Discussions about the reason for the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941 and about the readiness of the Red Army itself to launch an offensive most often come down to attempts to compare technical details military readiness. But so far these attempts remain attempts that do not lead to a mutually agreed conclusion. For each of the disputing parties has the right to choose and justify their arrays of figures, which in their own way may look correct (although there may be counter-arguments that cast doubt on these same figures). Examples:

We open “A Brief History (of the War...)”, Moscow, “Voenizdat”, 1965, p. 52:

The total strength of the Soviet Armed Forces six months before the start of the war, by January 1941, was 4,207 thousand people. The fascist German army at the time of the invasion of the USSR was more than twice as large as the Soviet one.

In the first echelons, the enemy had 103 divisions, of which 10 were tank divisions, that is, almost twice the strength of the first echelon of Soviet troops.

So - 103 divisions... Again, some kind of avoidance of a direct answer. Okay, but how many Soviet divisions were there in the first (uh-uh), in the western districts? We read on the same page above:

In total, in the western border districts before the war there were 170 divisions... The troops of these districts accounted for more than half the strength of the entire Red Army (about 54 percent). ... But the real capabilities of our troops did not correspond to the number of divisions...

Well, we now know that this turned out to be not enough. And 54% of approximately 5 million is about 2.5 million. Some certainty is already emerging. How many advancing Germans were there? Is it possible to find specific values?

IN last chapters The books also come across some numbers. For example, on page 556 there is a table "Distribution of Nazi divisions in 1941-1945." As of June 22, there is the following data:

The total number of Nazi divisions is 217.5
Quantity on the Soviet-German front - 153 (70.3%)

The total number of Nazi divisions is 314.5
Quantity on the Soviet-German front - 179 (57%)

And on page 569 there is finally a table entitled “Number of troops and weapons” (USSR and Germany on active fronts). However, it begins with... December 1941:

December 1941 – 4197 (USSR), 5093 (Germany)
......
January 1945 – 6532 (USSR), 3100 (Germany)

Initially, Hitler “released” 80-100 divisions for the Eastern Campaign. Then (by the beginning of 191) talk turned to 144 divisions (not counting the divisions of Italy, Romania, Hungary, and Finland). That's pretty much how it remained. On June 22, 152 German divisions, 12 Romanian, 2 Hungarian, 3 Italian, 18 Finnish - a total of about 3.5 million people - entered the battle.

ABOUT! It's getting closer! In total, this means that on June 22, 1941, the enemy launched an attack on the USSR in the amount of 3.5 million. But, excuse me, Finland declared war on the USSR on June 25. Hungary and Romania have not yet gone into battle on June 22 either. Therefore, from 3.5 million people it is necessary to subtract some of the strength of the armies of the German allies. There were 35 divisions allied to Germany (or 19%). Those. it turns out that on June 22, 1941, approximately 2.8 million German troops alone went to attack the USSR (And Soviet troops in western districts(see above) it was... about the same - 2.5 million).

In the end, it turns out that the advancing Germans did not have much of an advantage in the number of troops. Moreover, the attacker, it is believed, should have more soldiers, since in the attack (as a rule) the losses are higher. But... for some reason the Red Army, which was on the defensive, suffered really big losses. This is explained by the fact that although the Germans had approximately the same number of troops, they created an overwhelming superiority in the directions of the main attacks.

Maybe. But that’s what reconnaissance is for, to determine in advance the locations of these possible main attacks. Why haven't they identified it? Did Soviet intelligence find out something in advance? As it turns out, I found out. But for some reason the Soviet General Staff did not want to take this into account when deploying covering troops. It was possible to ignore such information only in one case - if the German attack was actually NOT TAKEN INTO ATTENTION.

But Hitler still attacked. Those. he must have had some reason for this. Some suggest that it is of a strategic nature. But then (to check) it makes sense to look into whether Hitler had any plans for “after Barbarossa”? As it turns out, he did. And this is evidenced by his Directive N: 32, which (unlike Directive N: 21) little known among historians.

A brief explanation of its text is in the book by L. Bezymensky “SPECIAL FOLDER “BARBAROSSA”, in Chapter 7 “Pyramid of Death” (fragments pp. 254-264)
. . . . . .

WHAT WERE UP TO AFTER "BARBAROSSA"

In no case should we accept the date that appears on the document with that name as the moment the development of Operation Barbarossa began. The same can rightfully be said about the moment the development of the operation is completed. According to normal logic, one could consider that the development of Operation Barbarossa as a military strategic plan ended on June 21, 1941, on the eve of the day when the three German army groups began to act in strict accordance with the orders developed by the OKW and OKH. But in reality this was not the case. The process of developing the operation continued after June 21, because the appetites of the German General Staff and the Nazi leadership by no means stopped at those military lines that were noted in “Directive N: 21”. Even that purely theoretical line “A-A” (from Arkhangelsk to Astrakhan), which was drawn along a line on the map Soviet Union, did not at all exhaust the plans that were hatched in the imperial chancellery. This is understandable: after all, the operation itself represented a decisive step in the struggle to seize world domination, and for this, of course, it was necessary not only to step over the notorious “A-A” line, but also to move much further. Where to?

In the history of “additional” planning for Operation Barbarossa, there are several weeks in which it received significant development in comparison with “Directive N: 21”. This happened in early July 1941 - when Hitler and all his military advisers (not to mention the leaders of the Nazi Party) were absolutely sure that the Soviet Union had already been defeated. ... On July 27, he “predicted” Halder that “in a month our troops will be at Leningrad and Moscow, on the Orel-Crimea line, at the beginning of October on the Volga, and in November in Baku and Batumi” (KTB. Halder, Bd. I, S. 1023). In these same July days, Hitler named another target - the Urals. July 16, 1941 dates back to what later became a classic document of aggression... the minutes of a meeting at Hitler’s headquarters, at which Hitler, Bormann, Rosenberg, Goering, Keitel and Jodl talked about how they could “divide the Russian pie.” This protocol, which was first announced at the Nuremberg trials and was often quoted in various works, dedicated to the Second World War, registered the complete confidence of the Nazi clique that the Soviet Union had already been defeated and the Soviet Army would not be able to provide any significant resistance.

Was the Wehrmacht ready for this situation? Certainly. The Nazi generals always knew how to foresee cases when it was necessary to develop success, but they did not know how to foresee their own defeats. No one in the German General Staff made plans in case of failure of “Barbarossa”, but already at the beginning of June 1941, that is, even before the attack on the USSR, “Directive N: 32” was developed - on actions “after Barbarossa”. But more about her a little later. First we will deal with the comparatively less well-known, but perhaps even more adventurous plan of German imperialism.

So, mid-July 1941. At Hitler's headquarters and the General Staff there is complete confidence in victory. Under these conditions, a development is placed on General Halder’s desk, in which it is assumed that the war is over, and that only 56 divisions will be needed to “secure and occupy” the occupied territory. They will carry out occupation tasks, and in addition, carry out “raids” into unoccupied areas. For this purpose, Halder decided to create several special groups, namely:

a) one tank corps for operations in Transcaucasia;
b) two tank corps to control the mouth of the Volga;
c) one tank corps for operations in the Southern Urals and one for operations in the Northern Urals (KTB. OKW, Bd. I, S. 1023).

In the Urals? Yes, in the Urals. A special development entitled “Operation against the Ural Industrial Region” and dated July 27, 1941 was devoted to this seemingly phantasmagoric task. It said:

“I. The operation will be carried out by mechanized troops with a force of 8 tank and 4 motorized divisions. If necessary, separate infantry divisions will also be involved, which will be tasked with guarding rear communications.
.....
The operation, by design, will be tied to highways and railways..."
......
Finally, specific directions of action were envisaged from Astrakhan to Kuibyshev, even with a call south of the Urals(east of Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk), and in the north up to Vorkuta. No more and no less!

Of course, today one can sneer at the generals from the OKW and OKH, who believed that they could, with 12 divisions, pass through almost the entire European territory Soviet Union and capture the Urals. As in the planning of Operation Barbarossa itself, here the German generals believed that they would operate in the Urals as if in a vacuum. For them the Red Army no longer existed, for them there was no Soviet population. It’s not without reason that they say: whomever the gods want to punish, they deprive of their minds...

But since August 1941, you will not find any mention of the Urals in the documents of the German General Staff. Developments of events in Soviet-German. front quickly sobered up both General Halder and many other generals - they began to note with fear the growing power of the Soviet resistance. I had to forget about the Urals, because the entire building of “Barbarossa” was shaking.
......
The Urals played another specific role in German military planning. The fact is that Hitler’s Germany, in the “ideal case” of developing aggression, would somehow have to meet the interests of Japanese imperialism. Theoretically, it was believed that the meeting between the Wehrmacht divisions and the Japanese samurai should have taken place somewhere near Novosibirsk. In any case, Hitler wanted to keep the Urals for himself. And although by the end of 1941 it became clear that neither Siberia nor the Urals were out of the question, the aggressors attempted to formally divide spheres of influence. At the end of December 1941 Japanese ambassador in Berlin, General Oshima handed over to Ribbentrop a draft of a special agreement on the “division of spheres of influence” between Germany and Japan (T. Sommer, Deutschland und Japan zwischen den Machten, Tubingen, 1962, S. 428). The project consisted of three parts. The first part, called “Division of Operation Zones,” stipulated that the dividing line between Japanese and German interests should be 70 degrees east longitude along the entire length of the Asian continent - from the north of Siberia through Central Asia to the Indian Ocean. In the Indian Ocean basin itself, operations could be carried out on both sides of the dividing line. The second part (titled “General Outline of Operations”) suggested that Japan should seize Anglo-American bases and territories in East Asia and dominate the Western Pacific. As for Germany and Italy, they were intended to seize territories in Europe and Asia, in particular in the Near and Middle East, as well as in the Mediterranean basin (“Probleme des zweiten Weltkrieges”, Koln, 1967, S. 134).

This document was thoroughly discussed in Berlin. From the side of the “experts” came whole line objections: for example, the admirals considered it impossible to give the Japanese any precise assurances regarding the delimitation of interests in the world's oceans. And the General Staff of the Ground Forces proposed replacing the division of the world along the 70th degree of Eastern longitude with a certain “natural border”, which should have passed much further east, namely: along the Yenisei, then along the border between the Soviet Union, Mongolia and China and further to Afghanistan. According to this dividing line as the Ural industrial area, and the Siberian industrial complex should have fallen into the hands of the Germans (Ibid, S. 137).

The agreement was nevertheless signed in its original form. Hitler, apparently realizing that it was too early to talk about a specific division of spheres of influence, decided not to tease Japan and agreed with the 70-degree line - fortunately, he could cede Siberia to the Japanese all the more readily because he did not have it at his disposal. At that moment, it was much more important for him to strengthen military cooperation with Japan and intensify the actions of both aggressors against the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition.

But the 70th degree divided not only the Asian part of the Soviet Union. Even more significant was the fact that the southern tip of this imaginary watershed faced the Indian Ocean, and Indian Ocean The eyes of not only the Japanese, but also the German Nazi leadership were riveted.

It is no coincidence that in the history of Operation Barbarossa there is another chapter - its “southern” chapter, concerning plans related to the advance of the Wehrmacht through the Caucasus to the Middle East and further to Afghanistan and India. In Western historical literature, the prevailing opinion is that all such activities of Hitler were at the stage of very preliminary consideration and, strictly speaking, represented another chimera. This thesis is not confirmed by anything; rather, on the contrary, it is refuted by all the archives discovered after the defeat of the Third Reich.

The main document that refutes the thesis about “chimeras” is the above-mentioned “Directive N: 32”, developed in June 1941. It directly intended to begin preparations for an operation “on the other side of the Caucasus.”

This directive had a curious “overture”: it was discovered that in different groups of the German military clique there were different ideas about the period “after Barbarossa”. If the brown Fuhrer himself believed that the main efforts needed to be concentrated in Europe and Asia, then the adherents of German colonialism could not give up the dream of returning African possessions. Therefore, in the preparation of “Directive N: 32,” those groups that considered it necessary first of all to gain a foothold in Africa in order to, based on the military bases captured there and the returned colonies, begin the fight against the British and Americans, gained the upper hand. This goal was closely linked to the intended capture of the entire Iberian Peninsula. As you know, Hitler was not satisfied with the alliance that existed between him and the fascist dictator Franco. Not trusting his ally, he assumed that it would be much safer to simply occupy Spain along with Portugal and turn the Pyrenees into a large military bridgehead.

However, the original version of “Directive N: 32” was refuted by Hitler as too one-sided. On his instructions, it was revised. Leaving open the possibility of using West African bases, Hitler demanded a rapid advance through North Africa and Egypt to Arabian Peninsula. Here Rommel’s troops, operating in North Africa, and German expeditionary force, who should have pass through Bulgaria and Turkey. Then it was planned to carry out the second pincer movement: to combine the attacks of the above-mentioned two groups with the third, moving from the north, that is, through Transcaucasia. This way was meant crush the French and English possessions in the Middle East. The entire Arabian Peninsula was to fall into German hands.

But that wasn't it either the last word in planning “after Barbarossa”. Subsequently, the united German troops had to make the leap from Arabia to India, at the same time, another strike was supposed to follow in the same direction - from Afghanistan.

The German military has long been paying attention to Afghanistan, considering this country a suitable base for action against India. Back in the 30s, Rosenberg’s department was preparing its agents in Afghanistan, relying mainly on a group of traitors from among national political figures. As early as December 18, 1939, Rosenberg sent a memorandum to Hitler in which he proposed to use Afghanistan “if necessary against British India or Soviet Russia” (ADAP, Bd. VIII, S. 431). Immediately after the start of the war, German agents in Afghanistan became noticeably more active; the leader of the local Waziri tribes, the so-called “fakir from Ipi” Haji Mirza Khan, also played a significant role in these plans. The Waziris were in the zone between India and Afghanistan and had to raise an uprising, to the “aid” of which, of course, German troops would come.

This was the general political background against which Hitler ordered to begin preparations for an operation against India carried out from the territory of Afghanistan. Of course, one “little thing” fell out of this “harmonious” plan: in order for German troops to move from Afghanistan to India, they first had to be in Afghanistan, having first covered “some” 7-8 thousand kilometers, separating Afghanistan from the western borders of the Soviet Union. However, intoxicated by his first military successes, it was easy for Hitler, in his over-inflamed imagination, to “jump” over such a “small” space as a space of several thousand kilometers.

How was the Wehrmacht going to “reach” Afghanistan and India? In the same July 1941, another plan was developed - a plan to move through the Caucasus, seize the Caucasian oil fields and advance to the Iran-Iraq border. ....

However, Iraq was only one and, moreover, most likely an auxiliary direction of future global aggression. The long-range target was India. To achieve this goal, in addition to the troops, a “fifth column” - the “fakir from Ipi” and others - had to operate. (Thus, the Germans had high hopes for the leader of the Indian nationalist movement, Subhas Chandra Bose.) It was assumed that the Indian nationalist forces would revolt the moment German troops approached the Indian border. The task of reaching the Indian border was assigned to the so-called “Formation F” - a motorized corps under the command of General Felmy, which was formed in Greece and specially equipped for operations in subtropical and tropical conditions.

Neither the plan to capture Afghanistan nor the plan to enter India was implemented. Discussing this topic, the famous German historian Andreas Hilgruber wrote that “everything related to Afghanistan, and in general all plans related to Directive N: 32, were envisaged for the time “after Barbarossa.” However, the cardinal prerequisite for the implementation of such plans, namely: the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union, never became a reality” (A. Hillgruber, op. cit., S. 388).

No, I didn't! Hitler could not implement “Directive No. 32”, he could not carry out other plans, such as operations “Tannenbaum” (capture of Switzerland), “Silberfuchs” (capture of Sweden), “Felix” - “Isabella” (capture of Spain and Portugal) , could not even move to conquer the American continent. For a simple reason: the Soviet people, with their legendary feat, thwarted the Barbarossa plan and thereby saved the whole world from fascist enslavement.

================

CHAPTER 16 FAILURE OF THE VELIX PLAN

HOW GIBRALTAR WAS SAVED

For many Germans, the victory of tank divisions over French army became an event that they savored for a long time. ....

General Canaris did not share the general euphoria and did not consider the fall of France a victory. “If Hitler wins,” he told his subordinate Colonel Heinz, “that will be the end of us, and also the end of the Germany we love and want to see. If Hitler loses,” he added, “it will also be our personal defeat because we could not get rid of him.” ...

For a variety of reasons, Hitler's High Command... turned its gaze towards Spain. Goering advised Hitler to occupy Spain and North Africa first, not Great Britain. In June 1940, before the treaty with France was signed, General Guderian, commander of the 19th Panzer Corps, also argued for the need to capture Britain's strategic bastion of Gibraltar. The general even advised Hitler to postpone the signing of the treaty with France so that he could pass through the whole of Spain with two tank divisions, capture Gibraltar, and from this bridgehead capture French North Africa. General Alfred Jodl, head of the OKW transport department, presented the Fuhrer with a plan that proposed cutting off Great Britain from its eastern possessions by seizing Spain, Gibraltar, North Africa and the Suez Canal.

The plan, which was soon called Operation Felix, aimed to occupy Gibraltar and Spanish possessions in North Africa and, in particular, Spanish Morocco, Rio de Oro and the Canary Islands, in order to use Spanish ports as a base for German submarines in the Battle of the Atlantic. When successful development events could have dealt a blow, and perhaps fatally, to Great Britain.

This plan, however, clearly went against the wishes of General Franco. Despite the serious assistance of Nazi Germany during the Spanish Civil War, he had his own vision of national interests. On June 12, 1940, he declared a “peaceful” situation; then, two days later, with the agreement of the French and English but not the Germans, he sent troops to occupy Tangier.

The British, of course, were concerned that Hitler would be able to convince Spain to enter the war with all the ensuing consequences for the Allies.

Sir Samuel Hoare, an ardent supporter of peaceful action, was urgently sent to Spain on a special mission to persuade Franco not to succumb to German pressure. The chorus did not believe in the success of its mission so much that it kept a plane ready in case war suddenly broke out.

Hoare's consultations with the Spanish government, which began in mid-June 1940, were so difficult that the British Ministry of Defense gave him the authority to promise, if necessary, that Britain would be “ready to discuss after the war any question relating to common interests with Spain.” Perhaps this innocent-sounding statement might have given the Spaniards reason to think that Gibraltar might fall to them. The chorus refrained from veiled or explicit promises to discuss the fate of Gibraltar after the war, since the discussion had settled down, and Franco, for reasons best known to himself, did not make any demands regarding this bastion of the British and seemed “determined not to enter the war.” Despite the off-the-record outbursts of bravado at the start of negotiations and expressions such as “why don’t you end the war; you won’t win it,” the caudillo turned out to be surprisingly accommodating. There was evidence that Franco delivered to Hitler following conditions- before entering the war and opening its country to the passage of German troops, Germany must give French Morocco and Algeria to Spain. Such conditions irritated Hitler, since Franco’s demands were obviously impossible for him to fulfill.

On July 10, Field Marshal Keitel asked Canaris, a well-known expert on Spain, to check the possibility of organizing a blockade of Gibraltar. Ten days later, the admiral, upset by the course of events in France, went to Spain. He was to be accompanied by Abwehr officers Hans Pickenbrock, Lieutenant Colonel Hans Mikosch, Captain Hans-Jochen Rudloff, as well as the Abwehr station chief in Spain, Captain Wilhelm Leisner. He was, however, able to go there alone and spent enough time there to see his old friends: General Juan Vigon, Chief of the General Staff of the Spanish Armed Forces, and General Carlos Martinez Campos, Chief of Spanish Intelligence. Canaris urged them to persuade Franco not to agree to Hitler's requests. It seems significant that only his personal relationships with these people allowed such amazing frankness; this strongly suggests that Canaris had long since brought them to his side as a “confidant liaison” in Spain. One of Canaris's biographers, Dr. C. H. Abshagen, probably got it right when he wrote of the admiral's relationship with Vigon and Martinez Campos as one based on “mutual trust.”

On July 18, Franco announced his claims to Gibraltar, but not with the goal of taking it away from the British, and then so that Germany would not claim it. The British Special Envoy, Samuel Hoare, whom Cadogan once called “that little bore”, became very agitated, apparently not understanding the true background of such a statement.

In August, Canaris spoke with Franco's cousin Ramon Serrano Suñer, who was preparing to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The admiral urgently asked Serrano Suñera to do everything possible to persuade Franco to withdraw from the war - a surprisingly frank conversation. Almost immediately after this conversation, Franco sent Serrano Sunier to Berlin to personally clarify Hitler’s attitude to this issue. At a meeting with Serrano Suñer on 16 September, Hitler did not insist on Spain's entry into the war, perhaps deciding to leave more strong arguments in favor of this to a meeting with Franco himself.

At an informal meeting during which Canaris was supposed to recruit Franco to collaborate with Hitler to capture Gibraltar, he did the opposite. Canaris warned Franco that if he became an ally of the Axis, Spain would suffer not only economically, but would also lose its islands, and perhaps even the Iberian Peninsula would be captured by the British. Moreover, Hitler's war plans did not include troops to defend Spain.

Franco must have hoped, having conceded to Hitler, to subsequently share the laurels of victory with Germany, and at that time there were such chances. But convinced by Canaris that Hitler's cause was doomed, he considered it more profitable to remain on the sidelines. As Winston Churchill said: “Franco changed his mind and decided not to drag his exhausted people into another war.”

Knowing that Franco feared a German invasion of Spain if he refused to cooperate, Canaris used his strongest argument:

Hitler has no intention of invading Spain by force. Having revealed the Fuhrer's secret, Canaris told Franco about Plan Barbarossa, Hitler's ambitious plan to take over Russia. It was for this reason that Germany could not contribute troops to the Spanish campaign, let alone defend Spain. The Abwehr chief surprised Franco with his conviction that Hitler would not win the war; thus Spain, as an active ally of Germany, was sure to be the target of revenge by the victorious Allies after the war.

On August 8, encouraged by Canaris's secret assurances, Franco presented his extortion terms to the German ambassador Eberhard von Stöhrer. Caudillo said that he would join Hitler if he was promised Gibraltar and French Morocco as a reward. Germany was also to promise, if necessary, military aid and supplies of wheat and oil to strengthen Spain's weak economy. The main requirement was to first land German troops on the English coast for a full-scale invasion, and only after that Spain agreed to enter the war.

This proposal caused Hitler to rush Canaris to Spain again in an attempt to persuade Franco to join the Axis or at least soften his “outrageous” demands. Canaris did not do this in conversations with his old friend. On the contrary, he again reminded Franco of the mistake of siding with Hitler, who was doomed to defeat. General Halder writes in his diary on August 9, quoting Canaris’s words upon his return: “Spain on its own will not be able to do anything against Gibraltar... It will be difficult to drag Spain into the war, as Hitler wants. Economic problems!"
......
Determined to reach an understanding with Franco, Hitler himself decided to meet with him. This meeting was scheduled for October 23 in the French border village of Hendaye to discuss the Felix plan. ......

Hitler arrived in Hyundai on his personal train, accompanied by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, Field Marshal Keitel and Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. It was striking that Admiral Canaris was absent from the delegation. Disliking Canarisa and fearing that, as close friend Franco, he would focus all the attention on himself and receive all the praise for bringing Franco into the Axis, Ribbentrop had Canaris expelled from the delegation. But this is exactly what Ribbentrop did not even have to worry about.

General Franco was accompanied by his cousin, Foreign Minister Ramon Serrano Suñer ( According to Canaris biographer Ian Colvin, an expert on German intelligence services for the British Foreign Office, Canaris instructed his Vatican agent Joseph Müller to make strictly secret contact with Spanish Foreign Minister Serrano Suñer during his visit to Rome and tell him the following: “Admiral [Canaris] asks you to tell Franco not to involve Spain in this game at any cost. You may think that we have strong positions. In fact, the situation is desperate, and the chances of winning the war are very small.” - Colvin, "Canaris, Chief of Intelligence", page 128) and the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin, General Eugenio Espinosa de los Monteros. Hitler prepared extensive protocol events with great pomp and splendor in order to flatter Franco. ....
The meeting in Hyundai was supposed to be carried out with a certain diplomatic ritual, at the end of which Franco was supposed to graciously yield to Hitler's wishes regarding Gibraltar, thus becoming a full ally of Germany in the war and receiving protection in the event of a British retaliatory strike. Franco did not compromise and did not allow German troops to set foot on the territory of his country.

The day before arriving in Hyundai, Hitler paid a visit to Vichy leader Pierre Laval in France. He also planned to meet personally with Marshal Henri Pétain the day after the Hendaye conference in order to persuade the French to abandon neutrality and act jointly with Germany against Great Britain. Franco, caught between two leaders of the Vichy government, was unhappy. When Hitler made it clear that he could not ignore the interests of France, Franco realized that he would not receive territorial gains by entering the war on the side of the Germans, and, in addition, he would lose a lot. Canaris's warning about British retaliatory measures became increasingly convincing.

For his part, Hitler obviously also realized the futility of his attempts to put pressure on Spain. Canaris had already informed Hitler (and not without reason) that much could not be expected from Franco in the Hyundai. ..... At a conference in Brenner Pass on October 15, Halder spoke with General von Epdorff: “The question of Gibraltar is closely linked to the interests of France. The participation of Spain will inevitably raise the problem of French colonial possessions and cooperation with France in North Africa.” Halder correctly notes that if France had learned about the transfer of its colonies to Spain, then “she would have stopped defending her colonies and would have handed them over to the British.”

The demands of Franco and Pétain were mutually unacceptable, and, in fact, this fact doomed the meeting in Hyundai to failure. Franco, for his own reasons, did not want to make concessions to Hitler. In addition, Canaris constantly emphasized that Germany would not open the Spanish front as long as Great Britain remained a threat, particularly at sea, and above all, at a time when Germany needed to mobilize all its forces for the upcoming, although still kept secret, invasion in USSR.

The meeting in Hyundai became completely meaningless when Franco expressed his doubts about Germany's victory in the war, which greatly offended Hitler. Caudillo emphasized that even if British Isles and will be captured, the British government and fleet will continue the war from Canada with the help of the Americans. This idea largely coincided with Canaris’s point of view. After the war, the wartime regent of Hungary, Admiral Miklós Horthy, said that Canaris predicted back in September 1938 that Germany would be doomed to defeat in any war if the United States entered it on the side of Great Britain and France. Canaris spoke about this as a warning to Horthy, convincing him that Hungary should not fight.

Although a meaningless memorandum of understanding was signed as a result of the meeting in Hyundai, neither the Fuhrer nor Franco got what they wanted. An angry Hitler later told Mussolini: “I’d rather have four teeth pulled out than do this again!”

Despite Franco's position, Hitler did not abandon Operation Felix. He was convinced that an attack on Gibraltar to cut off the Mediterranean at the same time as the main attack on the USSR by the end of 1940 would be a more effective step in the fight against Great Britain than a risky invasion across the English Channel. But in December Hitler lost the last vestiges of faith in Spain.

Franco's subsequent refusal to have anything to do with German plans The occupation of Vichy France (Operation Attila) forced Hitler to annul all agreements with Spain. On February 6, 1941, Franco once again denied Hitler's request to enter the war, using the disastrous state of the Spanish economy as an excuse. Ribbentrop, in one of his rare accurate assessments, told Hitler that in his opinion Franco had “no intention of entering the war.”
......
If Hitler had known that his chief of military intelligence, Admiral Canaris, was the inspirer of Franco’s incorrigible behavior, then, undoubtedly, Canaris would have paid for it with his life immediately, and not four years later. Canaris's actions were fraught with enormous risk.
......
After the war, when General Reinhard Gehlen, head of the new West German intelligence service, and one of his senior officers, Captain Eric Waldmann, visited Franco to renew contacts, the head of the Spanish intelligence service (G-2) spoke about Canaris's role. Chief G-2 also claimed that as a sign of his gratitude after the war, Franco provided Canaris' widow with a house in Spain and other assistance......

===================

So, after the war with France in the summer of 1940, Hitler did not stop his desire to expand his influence into neighboring countries. There were several options:

- Conduct a landing on the British Isles.
- Move troops through Spain to North Africa.
- Move troops to the Middle East (via Bulgaria and Turkey).
- Attack the USSR.

Hitler chose the latter.

Why?