Biography
On his mother's side he was the great-nephew of His Serene Highness Prince A.D. Menshikov; his aunt was the wife of a relative of the imperial family, M.I. Leontyev. Born on September 18, 1718 in Danzig, he spent his childhood in Pernov, where his father Ivan Vasilyevich Panin (1673-1736) was commandant. Brother of General Pyotr Panin, brother-in-law of diplomats I. I. Neplyuev and A. B. Kurakin.
This role of Panin explains both his position throughout the subsequent time among the fighting court parties (he always had to fight against the Orlovs) and his relationship with the empress, which was never sincere and good. Until very recently, he was accused, among other things, of deliberately corrupting Paul and, for his own personal purposes, contributing to the discord between the empress and her son; but from Poroshin’s notes it is clear that he took his task as an educator very seriously.
Foreign policy activities
All issues of foreign policy of the Russian government for the period from to the years are associated with the name of Panin. Having been at first an unofficial adviser to the empress, in 1763, after Vorontsov was sent on leave, he was made a senior member foreign board. Soon after, after Bestuzhev’s removal, he was entrusted with managing all the affairs of the board, although he was never chancellor.
Resolving questions about Russia’s relations with the Northern European states led Panin to create a system of so-called “ Northern Union", or "Northern Accord", which brought upon him the accusation of doctrinaire. With this system, Panin wanted, in order to exalt the prestige and importance of Russia, to create around it an alliance of all the northern powers, to counter the aspirations of the Bourbon and Habsburg dynasties; To this end, he tried - generally unsuccessfully - to unite states whose interests were completely opposite, such as Prussia with England and Saxony.
Performance evaluation
Paul could perpetuate his gratitude to Panin only after the death of Catherine, by erecting a monument to him in the church of St. Magdalene in Pavlovsk. Catherine, comparing P. with Orlov in a letter to Grimm, puts the latter much higher and says that Panin had many major shortcomings, but he knew how to hide them. He was one of the most educated Russian people of his time, so that, according to reviews of foreign ambassadors, “he looked more like a German”; Catherine called him encyclopedia. He was interested in a wide variety of issues in the field state knowledge and was familiar with many classic works of philosophical literature. A humane way of thinking and a strict sense of legality is indicated in eloquent words by one of the people closest to him, the famous Fonvizin; Some free-thinking in matters of faith is evidenced by the fact that, when inviting Plato to Pavel Petrovich as a teacher of the law, Panin was most interested in whether he was superstitious, and in a letter to Vorontsov, who fell ill from fasting, he said that the law does not require ruin health, but the ruin of passions “can hardly be done with mushrooms and turnips alone.” Panin belonged to the Freemasons. There were no two different opinions about his honesty and kindness in his time; even his enemies respected him as a proud and honest person. Of the 9,000 souls he received upon Paul’s marriage, he distributed half to his secretaries, Fonvizin, Ubri and Bakunin. Panin was a sybarite by nature, he loved to live well; according to Bezborodko, he had the best cook in the city; He was not married, but his passion for women was often blamed on him (his bride was Countess Sheremeteva, who died of smallpox). Despite all the varied activities that Panin had to display, he was very lazy and slow: Catherine said that he would die someday from rushing.
Diplomatic and private correspondence with Panin was published in the Collection of Imperial Russian Historical Society" The draft of the Imperial Council is published in the same place, vol. VII. About the Fonvizin project, see “Russian Antiquity” (, No. 12), “Archive of the book. Vorontsov”, “Russian Archive”.
Addresses in St. Petersburg
1773 - 03/31/1783 - house of P.V. Zavadovsky - Bolshaya Morskaya Street, 20.
Literature
- Lebedev, “Counts Panin” (St. Petersburg, );
- Kobeko, “Tsarevich Pavel Petrovich” (St. Petersburg, ) and Ikonnikov’s review of these works in the 28th Uvarov awards; Shumigorsky, “Biography of Maria Feodorovna” (vol. I);
- Chechulin, “Project of the Imperial Council” (“J. Min. Nar. Prosv.”, No. 3);
- his, “Russian Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the Reign of Catherine II” (St. Petersburg, );
- Arnheim, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Nordischen Frage" ("Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft", vol. II, III, IV, V and VII, -);
then general works (Soloviev, “History of Russia”; Bilbasov, “The History of Catherine II”) and all the literature on the history of Russian-Polish and Russian-Prussian relations.
Popular science publications
- Gavryushkin A.V. Count Nikita Panin: From the history of Russian diplomacy of the 18th century. - M.: International relations, 1989. - 176, p. - (From the history of diplomacy). - 50,000 copies. - ISBN 5-7133-0261-7
Notes
Links
- Elizabeth I. Instructions to the Obergoffmeister under His Imperial Highness Grand Duke Pavel Petrovich, Mr. General Lieutenant, Chamberlain and Cavalier Nikita Ivanovich Panin. 1761 / Post. L. N. Trefolev // Russian Archive, 1881. - Book. 1. - Issue. 1. - pp. 17-21.
- Image and characteristics of persons occupying the first and main positions at the St. Petersburg court.(1783) / Publ. N. Grigorovich // Russian Archive, 1875. - Book. 2. - Issue. 6. - pp. 113-125.
- Panin N. I. The most humble presentation of a weak concept and opinion about the education of His Imperial Highness, Sovereign Grand Duke Pavel Petrovich. Note from Count N.I. Panin. 1760 / Report. T. A. Sosnovsky // Russian antiquity, 1882. - T. 35. - No. 11. - P. 313-320.
Educator of Emperor Paul I. Rod. September 18, 1718 in Danzig, where his father at that time served in the commissariat department; died on March 31, 1783. The first years of his childhood, about which we know almost nothing, were spent by Panin in the German town of Pernov, Revel province, where his father, Ivan Vasilyevich, was at one time the commandant.
Start official activities N.I. Panin dates back to the reign of Anna Ioannovna: in 1740 he was promoted from sergeant of the horse guard to cornet.
Some messages that have reached us from foreign residents at the St. Petersburg court from 1743 give reason to assume that already in the first years of Elizabeth’s reign N.I. played a well-known role at court: he was, to some extent, even a dangerous rival of Razumovsky and I. . I. Shuvalov, which explains the subsequent appointment of a completely young man as envoy to Denmark. In 1747, N.I. went to his post through Dresden, in Berlin he introduced himself to Frederick II, and in Hamburg he received news of his appointment as chamberlain.
But in the same year he was moved from Copenhagen to Stockholm, where he stayed for almost 12 years. The position of the Russian envoy in Sweden at that time was very difficult: the task of Russian policy was, as is known, to prevent by all possible means the restoration of autocracy there, and it was necessary to constant struggle against representatives French government.
Panin, from the very beginning of his stay in Stockholm, was aware of the difficulty of his position and the uselessness of the long-winded declarations that he had to present to the Swedish government; He more than once asked for his recall, but was refused in the most flattering terms.
His position became especially difficult after the death of the king (1751), when France and Prussia sought to conclude an alliance with Sweden against Russia.
Hatred towards the Russian envoy at that time reached such a point that when, during the terrible Stockholm fires of 1751, people began to shout about the arsonists, Panin’s name was repeatedly mentioned. The subsequent complete revolution in the political relations of Europe (the rapprochement between Russia and France and the Anglo-Prussian Convention) completely changed the conditions in which Panin had to act; in addition, the struggle that was being waged at the St. Petersburg court against Chancellor Bestuzhev was not slow to affect his position.
Bestuzhev patronized Panin, and therefore the latter had powerful enemies at court in the person of Count. Vorontsov and I.I. Shuvalov.
Giving justice to Panin’s reports, Bestuzhev more than once informed him that they “aroused more malicious than prudent critics.” In 1756, Yaguzhinsky, son-in-law of I. I. Shuvalov, arrived in Stockholm on a special assignment.
In letters to Bestuzhev, Panin complained that Yaguzhinsky was very secretive with him, that through his translator he was inquiring about Panin’s acquaintances, about his correspondence with him, Bestuzhev, etc. When Panin, who, like other Russian envoys, found it difficult immediately enter into friendly relations with representatives of France, tried to prove the unprofitability of an alliance with this power, he received an angry rescript from St. Petersburg, corrected by the hand of Vorontsov himself: Panin’s “spontaneous” reasoning, as can be seen from this document, entailed a strict order that “he , according to his most submissive position, henceforth he reasoned and acted about matters with greater prudence and in accordance with our intentions.” Panin, convinced that the College “had firmly decided to eradicate him,” and depressed by financial worries, wrote that he would consider himself happy “if the opportunity presented itself to rid himself of everything by an honest death”; nevertheless, even after this letter to Bestuzhev, he remained in Sweden for almost three more years.
When, after the overthrow of Bestuzhev (1758), Vorontsov began to manage foreign affairs with the help of Shuvalov, Panin’s position became completely impossible; but on June 29, 1760, he was completely unexpectedly appointed to Bekhteev’s place as tutor to Grand Duke Pavel Petrovich and chief chamberlain to his imperial highness.
Given the influence that Panin’s enemies enjoyed at that time, this purpose always seemed incomprehensible, and one can hardly be satisfied with the explanation that “Elizabeth did not like to take away the activities of people who were outstanding for their abilities.” Be that as it may, Panin’s new appointment had a decisive influence on his entire career.
Having become familiar with the state of affairs upon his arrival in Petersburg in 1760, Panin immediately took the side of Catherine.
His rapprochement with Grand Duchess The closeness of Catherine with Bestuzhev, known to him, of course, contributed to this, as well as his position as Pavel’s teacher. Therefore, when, shortly before the death of Elizabeth, I. I. Shuvalov turned to Panin with the words that everyone was convinced of Peter’s inability, but some wanted to expel both himself and his wife from Russia, and establish a government in the name of Pavel Petrovich, while others - to expel only Peter alone, Panin categorically refused to cooperate under the pretext that “all such intrigues are ways to internecine destruction,” and reported these conversations to Catherine.
According to Solovyov’s assumption, this refusal followed only because Panin could suspect the insincerity of the proposals coming from people who disliked him. Indeed, already at that time the enemies, according to him in my own words, tried to deprive him of his importance by removing the crown prince from his post as tutor, and for this purpose they offered him the position of vice-chancellor.
The accession of Peter III to the throne brought Panin even closer to Catherine.
Panin’s personal relationship with the new emperor, who insulted him even on the eve of his accession to the throne, could not be good.
Peter, although he not only left Panin as Paul’s tutor, but also granted him (April 6, 1762) the rank of actual Privy Councilor and (May 2, 1762) the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called, however, did not trust him, which is why he always had one of the emperor’s adjutants with him, and Panin’s position was not strong: he was in danger of being sent again to Sweden, where he had to, together with the Prussian envoy, take care of restoration of autocracy, which he himself had previously fought against by all means.
The idea of the need for a change in government was then spreading more and more at court, but the views on this subject of Grand Duchess Ekaterina Alekseevna and Panin were different: “Panin,” as the empress herself later said, “wanted the coup to take place in favor of my son.” . There is news, although not entirely definite, that Panin’s aspirations even then went further than simply replacing Catherine with Paul.
Princess Dashkova says, for example, that when she spoke to Nikita Panin about the need for a change on the throne, he, agreeing with her, added that it would also be a good idea to establish a government form on the basis of the Swedish monarchy.
Despite, however, Panin’s intentions, known to Catherine, he not only retained his position under Pavel Petrovich, but acquired even greater importance, becoming one of the empress’s closest advisers.
But if Panin’s plans regarding the elevation of Pavel Petrovich to the throne did not come true, then he, in any case, did not abandon, as it seems, the idea of introducing greater regularity in government.
Already in the manifesto of June 6, the Empress most solemnly promised with the imperial word “to legitimize such government regulations, according to which the government of our dear fatherland, in its strength and within its borders, would have its course,” and already in August, if not earlier, Panin presented her with an extensive project concerning the reform of the supreme government.
This project, which perfectly expresses Panin’s views, especially deserves detailed consideration.
The Senate, which has all judicial seats under its control, is forced, as he noted, to be guided by the laws and statutes issued in different times and, “perhaps, for the most part, the most harmful, that is, when, at the insistence of the occasion, what was in demand.
The Senate cannot ensure that the natural changes of times, circumstances and things are always turned to the benefit of the state,” since its first rule is “to observe the course of the case and carry out what belongs to it, according to the force of the laws and statutes issued for each judicial investigation! .. The Senate decides cases not only according to laws issued at different times, but sometimes hastily, imprudently and even biasedly... All affairs of different state parts are carried out in their own boards and orders, even more with the supervision of one order, and the Senate does not can serve as a unifying institution. “From this,” Panin continues, “and especially from the power of legislation and autocracy, it goes without saying that the main true and general care for the entire state is confined to the person of the sovereign.
There is no way, however, that he can put it into useful action except by dividing it rationally between a certain small number of single persons chosen." Then proving the failure of all previous attempts to create such a higher institution in which legislative activity would be concentrated, Panin especially dwells in detail on the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna, to which he gives very sharp criticism.
And in the formerly supreme places, “the election of persons to them was turned to ranks, to noble origin and distinction to episodic people.” The Elizabethan House Study finally turned into “a home, not a state place, which was used by the fitful people of that time for their own whims and their own views.” It was this place that was disastrous for the state and harmful for the sovereign himself, whose name always covered the “epileptic people.” “In this situation, the state remained truly without general state care.
The sovereign was distant from the government.
Great and random gentlemen had no limits to their aspirations and further plans; The Elizabethan conference did not improve matters either - a “monster conference”, since the favorite remained the soul that gives life or kills the state: it was a whim the only rule, according to which cases were selected for proceedings. “Yes, otherwise,” Panin ends, “it is impossible to be where in the supreme sovereign place there are state parts without division, and none of which are particularly entrusted to anyone.” The main reason for all the troubles and the disastrous order described is, according to Panin, that “in the production of affairs, the power of persons has always acted more than the power of state places, and there was a lack of such initial foundations of government that could firmly preserve its form.” “It is necessary, therefore,” he says, “to establish by form the state’s supreme place of legislation or legislation, from which, as from a single sovereign, and from a single place, the monarch’s own life-giving will will flow and which will protect the autocratic power from the sometimes hidden abductors of it.” Such a place was the Imperial Council designed by Panin, whose competence would include all matters that, according to the charters, belonged to the state and, in essence, autocratic power.
The Council would consist of no more than eight and no less than six members and would be divided into 4 departments: foreign affairs, internal, military and secular, each of which would be controlled by one of the members of the Council called the Secretary of State or Minister ; These ministers could, however, be appointed from outside the Council members, the number of which would remain unchanged even with such an appointment from outside.
In the meetings of the Council, which would take place five times a week in the presence of the emperor, “each minister in his department proposes matters belonging to his report and the highest imperial decision,” and “the imperial advisers stipulate these with their opinions and reasoning, and we, by our autocratic command define our latest resolution.
Any new legislation, act, resolution, manifesto, charter, patent, which the sovereigns themselves register, must be signed by the civil minister in whose department the matter was carried out, so that the public can distinguish them. Nothing can come from the Council other than with the monarch’s own handwritten signature, and only in cases of unimportant requests and information on matters are they signed by one of the members of the Council or the ruler of his office." In addition to the establishment of the Council, Panin proposed some changes in the establishment of the Senate, to which he wanted to provide the right “to have the freedom to submit to the Highest commands, if in their execution they can oppress our state laws or the well-being of our people.” “There are, as you know,” Panin wrote to the empress at the end of the memo, “there are persons who.” For the special types and reasons known to them, such a new order of the government is disgusting; Therefore, the matter requires special royal care and chaste firmness, so that the Council immediately takes its form and is brought into flow and so that it does not have to soon, as happened before, again corrupt the established." The history of this project, however, is rather sad.
Catherine, who, as we know, promised, as we know, within a week of her accession to the throne “to legitimize such state institutions according to which the government of our fatherland would have its own course within its strength and within its borders” and who herself entrusted Panin with drawing up the project, seemed to consider the question the establishment of the Council was a settled matter, since in the draft manifesto on the return of Bestuzhev he was appointed “the first adviser to the newly established Imperial Council at the court”; but in the printed manifesto of August 31, this place was already excluded, and Catherine invited several people to express their views on the project.
One of the authors (the editor of volume VII of the "Collection of the Historical Society" assumes Bestuzhev in it) saw a danger in that point of the establishment of the Senate, which seemed to him "to have the freedom of Her Imperial Majesty to represent Her Majesty's own orders." Feldzeichmeister Vilboa believed that the author of the project, under the guise of protecting the monarchy, was thus leaning more toward aristocratic rule. “At least,” he said, “if there is an intention for such a reorganization, then the Imperial Council would seem to be the first step towards that.” It cannot be said that the Council designed by Panin was an institution pleasing to the Empress.
Already the memorandum presented by N.I. Panin during the project is all imbued with a passionate desire to destroy arbitrariness, eliminate the possibility of the influence of favoritism and establish such a “firm form of government” in which the state was governed “not by the will of individuals, but by the power of public places.” But, besides this, it is impossible not to admit that the State Council, legitimized by its form, without the knowledge, without whose signature, not a single act of the supreme will could be issued, consultation with which was obligatory - both in itself, and, in particular, according to Compared to the order of the era of “episode people”, it was an institution that was very inconvenient for representatives of power, and the right of the Senate to represent the highest commands, projected by Panin, was granted to the Senate several dozen years later, at the beginning of the 19th century, even then it aroused fears among defenders of the inviolability of autocratic power and therefore was soon cancelled.
The private secret Council established by Catherine no longer had the same significance that the Council and Senate designed by Panin could have acquired, and since the establishment of such a Council did not achieve the main goal of Panin’s project - “the establishment of the government on the firm and indispensable foundations of the law,” it is not surprising that he was unhappy with him. In any case, Panin was defeated this time; On December 28, the manifesto on the establishment of the Imperial Council and the division of the Senate into departments was already signed by the Empress, but then the sheet was torn and the Council was not established.
The only question that requires explanation is how Panin, with such aspirations on his part, could, almost until his death, occupy such a prominent position at court. The main reason for Panin’s influence was, undoubtedly, the importance that he could have as the educator of Tsarevich Paul and which should have been especially great due to the special circumstances that accompanied Catherine’s accession to the throne, and the relations that then existed between the empress and her son: both Panin himself, and the empress, and all the people around them connected, as we see, Panin’s importance with his role as the Tsarevich’s educator.
N.I.’s activities as a teacher caused a lot of criticism in the literature.
Starting from Lebedev and ending with Mr. Shumigorsky, everyone reproached him for not only being careless in the upbringing of the heir, but deliberately corrupting him and, because of his personal goals, promoting discord between the empress and her son. It seems to us that the view of Prof. Ikonnikov, who pointed out (in a review of Kobeko’s work) the fact that, by carefully studying “Panin’s Opinions on the Education of Grand Duke Pavel Petrovich” and Poroshin’s notes, it is necessary to come to the conviction that Panin correctly understood his purpose and, to the best of his ability, opportunity, performed his duties conscientiously.
He proposed to remove from the Grand Duke “all excess, splendor and luxury that tempt youth”; demanded that the gentlemen appointed in the service of His Imperial Highness should all be of “noble sentiments, good morals and customs,” but as, according to him, the last two qualities are rarely directly revealed in the general circulation of services and acquaintances, for their effect is greater (see ) in their families and between households, rather than in the general theater, for this reason it would be more useful for His Highness if at first no ranks were assigned to those positions, but it is enough to determine a salary sufficient for that." In particular, Panin objected to any premature caresses.
In the same way, Panin’s accusations that, when raising Pavel Petrovich, he paid little attention to his study of his fatherland, allowed ridicule of everything Russian, that he even corrupted the crown prince, are hardly founded.
Placing the study of history at the forefront, Panin added that in this case one should pay attention “preferably to one’s own fatherland.” He further pointed out the need for “a good study of our language, the success of which Lomonosov and Sumarokov greatly contributed to,” and advised to maintain the purity of speech. On the contrary, the “Education Plan” compiled by Panin indicates the comprehensiveness of his education; the very method of teaching adopted by Poroshin, and with which he fully sympathized, was proposed by Panin; Poroshin himself, finally, notes with particular pleasure those conversations and instructions that could, in his opinion, have a moral influence on the Tsarevich’s way of thinking. “N.I. Panin,” he said, “deigned to talk about some details that signify the true greatness of Emperor Peter the Great.” “His Excellency, looking at the images of local places and customs, reasoned how many foreign writers there are errors in this reasoning, which for the most part are written at random and based on incorrect tales; that it is regrettable that we ourselves do not put in the work to correct these errors and do not make our entire description true and thorough." "His Excellency Nikita Ivanovich and gr. Zakhar Grigorievich (Chernyshev) discussed, like enlightened people, about the foundations of love for the fatherland, about alliances that join us to the fatherland, etc. I was very pleased that His Highness listened to such reasoning." At the same time, in many cases Poroshin considers it necessary to note about “noble sentiments” of N.I. Panin, as, for example, after his conversation about the dangers of lies, “both in the discussion of general and particular matters.
If only the community would be prosperous if there were many fellow citizens with such noble and great thoughts,” he adds. Poroshin valued no less those conversations of Panin in which his humane views were expressed - conversations about the state of current morals, in comparison with previous ones in general : what, for example, are Panin’s comments on the Volynsky case, and about the book of previous sentences compiled by the unfortunate executed, Poroshin notes: “at this, N.I. Panin reasoned and it seemed that his very love for humanity spoke from his lips. Repeatedly Poroshin also notes moral ones.” instructions to the Tsarevich regarding his actions and also approves of them. In general, it is impossible to admit that Panin had an unseemly intention to influence the development of the Tsarevich in a bad direction, and the conversations that were not entirely appropriate for Pavel Petrovich’s age, which were allowed in his presence, are only explained. general conditions time and environment: the empress-mother herself allowed herself such conversations with her son. One cannot see anything premeditated in the fact that Panin sometimes allowed himself, under the Tsarevich, to have a critical attitude towards some of the orders of Catherine’s reign.
But be that as it may, Panin’s influence on Pavel Petrovich was enormous; about the relationship between them, foreign ambassadors said that it is unlikely that the sympathies between father and son could be stronger; despite the extraordinary variability of affections and distrust discovered in childhood, Pavel always had complete trust only in Panin and was under his exceptionally strong influence.
With this influence, the fragility of the position, natural after every violent coup, and Panin’s intentions regarding the enthronement of Paul, known to Catherine, naturally forced her to be very cautious towards Panin and, at the same time, excluded the possibility of sincerely friendly relations with him.
Whole line unrest throughout her reign made the empress even more suspicious, since the name of N. I. Panin was mentioned especially often in these unrest, although, no doubt, completely unfoundedly.
Already in the fall of 1762, during the Guryev conspiracy, the conspirators said: “we stand for what the prince was not crowned for, and now Panin and Shuvalov have doubts about who should be ruler.” IN next year a well-known case arose between Catherine's first accomplices - Lasunsky, Roslavlev and Khitrovo, regarding the promise given, allegedly, by the Empress Panin to transfer the throne to Pavel Petrovich.
In an extremely excited state, Catherine then wrote to Senator Suvorov: “It is impossible for him (Khitrovo) to come up with something, as if I promised Panin to be a ruler.
It cannot be that he heard such a lie from A. and G. Orlov, as he said.” Catherine herself understood very well the dependence of her position on the mentioned circumstances. “At first,” she says to Khrapovitsky, “I had no will, but Afterwards, for political reasons, she did not take it from Panin.
Everyone thought that if not Panin, then he was lost." And indeed, in the literature it was already indicated that at the most critical moments the empress did not dare to take responsibility for the Grand Duke without receiving Panin’s consent.
In exactly the same way, as we have already said, all his enemies looked at Panin’s position; finally, he himself looked at Panin’s position. All the intrigues of the enemies were always aimed at removing Panin from the post of educator.
Even under Elizaveta Petrovna, as we know, he refused the post of vice-chancellor in order to be only under Pavel Petrovich.
At the beginning of Catherine's reign, he himself said that his importance would last only as long as his bed was in the palace, that is, as long as he was a teacher.
These relations determined to a certain extent Panin's position at Catherine's court.
At first, Panin was only an unofficial adviser to the empress on foreign policy issues and had to endure a strong struggle with his old friend Bestuzhev, with whom he completely disagreed.
Foreign ambassadors informed their governments about the intrigues of Bestuzhev and Grigory Orlov against Panin, who therefore expressed a strong desire to retire from business. However, on October 4, 1763, upon leaving for leave abroad, gr. Vorontsov Panin was made a senior member of the Foreign Board; in October, after Bestuzhev’s removal, Panin was entrusted “due to the current undifficult circumstances” with managing the affairs of the collegium.
Without being officially appointed chancellor, he was placed above the vice-chancellor Prince Golitsyn and for almost a whole twenty years remained Catherine's chief adviser and head of Russian foreign policy.
The degree of Panin’s influence on the course of events is, of course, difficult to determine with accuracy: this influence, like all of Panin’s diplomatic activities in general, was in connection with the struggle of the court parties and his position at court; During the first years of her reign, this influence was stronger due to the inexperience of the empress, who later took a more and more definite and independent attitude to individual issues.
The name of Panin is primarily associated with the idea of the “Northern Alliance” system and the blind subordination of Russian politics to the views and intentions of the Prussian king Frederick II. Panin is accused of doctrinaire and of being under the absolutely exclusive influence Polish king, he sacrificed Russian interests to please him.
In resolving these issues, it is necessary, first of all, to distinguish between conscious and malicious subordination from involuntary one, and it is further necessary, in in this case, distinguish between Panin’s activities before 1772 - before the partition of Poland - and after it. Panin, always and first of all, had in mind the interests of Russia and until 1772 was rather distrustful of Frederick, which did not, however, prevent him from becoming more and more inclined after 1772 to think about the absolute need for Prussian rule for Russia. alliance, while the Empress was more and more inclined towards Austria; During this period, Panin’s activities were especially dependent on his personal position, on his relationship with Pavel Petrovich and the Empress.
The idea of the "Northern Accord", or concert, as is known, was that all the northern powers: Russia, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden and Poland, together with England, were to conclude a common offensive and defensive alliance to maintain peace in the north of Europe and counteracting the aspirations of the Bourbon and Habsburg dynasties.
Other Russian diplomats, Keyserling and Korff, were also imbued with hatred of France, and therefore of Austria, too, of whom the former had previously argued for the need for an alliance with Prussia in Polish affairs, and the second presented Catherine in 1764 with a project in which he proposed for discussion the question: “whether it is not possible to form a noble and strong alliance in the North against the powers of the Bourbon Union.” Having warmly accepted this idea, Panin directed all his efforts towards its implementation. “This new and never before seen in the northern part of Europe political system of uniting the mutual benefit and interests of all neighboring powers, regardless of interests extraneous to them,” a system that, according to Panin’s thought, was supposed to glorify Russia, determined his policy towards to individual states.
In the desire to unite completely disparate interests, the doctrinaire nature of Panin’s policy was reflected: Poland had to be unconditionally under the influence of Russia, French influence had to be eliminated in Sweden and Denmark, and England had to pay Sweden a subsidy for this purpose;
Prussia was, of course, a particularly important member of the proposed alliance, but it was difficult to convince England of the benefits that the subsidy it paid to Sweden would bring to it, and to convince Frederick II of the benefits for him of an alliance with England.
Panin's activities in implementing this system began with the establishment of Russian relations with Prussia and Russian influence in Poland.
Frederick longed for an alliance with Russia;
Panin tried to extract the greatest possible benefits from this alliance, necessary for joint actions with Prussia in Poland, and constantly pointed out to the Prussian ambassador Solms that in St. Petersburg only he and the empress were supporters of the Prussian alliance, and that Frederick, if he wanted an alliance, should agree to some concessions.
In Poland, first of all, the question of electing a king was on the agenda; Panin’s energetic activities in this direction, which fully met Catherine’s wishes, greatly strengthened his position. “I congratulate you,” Catherine wrote to him after choosing Poniatowski, “on the king we made; this case most greatly increases my trust in you.” In Panin’s letter to Repnin, who warned him against some danger, Catherine, to Panin’s words: “Perhaps, my dear friend, be calm and confident that everything except my contempt deserves nothing,” added: “And I “Ekaterina, I say that Panin has nothing to fear.” The next issues in Polish affairs were questions about the rights of dissidents and about some reforms Polish constitution.
In both of these questions, Panin’s views apparently reflected some duality: the desire to satisfy practical requirements and the requirements of justice; on both these issues he disagreed for some time with both the empress and Frederick.
Defending the rights of dissidents, he first of all thought about acquiring influence in Poland by this means; but in defending these rights he went so far that he aroused fierce resistance from the Poles and was forced to agree to some reduction in his original demands for the expansion of the secular rights of dissidents.
The desire to strengthen his influence in Poland at all costs explains the fact that Panin so strongly opposed the Haidamak movement, caused by his own policy regarding dissidents in Poland: this movement could compromise Russian policy in Poland.
As for the question of liberum veto, while Frederick was against any attempt to improve the political system of Poland, Panin, it seems, at least at first, had a different opinion.
He looked at Poland as a necessary member of the “northern chord” and therefore said that “Poland, if its trade and institutions were better organized, could replace Austria for the allies without becoming dangerous for them.” In general, he found it too cruel to deprive the Poles of the opportunity to get out of their barbaric state;
Frederick was, of course, against any reforms, and the Empress, who hesitated at first, then spoke out decisively against the abolition of the liberum veto; some private reforms were, however, carried out.
Wanting to strengthen the influence of Russia, Panin eliminated the intervention of Prussia, and demanded that Poland conclude an agreement that would transfer the guarantee of reforms into the hands of the Russian government, which was, of course, very insulting to the Poles.
Although Stanislav-August blamed mainly Frederick for the failure of his reform aspirations, who supposedly opened the eyes of the Russian court to the meaning of the abolition of the liberum veto; but the Poles turned all their hatred against Russia and specifically against Panin, who, seemingly wanting to lead Poland out of anarchy, at the same time completed its enslavement.
Having attracted Frederick to the Russian-Polish treaty, Panin was delighted with his business and thought that he had thus laid a solid foundation for his northern system.
At the same time as resolving issues about Russian-Polish and Russian-Prussian relations, Panin made every effort to attract England and Denmark to the system; the difference of interests did not allow rapprochement with England, an alliance with Denmark was concluded, but rapprochement between Denmark and Prussia and Sweden with Russia turned out to be impossible.
Hundreds of thousands of Russian money were spent in Sweden, “which, in the consideration of our affairs and interests, according to the way of its government and according to different nations The Swedish dividing parties were in exactly the same position as they had been in to this day, and may Poland always remain in the future,” to support the Russian party.
But the war with the Porte that broke out in 1768 showed the entire artificiality of the system built by Panin; caused mainly by Russian policy in Poland, it showed especially clearly the short-sightedness of this policy.
This war forced, first of all, all opponents of Panin’s Prussian system to raise their heads.
What had an unpleasant effect on Pavin, first of all, was the empress’s expressed desire to restore the Elizabethan conference - that same monster conference that he so cruelly characterized in his memorandum; “from today to tomorrow,” he wrote to the empress, “it is in no way possible to suddenly establish an indispensable Council or conference, and this is truly not necessary for the first year.” Panin tried to make this Council temporary and, when asked by Catherine who should be appointed members, he, among other things, carefully named his enemy, Count. Orlova.
At the very first meeting of the Council, Panin was also unpleasantly surprised by the fact that Catherine, completely apart from him, together with Orlov, developed a plan for the famous “expedition to the Mediterranean Sea.” All the failures were now attributed to Panin: “he irritated the Poles, irritated Austria and France, which resulted in the rise of Turkey, and, instead of a natural alliance with Austria, which could have helped against Turkey, he invented some kind of northern system.” Solms then wrote to the king that they were talking about removing Panin, who was responsible for the present confusion.
In the same sense, the English Ambassador Cathcart reported to his government that Panin, with very few, must withstand the pressure of the French and Austrian parties.
According to Cathcart, Panin could not resist the Orlovs, Chernyshev, Razumovsky, both Golitsyns and all those dissatisfied with the new system and defending the Austrian one.
At the Council meeting, Panin was asked some sensitive questions.
Chernyshev, for example, directly said that “everyone is now making preparations within the state, but nothing is known about outsiders, and thus he dares to ask whether in the current case there are allies on whom one can rely in times of need.” When later, instead of Golitsyn, Rumyantsev, and not Pyotr Panin, was appointed commander-in-chief of the first army in Turkey, people close to Panin were very unhappy.
The outbreak of war made it very difficult diplomatic activities Panin, especially since at the same time it became very alarming situation affairs in the north - in Sweden, where Russia had to fight a strong French influence.
However, it should be considered a private success that Panin managed to force Frederick II, who was trying to renew the treaty of 1764, to give an undertaking to commit sabotage to Swedish Pomerania in the event of any coup in Sweden; in December 1769 he managed to renew the alliance with Denmark.
Thus, the ties connecting Russia with old friends - Prussia and Denmark - were further strengthened.
Involving other states was incomparably more difficult.
Negotiations were underway with England long before the break with Turkey, but despite all Panin’s insistence, the alliance could not be concluded, since England did not agree to bear part of the costs of choosing the Polish king and did not want to assume any obligations in the event of a break with Turkey; the only thing she agreed to was financial support for Denmark and Russia in the sense of maintaining calm in the north and countering the influence of France.
After the efforts of the Russian ambassador in Stockholm Osterman to conclude a Russian-Swedish alliance collapsed, Panin tried to bring Prussia closer to Denmark and create an alliance between them, which would be the third step towards the northern system, but this also turned out to be impossible due to the resistance of the Prussian king, who wanted to isolate Russia from other states and thus convince it of the need for Prussian friendship.
The most important consequence Russian-Turkish war was the division of Poland caused by it, to which Frederick led Russia.
When the king, in order to test N.I. Panin regarding this issue, sent in February 1769 to St. Petersburg a partition plan drawn up by him and known as Count Linar’s project, Panin developed a whole project for an alliance between Austria, Prussia and Russia with the goal of expelling the Turks from Europe, and Austria was to be rewarded with Turkish possessions, Prussia with Polish ones, and Russia, as Panin said, did not need territorial acquisitions.
When, then, during Prince Henry’s stay in St. Petersburg, Catherine and some of her entourage, after the occupation of Tsips by the Austrians, directly proposed to Henry the question of why they should not own part of Poland, Panin expressed a completely opposite opinion. “Prussia and Russia,” he told Solms, “should rather turn Austria away from her intentions than follow her example; he himself will never give his mistress advice to take other possessions.” He further asked Solms not to contribute to this plan, since he would not want to preach to Russia the desire for new acquisitions only for the sake of benefits. Whatever, however, Panin’s true opinions on this issue, he was forced by the difficult situation in which Russia was placed by the Turkish War to agree to Frederick’s plan for the division of Poland.
At the beginning of the war, Panin still tried to regain his independence and stubbornly rejected Frederick’s offers of mediation; he said that, in any case, England must be involved in this mediation.
This greatly angered Frederick, who sent his brother Heinrich to St. Petersburg to make the negotiations more successful.
But Panin, even in conversations with him, insisted on the need for Austria and Prussia to declare war on Turkey; he tried to explain to Henry this “most beautiful and happiest idea of a triple alliance.” However, Frederick was already occupied exclusively with the thought of dividing Poland - only for this he wanted triple alliance, and not for the war with Turkey.
The negotiations ended, as is known, with Panin’s defeat.
Already agreeing to the proposed division, Panin clearly understood that it was impossible to look at the Polish acquisitions as a reward for the Turkish War, since Austria and Prussia received parts of Poland for free, and therefore wanted to come to an agreement with Austria regarding Turkey; however, he was forced was to agree to the division, because without it it was impossible to conclude a profitable peace with the Porte.
After his previous statements about the injustice of such a measure, Panin now consoled himself with the reasoning that Poland could exist after the partitions as a significant state, and the separated parts of it would not lose anything, no longer being subordinated to such a disorderly government.
If the break with Turkey had already affected Panin’s position, then the defeat that Russia now suffered from Prussia harmed him even more, since from that time on he was at odds with the empress herself.
Russia finds itself in a funny position.
Catherine saw clearly that she was in Frederick's hands only a tool to achieve his goals. The French charge d'affaires reported to his court that the Russian people especially reproached Panin for strengthening Prussia.
Grigory Orlov said publicly that the people who drew up the separate agreement deserve the death penalty. Panin, as they say, himself admitted that circumstances led him far against his wishes.
In 1772, in addition to the division of Poland, another event occurred, which cannot help but be looked upon as the defeat of Panin.
In August of this year, the young Swedish king Gustav III carried out a coup that restored autocracy and took him completely by surprise Russian government.
By the spring of 1773, Panin dreamed of making peace with Turkey, of Russia invading Finland, Denmark in Dalecarlia and Prussia in Pomerania, but France and Sweden made every effort to support the war between Turkey and Russia;
Panin was forced to temporarily agree to the peace proposals of Gustav III. From this moment on, the opinions of Panin and the Empress begin to diverge more and more: Panin remains committed to the Prussian union, while the Empress, more and more carried away by Eastern politics, is convinced of the need for rapprochement with Austria.
There can hardly be any doubt that this disagreement was due to Panin’s position at court and the struggle of the court parties.
It was during these years that Panin had to endure a particularly strong struggle with his opponents, and it was during these years that the relations of both Panin brothers with the empress became especially aggravated.
From this moment on, Panin and his pupil, Tsarevich Pavel Petrovich, whose discord with his mother intensified more and more over time, are the only ardent supporters of the Prussian union. In 1771-1772 Panin’s struggle with gr. Orlov: taking advantage of the latter’s departure to Moscow during the plague and later his trip to the congress in Focsani, Panin managed, as it were, to undermine his influence for some time, nominating Vasilchikov in his place, but this was only temporary and, perhaps, only an apparent success , since the empress always hid her correspondence with Orlov from Panin. “Thoughtful politicians,” as Solms wrote, “thought that the empress would be very pleased to have Orlov nearby as a confidant, and to use his services in the event that Count Panin, in the name of the Grand Duke, would decide to do something against her.” Saldern, a Russian diplomat who had previously conducted negotiations with Frederick II on Panin’s instructions and was then envoy to Warsaw, intervened in these intrigues.
Having parted ways with Panin Polish question, Saldern, upon returning from Warsaw, addressed him with “the most terrible proposals,” but, rejected by him, turned to the Grand Duke and slandered Panin.
Panin said that he could not publicize this act without compromising the Grand Duke, but he considered Saldern his main enemy.
Saldern allegedly worked for the return of Orlov, thereby gaining the trust of Catherine and now using it to overthrow him, Panin.
This was easy to achieve, since Catherine, according to Panin’s words addressed to Solms, would not forgive him, Panin, for what he openly told her about Count Orlov.
Catherine’s relationship with Panin at this time was such that when Panin spoke out in favor of annexing Danzig to Prussia (although he had previously had the opposite opinion), the Empress answered him that only someone who wanted to betray Russia could advise her that way; this matter was so serious that, according to Panin, told Solms, “the Empress and he, being together almost the whole day, do not speak.” Panin, according to the stories of his contemporaries, was so depressed by this that, after the conclusion of peace, he thought to abandon the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and retain his place only under the person of the Grand Duke. The Grand Duke was soon to marry, and Panin took measures to retain his influence over the future wife of his pupil; the mediator in choosing the bride was a person close to Panin - the former Danish ambassador to St. Petersburg Asseburg.
Perlustration delivered to Catherine a letter from Asseburg to Panin, “that the Land Countess (mother of Pavel Petrovich’s bride) is very well disposed, that she will not listen to anyone’s advice except Panin, and that she will listen to him and obey him in everything.” Subsequently, Panin was accused of helping Asseburg hide from Catherine that “Pavel Petrovich’s fiancee suffered from a curvature of the spinal column.” The Empress was indignant at this intervention by Panin.
In response to her letter about this, Baron Cherkasov replied: “Count Panin is very mistaken in wanting to conduct your affairs in his own way. He barely knows how to behave himself, and even then rather poorly.” With Paul's marriage, the Empress was not slow to take advantage of the opportunity presented to her and, having richly gifted Panin, removed him from the post of Obergoffmeister. “My house,” she writes a week after the wedding (in October 1773) to Mrs. Bjelke, “is cleaned, or almost cleaned.
All the affectation occurred as I foresaw, but, nevertheless, the will of the Lord was accomplished as I predicted." At the same time, there are some reports about the relationship between the empress and both Panin brothers (Peter Panin was very close to his brother Nikita), which show how bad this relationship really was.
Catherine seemed to have reasons to be especially dissatisfied with Pyotr Panin and wrote about him to the Commander-in-Chief Prince Volkonsky in Moscow as an impudent talker who should have been appeased. “But,” she continues, “just as I showered his brother with wealth above his merits and exalted him, I believe that he will take him away, and my house will be cleared of mischief.” Even more curious is the episode with the appointment of Pyotr Panin as commander in chief against Pugachev.
At a meeting of the Council convened after the capture of Kazan, Catherine expressed her desire to personally go against the rebels;
Nikita Panin argued that such an intention was inconvenient and, at the close of the meeting, offered her the services of his brother. Catherine expressed joy and assured that she had never diminished her trust in Panin, but her true feelings and attitudes towards both brothers were revealed from private correspondence. “I,” Nikita wrote to his brother, “from the very first could notice that, as much as it was reasonable to use you for your present work, it was considered absolutely necessary and necessary, but just as much, at the very least, was considered internally extreme and sensitive self-humiliation.” And Nikita Ivanovich was not mistaken. “You will see,” Catherine wrote to Potemkin at the same time, “that Mr. Count Panin deigns to make his brother a ruler with unlimited power in the best part of the empire.
What if I sign (this is about the powers that Panin demanded), then not only Prince Volkonsky, but I myself am not in the least protected, as in front of the whole world the first liar and a personal insult to me, but, fearing Pugachev, above all mortals in I praise and exalt the empire." Panin’s main means of maintaining his position and defending the alliance with Prussia, which expired in 1777, was to influence the young court after his removal from the post of chief chamberlain. After the death of Natalya Alekseevna (April 15, 1776 g.), in the choice of which Panin participated, Pavel Petrovich very soon married a second time, but N.I. managed not only to maintain, but even strengthen his influence on Pavel Petrovich and his wife: he very soon managed to gain the complete trust of Maria Fedorovna, so that even her parents, in difficult cases, acted according to his instructions.
There is no reason to assume that N.I. Panin used his influence solely to restore the young court against Catherine - he used it to strengthen his position against hated favorites and defend his political system.
When, for example, in June 1777, the Swedish king Gustav II came to St. Petersburg with the goal of rapprochement with Russia and, through it, securing Swedish Pomerania from Frederick II, Pavel Petrovich, in a conversation with him, showed himself to be a passionate admirer of Frederick and indignantly reported N.I. Panin received unflattering reviews from Gustav about the Prussian king.
From the correspondence of Pavel Petrovich and Maria Fedorovna with Panin during this time, it is clear what unanimity and mutual trust prevailed in this circle: Maria Fedorovna turned to Panin with all her requests and complained to him with amazing frankness about her difficult situation.
When, a year later, Maria Feodorovna wanted to marry her sister to Prince Peter of Holstein, N.I. assisted her in this, despite the fact that Catherine in her heart wanted to marry him to the daughter of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick.
When, finally, after the Peace of Teshen, Catherine, already busy with her eastern project, finally leaned towards Austria, N.I. Panin had to fight the influence of Joseph II. The Austrian emperor, with his concern for Maria Feodorovna’s family, tried to win her over to his side - and not without success, despite Panin’s opposition: there is news that Maria Fedorovna’s mother herself convinced Pavel Petrovich and her daughter not to obey Panin’s suggestions in order to get along with Ekaterina.
Joseph, who arrived in St. Petersburg in the summer of 1780, tried to make the best impression on the grand ducal couple and for this, as Maria Fedorovna wrote, he even “extremely caressed our dear Count Panin.” Joseph really attracted the sympathy of Maria Feodorovna with the offer to marry her sister to his nephew, the heir to the Austrian throne.
When, after Joseph’s departure, the nephew of the Prussian king, Friedrich Wilhelm, arrived in St. Petersburg, Panin tried to explain to the heirs of both thrones the system of politics that both courts were supposed to adhere to, and argued that the alliance between them was supposed to be eternal; under the influence of Panin, Friedrich-Wilhelm and Pavel Petrovich exchanged assurances of eternal friendship, but, despite all the efforts of Panin, the rapprochement of the princely couple with the House of Habsburg still took place, and this amounted to their alienation from Prussia.
Catherine was very dissatisfied with the machinations of N.I. Panin against Elizabeth’s marriage with the heir to the Austrian throne, and, as can be seen from the letters of Princess Dorothea, there were rumors about his disgrace already at the beginning of 1781. But, in addition to this, Panin is in some disgrace, although and little known to us, connections with his activities regarding the declaration of armed neutrality and his relationship with Potemkin.
The emergence of armed neutrality was explained by court intrigues: Potemkin allegedly wanted Russia to make peace with England, and Panin, to spite Potemkin, convinced the empress to issue a declaration clearly directed against England.
There is no doubt that Harris and Potemkin tried to act against Panin and that the latter was an enemy of England.
The only question that remains unclear is what Panin’s participation was in the creation of the act of armed neutrality itself, that is, the question of how much it was created without his knowledge.
In any case, Harris, being confident of Panin’s hostility, led intrigues against him and in December 1780, in a conversation with the empress, directly told her that Panin was deceiving her, that he had entered into a secret deal with the French envoy and was serving the Prussian king more than the empress herself.
Finally, in May 1781, Panin took leave and retired to the Dugino estate that had been granted to him.
But when the issue of Pavel Petrovich traveling abroad with his young wife was finally resolved, Panin returned to St. Petersburg in early September 1781; as Harris says, Friedrich begged Panin for this return.
The return to St. Petersburg followed under the pretext of a desire to be present at the smallpox inoculation of Pavel Petrovich’s children.
Panin did everything possible to prevent this journey;
He frightened Maria Fedorovna with the danger of smallpox for children. He supposedly instilled in Pavel fears for the state of affairs in Russia.
Unable to delay the trip, he tried to incite the Grand Duchess against Joseph and hoped that the Tsarevich would also visit Berlin.
Throughout Pavel Petrovich’s journey, Panin maintained correspondence with him; In the absence of the grand ducal couple, the well-known Bibikov affair took place abroad. In one intercepted letter from adjutant Bibikov to Kurakin, who accompanied Paul, Catherine read a complaint about the suffering of the fatherland, about the sad situation of everyone, “no matter how good-minded we are and still have some energy,” that the author of the letter is supported only by hope for the future and the idea that everything will return to its natural order.
Although Panin’s letters sent by the same courier were saved from inspection, Bibikov referred to them in his letter, and Catherine realized that behind these persons there were others, more important, who were or were known to be adherents of Pavel Petrovich.
Extremely excited, she tried unsuccessfully to find out the details and intentions of these “good-thinking people”; By the Bibikov case, in any case, the entire Panin party was finally and irrevocably condemned.
Upon the young couple’s return from abroad, her relationship with Panin changed, although as if forced (perhaps precisely under the influence of this case).
Having visited Panin the day after his arrival, Pavel then did not look at him for a whole month. On March 29, 1783, the young couple, according to Pavel himself, when talking about Panin, “came into an indescribable sensitivity”; “He was cheerful and fresh, like I haven’t seen him for three years.” Two days after that (March 31, 1783), Panin died in the arms of Pavel Petrovich and Maria Fedorovna, who arrived to him at the first news that he had become worse. According to the grief-stricken Pavel, “he left behind a general respect, forcing his enemies to remain silent, ashamed of having more than one opinion with the public, proof of which was the day of his funeral, where, being taken away, he went to people whom he had not had since birth seen." Catherine had a different opinion: already after Panin’s death, comparing him with Orlov, she could only say that Panin knew how to hide his shortcomings.
Paul could perpetuate his gratitude to Panin only after the death of Catherine, by erecting a monument to him in the church of St. Magdalene in Pavlovsk.
Whatever the opinions about Panin’s diplomatic talents: he was, first of all, one of the most educated Russian people of his time; His education was undoubtedly greatly influenced by his twelve-year stay abroad.
From Poroshin’s notes we then learn what questions Panin was particularly interested in: conversations at Pavel Petrovich’s table especially often concerned the state structure and policies of foreign powers.
These are: discussions about Swedish institutions and their influence on the collegial structure in Russia; about government institutions and government in Denmark ("out of this came the general state charters reasoning"), England and France, Holland and Hamburg; about courts, schools and education in general.
When one day there was talk in general about the system of state revenues in connection with Dantesse’s book about commerce in England and France, Panin noted, for example, that the author “stole everything from one English writer”; from Panin Grand Duke, according to Harris, received a decent knowledge of the modern history of Europe.
Panin also entered into more abstract scientific conversations with Poroshin, for example, about Leibniz, D’Alembert, Fontenelle, whose work “about the many worlds” he allowed the Grand Duke to read as “representing looking nice the most difficult things"; he often touched on new political literature.
Very often the conversation also turned to issues of Russian history: about previous reigns in general, about the education of Peter II, about Osterman, about the reign of Elizabeth, about current state Russia and various events, "about laws and civil institutions, about the situation Russian Academy Science, which is left without any care, and that the lower schools for educating youth and preparing them for academic sciences we do not have that they are necessary for the dissemination of sciences"; "about some details that signify the true greatness of the sovereign Peter the Great." Many of the conversations point to Panin’s humane views and his attitude towards the morals of the previous era. When the conversation once turned to Volynsky, Panin “deigned to say that he recently read this case, and his paralysis almost killed him.” His Excellency told me, says Poroshin, that he has now collected reports from everywhere, where which convicts are being held and on what cases in different boards. sent out.
He deigned to say that he now has a wonderful book about that, that yesterday he read it and was surprised to see that people were flogged and beaten with batogs for such faults, for which only a severe reprimand would have been worthy of punishment; that therefore, in some way, one can talk about the rights of those times." More than once Poroshin also makes comments indicating Panin’s critical attitude towards modern mores and the order of Catherine’s brilliant court.
The main feature of Panin’s views is the desire to establish the rule of law.
The arbitrariness that he denounced in the explanatory note to the draft of the State Council and which, as he could not help but see, continued to dominate in his time, made Russia in his eyes a despotic state.
Regarding the objections presented by the St. Petersburg academician Strube de Beermont (in the op. “Lettres Russiennes”) to those passages in “The Spirit of Laws” in which the author, speaking about despotic states, also names Russia several times, Panin said: Strube “a dit tout ce qu""il a pu dire", and "Montesquieu will remain Montesquieu." An interesting description of Panin’s views was given by one of the people closest to him, the famous author of “The Minor” and “The Brigadier”: “On internal affairs,” writes Fonvizin, “in his soul he abhorred the behavior of those who, by their appearance, ignorance and slavery was a state secret from what, in a well-organized part, should be known to everyone, such as: the amount of income, the reason for taxes, etc.
He could not tolerate private commissions being established by autocracy in civil and criminal cases, in addition to the judicial places established to protect innocence and punish crime.
With a shudder he listened to everything that could disrupt the order of the state: would anyone go with a report to the Sovereign directly about such a matter, which should first be considered in all parts by the Senate; will he notice the contradiction in today's decree against yesterday's, will he hear about the silent obedience to the temporary workers of those who by rank are obliged to defend the truth with their bellies; in a word, every act of contemptuous self-interest or partiality, every deception that beguiles the eyes of the sovereign or the public, every base action of souls matured in the timidity of ancient slavery and raised by blind happiness to famous degrees, brought his virtuous soul into awe." "Supreme power," said Panin in his above-mentioned political testament, - is entrusted to the sovereign for the sole good of his subjects... The sovereign, the likeness of God, the successor on earth of His highest power, cannot equally signify either his power or his dignity otherwise than by establishing immutable rules in his state, based on the common good and which he could not violate himself without ceasing to be a worthy sovereign.
Without these rules, or more precisely to explain, without the indispensable state laws neither the state of the state nor the state of the sovereign is strong... An enlightened sovereign who adheres to righteousness and meekness will never waver in his true majesty, for the property of rightness is such that no prejudices, no friendship, no inclinations, nor compassion itself can shake it. The strong and the weak, the great and the small, the rich and the poor - all stand on the same line; a good sovereign is good for everyone, and all his respects relate not to private benefits, but to the general benefit... He must know that the nation, sacrificing part of its natural freedom, has entrusted its welfare to his care, his justice, his dignity, that he is responsible for the behavior of those to whom he entrusts the affairs of government and that, consequently, their crimes, tolerated by him, become his crimes." Panin was an enemy of superstition and allowed some freethinking in the area of faith.
When Metropolitan Platon was invited to teach the law to Pavel Petrovich, N.I. was mainly interested in the question of whether he was superstitious. “It is impossible to wait,” he wrote to Count Vorontsov, who fell ill from eating Lenten food, “for human health to be preserved only directly, by His holy right hand, and then Calvin’s predestination would inevitably take root among us - a dogma that is more dangerous than all other heresies.
It is necessary to take care of your health.
The saving thing is to obey the law, but it only requires not health, but our passions of ruin, which can hardly be done with mushrooms and turnips alone." "That's why," he says, "in the West people survive longer and live longer." I. Panin was a member of many Masonic lodges, and in one modern song he is praised for the fact that with his advice he “introduced the royal heart into the temple of friendship.” There were no two different opinions about the honesty and kindness of N. I. Panin: Even his political enemies were convinced of his honesty, who respected him as a proud, noble, certainly incorruptible person; even such an enemy as Harris testified to this. “Panin,” he wrote, “in many respects represents an exception to everything. what I saw in his fatherland." As evidence of Panin's extraordinary kindness, it is pointed out that of the 9,000 souls granted to him upon Pavel Petrovich's marriage, he distributed half to his secretaries Fonvizin, Ubri and Bakunin.
A sybarite by nature, belonging to those Russians who especially quickly absorbed the brilliance of sophisticated Western European life, Panin loved to live well.
According to Bezborodko, he had the best cook in the city.
In conclusion, it does not hurt to note that, despite all the versatile activities that Panin had to display, he was incredibly lazy and slow.
Catherine said about him that someday he would die from haste.
This laziness resulted in a great stagnation in business, and back in 1785 Mr. Vorontsov wrote that gr. Panin seemed to bewitch the college, so that even after his death order could not be restored for a long time.
Lebedev, "Counts N. and P. Panin." St. Petersburg, 1863; Kobeko, D., "Tsarevich Pavel Petrovich", St. Petersburg, 1883; Review by Prof. Ikonnikov on Kobeko’s composition, - in the Report on the 28th Uvarov Awards;
Shumigorsky E., "Empress Maria Feodorovna", Moscow., 1890; Chechulin, N. “Project of the Imperial Council” (Journal of Min. Nar. Prosv. 1894, No. 3); Chechulin N., "Russian foreign policy at the beginning of the reign of Catherine II." St. Petersburg, 1896; Arnheim, "Beitrage zur Geschichte der Nordischen Frage ("Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Geschichtswissenschaft", vol. II-V, VII. 1889-1892); Project of the Imperial Council, in the "Collection of Imp. Russian Historical Society", vol. VII; About Fonvizin's project, see "Russian Antiquity", 1884, No. 12; Korsakov, D., "From the life of Russian figures of the 18th century". Kazan, 1891. Extensive correspondence of N.I. We find Panin with equal persons in the Archive of Prince Vorontsov, the “Russian Archive” and the “Collection of the Imperial Russian Historical Society”, “Readings of the Moscow Society of History and Antiquities”, etc. Of these we note: “Letters and Notes of Catherine II to gr. N.I. Panin and his answers 1762-1768. ("Read. Moscow. General. History and Antiquities" 1863); Correspondence between Count N.I. and P.I. Panin during Pugachev revolt. ("Sb. Russian Historical Society", vol. VI); Correspondence gr. N.I. Panina with gr. P. A. Rumyantsev. ("Russian Archive" 1882); Letters from Pavel Petrovich to N.I. Panin, letters led. book Maria Feodorovna and others to N.I. Panin. ("Russian Arch.", book I); N. I. Panin's story about the accession of Catherine II (from the notes of Bar. Asseburg), with a preface.
L. N. Maykova. ("Russian Arch." 1879); From papers gr. N.I. Panin, related to serfdom. right, sea forwarding. and the first Turkish war. ("Russian Archive", 1878). As a primary source for the biography of N. I. Panin, one can consider volumes 23-29 of the History of S. M. Solovyov, in which extensive extracts from the diplomatic correspondence of N. I. Panin are printed.
A. I. Braudo. (Polovtsov) Panin, Count Nikita Ivanovich chancellor and chamberlain under Catherine II; envoy to Copenhagen and Stockholm; teacher v. book Pavel Petrovich; R. 15 Sep. 1718, † 31 Mar. 1783 (Polovtsov)
During the thirty-four-year reign of Catherine II, three chancellors were replaced: M. I. Vorontsov, N. I. Panin and I. A. Osterman. But Vorontsov, who faithfully served Peter III and even came to St. Petersburg to persuade Catherine to abandon the coup, did not last long and had to resign after the empress’s accession. As for Osterman, he is one of the puppet chancellors who did not have a serious influence on affairs. The actual head of the foreign policy department until 1797 was A. A. Bezborodko, who formally remained the second person in the Collegium of Foreign Affairs. Foreign policy refers to the sphere of government in which empresses such as Anna Ioannovna and Elizaveta Petrovna, as we know, freed themselves from all state concerns, showed a certain interest, mainly at the everyday level. During their reign, the foreign policy department was in the hands of A. I. Osterman and A. P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin, who determined foreign policy countries.
A completely different situation developed under Catherine II, who actually played the role of chancellor and delved into all the details of the country’s foreign policy. If G. A. Potemkin, being away from the court, was the actual owner of the governorship with unlimited powers entrusted to him by Catherine, and E. R. Dashkova, being the president of two academies, performed her duties more or less independently, not always asking the empress’s permission , then the empress was so interested in foreign policy affairs that they were under her vigilant control. This is explained by the fact that the foreign policy prestige of the state was adequate to the prestige of the empress within the country. Anointed defines the role of chancellors under Catherine - they were just executors of her will, sometimes defending their point of view, but in most cases (this especially applies to A. A. Bezborodko) meekly carrying out Catherine’s commands.
N. I. Panin was born in 1718 in the family of a military servant Ivan Panin, who completed his military career lieutenant general. Although he served his entire life in the army, he did not gain military glory. His son Nikita began serving in the lower ranks in the Horse Guards regiment, which presented the scepter to Elizaveta Petrovna in 1741. When Elizaveta Petrovna drew attention to Nikita Panin, her favorite I. I. Shuvalov decided to get rid of his rival in a long-tested way - to remove him from the court and take on an assignment, the fulfillment of which involved leaving the capital. As a result, Panin was appointed ambassador to Denmark and then to Sweden. In the latter, he did not waste time, he got acquainted with the struggle political parties, mastered the art of diplomacy. Since revanchist sentiments were strong in Sweden, aimed at revising Peace of Nystadt, then Panin, in order to neutralize the influence of the revanchists, had the opportunity to master the entire arsenal of intrigues: aggravate the rivalry of the opposing “parties”, use bribes, become skilled in flattery.
At the same time, while living in Sweden, Panin absorbed some of the ideas of the Enlightenment. He, for example, fetishized the power of laws, which the entire population of the country, including the monarch, must strictly obey - only with good laws can a country achieve prosperity. Panin considered the first duty of the state to patronize the development of internal and especially foreign trade, industry using the country's rich natural resources, improving communications (land and water), and encouraging agriculture. To achieve these goals, merchants and industrialists had to issue loans on preferential terms and protect domestic industry with protective duties.
The diplomat Panin was also interested in the fate of the serfs. Here he, in principle, adhered to the views of moderate enlighteners, but made significant adjustments to them. In his opinion, the abolition of serfdom was premature, but he considered the priority task of the state to regulate the relationship between the master and the peasant by government laws that established the amount of duties in favor of the landowner. Severe punishment awaited those who broke the law. With such a stock of knowledge and convictions, Nikita Ivanovich arrived in Russia in 1760 - Empress Elizaveta Petrovna summoned him, entrusting him with the responsible task of educating the son of the heir to the throne, Pavel Petrovich. The position of chief chamberlain was rated quite highly among court officials - it freely opened the doors of the court and made it possible to establish more or less close relations with this court, that is, with the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess. The chief chamberlain also had access to the empress’s apartments. All this placed him among important dignitaries.
According to the instructions that the chief chamberlain was supposed to follow when raising Catherine’s son, the primary duty of the teacher was to affirm “in his tender heart direct piety, that is, conviction in faith.” What follows is a lengthy list of virtues that were to be instilled in the pupil: good morals, a virtuous heart, love of mankind, meekness, justice, etc. Panin was allowed to invite people of “good standing” into the society of the pupil “of every rank and dignity”, so that he could know their needs and learn to distinguish virtuous people from evil ones.
Panin’s duty was to prevent such vices as flattery, cowardice, obscene jokes, etc. Of the sciences taught to the Grand Duke, the first place should be occupied by the history of Russia, the study of the morals and customs of its people, examples of courage in defending the Fatherland, as well as natural resources countries. As for the remaining subjects to be mastered by the pupil, their list was left to the discretion of the teacher. We do not know what pedagogical skills Nikita Ivanovich had, we do not know pedagogical principles which he was guided by. It is only known that he received material for upbringing that was not of the best quality: from birth to six years, the Grand Duke was in the care of ignorant nannies, storytellers, and hangers-on, who considered it a good thing for a child if he was kept in a closed, stuffy room, wrapped up beyond measure. As a result, the boy grew up sickly and frail, extremely nervous and hot-tempered. The nannies taught the child to be obedient, intimidating him with the names of the empress and the chief chamberlain, so that the first meeting between the teacher and the ward was accompanied by a roar due to the fear instilled by the nannies. With the advent of Panin, the nannies were removed from the Grand Duke, but, judging by the notes of S.A. Poroshin, who day after day noted all the events in the life of the pupil, Panin was not distinguished by his zeal and heartfelt concerns for education. This was partly explained by his laziness, partly by the fact that in 1763 he was entrusted with the leadership of the foreign policy department, along with the duties of an educator.
The content of the conversations at the dinner table does not give reason to believe that Panin was guided by any system in choosing topics. It was more of a social or business conversation, alien to the interests of children and the mind of a young pupil. Since Nikita Ivanovich occupied first place among the nobles present, he, and no one else, determined the topic of conversation, and depending on Panin’s mood, either fun or deathly silence reigned at the table - Panin was silent, the rest were silent. The child could not derive any benefit from all the conversations. The lack of attention to the heir irritated the latter. Occasionally, however, the topics of conversation can, with some stretch, be classified as educational. One day Panin asked a pupil: “What do you think, is it better to command or obey?” “To this the sovereign deigned to say: he has all his time; at other times it is better to command, at other times it is better to obey.” The teacher should have been expected to reason, evaluate and specify the answer, but Panin left the answer without attention.
Nikita Ivanovich’s story about the Swedish king, a great admirer of puppet comedies, “and how he (the king), standing behind the scenery, spoke instead of Polychinelle” had educational significance. Panin “talked about this with mockery to His Majesty,” from which a moral lesson emerged: it is not the king’s business to participate in puppet comedies. If we add that the Grand Duke was taken to the theater, where he had the opportunity to watch frivolous scenes inherent in the by no means chaste age of Catherine, and also to watch comedies that were not at all intended for children, then it is difficult to positively assess Panin’s role in instilling in Paul the virtues prescribed by the instructions.
And yet, Panin had an important influence on Pavel’s upbringing: firstly, by selecting educators who knew their job, among whom the young officer S.A. Poroshin, who taught the heir mathematics, stood out for his high moral qualities and extensive knowledge; their duties only for a year; secondly, according to A.G. Tartakovsky, Panin, together with Poroshin, “persistently instilled in the heir ideas about his dynastic rights.” Of course, such suggestions did not contribute to the establishment of a trusting relationship between mother and son - Catherine looked at Paul as the legal heir and kept a vigilant eye on him in order to stop any attempts to take advantage of her rights. The discord between Catherine and her son especially intensified after the latter reached adulthood and from September 20, 1772, according to Panin and his supporters, could become, if not a co-ruler, then an executor of important government assignments. Catherine, however, kept the “small court” in isolation and did not intend to share even a small amount of power.
Catherine knew about Panin’s sympathies, but she did not dare to deprive him of his position and drive him away from the court in the first years of his reign, because she took into account the degree of his influence in court circles, and his active role in the coup, and, finally, the fragility of her position on the throne. In subsequent years, on the contrary, she was already sure that neither Panin nor his pupil posed a threat. Catherine became convinced of the extreme necessity of the count as head of the foreign policy department, since he, being a like-minded person in her views on rapprochement with Prussia, diligently carried out the will of the empress. But as soon as Catherine changed her foreign policy orientation, Panin found himself out of work.
Circumstances were such that the cautious Nikita Ivanovich had to participate in the turbulent events of June 28, 1762. Distinctive feature This coup consisted in the participation in it, in addition to ordinary guardsmen and guards officers, of such nobles as N.I. Panin and Hetman K.G. Razumovsky. Involving Panin in the ranks of the conspirators was quite a difficult matter, because Nikita Ivanovich did not like to take risks. And yet he was persuaded. This was greatly facilitated by Peter III himself, who awarded Panin, a purely civilian man who hated drill, with the rank of general-in-chief. The rank obliged the frail nobleman to participate in parades and formations of all kinds, to which the emperor was so partial. Panin refused the rank of general, saying that if they insisted on his acceptance, he would go to Sweden. When this refusal was reported to the emperor, he uttered two insulting phrases addressed to Panin: “Everyone told me that Panin is an intelligent person. Can I believe this now? Peter III nevertheless awarded his son's teacher a civil rank corresponding to general-in-chief.
Dashkova, after much thought and doubt, finally decided to talk to Panin, who was a distant relative of hers, “about the likelihood of Peter III being dethroned.” “I decided to open up to Count Panin,” Dashkova wrote, “on my first meeting with him. He stood for the rule of law and for the cooperation of the Senate.” Translated from diplomatic language into everyday language, Panin’s words meant that he understood the disastrous rule of the unbalanced Peter III for the country, but opposed violent measures. “Compliance with the rule of law” meant that the throne should be inherited by a legitimate successor, that is, Paul, his, Panin’s, pupil, and Catherine, Paul’s mother, was assigned the role of regent until he came of age. Perhaps, at some stage in the preparation of the coup and its implementation, Catherine could have agreed to the role of regent, but in an atmosphere of general rejoicing over the overthrow of Peter III and Catherine’s accession to the throne, the thought of a regency itself disappeared.
It would seem that such significant differences in views on the purpose of the coup should have forced Catherine to show a wary attitude towards Panin and affect his career. But this did not happen, firstly, because more or less trusting relations between the small court, especially Catherine and Panin, had a long history; secondly, Panin, seeing the futility of the protest, did not insist on the implementation of his plan; thirdly, the empress did not take revenge and show hostility not only to Nikita Ivanovich, but also to obvious supporters of her deposed husband.
On October 27, 1763, Panin received the following rescript from Catherine: “Due to the current difficult circumstances, it is for our benefit, during the absence of our Chancellor, to entrust you with the correction and processing of all matters of the Foreign Collegium; For this reason, we command you to be present at this board as a senior member until the chancellor returns, as long as your other positions allow you.” According to the meaning of the rescript, Panin’s new position was temporary, he had to send it until Vorontsov returned from a two-year vacation, but the latter’s request for leave was nothing more than a plausible pretext for resigning, and Panin became the head of the foreign policy department for almost 20 years. Panin’s appointment, like Catherine’s accession to the throne, received a response Austrian Ambassador Count Mercy d'Argenteau, who reported to Vienna in 1763: “As for the present, then, firstly, it is more than likely that the character of the new empress, composed of violent passions, will make her reign both good and and at worst, very lively and active; secondly, since Panin was the main instrument in enthroning the new empress and through this achieved the indispensable right to guide her in the affairs of government, he, of course, will be able to skillfully reconcile the preservation of his own credit with passions. empress. This minister is extremely capricious and skillful in enterprises beneficial to his ultimate goal."
During his long service, Panin had the opportunity to carry out a wide variety of orders from Catherine, including the most delicate ones, which had no direct relation to either diplomacy or the duties of a teacher, while either enjoying her boundless trust or being in semi-disgrace. Such delicate assignments include leading the investigation of two cases: the “Khitrovo case”, associated with Catherine’s intention to tie her fate with her favorite Grigory Orlov in marriage, and the investigation into the case of Mirovich, who unsuccessfully tried to carry out another coup - to overthrow Catherine and hand over the crown to him who was languishing in captivity in Shlisselburg to Ioann Antonovich.
The first investigation did not reveal a serious danger to Catherine, and the participants in the so-called conspiracy suffered a relatively light punishment, explained, in particular, by the fact that Nikita Ivanovich himself was among those who opposed this marriage. As for Mirovich, he made an attempt to free Ivan Antonovich from captivity during the days when the Empress was in the Baltic states, and she led the investigation through Panin, who during its conduct showed personal initiative, loyalty to Catherine, and strict execution of all her orders sent from Rigi.
When you read the Empress’s letters to Panin, two observations emerge from their contents: the empress’s high degree of trust in Panin and Catherine’s incredible restraint. The first news the Empress received from Panin apparently aroused two feelings in her: joy on the occasion of the death of the main contender for the crown and the imprisonment of the main culprit of the tragedy that occurred in Shlisselburg, and a feeling of anxiety, under the influence of which she expressed doubt that that Mirovich acted alone, and the belief that he had accomplices in St. Petersburg from among the guards, ready to repeat what she herself had done two years ago.
Catherine’s behavior is all the more surprising because, having received news from St. Petersburg, she did not rush headlong to the capital, but remained in Riga and pretended that everything was calm in the sky; she, as before, continued to lavish smiles, captivate the Livonian nobles with her charm, participate in masquerades, ceremonial receptions, etc. Only from the empress’s letters to Panin, quite frank, can one judge the deep anxiety and tense anticipation of new news from St. Petersburg. Couriers galloped between Riga and the capital day and night, delivering reports from Nikita Ivanovich and orders from the empress, who delved into the details of the matter. Noteworthy is the haste with which the Empress responded to Panin’s reports, and, for the sake of maintaining secrecy, she wrote all the rescripts to him in her own hand: July 9, July 11 and 14, July 22. In the last rescript, the empress expressed complete satisfaction with Nikita Ivanovich’s actions: “It couldn’t have been done better than you did, for which I am very grateful... it seems things are going smoothly.”
Panin also actively participated in the events that unfolded in the capital of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Warsaw, and related to the election of a new king, the former favorite of the empress, Stanislav Poniatowski. In carrying out its intention, Russian diplomacy had to overcome the resistance of its constant rival for dominance in Europe - France, as well as Austria. As a result, during the months when the election campaign was carried out in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Catherine became close to Frederick II, who considered that Stanislav Poniatowski most of all corresponded to his views in Poland. As a result of pressure on the electoral Sejm, on July 4, 1764, Stanislav Poniatowski was unanimously elected king. This gave Catherine a reason to write to Panin: “Congratulations on the king we made.” To be fair, we note that the main “doer” of the king was not Panin, but Catherine, who held in her hands all the threads of intrigue of the election campaign and, through the head of the Foreign Collegium, directly communicated with the Russian Ambassador in Warsaw, Kaiserling, and N.V. Repnin, who replaced him.
The year 1763 marks two more events to which Panin was directly involved. One of them was of a matrimonial nature and is associated with G. Orlov’s attempt to become the empress’s husband. Formally, this idea was proposed by A.P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin, who, at the behest of Elizaveta Petrovna, found himself in disgrace. This nobleman relied in his career on flattery and servility, the ability to anticipate secret desires powerful of the world this. After the death of Anna Ivanovna, Bestuzhev invited Biron to become regent of Ivan Antonovich and, showing extraordinary persistence, achieved his goal. Now, in 1763, having been returned from exile by Catherine, he bet on her favorite and, of course, at his suggestion, persuaded the empress to agree to the marriage. It seems to us that Catherine agreed to this step unwillingly, being in a state of uncertainty about her fate and fearing to lose the crown, which the Orlovs handed to her and which could just as easily be taken away from her. Favorite Grigory Orlov, the most narrow-minded of the brothers, boastfully declared in the presence of the empress and nobles that he would need a month to place another contender on the throne. To this, Kirill Razumovsky reasonably noted that Orlov would have been hanged a week before the coup.
According to Diderot’s version, “Bestuzhev revealed these plans to Chancellor Vorontsov. The Chancellor, not wanting to hear him and interrupting him halfway through his speech, said: “How did I deserve such humiliating trust on your part?” Following this, he ran to the empress and confronted her with the indecency and danger of such an act, advising her, if desired, to keep Orlov as a lover, shower him with riches and honors, but not at all think about marrying him, so harmful for herself and for the people " From Catherine he went to Count Panin and told him the matter, and begged him to help with his influence. Panin took a firm position: “The Empress can do whatever she wants, but Mrs. Orlova cannot be the Empress.” Even if we ignore Diderot’s dubious information about the people’s attitude towards Catherine’s intention to become Orlov’s wife, the protest against this intention on the part of the upper and lower classes of the capital’s nobility is confirmed by reliable sources. Relying on their support, the Empress easily rejected Bestuzhev's plan. Although Catherine understood that Orlov could only be a burden to her reign, she would not have dared to refuse him without outside support.
A similar situation developed around N.I. Panin’s project. If Bestuzhev’s project was largely related to the private life of the empress, then Panin’s project was of national importance; made changes to the structure of the highest authorities: Nikita Ivanovich proposed creating a new institution in the country - the Imperial Council and reforming the Senate. In fact, the Imperial Council was not one of the new and original institutions - the history of the country is familiar with a similar institution, but under a different name. It's about first of all about the Supreme privy council and the Cabinet of Ministers, established to help empresses who had no idea about government. Panin’s project provided for the creation of an Imperial Council, consisting of imperial advisers, “the number of which should never exceed eight and should not decrease less than six.” Four of the advisers are appointed secretaries of state, each of whom was in charge of a specific area of government: internal affairs, foreign policy, military and naval sectors. Panin motivated the need for secretaries of state for two reasons: the need to protect the sovereign from mistakes “inherent to humanity,” for he “cannot bring everything into useful action in any other way than by its reasonable division between a certain small number of selected individuals.” The second reason for the creation of the Imperial Council was the desire to remove temporary workers and favorites from governing the country. Favoritism, according to Nikita Ivanovich, is evil, because the favorites were guided not by the interests of the state, but by personal benefits.
The draft Manifesto on the establishment of the Imperial Council, prepared by Panin, emphasized that in earlier times “the power of persons rather than the power of state places” had a decisive influence in the conduct of affairs. The new institution was supposed to put an end to whims, replaced by the force of law. Often, government institutions “remained only by their name, and the entire state was governed by individuals alone and their wishes, without knowledge and out of place.” The competence of the new institution is defined in the most general form: “everything that can serve the sovereign’s own autocracy, the care and growth and correction of the state should be in our Imperial Council, as we actually have.” The Imperial Council must meet every day except Saturday and Sunday. Each secretary of state reported on the affairs of his department, and the empress could either accept or reject the draft decree prepared by the department with additions made during the discussion.
The Empress not only approved the project and signed the Manifesto on its creation, but named its personal composition. The Imperial Council was to be headed by A.P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin, and its members were Prince Y.P. Shakhovskoy, Count K.G. Razumovsky, N.I. Panin, Count 3. G. Chernyshev and M.I. Vorontsov. Panin was entrusted with the responsibility of head of the department of internal affairs, foreign affairs - with M.I. Vorontsov, and military - with Chernyshev. The post of Secretary of State for Naval Affairs remained vacant.
It seemed that the reformer Panin could celebrate his victory, his prestige was strengthened even more, and he had no rivals in influencing the empress. And suddenly everything changed radically: Catherine tore the sheet. This meant abandoning Panin's project. There are several reasons for this, among them the one referred to by S. M. Solovyov: the predecessors of the Imperial Council were created under helpless empresses who did not have the data to govern the country. Catherine did not count herself among them. Consequently, Panin’s project dealt a blow to the empress’s pride. In addition, and this is the most important thing, the Imperial Council, although it did not formally limit Catherine’s autocratic power, did infringe on her rights regarding her favorites, whom she intended not only to use for pleasure, but also to involve in governing affairs. It is clear that the entire Orlov clan strongly urged that Panin’s project be rejected. But how can this be done without causing grumbling from the influential Panin, who, presumably, was supported by many nobles?
Catherine’s cunning move was to bury the project with the wrong hands - she provided the opportunity for influential officials to familiarize themselves with the project so that they could express their opinion about it. Historians have two anonymous reviews at their disposal. Their authors did not object to the establishment of the Imperial Council, but made minor additions and changes: for example, the Council should meet not five, but four times a week; one of the anonymous people recommended calling the head of the chancellery not a director, but a chief secretary. Sharply negative judgments about Panin’s project were expressed only by Feldzeichmeister Vilboa, who believed that “under the guise of protecting the monarchy” the project “subtly leans more towards aristocratic rule”, in which members of the Council “can very conveniently grow into co-rulers”, which will lead “to the destruction of power and greatness Russian Empire" Vilboa did not skimp on compliments to the empress: her wisdom, “prudence and bright outlook” do not need any special advice.
Pleasing criticism of the project was exactly what the empress needed - there were grounds to disavow her signature. The fact that Vilboa, in his servility, accommodated himself to the opinion of the Empress and the Orlovs, and perhaps took advantage of their prompting, can be judged by the fact that there was no threat of turning the Council members “into co-rulers,” and the project also did not give rise to the establishment of an aristocratic board: the appointment and removal of Council members was within the competence of the Empress. In this case, what was important was not the arguments, not their persuasiveness, but the very fact that the project was unacceptable to just a single critic. Main argument in favor of the artificiality of Vilboa's arguments was that the throne was occupied by an intelligent, energetic empress who did not intend to obey the will of others.
The Feldzeichmeister recommended, instead of establishing the Imperial Council, to reform the Empress's Cabinet, dividing it into the necessary departments, and so that only well-known, legally established reports would be presented to her personally and that each department would be chaired by a State Secretary or Cabinet Secretary. These secretaries received incoming and outgoing papers, registered them, reported their contents to the empress at precisely specified hours, and finally drew up draft decrees for signing by the empress. Thus, instead of the Imperial Council, an institution of political importance, Vilboa proposed to ease the empress’s work by improving the technique of carrying out affairs. Such a proposal suited Catherine quite well. She was also satisfied with the second part of Panin’s project, which provided for the reform of the Senate. According to Panin, the Senate in its current form was a cumbersome institution that had an insignificant coefficient useful action. Each of the 30 senators, the author of the project believed, “comes to a meeting of the Senate as a dinner guest who does not yet know not only the taste of the food, but also the dishes with which he will be served.”
As for Nikita Ivanovich’s activities as head of the foreign policy department, she met with the support of the empress only in those cases when she corresponded to her views; on the contrary, the empress ignored his opinion if it contradicted her intentions. Let us give several examples of how Panin, contrary to his convictions, had to submit to the will of the empress and unconditionally carry out her commands.
In this regard, the sharp turn in Russia’s foreign policy orientation in 1780 is indicative. Until that year, Catherine maintained allied relations with Frederick II, which expired in 1777. Panin, who was one of the architects of the so-called Northern system, continued to focus on Prussia, while while Catherine believed that Russia had extracted maximum benefits from an alliance with Prussia and the time had come to move closer to Austria, Russia’s natural ally in the fight against Ottoman Empire. If before 1780 Frederick II was showered with flattery to Catherine II, receiving in return a generous dose of praise addressed to him, then from 1780 the place of the Prussian king in correspondence with the empress was taken by Austrian Emperor Joseph II. Panin did not agree with this turn, but had to humbly carry out Catherine’s orders.
The question ultimately turns to the question with what zeal and dedication Panin performed the duties of chancellor. Historians, as in most cases, have contradictory evidence from contemporaries. When using them, three circumstances should be taken into account: these certificates differ in nationality and the timing of reviews. Most foreigners left negative characteristics of Panin. We, however, must once again recall that the criteria for assessing foreigners, in this case diplomats, are not objective data, but the degree to which Russian nobles satisfy the interests of the country they represent.
Ambassadors to the Russian court often blamed their failures not on their own mistakes and inability to negotiate, but on the negative character traits of their Russian interlocutor. Finally, the reviews are unequal in content: while diplomats paid primary attention to Panin’s attitude towards official duties, Russian authors tried to highlight his moral qualities; laudatory reviews often contain notes of panegyric.
Fonvizin wrote: “Count Panin’s character was worthy of sincere respect and unfeigned love. His firmness proved the greatness of his soul. In matters related to the good of the state, neither promises nor threats were able to shake it. Nothing in the world could force him to offer his opinion to the monarch against his inner feelings. How many blessings this firmness has bestowed on the fatherland. She protected him from colic. Others adored him, his very enemies felt respect for him in the depths of their hearts, and from all his compatriots he was given the title of an honest man.”
Golitsyn gave an equally enthusiastic assessment of Panin: “He was with great dignity, and what distinguished him most of all was some kind of nobility in all his actions and in his attentiveness towards everyone, so that it was impossible not to love and respect him: it was as if he attracted me to myself. In my life I have never seen nobles so pleasant in appearance. Nature endowed him with dignity in everything that can make a wonderful man. All his subordinates idolized him."
The Empress's opinion about Panin changed. During the coup and for many years after it, he enjoyed her complete confidence. On the eve of the march to Peterhof to arrest Peter III Catherine, as she put it, convened “something like a council”, at which it was decided to send four guards regiment, a cuirassier regiment and four infantry regiments. Among the most proxies The person who made this decision was N.I. Panin. In a letter to Poniatowski dating back to 1762, the Empress did not spare words of praise addressed to Panin: he is “the most skillful, most intelligent and most zealous person at my court.” Panin looks different under the pen of the empress in 1783: “Count Panin was lazy by nature and had the art of giving this laziness the appearance of prudence and calculation. He was not gifted with such kindness or such freshness of soul as Prince Orlov, but he lived more among people and knew how to hide his shortcomings and his vices, and he had great ones.”
It seems that foreign diplomats treated Panin somewhat more favorably than the Russian Empress. The British Ambassador Harris reported in 1778: “One must have superhuman patience to deal with people so lazy and incapable of either listening to a question or giving a reasonable answer. You will hardly believe that Count Panin dedicates business pursuits half an hour a day." In the same 1778, the French Ambassador Carberon sent a dispatch with a similar review of Panin: “Count Panin is weak, like all the persons of this court, holding on to mercy; the trust he enjoys is sometimes useless. He is sensitive by nature, but by nature and habit he is lazy. The word “no” is unknown to him, but he rarely keeps his promises, and if on his part you apparently only occasionally encounter a rebuff in something, then the hopes he gives almost never come true. Among the traits of his character is cunning - that cunning that he surrounds you with politeness and thousands of pleasantries, forcing the person talking with him about business to forget that he is talking with the chief minister of the empress, and by this he distracts the interlocutor from the subject of his mission and knocks him off the serious tone that he should maintain in the midst of an exciting and dangerous conversation.”
Carberon returned to the theme of Panin’s laziness again two years later, describing his daily routine: “He gets up very late, amuses himself by looking at prints or new books, then gets dressed, receives those who come to him, then has dinner, and after that plays cards or sleeps, then he has dinner and goes to bed very late. His senior officials work no more than he does and spend their time playing cards, and lose a lot of money, up to six hundred rubles an evening, as happens, for example, with Fonvizin or Morkov, Bakunin and others.” In the first half of this decade, the ambassador of the allied Prussia, Count Solms, who enjoyed Panin’s special favor, did not note his official zeal. In January 1774, Solms reported to the king: “It is unpleasant to see that this minister, who has never been particularly hardworking, is now much less active, and allows himself incomparably more entertainment since he left the court than when he occupied there is the position of chief chamberlain. It's getting painful and I'm afraid it won't last long. Things suffer too much from such idleness.”
So, foreign diplomats, as well as Catherine, reproached Panin for laziness. Perhaps the key to explaining Panin’s decline in performance lies in the report of the English ambassador Gunning, sent three years earlier: “Recently, Count Panin’s enemies have been spreading a rumor that something like an apoplexy recently happened to him, which significantly weakened his abilities. And I know that a few days ago he himself, in the presence of the Empress, said that his nerves had become extremely weakened and that he was no longer able to do much work. Everyone believes that he wanted to prepare the Empress for his removal from service, an event that will greatly please Count Potemkin and the Chernyshevs, since all their influence was not enough to remove him from office, although recently their opinion outweighed his opinion on many occasions ".
The nobility of Panin’s nature and his selflessness are evidenced by his act, which amazed his contemporaries. In 1773, the Empress generously rewarded the teacher of her son, who had reached adulthood and no longer needed guardianship. Nikita Ivanovich was awarded a rank equivalent to field marshal, a salary with table money, 8412 serf souls, 100 thousand rubles for furnishing the house.
Such was the knight without fear or reproach, who honestly served his Fatherland. Catherine, although she made fun of Panin’s slowness (in a humorous description of the courtiers, she wrote about Panin: “Count Panin - if he ever hurries”), recognized the talents of a diplomat and educated person. “When you want reasoning and good general principles,” the empress wrote in the note “Portraits of Several Ministers,” you need to consult Panin, but not in private matters, because here he begins to get carried away and since he is very stubborn, he will only lead you into delusion. His share is foreign affairs." The Empress dismissed Panin in 1781, and on March 31, 1783 he died.
Bibliography
1. Dashkova, E. R. Notes. - London, 1859. - 25 p.
2. Quote. by: Pavlenko N.I. Catherine the Great. - M., 2004. -453 p.
3. Collection of the Russian Imperial Historical Society (hereinafter: Collection of RIO). T. 27. - St. Petersburg, 1880. - P. 365-372.
4. Ibid. - 374 p.
5. Bilbasov, V. A. Historical monographs. T. 4. - St. Petersburg, - 1901. - P. 15-24.
6. Sat. RIO. T. 1. - St. Petersburg, - 1867. - P. 203-221.
7. Goryushkin, A.V. Count Nikita Panin. - M., - 1989. - P. 99-100.
8. Catherine the Second. Notes. - St. Petersburg, - 1907. - P. 575-576.
9. Russian Antiquity. No. 5. - St. Petersburg, - 1902. - 371 p.
10. Ibid. - 372 s.
11. Sat. RIO. T. 72. - St. Petersburg, - 1891. - 415 p.
12. Ibid. - 463 p.
13. Sat. RIO. T. 19. - St. Petersburg, - 1876. - 398 p.
; his aunt was the wife of a relative of the imperial family, M.I. Leontyev. Born on September 15, 1718 in Danzig, he spent his childhood in Pernov, where his father Ivan Vasilyevich Panin (1673-1736) was commandant. Brother of General Pyotr Panin, brother-in-law of diplomats I. I. Neplyuev and A. B. Kurakin.
During his stay in Sweden, Panin, according to contemporaries, became imbued with sympathy for the constitutional system. He was a creature of Bestuzhev, and therefore his position with the fall of the latter and with the coup that took place in the mid-1750s. in Russian politics (rapprochement between Russia and France, the Anglo-Prussian convention) became very difficult.
Having a powerful enemy in the person of Count Vorontsov, who replaced Bestuzhev, Panin repeatedly asked to resign when he was unexpectedly appointed (June 29, 1760), instead of Bekhteev, as Pavel Petrovich's tutor. Panin became close to Catherine, especially after the death of Elizabeth.
In the introduction to the project, Panin, according to the historian, sharply criticized the arbitrariness that prevailed in management (“in the production of affairs, the power of persons has always acted more than the power of government officials”) and proposed the establishment of a Council of 6-8 ministerial members; all papers that require the signature of the sovereign had to go through this council and be certified by one of the ministers. The project was presented to the Senate by the right " have the freedom to submit to the Highest commands, if they ... may oppress the laws or the welfare of the people».
This project was rejected by the empress. In a letter to Vyazemsky she wrote: “ another thinks that because he has been in this or that land for a long time, then everywhere, according to the policy of this or that beloved land, everything should be established" Despite this, Panin did not lose his position, most likely due to the exceptional circumstances of Catherine’s accession to the throne and his influence on Paul, whose tutor he was; Catherine, in her own words, was afraid to remove it. A more cautious opinion on the issue of rejecting Panin’s project was expressed by N.D. Chechulin. .
This role of Panin explains both his position throughout the subsequent time among the fighting court parties (he always had to fight against the Orlovs) and his relationship with the empress, which was never sincere and good. Until very recently, he was accused, among other things, of deliberately corrupting Paul and, for his own personal purposes, contributing to the discord between the empress and her son; but from Poroshin’s notes it is clear that he took his task as an educator very seriously.
Foreign policy activities
All issues of foreign policy of the Russian government for the period from to the years are associated with the name of Panin. Having been at first an unofficial adviser to the empress, in 1763, after Vorontsov was sent on leave, he was made a senior member of the foreign board. Soon after, after Bestuzhev’s removal, he was entrusted with managing all the affairs of the board, although he was never chancellor.
Resolving questions about Russia's relations with the states of Northern Europe led Panin to create the system of the so-called “Northern Union”, or “Northern Accord”, which brought upon him accusations of doctrinaire. With this system, Panin wanted, in order to exalt the prestige and importance of Russia, to create around it an alliance of all the northern powers, to counter the aspirations of the Bourbon and Habsburg dynasties; To this end, he tried - generally unsuccessfully - to unite states whose interests were completely opposite, such as Prussia with England and Saxony.
Performance evaluation
Paul could perpetuate his gratitude to Panin only after the death of Catherine, by erecting a monument to him in the church of St. Magdalene in Pavlovsk. Catherine, comparing Panin with Orlov in a letter to Grimm, puts the latter much higher and says that Panin had many major shortcomings, but he knew how to hide them.
Count Panin was one of the most educated Russian people of his time, so that, according to reviews of foreign ambassadors, he “looked more like a German”; Catherine called him encyclopedia. He was interested in a wide variety of issues from the field of state knowledge and was familiar with many classic works of philosophical literature. A humane way of thinking and a strict sense of legality is indicated in eloquent words by one of the people closest to him, the famous Fonvizin; Some free-thinking in matters of faith is evidenced by the fact that, when inviting Platon Levshin to Pavel Petrovich as a teacher of the law, Panin was most interested in whether he was superstitious, and in a letter to Vorontsov, who fell ill from Lenten food, he said that the law requires not ruin of health, and ruin of passions, “can hardly be done with mushrooms and turnips alone.”
Panin belonged to the Freemasons. There were no two different opinions about his honesty and kindness in his time; even his enemies respected him as a proud and honest person. Of the 9,000 souls he received upon Paul’s marriage, he distributed half to his secretaries, Fonvizin, Ubri and Bakunin.
Nikita Ivanovich Panin
D. G. Buckinghamshire about Count Nikita Ivanovich Panin:
Mr. Panin, having passed his fifty years, looks rather unhealthy; It was he who, thanks to the fact that he had been in Sweden for some time, was best versed in the affairs of the north. The system to which he adhered, and from which nothing will force him to retreat until its complete impracticality is revealed in view of the dislike of other powers, is to balance the formidable alliance House of Austria with the house of Bourbon by firmly uniting England, Russia, Holland and Prussia, and strengthening this league by keeping Sweden inactive, and by inducing Denmark to abandon all her French connections. (Mr. Panin has no choice but to show the greatest hostility towards the French and Austrians, since he is fully aware of the intrigues of their tireless emissaries aimed at removing him from power.) He thinks to achieve the first by constantly maintaining the hostility of factions there, who are tearing apart this unfortunate country, the latter - in order to convince the Grand Duke so that, upon reaching adulthood, he renounce his claims to the Duchy of Holstein. (From a conversation I once had on this subject with Mr. Panin on this subject, it appears that he seems to attach less importance to the votes in the Reichstag of the Empire than they actually have for Russia.)
The King of Prussia is his hero, but he is not so blinded by this partiality as not to notice the many faults which mar the character of this great monarch, and not to realize that the agreements with him will probably not last longer than the day they remain important to his interests .
Panin is considered an honest and decent person in a country where this concept has no meaning. Conscious and proud of this, he will always be careful not to deviate from the behavior by which such a reputation has been created.
For the benefit of Russia, for the peace and happiness of her sovereign, it is highly necessary that Mr. Panin and Count Orlov should be able to live in friendship, but such friendship is incompatible with the idea of marriage, which the young man is believed to still be passionate about; it can never be indulged by another without injury to reputation, without risk to his own popularity, without dereliction of duty in a matter which, as an alarmed nation believes, he alone can properly perform.
Princess Dashkova owns his heart, either as his child or as his mistress; bad people claim that it is both. He speaks of her with admiration, he spends almost every free minute with her, he tells her the most important secrets with boundless trust, which a minister can hardly extend to a private person. The Empress, knowing about this circumstance, is rightly worried that such information is being received by a person prone to endless intrigue, overwhelmed by insatiable ambitions, one who from a bosom friend has become an inveterate enemy; therefore, the empress extracted a promise from him that he would not talk about government affairs. He gave his word, but in this case he broke it.
IN early years Mr. Panin had an affair with the wife of the brother of the Grand Chancellor, Count Roman Vorontsov. She was the mother of that Vorontsov, who later became ambassador to England, Elizabeth, the favorite of Peter III, the wife of Count Buturlin, the current Russian envoy to Spain, and Princess Dashkova. On her deathbed, this lady assured Mr. Panin that Princess Dashkova, who was present, was his daughter. Since he always speaks of her with sincerity and affection and makes no attempt to hide how much time he spends alone with her, those who know him best claim that it is highly possible that he is not motivated by love affair; impartiality makes one believe that his affection is exclusively paternal in nature, and their communication is innocent.
In a conversation that I had in Tsarskoe Selo with Her Imperial Majesty about Princess Dashkova, she assured me that this lady would not stay in St. Petersburg for more than two months.
Based on this, and also having accurate information that the princess (several days before the empress left for Riga, they let me know that Princess Dashkova was in men's clothing seen in the barracks of horse guards) uses all her art to turn the hearts of not only Mr. Panin, but also many others from her person and the government, she has the intention of expelling her from St. Petersburg, perhaps this decision has now been carried out.
The character of General Panin can best be understood from what his brother recently said about him.
When the general's wife died, it was thought that he was so shocked by this loss that it threatened his health. The Empress sent to him the Brother-in-law (an old servant in whose experience, affection and devotion Her Majesty has the greatest confidence; when the Revolution was preparing, he was the main channel of communication between her and the conspirators. Previously, he was considered the manager of her private wardrobe, but now she gave him the rank chamberlain. He took care of his son, born in Moscow on Christmas Day 1762), to assure her of his affection and friendship and encourage her to take care of her health when she so needed it. Mr. Panin, having learned about this, expressed himself in the following words(as best I can convey it in English): “I truly love my brother. He and I were born from the same womb. This, however, does not blind me to his character; his abilities are small, he is desperate and reckless, and, therefore, there is some reckless purpose for which the empress needs his service.”
Denis Ivanovich Fonvizin (1745–1792), Russian playwright:
Count Panin's character was worthy of sincere respect and unfeigned love. His firmness proved the greatness of his soul. In matters related to the good of the state, neither promises nor threats were able to shake it. Nothing in the world could force him to offer his opinion to the monarch against his inner feelings.
From the “Notes” of Prince Fyodor Nikolaevich Golitsyn:
He was with great dignity, and what distinguished him most of all was a kind of nobility in all his actions and in his attentiveness towards everyone, so that it was impossible not to love and respect him: he seemed to attract people to himself. In my life I have never seen noblemen so pleasant in appearance. Nature endowed him with dignity in everything that can make a wonderful man. All his subordinates idolized him.
From the monograph “Catherine the Great” by Nikolai Ivanovich Pavlenko:
The Empress's opinion about Panin changed. During the coup and for many years after it, he enjoyed her complete confidence. On the eve of the campaign to Peterhof to arrest Peter III, Catherine, as she put it, convened something like a council, at which it was decided to send a cuirassier regiment and four infantry regiments against the overthrown regiment. Among the most trusted persons who made this decision was N.I. Panin. In a letter to Poniatowski dating back to 1762, the Empress did not spare laudatory reviews... He looked differently under the pen of the Empress in 1783: “Count Panin was lazy by nature and had the art of giving this laziness the appearance of prudence and calculation. He was not gifted with such kindness or such freshness of soul as Prince Orlov, but he lived more among people and knew how to hide his shortcomings and his vices, and he had great ones.” This is how the empress appreciated Panin’s service. ...She dismissed Panin in 1781, and on March 31, 1783 he died.
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