking for reinforcements. In general, this day can be called a turning point in the relationship between Kutuzov and Rostopchin. It was from August 26 that the commander-in-chief’s demands on the governor-general took on a mocking tone. In this letter, Kutuzov not only did not warn Rostopchin about his intention to retreat, but also demanded the immediate sending of reinforcements, which, even if they immediately left Moscow, would not have reached the troops before the last days of August.

Ambiguity and uncertainty in such an issue as the security of Moscow had no right to exist, and therefore the Governor-General demanded that Kutuzov give him clear instructions in this regard. Kutuzov’s answer cannot be called definite: “Your thoughts about preserving Moscow are sound and must be presented.”

Meanwhile, after, according to the commander-in-chief, victory over Napoleon, the Russian army retreated to Moscow, although this retreat was more like a flight. This is supported by the speed of movement - 110 kilometers in 5 days and the terrible disorder that reigned in the troops. As Barclay de Tolly recalled, during these days the units retreated chaotically, without any disposition, without commanders, obeying general direction movements. The chaos reached such a scale that it was impossible to find even the General Headquarters among the army. Every day, thousands of soldiers left their location to indulge in robbery, as evidenced by the correspondence between Kutuzov and Rostopchin, who took all possible measures to stop it. On August 30, the demoralized Russian army approached the capital. The Moscow governor-general immediately went to the field marshal. Kutuzov’s orderly, the prince, described their meeting in the village of Mamonovo as follows: “After various mutual compliments, they talked about the defense of Moscow. It was decided to die, but to fight under its walls. The reserve was supposed to consist of the Moscow squad with crosses and banners. Rastopchin left with admiration and in his delight, no matter how smart he was, but he did not understand that there was a hidden meaning in these assurances and orders of Kutuzov. Kutuzov could not have discovered ahead of time under the walls of Moscow that he would leave her, although he hinted in a conversation to Rostopchin.” From the memoirs of a person close to Kutuzov, we can find out another oddity in the field marshal’s behavior. Even in these critical days for Moscow, he did not inform his plans to its governor-general, that is, an official from whom, on the contrary, nothing could be hidden, since the military success of the army largely depended on his personal participation.

This oddity was repeated on September 1, when Kutuzov, contrary to the opinion of his generals, did not invite Rostopchin to the military council. Moscow Governor-General, Commander-in-Chief of Moscow, Infantry General, and finally, the man who did the most for the defense of the city and still has great opportunities providing assistance to the army, both financially and by convening armed Muscovites, was simply ignored by the commander-in-chief. Moreover, the idea of ​​gathering citizens for battle near the city walls, often taken by historians as one of the fantastic plans of the Moscow governor-general, was seriously considered not only by him. Bagration also completely agreed with Rostopchin. Even Kutuzov initially accepted the count’s proposal to arm the Muscovites with enthusiasm, which he wrote about on August 17 to Rostopchin. It should be noted that in this case, Kutuzov probably misunderstood the promises of the Moscow governor-general, who really counted on the eighty thousand militia formed under his leadership in neighboring provinces, and, separately, on the enthusiasm of several thousand townspeople who were to be convened immediately before the battle at the city walls, but not before. Rostopchin reported to Kutuzov on August 22 about the real assessment of his forces: “...with the exception of the unknown number of residents of Moscow and its environs, I have up to 10,000 uniformed and more than a half trained recruits."

It is worth remembering one more accusation against Rostopchin: the accusation of inconsistency, inconsistency of statements and real action. The count, who had been toying with the idea of ​​a people’s battle for so long, according to Glinka, on August 30, while composing his famous “Appeal to the Three Mountains,” declared: “We will have nothing on the three mountains.” In the mentioned poster, Rostopchin called on Muscovites to defend the ancient capital and the entire Russian land. “...Arm yourself with what you can, both horse and foot; take only bread for three days; go with the cross; take the banners from the churches and with this sign gather immediately on the Three Mountains; I will be with you, and together we will destroy the villain.”

However, the count himself did not appear at the Three Mountains, which subsequently made the Muscovites very unhappy. This can be reflected in the anecdote cited by Dmitriev about an alleged conversation between the Governor General and Prince Shalikov. Soon after the French left, Rostopchin called him to his place to find out why he remained in Moscow? Shalikov’s answer was insulting: “How could I leave! Your Excellency announced that you will defend Moscow on the Three Mountains with all the Moscow nobles; I came there armed; but not only didn’t I find any nobles there, I didn’t find your Excellency either!” More serious evidence was left by the Moscow official Bestuzhev-Ryumin, who on August 31 found himself near the Presnenskaya outpost, where the road to the Three Mountains began. "My God! With what heartfelt tenderness I looked at the Orthodox Russian people, my compatriots, who were striving with weapons in their hands, bought dearly from self-interested merchants; others walked with pikes, pitchforks, and axes to the Three Mountains suburb to save Moscow, the cradle of Orthodoxy and the tombs of our forefathers, from the advancing enemy, and with the spirit of true patriotism they shouted: “Long live our Father Alexander!” The slightest support for this patriotic explosion, and God knows whether the enemy would have entered Moscow? The people numbered several tens of thousands, so it was difficult, as they say, for an apple to fall, in a space of 4 or 5 square miles, which from the rising of the sun to the setting did not disperse in anticipation of Count Rostopchin, as he himself promised to lead them; but the commander did not appear, and everyone, with bitter despondency, went home.”

What were Rostopchin’s motives in this case? It is strange that, already assuming the sad fate of the capital, and with full confidence that there would be no battle, he, nevertheless, convened Muscovites to help the army. However, this decision can be explained quite simply: firstly, there were still hopes for a battle near Moscow, in which case the Moscow governor-general undertook what he had long promised, thereby providing real support to the army; secondly, the expression of popular enthusiasm could have a moral influence on the military leadership in choosing further actions.

We should also reject the opinion about the duplicity of the Moscow governor-general, who allegedly wrote his “Appeal to the Three Mountains” and called the people to battle in pursuit of popularity and to create a false patriotic effect, thereby deceiving the Muscovites, since he himself did not plan any popular battle I didn't intend to participate in it. This was mainly supported by the Count’s words mentioned by Glinka: “There will be nothing on our three mountains.” But this version is correct only if the researcher has previously accepted, as the basis for conclusions, the thesis about Rostopchin’s low moral qualities. If we consider the Moscow Governor-General, at a minimum, as a figure who really assesses the situation, then it becomes clear that these words express his There are great doubts about the field marshal’s intention to use the help of the townspeople. The Count understood perfectly well that under any circumstances, without the support of the army, the patriotic initiative of Muscovites could only lead to a bloodbath, and this could explain his failure to appear at the Three Mountains. Rostopchin did not want to encourage those gathered with his appearance, because it was him, as Bestuzhev-Ryumin testifies, that the Muscovites saw as a leader. The Governor-General did not appear, the Muscovites dispersed, and perhaps this circumstance saved many of their lives. And it’s not Rostopchin’s fault that Kutuzov neglected the patriotic feelings of the townspeople and did not take advantage several tens of thousands of armed people, determined to die at the walls of the holy city.

Rostopchin was notified of Kutuzov's decision to leave Moscow to the enemy late in the evening of September 1. The Governor-General immediately sent the already mentioned Voronenko to Fili to report the beginning of the movement of enemy troops. In the meantime, he ordered that all available carts be used to remove the wounded. The police were tasked with breaking barrels of wine. Then, outraged by Kutuzov’s treachery, he sent a letter to the emperor, from which Alexander I learned about the abandonment of the city.

So, the ancient capital of Russia was abandoned by the Russian army. Although subsequent events showed that it was on its ruins that the grave was prepared for Napoleonic plans However, the very fact of the surrender of Moscow was considered by both contemporaries and later authors as the most difficult episode in Russian history. The question of how it happened that the French captured one of the two largest political, economic, cultural and military centers of the Russian Empire, moreover, located at a considerable distance from the state border, was considered by the majority of authors writing about the Patriotic War of 1812. It should be noted that this problem usually considered in two planes, in search of other options for the development of events, and in search of a specific culprit. The latter, however, is not without logic, since the Moscow governor-general and commander-in-chief of the Russian army were directly involved in the fall of Moscow, with the exception of Napoleon.

Soviet historiography proceeded from the assumption that Kutuzov had a counteroffensive plan. According to him, the Russian army, which had significantly bled the enemy troops in the Battle of Borodino, was supposed to retreat to Moscow, there unite with militia units armed with Muscovites and newly formed regiments and, after gaining an advantage in manpower, give a new battle to the enemy. In this case, the battle near the walls of Moscow should have ended with the inevitable defeat of Napoleon and given rise to a brilliant counter-offensive of the Russian army. But Kutuzov’s plans were not destined to come true, since officials did not prepare the necessary reserves. The field marshal, who was about to give a decisive battle near the walls of Moscow, discovered that he had neither the support of the people's militia, nor the armed citizens, nor the army regiments. Moreover, the city was not ready for defense. All this forced Kutuzov to make the only right decision - to leave the ancient capital in order to preserve the army. The main culprits for this situation, according to Beskrovny and Zhilin, were Alexander I and Rostopchin, and the latter, due to his direct participation in these events, was more involved in the tragedy.

Such an interpretation of events cannot but be considered one-sided. After all, as you know, Rostopchin acted as a decisive opponent of the surrender of the city, and the corresponding decision was made by Kutuzov at a military council, to which the governor-general was not even invited. All this provides the basis for a detailed analysis of all the circumstances of leaving Moscow.

The first of these is the assumption that Rostopchin did an unsatisfactory job of organizing the people's militia and did not provide Kutuzov with the promised support of armed Muscovites at the city walls. It is known that the Moscow Governor-General took all possible measures to quickly gather and prepare militia units. Moscow and the Moscow province, directly under the leadership of Rostopchin, showed unparalleled patriotism, and already on August 26, about 25 thousand warriors were at the disposal of the Russian army, at least 19 thousand of whom took direct part in the Battle of Borodino. By the end of August, the capabilities of the Moscow province were practically exhausted. By September 1, the militia regiments of the neighboring provinces were already on their way to Moscow or were at points designated by the military command.

The conclusion that Rostopchin is afraid to arm the townspeople is also not entirely justified. It is known that on August 18 he publicly announced the free sale of weapons from the arsenal. Moreover, the price for it was significantly (30-40 times!) lower than the market price. Thus, any Muscovite who wanted to arm himself could do so freely. The Moscow governor-general, however, by organizing the sale rather than the distribution of weapons, deliberately created an obstacle to the arming of the poorest sections of the population, from whom in this case he could expect not an outburst of patriotic feelings, but an attempt to take advantage of the chaos and disorder of these days for robbery and disturbances. The price set in the arsenal made guns and sabers affordable to working Muscovites and small owners, but not to beggars and brothel dwellers. In any case, one cannot idealize the moral qualities of these layers of townspeople, even in conditions of military danger, as many authors did, but take into account the factor that the risk of disturbances in the rear of the Russian army was too great not to establish a protective property barrier on the way those wishing to arm themselves.

It is also impossible to perceive the armed Muscovites as a real existing military unit, fully combat-ready and well organized, as was done by Kutuzov, who proposed sending them to Zvenigorod, and many authors. It is in the method of organization and preparedness that they fundamentally differ from the previously formed Moscow militia, which, by the way, is also considered by many critics of Rostopchin as an inferior combat unit. However, the warriors underwent short-term training, were equally armed, equipped, and, most importantly, divided into units. Muscovites were considered by the Governor-General as emergency aid to the army, an element capable of fighting to the death, deciding the fate of not only their hometown, but also for Russia, albeit through their own death, but to divert several tens of thousands of enemy soldiers to themselves, which will undoubtedly help the Russian troops. The battle near Moscow was supposed to be precisely people's battle, a battle of unity between patriotic citizens and the army. Because of this, the convening of Muscovites should have taken place not in advance, but directly on the critical day, which was done by Rostopchin on August 30. The opinion that this poorly organized and armed, spontaneous mass of people could independently, without the help of regular troops, compete with the battle-hardened French army.

One of the misconceptions that migrates from publication to publication is the conclusion that Rostopchin promised Kutuzov to provide eighty thousand new militias, residents of the city and province, near Moscow. In a letter to the Governor-General dated August 30, the field marshal calls them “the Moscow squad,” and even earlier, on August 17, he writes: “The call of eighty thousand over the militia of voluntarily armed sons of the fatherland is a feature that proves the spirit of the Russian and the trust of the residents of Moscow to their commander, who revives them.” . These letters gave the authors grounds to claim allegedly boastful behavior and even the deception of Rostopchin, on the basis of whose false statements Kutuzov incorrectly assessed the capabilities of the defense of Moscow, which gave the field marshal the moral right to subsequently ignore the governor general when accepting major decisions. The first to mention the figure of eighty thousand in the document was Alexander I, who believed after a conversation with Rostopchin that Moscow and the province would field additional militia. Later, this figure was repeated several times, by authors, both positive and negative, relating to the Governor-General, and was never questioned. However, in in this case There was a banal confusion of concepts. Rostopchin, the Tsar and Kutuzov, speaking about the “Moscow squad”, put completely into this term different meanings. For the head of the first district of the people's militia, which included, in addition to Moscow, a whole series of surrounding provinces, the Tver, Ryazan, and Vladimir militias were nothing more than Moscow military force , which, according to rough calculations, could number, with the exception of the Moscow zemstvo army itself, no less than eighty thousand warriors, which Rostopchin confidently reported to both the emperor and later Kutuzov. But for both Alexander I and the future field marshal, the term “Moscow » meant formed directly in Moscow and the capital province. Therefore, the promises of Rostopchin, who knew better than others the true capabilities of the province, and the bewilderment of Kutuzov, who believed that under the walls of the ancient capital he would find eighty thousand armed Muscovites, can be considered as completely true.

The second argument of Rostopchin’s critics was the thesis about the Moscow Governor General’s alleged failure to supply the army, despite numerous requests from Kutuzov. The approach of the Russian army to the ancient capital required particularly close cooperation between the Moscow administration and the military command. The primary task for the Governor-General was to provide the troops with everything they needed, especially since Kutuzov communicated with him personally on all issues. Requests were sent daily, and the Governor General fulfilled them to the best of his ability.

So on August 20, the field marshal asked to send an additional supply of crackers. On August 21, he demanded an entrenching tool. On August 26, at the height of the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov sent Rostopchin an order: “...immediately send from the arsenal for 500 guns complete charges, more than battery ones.” On the evening of the same day, the commander-in-chief sent a letter in which he announced his intention to continue the battle the next day and asked for reinforcements to be delivered. On August 27, he announced his intention to retreat to Moscow and asked: “...Everything that Moscow can give in terms of troops, an increase in artillery, shells and horses and other things that can be expected from the faithful sons of the fatherland, all this would be added to the army waiting to fight with the enemy." On the same day he demanded another 500 horses for artillery.

Rostopchin regularly supplied the army. On August 22, he wrote to Kutuzov: “At the notice of Your Lordship, I immediately began making crackers and can bake and produce for one month with delivery for 120 thousand, that is, 30 thousand quarters of flour.” The count later recalled that during the thirteen days of August, every morning 600 carts loaded with crackers, cereals and oats were sent to the army. On August 25, he reported that entrenching tools for workers had been purchased and shipped. On August 27, the count ordered artillery charges in boxes to be urgently sent to Mozhaisk. 3-4 horses were allocated for this, and the shipment was taken under the personal control of the count. On August 29, Rostopchin sent 26,000 shells for cannons to the army. On the same day, two regiments marched to Mozhaisk, and another one on the thirtieth. At the same time, 500 horses for artillery, four battery companies, shells, 4,600 people under the command of Major General Miller, 100 artillerymen from the militia and a supply of crackers for ten days were sent to the active army.

However, the army experienced a serious shortage of weapons and provisions, which gave reason to suspect the Moscow governor-general of deliberately disrupting supplies and delaying the execution of Kutuzov’s requests. Let's look at these charges. So on August 23, Kutuzov ordered 1000 carts to be placed at each postal station from Mozhaisk to Moscow. A total of 4,000 carts were required. [a] And although on August 25 Rostopchin reported on the execution, on August 27 Kutuzov wrote with dissatisfaction that he had not found a single cart in Mozhaisk. It should be noted that in this case the guilt of the Governor General is not obvious. On August 22, Ivashkin sent out a circular order to private bailiffs demanding that they show diligence in collecting carts. Hiring large quantity supply for the army, in a situation when spontaneous evacuation began from Moscow, was an extremely difficult task, since cab drivers preferred speculative prices offered by Muscovites to government tariffs, however, this problem was solved, and the supply left the city on August 25. Considering the distance to Mozhaisk is 105 kilometers, the carts were supposed to arrive and arrived on the evening of August 27. Some of Kutuzov's requests should be called, at least, strange, taking up time and money. So the demand from August 27, that is, when the battle was already over, to send an entrenching tool is meaningless if the field marshal did not intend to give a new battle at the walls of Moscow and strange otherwise, because then it would be more reasonable to prepare the tool in the city and deliver it directly to the site of the future battle.

Remember, from Lermontov: “Tell me, uncle, it’s not for nothing that Moscow was burned by fire...” The ancient capital owed that fire, which turned Napoleon’s stay in the city into a living hell, to its mayor, Count Fyodor Rostopchin. However, not only this...

The Great Fire of Moscow on September 2, 1812. Engraving by G. Sasso from the original by E. Cateni. 1818 Courtesy of M. Zolotarev

The Moscow fire of 1812 is truly one of the most striking (in every sense) events in the biography of Fyodor Vasilyevich Rostopchin (1763–1826). He was even accused of this from time to time: liberal and Soviet historians no, no, and they compared the count with Herostratus. Meanwhile, he was one of the most prominent and brilliant statesmen of the late XVIII - early XIX century. And he became famous, of course, not only for the fire.

Tent from Suvorov

According to the Rostopchin family legend, the ancestor of their surname was a direct descendant Genghis Khan, Boris Davydovich Rostopcha, who left Crimea for Rus' in early XVI centuries under the Grand Duke Vasily Ivanovich. Father of Fyodor Rostopchin, Vasily Fedorovich, was a wealthy landowner, owner of estates in the Oryol, Tula and Kaluga provinces. The mother, nee Kryukova, died early, after the birth of her second son. Of course, Fedor received a good home education and upbringing, he knew the basic European languages. And although his teachers were often foreigners, he still remained Russian in spirit, “remembering the teachings of priest Peter and the words of mother Gerasimovna.”

10 year old boy Fedor Rostopchin was enlisted in the Life Guards Preobrazhensky Regiment. In fact, his service began in 1782, when he received the rank of ensign. In 1786–1788, Rostopchin undertook a long trip abroad, visiting Germany, France, and England. In Berlin he took private lessons in mathematics and fortification, and in Leipzig he attended lectures at the university. Joining the Masonic lodge in Berlin allowed him to acquire many useful connections. And in England he became close to the Russian ambassador in London, Count Semyon Romanovich Vorontsov, with whom he subsequently was in constant correspondence and who greatly contributed to the first steps of Rostopchin’s rapid career.

Fyodor Vasilievich Rostopchin (1763–1826) and Title page“Thoughts out loud on the Red Porch” by Fyodor Rostopchin, 1807 edition. Images courtesy of M. Zolotarev

Returning to Russia the day before Russo-Swedish War 1788–1790, he spent several months at the main headquarters of the Russian troops in Friedrichsgam (Finland), and in the summer of 1788, as a volunteer, Rostopchin went on a campaign against the Turks and participated in the assault on Ochakov and in the famous battles of Rymnik and Focsani. As it appears, Fedor Rostopchin was not timid: it was no coincidence that he served under the command of Alexander Vasilievich Suvorov, who, as a sign of his favor, presented him with a military camp tent. Finally, in 1790, Rostopchin again took part in the Finnish campaign. Commanding a grenadier battalion, he was nominated for the Cross of St. George, which, however, he did not receive.

In 1791, through the mediation of Count Vorontsov, Rostopchin became close to one of the leaders of the foreign policy department, Alexander Andreevich Bezborodko, on whose recommendation in February 1792 he was awarded the rank of chamber cadet with the rank of brigadier. He was received at court and became a member of high society salons, where he soon acquired a reputation as a wit. His jokes, witticisms and anecdotes were widely known.

At the court of Emperor Paul

Since 1793, Fyodor Rostopchin was assigned to the “small court” of Grand Duke Pavel Petrovich in Gatchina. It was he who first informed the heir about his death Catherine II. It was then that his career took off sharply. Favorite Paul I, Rostopchin eventually began to play a key role in determining the foreign policy course of the empire, managing foreign affairs in Russia.

Possessing geopolitical thinking and being one of those who did a lot for the then emerging movement, called the “Russian Party,” Fyodor Rostopchin sought to build foreign policy based not on subjective dynastic preferences, but on real national interests.

His concept, formulated in the note “On the Political State of Europe” (1801), was based on ideas about the self-sufficiency of Russia and its independence from the countries of the Old World. With his ideas he anticipated later constructions N.Ya. Danilevsky, author of the famous work “Russia and Europe”. Count Rostopchin proposed breaking the alliance with England, creating it with Napoleonic France and carrying out the division of Turkey. the main idea The document was that as a result of the war with France in 1799, England, Prussia and Austria were the winners, but not Russia.

Characterizing the leading countries of Europe, Rostopchin came to the conclusion that almost all of them “secretly harbor envy and malice” towards the Russian Empire and therefore it must vigilantly monitor them and, when it is beneficial for it, take advantage of the contradictions between them. Fedor Rostopchin believed that an alliance with Napoleonic France would weaken England and divide Turkey. He proposed a project for the distribution of the possessions of the Ottoman Empire between Russia, Prussia, Austria and France, which would receive Egypt. If it were implemented, the Romanians, Moldovans and Bulgarians would go to Russia, and Greece was planned to be declared a republic under the protection of four allied powers with the expectation that the Greeks themselves would soon come under the scepter of the Russian emperor.

Then Russia would become a natural center uniting Orthodox and Slavic peoples, and, accordingly, would ensure dominance in Europe. Thus, Rostopchin’s geopolitical ideas were based on the idea of ​​an Orthodox civilization, the population of which would be predominantly Slavic.

Responsibilities Fedora Rostopchina at that time they were diverse and were not limited to the conduct of foreign policy affairs alone. Thus, being also the director of the postal department, he provided great support to the development of a network of postal stations in the country. In addition, Rostopchin contributed to the approval by the emperor of the Regulations for churches and monasteries of the Catholic Church in Russia, which dealt a tangible blow to the activities of the Jesuits. Even earlier, he managed to achieve a ban on holding congresses of the Catholic clergy.

Rostopchinskaya breed

But despite all the indisputable services of Fyodor Rostopchin to the emperor, in February 1801 he was subjected to disgrace. Rostopchin's removal was organized by Count Peter Alekseevich Palen, the capital's military governor, who, preparing a conspiracy against Paul I, removed from the road those who could interfere with the implementation of his plans. Just before his death, the emperor sent a dispatch to Rostopchin: “I need you, come quickly.” He immediately set off, but before reaching Moscow, he received news that Pavel had passed away, and returned to his estate near Moscow.

Fedor Rostopchin openly condemned Alexander I for participating in the coup that led to the death of his father, and categorically did not accept liberal projects related to the activities of the so-called Secret Committee, as well as Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky. As a result, during the reign of Alexander I, he was in disgrace for a long time. Until 1810 he lived mostly on his Voronovo estate. Rostopchin criticized the authorities and society for their commitment to liberal reforms, moral degradation, the cultivation of the ideas of rationalism and cosmopolitanism, the prosperity of Freemasonry, the lack of order in all spheres of public life, etc.

"During the French Revolution
shoemakers and rag-pickers wanted to become counts and princes; Our counts and princes wanted to become rag-pickers and shoemakers.”

In the village he got carried away using the latest methods farming: he began to experiment in this area, use new tools and fertilizers, specially ordered purebred cattle from England and Holland, ordered machines and agronomists, and created an agricultural school. He managed to achieve significant success: for example, a breed of horses was bred, which was called the Rostopchinsky. But gradually the count became increasingly disillusioned with Western European methods and became a defender of traditional Russian agriculture.

In 1806 he published the brochure “The Plow and the Plow.” In it, Rostopchin, being quite an effective owner for his time, noted that he was definitely positive in Russian conditions The introduction of only some Western European agricultural implements, in particular the threshing machine and the plow, can be considered. In general, in his opinion, these innovations were more harmful than useful; he associated them with the frivolous fashion of Russian landowners, which he placed “among the amusements inherent in wealth and luxury.” “Because it is no more useful than horn music, the Anglinsky Garden, racehorses, colonnades with pediments, hound hunting and the serf theater,” the author of the brochure emphasized.

In fact, Rostopchin was one of the first to talk about Russian identity from the point of view of economic development, insisting that farming and agriculture should be carried out taking into account the geoclimatic and historical characteristics of Russia.

“Heal Russia from the infection”

In 1805–1807 Russian empire becomes a key participant in unsuccessful anti-Napoleonic coalitions, which led to military defeats and the signing of the shameful Peace of Tilsit. In December 1806, Rostopchin sent a letter to Alexander I, in which he called on the emperor to expel most of the French from the country: “Heal Russia from the infection and, leaving only the spiritual, order to send abroad a host of cunning villains, whose harmful influence is destroying the minds and souls of our foolish subjects.” .

During this period, Fyodor Rostopchin was one of the leaders in the fight against noble hallomania. In 1807, his pamphlet “Thoughts Out Loud on the Red Porch” was published, which was a resounding success in society. It was a kind of manifesto of emerging Russian nationalism. The work had not only an anti-Napoleonic, but also an anti-French orientation: “Lord have mercy! Will this ever end? How long will we have to be monkeys? Isn’t it time to come to your senses, come to your senses, say a prayer and, spitting, say to the Frenchman: “Get lost, you devilish obsession! Go to hell or home, it doesn’t matter, just don’t be in Rus'.”

Battle of Rymnik on September 11, 1789. I. Mark. Engraving from the late 18th century. Courtesy of M. Zolotarev

The reason for such harsh judgments and attacks was the bloody experience of France, which struggled for almost two decades in the convulsions of revolution, terror and wars of conquest - starting in 1789. Count Rostopchin wrote about the French in a special, “folk” language: “What the damned have done in these twenty years! Everything was destroyed, burned and destroyed. First they began to speculate, then argue, scold, fight; nothing was left in place, the law was trampled, the authorities were destroyed, the temples were desecrated, the king was executed, but what a king! - father. Heads were chopped off like cabbage; everyone commanded - now this or that villain. They thought that this was equality and freedom, but no one dared to open their mouth or show their nose, and the trial was worse than Shemyakin. There were only two definitions: either in a noose or under a knife. It seemed too little to cut, shoot, drown, torture, fry and eat our own people; they turned to their neighbors and began to rob and strangle them,<…>saying: “You’ll say thank you later.” And there Bonaparte appeared,<…>shushed, and everything fell silent. He drove the Senate around, took everything into his hands, harnessed the military, the secular, and the spiritual, and began to drive all three. At first they began to grumble, then whisper, then shake their heads, and finally shout: “Sabbath republic!” Let's crown Bonaparte, and then it's time for him. So he became the head of the French, and again everyone became free and equal, that is, to cry and groan; and he, like a mad cat, began to rush from corner to corner and is still in a fume. What a surprise: they heated it hot, but soon closed it. The revolution is a fire, France is a firebrand, and Bonaparte is a poker.”

Leader of the "Russian Party"

Denouncing the gallomania of society, Rostopchin pointed to the need to look for role models in his own Russian national experience: “What do we not have? Everything is or can be. A merciful sovereign, a generous nobility, a rich merchant class, and a hardworking people.<…>And what great people there were and are! Warriors: Shuisky, Golitsyn, Menshikov, Sheremetev, Rumyantsev, Orlov and Suvorov; saviors of the Fatherland: Pozharsky and Minin; Moscow: Eropkin; heads of the clergy: Filaret, Hermogenes, Prokopovich and Plato; a great woman in deeds and mind - Dashkova; ministers: Panin, Shakhovskoy, Markov; writers: Lomonosov, Sumarokov, Kheraskov, Derzhavin, Karamzin, Neledinsky, Dmitriev and Bogdanovich. They all knew and know French, but none of them tried to know it better than Russian.”

“Thoughts Out Loud” was published in a circulation of 7 thousand copies, unheard of at that time. The publication made Rostopchin one of the most authoritative leaders of the “Russian party”, which took a harsh anti-French and anti-liberal position. He viewed Gallomania as a kind of spiritual capitulation to France on the eve of the great war with Napoleon. In fact, Rostopchin became - along with G.R. Derzhavin, N.M. Karamzin and A.S. Shishkov- one of the founding fathers of Russian conservatism, the beginnings of which, already in the period of its inception, were fully consistent with the later formula of Count S.S. Uvarova: “Orthodoxy. Autocracy. Nationality."

A caricature of the political situation in Europe at the end of the 18th century Ainsi va le monde (translated from French - “That’s the way the world is”). In an open carriage sit the seven monarchs of Europe; the carriage is pulled by the Austrian emperor; Marie Antoinette holds him back; Louis XVI puts his stick in the wheel; the Swedish king sits in the coachmen; Catherine II stands on a carriage with a long whip in her hand; The English Prime Minister looks at everything from the top of a cliff in telescope. The Pope has just left St. Peter's Basilica with his congregation and is blessing this train.

The main center of the “Russian party” was the Tver salon of Alexander I’s beloved sister, Grand Duchess Ekaterina Pavlovna, who opposed the liberal aspirations of her royal brother and Mikhail Speransky. After the publication of “Thoughts Out Loud,” the author of the pamphlet became a welcome guest in the salon of the “Tver demigoddess” (as Karamzin put it). Ekaterina Pavlovna set herself the task of bringing Fyodor Rostopchin closer to the emperor. In November 1809, Alexander visited his sister in Tver and had a long conversation with the count. The results of this conversation were immediate. On February 24, 1810, Rostopchin was appointed chief chamberlain.

“Isn’t it time to come to your senses, come to your senses and say to the Frenchman: “Get lost, you devilish obsession! Go to hell or home, it doesn’t matter, just don’t be in Rus'.”

In 1811, he prepared and, through Ekaterina Pavlovna, handed over to the emperor a “Note on the Martinists.” Briefly outlining the history of Russian Freemasonry, the count argued that ordinary members of Masonic lodges were victims of deception: they “hoped to acquire the kingdom of heaven, where they would be directly led by their leaders, who preached to them fasting, prayer, alms and humility, appropriating their wealth, with the aim of purifying souls and detaching them from earthly goods.” According to Rostopchin, the patron of the Freemasons during the reign of Alexander I was Speransky, “who, not adhering to any sect in his soul, perhaps even any religion, uses their services to direct affairs and keeps them dependent on himself.”

Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky (1772–1839). Courtesy of M. Zolotarev

Rostopchin expressed confidence that “Napoleon, who directs everything towards achieving his goals, patronizes them and will someday find strong support in this society, which is as worthy of contempt as it is dangerous.” Moreover, he warned that the leaders of the Russian Freemasons “set themselves the goal of producing a revolution in order to play a prominent role in it, like the scoundrels who ruined France and paid own life for the troubles they caused." Based on the foregoing, Rostopchin insisted on the need to take “strict measures against society, which with its mystery should attract the attention of the government and encourage its new dissolution.” The “Note on the Martinists” was directed primarily against Mikhail Speransky, in whose disgrace Rostopchin played a well-known role.

Moscow Commander-in-Chief

Shortly before the start of the Patriotic War, Ekaterina Pavlovna ensured that Rostopchin was promoted to infantry general and appointed Moscow governor-general, and soon Moscow commander-in-chief. Thus, Alexander I wanted to enlist the support of the “Russian party” at a critical moment for Russia. Count Rostopchin, along with everything else, was entrusted with the task of developing patriotic sentiments in Moscow: “to influence the minds of the people, arouse indignation in them and prepare them for all sacrifices to save the fatherland.”

To fulfill this mission, Rostopchin issued so-called posters informing the people and explaining the events taking place in the country. Such publications were unprecedented at that time, and they had a strong influence on the population. They were called posters because they were distributed from house to house like theater ones. These were also a kind of “thoughts out loud”, written in the bright “folk” style characteristic of Rostopchin. So the commander-in-chief wanted to reassure the Muscovites, instill in them confidence in the strength of the Russian army, to show that “the Poles, Tatars and Swedes were more powerful than your French, and our old men pumped them out so much that to this day the circle of Moscow is surrounded by mounds like mushrooms, and there are their bones under the mushrooms.”

Archpriest of the Cavalry Regiment Gratinsky, serving a prayer service in the presence of the French in the parish church of St. Euplaus in Moscow on September 15, 1812. Engraving II half. 19th century

Rostopchin consciously sought to embellish the news of the victories of the Russian troops, smooth out reports of defeats, trying to prevent the occurrence of unrest and looting, the spread of panic and defeatist sentiments. Among the common people, among the townspeople and merchants, the posters were read with delight: “his words were after the hearts of the Russian people.” But as for the nobles, the attitude towards them was ambiguous. Poet Mikhail Alexandrovich Dmitriev, calling them “a masterful, inimitable thing,” wrote that the count was then “blamed by the public: the posters seemed like boasting, and their language seemed indecent.”

Played a significant role Fedor Rostopchin in creating a people's militia and collecting donations for the needs of the army. He headed the committee for organizing the militia in Moscow and the nearest six provinces: Tver, Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Ryazan, Kaluga and Tula. In addition to the formation of the militia, the Moscow commander-in-chief was in charge of supplying the Russian army, which was retreating to the ancient capital, and accommodating and treating the wounded. Alexander I also instructed Rostopchin to personally deal with the issue of construction according to the adventurer’s design Franz Leppich“secret weapon” - a balloon from which incendiary shells were supposed to be dropped on the French. This event turned out to be fruitless, although a lot of money was spent on it.

Fire of 1812

Fyodor Rostopchin is usually accused of restraining the population leaving the city, of late and incomplete removal of state property, of irrational use transport. However, all this was primarily due to the fact that Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov Until September 1, 1812, he assured the count of the impossibility of surrendering Moscow.

On September 2, the day the Russian troops abandoned the ancient capital, the merchant’s son was executed by order of Rostopchin Mikhail Vereshchagin: he was handed over to the crowd. Previously, he was arrested for distributing “proclamations” translated into Russian - “a letter from Napoleon to the Prussian king” and “a speech made by Napoleon before the princes of the Rhine League in Dresden”, which contained anti-Russian statements and stated that in less than six months Bonaparte would take over both Russian capitals. In fact, Napoleon did not pronounce or write such speeches and letters: these were texts that Vereshchagin himself most likely fabricated. The public execution, caused by emergency circumstances, was later used by opponents of the Moscow commander-in-chief in order to compromise him in the eyes of the tsar and noble society. In fairness, it should be noted that Rostopchin really significantly exceeded his powers, since the Senate sentenced Vereshchagin not to death penalty, and to punishment with a whip and exile to Siberia.

The French in Moscow in 1812. Lithograph of Herman from the original by A. Adam. Courtesy of M. Zolotarev

On the night of September 3, after the French entered Moscow, a huge fire broke out, lasting for several days and destroying nine-tenths of the city. Due to a number of circumstances, Rostopchin hid his decisive role in this event until the end of his life. Nowadays, most historians, and various directions and political convictions, they are inclined to believe that it was he who prepared all the conditions for this action: he equipped a small team of police arsonists and took them out of the city necessary tools to extinguish a fire. The burning of Moscow had enormous strategic and moral significance: it influenced the entire further course of the war. Napoleon could not find here either housing or food for his soldiers, as well as a sufficient number of traitors and traitors to demoralize Russian society, the army and the people. And this is the merit of Rostopchin.

Over the next two years, the count remained at the post of Moscow commander-in-chief. His service took place exclusively difficult conditions. He was accused of burning Moscow and destroying the property of many families. During these years, he was engaged in restoration, removal from the city and burial of a huge number of dead, and organizing assistance to residents affected by the fire.

Mayor Fyodor Rostopchin looks at burning Moscow. Caricature by an unknown artist from the 1810s. Courtesy of M. Zolotarev

On August 30, 1814, Rostopchin was dismissed and appointed a member of the State Council. The family life of the former mayor was overshadowed by the fact that his wife and daughter converted to Catholicism, and a few years after the war, the latter left Russia completely, becoming a famous writer in France under the name Countess de Segur. This turned out to be a tragedy for Rostopchin, who spent his entire life fighting Catholic proselytism in Russia.

IN last years he spent a lot of time abroad undergoing treatment there. The count returned to his homeland only a couple of years before his death. Tormented by illnesses, removed from political activity, Fyodor Rostopchin did not lose his presence of mind and often responded to current events with witty aphorisms. His response to the Decembrist uprising is widely known: “In the era of the French Revolution, shoemakers and rag-pickers wanted to become counts and princes; Our counts and princes wanted to become rag-pickers and shoemakers.” A few weeks later, on January 18, 1826, Rostopchin died.

Of all the Moscow governors-general, active, idle, lazy, stupid and educated, Muscovites most often remember Count Rostopchin, who, having served as the military governor of Moscow for two years, left behind extremely strong memories.

Characteristics of F.V. There are very different types of Rostopchin, some talk about his passionate and manic nature, others - about vanity and bile, others - about courage and honesty, but essentially they have one thing in common: they all highlight the speed and sharpness of his mind, as well as a certain “duality” his nature - he was both Russian and French at the same time, moreover, coming from a Tatar family. P.A. Vyazemsky in his memoir notes describes Rostopchin as follows: “He was a native Russian, a true Muscovite, but also a born Parisian. The spirit, valor and prejudices were from the temperament from which the Pozharskys and Minins could appear at a given moment; With his mentality and wit, he was a real Frenchman. He hated the French and scolded them in purely French...”

Moreover, the same P.A. Vyazemsky cites the following dialogue that took place between Paul I and Rostopchin: the emperor asked why Rostopchin, although of Tatar origin, was not a prince. To which the latter replied: “But because my ancestor moved to Russia in the winter. The tsars granted princely dignity to the famous Tatar newcomers in summer, and fur coats to winter ones.” Under one of his portraits, Rostopchin left an inscription in French:
I was born a Tatar
And he wanted to become a Roman;
The French made me a barbarian
And the Russians - Georges Dandin.

As always, the caustic historian E.V. Tarle gives Rostopchin an unflattering description: “He was a man of a quick and undisciplined mind, a wit (not always successful), a loud joker, a fanfare, proud and self-confident, without any special abilities or calling for anything.”

Posters
Of course, the most famous part of the activities of the new governor-general was the distribution of leaflets with appeals to the people, the full title of which was “Posters of 1812, or friendly messages from the commander-in-chief in Moscow to its inhabitants.” In the summer of 1812, Rostopchin began distributing posters (they were hung on the streets). The frequency of publication of posters depended on the severity of the political moment: most often they appeared immediately before the surrender of Moscow, full of pathos that the capital must be protected and under no circumstances surrender it to the enemy. After the surrender of Moscow, Rostopchin released a poster intended for residents of the Moscow province, but then a long forced silence ensued due to the long absence of most of the audience of this periodical.

The very first poster set the tone for the entire enterprise: before us is a popular print of a certain “Moscow tradesman who was in the warriors, Karnyushka Chikhirin,” a collective image, falling out of a tavern in a drunken state and threatening the French from there. The comedy lies in the fact that this supposedly common drunken talk is composed by Rostopchin, who, according to Tarle’s caustic remark, at home with his wife, a French Catholic, “speaked only French, he also spoke French with his friends, he did not know Russian literature at all.” , and although he died in 1826, there is no sign that he suspected, for example, the existence of Pushkin or Zhukovsky.” Tarle continues the passage with the remark that these “ridiculous posters” did not make the slightest impression on the people. It must be said that the Russian people, according to Tarle, paid little attention to anything at all. For example, the story of the hot air balloon, the appearance of which Rostopchin foreshadows in one of his posters, also amazingly “passed by” Muscovites.

Before the surrender of Moscow, Rostopchin writes posters every day, or even several times a day, reporting peculiar reports from the battlefields, according to which for one killed Russian there are at least 600 killed Frenchmen, and also very peculiarly calming and encouraging the townspeople, for example, with the following maxims : “His Serene Highness says that he will defend Moscow to the last drop of blood and is ready to fight even in the streets. You, brothers, don’t look at the fact that the offices have been closed: things need to be tidied up; and we will deal with the villain in our court!”

In addition to publishing posters, Rostopchin also invented another seemingly effective means: he took the habit of walking around Moscow, talking to people. True, he himself wrote about the failure of his enterprise: “You have to be very careful with these people, because no one has a large stock of common sense like a Russian person, and they often made such comments and questions that would complicate even a diplomat, the most experienced in disputes of words."

The poster, published after the surrender of Moscow and addressed to the residents of the Moscow province (dated September 20), by its existence refutes Tarle’s words that Rostopchin knew nothing about Russian literature. This poster is written in a completely different style, not “popular”, it is imbued with patriotic pathos - to create this effect, Rostopchin seems to be turning to the rhetoric of the then fashionable work “The Tale of Igor’s Campaign,” discovered and published by Musin-Pushkin at the turn of the century. By the way, the original “Lay” burned in that very fire in Moscow, which gave researchers reason to doubt the authenticity of the work. The epithets used by Rostopchin (“let his warriors loose like fierce beasts,” “bitter tears will pour out to the fierce wolf”), the rhetorical image of the enemy (“the villainous Frenchman is an unbaptized enemy”) - everything refers to speech features"Words". Here's a revealing quote:
“We will destroy the enemy’s strength, we will bury them in Holy Rus', we will begin to beat them wherever we meet. There are very few of them left, and there are forty million of us people, flocking from all sides like a flock of eagles. We will exterminate the overseas reptile and give their bodies to the wolves and crows; and Moscow will be decorated again.”

“The Vereshchagin Case” and flight from Moscow
Of course, for the information war a demonstrative case was needed, it was the Vereshchagin case: a merchant son who was friends with the son of postal director Klyucharev, allegedly looking through secret documents, intended for the government, “translated into Russian two newspaper reports about Napoleon, namely: a letter to the Prussian king and Napoleon’s speech to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine in Dresden.” In fact, Napoleon did not write this letter and did not make such a speech; it was not political, but rather literary event, since the authorship of the documents belongs to Vereshchagin himself. This, however, did not prevent Governor General Klyucharev from being expelled from the capital, and Vereshchagin being accused of treason and imprisoned for the time being.

Count Rostopchin and merchant son Vereshchagin in the courtyard of the governor's house in Moscow. Hood. A. Kivshenko. 1893

Fyodor Vasilyevich remembered the unfortunate Vereshchagin at a critical moment for himself - when he needed to appease the angry crowd that did not let the governor-general out of the house. Karolina Pavlova, from the words of her father K. Janisch, wrote about this: “The embittered mob rushed to the governor-general’s house, shouting that they had deceived them, that Moscow was being betrayed to the enemy. The crowd grew larger, became more and more enraged and began to call the Governor-General to account. rose shout: “Let him come to us! Otherwise we’ll get to him!” Rostopchin went out to the people, who “met him with angry exclamations.” Surprisingly, this critical moment indirectly proves the popularity of Rostopchin’s posters, a certain mocking success of his information war, refuting Tarle’s words that no one paid “the slightest attention” to the posters. In order to divert the attention of the crowd from his own person, Rostopchin ordered Vereshchagin and the Frenchman Mouton to be brought from prison, ordering the first to be hacked to death with sabers and thrown half-dead to the crowd, later presenting this murder as a popular reprisal against a “villain”, and the second to be released “so that he could tell the French how it is with us.” deal with traitors." The act is completely Machiavellian.

The story of the fire
Another dark spot on Rostopchin’s biography is the story of the burning of Moscow after the French entered the city. Many French memoirists assured that the Russians, on orders from the Governor General, deliberately launched incendiary rockets from the outskirts. How they knew this is a secondary question, but in any case the accusation is very serious.

Count Rostopchin (watching the fire of Moscow): “Everything is going like clockwork” (English caricature)

Three weeks before the French entered Moscow, Rostopchin wrote to Bagration the following: “I cannot imagine that the enemy could come to Moscow. Whenever it happens that you retreat to Vyazma, then I will begin the administration of all state things and will give everyone the freedom to get out, and the people here, out of loyalty to the sovereign and the fatherland, will decisively die at the walls of Moscow, and if God does not help them in their good enterprise, then, following the Russian rule: do not get it from the villain, he will turn the city into ashes, and Napoleon will receive instead of booty the place where the capital was. It’s not a bad idea to let him know about this, so that he doesn’t count millions and stores of bread, for he will find coal and ash.” Here Rostopchin directly expresses his intention to set fire to Moscow so that it does not fall to the enemy. However, whether the city was really set on fire on Rostopchin’s orders, and if this is true, whether he expected the effect to be produced, remains completely unclear. It should be noted that Fyodor Vasilyevich himself completely denied his guilt, placing it on the French and... M.I. Kutuzov, who actually ordered the removal of fire fighting equipment from Moscow before the retreat.

After the War of 1812, Rostopchin would repeatedly return to the topic of leaving Moscow, painstakingly collecting all the evidence about the fire that happened and pedantically, point by point, refuting them. He even created a table of refutations of Napoleon's bulletins, published during the stay of the French army in Moscow, in which a retaliatory information war was waged against Rostopchin. We can say that both managed to win this information war - each for their own audience. Rostopchin became convinced of the effectiveness of his posters when the people did not allow him to flee Moscow, but he was convinced of the effectiveness of Napoleon’s bulletins throughout his subsequent life, forced, while living in Paris, to write constant excuses.

Chronicle of the day: Napoleon offers peace

The main forces of the Russian troops continued to move west and reached Podolsk.

Meanwhile the avant-garde Great Army crossed the Moscow River at Borovsky Perevoz and followed Cossack brigade Efremov, whom he mistook for the rearguard of the Russian army. Only when they reached Bronnitsy did the French reveal the deceptive maneuver, but the direction of withdrawal of the main Russian forces still remained a mystery to them.

Napoleon, still in Petrovsky Castle, through the head of the Moscow Orphanage, General I.A. Tutolmina turned to Alexander I with proposals for peace. For the next few days, the French emperor will wait for an answer, but it will never come.

Person: Fedor Vasilievich Rostopchin

Fyodor Vasilievich Rostopchin (1763-1826)
The biography of Fyodor Vasilyevich Rostopchin (otherwise - Rastopchin) shows us a typical nobleman-careerist, using family, friendly and official connections to get closer to the court.

Fyodor Vasilyevich was born into the family of an Oryol landowner and captain Vasily Fedorovich Rostopchin, received a good education at home, was enrolled in the Preobrazhensky Regiment at the age of 12, and received the rank of ensign at the age of 19. In his youth, Fyodor Rostopchin traveled extensively throughout Europe, attended lectures at the University of Leipzig, and visited Great Britain and Holland.

Since 1788, thanks to the efforts of his patron, Prince of Schaumburg, he was under A.V. Suvorov, participated in the assault on Ochakov, the battle of Focsani, the battle of Rymnik, and was promoted to captain-lieutenant. In 1790, Rostopchin and his brother went to the Swedish war, but setbacks haunted him: the command remained dissatisfied with him, and his patron died, moreover, during the Swedish campaign, his younger brother also died in a naval battle.

Seeing the futility of his attempts to do military career, Fyodor Rostopchin tries to get into the court, at first also unsuccessfully. As a result, he becomes one of the secretaries at the Iasi Peace Conference with Turkey (1792) with the rank of brigadier and the rank of chamber cadet. This allowed the young nobleman to appear at the empress’s court, from where he, however, was quickly “exiled” to Grand Duke Pavel Petrovich, whose favor Rostopchin managed to win.

After the death of Catherine, Paul I made Fyodor Vasilyevich an aide-de-camp, then a major general and gave him several orders and a large estate in the Oryol province. At court, Rostopchin led with varying degrees of success protracted war with the party of Empress Maria Feodorovna on one side and the strengthened Jesuits on the other.

The peak of Rostopchin's career came in 1798-99, when he received the rank of lieutenant general and the post of first head of the Military Department, and then cabinet minister for foreign affairs. In the foreign policy field, it was through the efforts of Fyodor Vasilyevich that Paul I inclined towards an alliance with republican France against England, as well as the creation of a continental trade union.

After the palace coup of 1801, Rostopchin was dismissed and lived on his estate near Moscow, where he studied literature. In 1809, with the support of Princess Dashkova and the Emperor’s sister F.V. Rostopchin returned to the court and in 1812 received an appointment as governor general in Moscow.

Under Paul I, Fyodor Vasilyevich became a minister; after Paul’s death, Rostopchin was retired for the first ten years of Alexander’s reign; his return to service occurred shortly before the war - in 1810 he became chamberlain and then governor-general of Moscow. He remained in this position until 1814, after which he went to travel around “ new Europe", in order to heal severely damaged health.

Fyodor Vasilyevich lived with his family abroad for eight years and only in 1823 returned to Russia. However, Rostopchin’s health did not allow him to engage in government affairs. In 1825, the beloved daughter of the former governor died, which was a terrible blow for him. F.V. Rostopchin died in early 1826 in Moscow, paralyzed and unable to even speak.