ATS During the Great Years Patriotic War(1941-1945)

On the eve of the war, changes occurred in the NKVD apparatus that had a serious impact on the activities of the People's Commissariat in the war and even post-war years: state security agencies were separated into an independent structure. In February 1941, the People's Commissariat for State Security was formed. However, with the outbreak of hostilities in July of the same year, the People's Commissariats of Internal Affairs and State Security of the USSR again merged into a system of single “bodies”. In 1943, a reorganization similar to the pre-war one took place: two people's commissariats were formed on the basis of the NKVD. It is interesting that such rearrangements will be practiced in the future, including in the 50s. For the police, they meant a transition to operational subordination to state security agencies (in case of unification) or the beginning of relatively independent activity.

During the Great Patriotic War, there was another feature of the hierarchical position of the internal affairs bodies: in areas under “martial law,” the police acted under the leadership of the corresponding military command. The personnel of the internal affairs bodies were involved in operations to eliminate landings, sabotage groups, as well as Wehrmacht units operating in the Soviet rear. For this purpose, the famous fighter battalions were formed, numbering on average up to 200 fighters. Operating under the leadership of the military (a total of 1,755 such units were formed), they were replenished by the “reserve” - the so-called “assistance groups”, numbering more than 300 thousand citizens.

In large administrative centers Military units and units were formed from police officers, called upon to take part in hostilities when the front line moved directly to the city borders.

But the main emphasis of the use of internal affairs bodies in the fight against invaders was in the direction of organizing and conducting special operations behind enemy lines. For this purpose, a separate special-purpose motorized rifle brigade of the NKVD of the USSR is being created in Moscow. Special groups (30-50 fighters) of police carried out targeted strikes on headquarters, communications centers, warehouses and other important facilities. Over four years, the brigade carried out about 137 thousand such operations.

The partisan movement, which had developed on a wide front by 1942, owes its effectiveness largely to the police: as a rule, the heads of the internal affairs bodies of the territories abandoned by Soviet troops were entrusted with organizing resistance to the invaders. The secretary of the party committee and the heads of the state security and internal affairs agencies are largely responsible for the formation of a network of partisan detachments. No one doubts the effectiveness of their combat work: partisan movement was capable of not only performing operational and technical tasks, but also strategic ones.

Police officers en masse signed up as volunteers for the active army. In June-July 1941 alone, about 25% of the total went to the Red Army personnel, and 12 thousand workers from the Moscow police went to the front. A brigade was formed from workers of the NKVD of Moldova, Ukraine, the Rostov region and the Krasnodar Territory of the RSFSR, which was transformed in November 1941 into a division commanded by police captain P. A. Orlov.

Police officers made a worthy contribution to the development of a nationwide struggle behind enemy lines. They joined the ranks of the partisans, were part of destruction battalions and sabotage groups. Thus, the chief of police of the city of Sukhinichi, E. I. Osipenko, first headed a fighter detachment, and then the headquarters of a small partisan detachment. For valor, courage and courage shown in guerrilla warfare, he was awarded the medal “Partisan of the Patriotic War”, 1st degree, No. 000001.

The main task of the police during the war remained the protection of public order and the fight against crime, which ensured a strong rear. There were many problems in this area, which was explained both by the deterioration in the quality of personnel (by 1943, in some police departments, personnel had been renewed by 90-97%), and by the worsening crime situation and the increase in crime. In 1942, crime in the country increased by 22% compared to 1941, in 1943 - by 20.9% compared to 1942, in 1944, respectively - by 8.6%, and only in In 1945, there was a decrease in the crime rate: in the first half of the year the number of crimes decreased by 9.9%. Of great concern was that the largest increase was due to serious crimes. In 1941, 3,317 murders were registered, and in 1944 - 8,369, robberies and robberies, respectively, 7,499 and 20,124, thefts, 252,588 and 444,906, cattle thefts, 8,714 and 36,285.

IN military situation special measures were taken to combat crime. This is evidenced, in particular, by the resolution of the Military Council of the Arkhangelsk Military District “On ensuring public order and defense measures in the Arkhangelsk and Vologda regions”, according to which walking on the streets and traffic was prohibited from 24 to 4 hours. 30 min. (violation was subject to administrative punishment in the form of a fine of 3,000 rubles or arrest for 6 months). Persons who violated the established rules of trade, were engaged in speculation, purchasing manufactured goods and products in order to create reserves, as well as those who were seen in hooliganism, embezzlement, theft, spreading panic and provocative rumors, disrupting communications, air defense rules, fire protection and evading defense duties assignments, were responsible for a grave crime with cases being tried by military tribunals according to martial law. The resolution provided for shortened (up to two days) periods of preliminary investigation in these cases; the bodies of the NKVD and NKGB were given the right in cases that did not allow delay to carry out searches and arrests without the sanction of the prosecutor. In January 1942, the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR, by its resolution, proposed to classify thefts committed from evacuees as taking place during natural disasters, and in case of additional aggravating circumstances (by a group of persons, a repeat offender, etc.) - as banditry.

After Moscow's announcement on state of siege police and military patrols were given the right to shoot bandits and looters at the scene of a crime.

Special organizational, tactical and operational measures were also taken by the police. This primarily applied to cities with the most unfavorable crime situation. Thus, a brigade of the NKVD of the USSR was sent to Tashkent, which in 40 days of work eliminated a gang of 48 people who committed more than 100 serious crimes. Several thousand criminals were brought to justice (including 79 murderers and 350 robbers), and the military tribunal handed down 76 death sentences. Similar operations were carried out in 1943 in Novosibirsk and in 1944 in Kuibyshev.

The internal affairs bodies took an active part in helping children. Employees were engaged in identifying neglected and homeless children and placing them in orphanages and reception centers. The network of children's rooms at the police station expanded. In 1943, there were 745 children's rooms in the country, and by the end of the war there were more than a thousand. In 1942-1943. The police, with the help of the public, detained about 300 thousand homeless teenagers, most of whom were employed. Many of them were taken in by Soviet people.

Police passport officers made their contribution to the fight against crime and strengthening the country's defense. At the beginning of 1942, passports were re-registered in a number of areas of the USSR by gluing a control sheet into each passport. In September 1942, they were sent to the field guidelines on inspection and detection of counterfeit passports. The passport units carried out a lot of work in the territories liberated from the enemy. Only in 1944-1945. 37 million people were documented; during the documentation, 8,187 fascist collaborators were identified, 10,727 were former policemen, 73,269 served in German institutions, 2,221 were convicted.

The timely removal of weapons from the population and the collection of weapons and ammunition remaining on the battlefields were of great preventive importance. This work unfolded as the country's territory was liberated from the Nazi invaders. As of April 1, 1944, 8,357 machine guns, 11,440 machine guns, 257,791 rifles, 56,023 revolvers and pistols, and 160,490 grenades were collected and confiscated from the population. This work continued subsequently.

The BHSS devices operated effectively. Thus, in 1942, workers of the BHSS of the Saratov region confiscated from thieves, speculators and currency traders and deposited into the state treasury: cash - 2,078,760 rubles, gold in products - 4.8 kg, gold coins of royal mintage - 2,185 rubles, foreign currency - $360, diamonds - 35 carats, silver in products - 6.5 kg.

On the eve of the war, changes occurred in the NKVD apparatus that had a serious impact on the activities of the People's Commissariat in the war and even post-war years: state security agencies were separated into an independent structure.

In February 1941, the People's Commissariat for State Security was formed. However, with the outbreak of hostilities in July of the same year, the People's Commissariats of Internal Affairs and State Security of the USSR again merged into a system of single “bodies”. In 1943, a reorganization similar to the pre-war one took place: two people's commissariats were formed on the basis of the NKVD. It is interesting that such rearrangements will be practiced in the future, including in the 50s. For the police, they meant a transition to operational subordination to state security agencies (in case of unification) or the beginning of relatively independent activity.

During the Great Patriotic War, there was another feature of the hierarchical position of the internal affairs bodies: in areas under “martial law,” the police acted under the leadership of the corresponding military command. The personnel of the internal affairs bodies were involved in operations to eliminate landings, sabotage groups, as well as Wehrmacht units operating in the Soviet rear. For this purpose, the famous fighter battalions were formed, numbering on average up to 200 fighters. Operating under the leadership of the military (a total of 1,755 such units were formed), they were replenished by the “reserve” - the so-called “assistance groups”, numbering more than 300 thousand citizens.

In large administrative centers, military units and units were formed from police officers, called upon to take part in hostilities when the front line moved directly to the city borders.

There were significantly more other regular military formations of the NKVD. They were staffed mainly not by police officers, but by employees of other departments of the department. Together with the rest of the Red Army in July 1941, they took the first blow of the Wehrmacht of the NKVD army (29th, 30th, 31st).

And throughout the rest of the war years, the Soviet government, forming more and more military formations, used the apparatus of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs as a mobilization base for the Red Army. One of these NKVD armies (70th) was formed in the Urals at the end of 1942 - beginning of 1943. Two divisions of this army were formed in the Sverdlovsk region: the 140th in Krasnoufimsk and the 175th in Revda. The army headquarters was located in the regional center. The Ural association of the NKVD, consisting of border units, units of internal troops, employees of internal affairs bodies, participated in the Oryol-Kursk battle, the Belarusian, East Prussian and Berlin operations. New areas of the police’s work were added to, primarily participation in the implementation of the main state task - the defeat of the army of Nazi Germany.

During the war years, a military unit - a division - was formed from among exclusively career police officers from Moldova, Ukraine, the Krasnodar Territory and the Rostov Region: a unique case for law enforcement agencies of the USSR and Tsarist Russia, which has no analogues in the history of the country. (The duties of the formation commander were performed by the deputy head of the police department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Moldavian SSR, police captain P.A. Orlov.)

But the main emphasis of the use of internal affairs bodies in the fight against invaders was in the direction of organizing and conducting special operations behind enemy lines. For this purpose, a separate special-purpose motorized rifle brigade of the NKVD of the USSR is being created in Moscow. Special groups (30-50 fighters) of police carried out targeted strikes on headquarters, communications centers, warehouses and other important facilities. Over four years, the brigade carried out about 137 thousand such operations.

The partisan movement, which had developed on a wide front by 1942, owes its effectiveness largely to the police: as a rule, the heads of the internal affairs bodies of the territories abandoned by Soviet troops were entrusted with organizing resistance to the invaders. The secretary of the party committee and the heads of the state security and internal affairs agencies are largely responsible for the formation of a network of partisan detachments. No one doubts the effectiveness of their combat work: the partisan movement was capable of not only carrying out operational and technical tasks, but also strategic ones.

The main police task during the war years still remained the fight against crime and the protection of public order. Its implementation took place against the backdrop of a worsening crime situation. The annual increase in crime, due to an increase in serious crimes, was at the level of 16% throughout the war years. One of the factors that had a negative impact on her condition was the availability of weapons to the population of front-line areas.

The difficult situation required the use of emergency measures not only at the front, but also in the rear. These include strengthening criminal liability for various types of crimes, their reclassification (theft into banditry, etc.), a curfew, and the transfer of consideration of initiated criminal cases to military tribunals. The practice of delivering targeted, massive strikes against crime in the regions has become widespread. Large teams of specialists to investigate serious crimes are sent to large cities with the most unfavorable conditions. A similar operation was carried out in 1942 in the cities Central Asia– Tashkent, Alma-Ata, Frunze, etc.

The re-registration of passports, carried out almost continuously during the war, was important. It covered small territories (areas of mass arrival of evacuees, areas of the country liberated from the enemy, areas with a difficult crime situation). Carrying out re-registration made it possible to solve, along with the police (identifying convicted persons, those on the wanted list, hiding from mobilization, etc.), the tasks of ensuring state security (identifying police officers, employees of the German administration, traitors). In addition, the police fought against desertion, looting, and the spread of provocative rumors, cleared cities of criminal elements, ensured the organized evacuation of the population, carried out orders of the military authorities in charge of areas declared under martial law, combated child homelessness (departments for combating juvenile delinquency established in 1943).

The Central Information Bureau, created at the passport department of the Main Police Department, worked effectively, designed to ensure the prompt search of citizens who had lost contact with their relatives. With the help of this unit, about 20 thousand lost children were found and returned to their parents.

The fight against crime in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states, which are being liberated from the enemy, deserves special mention. Criminality here often manifested itself in the form of political banditry, which the Soviet police had to resist during the civil war.

The fierce nature of the confrontation, the wide scope of anti-Soviet, antisocial contradictions required the creation of headquarters to combat banditry, designed to coordinate the joint actions of the police, state security agencies and the Soviet Army. They were headed, as a rule, by the heads of police departments of the republics.

Already in the first days of the war, every fourth employee was drafted into the army, because... As a rule, detachments were created on the basis of organs people's militia. All this led to a significant increase in personnel turnover, comparable to the level of the 20s: by 1943, the personnel of the internal affairs bodies was renewed by 50%.

XIII. Soviet police in the post-war years

With the end of the war, the Allied People's Commissariats were reorganized into ministries: in 1946, the NKVD became the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. But the organizational and staffing changes did not end there; periodic divisions and mergers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the MGB (NKGB) continued until the mid-50s. Thus, the practice of directing the police and criminal investigation by the state security agencies continued.

In August 1950, the Main Police Directorate united three departments: police service (protection of public order, enforcement of laws and orders of government agencies), combating the theft of socialist property and profiteering, and criminal investigation.

Only after the death of I.V. Stalin and the execution of the former USSR Minister of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria, the final “divorce” of the internal affairs and state security bodies became possible. In pursuance of the Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee “On serious shortcomings in the work of the party and state apparatus,” a State Security Committee is being formed under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In April 1955, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR was organized.

At the same time, measures are being taken to return the police to the control of party and Soviet bodies, and bold, decisive steps are being taken to eliminate, as they said then, excessive centralization of the management of internal affairs bodies. In particular, in October 1956, “double subordination” of the police was restored (vertically - to the corresponding higher authority and horizontally - to the Council people's deputies appropriate level). IN practical activities Even after the war, the police had to overcome significant difficulties, again comparable to the period of the end of the civil war (difficult crime situation, due, in particular, to mass amnesties, high staff turnover associated with a decrease in financial resources allocated to internal affairs bodies from the state budget). As before, problems were solved mainly through the use of emergency measures. Those amnestied were detained and subsequently transferred to the disposal of Special Meetings, which meant for most of them a sentence for a new term. Internal affairs bodies were transferred to a special position major cities. The shortage of personnel was made up for by carrying out various types of mobilizations; the “quality and harmony” of the ranks was ensured by carrying out mass “cleansings”.

At the same time, it was during these years that investigative apparatuses were created within police departments (1947). In 1952, the internal affairs bodies were entrusted with the task of protecting retail facilities and industrial institutions- departments of non-departmental external guard security appear.

The measures taken, however, did not have a dramatic impact on improving the situation. Positive trends that appeared in certain years were nullified by the political “excesses” of the “top”. Thus, the thesis put forward by the country's leadership about the inevitability of a quick and complete eradication of crime meant a reduction in staff and funding for a futile department, and a narrowing of the use of operational-search methods of combating crime.

Moreover, for seven years, from January 1960 to July 1966, the country did not have a single body designed to lead the fight against crime due to the reform of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs with the transfer of its powers to the internal affairs bodies of the union republics. It had undoubted advantages in the field of politics (“the then” generation of citizens of the USSR was promised life in the conditions of communism - a society on the body of which there are no “criminal ulcers”; the impossibility of forceful restoration of the Stalinist course by “bodies” divided across fifteen republics, etc.), this decision does not stand up to criticism in the fight against crime. The Republican ministries for the protection of public order (the Ministry of Internal Affairs received this name in 1962) were unable to withstand the “criminal wave” (according to the oldest veteran workers, it was during this period that the practice of improving indicators in police reports became widespread: a “reduction” in crime was required , and the authorities did not have real opportunities to achieve it), which predetermined the restoration of a unified system of internal affairs bodies with the return of the name that most fully reflected its essence - the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. It united as structural divisions: the police administrative service department (hereinafter - the main department for the protection of public order), the criminal investigation department, the BHSSiS department, the traffic police department, the special police, transport police department (later - the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs for Transport), organizational and inspection department (since 1972 - Headquarters). The lower divisions also underwent a similar reorganization.

From this point on, signs of some improvement in the situation begin to appear. Organizational changes carried out in the late 60s identified the criminal investigation service (GUUR), the fight against property theft (UBKHSS), and the state traffic inspectorate (UGAI) as independent ones. The steps taken by the government leadership to increase the salaries of employees (1970, 1973, 1977-1978), and to develop a network of departmental educational institutions. However, the course of “varnishing” reality, improving quantitative indicators, adopted in past years, over time gave “metastases”, which turned out to be impossible to hide. In the early 80s, there was a change in ministerial leadership, which led to catastrophic consequences, since it led to a personnel purge that had no analogues in its scale (from 1982 to 1986, almost all heads of city and regional authorities were replaced).

These measures set the internal affairs bodies far back in their development. In fact, we had to solve anew the problem of “forming a core of professionals” (the problem of the 20s, 30s, 40s), set by the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the eve of the department’s seventieth anniversary. The perestroika processes objectively contributed to the deterioration of the situation in the country as a whole and in the authorities in particular.

With the collapse of the USSR, the police with hope entered into new stage its history...

During the Great Patriotic War, the number of crimes in the USSR increased significantly, new gangs appeared and it became unsafe to go out onto city streets and leave your home unattended. The police, which were part of the NKVD structure, fought against the criminals, but the forces were unequal. This post will tell you about the crime situation in those years.

At the same time, criminal elements, taking advantage of the confusion, and in some cases panic, the shortage of almost all goods, began to act boldly, sometimes downright brazenly, carrying out reckless raids on shops, apartments of citizens, cars and ordinary passers-by. Fortunately, during the war, blackout was introduced, and the streets were plunged into darkness from evening to early morning. Numerous vacant lots, labyrinths of narrow private streets, gardens and parks made it easy and quick to hide from the police. When detained, the bandits often put up fierce resistance, using weapons.

During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet cities were subjected to systematic raids German aviation, and often the targets of bombing were residential areas of the city. Sometimes air raid alerts were announced five or six times a day or more. This led to a significant part of the population leaving their homes and staying in shelters for a long time. The property was left unattended. Some houses were simply empty. Destruction and fires also contributed to the emergence of chaos in the cities for some time, under the cover of which it was possible to make a good profit. In addition, the majority of citizens worked 10-12 hours, again leaving their homes and apartments for a long time. It is no coincidence that the most common crimes were thefts from apartments whose owners either died during the bombing or temporarily left them due to an air raid raid. There were looters who did not disdain the belongings of the dead.

In the first half of 1942, crimes such as murders and attempted murders with the aim of obtaining ration cards and food products became widespread. They stole mainly from the apartments of citizens evacuated and conscripted into the Red Army.
Due to shortages, any product could be sold on the market. Police officers systematically checked the housing stock, various places concentration of criminal elements, identifying and detaining criminals and suspicious persons. In markets where thieves traditionally gathered and stolen goods were sold, the police carried out mass document checks and raids, followed by verification of all suspicious persons. Persons without certain occupations were arrested and expelled from cities. Due to the growth pickpocketing The police formed special task forces who, in plain clothes, patrolled markets, trams and tram stops, especially during rush hours.

Here is one of the cases of police work in Murmansk. “So, on November 29, 1944, senior detective Lieutenant Turkin, while going around the city market, on suspicion of selling stolen goods, detained a citizen in military uniform who identified himself as A.S. Bogdanov. While going to the regional NKVD department, he suddenly grabbed a revolver from his pocket.” and tried to shoot at the policeman. However, Turkin managed to disarm Bogdanov and took him to the department. Subsequently, it turned out that the day before the detainee had committed a theft and brought the stolen items to sell at the market."

However, swindlers operated not only in apartments; they often committed thefts from commercial premises, mainly from shops. Difficulties with food, the card system gave rise to new types of crimes, such as theft and sale at speculative prices ration cards, theft of food from warehouses, shops and canteens, sale and purchase of gold, jewelry, smuggled goods. The main contingent of those arrested under articles of “speculation” and “theft of social property” were employees of trade and supply organizations, shops, warehouses, bases and canteens. Employees of the Department for Combating the Theft of Social Property (OBKhSS) carried out surprise inspections of trade organizations and canteens, controlled the work of the guard service, monitored order at large enterprises, ensured the safety and strict distribution of food and manufactured goods cards, tracked down and detained speculators red-handed.

The fact is that, unlike ordinary theft, for which one could get off with a suspended sentence, the theft of social property (in fact, state property) according to the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of August 7, 1932, was punishable by imprisonment for up to ten years with confiscation. Among the thieves, this decree was called “Decree 7-8.”

“It must be said that the criminal front expanded from year to year. In the country as a whole, the crime rate in 1942 increased by 22% compared to 1941, in 1943 the increase was 21% compared to the previous year, and in 1944 respectively - 8.6%. And only in 1945 there was a slight decrease in the crime rate, when in the first half of the year the number of crimes decreased by 10%. At the same time, serious crimes showed the largest increase. If in the second half of 1941 in the USSR ( only in unoccupied territory) 3,317 murders were registered, then in 1944 - already 8,369, and the number of assaults and robberies increased respectively from 7,499 to 20,124. But the most impressive is the increase in thefts from 252,588 to 444,906 and cattle theft - from 8,714 to 36,285. And let us remind you that we're talking about only about crimes registered by the police."

The situation in the fight against crime was aggravated by a change for the worse in the qualitative composition of the law enforcement agencies themselves. By 1943, many police agencies had significantly updated personnel. Old, experienced employees went to the front, and in their place came inexperienced and insufficiently trained people. At the same time, gangster groups, as a rule, were significantly replenished with criminals hiding from law enforcement agencies, deserters, and draft dodgers. In addition, the crime situation, for example in a number of eastern regions The country was complicated by the movement of huge flows of people through them from the western regions to Kazakhstan, the Urals and Siberia, and the placement of a large number of evacuees. For example, during the war years in the Saratov region, a quarter of the total population was non-indigenous.

In August 1942, banditry in Saratov took on enormous proportions. “In the fight against crime, the criminal investigation units, OBKhSS, passport services, local police officers and units of the internal troops of the NKVD closely interacted. During the year, Saratov police officers confiscated from criminals total two million rubles, 2100 rubles in gold coins of royal mintage, 360 US dollars, 4.8 kg of products from precious metals and 6.5 kg of silver."

Then, in 1943, during Operation Tango, law enforcement agencies neutralized the Lugovsky-Bizyaev bandit group, consisting of twelve people. She, like the Moscow “Black Cat” from the famous film, terrorized the population for a long time regional center, created an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty among citizens. Almost every day in various parts In Saratov, bandits committed murders and daring armed raids on the cash offices of government institutions, shops and warehouses. At the end of the same 1943, in the Penza region, police liquidated the Zhilin bandit group. It consisted of 19 people and carried out 18 armed raids.

In a military situation in cities with the most unfavorable crime situation, the police took special organizational, tactical and operational measures to combat crime. For example, walking on the streets and traffic from 24.00 to 05.00 were prohibited. For violation of trade rules, speculation, purchase of manufactured goods and products in order to create reserves, as well as hooliganism, embezzlement, theft, spreading panic and provocative rumors, disruption of communications, air defense rules, fire protection and evasion of defense tasks, the perpetrators were held accountable as a grave crime.

In January 1942, the plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR, by its resolution, established that thefts from evacuees must be classified as committed during natural disasters, and if they were committed under additional aggravating circumstances: by a group of people, a repeat offender, etc. - then as banditry.

“The NKVD authorities seized from St. Petersburg speculators and thieves 9.5 million rubles in cash, 41,215 rubles in gold coins and 2.5 million rubles in government bonds, as well as almost 70 kg of gold, half a ton of silver, 1,537 diamonds, 1,295 gold watches, 36 km manufactures and 483 tons of food!These figures alone indicate that the standard of living in besieged Leningrad varied greatly among different people.
The bandits were found to have a large arsenal of weapons with which they could arm half a division: 1,113 rifles, 820 hand grenades, 631 revolvers and pistols, ten machine guns and three machine guns, as well as almost 70 thousand rounds of ammunition. As for the social composition of the convicts, the majority of them were workers - 10 thousand people. Second place was occupied by persons without certain occupations - 8684 people."

During the Great Patriotic War, banditry spread widely in remote areas of the USSR, including Siberia. A typical example is the criminal activity of the so-called Pavlov gang in the Tommot district of the Aldan district of the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. This “brigade” got its name from the name of the organizer Yegor Nikolaevich Pavlov, a 50-year-old Evenk. Before the war, this citizen was a member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and served as chairman of a collective farm. But the war changed destinies and turned the lives of many people upside down - some for the better, and some for the worse. It all started with the fact that in August 1942, from the collective farm headed by Pavlov. The "18th Party Conference" began a mass exodus of collective farmers. Almost simultaneously, eight commercial hunters left it, who then went into the taiga with their families; they were joined by three more individual farmers. However, the “Pavlovians” were not going to just sit out in the thicket of the forest.

Having put together a gang, partly based on family ties, they began “combat operations” on November 22, 1942. On this day, bandits attacked the camp of a reindeer herder at the Khatyrkhai mine. Their trophies were twenty deer that belonged to the mine. The next day, the “squad” made a much more daring foray. The Krutoy precinct was attacked, where bandits carried out a door-to-door search and massively confiscated weapons from the population. Along the way, they robbed a local store and took “prisoners” - workers of mining teams. In the center of the Khatyrkhai mine, “Pavlovites” attacked an office with the aim of robbing gold and money. However, a small armed detachment led by the head of the mine and the party organizer organized a defense.

The firefight lasted until late at night. The bandits probably remembered school stories about the Middle Ages, they tried to set fire to the building several times, but they failed. At 21.00, already in the dark, they broke into a food warehouse. Having loaded 15 sleds with goods, the bandits sent the loot into the taiga to the location of their camp. Before leaving, they set fire to the radio station, and shot an unarmed woman, a doctor at the local mine hospital Kamenskaya, who ran out from there. Thus began the robbery of the mines and the terror of civilians by Pavlov’s gang. Subsequently, attacks on the mines followed one after another. From just one mine, Khatyrkhay, “Pavlov’s brigade took out seven tons of flour, various industrial goods worth 10,310 rubles in gold terms, stole twenty deer, simultaneously robbing the entire civilian population.” Only in February 1943, with significant losses of personnel, NKVD officers were able to neutralize the gang.

In addition to Pavlov's gang, in 1941-1945. in Yakutsk itself, as well as Allah-Yunsky, Tommotsky, Aldansky and other regions of the republic, it was possible to eliminate a number of other gangs: the Korkin gang, the Shumilov gang, etc.

Often deserters who escaped from front-line units ended up in gangs. Some of them, “returning” from the front, successfully found work and even started “business”. It must be said that it was the village that became the main shelter for soldiers fleeing the army. Here the people lived more simply than in the city; the documents of those “returning from the front” were not checked, and fellow villagers believed that they were “released” for health reasons. Exposure most often came only after written message commanders of military units about the desertion of a serviceman. However, if a person managed to get lost in the turmoil of the battle and only then escape, there was a chance to end up in the “missing in action” column. In this case, the likelihood of being caught became even less. Here it was important to have time to warn relatives before they received the relevant notice. However, these papers, as a rule, arrived very late or did not arrive at all. Sometimes a deserter had a chance that his military unit, say, would be surrounded and die, and the documents would be burned or fall to the enemy. Then no one would have known about the soldier’s escape.

The work of searching for deserters and recruiting recruits fell on the shoulders of the regional military registration and enlistment offices. The largest number of deserters from the front was in 1941. But in 1942, the authorities, apparently sighing after the end of the battle for Moscow, became seriously “concerned” with the fate of thousands of soldiers who had escaped from the army. But not every deserter caught was met with severe punishment. The death penalty was applied against them in approximately 8-10% of cases. And “deviators”, that is, those who did not appear at the military registration and enlistment office on a summons or otherwise avoided being drafted into the army, had even less chance of standing up to the wall. The majority had a second chance to serve their Motherland, but in a penal company. People were sentenced to capital punishment only for repeated desertion and desertion associated with robberies and other serious crimes. Due to the large number of deserters, investigative authorities did not have enough time to thoroughly investigate each case. Cases, as a rule, were conducted superficially; data on desertion were entered into the protocol from the words of the accused without any verification. Details of the escape from the front, the location of the weapons and accomplices were not always revealed.

"However, in major cities, despite the seemingly strict military regulations, the deserters managed not only to hide, but to live right at home. So, a certain Shatkov escaped from the front on November 28, 1941 and arrived in his native Gorky, where he lived with his family without any registration. The “pacifist” was detained only on January 11, 1942, again after receiving a message from the unit commander.
In just the 42nd year Gorky region 4,207 deserters were caught and convicted, while many others managed to escape punishment. In the post-war years, residents recalled entire forested areas literally overrun by army fugitives and draft dodgers. However, this region was far surpassed by its neighbors in the Volga region. In the Saratov region, 5,700 deserters were caught over the same period. And the record was set by the Stalingrad region - six thousand deserters in 1944. However, this was largely due to the military operations that took place here... In July - September 1944, on the orders of Beria, the NKVD, NKGB, prosecutor's office, as well as Smersh carried out a large-scale operation to identify deserters and evaders. As a result, a total of 87,923 deserters and another 82,834 draft dodgers were arrested throughout the country... Of those detained, 104,343 people were transferred to the district military registration and enlistment offices and joined the ranks of the Red Army before the final stage of the Second World War."

“During the entire period of the Great Patriotic War, according to various estimates, 1.7-2.5 million people fled from the ranks of the Red Army, including defectors to the enemy! At the same time, only 376.3 thousand people were convicted under the article “desertion”, and 212.4 thousand of the deserters put on the wanted list could not be found and punished.”
At the same time, the Soviet government probably naively believed that yesterday’s thieves and swindlers would really be determined to defend their Motherland. The Stalinist repressive system, which was so ruthless towards mothers with many children, peasants and ordinary workers, showed unprecedented humanism and compassion for those who really deserved severe punishment. Thanks to Article 28 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, some criminals received a total of 50-60 years in prison and were again released. Here is one of many examples. On December 31, 1942, thief G.V. Kiselev, already convicted six times. was released from prison and sent to military unit, from where he very quickly deserted. On August 30, 1943, he was arrested again, sentenced to another ten years and again sent to “atone for guilt” in the Red Army. And again Kiselev fled from there and continued to engage in robberies and thefts. On October 10 of the same 1943, the inveterate criminal, who was never filled with patriotism, was arrested once again, but everything happened again.

Thefts also occurred in the army. Therefore, on March 3, 1942, the State Defense Committee of the USSR adopted secret resolution No. 1379ss “On the protection of military property of the Red Army in wartime.” According to it, for the theft of weapons, food, uniforms, equipment, fuel, etc., as well as for their intentional damage, capital punishment Punishment - execution with confiscation of all property of the criminal. Wasting military property was punishable by at least five years in prison.

During the war years, the police did a lot of work to combat banditry and other types of crime. However, they also had serious problems. The shortage of personnel often forced the hiring of poorly educated and uncultured people without checking what they had done in the past. Therefore, crime and violation of the law occurred among law enforcement officers. “On June 4, 1943, the head of the Vad district department (Gorky region) of the NKVD Karpov organized a collective drinking party right at work, in which, at his invitation, the department secretary Lapin and the district commissioner Patin, who was on duty that day, took part. The latter was drunk in vain. The case "The fact is that while the police were raising toasts to the Victory and to Stalin, those sitting in the pre-trial detention cell made a dig and escaped. In total, seven people escaped from the clutches of the police. This outrageous incident became known even in the Gorky Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)."

INTRODUCTION

police war crime

The relevance of the final qualifying work was determined by the fact that the Great Patriotic War is one of the most heroic and tragic pages in the chronicle of Russian history. This war was a severe test and a school of courage for the multinational Soviet people. During the harsh war years, all branches of the Armed Forces and branches of the armed forces showed great valor. Employees of the internal affairs bodies made a significant contribution to achieving the Great Victory. Many prominent Soviet military leaders highly appreciated the contribution of police officers to the overall victory over fascism. During the Great Patriotic War, internal affairs bodies carried out about 20 different service and combat missions. Police officers bravely fought the Nazis, ensured the security of the rear of the front, participated in the protection of important facilities and institutions, acted as part of fighter battalions and partisan detachments, organized local air defense, neutralized enemy saboteurs, fought banditry and crime, and ensured public order in front-line and rear cities and settlements, carried out the resettlement from front-line areas of persons who were recognized as socially dangerous, participated in the implementation of special tasks for the eviction of certain peoples and ethnic groups and etc.

The degree of scientific development of the topic. Many scientists have been involved in research in this area at different times, such as: F.I. Dolgikh, I.A. Isaev, M.M. Rassolov, O.I. Chistyakova, T.V. Shatkovskaya and many others.

The methodological basis of the study is the theory of knowledge, its universal method of materialist dialectics. The following general scientific research methods were used: formal-logical and systematic methods of scientific knowledge, description, comparison, analysis and synthesis.

The practical significance of the work lies in a systematic theoretical and practical study of the main problems arising from the topic. The results of the study can be used for educational purposes.

The object of the study is the legal relations that arise in the sphere of actions of the Soviet police during the Great Patriotic War.

The subject of the work is the Soviet police during the Great Patriotic War.

The purpose of the work is a comprehensive legal analysis of the features of the Soviet police during the Great Patriotic War.

The goal also predetermined specific tasks, in particular:

consider the internal affairs bodies at the beginning of the war;

explore the socio-economic situation at the beginning of the war;

characterize the structural restructuring of the police in wartime conditions;

illuminate the Soviet police and the front;

analyze the activities of the police aimed at combating crime;

to study the activities of the police to protect public order in the rear regions.

Work structure. The study consists of an introduction, two chapters combining six paragraphs, a conclusion and a bibliography.

CHAPTER 1. SOVIET POLICE AND ITS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

1.1 Internal affairs bodies at the beginning of the war

The trend towards the unification of internal affairs bodies into an all-Union system ultimately culminated in the establishment on July 10, 1934 of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR. By the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the NKVD of the USSR was entrusted with: ensuring revolutionary order and state security, protecting public (socialist) property, recording civil status, and border guards. The leading place in the structure of the NKVD of the USSR belonged to the Main Directorate of State Security.

In this regard, changes and additions were made to the constitutional legislation. The VII Congress of Soviets of the USSR (January 28 - February 6, 1935) classified the NKVD as an all-Union People's Commissariat. According to the general rule (Article 53 of the 1924 USSR Constitution), the all-Union People's Commissariats had in the Union republics commissioners directly subordinate to them, or other bodies subordinate to them. There was an authorized representative of the NKVD of the USSR only in the RSFSR, and in the other union republics people's commissariats of internal affairs were created.

As already noted, the decision to create an all-Union People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was made at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on July 10, 1934. On the same day it was formalized by a resolution of the Central executive committee USSR “On the organization of the NKVD of the USSR”, which defined the tasks assigned to the created department: “a) ensuring revolutionary order and state security; b) protection of public (socialist) property; c) civil registration (recording of births, deaths, marriages and divorces); d) border guard." Structurally, the NKVD of the USSR consisted of operational-Chekist directorates and departments, administrative-operational directorates, military directorates, directorates of forced labor camps, as well as directorates and departments that ensure and service the activities of the People's Commissariat.

The contribution of the internal affairs bodies to the common cause of strengthening the country's defense capability, and then to the victory over the Nazi invaders, was significant and versatile. In the pre-war years, the extremely important task of establishing population records was completed, without which it would have been impossible to in full solve problems of economic development, military development, fighting crime, and ensuring state security.

The introduction of a unified passport system at the end of 1932 and a number of other measures made it possible to ensure population registration at a fairly high level. The facts revealed during the certification process eloquently testified to the severity of the problem. Suffice it to say that before passportization there were 250 thousand inhabitants in Magnitogorsk, but in fact at the time of passportization about 75 thousand lived there. Sakhalin, before the introduction of passports, according to reporting data, had 120 thousand inhabitants, and according to the results of passportization - 60 thousand inhabitants. Even within enterprises, the discrepancies in data were quite significant. For example, at the Bolshevik plant, according to the reporting that existed before the introduction of the passport system, there were 22 thousand people, but in fact 19 thousand people worked.

Other steps have been taken in the same direction. Since 1939, the NKVD of the USSR has been keeping records of the rank-and-file and junior commanding personnel of the Red Army reserve. Military registration desks as part of the lower police apparatus operated throughout the war and in the post-war years. In October 1940, the NKVD of the USSR was entrusted with the extremely responsible task of providing local air defense.

In the pre-war years, reforms were carried out in the bodies and units of the NKVD of the USSR, which were of a military-strategic nature and aimed primarily at strengthening the country's defense capability. In this regard, we can mention the reorganization of the Main Directorate of Border and Internal Troops of the NKVD of the USSR, carried out on the basis of a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of February 2, 1939, as a result of which it was divided into six main departments of the NKVD of the USSR: border troops, troops for the protection of railway structures, troops for the protection of especially important industrial enterprises, convoy troops, military supply of troops, military construction department of troops.

Since 1939, work began on organizing military units fire protection of the NKVD of the USSR in the largest industrial centers: Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv and Baku. Their total number was planned to be very impressive - 26,800 soldiers, including in Moscow - 51 companies with 10,500 troops. Various measures were planned to strengthen the fire service as a whole.

The internal affairs bodies contributed to the overall victory by participating in hostilities; carrying out subversive activities behind enemy lines; guarding the rear of the active army; fighting crime and maintaining public order.

People's Commissars (in the RSFSR - authorized by the NKVD of the USSR) were part of the Councils of People's Commissars of the corresponding union republics (Article 67).

December 1936 The VIII Extraordinary All-Union Congress of Soviets adopted the new Constitution of the USSR. This Constitution introduced significant changes to the characteristics social order, into the system of government bodies, the structure of the union state.

According to the Constitution, the people's commissariats of the USSR were divided into all-union and union-republican.

Art. 78 of the USSR Constitution of 1936 included the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs among the Union-Republican People's Commissariat, and Art. 83 of the Basic Law to the authorities government controlled Union republics also included people's commissariats for internal affairs.

At the same time, on a number of issues, the legal status of the NKVD of the USSR differed significantly from the status of other Union-Republican People's Commissariats: it was endowed with the rights of an all-Union People's Commissariat. So, in accordance with Art. 93 of the Constitution of the RSFSR of 1937, “the all-Union People's Commissariats and the NKVD form their own departments under the regional and regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.” This indicated a high level of centralization of the management of internal affairs bodies and led to a weakening of ties with local authorities and management.

According to the Constitution of the RSFSR, adopted in 1937, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs also belonged to the Union-Republican People's Commissariats (Article 54). However, as before, the NKVD was absent from the Council of People's Commissariats of the RSFSR.

IN autonomous republics People's Commissariats of Internal Affairs were formed. People's Commissars of Internal Affairs were members of governments - Councils of People's Commissars of Autonomous Republics (Article 69).

The absence of a People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs within the Government of the RSFSR came into conflict with the provisions of the Constitution defining the subjects of jurisdiction of the RSFSR. So, paragraph “g” art. 15 established that “the jurisdiction of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic represented by its higher authorities authorities and government bodies are subject to the protection of public order and the rights of citizens. And the government of the republic - the Council of People's Commissars - “takes measures to ensure public order, protect the interests of the state and protect the rights of citizens” (Article 45).

The Constitution of the RSFSR of 1937 formally established the principle of double subordination of internal affairs bodies: departments (administrations) of the regional, regional, district Councils of Working People's Deputies are subordinate to both the corresponding Councils of Working People's Deputies and a similar department of the higher Council of Working People's Deputies, i.e. departments (administrations) of territories and regions - to the corresponding People's Commissariat of the RSFSR.

At the same time, and this should be especially emphasized, in contrast to the previously existing legislation, it was not the Soviets of Working People's Deputies, but the NKVD that formed its local administrations (Articles 93, 97 of the Constitution of the RSFSR of 1937)

Of course, internal affairs bodies operated on the territory of the RSFSR (as well as other law enforcement agencies) and through them the above provisions of the Constitution were implemented. However, one cannot ignore the fact that the content of the Basic Law in this case did not correspond to reality: the Council of People's Commissars of the Republic did not have a People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. The leadership of the Internal Affairs Directorate of territories, regions, autonomous regions, and the NKVD of the ASSR was carried out directly by the NKVD of the USSR.

The constitutions of the autonomous republics also enshrined the fundamental principles of the organization of internal affairs bodies. Thus, in accordance with the Constitution of the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, adopted on June 24, 1937 by the Extraordinary X Congress of Soviets of the Republic, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs was part of the government of the autonomy. Article 64 of the Constitution of the CB ASSR established that the NKVD of the republic forms its own departments under the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies with the approval of the Presidium Supreme Council Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

The historical conditions in which the 1936 Constitution of the USSR was adopted led to the fact that many of its provisions were not implemented in practice. This applies both to some of the democratic rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution, and to provisions related to regulation legal status internal affairs bodies.

The NKVD of the USSR was removed from the control of state bodies and placed under the personal control of I.V. Stalin. Under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, there was a Special Meeting, which was given the right to administratively apply expulsion, exile, imprisonment in forced labor camps and deportation outside the USSR. The internal affairs bodies committed gross violations of the law and unjustified repression.

Excessive centralization remained in the organizational structure of the entire system of internal affairs bodies, which was one of the conditions for deviations from the rule of law and unjustified repression.

In February 1941, state security agencies were withdrawn from the NKVD system of the USSR. They were transferred to the jurisdiction of the newly formed People's Commissariat for State Security of the USSR.

For the development of internal affairs bodies of the Soviet state in the period from 1917 to 1941. characterized by two periods:

a) the period when management in the field of internal affairs fell under the exclusive competence of the union republics, and the system of internal affairs bodies took shape and developed within the framework of the union republics. Chronological framework this period - October 1917 - July 1934.

During this period, the legal basis for the organization and activities of internal affairs bodies was determined by the legislation of the union republics, which was built after the adoption of the USSR Constitution of 1924 in accordance with the principles formulated and enshrined in it;

b) the period from July 1934 to 1941, when management in the field of internal affairs passed into the joint competence of the USSR and the union republics. The system of internal affairs bodies acquired an all-Union character.

Thus, the legal basis for the organization and activities of internal affairs bodies was determined exclusively by legislative and other legal acts of the USSR. The transformations that took place in the NKVD system of the USSR in 1934-1940 indicated a significant expansion of the department’s scope of activity, primarily due to functions not related to the implementation of tasks of maintaining public order and ensuring state security. This was dictated primarily economic necessity, since in the conditions of accelerated modernization of the national economy, the country's leadership was forced to make extensive use of administrative resources. In addition, in connection with the outbreak of war, structural changes in the NKVD were due to preparations for carrying out the tasks assigned to it in wartime conditions. As a result of the constant expansion of the department’s functions and the creation of new organizational structures the number of the central apparatus of the NKVD grew. As of January 1, 1940, it increased almost four times compared to 1934.

1.2 Socio-economic situation at the beginning of the war

In the pre-war period, a contradictory and multifaceted socio-political situation developed in the USSR. The nature of the relationship between society and government was determined by multi-vector trends.

The state simultaneously had to solve the extremely difficult problems of accelerated and large-scale industrialization; forced collectivization and mechanization of agriculture; cultural revolution, which implied qualitative changes in social sphere. The systemic modernization of the country and fundamental changes in its economy have significantly affected the quality and direction of social processes and the spiritual life of society.

The policy of industrialization and collectivization contributed to significant migration of the population and the introduction of a huge number of people who came to production former peasants to industrial skills and urban culture.

Priority in the development of heavy and defense industries to the detriment of light industry and food was of a forced nature. However, this led to high prices and shortages of goods consumer consumption and food products. In 1939-1941. this problem became so acute that in a number of regions the card system, which had been abolished nationwide in 1934, was reintroduced.

With the beginning of the third five-year plan, difficulties emerged in production that led to a slowdown in economic growth. To restore order in production, the leadership of the USSR took measures to tighten labor legislation and apply harsh administrative and even criminal penalties to violators. On December 20, 1938, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved a resolution on the mandatory introduction of work books at all enterprises and institutions. This resolution was aimed primarily at combating staff turnover.

In January 1939, another resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was issued, according to which being late for work for more than 20 minutes was equivalent to absenteeism. This decision was a kind of forerunner of the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 26, 1940 “On the transition to an eight-hour working day, to a seven-day working week and on the prohibition of the unauthorized departure of workers and employees from enterprises and institutions.” This decree, adopted in the context of the outbreak of World War II, not only introduced a number of strict measures for absenteeism, tardiness and unauthorized departure from work, but also actually attached the employee to the enterprise. In 1940-1941 Based on this decree, the judiciary sentenced 3.2 million. violators were sentenced to six months of correctional labor without interruption from work with the withholding of a quarter of earnings, another 633 thousand people were imprisoned for a period of two to four months.

In October 1940, a reform of factory training was carried out, which was of great importance for the creation of a system of labor reserves, which fully justified itself during the Great Patriotic War. The specially created Directorate of Labor Reserves under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (later the People's Commissariat of Labor Reserves) routinely provided enterprises and construction sites with labor, with the main emphasis being on training young workers.

Along with regular schools In order to provide factory training, vocational schools and vocational railway schools were created. It was announced that 800 thousand young men and women were mobilized and recruited to schools as labor reserves. They studied at state expense, were provided with uniforms, allowances and received scholarships. Term compulsory service upon graduation, it increased to four years. In December 1940 a resolution was passed prohibiting unauthorized leaving of school. Criminal punishment was provided for unauthorized departure from college (school).

In the pre-war years, a number of important measures were taken aimed at developing the social and living sphere of enterprises and ensuring the preferential supply of workers in a number of the most significant sectors of the economy, primarily those working for defense. Benefits were introduced for mothers of large families, students, and students of vocational schools. At enterprises, labor safety commissions were established under trade union committees and the institute of labor safety inspectors was introduced. Large enterprises created their own outpatient clinics, clinics, and medical units. Workers and employees were provided with regular vacations; for their full use, sanatorium and resort facilities were created at an accelerated pace in the Crimea, the Caucasus and other regions of the country. By 1938, there were 1,838 sanatoriums and 1,270 rest homes in the USSR, and their network was constantly expanding. Significant discounts were provided for production drummers and their families when purchasing vouchers.

The entry into the USSR of the Baltic states, the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina complicated the socio-political situation. During the “Sovietization” of these regions, part of the population was subjected to repression, which to a certain extent was due to the presence in the annexed territories of elements hostile to Soviet power and even an anti-Soviet underground25. In the pre-war years, the NKVD carried out several operations to evict (deport) tens of thousands of people from border areas to remote regions of the USSR. In order to eliminate the “potential intelligence base,” repression was also extended to persons belonging to the nationalities of “bourgeois-fascist states,” mainly bordering the USSR.

During the same period, there was an increase in anti-religious propaganda, accompanied by the closure of temple buildings and monasteries, and the persecution of clergy.

Shortly before the war, the importance of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the system of development and decision-making began to change, which was explained by the process of gradually increasing the role of the Council of People's Commissars. On March 21, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On the formation of the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars.” In addition to V. M. Molotov, who initially headed it as head of government, the Bureau included: N. A. Voznesensky (first deputy), A. A. Andreev, L. P. Beria, N. A. Bulganin, L. M. Kaganovich, A. I. Mikoyan. The Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars was entrusted with the consideration of all current issues, the preparation of quarterly and monthly supply plans and many others.

Before the war, new noticeable changes took place in the leadership of the country. May 6, 1941 I.V. Stalin replaced V. M. Molotov as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. This was a decisive step that significantly increased the role and importance of the government in the government system state power. V. M. Molotov became deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, retaining the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. A. A. Zhdanov became J. V. Stalin’s deputy in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, that is, the second person in the party. Appointed Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, A.S. Shcherbakov replaced him as curator of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee, while simultaneously retaining the post of First Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee and City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

In the pre-war years, the implementation of military and military-technical policies intensified. All important administrative decisions that determined its content were formalized by joint resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In addition to the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars, other specially created government bodies were also used as a kind of “drive belts” of public administration. Thus, in April 1937, the Defense Committee was formed under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and from November 1937 to March 1941, the Economic Council under the Council of People's Commissars functioned.

In general, in the second half of the 1930s. In connection with the increasing military danger, a lot of work was done to strengthen the personnel and military-technical base of the USSR Armed Forces. With the development of military equipment and weapons, the combat power and mobilization readiness of the Red Army increased, and the level of mechanization and motorization of troops increased significantly.

I.V. Stalin kept close attention to the selection of leading personnel of the Red Army, from whom unconditional political reliability was required. Many senior command and political positions were entrusted to those with whom Stalin had been personally connected since the days of Civil War. One of them was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, K. E. Voroshilov, who headed the military department from November 1925 to May 1940. A year before the war, K. E. Voroshilov was replaced as People's Commissar of Defense by S. K. Timoshenko.

In general, the Soviet leadership paid great attention improving the quality of training command staff army, developing a network of military educational institutions - schools and academies. In 1941, before the start of the Great Patriotic War, the training of military personnel was carried out by: 15 military academies, 10 military faculties at civilian universities, seven higher naval and 203 secondary military schools and a number of others. More than 100 courses were run to retrain and improve command and control personnel.

The mobilization activities of the last pre-war years were based on the provisions of the “Law on General Military Duty”, adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on September 1, 1939. According to this law, military service was established for all segments of the population, and previously existing restrictions and prohibitions for certain social groups were abolished . The term of service in the Red Army was determined to be three years, in the navy - five years.

On the eve of Nazi Germany's attack on the USSR, in mid-May 1941, the conscription of enlisted personnel for large training camps began. He gave over 800 thousand people. In general, the personnel of the USSR Armed Forces increased by more than 2.3 times in two and a half pre-war years. As of June 22, 1941, they numbered 5.7 million people.

Such a large-scale strengthening of the Armed Forces significantly strengthened the defense power of the USSR and allowed the Soviet military-political leadership to solve important geostrategic tasks in the face of increasing military danger. At the same time, we had to take into account the fact that this necessary process had certain negative demographic and economic consequences, because millions of able-bodied men of reproductive age (mostly from 19 to 40 years old) were drafted into the army. This aggravated the problem of labor shortage in the city and in the countryside: only over 5% of the total amateur population served in the Armed Forces.

Thus, the complex political and socio-economic processes that began with the 1917 revolution changed significantly by the end of the 1930s. social image of the USSR. Soviet society consisted mainly of workers, peasants and office workers. In the pre-war period, a contradictory and multifaceted socio-political situation developed in the USSR. The nature of the relationship between society and government was determined by multi-vector trends. The state simultaneously had to solve the extremely difficult problems of accelerated and large-scale industrialization; forced collectivization and mechanization of agriculture; cultural revolution, which implied qualitative changes in the social sphere. The systemic modernization of the country and fundamental changes in its economy have significantly affected the quality and direction of social processes and the spiritual life of society.

1.3 Structural restructuring of the police in wartime conditions

In the conditions of the approaching war and the increasing intelligence activity of foreign states in relation to the USSR, the cumbersome structure of the NKVD was unable to carry out high-quality management of tasks to ensure state security. In accordance with the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated February 3, 1941, the NKVD was divided into two departments: the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, which was headed by the General Commissioner of State Security L.P. Beria, and the People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR under the leadership of the State Security Commissioner of the 3rd rank V. N. Merkulova. By order of the NKVD of the USSR dated February 26, 1941, a new organizational structure of the NKVD3 was introduced. The activities of the structural units were supervised by the deputy people's commissar of internal affairs of the USSR: S. N. Kruglov (first deputy people's commissar), V. S. Abakumov, V. V. Chernyshev, I. I. Maslennikov (deputy people's commissar for troops) and B. P. Obruchnikov (Deputy People's Commissar for Personnel).

By a joint directive of the NKVD and NKGB of March 1, 1941, the functions between them were delimited. The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was entrusted with: “a) protection of public (socialist) property, protection of personal and property safety of citizens and protection of public order; b) protection of the state borders of the USSR; c) organization of local air defense; d) keeping convicts in prisons, forced labor camps, forced labor colonies, labor and special settlements and organizing their labor use and re-education; e) combating child homelessness and neglect; f) reception, escort, protection, maintenance and labor use of prisoners of war and internees; g) operational security service for the NKVD troops; h) state supervision of fire protection and management of fire prevention measures; i) registration of persons liable for military service; j) construction, repair and maintenance of roads of union significance; k) accounting, protection, scientific and operational development of state archival funds of the USSR; l) civil registration.”

After the division of departments, improvement of the organizational structure of the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR and its local authorities continued. So, already on February 28, 1941, the 1st special department (recording and archival) was formed as part of the People's Commissariat, which was entrusted with: recording all criminals and special settlers (except for those kept in forced labor camps), identifying them and organizing an all-Union search, checking people at the request of administrative bodies, carrying out public supervision of exiles and deportees, as well as working with appeals from prisoners. In order to unify the education system for internal affairs personnel, the Directorate of Educational Institutions of the NKVD of the USSR was created.

The changes also affected the functions of the People's Commissariat. Due to the fact that the NKVD was in charge a large number of workforce, by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated March 24, 1941, the department was entrusted with the construction of airfields for the Air Force of the Red Army, which was managed by the created Main Directorate of Aviation Construction.

Serious structural reforms of the NKVD of the USSR were carried out during the Great Patriotic War. With its beginning, in order to increase the efficiency of executive authorities in the country, the procedure for making management decisions was significantly simplified. Great importance The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated July 1, 1941 “On expanding the rights of the People's Commissars of the USSR in wartime conditions” played a role in increasing the efficiency of the departments. The specifics of the activities of the NKVD bodies in wartime conditions required the concentration of available forces and means on solving their specific tasks both at the front and in the rear. For these purposes, the following measures were taken: strengthening the centralization of management; participation in the reorientation of the national economy to satisfy the vital activity of the state; organization of rear security for the active army; involvement of personnel of troops and bodies of the NKVD in the conduct of military operations; organization of reconnaissance and sabotage activities behind enemy lines; creation of defensive lines on the path of enemy advance; training reserves for the Red Army. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria was introduced into the State Defense Committee, and in December 1942 was included in the GKO Operations Bureau.

The first major reorganization of the structure of the NKVD of the USSR took place in July 1941. In order to merge the efforts of state security and internal affairs bodies, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 20, 1941, the NKVD and NKGB were merged into the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR. By order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, its new structure was introduced with the appointment of heads of departments and departments.

The creation of a single apparatus providing centralized management of the activities of state security and internal affairs bodies made it possible in the first months of the war to direct the main efforts to solving the most important task - the fight against enemy intelligence, sabotage and terrorist groups, as well as deserters and distributors of provocative rumors. The unification of the People's Commissariats contributed to the establishment of closer ties between the territorial bodies of internal affairs and special departments, which made it possible to develop unified system organizing counterintelligence activities, timely summarizing data about the enemy and directing strikes at the most vulnerable spots of enemy intelligence.

The unfavorable development of the operational-strategic situation on the Soviet-German front for the Red Army required the country's leadership to take emergency measures, including the creation of state defense lines in the deep rear, in connection with which the structure of some people's commissariats was restructured. In August - December 1941, in connection with the formulation of new tasks by the NKVD, the organization of its central apparatus underwent a number of changes. So, to manage the construction entrusted to the NKVD defensive structures On August 23, 1941, the Main Directorate of Defense Works of the NKVD of the USSR was formed. On each of the fronts, defense works departments were created, which included several field construction projects. Having completed a significant amount of work, on October 15, 1941 they were transferred to the People's Commissariat of Defense.

The need to take preventive measures aimed at preventing complicity with the enemy on the part of the Soviet Germans led to the creation on August 28, 1941 of the Special Resettlement Department of the NKVD of the USSR, which was entrusted with issues of relocation, placement, household and labor arrangements for the relevant categories of the population. Due to the fact that the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria in the State Defense Committee was entrusted with responsibility for the production of weapons and ammunition; on September 5, 1941, the 7th special department was formed within the NKVD structure (for operational and security services for the production of mortar weapons). The deterioration of the criminal situation in the country led to the separation of an independent Department for Combating Banditry from the Main Police Department on September 30, 1941.

It should be noted that in the period 1941-1943. The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs has become one of the most important elements of the system of state and military administration of the country. Having united with the NKGB and taking over its functions, he began to carry out tasks far beyond the scope of ensuring state security and maintaining public order, while simultaneously solving a number of economic issues.

A radical change in the course of the war allowed the country's leadership to begin the transition from emergency management methods to planned ones. The extreme centralization of management in the field of state security began to conflict with the emerging situation. In such conditions, it was necessary to use available resources more rationally, properly organizing the activities of government bodies. By the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of April 14, 1943, the independent People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR was re-formed by separating operational security departments and departments. V.N. was appointed People's Commissar of State Security. Merkulov.

After the transformations carried out in April - May 1943, the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR included: administrative and operational departments and departments: Main Directorate of Police, Main Directorate of Fire Protection, Main Directorate of Local Air Defense, Directorate of State Archives, Prison Directorate, Directorate for Prisoners of War Affairs and internees, Headquarters of extermination battalions, Department for Combating Banditry, Department of Government HF Communications, Counterintelligence Department of the NKVD of the USSR Smersh; military directorates and departments: Main Directorate of Border Troops of the NKVD of the USSR, Main Directorate of Internal Troops of the NKVD of the USSR, Directorate of the NKVD Troops of the USSR for the Protection of Railways, Directorate of the NKVD Troops of the USSR for the Protection of Particularly Important Industrial Enterprises, Directorate of Convoy Troops of the NKVD of the USSR, Directorate of Military Supply of the NKVD of the USSR , Department of Military Educational Institutions of the NKVD Troops of the USSR; Directorate of forced labor camps: Main Directorate of forced labor camps and colonies, Main Directorate of Airfield Construction, Main Directorate of Railway Construction Camps, Main Directorate of Mining, Metallurgical and Fuel Industry Camps, Main Directorate of Camps industrial construction, Directorate of Special Construction Camps, Directorate of Timber Industry Camps, General Directorate of Construction Far North; other departments and departments: Main Directorate of Highways, Economic Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, Directorate of Material and Technical Supply of the NKVD of the USSR, Personnel Department, Central Financial Department, Planning Department, Department of Railroad and Water Transportation, Motor Transport Sector.

At the final stage of the war, the improvement of the NKVD structure mainly followed the creation of directorates and departments designed to manage one particular area of ​​activity. Of particular note is the significant increase in the number of administrative and operational departments and departments, as well as structural units that managed the activities of forced labor camps. All this was directly related to the need to normalize life in the country, as well as the increasingly increasing economic activities of the department.

The improvement of the command and control bodies of the NKVD troops on the eve and during the war followed the path of a constant search for the most optimal form, which made it possible to carry out high-quality leadership of troops in a constantly changing situation. It was this circumstance that became the reason for so many reorganizations of governing bodies. For the most part, they were initiated by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs or his deputy for the troops, as they concerned internal structure the department itself. However, in a number of cases, especially when the question was raised about assigning new tasks to the troops or creating new military structures, reorganizations were carried out on the basis of decisions of the State Defense Committee.

Thus, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR during the war years represented one of the central links in the system of state leadership and administration. Despite the significant scale economic work The NKVD during the war years, the main directions of its activities continued to be law enforcement and administrative. Fulfilling tasks to protect public order, including in transport, and combat nationalism and banditry made it possible to maintain a stable situation in the Soviet rear and prevent mass anti-Soviet protests in the country.

CHAPTER 2. MAIN DIRECTIONS OF ACTIVITY OF SOVIET POLICE BODIES DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

2.1 Soviet police and front

The document that formulated a detailed program of fighting the enemy was the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions of June 29, 1941, which defined the political essence of the war and set out specific tasks in war conditions. The directive demanded that the party and Soviet bodies strengthen the rear of the Red Army, subordinating all activities to the interests of the front, ensure the intensive work of all enterprises, explain the current situation to the workers, organize the security of factories, power plants, etc., organize a merciless fight against all disorganizers of the rear, deserters, alarmists, rumor mongers, destroy spies, saboteurs, enemy paratroopers, assist destruction battalions.

The Great Patriotic War required a change in the nature and content of the work of all government bodies in relation to the specifics of wartime. In particular, the work of law enforcement agencies was organizationally restructured. On July 20, 1941, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR were merged.

The responsibilities of the police were significantly expanded. It was entrusted with the fight against desertion, looting, alarmism, spreaders of provocative rumors, clearing cities and defense points of criminal elements, combating theft in transport with theft of evacuated cargo, unloading railway and water transport from passengers whose movement was not necessary, ensuring organized evacuation of the population and industrial enterprises. In addition, the internal affairs bodies ensured the implementation of orders and regulations of the military authorities that regulated the regime in areas declared under martial law.

In the border areas, internal affairs officers, together with border guards and units of the Red Army, took part in battles with the advancing Wehrmacht troops.

From the first minutes of the war, police officers heroically defended the Brest station. Head of the line police department A.Ya. Vorobyov in a matter of minutes gathered the personnel of the department and, in cooperation with the 17th border detachment and the 60th railway regiment of the NKVD, organized the defense of the station. Only on June 25, 1941, the surviving participants in the defense of the station broke out of the encirclement. A.Ya. himself Vorobyov was captured by the Nazis and executed.

The Vitebsk police in June 1941 was consolidated into a regiment consisting of 4 battalions. The regiment took part in the defense of Vitebsk.

In early July 1941, together with the soldiers of the 172nd Infantry Division, fighter battalions and a police battalion, which included cadets from the Minsk police command school, took part in the defense of Mogilev.

Employees of the internal affairs bodies took an active part in the defense of Riga, Siauliai, Liepaja, Tallinn, Kingissep, Lvov, Kyiv, and Dnepropetrovsk.

In the Narva People's Militia Regiment, a company formed from police officers from Latvia and Estonia took part in the battles near Kingissep. Its fighters all died on the field without retreating a single step.

In 1941, formations were formed from the personnel of internal affairs bodies.

In July 1941, two volunteer regiments were formed from workers of the NKVD and the Ukrainian police, intended for combat operations behind enemy lines. But due to the current situation, both regiments were used in the defense of Kyiv. In September 1941, the 3rd NKVD Regiment was formed, consisting mainly of police officers, defending Kyiv on the southern outskirts of the city.

In addition, a battalion of the Kyiv city police took part in the defense of Kyiv.

NKVD units, police and fighter battalions were the last to leave the city, blowing up bridges across the Dnieper.

In July 1941, two regiments were formed on the Southern Front from police officers from Moldova and the occupied regions of Ukraine. The regiments performed tasks to protect important objects. In August 1941, on the basis of a resolution of the Military Council of the Southern Front, on the basis of two regiments, a separate brigade militia, which is entrusted with ensuring the protection of the army's rear. In November 1941, the brigade was reorganized into a division, which became part of the NKVD troops to protect the rear of the Southern Front. In 1942, it was replenished with another regiment of police officers from the Rostov region and Krasnodar region.

A special place is occupied by the participation of internal affairs bodies in the defense of cities that later became hero cities - Moscow, Odessa, Sevastopol, Stalingrad, Leningrad.

In Sevastopol, a detachment of 120 people was formed from police officers, whose fighters, together with sailors, repelled enemy attacks.

In the last hours of defense on Cape Kherson, while carrying out the task of the city defense committee to evacuate the wounded, the head of the city police, V. Buzin, died.

In Sevastopol, on the memorial of courage, the names of the units that distinguished themselves during the defense of the city are carved, there is a line - “City Police”.

Leningrad. In July 1941, two Leningrad police officers were formed special squad to fight enemy paratroopers and saboteurs. In the battles on the outskirts of Leningrad, a police detachment under the command of the Pushkin city police department I.Ya. Yakovleva.

The city police sent three police battalions to replenish the 20th Infantry Division of the NKVD troops. The battalions fought in the Nevskaya Dubrovka area.

Moscow. Four divisions, two brigades and several separate units of the NKVD, a fighter regiment, police sabotage groups and fighter battalions took an active part in the battle for Moscow.

A detachment of volunteer skiers consisting of 300 people was formed from police officers and placed at the disposal of the 16th Army.

A police battalion of 400 people took part in the defense of Tula.

From November 9 to December 234, 1941, the NKVD Directorate of the Moscow Region sent 189 fighter-sabotage groups behind enemy lines.

Stalingrad. In July 1941, the Stalingrad police were consolidated into separate battalion, which was headed by the head of the regional police department N.V. Biryukov. The heads of city police departments were appointed commanders of the destruction battalions.

More than 800 city and regional police officers took part in the defense of the city in 1942.

The Marshal of the Soviet Union, former commander of the 62nd Army, V.I., highly appreciated the workers of the Stalingrad police. Chuikov: “As a participant in this unprecedented battle in history, I would like to emphasize the courage, stamina, endurance and self-control of the Stalingrad police officers during the defense of the city. Under continuous bombing, artillery and mortar fire, they removed and evacuated people beyond the Volga, extinguished fires, protected material assets, property of citizens, and public order. It is difficult to overestimate their role in the crossing of troops who arrived to help the defenders of the city.... At critical moments, when the enemy managed to wedge somewhere into our defense, police officers more than once occupied the firing line...."

Thus, the contribution of the police, organs and troops of the NKVD as a whole to the victory over the fascist invaders during the Great Patriotic War is enormous. This is clearly demonstrated by statistical data.

Head of the Leningrad Police Department E.S. Grushko, in a memo addressed to the chairman of the executive committee of the Leningrad City Council dated December 22, 1941, reported that in December 1941, the rank and file worked for 14-16 hours, and the command and operational staff worked for 18 hours. Every day, 60-65 people were out of action in the RUD detachment, 2025 people in river police detachments, and 8-10 people in most police departments. Most of them died of hunger.

2.2 Police activities aimed at fighting crime

The main task of the police during the war continued to be the protection of public order and the fight against crime. One of the problems of the situation in this area was the qualitative deterioration of personnel (in 1943, in some police agencies, personnel were renewed by 90-97%).

It should be noted that more than 25% of the personnel of the internal affairs bodies were drafted into the army in the first days of the war. 12 thousand employees from the Moscow police alone went to the front.

They were replaced by persons unfit for military service: disabled people, pensioners, women.

By decision of the Moscow City Party Committee, 1,300 women who served in government agencies and organizations were sent to the police. If before the war there were 138 women working in the Moscow police, then during the war there were about 4 thousand of them. In Stalingrad, women made up 20% of the total personnel.

Since the beginning of the war, the external police service was transferred to a two-shift work schedule - 12 hours each, vacations for all employees were canceled.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the criminal situation in the country became significantly more complicated, and a significant increase in crime was noted.

In 1942, crime in the country increased by 22% compared to 1941, in 1943 - by 20.9% compared to 1942, in 1944 - by 8.6% compared to the previous year. Only in 1945 was a decrease in the crime rate recorded - in the first half of the year the number of crimes decreased by 9.9%.

The largest increase occurred due to serious crimes. In 1941, 3317 murders were registered, in 1944 - 8369, robberies 7499 and 20124, respectively, thefts 252588 and 444906, cattle thefts 8714 and 36285

In such conditions, internal affairs bodies were forced to restructure the work of their units.

The criminal investigation department was involved in solving murders, robberies, robberies, looting, thefts from the apartments of evacuees, seized weapons from criminal elements and deserters, and assisted state security agencies in identifying enemy agents.

A factor that had an extremely negative impact on the state of crime in the country was the availability of weapons in the front-line conditions, as well as in areas liberated from occupation. Criminals, including deserters, having taken possession of weapons, united in armed gangs, committed murders, robberies, and thefts of state and personal property.

For 1941 - 1944 More than 7 thousand bandit groups numbering more than 89 thousand people were liquidated on the territory of the USSR.

Very difficult situation took shape at the beginning of 1942 in the cities of Central Asia - Tashkent, Alma-Ata, Frunze, Dzhambul, Chimkent, etc. Organized groups of criminals committed daring, especially dangerous crimes - murders, robberies, major thefts. The NKVD of the USSR sent a brigade from the Main Police Department to Tashkent, which eliminated a number of large gangs. In particular, a criminal gang of 48 people, who committed more than 100 serious crimes, was stopped. Several thousand criminals were brought to justice, including 79 murderers and 350 robbers. The military tribunal imposed 76 death sentences.

Similar operations were carried out in 1943 in Novosibirsk and in 1944 in Kuibyshev.

The fight against criminal crime in besieged Leningrad was of particular importance.

During the blockade, bread was stolen from citizens, things from the apartments of evacuees and people conscripted into the Red Army. Increased danger represented criminal groups that carried out armed attacks on food stores and vehicles transporting food.

In addition, pickpockets who stole food cards. During November-December 1941, criminal investigation officers identified several groups of pickpockets, from whom a large number of food cards were confiscated, stolen from starving residents of Leningrad.

During the Great Patriotic War, the divisions of the internal affairs bodies for combating the theft of socialist property and profiteering (BCSS) worked no less intensely. Their main focus was on strengthening the protection of rationed products that went to supply the Red Army and the population, and suppressing the criminal activities of plunderers, speculators and counterfeiters. Particular attention was paid to the control of supply and procurement organizations, food industry enterprises and trading network. This is due to the fact that due to the occupation of part of the USSR territory, significant food resources were lost.

The main areas of activity of the BHSS units during the war were:

the fight against speculation and malicious repurchase of goods; combating theft and other crimes in supply and distribution organizations and enterprises working for defense;

combating theft, abuse, violations of trade rules and crimes related to improper placement of goods in trade and cooperative organizations;

the fight against theft in the Zagotzerno system, squandering grain funds and spoilage of bread;

combating the theft of funds from the cash registers of state, economic and cooperative organizations and enterprises.

Of particular importance in the work of the BHSS units was the provision of the card system for food products introduced at the beginning of the war. Under these conditions, criminals were engaged in theft of cards in printing houses, during transportation, in places of their storage and in card bureaus. At the same time, in stores, city and district card bureaus, bread was stolen by reusing coupons and receiving bread and other products with them for the purpose of selling them on the market at speculative prices. In other cases, dummies were included in the lists for receiving food cards in house administrations and organizations.

BHSS employees, with the help of party bodies, took measures to strengthen the security of food warehouses, brought order to the printing houses where cards were printed, and introduced a monthly change in their protection, which excluded the reuse of coupons. It has become common practice to carry out surprise checks of the availability of material assets in warehouses and other storage facilities.

January 1943, the State Defense Committee adopted “On strengthening the fight against the theft and squandering of food products”, in order to implement which the NKVD of the USSR issued an order to take decisive measures to strengthen the work of the police to combat the theft and squandering of food and industrial goods, with abuse of cards, measuring, weighing and

shortchanging buyers. It was recommended that investigations into such crimes be carried out within ten days.

It should be noted the work of the police passport offices. At the beginning of 1942, in a number of areas of the USSR, re-registration of passports was carried out by pasting a control sheet into each passport. The positions of inspector-experts were introduced into the staff of passport departments, which made it possible to identify a significant number of people who had foreign or counterfeit passports.

The employees of the passport units carried out a lot of work in areas liberated from the enemy.

Only in 1944 - 1945. 37 million people were documented, 8,187 accomplices of the occupiers, 10,727 police officers, 73,269 persons who served in German institutions, 2,221 convicted persons were identified.

To keep records of people evacuated to the rear of the country, a Central Information Bureau was formed within the structure of the passport department of the Main Police Department, at which an information desk was created to search for children who have lost contact with their parents. Children's information desks were available in every police department of republics, territories, regions and large cities.

During the war, the Central Information Bureau of the Passport Department of the Main Police Department registered about six million evacuated citizens. During the war years, the bureau received about 3.5 million requests asking for the whereabouts of relatives. New addresses of 2 million 86 thousand people were reported, about 20 thousand children were found and returned to their parents.

The work of the police to prevent neglect and homelessness of minors deserves special consideration.

Police officers took an active part in the evacuation of children and children's institutions from areas under the threat of occupation.

For reference: only in the second half of 1941 - the beginning of 1942, 976 orphanages with 167,223 children were removed.

During the war years, the network of children's rooms at the police was significantly expanded. In 1943, there were 745 children's rooms in the country; by the end of the war there were more than a thousand.

In 1942 - 1943 The police, with the help of the public, detained about 300 thousand homeless teenagers, who were employed and given residence.

The fighting of the Great Patriotic War caused a significant increase in crimes related to illegal trafficking in weapons and crimes involving their use. In this regard, law enforcement agencies were tasked with confiscating weapons and ammunition from the population and organizing their collection at battle sites.

The following data can indicate the number of weapons remaining on the battlefields.

From October 1 to October 20, 1943, the Verkhne-Bakansky district department of the NKVD of the Krasnodar Territory collected weapons: machine guns - 3, rifles - 121, PPSh machine guns - 6, cartridges - 50 thousand pieces, mines - 30 boxes, grenades - 6 boxes .

In the conditions of front-line Leningrad, it was also carried out systematic work on the selection and seizure of firearms. In 1944 alone there were

seized and selected: 2 guns, 125 mortars, 831 machine guns, 14,913 rifles and

machine guns, 1,133 revolvers and pistols, 23,021 grenades, 2,178,573 cartridges, 861 shells, 6,194 mines, 1,937 kg of explosives. As of April 1, 1944, 8,357 machine guns, 11,440 machine guns, 257,791 rifles, 56,023 revolvers and pistols, 160,490 grenades were collected and confiscated from the population .

Work on collecting weapons at battle sites was carried out until the 50s, however, it should be noted that it was not possible to completely collect the remaining weapons, and more later years excavation of weapons and their restoration will be one of the sources of illegal arms trafficking in modern conditions.

Attention should be paid to the activities of the internal affairs bodies to combat crime in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, liberated from the enemy, where criminal crime is closely intertwined with the illegal activities of nationalist organizations.

After the liberation of the territories of Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, headquarters to combat banditry were created, headed by the people's commissars of internal affairs of the republics, their deputies, and heads of police departments.

In addition to participating in hostilities, maintaining law and order and fighting crime, employees of internal affairs bodies during the Great Patriotic War took whatever part they could in raising funds for the defense fund. In the second half of 1941 alone, 126 thousand units of warm clothes and 1,273 thousand rubles were collected for gifts to military personnel for the needs of the Red Army.

During the war years, the Moscow police contributed 53,827 thousand rubles in cash and 1,382,940 rubles in government bonds to the defense fund.

Donors donated 15 thousand liters of blood for wounded soldiers.

The capital's police officers worked about 40 thousand man-days on clean-up days and Sundays, and the money they earned was transferred to the defense fund.

Tank columns “Dzerzhinets”, “Kalinin Chekist”, “Rostov Police”, etc. were built at the expense of the country’s police workers.

For their dedicated work during the Great Patriotic War, by decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 5 and November 2, 1944, the Leningrad and Moscow police were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Thus, in military conditions, the work of the police had its own characteristics.

And finally the seventh specific feature The work of the police during the Great Patriotic War consisted of its activities to maintain public order and ensure the safety of citizens, save people and state values ​​during the offensive of the Nazi troops on our cities, territories and regions, as well as during restoration work in those liberated from occupation territories.

2.3 Police activities to protect public order in rear regions

The selfless work of police officers during the Great Patriotic War was their irreplaceable and invaluable contribution to the victory over enemy forces. During the war period, the main directions of activity of the Soviet police were clearly defined: maintaining public order; fight against criminality and enemy agents; participation of police officers in combat operations on the war fronts; participation of the police in organizing the fight behind enemy lines.

One of the main tasks of the police during the war remained maintaining public order and fighting crime. The police personnel of all republics, territories and regions acted in military conditions, well remembering the instructions of V.I. Lenin that “... since it has come to war, then everything must be subordinated to the interests of the war, the entire internal life of the country must be subordinated to the war, not the slightest hesitation on this score is unacceptable.”

In wartime, the state demanded vigilance, discipline and organization from its citizens and severely punished those who did not maintain public order and committed crimes.

Party and Soviet bodies and city defense committees paid the closest attention to the protection of public order and the fight against disruptors. Thus, on June 23, 1941, the bureau of the Rostov City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considered the issue of protecting the socialist order and public safety in Rostov-on-Don. The reports of comrades Gusarov, Riglovsky and Volkov noted that the police and the prosecutor's office, in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated June 22, 1941 “On martial law,” carried out extensive preparatory work to familiarize all operational personnel with the current situation and the need to strengthen the fight against the criminal element, and also carried out the timely deployment of their strength." The speakers also pointed out facts of resistance to the ongoing events on the part of individuals. During the meeting, the bureau of the city committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided:

Oblige the prosecutor's office and police to intensify the fight against persons engaged in anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation, robbery and hooliganism, buying and speculating in food products. Ensure that these cases are promptly investigated and resolved.

Oblige district prosecutors, judicial authorities, police, heads of enterprises and institutions to promptly consider complaints from workers, take special control over complaints from the families of Red Army soldiers and take the most decisive measures against persons who violate socialist legality to the fullest extent of wartime.

Take into account the statement of the Regional Prosecutor's Office and the Regional Police that the prosecutor's office and the police have established round-the-clock duty, and that enhanced operational measures are being taken to establish special posts in all places of mass gathering of citizens and to take under the protection of objects of state power - the city water pipeline, the bread factory, the microbiological institute , anti-plague institute, state bank, regional party archive, buildings of district committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, district executive committees and other particularly important objects. In very difficult conditions, police officers in front-line regions and districts had to maintain public order. The memories of the participants in these events give us the opportunity to present a “living” picture of what was happening.

Veteran of the Rostov police N. Pavlov writes in his memoirs: “During the next Nazi raid, I climbed to the roof of the building. Here and at other posts, people were on duty around the clock, monitoring the air, establishing the direction of movement of enemy aircraft, and areas of destruction. Each such observation post was connected by telephone to the command control post. Below, a serena howled hysterically, warning citizens of danger. Police units on the streets helped townspeople take refuge in bomb shelters.

At the intersection of Budennovsky Prospekt and Engels Street, a lone policeman was regulating the traffic of rare vehicles as if nothing had happened. He didn’t leave his post for a minute.”

And here is a fragment of order No. 915 dated August 31 of the head of the NKVD for the Rostov region: “At 3 hours 25 minutes on August 16, 1941, a fascist plane that broke through to the city of Rostov dropped several high-explosive bombs in the area of ​​​​the Gnilovsky crossing. A policeman from the 9th police department, Comrade D.M. Shepelev, who was on duty near the source of the lesion. he was thrown against the fence by the blast wave and received severe bruises. Despite this, he did not leave his post and, together with the policemen who arrived in time, comrade. Lebedev I.A., Rusakov and Gavrilchenko skillfully and without panic led the population to places of shelter, organized first medical aid and sending the victims to the hospital.”

As we see, police officers served in any conditions and were the last to leave cities that were threatened with capture by the enemy. This was the case throughout the country, and this was also the case in Ukraine: in Lvov and Kyiv, Odessa and Sevastopol, Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk. In his memoirs, Marshal of the USSR G.K. Zhukov mentions Marshal S.M. Budyonny that when he was traveling to Maloyaroslavets through Medyn, he met no one except three policemen, the population and local authorities left the city.

In the first days of hostilities, the police forces of the border regions found themselves in extremely difficult conditions. The cities of the western regions of Ukraine were among the first to receive the Nazis' air attack. By order of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, police personnel were brought into combat readiness and began to carry out the assigned tasks.

To ensure strict order in Lviv, the leadership of the NKVD Directorate of the Lviv Region immediately sent its employees to strengthen the city police departments. Police operational groups eliminated the consequences of the bombings and provided assistance to the victims. The Ukrainian nationalist underground became more active in the city, and criminals began to operate. In some areas, nationalists began shooting from attics and windows, and looters tried to loot stores. However, the operational groups tried their best to stop such actions. The police and internal troops of the NKVD played a decisive role in maintaining order in Lviv.

The Lviv region police personnel, having left Lviv on June 30 along with the troops of the Southwestern Front and already being on the territory of the Vinnitsa and Kirovograd regions, protected public order, carried out operational tasks to combat parachute landings, spies and disorganizers of the rear.

And in July 1941, a regiment was formed from the personnel of the Lvov and Moldavian police, which included three battalions with a strength of 1,127 people. The regiment was commanded by the Deputy Head of the NKVD Directorate of the Lvov Region, Police Major N.I. Rope. The regiment began to protect hydroelectric power stations, radio stations, oil depots, a meat processing plant, a bread factory, an elevator, and bridges over the Bug and Sinyukha rivers. Often, operational groups of regiment soldiers carried out special command tasks in the Odessa and Kirovograd regions.

Literally from the first days of the war, the internal affairs bodies of Belarus had to fight numerous parachute landings independently or together with border guards and Red Army soldiers. So, on June 22, 1941, the personnel of the Volkovysk RO NKVD, headed by the head of the department C.JI. Shishko arrived at the German landing site and boldly entered into battle with him.

On the night of June 25-26, 1941, a large enemy landing force was landed near the village of Sukhaya Gryad in the Smolevichi region. Having learned about this, employees of the Smolevichi Regional Department of the NKVD went to eliminate the saboteurs. As a result of a fierce battle that lasted for several hours, the landing force was destroyed. In battles with fascist paratroopers, district commissioners of the department E.I. died. Bocek, B.C. Savrshkhkiy, assistant to detective A.P. Soot, policemen P.E. Fursevich, N.P. Margun.

Bloody battles with enemy airborne troops also unfolded on the approaches to Mogilev. In one of them, the head of the passport department of the regional police department, Bankovsky, who headed the operational group, and ordinary policeman Stepankov died.

A platoon of cadets from the Minsk police school entered into a fight with 30 enemy paratroopers who landed in the Lupolovo area, where the airfield was located. The cadets acted boldly and confidently. The parachute landing force was destroyed.

It was difficult for Belarusian police officers in the front line to carry out their duties. But even in the most difficult situations, when contact with management was lost, employees carried out important tasks with dignity and made decisions independently. An example of this is the feat of policemen of the Volkovysk regional department of the NKVD P.V. Semenchuk and P.I. Mowed. They saved two million five hundred and eighty-four thousand rubles from the invaders and delivered them to the State Bank of Orel. A similar feat was accomplished by policeman of the Braslav regional department of the NKVD S.I. Mandryk. In June 1941, he saved a large sum of money from the Braslav branch of the State Bank and delivered it first to Polotsk and then to Moscow.

In Mogilev, the police took under protection important objects of the city (regional party committee, regional executive committee, bread factory, bank, etc.). Police officers, together with cadets of the Minsk Police School and employees of the internal affairs bodies of the western regions of Belarus who arrived in Mogilev, performed guard duty at the airfield.

In Minsk, in conditions of severe fires and incessant bombing, soldiers of the 42nd NKVD convoy brigade served alongside the police. They guarded all government institutions, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the NKVD, the post office, and the telegraph office. A fire in the NKVD premises was prevented twice.

A very difficult situation was also developing in the front-line zone of the North Caucasus Front. Party bodies of the autonomous republics of the North Caucasus provided great assistance in organizing extermination battalions and self-defense units. This issue was repeatedly considered at meetings of the regional committee bureaus, where it was decided to create the above formations. By the end of 1941, more than 80 fighter battalions had been created in the autonomous republics of the North Caucasus. The largest of them were the Ordzhonikidzen, Nalchik, Khasavyurt destruction battalions, the Grozny communist and Makhachkala Komsomol battalions. Only on the passes of the Main Caucasus Ridge during August-October 1942 they detained 146 enemy paratroopers.

In the interests of protecting the rear of the armies of the Northern Group, it was allowed to use the internal troops of the NKVD to carry out operations to eliminate small enemy groups and gangs within the front rear zone (approximately 50 km), search for and detain enemy agents, deserters and other hostile elements, and conduct mass raids. For these operations it was involved local population, Komsomol youth detachments, fighter battalions, assistance brigades. As the territory occupied by him was liberated from the enemy, the internal troops of the NKVD were withdrawn from the units protecting the rear of the fronts and will continue to carry out their immediate tasks.

Maintaining public order in military conditions requires courage and great resourcefulness from every police officer.

In the first days of the war, Leningrad found itself at the forefront of the attack by Nazi troops. In this regard, the command of the Leningrad Front and the security officers took a number of measures to filter arriving refugees and detain fascist infiltrators, criminals and deserters. So-called barrage outposts were formed, where police officers and brigade soldiers served around the clock. The outposts were controlled by criminal investigation officers. Control posts were usually located on highways leading into the city and railway lines. These measures were dictated by extreme necessity, as evidenced by the following figures: in nine months, starting from September 8, 1941, operatives detained at posts (not counting criminals) 378 enemy spies and saboteurs who were trying to penetrate the city.”

After fascist aviation carried out the first massive raid on the city on September 8 and dropped over 12 thousand incendiary bombs, a strong fire began. The fire destroyed large food reserves of Leningrad - thousands of tons of flour and sugar. The fire spread to six buildings in which textiles, carpets, furs and other valuables were stored. Bomb Strike according to the calculations of the fascist command, the warehouses should have demoralized the defenders of Leningrad. Moreover, on September 8 they captured Shlisselburg and cut off Leningrad from the mainland. The blockade of Leningrad began.

In a memorandum from the head of the NKVD Directorate of the Leningrad Region, Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Direction to Marshal of the USSR K.E. Voroshilov was told in August 1941 that during the first two months of the war, the Leningrad police identified and arrested many Nazi intelligence agents who sowed panic among the population and distributed special fascist leaflets. So, in July, a certain Koltsov was detained by police officers on Skorokhodov Street. He was seen planting anti-Soviet leaflets. During the search, firearms and a large number of leaflets were found and confiscated from Koltsov. According to the verdict of the military tribunal, Koltsov was shot.

In conditions of war and the siege of Leningrad, the law enforcement structure solved special, very specific tasks, characteristic only of an extremely difficult period. It was then that the tasks of the troops and bodies of the NKVD significantly expanded in protecting the military rear, ensuring the regime of the front-line city, carrying out the eviction of the German and Finnish population from the suburbs of Leningrad, participating in the construction of defensive lines both on the outer contours and inside the city, creating internal defense units (VOG ), anti-landing defense organizations and many others.

Under blockade conditions, the executive and administrative functions of the NKVD bodies expanded significantly. The heads of bodies and divisions of the NKVD had the right to issue decisions and orders binding on residents and administrations. On a wider range of issues, administrative liability was established for violations of executive discipline and law and order.

The role of the legendary destroyer battalions in maintaining public order within blockade ring, in eliminating fires, the consequences of bombing and shelling, and rescuing people.

By July 1, 1941, 37 fighter battalions had been formed in Leningrad, and in 23 of them, command positions were occupied by police officers and other units of the NKVD; in the Leningrad region, 41 and 17, respectively.

These new formations acted on the basis of the well-known decree of June 24, 1941 On the protection of enterprises and institutions and the creation

fighter battalions and temporary instructions. The extermination battalions were headed by responsible officials of the NKVD, who were able, on the basis of regulations, to resolve issues not only of operational combat activities, but also logistical issues related to weapons, transport, food, etc.

The activities of the NKVD bodies received full support from all segments of the population of Leningrad, local governments and military authorities. Leningraders understood very well the extreme importance of strict implementation of legal acts, including decrees and orders of the headquarters of the troops for the protection of the rear of the front and the NKVD on access control, compliance with the passport regime and all wartime laws.

Leningrad police officers had to serve in extremely difficult and difficult conditions. In December 1941, the head of the police department E.S. Grushko, in a memo addressed to the chairman of the executive committee of the Leningrad City Council, reported that the rank and file worked 14-15 hours. Every day, 60-65 people were out of action in the traffic control unit, 20-25 people in river police units, and 8-10 people in most police departments. And the reason for this was hunger and disease. In January 1942, 166 police officers died of starvation, and more than 1,600 were near death. And in February 1942, 212 police officers died.

Air raids and artillery shelling killed 16,467 Leningraders and injured 33,782 people. “At least 800 thousand Leningraders died from hunger and deprivation - this is the result of the enemy blockade.

The Stalingrad police also had many new responsibilities in those harsh years. Its employees directly helped evacuate many tens of thousands of people - especially women, the elderly, children, and the wounded. The evacuation continued even when Stalingrad was already on fire. The fighting was already taking place on the outskirts, and at the intersections of city streets, on the orders of the head of the regional police department and at the same time the deputy head of the NKVD department for the Stalingrad region N.V. Biryukov's traffic controllers served until the last moment. Remembering this, Biryukov wrote: Cars passed less and less often, fewer and fewer people remained in the city, but everyone, looking at the policeman, still calmly standing with two flags at his post, felt that the city was alive.”

When in the first months of the war a stream of evacuees from the western regions of the country poured into Stalingrad, an enormous burden fell on the employees of the passport offices, external service, operational departments and other services of the Stalingrad police. The railway police worked harmoniously and efficiently. They ensured public order, stopped looting, confiscated weapons found among evacuees, identified enemy agents, and fought criminal cases. Already in the fall of 1941, a curfew was introduced, prohibiting all movement in the city from 11 pm to 6 am.

In June 1941, by decision of the regional Council, the headquarters of the MPVO was organized. District and city headquarters of the MPVO also began to form. A significant role in the implementation of this decision was assigned to police and fire department employees. They ensured that all house administrations and households in Stalingrad had shelter holes, provided instructions and trained self-defense units and groups. Local MPVO formations were trained in the rules of using fire extinguishing means, eliminating fires, extinguishing incendiary bombs, etc. Close attention was paid to increasing fire safety industrial, primarily defense enterprises, cultural and community premises, children's institutions, residential buildings, inspection of shelters. The basements of stone houses were equipped as bomb shelters, shelters were prepared in the squares and streets of the city, in populated areas and in the courtyards of households. In total, almost 220 thousand residents of Stalingrad could take refuge in basement-type shelters and crevices.

It took police officers a lot of effort to establish a strict passport regime in Stalingrad. It was necessary to cleanse the city of the criminal element and persons who sought to remain in it at any cost. Registration in the city was strictly prohibited, and police officers practiced surprise checks of households, hostels, shelters, train stations, and markets. Personnel of the regional administration, city police departments, and employees of other NKVD services took an active part in them. Thus, in just one of the night raids in the Dzerzhinsky district of Stalingrad, 58 passport regime violators were detained and taken to the 3rd police department.

The regional department of the Stalingrad police took effective measures to suppress profiteering, looting, desertion, and daily strengthened the protection of public order. Experienced employees of the regional department had to regularly travel to rural police departments to provide assistance. At meetings of the leadership of the UM, the results of the work of each police agency for 1941 were discussed in detail. This is clearly evidenced by the surviving minutes of the meetings. All this suggests that constant control was established over the work of the police.

The patrol service was also well organized in Stalingrad. In deployments, in addition to their main duties, police officers had to monitor compliance with blackout rules, and each guard was assigned a certain area of ​​houses. On November 25, 1941, by order of the head of the NKVD, the deployment of patrol routes and posts in the city center, developed by the service and combat training department, was approved. According to this order, up to 50 posts were posted daily from among management employees. They entered service at 21:00, and were briefed in the management meeting room. If an air raid alert was announced, they had to remain in place, stop moving and maintain order.

External service workers were always dressed strictly in uniform. As participants in the defense of Stalingrad testify, the uniform of the police officers had psychological action on the population - calmed people down. Citizens felt that they were protected.

The front was quickly approaching the borders of the region. Former inspector of the Nizhnechirsk branch of the NKVD M.N. Senshin recalled: “In the summer of 1942, the entire personnel of our NKVD department was in barracks. Due to the approaching front, we could be alerted at any time of the day.”

Often, police officers had to organize the evacuation of one or another collective or state farm. In this case, the police remained on the farm until everything valuable was removed. And what could not be sent was to be destroyed on the spot. The police officers coped with these types of tasks properly. For example, in the description of the district commissioner of the Krasnoarmeisky RO NKVD (now Svetloyarsk district) S.E. Afanasyev, compiled at that time, noted: “Comrade. Afanasyev, being a fighter of the destruction battalion, when the front line approached, was in the Tsatsa mudslide, evacuated collective farm livestock and property, left the village of Tsatsa on the day the village was occupied by the Germans... 300 heads of cattle and 600 heads of sheep were snatched from the enemy.”

In the summer of 1942, Stalingrad police officers had to selflessly fight the consequences of fascist air raids on the city. While Hitler's troops They tried in every possible way to break through to the Volga. During the month of August alone, enemy aircraft carried out 16 massive raids on Stalingrad. As a result, the water supply system failed and the city was left without water, which created favorable conditions for the spread of fires. During these difficult days, police officers saved the lives and property of citizens. Police department officer M.S. Kharlamov saved 29 families and their property from burning houses. And even when he learned about the death of his family, he did not leave his combat post.

As we see, the front continued in the rear. And not only in your neighbor. For each policeman, the front line passed through the streets, squares and squares of their native cities and towns.

In November 1941, during the battles near Rostov-on-Don, three fascist saboteurs made their way onto the central street of the city, where policeman N. Gusev was standing at his post, and attacked a guard. Mortally wounded N. Gusev managed to shoot two and wound a third. The policeman died, but fulfilled his duty to the end.

During one of the German air raids on the capital, police sergeant N. Vodyashkin managed to notice that someone was giving light signals to the planes in the area of ​​the Kievsky railway station. As a result of the skillful actions of the police sergeant, the saboteur was detained.

During wartime, BHSS employees closely monitored that trade facilities, warehouses, and bases destroyed by bombing were not plundered. They were responsible for ensuring that the remaining property and valuables were fully accounted for, capitalized and handed over for their intended purpose; prevented the destruction and seizure of monetary documents by criminals; controlled the correct write-off of destroyed, damaged and unusable property according to acts. Only in 1942, the department for combating the theft of socialist property in Leningrad, headed at that time by M.E. Orlov, confiscated 75 million rubles worth of valuables from the thieves and turned them over to the state. Including: 16,845 rubles in royal minted gold, 34 kilograms of gold bullion, 1,124 kilograms of silver and 710 gold watches.

And in 1944, Leningrad police officers seized 6,561,238 rubles, 3,933 dollars, 15,232 rubles in royal gold coins, 254 gold watches and 15 kilograms of gold from criminals. During the same period, property and valuables worth 20,710,000 rubles were found and returned to the injured citizens.

In 1942, workers of the BHSS of the Saratov region confiscated from thieves, speculators and currency traders and deposited into the state treasury: cash - 2,078,760 rubles, gold in products - 4.8 kg, gold coins of tsarist minting - 2,185 rubles, foreign currency - 360 dollars, diamonds - 35 carats, silver in products - 6.5 kg. In 1943, BHSS employees seized over 81 million rubles from criminals.

Strict compliance with the permitting system was important in the administrative activities of the police during the war period. Under her control were: explosives, firearms, printing equipment, stamps, duplicating machines. The police licensing system extended its effect to the opening of such enterprises as shops selling rifled firearms and bladed weapons, weapons repair and pyrotechnic workshops, shooting ranges, stamping and engraving workshops, etc.

Under military conditions, the police also began to monitor the sanitary and hygienic situation. The sanitary service could not cover the entire evacuated population and the huge wave of refugees, as a result of which epidemic diseases spread in some cities and regions. In such a very difficult situation, party and Soviet authorities began to take urgent measures to eliminate epidemic diseases. So in Georgia, units of the republican police, together with health authorities, actively participated in the construction of hygiene houses in Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Batumi, Sukhumi, Akhaltsikhe, Poti and in organizing their round-the-clock and unhindered work. Special disinfection chambers were created at the Tbilisi and Navtlug stations, equipped with the necessary equipment and chemicals. Police personnel, together with the sanitary inspection, controlled preventive and sanitary work in schools, theaters, children's institutions, public catering facilities, dormitories, on the streets and in courtyards, and especially in cities and towns where many evacuees settled. The authorized commissions created to fight against epidemic diseases were assigned to senior officials of local police agencies. They were given the right, in cases of need, to use coercive methods and to bring to justice those responsible for violations of sanitary rules.

The police, protecting public order, constantly relied on the help of workers. From among them, police assistance brigades were formed. In 1943, their ranks numbered 118 thousand people. Since 1941, public order groups were created in villages. By 1943, they included about 1 million people. Each such group acted under the leadership of a local police commissioner. For 1941 - 1943 members of the groups detained about 200 thousand enemy and criminal elements, seized several tens of thousands of guns from the population.

From the first days of the war, the internal affairs bodies were faced with the task of ensuring reliable protection of the rear, suppressing the machinations of enemy saboteurs, disruptors, alarmists, maintaining public order, and decisively combating crime. This task was carried out jointly by state security officers, police, firefighters, troops to protect the rear of the active army, and fighter battalions.

From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, the functions of district commissioners were supplemented with responsibilities for observing the rules of blackout and local air defense, for managing the shelter of the population in bomb shelters, participating in extinguishing fires, clearing rubble, protecting valuables, and evacuating children to the rear.

During the war, the tasks of the NKVD troops, who guarded important industrial and government facilities, as well as railway structures. In 1942-1943. under the protection of the NKVD troops, 15,116,631 wagons were en route (about 70% of all transported cargo), which made it possible to reduce the number of cargo thefts by at least a third railways. According to the list approved in March 1942 by the NKVD and NKPS (roads and communications), NKVD troops, in addition to military cargo, were supposed to guard trains with bread, meat, non-ferrous metals, cars, tractors, textiles and leather goods, shoes, ready-made clothes and linen . The NKVD troops were also entrusted with guarding letter trains.

Taking into account the war, all services and units of the Moscow police restructured their work. For example, external services took an active part in eliminating the consequences of enemy air raids. As a result of strengthening the passport regime, it was possible to take effective measures against deserters, saboteurs, criminals and provocateurs. The provision of the criminal investigation department with special forensic equipment and communications equipment has significantly improved, and a scientific and technical department has been created.

Units to combat the theft of socialist property paid close attention to the use of products and the protection of the property of enterprises and citizens.

The fundamental document regulating the activities of internal affairs bodies during the war was the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the USSR dated June 24, 1941 "On the protection of enterprises and institutions and the creation of destruction battalions" in accordance with which the security regime for objects in areas located on martial law, fighter battalions were created to fight enemy saboteurs.

Based on the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On Martial Law” dated June 22, 1941, the commander of the Moscow Military District and the head of the NKVD Directorate of Moscow and the Moscow Region issued an order on the procedure for removing from the capital and region persons recognized as socially dangerous due to their criminal activities, and in connection with the criminal environment. Relevant materials on such persons were prepared by the police within three days and submitted for approval to the military prosecutor and the head of the NKVD department. The Moscow police successfully coped with this task.

Maintaining public order in Moscow from the first days of the war was carried out by joint patrols of the military commandant and the city police. The organization of this work was based on the Instruction on patrolling the streets of Moscow in wartime, approved by the military commandant on July 6, 1941. According to this instruction, patrolling in the city was carried out around the clock. In addition, on the roads leading to the capital, from August 19, 1941, outposts of police officers and internal troops were set up.

An important role in strengthening public order in the fight against crime during the war years was played by the services of the State Automobile Inspectorate and traffic control units (ORUD). During the war, especially in the initial period, the State Automobile Inspectorate of the City Police Department did a lot of work to mobilize road transport for the needs of the front.

A significant contribution to the protection of public order and the identification of enemy and criminal elements was made by employees of the passport offices of city police departments. From the first days of the war, the Soviet state instructed the NKVD and the police to take decisive measures to strengthen the passport regime in the country, strict compliance by officials and citizens with the rules of registration and issuance of documents.

It should be noted that these issues were the focus of attention of the management of the department, district departments and police departments. During the war years, control over the work of house management and dormitory commandants intensified, residents without registration or without documents were identified, special positions of inspectors and experts were introduced to identify fake passports, documents were checked from citizens and military personnel on trains, at stations, and in other public places. This made it possible to expose saboteurs, criminals, as well as persons evading service in the Red Army.

In strengthening the passport regime in the country important had re-registration of passports of citizens living in secure areas, restricted areas and the border strip of the USSR. A control sheet indicating the surname, name, and patronymic of the passport holder was pasted into the documents of residents of these areas. The control sheet was sealed with the official seal of the police authority. For example, in 1942, more than one and a half million passports were re-registered in Moscow. Thanks to the high vigilance of workers at passport and military registration offices, enemy agents were also identified.

The operational situation in Moscow continued to remain tense throughout the war period. The entire team of the Moscow city police, primarily the criminal investigation department, which was first led by K. Rudin and then by A. Urusov, actively fought crime. Highly qualified specialists, real masters of detective work, worked in the criminal investigation department: G. Tylner, K. Grebnev, N. Shesterikov, A. Efimov, I. Lyandres, I. Kirillovich, S. Degtyarev, L. Rasskazov, V. Derkovsky, K. Medvedev, I. Kotov and others.

The police paid much attention to preventing the theft of state and personal property of citizens at enterprises and in the residential sector. Thus, to prevent theft at enterprises and institutions, it was installed strict order employees hand over outerwear to special wardrobes, access to places where material assets are stored is limited, and the storage facilities themselves are equipped with alarms. It was strictly forbidden for cashiers to transport money without being accompanied by armed guards. The admission of employees to institutions in non-working hours. Measures for selecting employees to protect enterprises and institutions were tightened.

In the Moscow Criminal Investigation Department for emergency travel to incident sites and taking timely measures to uncover the most dangerous crimes a duty unit was created. Her task force was subordinate to the duty officer at the city police department. Despite the complexity of the operational situation in Moscow, the proximity of the front, frequent enemy air raids on the city and bombings, police officers achieved a reduction in crime in the city.

At the end of October 1941, during the most intense days of fighting on the outskirts of Moscow, the entire city police were consolidated into combat units and formed a police division intended for combat operations on the near approaches to the city in five defense sectors, which were headed by generals and officers of military academies who were in Moscow.

Thus, the difficult situation of the war urgently required the protection of public order in the country. Strict adherence to the rule of law is one of the universal human values, which arose simultaneously with legislation as a requirement for state political authorities to comply with the laws adopted by it, was also during the war period an unshakable principle of the activities of all bodies, institutions, organizations in the field of public order, including the police, guarding the laws. In the days of the most difficult trials for the entire country, police officers, without sparing their lives, defended the legal rights of workers and ensured their personal safety.

CONCLUSION

Summing up, we can state the achievement of goals and objectives diploma research and draw the following conclusions.

The legal basis for the organization and activities of internal affairs bodies was determined exclusively by legislative and other legal acts of the USSR. The transformations that took place in the NKVD system of the USSR in 1934-1940 indicated a significant expansion of the department’s scope of activity, primarily due to functions not related to the implementation of tasks of maintaining public order and ensuring state security. This was dictated primarily by economic necessity, since in the conditions of accelerated modernization of the national economy, the country's leadership was forced to make extensive use of administrative resources. In addition, in connection with the outbreak of war, structural changes in the NKVD were due to preparations for carrying out the tasks assigned to it in wartime conditions. As a result of the constant expansion of the functions of the department and the creation of new organizational structures, the number of the central apparatus of the NKVD grew. As of January 1, 1940, it increased almost four times compared to 1934.

The complex political and socio-economic processes that began with the 1917 revolution changed significantly by the end of the 1930s. social image of the USSR. Soviet society consisted mainly of workers, peasants and office workers. In the pre-war period, a contradictory and multifaceted socio-political situation developed in the USSR. The nature of the relationship between society and government was determined by multi-vector trends. The state simultaneously had to solve the extremely difficult problems of accelerated and large-scale industrialization; forced collectivization and mechanization of agriculture; cultural revolution, which implied qualitative changes in the social sphere. The systemic modernization of the country and fundamental changes in its economy have significantly affected the quality and direction of social processes and the spiritual life of society.

During the war, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR was one of the central links in the system of state leadership and management. Despite the significant scale of economic work of the NKVD during the war, the main areas of its activity continued to be law enforcement and administrative. Fulfilling tasks to protect public order, including in transport, and combat nationalism and banditry made it possible to maintain a stable situation in the Soviet rear and prevent mass anti-Soviet protests in the country.

The contribution of the police, organs and troops of the NKVD as a whole to the victory over the fascist invaders during the Great Patriotic War is enormous. This is clearly demonstrated by statistical data.

During the war, 53 divisions and 20 brigades of the NKVD troops took part in battles, not counting many other independent units, as well as border troops. During the same period, the NKVD of the USSR formed 29 divisions for the active army or transferred from its composition to the NKVD of the USSR. In total, 82 divisions from the NKVD took part in battles both temporarily and permanently. From the bodies of the NKVD of the USSR, by January 13, 1945, 215,337 people were transferred to the Red Army, the losses of the NKVD troops of the USSR in the war amounted to 61,400 people for the border troops, for all other NKVD troops (internal troops - 97,700 people).

For 1941 - 1944 Internal affairs bodies, state security and internal troops on the territory of our country liquidated 7,161 bandit groups, in which there were 89,008 bandits.

The losses of personnel of internal troops and NKVD troops in the Great Patriotic War amounted to 159 thousand people.

Head of the Leningrad Police Department E.S. Grushko, in a memo addressed to the chairman of the executive committee of the Leningrad City Council dated December 22, 1941, reported that in December 1941, the rank and file worked for 14-16 hours, and the command and operational staff worked for 18 hours. Every day, 60-65 people were out of action in the RUD detachment, 20-25 people in river police detachments, and 8-10 people in most police departments. Most of them died of hunger.

In war conditions, the work of the police had its own peculiarities.

The first distinctive feature was that police officers had to re-establish relations with the public, again create police assistance teams from among persons not subject to mobilization, primarily women and elderly men. In connection with this, police officers needed to go on business trips quite often.

The second feature was that the police had to fight new types of crimes that had been encountered almost or not at all before the war.

Third important feature- daily operational work with evacuees, who also include criminals, former prisoners, speculators and other suspicious people.

During the war, police services constantly had to contact state security agencies. It was necessary to use all possibilities to combat spies, saboteurs and German spies sent to the rear of the Red Army. This was the fourth distinctive feature of the work of the police in wartime.

The fifth feature was due to the fact that during the war, juvenile delinquency increased, homelessness and neglect among children and adolescents increased. It was the job of the entire police

The sixth feature is the relative availability of weapons during the war. At this time, the police were still responsible for fighting crime in general. But this struggle was complicated by the fact that armed attacks on citizens and protected objects became especially common, since the acquisition of weapons in military conditions was not particularly difficult for criminals.

And finally, the seventh specific feature of the work of the police during the Great Patriotic War was its activity in maintaining public order and ensuring the safety of citizens, saving people and state values ​​during the offensive of Nazi troops on our cities, territories and regions, as well as the time of restoration work in the territories liberated from occupation.

The difficult situation of the war urgently required the protection of public order in the country. Strict adherence to the rule of law - one of the universal human values ​​that arose simultaneously with legislation as a requirement for state political authorities to comply with the laws adopted by it, was also during the war period an unshakable principle of the activities of all bodies, institutions, organizations in the field of public order, including bodies police guarding the laws. In the days of the most difficult trials for the entire country, police officers, without sparing their lives, defended the legal rights of workers and ensured their personal safety.

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The main job of fighting crime during the war years lay with the police, which was part of the NKVD structure. At the same time, law enforcement officers had to act in difficult conditions. Many experienced workers were sent to the front, and young, untested personnel took their place. There was also a shortage of vehicles, and work in the rear was complicated by the influx of refugees and evacuees.

At the same time, criminal elements, taking advantage of the confusion, and in some cases panic, the shortage of almost all goods, began to act boldly, sometimes downright brazenly, carrying out reckless raids on shops, apartments of citizens, cars and ordinary passers-by. Fortunately, during the war, blackout was introduced, and the streets were plunged into darkness from evening to early morning. Numerous vacant lots, labyrinths of narrow private streets, gardens and parks made it easy and quick to hide from the police. When detained, the bandits often put up fierce resistance, using weapons.

During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet cities were subjected to systematic raids by German aircraft, and residential areas of the city were often the targets of the bombings. Sometimes air raid alerts were announced five or six times a day or more. This led to a significant part of the population leaving their homes and staying in shelters for a long time. The property was left unattended. Some houses were simply empty. Destruction and fires also contributed to the emergence of chaos in the cities for some time, under the cover of which it was possible to make a good profit. In addition, the majority of citizens worked 10-12 hours, again leaving their homes and apartments for a long time. It is no coincidence that the most common crimes were thefts from apartments whose owners either died during the bombing or temporarily left them due to an air raid raid. There were looters who did not disdain the belongings of the dead.

In the first half of 1942, crimes such as murders and attempted murders with the aim of obtaining ration cards and food products became widespread. They stole mainly from the apartments of citizens evacuated and conscripted into the Red Army.
Due to shortages, any product could be sold on the market. Police officers systematically checked the housing stock and various places where criminal elements were concentrated, identifying and detaining criminals and suspicious persons. In markets where thieves traditionally gathered and stolen goods were sold, the police carried out mass document checks and raids, followed by verification of all suspicious persons. Persons without certain occupations were arrested and expelled from cities. Due to the increase in pickpocketing, the police formed special task forces that, in plain clothes, patrolled markets, trams and tram stops, especially during rush hours.

Here is one of the cases of police work in Murmansk. “So, on November 29, 1944, senior detective Lieutenant Turkin, while going around the city market, on suspicion of selling stolen goods, detained a citizen in military uniform who identified himself as A.S. Bogdanov. While going to the regional NKVD department, he suddenly grabbed a revolver from his pocket.” and tried to shoot at the policeman. However, Turkin managed to disarm Bogdanov and took him to the department. Subsequently, it turned out that the day before the detainee had committed a theft and brought the stolen items to sell at the market." (Zefirov M.V., Degtev D.M. “Everything for the front? How victory was actually forged”, “AST Moscow”, 2009, p. 358).

However, swindlers operated not only in apartments; they often committed thefts from commercial premises, mainly from shops. Difficulties with food, the card system gave rise to new types of crimes, such as theft and sale of food cards at speculative prices, theft of food from warehouses, shops and canteens, sale and purchase of gold, jewelry, and contraband goods. The main contingent of those arrested under articles of “speculation” and “theft of social property” were employees of trade and supply organizations, shops, warehouses, bases and canteens. Employees of the Department for Combating the Theft of Social Property (OBKhSS) carried out surprise inspections of trade organizations and canteens, controlled the work of the guard service, monitored order at large enterprises, ensured the safety and strict distribution of food and manufactured goods cards, tracked down and detained speculators red-handed.

The fact is that, unlike ordinary theft, for which one could get off with a suspended sentence, the theft of social property (in fact, state property) according to the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of August 7, 1932, was punishable by imprisonment for up to ten years with confiscation. Among the thieves, this decree was called “Decree 7-8.”

“It must be said that the criminal front expanded from year to year. In the country as a whole, the crime rate in 1942 increased by 22% compared to 1941, in 1943 the increase was 21% compared to the previous year, and in 1944 respectively - 8.6%. And only in 1945 there was a slight decrease in the crime rate, when in the first half of the year the number of crimes decreased by 10%. At the same time, serious crimes showed the largest increase. If in the second half of 1941 in the USSR ( only in unoccupied territory) 3,317 murders were registered, then in 1944 - already 8,369, and the number of assaults and robberies increased respectively from 7,499 to 20,124. But the most impressive is the increase in thefts from 252,588 to 444,906 and cattle theft - from 8,714 to 36,285. And let us remind you that we are talking only about crimes registered by the police." (Ibid p. 359)

The situation in the fight against crime was aggravated by a change for the worse in the qualitative composition of the law enforcement agencies themselves. By 1943, many police agencies had significantly updated personnel. Old, experienced employees went to the front, and in their place came inexperienced and insufficiently trained people. At the same time, gangster groups, as a rule, were significantly replenished with criminals hiding from law enforcement agencies, deserters, and draft dodgers. In addition, the crime situation, for example, in a number of eastern regions of the country was complicated by the movement of huge flows of people through them from the western regions to Kazakhstan, the Urals and Siberia, and the placement of a large number of evacuees. For example, during the war years in the Saratov region, a quarter of the total population was non-indigenous.

In August 1942, the scope of banditry in Saratov assumed enormous proportions. “In the fight against crime, criminal investigation units, OBKhSS, passport services, local police officers and units of internal troops of the NKVD closely interacted. During the year, Saratov police officers confiscated from criminals a total of two million rubles, 2,100 rubles in gold coins of royal mintage, 360 US dollars, 4.8 kg of items made of precious metals and 6.5 kg of silver." (Ibid p. 360).

Then, in 1943, during Operation Tango, law enforcement agencies neutralized the Lugovsky-Bizyaev bandit group, consisting of twelve people. She, like the Moscow “Black Cat” from the famous film, terrorized the population of the regional center for a long time, creating an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty among citizens. Almost every day in various parts of Saratov, bandits committed murders and daring armed raids on the cash offices of government institutions, shops and warehouses. At the end of the same 1943, in the Penza region, police liquidated the Zhilin bandit group. It consisted of 19 people and carried out 18 armed raids.

In a military situation in cities with the most unfavorable crime situation, the police took special organizational, tactical and operational measures to combat crime. For example, walking on the streets and traffic from 24.00 to 05.00 were prohibited. For violation of trade rules, speculation, purchase of manufactured goods and products in order to create reserves, as well as hooliganism, embezzlement, theft, spreading panic and provocative rumors, disruption of communications, air defense rules, fire protection and evasion of defense tasks, the perpetrators were held accountable as a grave crime.

In January 1942, the plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR, by its resolution, established that thefts from evacuees must be classified as committed during natural disasters, and if they were committed under additional aggravating circumstances: by a group of people, a repeat offender, etc. - then as banditry.

“The NKVD authorities seized from St. Petersburg speculators and thieves 9.5 million rubles in cash, 41,215 rubles in gold coins and 2.5 million rubles in government bonds, as well as almost 70 kg of gold, half a ton of silver, 1,537 diamonds, 1,295 gold watches, 36 km manufactures and 483 tons of food!These figures alone indicate that the standard of living in besieged Leningrad varied greatly among different people.
The bandits were found to have a large arsenal of weapons with which they could arm half a division: 1,113 rifles, 820 hand grenades, 631 revolvers and pistols, ten machine guns and three machine guns, as well as almost 70 thousand rounds of ammunition. As for the social composition of the convicts, the majority of them were workers - 10 thousand people. Second place was occupied by persons without certain occupations - 8684 people." (Ibid. p. 380).

During the Great Patriotic War, banditry spread widely in remote areas of the USSR, including Siberia. A typical example is the criminal activity of the so-called Pavlov gang in the Tommot district of the Aldan district of the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. This “brigade” got its name from the name of the organizer Yegor Nikolaevich Pavlov, a 50-year-old Evenk. Before the war, this citizen was a member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and served as chairman of a collective farm. But the war changed destinies and turned the lives of many people upside down - some for the better, and some for the worse. It all started with the fact that in August 1942, from the collective farm headed by Pavlov. The "18th Party Conference" began a mass exodus of collective farmers. Almost simultaneously, eight commercial hunters left it, who then went into the taiga with their families; they were joined by three more individual farmers. However, the “Pavlovians” were not going to just sit out in the thicket of the forest.

Having put together a gang, partly based on family ties, they began “combat operations” on November 22, 1942. On this day, bandits attacked the camp of a reindeer herder at the Khatyrkhai mine. Their trophies were twenty deer that belonged to the mine. The next day, the “squad” made a much more daring foray. The Krutoy precinct was attacked, where bandits carried out a door-to-door search and massively confiscated weapons from the population. Along the way, they robbed a local store and took “prisoners” - workers of mining teams. In the center of the Khatyrkhai mine, “Pavlovites” attacked an office with the aim of robbing gold and money. However, a small armed detachment led by the head of the mine and the party organizer organized a defense.

The firefight lasted until late at night. The bandits, probably remembering school stories about the Middle Ages, tried to set fire to the building several times, but they failed. At 21.00, already in the dark, they broke into a food warehouse. Having loaded 15 sleds with goods, the bandits sent the loot into the taiga to the location of their camp. Before leaving, they set fire to the radio station, and shot an unarmed woman, a doctor at the local mine hospital Kamenskaya, who ran out from there. Thus began the robbery of the mines and the terror of civilians by Pavlov’s gang. Subsequently, attacks on the mines followed one after another. From just one mine, Khatyrkhay, “Pavlov’s brigade took out seven tons of flour, various industrial goods worth 10,310 rubles in gold terms, stole twenty deer, simultaneously robbing the entire civilian population.” (Ibid p. 363). Only in February 1943, with significant losses of personnel, NKVD officers were able to neutralize the gang.

In addition to Pavlov's gang, in 1941-1945. in Yakutsk itself, as well as Allah-Yunsky, Tommotsky, Aldansky and other regions of the republic, it was possible to eliminate a number of other gangs: the Korkin gang, the Shumilov gang, etc.

Often deserters who escaped from front-line units ended up in gangs. Some of them, “returning” from the front, successfully found work and even started “business”. It must be said that it was the village that became the main shelter for soldiers fleeing the army. Here the people lived more simply than in the city; the documents of those “returning from the front” were not checked, and fellow villagers believed that they were “released” for health reasons. Exposure most often occurred only after a written message from the commanders of military units about the desertion of a serviceman. However, if a person managed to get lost in the turmoil of the battle and only then escape, there was a chance to end up in the “missing in action” column. In this case, the likelihood of being caught became even less. Here it was important to have time to warn relatives before they received the relevant notice. However, these papers, as a rule, arrived very late or did not arrive at all. Sometimes a deserter had a chance that his military unit, say, would be surrounded and die, and the documents would be burned or fall to the enemy. Then no one would have known about the soldier’s escape.

The work of searching for deserters and recruiting recruits fell on the shoulders of the regional military registration and enlistment offices. The largest number of deserters from the front was in 1941. But in 1942, the authorities, apparently sighing after the end of the battle for Moscow, became seriously “concerned” with the fate of thousands of soldiers who had escaped from the army. But not every deserter caught was met with severe punishment. The death penalty was applied against them in approximately 8-10% of cases. And “deviators”, that is, those who did not appear at the military registration and enlistment office on a summons or otherwise avoided being drafted into the army, had even less chance of standing up to the wall. The majority had a second chance to serve their Motherland, but in a penal company. People were sentenced to capital punishment only for repeated desertion and desertion associated with robberies and other serious crimes. Due to the large number of deserters, investigative authorities did not have enough time to thoroughly investigate each case. Cases, as a rule, were conducted superficially; data on desertion were entered into the protocol from the words of the accused without any verification. Details of the escape from the front, the location of the weapons and accomplices were not always revealed.

“However, even in large cities, despite the seemingly strict military regulations, deserters managed not only to hide, but to live right at home. Thus, a certain Shatkov escaped from the front on November 28, 1941 and arrived in his native Gorky, where lived with his family without any registration.The “pacifist” was detained only on January 11, 1942, again after receiving a message from the unit commander.
In just 1942, 4,207 deserters were caught and convicted in the Gorky region, while many others managed to escape punishment. In the post-war years, residents recalled entire forested areas literally overrun by army fugitives and draft dodgers. However, this region was far surpassed by its neighbors in the Volga region. In the Saratov region, 5,700 deserters were caught over the same period. And the record was set by the Stalingrad region - six thousand deserters in 1944. However, this was largely due to the military operations that took place here... In July - September 1944, on the orders of Beria, the NKVD, NKGB, prosecutor's office, as well as Smersh carried out a large-scale operation to identify deserters and evaders. As a result, a total of 87,923 deserters and another 82,834 draft dodgers were arrested throughout the country... Of those detained, 104,343 people were transferred to the district military registration and enlistment offices and joined the ranks of the Red Army before the final stage of the Second World War." (Ibid. p. 376 -377).

“During the entire period of the Great Patriotic War, according to various estimates, 1.7-2.5 million people fled from the ranks of the Red Army, including defectors to the enemy! At the same time, only 376.3 thousand people were convicted under the article “desertion”, and 212.4 thousand of the deserters put on the wanted list could not be found and punished.” (Ibid. p. 378).
At the same time, the Soviet government probably naively believed that yesterday’s thieves and swindlers would really be determined to defend their Motherland. The Stalinist repressive system, which was so ruthless towards mothers with many children, peasants and ordinary workers, showed unprecedented humanism and compassion for those who really deserved severe punishment. Thanks to Article 28 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, some criminals received a total of 50-60 years in prison and were again released. Here is one of many examples. On December 31, 1942, thief G.V. Kiselev, already convicted six times. was released from prison and sent to a military unit, from where he very quickly deserted. On August 30, 1943, he was arrested again, sentenced to another ten years and again sent to “atone for guilt” in the Red Army. And again Kiselev fled from there and continued to engage in robberies and thefts. On October 10 of the same 1943, the inveterate criminal, who was never filled with patriotism, was arrested once again, but everything happened again.

Thefts also occurred in the army. Therefore, on March 3, 1942, the State Defense Committee of the USSR adopted secret resolution No. 1379ss “On the protection of military property of the Red Army in wartime.” According to it, for the theft of weapons, food, uniforms, equipment, fuel, etc., as well as for deliberate damage to it, the highest penalty was established - execution with confiscation of all property of the criminal. Wasting military property was punishable by at least five years in prison.

During the war years, the police did a lot of work to combat banditry and other types of crime. However, they also had serious problems. The shortage of personnel often forced the hiring of poorly educated and uncultured people without checking what they had done in the past. Therefore, crime and violation of the law occurred among law enforcement officers. “On June 4, 1943, the head of the Vad district department (Gorky region) of the NKVD Karpov organized a collective drinking party right at work, in which, at his invitation, the department secretary Lapin and the district commissioner Patin, who was on duty that day, took part. The latter was drunk in vain. The case "The fact is that while the police were raising toasts to the Victory and to Stalin, those sitting in the pre-trial detention cell made a dig and escaped. In total, seven people escaped from the clutches of the police. This outrageous incident became known even in the Gorky Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)."